Midrash su Numeri 35:22

(Bamidbar 35:22) "And if of a sudden, without hatred, he thrust him": to exclude (his killing) unwittingly. "or he cast upon him some instrument, but not in prey": without "hunting" or intent to kill. (22) "Or with any stone, whereby one can die," "without seeing": to include (for exile) a blind man and one who throws (a stone) at night. R. Yehudah says: "without seeing": to exclude a blind man. "and he not be his foe": Issi b. Akiva says: We find his stringency to be his lenity, and his lenity, his stringency, viz.: You cannot make him liable for the death penalty — Perhaps he killed him unwittingly. And you cannot make him liable for exile — Perhaps he killed him wittingly. "and he not be his foe" (juxtaposed with [24] "Then the congregation shall judge"): to exclude haters from sitting in judgment. This tells me of haters. Whence do we derive the same for kin? From (24) "between the slayer and the avenger" (with no other "relationship" intervening). Whence do I derive the same for witnesses? It follows, viz.: The Torah states: Kill through (the agency of) judges, kill through witnesses. Just as judges who are (their) haters or kin are unfit (to judge in their case), so, witnesses (who are haters or kin). Furthermore, it follows a fortiori, viz.: If judges — who do not decide (the facts of the case) — haters and kin are unfit to serve (as judges), then witnesses — who decide (the facts of the case) — how much more so are haters and kin unfit to serve (as witnesses)! This tells me only of (the instance of a murderer). Whence do I derive (the same for) all other instances of the death penalty? From [the superfluous] (Ibid.) "according to these judgments." This tells me only of Israelites. Whence do I derive the same for proselytes? From (Vayikra 24:22) "for proselytes and native-born (Israelites) alike." This tells me only of capital cases. Whence do I derive (the same for) monetary cases? From (Ibid.) "One (standard of) judgment shall there be for you," — But perhaps just as capital cases (are adjudicated) by twenty-three, so, monetary cases? It is, therefore, written (here) "according to these (capital) judgments." These are (adjudicated) by twenty-three, and not monetary judgments, of which it is written (Shemot 22:8) "Until elohim (counting three judges) shall come the dispute of both." And whence is it derived that capital cases (are adjudicated) by twenty-three? From (Bamidbar 35:24) "And the congregation (ten) shall judge" (25) And the congregation (ten) shall rescue" — twenty all together. And whence is it derived that three are added? From (Shemot 23:2) "Do not be after the many to do evil," I understand that I should be with them to do good. If so, what is the intent of (Ibid.) "After the many (i.e., the majority to incline" (judgment)? Let your judgment for good (i.e., acquittal) not be like your judgment for evil (i.e., incrimination). I still would not know how many, (but the Torah states: Kill by witnesses; kill by the inclination of the judges. Just as witnesses are two, so, the inclination of the judges (i.e., acquittal, is with a majority of one, and incrimination by a majority of two); and since the verdict of beth-din cannot be evenly balanced, three most be added to them (the twenty). The expounders of metaphor stated: The three "eduyoth" ("congregants") written in this section (one in [24] and two in [27]) signal that capital cases are adjudicated by thirty.