Halakhah do Rodzaju 44:35

Acceptance of the premise that the principle of self-defense applies to Noachides as well as to Jews does not serve to justify any and all military action even if limited to wars of defense. War almost inevitably results in civilian casualties as well as the loss of combatants. Yet the taking of innocent lives certainly cannot be justified on the basis of the law of pursuit. The life of the pursuer is forfeit in order that the life of the intended victim be preserved. However, should it be impossible to eliminate the pursuer other than by also causing the death of an innocent bystander, the law of pursuit cannot be invoked even by the intended victim,¹This is certainly the case with regard to a Jew who is pursued by a person intent upon taking his life. In such circumstances the intended victim may not save his own life at the expense of the life of an innocent third party. The general rule that all prohibitions are suspended in face of danger does not apply to the three cardinal sins, viz., homicide, idolatry and certain forms of sexual licentiousness. Hence, the intended victim may not take the life of his pursuer if it is impossible to do so other than by taking the life of an innocent party at the same time. There are however, some authorities, including R. Shmu’el Jaffe-Ashkenazi (Maharash Jaffe), Yefeh To’ar (Fürth, 5452), Genesis 44:5, (cited by Parashat Derakhim, derush 2), who maintain that a gentile may transgress any prohibition, including the three cardinal sins, in order to save his life. According to Maharash Jaffe, defensive military action designed to eliminate an aggressor would be justified on grounds of self-defense even when such action necessarily results in the loss of civilian lives. According to this authority, such action would be permissible in situations in which it is impossible to kill the aggressor without also taking the lives of innocent noncombatants, provided that the life of the individual undertaking such action is endangered. See also, R. Shlomoh Algazi, Shama Shlomoh (Amsterdam, 5470), p. 15b; Shenot Ḥayyim, p. 36b; R. Barzilai Baruch Ya’avets, Leshon Arumim (Izmir, 5516), p. 7; and R. Abraham Samuel Meyuchas, Sedei ha-Areẓ, I, 55. The view of Maharash Jaffe is, however, rejected by numerous later authorities. R. Judah Rosanes, Parashat Derakhim, loc. cit., concedes that a Noachide may commit acts of idolatry and sexual licentiousness in order to escape danger since the biblical verses banning such actions even in the face of force majeure are addressed only to Jews and are not part of the Noachide Code. However, the prohibition against homicide under such circumstances is not based upon a biblical command but upon the a priori consideration “How do you know that your blood is sweeter than the blood of your fellow?” (Sanhedrin 74a). As an a priori concept, argues Parashat Derakhim, this principle is binding upon Noachides no less than upon Jews. A similar view is expressed by the same authority in his Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:2, as well as by R. Joseph Babad, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 296, and in a note appended by a grandson of R. Isaac Schorr to the latter’s Teshuvot Koaḥ Shor, no. 20, p. 35a. much less so by a third party who is himself not personally endangered. Since the law of pursuit is designed to preserve the life of the innocent victim, it is only logical that it is forbidden to cause the death of a bystander in the process since to do so would only entail the loss of another innocent life. In such situations the talmudic principle "How do you know that your blood is sweeter than the blood of your fellow?" (Sanhedrin 74a) is fully applicable.