Bibbia Ebraica
Bibbia Ebraica

Talmud su Levitico 5:14

וַיְדַבֵּ֥ר יְהוָ֖ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֥ה לֵּאמֹֽר׃

E l'Eterno parlò a Mosè, dicendo:

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah

HALAKHAH: “A preliminarily married woman or one who waits for her brother-in-law,” etc. Why can he not make her drink? It is a decision of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the Cohen10Lev. 5:15. A man can bring his wife only if he is living with her..” Then he should not be able to declare his jealousy11If “his wife” in this paragraph means only the definitively married one, the entire procedure should be impossible for the preliminarily married woman.! The Torah said, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,12Lev. 5:14; if the meaning of “his wife” were constant in this verse, the second clause should have read “and he declared his jealousy to her.” The woman who is a wife but not a wife in the first sense is the preliminarily married one. Therefore, the second mention of “wife” adds the preliminarily married one as object of jealousy.” even if she is only partially his wife.
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Jerusalem Talmud Sotah

Rebbi Jehudah asked: As you say, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,12Lev. 5:14; if the meaning of “his wife” were constant in this verse, the second clause should have read “and he declared his jealousy to her.” The woman who is a wife but not a wife in the first sense is the preliminarily married one. Therefore, the second mention of “wife” adds the preliminarily married one as object of jealousy.” even if she is only partially his wife, similarly, “under your husband,” even if he is only partially your husband17R. Jehudah notes that “under your husband” is repeated (vv. 19,20). Therefore, if the repetition of “his wife” (cf. Note 12) also includes a partial wife ( preliminarily married or one who waits for her brother-in-law), the repetition here should also give the partial husband the right to bring his partial wife to the Temple. There is no answer given; R. Jehudah’s argument is contradicted by the verse he himself quotes, cf. Chapter 1, Notes 154–156.. How is that? If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he wed her18“He took her in”, i. e., he brought her to his house in the final wedding ceremony to live with him., and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy19The final wedding activates the prior declaration of jealousy. The Babli agrees, 25a.. If he20The brother-in-law. declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he20The brother-in-law. wed her, and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy19The final wedding activates the prior declaration of jealousy. The Babli agrees, 25a.. If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah21As stated in Mishnah 3:6, the ceremony is ineffective for a woman whose husband had slept with her while she was forbidden to him. Since it is his action that (a) keeps his wife permanently forbidden to him and, (b) prevents his wife from proving her innocence, he as the guilty party is forced to divorce her and to pay the full amount of the ketubah.; otherwise22If the husband did not sleep with his wife after she became forbidden to him, he has the choice to divorce her because of her fault, without paying any of his own money. she has to leave without ketubah. [If he declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah; otherwise without ketubah.]23From the Rome ms., probably omitted by the scribe of the Leiden ms. because of the parallel text. If her husband declared his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who married her, then she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of [the first husband’s] declaration of jealousy24Since by biblical standards the brother-in-law’s marriage is an automatic consequence of the first husband’s death.. If her husband did not declare his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who declared his jealousy but did not manage to take her in before he died and she became destined for his brother, the latter cannot make her drink since she became destined for him only because of the first brother25Since the second brother never became her husband, his declaration is irrelevant to the third brother.. But if her brother-in-law declared his jealousy, took her in, and died, then she became destined for a brother-in-law who took her in, when she went to a secluded place he makes her drink on the basis of his20The brother-in-law. declaration of jealousy.
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Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his”76Since the widow’s ketubah is guaranteed by her first husband’s estate, there is no reason why the standing grain should go to the levir. If the husband had lived, it would have been his, but it could not be the levir’s before the latter actually married the widow. One has to correct the Mishnah to hers from his. This argument is R. Simeon ben Laqish’s in the Babli, 82a. but [ ]77The word “hers” is missing in ms. and editio princeps; it is understood in the text.. In which respect? In case the heir took it78If the levir harvested the grain without crediting it to the widow’s ketubah fund, she can go to court and have him acquire real estate for the corresponding amount., one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands79The same statement is quoted in Halakhah 9:3; there the scribe wrote: “one does not remove from their hands”, but the first corrector crossed out “not”. In both cases, the context implies that the scribe’s original text is the correct one. Since the heir does not have a claim on the standing grain, the heir’s creditor does not have one either.? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.80It is stated repeatedly in the Babli (Yebamot 46a,66b; Giṭṭin 40b; Ketubot 59b, Nedarim 86b; Baba Qama90a) that dedications to the Temple break contracts. This rule is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi and the latter’s position in this matter is not known. In Rashi’s interpretation, only dedications to the altar break contracts, not dedications which are purely monetary gifts to Temple or charity. Therefore, that principle does not apply here in any case.
The text is Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:2. There it is stated that if somebody dedicates his encumbered property, neither can the wife collect her ketubah nor a creditor his claim from Temple property which must first be redeemed. Then it is stated that if the creditor’s claim is at least equal to the appraised value of the property, he may lend another denar to the debtor and force him to redeem it to be able to foreclose the now secular property.
” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption81This is a generally accepted principle; Babli Arakhin 32b, Pesaḥim31a. The redemption is purely symbolical since the debtor did not have the right to injure the creditor’s claim by dedication; therefore, the dedication is invalid.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny82Me‘ilah is larceny with Temple property which requires restitution in the amount of 125% and a sacrifice; Lev. 5:14–16. R. Joḥanan implies that a person using the dedicated property for his personal advantage before it was redeemed is obligated for a sacrifice. On the other hand, it is sinful to offer unnecessary sacrifices which would be ”profane animals in the Temple courtyard.” If the sacrifice is valid then the dedication must be valid and could not be undone by a token amount but would require appraisal by a Cohen (Lev. 27:11–14).. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate83Lev. 5:14 restricts me‘ilah to “the Eternal’s holy things”, which excludes real estate.? But we talk about standing grain84This is not subject to me‘ilah when standing but will be subject once it is cut.. Since if the administrator85The Temple’s chief financial officer. Since the dedication was invalid when made for the field, he should not have cut the grain. But once it was cut, it becomes legitimate Temple property and can be sold for the Temple’s upkeep. misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule86This does not mean that the levir can take the standing grain, cut it, and keep it, but that the their’s standing vis-à-vis the creditor is like the administrator’s vis-à-vis the creditor. Since the creditor’s lien is on the real estate, it cannot cover the grain once it is cut and made movable. (Cf. the commentary RYDBZ ad loc. in the Wilna ed., and the novellae of Rashba, Giṭṭin 40b, end.). Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate87Since the ox is movable, the dedication should be absolute.? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value88This is a rabbinical rule to protect the holders of chattel mortgages.. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand89This is the main question of this paragraph: Since the heir can cut the grain to the detriment of the lienholder, why can he not cut the grain to the detriment of the widow who also is a lienholder?. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.
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