Deuteronômio 14:21 Referências do Talmudee: Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim, Jerusalem Talmud Orlah, Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim & Jerusalem Talmud Nazir

MISHNAH: The following vows are permitted¹Even though they sound like vows, they are not vows.: Profane I would eat with you²Since he vows to eat what is permitted, there is nothing to it.; like pork³As the Halakhah explains, a vow must refer to something which can be a sacrifice. Since swine cannot be sacrificial animals, if he says “what I would eat from you is like pork”, there is no vow and no legal consequence. If he would say, a qônām that what I would eat from you is like pork, he would be forbidden since he referred to the sacrifice., like idolatry, like carcasses⁴Forbidden food, Deut. 14:21., like meat from a torn animal⁵Forbidden food, Ex. 22:30., like abominations⁶Forbidden food, Lev. 11:29 ff., like crawling things⁷Forbidden food, anything not on the list of permitted animals. These are explicitly permitted to Gentiles, Gen. 9:3., like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave⁸Heave and ḥallah, the heave from dough, are holy. Sacrifices can only be brought from sources that are profane before dedication. Therefore, heave and ḥallah cannot become sacrifices. As long as the person making the vow does not mention qorbān or any of its substitutes, there is no vow., are permitted. One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother⁹He says that sexual relations with his wife should be forbidden as they are with his mother. Since his mother cannot be a sacrifice, there is no vow but the rabbi is not permitted to tell him this but must find another reason (e. g., do you realize how much money a divorce would cost you?) to find a cause to annul the vow because people should be made uncomfortable vowing. If the vow is not dissolved within one week, the wife can ask the court to force a divorce; the husband being the guilty party (Mishnah Ketubot 5:6). (Cf. Qor‘an 58:2.), one finds for him an opening from another place that he should not be flippant about this. A qônām that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, or one who says to his wife, a qônām that I shall not sleep with you, he is under the obligation¹⁰Num. 30:3. As long as qorbān or one of its substitutes is not mentioned, sleeping, speaking, and walking are all immaterial and there really is no vow. But since there was intent to make a vow, the verse may be applied (at least by rabbinic standards). “he shall not profanate his word.” An oath that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, he is forbidden¹¹Since an oath does not depend on any material substrate (Chapter 1, Note 4)..

¹⁰The text from here to Note 44 is also in Pesaḥim 2:1, fol. 28c; the parallel in the Babli is Pesaḥim 21b–23a. The discussion is about the prohibition of usufruct of ‘orlah fruits. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar¹¹In the Babli, R. Eleazar is not mentioned. [But the name appears in the Munich ms. of the Babli; added from Addenda and Corrigenda by Guggenheimer]: Everywhere it is written “do not eat, do not eat¹²Singular or plural., it shall not be eaten”, you understand a prohibition of usufruct included in the probition of eating unless the verse comes and explains to you as it did explain about limbs of a living animal and a carcass. What did it explain about limbs of a living animal? (Ex. 22:30) “Flesh torn in the field you shall not eat¹³The verse ends: You shall throw it to the dog. Why is it necessary to permit torn limbs as dog food? R. Eleazar argues that this shows that without such permission the limb would be forbidden for all usufruct..” And what did it explain about a carcass? (Deut. 14:21) “Do not eat any carcass; to the sojourner in your gates you shall give it and he may eat it.” Hizqiah stated a disagreement¹⁴In the Babli (Pesaḥim 21b), Ḥizqiah accepts the statement of R. Eleazar only for the passive formulation; later (Note 31) this is clarified to be the position of Ḥizqiah and R. Joḥanan in a second version. In this first version, Ḥizqiah must hold that an inference from a verse is only valid if there is no second verse leading to the same result. The theoretical basis is the recognition that the legal texts in the Torah are incomplete and sometimes contradictory as a system. In addition, it is held that words do not change their meaning in legal contexts. Therefore, a mechanism of translation of the Torah text into a coherent and reasonably complete system must exist. The rule appealed to by Ḥizqiah is one of the translation rules; cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Ph. Longworth (ed.), Confrontations with Judaism (London 1966) pp. 171–196.
Since here the torn limb and the carcass both lead to the same argument, one of them would be superfluous and, therefore, both must be needed for other inferences. The argument of R. Eleazar is refuted.. What does one forbid to the dog?

¹⁶The text from here to Note 64 also is in Orlah 3:1, Notes 10–44, ע. It seems that the origin of the text is in Pesaḥim since only here the verses are quoted in full and an important sentence is missing in ע. In the Babli, the parallel is 21b–23a. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar¹⁷In the printed editions of the Babli, R. Eleazar is not mentioned, but his name appears in the Munich ms.: Everywhere it is written do not eat, do not eat¹⁸Plural., it shall not be eaten, you understand a prohibition of usufruct included in the prohibition of eating unless the verse is explicit and explains to you as it did explain about limbs of a living animal and a carcass. What did it explain about limbs of a living animal? Flesh torn in the field you shall not eat; throw it to the dog¹⁹Ex. 22:30. Why is it necessary to permit torn limbs as dog food? R. Eleazar argues that this shows that without such permission the limb would be forbidden for all usufruct.. And what did it explain about a carcass? Do not eat any carcass; to the sojourner in your gates you shall give it and he may eat it, or sell to the stranger.²⁰Deut. 14:21. Ḥizqiah stated a disagreement²¹In the Babli 21b, Ḥizqiah accepts the statement of R. Eleazar only for the passive formulation; later (Note 48) this is clarified to be the position of Ḥizqiah and R. Joḥanan in a second version. In this first version, Ḥizqiah must hold that an inference from a verse is only valid if there is no second verse leading to the same result. The theoretical basis is the recognition that the legal texts in the Torah are incomplete and sometimes contradictory as a system. In addition, it is held that words do not change their meaning in legal contexts. Therefore, a mechanism of translation of the Torah text into a coherent and reasonably complete system must exist. The rule quoted by Ḥizqiah is one of the translation rules; cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Ph. Longworth (ed.), Confrontations with Judaism (London 1966) pp. 171–196.
Since here the mention of the torn limb and the carcass both lead to the same argument, either one of them would be superfluous and, therefore, both must be needed for other inferences. The argument of R. Eleazar is refuted.. What does one forbid to the dog²²The dog is not a human and is not obliged by any rules.?