Comentário sobre Levítico 10:20

וייטב בעיניו AND IT WAS PLEASING IN HIS EYES — He admitted his error and was not ashamed to do so, by saying (instead of admitting it) “I have not heard a statement (from God regarding this)", but rather he said, “I have heard, but I forgot it” (Sifra, Shemini, Chapter 2 12; Zevachim 101b).

וייטב בעיניו, Moses enjoyed the reasoning Aaron presented explaining why he had acted as he did and he accepted his interpretation of the law. He complimented both him and his sons.

וישמע משה וייב בעיניו. Moses heard this and it was pleasing in his eyes. Why had Moses either forgotten or been unaware of such a simple halachah as that one has to distinguish between the degrees of sanctity of one-time offerings and that of regular offerings? If Moses was aware of an argument why such a differentiation should not be made, why did he accept Aaron's reasoning instead of trying to convince him that his own argument was correct? Moses had no right to command Aaron to either eat or burn sacrificial meat unless he was convinced that the halachah demanded this. His anger against Aaron and his sons was not caused by his conviction that they had committed an halachic error, but merely because he did not think they had adequate reason to burn up that meat. Alternatively, as suggested by Zevachim 101, he may have thought that all three of them had become ritually impure preventing them from consuming the meat of the sin-offering. According to the Talmud, Moses had enquired if something had gone wrong during the sprinkling of the blood or whether for some reason the animal had left the precincts of the Tabernacle. All of these events would have been due to some degree of negligence on the part of the priests and would have given Moses reason to be angry. Once Aaron had countered by citing the logic which had prompted him to make the decision to burn the meat Moses was put at ease. He realised that Aaron had not burned the meat until he had correctly judged the circumstances which demanded such action. If Aaron had not had logic going for his decision, it would indeed have been difficult to decide whose considerations were weightier; as it was, Moses was entitled to accept the קל וחומר Aaron had learned. When the Torah said וייטב בעיניו, this means that Moses approved of the meat having been burned. It is also possible that the words refer to Moses now approving of Aaron having made the decision without consulting him.

He admitted and was not ashamed... [Rather Moshe said: I heard and I forgot (Zevachim 101a)]. This raises a difficulty: Where does the verse hint that he admitted by saying: “I heard [and I forgot],” perhaps he admitted by saying: “I never heard”? The answer is: The phrase, “Moshe heard” is superfluous, for it is obvious he heard, as he spoke with Aharon. Rather, this is what it means: Since Moshe had already heard previously, Aharon’s words were good in his eyes afterwards, for he had forgotten what he had heard (Divrei Dovid). Rashi’s words raise a difficulty, however, because it should not say “וישמע,” but rather: “...ומשה שמע’,” which is in the past tense. Then, it would mean that because he had already heard it was therefore good in his eyes. Another difficulty: Rashi should have made his comment on the s.v. וישמע and not on “It was good in his eyes.” Therefore, it appears that the verse’s language is surely reversed, and the word “וישמע” is superfluous as well. It should say only: “And it was good in Moshe’s eyes.” Although the word וישמע hints at hearing, as implied by Targum Yonasan (see there), nevertheless, we should derive from the fact that it should say: “He heard and it was good in Moshe’s eyes.” However, [according to the way it is] now, “it was good in his eyes” does not refer to Moshe alone, but rather comes to hint that we should also explain: “It was good in his eyes,” i.e., in Aharon’s eyes. [This follows the saying]: Hashem spoke once and we heard twice. Thus, since וישמע comes to teach regarding ‘hearing,’ it must be that Moshe admitted he had heard and forgot, and therefore, “it was good in his eyes,” i.e., also in Aharon’s eyes, for he was happy that his understanding [of the matter] was in agreement with the Omnipresent’s point of view (Rav Yaakov Trivash). Some raise the difficulty: It implies here that it is a greater shame if he would say “I forgot” than if he said “I never heard,” and yet in Shabbos (119b-120a): “Rabbi Katina said: Even at the time of Yerusholayim’s shame there were still honest men there, as it is written (Yeshayahu 3:7): ‘[I will not be a ruler,] while in my house there is neither bread nor clothing,’ which refers to Torah, and they would not say: I learned and I forgot.” [Thus, they were honest because they would admit to being completely unlearned although they could have said: I learned and forgot]. This poses a difficulty: Perhaps [they were not honest at all but] they just did not want to say “I learned and I forgot” because it is a great shame. [Otherwise, they might have lied]. However, there is no difficulty at all. There, it is referring to the entirety of Torah — that he does not know anything about it — in such a case it is a great disgrace if he says he never learned any Torah. It would be better for him to say: I did what is incumbent upon me and I learned, but I forgot for some reason. However, this is not so here where it refers to one matter. It would have been more comfortable for Moshe to say I learned much Torah, but one matter I have not learned yet. Furthermore, we can say: How could Moshe say: “I never heard”? If so, from where would Aharon know? For if Moshe never heard, [from where would Aharon know? Rather,] the praise of Moshe’s admission was in this: Regarding anything that has two types of rationale, one to permit and one to forbid, people will often rationalize one way and then later retract from their original line of reasoning, because the second line of reasoning seems more logical. Thus, there is no shame in retracting. Therefore, if Moshe would have said: I never heard, but my reasoning was originally to permit, but Aharon posed a difficulty on it. And since there was an opposite reasoning [not to permit], it would not be shameful for Moshe [to retract from his original position]. However, now that he [originally] heard it was forbidden, and he forgot and ruled to permit from the strength of his reasoning, and then he remembered that he heard explicitly to forbid, this clarifies now that his reasoning was wrong. In this, there is great shame. If so, the Gemara in Shabbos (ibid.) presents no difficulty, for there it is not applicable to say they relied on rationale that would result in shame (Divrei Dovid).

Another approach would focus on the first words in the verse, i.e. "Moses heard." This may mean that Moses had heard from G'd about the difference between the degree of sanctity of one-time offerings and those of regular offerings. As a result he approved of what Aaron had done, i.e. וייטב בעיניו. You may counter by saying that if Moses had heard the הלכה from G'd why had he been angry at Aaron? Perhaps he was angry because he himself had not yet told Aaron about this and he thought that Aaron had done what he did without adequate reason. It is also possible that Moses who was able to receive prophetic revelations at any time (as we know from Numbers 9,8: "stand still and I will hear what G'd will command") now received word from G'd as to the correct procedure; as a result he was pleased to have G'd confirm that Aaron had acted correctly.

Torat Kohanim on our verse writes as follows: "Rav Yehudah said that as long as Rabbi Chananiah son of Yehudah was alive he used to explain that anger is a terrible affliction as it caused Moses to err. Seeing that Rabbi Chananiah is dead already, I feel I must respond to what he said. Anger did not cause Moses to err but his error caused Moses to become angry." Why did Rav Yehudah say that "Rabbi Chananiah said as long as he was alive etc.?" Why did he interpret events differently from Rav Yehudah whose opinion seems psychologically more sound and seems better supported by the text? We must also analyse why Rav Yehudah waited until after Rabbi Chananiah's death before he took issue with his explanation. It seems that both Rav Yehudah and Rabbi Chananiah ben Yehudah intended to be complimentary to Moses by their statements. The fact is that what happened can be explained by two different approaches. 1) Forgetting what G'd had said to Moses; it does not reflect credit on someone of Moses' stature if we were to accuse him of having forgotten some instruction G'd had taught him. 2) Moses became angry at the surviving sons of Aaron and spoke harshly with them as reported in our verse. In fact he was also angry at Aaron but he expressed this by speaking to Aaron's sons; he did not criticise Aaron to his face. Rabbi Chananiah chose to attribute Moses' having forgotten a הלכה as due to his anger, an inadvertent sin, as he did not want to accuse Moses of simply having forgotten something G'd had told him. We find a similar approach in Sifri Mattot 31,21 where Rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah quoted three occasions when Moses was reported as becoming angry and we find in each case that he committed an error. Numbers 31,14 describes Moses as angry at Eleazar the High Priest. The anger is not reported as caused by an error on his part. We therefore have to find a different reason to explain Moses becoming angry at the sons of Aaron. The reason had to be the failure of the sons of Aaron and Aaron himself to request a ruling from Moses before deciding to burn the meat. Moses' anger caused him to rule incorrectly and to tell them to eat the meat. Moses was convinced at the time that he had ruled correctly and that the sacrificial meat was fit for consumption by priests in their condition. (The author adds: "Rabbi Chananiah's reasoning is not compatible with the explanation I gave earlier that Moses simply told Aaron that he had good reason to rule differently from him and was in doubt about the issue").

Rav Yehudah did not want to contradict Rabbi Chananiah outright and to reject his explanation as wrong. All he wanted to do was to come to the defence of Moses by pointing out that error need not necessarily be the result of anger. He did so because one can argue that anger is more of a negative virtue than forgetting something one has been told by G'd. It may therefore be preferable to explain what happened in terms of Moses simply having forgotten a relevant הלכה. When he realised he had forgotten the הלכה, Moses became angry once he had the feeling that Aaron and his sons had not acted in accordance with G'd's will. His anger had nothing whatsoever to do with his own honour or dignity. Rav Yehudah did not feel that this explanation was the only possible one; rather he felt that it was no less likely than that offfered by Rabbi Chananiah. After all, one could explain Moses' anger without implicating him in something unbecoming and one could explain his forgetting without Moses' image suffering much in our eyes as a result. This is why Rav Yehudah did not voice his dissent until after Rabbi Chananiah had died. Rabbi Chananiah had not shared Rav Yehudah's view that one could allow for both considerations but insisted that Moses' error could only be explained in terms of his having first become angry. The text of the Sifri states: הרני כמשיב על דבריו meaning that Rav Yehudah appeared to dissent. [Our text of the Sifri does not have the letter כ mentioned by the author. Ed.] This version of the text is compatible with the view we have expressed. One may also understand Rav Yehudah as having most definitely held the view that Moses only became angry because he had erred and presumed that Aaron and his sons had sinned by burning the meat. One may err by simply not concentrating on a problem, i.e. by הסח הדעת, being absent-minded. This is something quite inadvertent. One cannot, however, become angry and be absent-minded at the same time. Anger, by definition, implies that one has one's mind on the subject of one's anger. Whereas a sin associated with anger is one that is considered מזיד, the result of an action one is aware of, the same is not the case when the sin is the result of one's having forgotten something. Furthermore, if we say that Moses erred, i.e. forgot something, the result of his forgetting did not result in a sin occurring at all. If we perceive Moses as having been irritated by the actions of Aaron and his sons his anger was caused by this and this anger was an outright sin. Rav Yehudah chose to portray Moses' anger as having been caused by an error not by his irritation. In this way he helped us maintain a better image of Moses. If he said that he disagreed with Rabbi Chananiah after the latter's death, this did not mean that he had not voiced his disagreement during his lifetime, but that even after Rabbi Chananiah's death he still felt that he had to go on record as disagreeing with Rabbi Chananiah. Alternatively, Rav Yehudah may have not voiced his dissent until after Rabbi Chananiah died because he was afraid that Rabbi Chananiah would offer proof that he was right, something he could no longer do after he had died.