אַךְ־כָּל־חֵ֡רֶם אֲשֶׁ֣ר יַחֲרִם֩ אִ֨ישׁ לַֽיהוָ֜ה מִכָּל־אֲשֶׁר־ל֗וֹ מֵאָדָ֤ם וּבְהֵמָה֙ וּמִשְּׂדֵ֣ה אֲחֻזָּת֔וֹ לֹ֥א יִמָּכֵ֖ר וְלֹ֣א יִגָּאֵ֑ל כָּל־חֵ֕רֶם קֹֽדֶשׁ־קָֽדָשִׁ֥ים ה֖וּא לַיהוָֽה׃
Contudo, qualquer coisa devotada que alguém devotar a יהוה, seja de homem, animal ou campo de sua herança, não poderá ser vendida nem resgatada; toda coisa devotada será santíssima para יהוה.
Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim
MISHNAH: All substitute names1Since vows and oaths are sacral acts, the invocation of vow or oath is automatically the invocation of God’s Name. Just as God’s Name should not be invoked in vain, the people shied away from using the expressions “vow, making a vow” or “oath, swearing”. As explained in the next Note, one of the oblique references to a vow was the word qorbān and its substitute, as given in Mishnah 2. of vows2Making a vow is taking on an obligation. There are three kinds of vows found in talmudic literature.
A person may vow to bring a sacrifice or to give a certain sum to the Temple. This is a relatively simple matter since (Mishnah Qiddšin 1:6) “speaking to Higher Powers is like delivering to a human”; i. e., a promise to God is as final as delivering the merchandise in a commercial transaction. Therefore, these vows are only a minor topic in the present tractate.
A person may make a vow to become a nazir for a certain time; then he is required to abstain from grapes and grape products as well as from becoming impure by the impurity of the dead, and he must let his hair grow. This kind of vow is discussed in Tractate Nazir.
The main topic of Tractate Nedarim is “any vow or oath of prohibition to deprive oneself” (Num. 30:14), i. e., a vow in which a person for any reason prohibits to himself things which otherwise are permitted. One may also make a vow to forbid certain actions to oneself but the actions must be forbidden as things are forbidden. (Self-flagellation is forbidden in Judaism since inflicting any wound on oneself is forbidden except for medical purposes, Mishnah Baba qama 8:5.) Since an animal which was dedicated as a sacrifice is forbidden for any profane use, it became general practice to say about anything of which one wanted to prohibit all use for himself “this is qorbān for me”, or simply qorbān “sacrifice”. Therefore, if in Math. 15:5 it is noted that a son can say to his parents that all he possesses should be qorbān for them; on the surface it is the height of mistreatment of the parents if the son prohibits them any use whatsoever of his property and even prohibits himself to help his parents in any way. The rabbinic answer would be that if the son goes off to fight as a guerilla against the Romans, or the Herodian government, cutting off all ties might save his parents’ property from confiscation. (Cf. Peah 1:1, Note 113, about the unpredictability of the duty to honor father and mother: “Somebody might serve his father fattened meat and go to hell; another might bind his father to the grindstone and go to paradise.”) The vow could also be in error, cf. Mishnah 3:2. Chapter 4 shows that a person forbidding his property to another can nevertheless take care of that other person. Cf. also Chapter 9, Note 38.
{In Math. 15:5, Jesus complains that Pharisees declare a person free from prosecution (פָּטוּר) if he violates the commandment to honor and fear father and mother by maliciously forbidding his property to them. The pharisaic rule in question is that “a prohibition violated without an action is not prosecutable” (Babli Sanhedrin 63a/b). Speech is not counted as an action in this respect. The rule is opposed by R. Jehudah who in many cases represents older traditions (from his father’s teacher R. Eliezer.) The testimony of Math. shows that in this case, the majority opinion is the historic position. R. Jehudah’s position is that of the Qumran community in the Manual of Discipline and the Damascus Document.} are like vows, of bans3“Ban” is the irrevocable gift of property to the Temple, Lev. 27:28. like bans, of oaths4An oath is subject-related, in contrast to a vow which is object-related. If a person prohibits himself to eat any bread, that is an oath of deprivation. If he prohibits the use of a specified loaf, or even any loaf, on himself, that is a vow of deprivation. like oaths, of nazir vows5While this is also a vow of deprivation it follows its own rules, Num. 6:1–21. like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you6Here starts the detailed explanation of what substitute names are. All expressions in this sentence are examples of נדר הנאה “a vow [to forbid] usufruct”, in which A tells B that all of B’s property is forbidden to A as if it were a sacrifice or sacred property and A’s property to B.., I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden7All of B’s property, not only his food.. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt8R. Aqiba decided that, while the exact meaning of “excommunicated” in this context is unknown since the use of a judicial term by a private person is inappropriate, the most extensive interpretation must be adopted.. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath9This sentence is very elliptic. Since the nazir prohibits vines and all their products for himself and he needs atonement for his status (Num. 6:11) one concludes (Nedarim 1:1, 36d 1. 50; Babli 10a) that it is essentially sinful to deprive oneself from permitted enjoyments. It follows that just people do not make vows of deprivation or nezirut. They also do not make vows of sacrifices since such a vow implies that the person will be financially responsible until a correct sacrifice has been presented in the Temple. Responsible people offer free-will gifts in which they designate an animal as sacrifice; if anything should happen to that animal before it is sacrificed he is not obligated to offer a replacement.
Since the wicked do make vows and swear, any expression of vow or oath declared to be in the form used by the wicked has to be interpreted to imply a maximum obligation. Still, somebody who simply says that he makes a vow of the wicked is not obligated for anything unless some object on which the vow could fall was before him at that moment. For example, if a loaf of bread was before him and he said, this loaf is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is forbidden to eat that loaf. If a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days.. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything10Since good people do not make vows nor do they swear.. As their freewill gifts11If somebody said, this loaf of bread is to me as a free-will gift of a just person, he means that for him it is qorbān and therefore forbidden for all usufruct. Similarly, if a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a free-will gift of the just, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days., he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
A person may vow to bring a sacrifice or to give a certain sum to the Temple. This is a relatively simple matter since (Mishnah Qiddšin 1:6) “speaking to Higher Powers is like delivering to a human”; i. e., a promise to God is as final as delivering the merchandise in a commercial transaction. Therefore, these vows are only a minor topic in the present tractate.
A person may make a vow to become a nazir for a certain time; then he is required to abstain from grapes and grape products as well as from becoming impure by the impurity of the dead, and he must let his hair grow. This kind of vow is discussed in Tractate Nazir.
The main topic of Tractate Nedarim is “any vow or oath of prohibition to deprive oneself” (Num. 30:14), i. e., a vow in which a person for any reason prohibits to himself things which otherwise are permitted. One may also make a vow to forbid certain actions to oneself but the actions must be forbidden as things are forbidden. (Self-flagellation is forbidden in Judaism since inflicting any wound on oneself is forbidden except for medical purposes, Mishnah Baba qama 8:5.) Since an animal which was dedicated as a sacrifice is forbidden for any profane use, it became general practice to say about anything of which one wanted to prohibit all use for himself “this is qorbān for me”, or simply qorbān “sacrifice”. Therefore, if in Math. 15:5 it is noted that a son can say to his parents that all he possesses should be qorbān for them; on the surface it is the height of mistreatment of the parents if the son prohibits them any use whatsoever of his property and even prohibits himself to help his parents in any way. The rabbinic answer would be that if the son goes off to fight as a guerilla against the Romans, or the Herodian government, cutting off all ties might save his parents’ property from confiscation. (Cf. Peah 1:1, Note 113, about the unpredictability of the duty to honor father and mother: “Somebody might serve his father fattened meat and go to hell; another might bind his father to the grindstone and go to paradise.”) The vow could also be in error, cf. Mishnah 3:2. Chapter 4 shows that a person forbidding his property to another can nevertheless take care of that other person. Cf. also Chapter 9, Note 38.
{In Math. 15:5, Jesus complains that Pharisees declare a person free from prosecution (פָּטוּר) if he violates the commandment to honor and fear father and mother by maliciously forbidding his property to them. The pharisaic rule in question is that “a prohibition violated without an action is not prosecutable” (Babli Sanhedrin 63a/b). Speech is not counted as an action in this respect. The rule is opposed by R. Jehudah who in many cases represents older traditions (from his father’s teacher R. Eliezer.) The testimony of Math. shows that in this case, the majority opinion is the historic position. R. Jehudah’s position is that of the Qumran community in the Manual of Discipline and the Damascus Document.} are like vows, of bans3“Ban” is the irrevocable gift of property to the Temple, Lev. 27:28. like bans, of oaths4An oath is subject-related, in contrast to a vow which is object-related. If a person prohibits himself to eat any bread, that is an oath of deprivation. If he prohibits the use of a specified loaf, or even any loaf, on himself, that is a vow of deprivation. like oaths, of nazir vows5While this is also a vow of deprivation it follows its own rules, Num. 6:1–21. like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you6Here starts the detailed explanation of what substitute names are. All expressions in this sentence are examples of נדר הנאה “a vow [to forbid] usufruct”, in which A tells B that all of B’s property is forbidden to A as if it were a sacrifice or sacred property and A’s property to B.., I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden7All of B’s property, not only his food.. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt8R. Aqiba decided that, while the exact meaning of “excommunicated” in this context is unknown since the use of a judicial term by a private person is inappropriate, the most extensive interpretation must be adopted.. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath9This sentence is very elliptic. Since the nazir prohibits vines and all their products for himself and he needs atonement for his status (Num. 6:11) one concludes (Nedarim 1:1, 36d 1. 50; Babli 10a) that it is essentially sinful to deprive oneself from permitted enjoyments. It follows that just people do not make vows of deprivation or nezirut. They also do not make vows of sacrifices since such a vow implies that the person will be financially responsible until a correct sacrifice has been presented in the Temple. Responsible people offer free-will gifts in which they designate an animal as sacrifice; if anything should happen to that animal before it is sacrificed he is not obligated to offer a replacement.
Since the wicked do make vows and swear, any expression of vow or oath declared to be in the form used by the wicked has to be interpreted to imply a maximum obligation. Still, somebody who simply says that he makes a vow of the wicked is not obligated for anything unless some object on which the vow could fall was before him at that moment. For example, if a loaf of bread was before him and he said, this loaf is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is forbidden to eat that loaf. If a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days.. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything10Since good people do not make vows nor do they swear.. As their freewill gifts11If somebody said, this loaf of bread is to me as a free-will gift of a just person, he means that for him it is qorbān and therefore forbidden for all usufruct. Similarly, if a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a free-will gift of the just, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days., he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.
Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written12Num. 30:3. “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,13Lev. 27:28.” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir14Num. 6:2.”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. 15Cf. Yebamot 8:1, Note 72, Babli Avodah zarah 27a (and another 18 times without attribution). The quotes are from speeches of Laban and Joseph in Gen. which have no legal implications. This proves that the repetitions are a matter of style. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “12Num. 30:3. Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths16The second half of the verse is clearly written for emphasis. It implies (a) that a vow is valid only if pronounced, not if only thought of and (b) that any speech which can be interpreted as a vow is a vow.
The Babli, 3a/b, quotes both the argument in the style of R. Aqiba and that of R. Ismael without mentioning any names.. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”17This is an application of the second hermeneutical rule of gezerah šawah “equal cut”. If it was established in Num. 30:3 that “vow” means “anything that implies a vow” and in Lev. 27:2 any dedication to the Temple, including bans, is classified as “vow”, it follows that anything which implies a ban is a ban.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”18Again this is an application of gezerah šawah, but this time the reference quote is Num. 6:2, cf. Note 14.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths19This reference is odd since the argument is about vows, not oaths. One has to assume that the scribe left out the relevant portion of the sentence which should be identical to the one used in the preceding case., “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
The Babli, 3a/b, quotes both the argument in the style of R. Aqiba and that of R. Ismael without mentioning any names.. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”17This is an application of the second hermeneutical rule of gezerah šawah “equal cut”. If it was established in Num. 30:3 that “vow” means “anything that implies a vow” and in Lev. 27:2 any dedication to the Temple, including bans, is classified as “vow”, it follows that anything which implies a ban is a ban.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”18Again this is an application of gezerah šawah, but this time the reference quote is Num. 6:2, cf. Note 14.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths19This reference is odd since the argument is about vows, not oaths. One has to assume that the scribe left out the relevant portion of the sentence which should be identical to the one used in the preceding case., “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim
Now estimates26A person who offers to pay to the Temple the monetary value of his person, Lev. 27:1–8, which in general is a fixed sum but becomes an estimate for poor persons., bans, exchanges27Exchanging a dedicated animal for another, Lev. 27:9–10., and dedications28Giving non-sacrificial animals or any other valuables to the Temple to cover its expenses, Lev. 27:11–25. were in the same paragraph29Lev. 27, where bans are treated in v. 28. Why should bans be treated differently from all other categories of gifts?, but we did not state ‘substitute names of estimates, substitute names of exchanges and dedications.’ But if these were stated, what would we state30Recognized substitutes for vows, bans, nazir vows, and oaths are listed in Mishnah 2. The other dedications do not have recognized substitute names. The hypothetical names quoted in the sequel are built on the linguistic pattern of the accepted ones but either they make no sense or they have a sense very far from the intended one. Since they are not part of the current vocabulary as substitute names, they cannot be used.? ‘Araphin, ‘araṣin, ‘araqin31“Disappearances”.? Temupha, temuna32“Picture”., temuqa? Hegder, hegzer, hegres33The substitution of גּ for ק in this series shows that the pronunciation of q was close to that of Arabic ق.. It is understandable following him who says, unspecified bans are for the support of the Temple34If bans are gifts to the Temple they are gifts to God and, as stated in Note 2, they become absolute the moment the intention to give is declared. Therefore, substitute names which are in common use are as effective as the explicit mention of the word “ban”. But if an unspecified ban is intended for Cohanim (the majority opinion in Mishnah ‘Arakhin 8:6), the collection of the gift is a money transaction between Cohanim and the giver, subject to the rule that “the proof is on the claimant” (Sanhedrin 3:9, 21b 1. 70; Babli Baba qama 46b). The Cohanim would have to prove that the putative giver in his use of the substitute words really did intend to refer to bans. This proof seems almost impossible. Therefore, substitute bans could not be like bans and the Mishnah here must be interpreted as supporting the opinion that unspecified bans are for the Temple.. But according to him who says, unspecified bans are for the priests? Why did we not state ‘substitute names for heave’? But if it were stated, what would we state30Recognized substitutes for vows, bans, nazir vows, and oaths are listed in Mishnah 2. The other dedications do not have recognized substitute names. The hypothetical names quoted in the sequel are built on the linguistic pattern of the accepted ones but either they make no sense or they have a sense very far from the intended one. Since they are not part of the current vocabulary as substitute names, they cannot be used.? Terupha35“Medicine”., teruṣa, teruqa?