Halakhah su Levitico 7:35

There are, however, latter-day authorities who disagree with the principle formulated by Birkei Yosef. The Gemara, Niddah 61b, declares, "Commandments will be abrogated in the eschatological era," i.e., subsequent to the resurrection of the dead. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, Kovez Shi'urim, II, no. 29, formulates two possible analyses of that dictum: (1) The underlying principle may be that fulfillment of mizvot is contingent upon a specific time-period or historical epoch. Just as ritual obligations were not incumbent in the pre-Sinaitic era so, also, those obligations will lapse in the post-resurrection era. (2) Alternatively, the principle enunciated in Niddah 61b may simply be that the resurrected dead are not required to perform mizvot. The principle that "the dead are free" of all obligations, derived from Psalms 88:6, entails irrevocable abrogation of all further responsibility for fulfillment of commandments. Hence, the dead are relieved of all ritual obligations even subsequent to their resurrection. According to the latter analysis, release from such obligations is not limited to any particular epoch. Accordingly, the principle would apply even in contemporary times in the unlikely event that a particular corpse would miraculously be restored to life prior to the general resurrection. Whether or not the dead who were restored to life by the prophet Ezekiel were required to observe the commandments is contingent upon which of these two analyses is accepted. Similarly, according to the authorities who maintain that the righteous will be restored to life during the messianic era, the question of their obligation vis-à-vis fulfillment of mizvot in the interim period between their resurrection and the advent of the world-to-come is contingent upon which of these two analyses is regarded as correct. R. Elchanan Wasserman asserts that mizvot are eternally valid and binding, at least in theory, even in the period of the world-to-come. He advances arguments demonstrating that the second analysis is correct and that, in reality, there will be no obligation with regard to fulfillment of commandments in the world-to-come only because death, in and of itself, irrevocably terminates the obligation to perform mizvot.¹³See also Rambam, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, shoresh 3; cf., however, Sifra, Parashat Ẓav (Leviticus 7:35), sec. 158. Accordingly, termination of such obligation is not rescinded by subsequent restoration to life. This position entails the negation of the notion that resurrection serves to nullify, or to reverse, earlier demise.¹⁴An opposing view is espoused by R. Chaim Kanievsky, loc. cit. Since resurrection is not tantamount to a reversal of death, there is no logical manner in which a prior marital relationship can be regarded as having been re-established by resurrection.