Talmud su Levitico 4:28

¹⁰This paragraph has a parallel in Terumot 8:1, Notes 14–22. As explained there, the background of the paragraph in Terumot is different from the one presumed here; therefore at a place where the readings there and here seem to be opposite to one another, both are correct in their settings. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable¹¹Referring to Mishnah Terumot 8:1; a childless woman of non-priestly birth, married to a Cohen, was eating heave in purity, as is her right and duty, when she was informed of her husband’s death. By this death she returns to her non-priestly status and heave is forbidden to her. Nevertheless, she is not liable for a reparation sacrifice nor to pay for the heave eaten in error. This is the topic of Terumot 8:1, it is not followed up here.? What is the difference between him¹²An Israel to whom heave is forbidden, Mishnah Terumot 6:1. who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable¹³He had been told from childhood that he was a Cohen; he was stripped of his priesthood by a court on the testimony of two witnesses that one of his female ancestors had been forbidden to her Cohen husband. His case is not different from that of the woman in Note 12.? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath¹⁴This is a paradigm of an inadvertent sin as mentioned in Lev. 4:27., who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah Pesahim 6:4).. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah Pesahim 6:4)., who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat¹⁶Fat of animals which would be burned on the altar if these animals were sacrifices, and the fat into which ischiatic tendons are embedded, is forbidden for human consumption. All other fat is permitted. If a person intended to commit a sin but, unknown to him at the time, failed to commit the sin, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice. and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself¹⁷Translated using the Bomberg Babli text.: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues, from where that he who eats with permission is free¹⁴This is not an attack on the argument of R. Ḥanina; if a person has no intention of breaking the law and is not breaking the law, obviously he is free not only of guilt but of all monetary obligations.
The parallel to this text is in Horaiot 1:1, fol. 45c; a text which differs in places from the text here. The commentaries assume that the text there is the better one; they take the question of R. Ḥaggai as directed against the argument of R. Ḥaninah; therefore, they are forced in the next sentence to follow the Horaiot text and to switch the terms “Israel” and “Cohen”, an emendation not supported here by any manuscript and contradicted by the third question of R. Ḥaggai.? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out that it was heave, who is obligated¹⁵An Israel who ate what he thought was profane food. If it turns out that it was heave, he has to pay as stated in Mishnah 6:1. If it turns out that he was in fact a Cohen but did not know it, he does not have to pay even though at the time of eating he thought he was an Israel. If payment were a punishment for negligence, there is no reason why he should not be held liable.
In the Horaiot text, speaking of a person who thought he was a Cohen when he was not, the reference would be to the position of R. Joshua in the Mishnah here and the “declaration of the court” is the court decision which strips him of his priesthood, on the testimony of two cross-examined credible witnesses. The conditions under which an action of the court obligates him to bring a sacrifice are noted Horaiot 1:1; the reading of Horaiot is appropriate there, the reading of Terumot is appropriate here., and him who thought that he was an Israel but it turned out that he was a Cohen, who is free? They said to him, by the declaration of the court¹⁶The interpretation of the biblical law quoted later.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was a weekday but it turned out that it was a Sabbath¹⁷The person violating the Sabbath in error has to bring an expiatory sacrifice., who is obligated, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out that it was a well-being offering, who is free¹⁸This refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim6:4. The Passover sacrifice, a lamb or kid goat, has to be sacrificed during the afternoon of Nissan 14, even if that day is a Sabbath. It also has to be designated beforehand as Passover sacrifice and is counted as a special kind of well-being offering. If the 14th falls on a weekday, a festival offering, which is a well-being offering, is also slaughtered at the same time (cf. the author’s The Scholar’s Haggadah, Northvale NJ 1995, p. 248.) On the Sabbath, any slaughtering not directly mandated by the biblical verse is forbidden. On that the Mishnah states: “If the Passover sacrifice [which is valid only if slaughtered for this particular purpose] was slaughtered not for its purpose on the Sabbath, one is obligated for an expiatory sacrifice. For any well-being offering slaughtered as a Passover sacrifice which was not usable [a calf or an old sheep or goat], one is obligated. If it was usable, R. Eliezer obligates him for an expiatory sacrifice, R. Joshua declares him free.” Why should he be free?? They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission¹⁹The language refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim 6:6: “If he slaughtered [the Passover sacrifice on a Sabbath] and it turned out to have a blemish, he is obligated [for an expiatory sacrifice]. If it turned out to be unusable because of an internal defect [which could not have been detected by inspection when the animal was alive], he is free. If he slaughtered and then it turned out that the owners had withdrawn from it [they chose another lamb as their sacrifice], or that they had died [and the sacrifice became unusable because nobody may eat from the Passover unless he joined the group before the lamb was slaughtered], or had become impure, he is free since he slaughtered with permission.” Since R. Joshua declares him free and the animal could have been a valid Passover sacrifice, he slaughtered with permission.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted fat but it turned out that it was forbidden fat, who is obligated, and him who thought that it was forbidden but it turned out that it was permitted, who is free²⁰He thought the fat he ate was forbidden when in fact it was permitted. Then in his mind he should be more guilty of negligence than the one who thought the fat was permitted when it was in fact forbidden.? They did not answer him. What did he say to them? Let us take counsel! (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring.²¹The involved statement is explained to mean that one became aware of the sinful character of what he had done inadvertently. If a person never knew that certain acts are forbidden, he cannot become obligated for an expiatory sacrifice since no negligence was involved. If he knew and then did something inadvertently, he is obligated for his negligence. But if he knew beforehand that, had he known then what he knows now, his action would have been legitimate, there is no negligence and no sacrifice.” He who returns from his prior knowledge is obligated for his error; this excludes one who would not stop even if he knew! Rebbi Assi went to see them and said, why did you not answer him (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring”? They said to him, he asked the question and gave the answer²²This paragraph is more explicit in Horaiot, and written in better style..

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable¹⁹This paragraph has no direct connection with the theme of the Mishnah, but is added here to elucidate Lev. 4:27. Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering.. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated²⁰Mishnah Keritut 6:4; Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah 3(1), 6(1), Ahare Mot Parašah4(8).
Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution (Lev. 5:20–26; Num. 5:5–10), (2) misappropriation of sancta(Lev.5:14–16), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease (Lev. 14). A suspended reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away all iniquities (Lev. 16:21).: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God., or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. ²¹This copy from the first paragraph has no discernible meaning here. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent}⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah23b, Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin 15a,44b,66a, Makkot 9b, Ševuot 7b, Menahot 9b,67a, Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. on the Court is not liable.

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says⁵⁵Lev. 4:27., [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them)⁵⁶The text is a baraita in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err(Lev. 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull⁵⁷A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁸This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption⁵⁹Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.? The statement of a baraita⁶⁰Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed⁶¹If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..

MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat⁹⁴Lev. 4:28,32., the Prince a he-goat⁹⁵Lev. 4:23, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull⁹⁶Cf. Mishnaiot 1:6, 2:1.. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice⁹⁷Num. 15:22–25..
For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable⁹⁸Mishnah 5.. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable⁹⁹The reparation sacrifices for robberies or defrauding (Lev. 5:20–26), larceny of sancta(Lev. 5:14–16), the semi-manumitted slave girl (Lev. 19:20–22), the nazir(Num. 6:12), and the healed sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:1–32). Since no extirpation is involved, the Court is not liable for a sacrifice in case they rule wrongly in one of these matters.. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable¹⁰⁰Mishnah 6. but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon⁸⁴He is not mentioned in our Mishnah text, but Mishnah 8 states that the High Priest is exempt according to everybody; only for the king does R. Aqiba disagree; Babli 9a. According to Tosephta 1:10, the king is exempted only for disregarding a request for testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (since his diadem is a permanent atonement for imperfect sacrifices, Ex. 28:38.)
The High Priest is required (Lev.21:10) to be the richest priest; if he is not, the other priests have to make him so. R. Joseph David Sinzheim (Yad David on Horaiot) notes that the High Priest had the choice always to officiate at the burning of incense. Any other priest was given only a once in a lifetime occasion for this (Mishnah Yoma 2:4) since presenting the incense made the presenter rich (explicit in the Babli, implicit in the Yerushalmi, Yoma Halakhah 2:4, 40a 12). The king naturally has taxing powers.
Since king and High Priest are never able to bring a sacrifice according to the rules of the poor (Lev. 5:7–10) or the very poor (vv. 11–13), they are prohibited from ever bringing a sacrifice depending on the offerer’s wealth.. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat¹⁰¹This is qualified in the Halakhah..