Êxodo 21:33 Midrash: Sifrei Bamidbar & Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael

(Bamidbar 5:5-6) "And the L-rd spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel: A man or a woman, if they do of all the sins of man": Why is this section mentioned? (i.e., it has already been mentioned elsewhere.) — It is written (Vayikra 5:20-22) "If a soul sin and commit a profanation against the L-rd … or if he find a lost object and swear falsely, etc." But the stolen property of a proselyte is not mentioned. It is, therefore, written (here) "Speak to the children of Israel: A man or a woman, if they do all of the sins of man." Scripture comes to teach us about the stolen property of a proselyte that if one swore to him falsely (that he did not steal it) and the proselyte died, he pays the principal and the fifth to the Cohanim and the guilt-offering to the altar, (a proselyte, halachically, not having any heirs). This is a rule in the Torah: Any section stated in one place in the Torah, missing one thing, and repeated in a different place is repeated only for the sake of the thing that is originated. R. Akiva says: Everything stated therein must be expounded. R. Yoshiyah (in explication of R. Akiva) says: Why is "a man or a woman" stated? From (Shemot 21:3) "And if a man open a pit or if a man dig a pit," I would know only of a man. Whence would I derive (the same for) a woman? From "a man or a woman," to liken a woman to a man in respect to all transgressions and damages in the Torah. R. Yonathan says: (The above derivation) is not needed, for it is already written (Ibid. 34) "The owner (whether man or woman) of the pit shall pay," and (Ibid. 22:5) "Pay shall pay the kindler (whether man or woman) of the fire." Why, then, is it stated "a man or a woman"? For its (own) teaching, (i.e., that the law of theft of the proselyte" obtains both with men and with women.) "if they do all of the sins of man to commit a profanation against the L-rd": Why is this stated? (i.e., it is already written [Vayikra 5:21] "If a soul sin and commit a profanation, etc.") Because it is written "If a soul sin and commit a profanation… (22) or find a lost object, etc.", I might think that only one who lies in respect to what is mentioned therein is regarded as one who lies against the L-rd Himself. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who lies in respect to all other things? It is, therefore, written "if they do all of the sins of man to commit a profanation against the L-rd." "to commit a profanation" ("limol ma'al"). "me'ilah" in all places is "lying." And thus is it written (I Chronicles 5:25) "Vayimalu ('and they lied') against the G-d of their fathers," and (Joshua 7:1) "And the children of Israel yimalu ma'al ('falsified') in respect to the ban," and (I Chronicles 10:13) "And Saul died because of his falsification ('bima'alo ma'al') against the L-rd." And, in respect to Uzziyahu (II Chronicles 26:18), "Leave the sanctuary, for you have acted falsely (ma'alta')," and (Bamidbar 5:12) "… and she be false (uma'ala) to him" — whence we see that "me'ilah" is "lying." (Ibid. 6) "and that soul shall be guilty": Why is this stated? (i.e., it seems redundant.) "a man or a woman" would seem to indicate specifically these. Whence would I derive (the same for) one whose sex is unknown or a hermaphrodite? From "and that soul shall be guilty" — All are included, even proselytes and servants. — But this would seem to include all, both the above and minors! — Would you say this? If a minor is exempt from (punishment for) the grave sin of idolatry, how much more so (is he exempt from punishment for) all the mitzvoth of the Torah! Whence is it derived that if one stole and swore (falsely) and went to bring the money (to repay) and the guilt-offering and could not manage to bring them before he died, that his heirs are exempt? From "and that soul shall be guilty." — But perhaps just as they are exempt from the guilt-offering, so, they are exempt from the principal. — It is, therefore, written (Ibid. 7) "and he shall give it (the principal) to the one to whom he is liable (for payment)." "and that soul shall be guilty": Why is this stated? Whence do you derive that if one burned his neighbor's grain sack on the Sabbath that beth-din does not exact payment from him because he is liable to the death penalty? From "and that soul shall be guilty" (i.e., in the aforementioned instance, the life alone is taken.) (Ibid. 7) "and they confess their sin which they have done": This tells me that a sin-offering requires confession. Whence do I derive (the same for) a guilt-offering? From "and that soul be guilty and they confess." R. Nathan says: This is a paradigm (binyan av) for all that are put to death that they require confession.

R. Yoshiyah says: (If men and women are equated,) let neither a man or a woman be stated (in 21:29). "Because it is written (Ibid. 33) "If a man open a pit," this tells me only of a man, whence do I derive (the same for) a woman? From (29) "a man or a woman," to equate a woman with a man for all of the injuries of the Torah.

(Exodus 21:33) "And if a man open a pit": Why is this stated? It can be derived by reason, viz.: Since the ox is his possession and the pit is his possession, then if you have learned that he is liable for his ox, should he not be liable for his pit? No, this may be true of his ox, whose way it is to cause damage, as opposed to his pit, whose way it is not to go and cause and cause damage. It is, therefore, written "And if a man open a pit or if a man dig a pit." Because I have not been able to derive this by reason, it must be stated by itself.