Halakhah su Salmi 116:6

There is an obvious tension between the pertinent talmudic dicta bearing upon actions which pose a hazard to life or health. The Gemara, Shabbat 32b, declares, "A man should not place himself in a place of danger." Yet elsewhere, (Shabbat 129b and Niddah 31a as well as other places), the Gemara cites the verse "The Lord preserves the simple" (Psalms 116:6) as granting sanction to man to place his trust in divine providence and to ignore possible danger. The Gemara itself dispels what would otherwise be an obvious contradiction by stating that certain actions which contain an element of danger are permitted since "the multitude has trodden thereupon."

Rabbi Unterman's distinction between Jews and Noachides with regard to termination of pregnancy within the first forty days following conception was anticipated by an earlier authority. Rabbi Plocki, in his Hemdat Yisra'el (p. 176), marshals evidence that an embryo may be destroyed with impunity during the first forty days of its development based upon Rabbenu Tam's interpretation of the talmudic dispute (Yevamot 12a) concerning the "three [categories of] women" who may resort to contraceptive devices in order to prevent conception. Rabbenu Tam explains that the dispute concerns the insertion of a tampon after cohabitation. The Tanna, R. Meir, rules that use of contraceptive devices by these women is mandatory since pregnancy would place their lives in jeopardy; the Sages assert that such action is not incumbent upon these women stating that the verse "The Lord preserves the simple" (Ps. 116:6) permits reliance upon divine providence to avert tragic consequences. However, according to Rabbenu Tam, the Sages permit the use of contraceptives after cohabitation reasoning that women are not commanded to refrain from "destroying the seed." R. Plocki points out that fertilization most frequently takes place immediately following cohabitation. Contraception following cohabitation is then, in effect, not destruction of the seed but abortion of a fertilized ovum. If abortion is forbidden even in the earliest stages of gestation, how then can Rabbenu Tam permit the use of contraceptive devices following cohabitation? R. Plocki concludes that destruction of the embryo during the first forty days following conception does not constitute an act of feticide but rather falls under the category of "destroying the seed." Since we accept the opinion of those authorities who rule that women are also bound by the prohibition against "destroying the seed," R. Plocki's reasoning (as evidenced by his own remarks) finds practical application only with regard to Noachides. According to those authorities who maintain that the ban against destroying the seed does not apply to Noachides, the latter may be permitted to interrupt pregnancy during the first forty days of gestation.

The minimal danger to which the child is exposed by being placed under general anesthesia during removal of his bone marrow does not serve to militate against the permissibility of the procedure. The Gemara, Yevamot 72a, reports that blood-letting carries with it an element of increased danger when performed on a cloudy day or on a day when the south wind blows. Accordingly, R. Papa prohibited both blood-letting and circumcision on such days. Nevertheless, the Gemara, invoking the principle "The Lord preserves the simple" (Psalms 116:6), concludes that since people, in general, customarily disregard this particular danger those procedures are entirely permissible. The underlying principle, invoked by the Gemara in a number of different contexts, is that although a person may not ordinarily expose himself to danger, he may engage in activities generally regarded as innocuous even though, in actuality, they do pose a danger. In such circumstances, a person may act in the manner of "simple" persons who do not give thought to such matters and rely upon Providence to protect them.