Midrasz do Kapłańska 5:4
א֣וֹ נֶ֡פֶשׁ כִּ֣י תִשָּׁבַע֩ לְבַטֵּ֨א בִשְׂפָתַ֜יִם לְהָרַ֣ע ׀ א֣וֹ לְהֵיטִ֗יב לְ֠כֹל אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְבַטֵּ֧א הָאָדָ֛ם בִּשְׁבֻעָ֖ה וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֑נּוּ וְהוּא־יָדַ֥ע וְאָשֵׁ֖ם לְאַחַ֥ת מֵאֵֽלֶּה׃
Albo jeżeliby kto przysiągł, a wymknęło mu się z ust, aby wyrządził sobie co złego, albo dobrego, we wszystkiém, co wymyka się człowiekowi w przysiędze, a uszłoby z świadomości jego, - on zaś dowiedziałby się, i byłby winien w jakiejkolwiek z tych rzeczy;
Sifra
1) (Vayikra 5:5): "Then it shall be, if he be guilty for one of these, then he shall confess where he has sinned." Whence is it derived that he is liable for each one of these ("hearing the voice, etc.") utterance of the lips, and tumah of the sanctuary and its consecrated objects) individually, and that all three are not required for liability? From "for one." Each one is implied (in all of its possible applications).
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Sifra
1) (Vayikra 5:4) ("Or if a soul swear, to pronounce with the lips, to do harm or to do good, for all that a man will pronounce with an oath, and it be hidden from him, and he knew, and he is guilty in one of these") I might think (the intent of the verse to be that if one violates any pronouncement of the lips, including) a vow to become a Nazir or to bring a sacrifice, he is liable for an offering; it is, therefore, written: "if a soul swear" — It is for an oath that one is liable, and not for the others.
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Sifra
2) I might think that if one thought (the oath) in his heart (but did not utter it) he were liable; it is, therefore, written "with the lips," not with the heart. Or I might think that I exclude what is resolved in one's heart (as in an instance when one resolves upon a loaf of wheat, but utters (only) "a loaf." It is, therefore, written "to utter" (i.e., so long as there is no contradiction between the utterance and the resolution of the heart, the resolution stands.)
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