וַאֲשֶׁר֩ יָבֹ֨א אֶת־רֵעֵ֥הוּ בַיַּעַר֮ לַחְטֹ֣ב עֵצִים֒ וְנִדְּחָ֨ה יָד֤וֹ בַגַּרְזֶן֙ לִכְרֹ֣ת הָעֵ֔ץ וְנָשַׁ֤ל הַבַּרְזֶל֙ מִן־הָעֵ֔ץ וּמָצָ֥א אֶת־רֵעֵ֖הוּ וָמֵ֑ת ה֗וּא יָנ֛וּס אֶל־אַחַ֥ת הֶעָרִים־הָאֵ֖לֶּה וָחָֽי׃
가령 사람이 그 이웃과 함께 벌목하러 삼림에 들어가서 손에 도끼를 들고 벌목하려고 찍을 때에 도끼가 자루에서 빠져 그 이웃을 맞춰 그로 죽게함 같은 것이라 이런 사람은 그 성읍 중 하나로 도피하여 생명을 보존할 것이니라
On Flight and Finding
[77] After treating in this way of unintentional acts he goes on to legislate concerning assault and premeditation, saying, “If a man set upon his neighbour to slay him by guile and flee for refuge” (Exod. 21:14) to God, even to Him Who has been already symbolically called a place, Who is the occasion of life to all; for in another place likewise it says, “Whosoever shall flee there shall live” (Deut. 19:5).
On the Special Laws
§ 120. (Involuntary homicide.) What does Philo understand by this? In the Pentateuch it seems to mean accidental homicide, see particularly the example given in Deut. 19:5 of the man killed by the slip of the head from his neighbour’s axe. Nothing is said in these sections exactly in contradiction of this, though the μὴ ἐκ προνοίας in § 128 may point to a wider interpretation. But in §§ 92 and 104 we have had suggestions that he regards homicide, if committed in sudden anger or in an unpremeditated quarrel, as different from ordinary murder, though he does not follow this up (see notes on §§ 92 and 104). His view in fact seems much the same as that of Plato, who (Laws 866 D ff.) discusses the point and says that one who kills another in hot blood or unpremeditatedly is οὐ παντάπασιν ἀκούσιος ἀλλʼ εἰκὼν ἀκουσίου. Philo’s ἡμίεργον in § 92 is a rough equivalent of Plato’s εἰκών (“likeness or shadow,” Jowett) and indeed may be a reminiscence of it. That is to say, it is something between ἀκούσιος and ἑκούσιος. One may conjecture that he does not consider it worthy of death, but in face of the law of Ex. 21:18, 19, described in § 100, refrains from saying so.