וְאִ֨ם כָּל־עֲדַ֤ת יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ יִשְׁגּ֔וּ וְנֶעְלַ֣ם דָּבָ֔ר מֵעֵינֵ֖י הַקָּהָ֑ל וְ֠עָשׂוּ אַחַ֨ת מִכָּל־מִצְוֺ֧ת יְהוָ֛ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־תֵעָשֶׂ֖ינָה וְאָשֵֽׁמוּ׃
E se toda a congregação de Yisrael errar, e algo for oculto dos olhos da assembleia, e fizerem algo contra qualquer dos mandamentos de יהוה que não devem ser feitos, e forem culpados:
Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim
MISHNAH: For what was the disbursement used? One buys from it daily and musaf sacrifices and their libations, the `omer1The offering of barley grain on the 16th of Nisan to permit consumption of grain from the new harvest; Lev. 23:9–14., and the Two Breads2The two leavened breads on Pentecost, Lev. 23:17., and the shew-bread3Seven breads every week, Lev. 24:5–9., and all public offerings4Including incense and public reparation offerings (Lev. 4:13–21.). The watchmen for aftergrowth in the sabbatical year5Since the `omer and the Two Breads have to be produce of the Land, and no sowing is permitted in a Sabbatical, the grains have to be harvested from spontaneous aftergrowth. Fields from which such a yield is expected have to be watched lest the plants be eaten by animals or the grains be taken by humans. In this case the watch is an essential precondition for the possibility of the offering and therefore the expenses have to be borne by the Temple. take their wages from the disbursement from the lodge. Rebbi Yose says, he also may volunteer as unpaid trustee6Even though the unpaid trustee acquires rights to what he is watching, R. Yose holds that private property may be donated to the Temple as public offering.. They told him, would you not also say that they only come from the public7The Sages deny that private property may be donated to the Temple as public offering. “They” are public offerings. Therefore the argument cannot be intended to convince R. Yose; rather it is a statement clarifying that they insist that only fully paid watchmen are acceptable.?
Jerusalem Talmud Horayot
22Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz., the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Lev. 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable23To bring the sacrifice. for something24An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them25They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden26Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. 27There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew28Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges29One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times30R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Ševuot 14b, Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, 31Returning to our topic, Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable23To bring the sacrifice. for something24An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them25They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden26Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. 27There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew28Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges29One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times30R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Ševuot 14b, Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, 31Returning to our topic, Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.
Jerusalem Talmud Horayot
Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says55Lev. 4:27., [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them)56The text is a baraita in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err(Lev. 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull57A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat58This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption59Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.? The statement of a baraita60Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him18Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions8The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed61If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed61If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..