민수기 30:3의 주석

נדר A VOW — This is when one says, Behold, I take upon myself an obligation which is as sacred to me as an offering, that I will not eat, or that I will not do such-and-such a thing. — One might think that if he swears that he will eat the flesh of an animal which has not been slaughtered properly according to the rite that I may apply to him the text, “He shall do according to all that goeth forth from his mouth”! It, however, says, “[If he takes an oath] to forbid something to himself”, i.e., to forbid for himself something which is permissible to him — and not to make permissible that which is forbidden to him (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4).

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre¹⁵Sifre, Matoth 153. is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond:¹⁰Verse 3. “I might think that even if ‘he swore’¹⁶The words “he swore” show clearly that the Sifre is speaking about an oath, while Rashi applied it to a vow. to eat n’veiloth and treifoth,¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows).¹⁷The language of the verse before us is as follows: If a man ‘voweth a vow’ unto the Eternal, or ‘sweareth an oath’ to bind his soul with a bond. Ramban’s intent is to point out that Rashi, who made his comment on the phrase if a man voweth a vow, and speaks of konam [a term used only in vows], is diverging from the Sifre who gives this explanation on the phrase or sweareth an oath. Since, as will be explained further on, there are important legal differences between vows and oaths, Rashi’s application of the Sifre to the case of a vow [instead of to an oath] is thus incorrect. And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this],¹⁸In my “Kuntros on Variant Readings in Rashi according to the first print, Reggio 1475,” p. 27 (printed in Berliner’s Rashi, Feldheim, Jerusalem, 5730) I have shown that on the basis of a minor emendation in the text of Rashi [as found in the Reggio edition], Ramban’s criticism of Rashi disappears. for the Rabbis have said¹⁹Nedarim 2b. that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters,²⁰Ibid., 13b. such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it.²¹In other words, there is no question as to when a person “vows” to eat n’veilah [which is forbidden] that it is invalid, but even if he “vowed” to eat a permissible thing it is also invalid, since we do not find anywhere in the Gemara vows about matters which require one “to get up and do,” but only matters which require one to abstain from certain things. On the other hand, in the case of an “oath,” as where one says “I swear to eat this loaf,” the oath would indeed be valid. Since Rashi applied it to “vows,” it is therefore incorrect, as explained above. — The reason for this distinction between oaths and vows is as follows: An oath takes effect upon the person himself. Hence if he says, “I swear to eat the loaf,” he is obliged to do so. But a vow takes effect upon the object. Hence if he says, “This bread is ‘konam’ to me,” it is a valid vow and he may not eat it. But if he were to say, “A vow be upon me that I shall eat this loaf,” it would be invalid, since it is a contradiction in terms [the statement begins with a reference to a vow, but concludes with — “I shall eat …” — which is appropriate only for an oath]. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,”²²Kinim 1:1. or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object which itself becomes forbidden], this [vow is valid] because [there is a general principle that] dedicating something [verbally] to the Sanctuary creates an obligation on one’s property exactly as if it had been handed over to an ordinary person.²³Therefore when he says, “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” it is as if he had actually separated a specific animal to be an offering. Thus his vow attaches to a definite object, and therefore it is valid. Or [it may be that] this is a stringency²⁴In other words, even if we are not to resort to the preceding explanation that a verbal promise to the Sanctuary is tantamount to actual delivery of the object, we may yet explain the reason why vows to the Sanctuary are valid, because of a stringency ordained by the Rabbis based on the fact that since ultimately he will set aside a specific animal for his offering, therefore the effect of the vow takes place immediately upon his utterance thereof, and all his property becomes mortgaged to the fulfillment of the vow. applicable [only] to vows to the Sanctuary, because they [such vows] involve an object which becomes forbidden to an ordinary person and invested [with sanctity] for the Sanctuary when [the object is actually] set aside [as an offering]; therefore right from the start [when he merely bound himself verbally to separate an animal as an offering at some future date], the obligation created by the vow takes effect upon his property. But the case of [ordinary] vows of utterance [about a secular matter] we have no such rule, because there is no [tangible] object existing at all, neither at the beginning [i.e., at the time of uttering the vow], nor at the end [i.e., at the time that the vow is to be fulfilled]. Similarly, [the expression of the Sifre mentioned by Rashi that] he can “forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but cannot allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah]” is a statement which is not correct to make in connection with vows [as Rashi did], because they do take effect on matters of [religious] commandments, just as they do on secular matters [i.e., on matters which do not come within the scope of the commandments]. Thus someone who says in the form of a vow “I will not make a Booth [for the Festival of Tabernacles]” or “I will not put on phylacteries” is indeed forbidden [to make the Booth, or to put on the phylacteries] although he thereby violates a positive commandment.²⁵The reason for this is that since a vow takes effect upon a particular object (see Note 21), he may forbid the use of the particular Booth or of the phylacteries in the fulfillment of the commandment. But he cannot prohibit their use by means of an oath, swearing not to use them, since the oath creates a prohibition on the person, and that is invalid for him to do, since “he has already sworn on Sinai” to fulfill the commandment, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath, as will be explained. Similarly a man who vowed not to have [sexual] intercourse with his wife is forbidden [to have such intercourse with her] although he thereby violates a negative commandment.²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. Similarly, vows take effect to oblige one to observe a negative commandment [although, of course, he already is bound not to transgress it], such as if he vowed not to eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. — [so that if he does it he violates two prohibitions: against eating n’veilah, and against breaking his vow, this principle being deduced] from the words of the Mishnah:²⁷Nedarim 17a. The Mishnah there establishes the distinction that a vow may take effect upon another vow, but one oath may not take effect upon another. From this Ramban deduces the teaching that if an object is prohibited to a person for some reason, such as n’veilah or treifah (see Note 14 above), or indeed any other prohibition, another vow — not to eat it — can still take effect upon that object doubly prohibiting the person from eating it, so that if he does eat it, he violates two prohibitions: one for having eaten n’veilah, and one for having violated his vow. “A vow may take effect upon a vow etc.”
Thus a vow takes effect to forbid [not only that which was previously permitted, but also to forbid] that which was [already] forbidden [such as when he vows not to eat n’veilah]¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96., and [a vow takes effect] not to do [something] which he is [commanded to do and] forbidden to transgress [such as the duty to have sexual intercourse with his wife,²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. as mentioned above], except that vows do not take effect to allow him to actively transgress a negative commandment.²⁸Thus if he vowed to eat the flesh of n’veilah which is prohibited by a negative commandment, the vow takes no effect whatever, so that if he does not eat it he is not punishable for having violated his word. But oaths are only able to render forbidden that which was [hitherto] permitted, and they do not apply at all to matters involving commandments, neither to transgress [the prohibition of] a negative commandment [even passively, such as by swearing not to have intercourse with his wife], nor to strengthen its observance [such as by swearing not to eat n’veilah],¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. nor to neglect [the performance of] a positive commandment, such as [by saying]: “I swear that I will not make a Booth,” or “[I swear] that I will not put on phylacteries.” Even to strengthen the performance of a positive commandment [an oath] cannot take effect, so that if a person swears to fulfill a commandment and does not fulfill it, he is not liable for [breaking his] oath either to [the punishment of] stripes [if he deliberately neglects it] or to [bring] an offering [if he neglects it accidentally].²⁹The punishment for breaking an oath in optional matters deliberately is the same as for transgressing any negative commandment; i.e., stripes (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), and for accidentally breaking it, there is a duty to bring an offering (Leviticus 5:4-13). But if one swears to fulfill a positive commandment [e.g. “I swear to wear phylacteries”] the oath is invalid, because “he has already sworn at Mount Sinai” [to perform all the commandments of the Torah], and an oath does not take effect upon another oath (see Note 27). Therefore if he does not fulfill the commandment, he is responsible for neglect of a positive commandment, but is not subject to stripes or an offering for failure of fulfilling the additional oath, since his oath never took effect. But it is permitted for a person to encourage himself [to fulfill a commandment by swearing to do so], for it is written, I have sworn, and have confirmed it, to observe Thy righteous ordinances.³⁰Psalms 119:106. See Nedarim 8a. Therefore it is only with reference to swearing [and not, as implied by Rashi, to vows] that one can interpret [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond¹⁰Verse 3. [as the Sifre does, that he may forbid upon himself that which was hitherto permitted to him, but may not allow himself to do that which is forbidden, by means of swearing to do it]. These are great [i.e., complex and important] laws, and the scholar will find them [explained in the Talmud] in their [proper] places.

איש כי ידור נדר, When a man vows a vow, etc. Why did the Torah repeat both the word נדר, vow, and the word שבעה, oath? Why could the Torah not simply have written איש כי ידור לה׳ או ישבע? Furthermore, why did the Torah phrase observance both in a positive and in a negative connotation, i.e. "he must not profane his word, as well as he must do in accordance with what came out of his mouth?" I believe we must look for the key to the way the Torah worded this legislation by remembering that there are two categories of vows and oaths. One category is related to a person's soul, i.e. he may undertake to study Torah, give a certain amount of charity, refrain from abominable practices, not to visit places predominantly visited by women, etc. The other category of vows and oaths pertains to the body and involves matters which are neither forbidden to us nor are we commanded to do them. Here too there are two divisions; one may vow to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or live in a certain house, etc. Or, one may undertake on oath not to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or wear certain clothes. G'd legislated here how a person should best conduct himself. The words כי ידור נדר, i.e. an ordinary vow involves an undertaking to go to a certain place or to perform a certain task. The addition of the word לה׳ means that different rules apply when the vow is not of a secular nature but relates to one's conduct vis-a-vis G'd. The addition of this word therefore means that the word נדר has not been repeated at all, but that once it applies to secular vows and once to religious vows.