Halakhah do Sędziów 4:26

It may also be inferred from the comments of Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5, that he is of the opinion that a woman cannot be "accepted" for appointment or election to a position of communal leadership. Radbaz seeks to explain how it was possible for Deborah to have been appointed to the office of judge (as distinct from the question of how she could render decisions in particular cases brought before her). Radbaz records several arguments advanced by Tosafot in answering the question of how Deborah's decisions were binding in individual cases, but fails to cite the answer that she was "accepted" by the populace. The omission of this argument is significant. Radbaz obviously maintains that "acceptance" does not vitiate the prohibition against women holding communal office.¹⁴Cf., R. Ya‘akov Levinson, Shivayon ha-Nashim, pp. 18ff. Rabbi Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg also argues vigorously that acceptance is a valid procedure only on an ad hoc basis but cannot validate permanent or prolonged incumbency in office. He notes that the phrase "som tasim," from which the prohibition is derived, refers explicitly to induction into office and asserts that there can be no "acceptance" when a transgression is involved. Rabbi Levinson resolves the question with regard to Deborah's functions as a judge by noting that Scripture carefully states, "… and the children of Israel went up to her for judgment" (Judges 4:5) indicating that Deborah did not occupy an official position but that each such act was spontaneous and voluntary on the part of the litigants.

And this commandment is practiced by males but not by females, as they do not judge - as we have said above in many places. And do not let that which is written about Devorah the prophetess (Judges 4:4), "and she judged Israel," be difficult to you. As it is possible for us to answer that the judgement was not concluded according to her [word]. Rather, [since] she was a wise woman and a prophetess, they would give and take with her - even about matters of the prohibited and the permitted and also civil laws. And hence it is written about her, "and she judged Israel, etc." Or we can say that the heads of Israel accepted her upon them - and after them, everyone - to decide according to her [word]. As everyone is fit [to judge] with acceptance [of the parties involved], since any condition upon money is valid (Ketuvot 56a). And nonetheless, all this that we have said that they do not judge is according to the opinion of some commentators and the opinion of the Yerushalmi (Talmud Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:9) - as such is it found there explicitly. But according to the opinion of some commentators, they are fit to judge. And they said that it is an open verse [that proves this] - as it is stated, "and she judged." And [about] that which they said in Sanhedrin 34b that anyone who is not fit to testify is not fit to judge - and women are certainly not fit to testify, as is proven there - it is possible that they would say, according to their opinion, that this is [not an issue] since we do not learn from general principles (Eruvin 27a). But what appears [correct] from the [sources] and from logic is that they are not [included] in the category of judgment, as it is found in the Yerushalmi and as it is implied in our Gemara (Bavli) by way of simple understanding.