וַעֲשִׂ֣יתֶם ל֔וֹ כַּאֲשֶׁ֥ר זָמַ֖ם לַעֲשׂ֣וֹת לְאָחִ֑יו וּבִֽעַרְתָּ֥ הָרָ֖ע מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ׃
então fareis a ele conforme planejou fazer a seu irmão, e removerás o mal do vosso meio.
Jerusalem Talmud Makkot
HALAKHAH: “How are plotting witnesses treated,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, everything was included in do not testify against your neighbor as a false witness. As an exception, do to him as he plotted to do to his neighbor. If you can satisfy do to him as he plotted then fulfill (do not testify)7Text of the Leiden ms., to be deleted. [do to him as he plotted to do]8Text of G, to be accepted.. But if you cannot satisfy do to him as he plotted to do to his neighbor then (do not)7Text of the Leiden ms., to be deleted. satisfy do not testify against your neighbor1It is one of the Ten Commandments not to testify falsely. In addition, Deut. 19:16–20 prescribes that a “plotting” false witness has to be punished by the penalty which would have been imposed on his victim had his testimony been found true. By rabbinic definition, a “plotting” witness is one whose testimony not only is false but shown to be impossible, in that there are witnesses to the fact that he testified to be eye witness of a fact which he could not have seen since at the time it was supposed to have happened he was at another place (Sanhedrin Chapter 5, Note 3). There are cases when plotting perjury is proven but the penalty cannot be imposed. Then the false witness must be punished for breaking the Eighth Commandment, which is the standard punishment decreed for breaking any prohibition for which the penalty was not specified, fixed in Deut. 25:3 as at most 40 lashes (which, because the court marshal might err in his count, is limited to 39 lashes).
The Babli (2b) disagrees with this explanation; it classifies simple perjury as “actionless crime” for which no penalty is possible; this clearly is not the Yerushalmi’s position (cf. Ketubot 4:4 Note 196.). Another explanation: Do to him, not to his descendants3If the witness is not a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would not change his status at all. If he is a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would punish not only him but also his descendants, against the biblical text as explained in the Halakhah..
The Babli (2b) disagrees with this explanation; it classifies simple perjury as “actionless crime” for which no penalty is possible; this clearly is not the Yerushalmi’s position (cf. Ketubot 4:4 Note 196.). Another explanation: Do to him, not to his descendants3If the witness is not a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would not change his status at all. If he is a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would punish not only him but also his descendants, against the biblical text as explained in the Halakhah..
Jerusalem Talmud Makkot
Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, if two alternatives are presented to the court, one chooses one of them9As a general principle, no crime can be punished by more than one punishment. There never can be separate penalties for testifying falsely (Ex.20:13) and plotting (Deut. 19:19). This justifies the alternative presented in the preceding paragraph.
The text is copied from Terumot 7:1 Note 14; also Bava qamma 7:2, Note 30.. This excludes matters in the Power of Heaven10This sentence refers to the topic in Terumot; it is irrelevant here..
The text is copied from Terumot 7:1 Note 14; also Bava qamma 7:2, Note 30.. This excludes matters in the Power of Heaven10This sentence refers to the topic in Terumot; it is irrelevant here..
Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth10Lev. 24:20, speaking of payment for either animal or man..” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.11Deut. 19:21, 25:12.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones12Cf. Sifry Deut. 293. The quote Deut. 19:21 refers to the punishment of the perjured witnesses. Since in injury cases the false accuser wanted to extort money and therefore would have to pay money, it is concluded that Deut. 25:12 which prescribes punishment for intentional injury also must mean payment of money. Therefore Lev. 24:20 refers to payment for unintentional injury.. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent]13Text missing in the Leiden ms., supplied from E and supported by the Genizah text. he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”14Deut. 19:19, referring to the punishment of perjured witnesses. The quote is confirmed by all three ms. sources but probably the reference should be to Lev. 23:19: “As a person injures another, so should be done to him”. The Babli, 84a, in quoting a similar baraita refers to Lev. 24:22: “A uniform law shall it be for you”; cf. also Sifra Emor Pereq 20(7).? This indicates that he only pays money.