Talmud sobre Números 30:4

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. ²A similar argument in the Babli, 67a/b. In both Talmudim, the argument is amoraic. It is written³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written⁴Num. 30:11. “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written⁵Num. 30:4. “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ.” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

⁴⁸A baraita similar to this one is quoted and explained in the Babli Šebuot 20a.“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’⁴⁹Num. 30:4: “If she be married to a man and her vows are on her or the expression of her lips which she forbade on herself.” Since “expression” is opposed to “vows”, it must refer to oaths. Similarly, “to express with one’s lips” is used for “to swear an oath” in Lev. 5:4; cf. Šebuot 20a., is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is⁵⁰It seems that “not” has fallen out here. The two cases will be explained below. a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”?⁵¹First one states that ‘prohibition’ is an expression of an oath. Then one argues ‘if it is an oath’, ‘if it is not an oath’. This contradicts the first statement. Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm⁵²The first two sentences have one author, the last two a different one.. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna⁵³The baraita, as one would reasonably expect, is from one author. But the implicit verb in the first two sentences should not be read as “is” but as “may be”.. If he said it in the language of a vow⁵⁴That he forbids the object for himself. you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath⁵⁵That he forbids himself the use of the object. Since “prohibition” is applied to both vows and oaths, the meaning of the word is determined by the syntax of the sentence in which it is used; cf. Note 4. you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath⁵⁶Violating a vow is a prohibition which, if proved in court by two witnesses, might subject the perpetrator to punishment by whipping. Even if the violation was inadvertent, there never is a possibility of a sacrifice. But inadvertently violating an oath imposes on the perpetrator the duty to offer a reparation or a purification offering in the Temple, Lev. 5:1–13.. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves⁵⁷Multiple guilt (multiple sacrifices) are possible only for multiple objects of prohibitions, not for repeated prohibitions of the same object.. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver⁵⁸If somebody made an oath to the effect that he would not eat a certain food, that food is forbidden to him as if it were cadaver meat, forbidden to any Jew.. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items⁴⁰Mishnah 2:2: “A vow that I shall not build a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I will not wear phylacteries: vows are forbidden, oaths permitted, for one cannot swear to break religious obligations.” If somebody makes a vow that religious objects should be forbidden to him (as if they were dedicated sacrifices), he commits a twofold sin in making a frivolous vow and breaking biblical commandments, but what he did is done. But if he swears that he will not fulfill his religious obligations, the oath is invalid since, in the language of the Babli, “he already is under oath from Mount Sinai”, and a valid oath cannot be superseded by another oath. Since visiting the sick is a religious obligation, if the prohibition of usufruct is interpreted as an oath it should be nonexistent in the case of a visit to a sick person. No answer is given since practice follows R. Joḥanan.. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated⁵⁹Tosephta Šebuot 2:4, referred to in Babli Šebuot 28b., “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement⁶⁰If he swore falsely that he had not eaten, he committed the sin of a false oath. Since that oath does not forbid anything, each statement stands on its own and subjects him to the punishment for swearing falsely.; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once⁶¹The first oath established the prohibition; the following oaths are futile, forbidden in the Third Commandment, but not triggering any obligation of sacrifice..” Rebbi Yudan said⁶²He explains the prior statement “If you say prohibition is not a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.”, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions⁶³Since vows are subject related, if he forbade himself the use of a loaf, he may later declare the loaf to have the status of qorbān, to add the prohibition of sacrilege to the prohibition of eating. But if he first declared the loaf to be qorbān, it is automatically forbidden to him and no oath can increase the degree of prohibition. Therefore, the oath following the vow is a futile oath..