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וְאַתֶּ֗ם חֲנ֛וּ מִח֥וּץ לַֽמַּחֲנֶ֖ה שִׁבְעַ֣ת יָמִ֑ים כֹּל֩ הֹרֵ֨ג נֶ֜פֶשׁ וְכֹ֣ל ׀ נֹגֵ֣עַ בֶּֽחָלָ֗ל תִּֽתְחַטְּא֞וּ בַּיּ֤וֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי֙ וּבַיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִ֔י אַתֶּ֖ם וּשְׁבִיכֶֽם׃
И станьте без лагеря семь дней; всякий, кто убил кого-либо и кто прикоснулся к любому убитому, очистите себя на третий и седьмой день, вы и ваши пленники.
Rashi on Numbers
מחוץ למחנה [AND ABIDE YE] OUTSIDE THE CAMP — This means that they should not enter the forecourt of the Sanctuary (the מחנה שכינה cf. Rashi on 5:2).
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Ramban on Numbers
WHOSOEVER HATH KILLED ANY PERSON, AND WHOSOEVER HATH TOUCHED ANY SLAIN, [PURIFY YOURSELVES ON THE THIRD DAY AND ON THE SEVENTH DAY]. “Rabbi Meir says: Scripture is speaking about someone who killed with an object which is susceptible of impurity, and the verse [here] teaches you that the object [i.e., the weapon] renders the person impure through [indirect] contact with the corpse as if he had touched the corpse itself.82The implication is that the sword is itself “a progenitor of fathers of impurity” like the corpse, and the person who touches the sword becomes a “father of impurity,” who is rendered impure and may not enter the Divine camp for seven days. See above, Seder Chukath, Note 40. I might think that even if he shot an arrow at him and killed him [the same law applies]; Scripture therefore says, and whosoever hath killed any person [and whosoever hath touched any slain].83Verse 19. Thus it compares a person who kills to a person who touches. Just as he who touches [is rendered impure] by virtue of that contact [with the corpse], so is the person who kills [rendered impure] by virtue of his contact [with the corpse, effected through the weapon he holds in his hand, which contact is non-existent when he shoots an arrow and kills him].” Thus far is the language of Rashi.
But his words are not clear to me. For if he killed with an object which is susceptible to impurity but can be [made pure] by immersion,84This term includes all vessels except those made of earthenware, which, once rendered impure, cannot be purified by immersion in a ritual pool or by any other means. All other vessels can be so purified. then the person touching it does not contract the seven-day period of impurity, nor does he require the sprinkling [of the waters of purification], since the object [with which he killed] becomes “a father of impurity,”85See above, Seder Chukath, Note 40, for an explanation of this subject. and the person who becomes impure through it, becomes a “first degree of impurity” [who is only required to immerse himself in a ritual pool and he becomes pure the evening of that same day; and since the verse here requires a seven-day period of impurity, it cannot be referring to such a case]. And if [he killed him] with a metal instrument, we have already been taught86Above 19:16. See Ramban there. that a sword [or any metal object with which a person is killed] is exactly the same degree of impurity as the dead person himself,82The implication is that the sword is itself “a progenitor of fathers of impurity” like the corpse, and the person who touches the sword becomes a “father of impurity,” who is rendered impure and may not enter the Divine camp for seven days. See above, Seder Chukath, Note 40. and therefore conveys a seven-days’ impurity [to anyone who touches it, so there is no need for our verse to repeat this principle]. And if the Rabbi [Rashi] is of the opinion that since he [the killer] touched the instrument whilst it was itself still in contact with the corpse [then even if it was not a metal object] it renders him impure for a seven-day period just as [if he had touched] the corpse itself — such [conveyance of a stricter degree of] impurity through [indirect] contact is only a law of the Rabbis when the contact is that of objects with a corpse, as is explained in Tractate Neziruth, Chapter Shloshah Minim.87Literally: “Three things” [the opening words of that particular chapter of the Tractate]. The text referred to here is found in Nazir 42b: “But is [the law that the corpse conveys] impurity [to a human being] by contact [with an object which touches the corpse at the same time as touching the human being] a Scriptural law? [It is only a law of the Rabbis!] “It is obvious, therefore, that the Scriptural verses here cannot be speaking of such a case. Hence Rashi’s comment “that the verse [here] teaches you that the object renders the person impure through contact etc.” cannot be the correct explanation of this verse.
But the language of the Rabbis in the Sifre is as follows:88Sifre, Chukath 127. “Rabbi Meir says: Scripture is speaking about someone who killed with an object which is susceptible to impurity, and [teaches us that] it conveys impurity by moving [the corpse, as will be explained further on]. Or I might think that even if he shot an arrow at him and killed him [the same law applies]; Scripture therefore says etc.”89“And whosoever hath killed any person, and whosoever hath touched any slain. Thus it compares etc. “[as quoted by Ramban from Rashi’s commentary]. And the meaning of [this Sifre] is that Rabbi Meir came to deduce from here [the principle] that a human corpse conveys impurity when carried. Thus if he killed him with a walking-stick or a spear, even if it did not consist of metal, and he was “carried,” [i.e., the slain person was moved] through them,90This is known as tumath heset — “the impurity caused by shaking” an impure object [such as n’veilah, or a human corpse] so as to move it from its place. Such movement, even if done in an indirect manner, is sufficient to convey impurity, just as if it had been carried directly. at the time of death, the corpse conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration to the person who “carried” [i.e., moved] it. And when [using the phrase] “an object which is susceptible to impurity,” Rabbi Meir was not referring to a vessel which forms a receptacle [and is therefore susceptible to impurity] but to an object through which the person receives impurity [directly] from the corpse itself,91In other words, Rabbi Meir’s statement [quoted by Rashi] does not refer to a vessel forming a receptacle but to an object through which the person becomes impure from the corpse itself by shifting or shaking it, even if the person did not touch or carry the corpse at all, since causing an impure object to move or to shake is subject to the same law as carrying it. This interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s meaning is made clear by the first part of the Beraitha, which Ramban now brings, and which Rashi did not quote. Ramban in conclusion proceeds to explain that although the anonymous opinion in the first part of the Beraitha agrees with Rabbi Meir on the main principle referred to here, that causing a corpse to move also conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration — they disagree on the process of reasoning which establishes this principle, as Ramban explains. such as by “carrying” [i.e., moving it]. And the beginning of this Beraitha there [in the Sifre] states as follows:88Sifre, Chukath 127. “Whence do we know that it [a corpse] conveys impurity by shaking it? You make use of a kal vachomer:92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. If a dead animal that conveys a non-stringent form of impurity [since it conveys impurity only until the evening of the same day] nonetheless conveys impurity by being moved, is it not logical that a human corpse that conveys a stringent form of impurity [i.e., an impurity of seven-days’ duration] should convey impurity by being moved! But if so [you might argue] that just as there, the impurity conveyed [by moving the dead animal] is only until the evening, so here also [in the case of the human corpse], the impurity conveyed [by moving or shaking it] is only until the evening [of that day ! You must say that this cannot be so. Rather,] you must say that the law of moving it is the same as touching it. Where touching [the source of impurity] renders one impure for a seven-days’ duration [as does touching a corpse], so also does moving it render one impure for a seven-days’ duration, and where touching renders one only impure until the evening [as does touching a dead animal], moving it also renders one impure only until the evening. Rabbi Meir says etc.” From here then, the meaning of the Beraitha becomes apparent, as we have explained it above:91In other words, Rabbi Meir’s statement [quoted by Rashi] does not refer to a vessel forming a receptacle but to an object through which the person becomes impure from the corpse itself by shifting or shaking it, even if the person did not touch or carry the corpse at all, since causing an impure object to move or to shake is subject to the same law as carrying it. This interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s meaning is made clear by the first part of the Beraitha, which Ramban now brings, and which Rashi did not quote. Ramban in conclusion proceeds to explain that although the anonymous opinion in the first part of the Beraitha agrees with Rabbi Meir on the main principle referred to here, that causing a corpse to move also conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration — they disagree on the process of reasoning which establishes this principle, as Ramban explains. Thus the First Sage [i.e., the anonymous Sage of the first part of the Sifre] deduced from a kal vachomer92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. the principle that carrying [or moving] a corpse [without touching it] conveys impurity even for a seven-days’ duration, because he does not adopt [the principle of] dayo,93Literally: “It is sufficient.” This means that it is “sufficient” for a law to be derived by logical conclusion from another law to be only as strict as that law, but it cannot be stricter than the law from which it is derived. Thus, in the case before us, the law that causing a corpse to move conveys impurity, is derived — according to the First Sage of the Beraitha — from the law causing a dead animal to move. Hence if we apply the principle of dayo we must conclude that the impurity conveyed to one by causing a corpse to move is only as strict as causing a dead animal to move, namely, until the same evening. But since the anonymous First Sage recorded in the first half of the Beraitha clearly states that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity, it is clear that he does not accept the principle of dayo. On the other hand, Rabbi Meir who accepts this principle of dayo, cannot therefore derive the law that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity from the kal vachomer of the law of causing a dead animal to move. Hence he derives it from our verse which expressly likens the law of causing a corpse to move with that of touching it, in which latter case the impurity conveyed is that of a seven-days’ duration. This is the gist of Ramban’s explanation. whereas Rabbi Meir derived it from this verse [before us], because since he follows the principle of dayo,93Literally: “It is sufficient.” This means that it is “sufficient” for a law to be derived by logical conclusion from another law to be only as strict as that law, but it cannot be stricter than the law from which it is derived. Thus, in the case before us, the law that causing a corpse to move conveys impurity, is derived — according to the First Sage of the Beraitha — from the law causing a dead animal to move. Hence if we apply the principle of dayo we must conclude that the impurity conveyed to one by causing a corpse to move is only as strict as causing a dead animal to move, namely, until the same evening. But since the anonymous First Sage recorded in the first half of the Beraitha clearly states that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity, it is clear that he does not accept the principle of dayo. On the other hand, Rabbi Meir who accepts this principle of dayo, cannot therefore derive the law that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity from the kal vachomer of the law of causing a dead animal to move. Hence he derives it from our verse which expressly likens the law of causing a corpse to move with that of touching it, in which latter case the impurity conveyed is that of a seven-days’ duration. This is the gist of Ramban’s explanation. therefore he cannot derive it by a kal vachomer92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. [from dead animals], as is stated in Tractate Baba Kamma, Chapter Keitzad Haregel.94Baba Kamma 25a. — The heading of the chapter means literally: “How is the leg” of a beast an attested danger. The Gemara there records a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah whether we accept the principle of dayo, although Rabbi Meir’s name is not specifically mentioned.
But his words are not clear to me. For if he killed with an object which is susceptible to impurity but can be [made pure] by immersion,84This term includes all vessels except those made of earthenware, which, once rendered impure, cannot be purified by immersion in a ritual pool or by any other means. All other vessels can be so purified. then the person touching it does not contract the seven-day period of impurity, nor does he require the sprinkling [of the waters of purification], since the object [with which he killed] becomes “a father of impurity,”85See above, Seder Chukath, Note 40, for an explanation of this subject. and the person who becomes impure through it, becomes a “first degree of impurity” [who is only required to immerse himself in a ritual pool and he becomes pure the evening of that same day; and since the verse here requires a seven-day period of impurity, it cannot be referring to such a case]. And if [he killed him] with a metal instrument, we have already been taught86Above 19:16. See Ramban there. that a sword [or any metal object with which a person is killed] is exactly the same degree of impurity as the dead person himself,82The implication is that the sword is itself “a progenitor of fathers of impurity” like the corpse, and the person who touches the sword becomes a “father of impurity,” who is rendered impure and may not enter the Divine camp for seven days. See above, Seder Chukath, Note 40. and therefore conveys a seven-days’ impurity [to anyone who touches it, so there is no need for our verse to repeat this principle]. And if the Rabbi [Rashi] is of the opinion that since he [the killer] touched the instrument whilst it was itself still in contact with the corpse [then even if it was not a metal object] it renders him impure for a seven-day period just as [if he had touched] the corpse itself — such [conveyance of a stricter degree of] impurity through [indirect] contact is only a law of the Rabbis when the contact is that of objects with a corpse, as is explained in Tractate Neziruth, Chapter Shloshah Minim.87Literally: “Three things” [the opening words of that particular chapter of the Tractate]. The text referred to here is found in Nazir 42b: “But is [the law that the corpse conveys] impurity [to a human being] by contact [with an object which touches the corpse at the same time as touching the human being] a Scriptural law? [It is only a law of the Rabbis!] “It is obvious, therefore, that the Scriptural verses here cannot be speaking of such a case. Hence Rashi’s comment “that the verse [here] teaches you that the object renders the person impure through contact etc.” cannot be the correct explanation of this verse.
But the language of the Rabbis in the Sifre is as follows:88Sifre, Chukath 127. “Rabbi Meir says: Scripture is speaking about someone who killed with an object which is susceptible to impurity, and [teaches us that] it conveys impurity by moving [the corpse, as will be explained further on]. Or I might think that even if he shot an arrow at him and killed him [the same law applies]; Scripture therefore says etc.”89“And whosoever hath killed any person, and whosoever hath touched any slain. Thus it compares etc. “[as quoted by Ramban from Rashi’s commentary]. And the meaning of [this Sifre] is that Rabbi Meir came to deduce from here [the principle] that a human corpse conveys impurity when carried. Thus if he killed him with a walking-stick or a spear, even if it did not consist of metal, and he was “carried,” [i.e., the slain person was moved] through them,90This is known as tumath heset — “the impurity caused by shaking” an impure object [such as n’veilah, or a human corpse] so as to move it from its place. Such movement, even if done in an indirect manner, is sufficient to convey impurity, just as if it had been carried directly. at the time of death, the corpse conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration to the person who “carried” [i.e., moved] it. And when [using the phrase] “an object which is susceptible to impurity,” Rabbi Meir was not referring to a vessel which forms a receptacle [and is therefore susceptible to impurity] but to an object through which the person receives impurity [directly] from the corpse itself,91In other words, Rabbi Meir’s statement [quoted by Rashi] does not refer to a vessel forming a receptacle but to an object through which the person becomes impure from the corpse itself by shifting or shaking it, even if the person did not touch or carry the corpse at all, since causing an impure object to move or to shake is subject to the same law as carrying it. This interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s meaning is made clear by the first part of the Beraitha, which Ramban now brings, and which Rashi did not quote. Ramban in conclusion proceeds to explain that although the anonymous opinion in the first part of the Beraitha agrees with Rabbi Meir on the main principle referred to here, that causing a corpse to move also conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration — they disagree on the process of reasoning which establishes this principle, as Ramban explains. such as by “carrying” [i.e., moving it]. And the beginning of this Beraitha there [in the Sifre] states as follows:88Sifre, Chukath 127. “Whence do we know that it [a corpse] conveys impurity by shaking it? You make use of a kal vachomer:92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. If a dead animal that conveys a non-stringent form of impurity [since it conveys impurity only until the evening of the same day] nonetheless conveys impurity by being moved, is it not logical that a human corpse that conveys a stringent form of impurity [i.e., an impurity of seven-days’ duration] should convey impurity by being moved! But if so [you might argue] that just as there, the impurity conveyed [by moving the dead animal] is only until the evening, so here also [in the case of the human corpse], the impurity conveyed [by moving or shaking it] is only until the evening [of that day ! You must say that this cannot be so. Rather,] you must say that the law of moving it is the same as touching it. Where touching [the source of impurity] renders one impure for a seven-days’ duration [as does touching a corpse], so also does moving it render one impure for a seven-days’ duration, and where touching renders one only impure until the evening [as does touching a dead animal], moving it also renders one impure only until the evening. Rabbi Meir says etc.” From here then, the meaning of the Beraitha becomes apparent, as we have explained it above:91In other words, Rabbi Meir’s statement [quoted by Rashi] does not refer to a vessel forming a receptacle but to an object through which the person becomes impure from the corpse itself by shifting or shaking it, even if the person did not touch or carry the corpse at all, since causing an impure object to move or to shake is subject to the same law as carrying it. This interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s meaning is made clear by the first part of the Beraitha, which Ramban now brings, and which Rashi did not quote. Ramban in conclusion proceeds to explain that although the anonymous opinion in the first part of the Beraitha agrees with Rabbi Meir on the main principle referred to here, that causing a corpse to move also conveys impurity of seven-days’ duration — they disagree on the process of reasoning which establishes this principle, as Ramban explains. Thus the First Sage [i.e., the anonymous Sage of the first part of the Sifre] deduced from a kal vachomer92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. the principle that carrying [or moving] a corpse [without touching it] conveys impurity even for a seven-days’ duration, because he does not adopt [the principle of] dayo,93Literally: “It is sufficient.” This means that it is “sufficient” for a law to be derived by logical conclusion from another law to be only as strict as that law, but it cannot be stricter than the law from which it is derived. Thus, in the case before us, the law that causing a corpse to move conveys impurity, is derived — according to the First Sage of the Beraitha — from the law causing a dead animal to move. Hence if we apply the principle of dayo we must conclude that the impurity conveyed to one by causing a corpse to move is only as strict as causing a dead animal to move, namely, until the same evening. But since the anonymous First Sage recorded in the first half of the Beraitha clearly states that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity, it is clear that he does not accept the principle of dayo. On the other hand, Rabbi Meir who accepts this principle of dayo, cannot therefore derive the law that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity from the kal vachomer of the law of causing a dead animal to move. Hence he derives it from our verse which expressly likens the law of causing a corpse to move with that of touching it, in which latter case the impurity conveyed is that of a seven-days’ duration. This is the gist of Ramban’s explanation. whereas Rabbi Meir derived it from this verse [before us], because since he follows the principle of dayo,93Literally: “It is sufficient.” This means that it is “sufficient” for a law to be derived by logical conclusion from another law to be only as strict as that law, but it cannot be stricter than the law from which it is derived. Thus, in the case before us, the law that causing a corpse to move conveys impurity, is derived — according to the First Sage of the Beraitha — from the law causing a dead animal to move. Hence if we apply the principle of dayo we must conclude that the impurity conveyed to one by causing a corpse to move is only as strict as causing a dead animal to move, namely, until the same evening. But since the anonymous First Sage recorded in the first half of the Beraitha clearly states that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity, it is clear that he does not accept the principle of dayo. On the other hand, Rabbi Meir who accepts this principle of dayo, cannot therefore derive the law that causing a corpse to move conveys a seven-days’ duration of impurity from the kal vachomer of the law of causing a dead animal to move. Hence he derives it from our verse which expressly likens the law of causing a corpse to move with that of touching it, in which latter case the impurity conveyed is that of a seven-days’ duration. This is the gist of Ramban’s explanation. therefore he cannot derive it by a kal vachomer92The syllogism of “a minor and major” [a fortiori argument]. See Ramban, Vol. II, p. 133, Note 208. [from dead animals], as is stated in Tractate Baba Kamma, Chapter Keitzad Haregel.94Baba Kamma 25a. — The heading of the chapter means literally: “How is the leg” of a beast an attested danger. The Gemara there records a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah whether we accept the principle of dayo, although Rabbi Meir’s name is not specifically mentioned.
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Tur HaArokh
ואתם חנו מחוץ למחנה...אתם ושביכם, ”as for you, encamp outside the camp, etc., you and your captives.” Also the captives were required to purify their garments that might have been in contact with the people slain during that campaign [after they were dead, of course. Ed.] All the clothing or vessels made of cloth or hide that were in their possession was subject to the same halachic restrictions as if they had belonged to Israelites in the first place. This was in order that these possessions in turn should not be capable of contaminating things belonging to the Israelites.
This verse enables us to answer the question raised by everybody, why, after the wars against Sichon and Og when an immense amount of loot was captured, did Moses not already command these procedures of purification that the loot had to undergo. Granted that seeing those nations had been part of the seven Canaanite nations, concerning which in the wars against them even pig’s meat had become permitted, there was no need to purify their pots if even the contents of these pots had been permitted. (Compare ואכלת את שלל אויביך, “you may eat the loot captured from your enemies” Deut. 20,14). The Midianites not being Canaanites, the relaxation of these rules of ritual contamination did not apply to them.
Yet another answer to the question raised above, technical in nature, is that when such captured vessels have not been used for over 24 hours, any residue of food remaining in them is presumed to have become repulsive and certainly would not enhance the taste of anything cooked or baked in them now. Therefore, anyone eating from such vessels would not derive any benefit from the forbidden ingredients, the principal reason why these are forbidden. In this instance, the survivors who had been taken prisoners, had still been using their vessels on the way to where the Israelites were encamped, so that the fact that the remnants of food therein had already made the vessels repulsive did not apply. This is also why the Torah did not have to warn that anyone touching a dead body had become ritually contaminated and required seven days of remaining outside the camp of the Levites while undergoing purification rites. This law was well known, but seeing that this legislation was applied for the first time to gentiles, (captives) the Torah reiterated the laws [so that the gentiles would not feel discriminated against? Ed.] Seeing that only 2% of the people had been involved in the campaign it was important to issue the warning that they must not come into contact with their families until after they had completed the purification rites. The reason why these restrictions were not announced in the wars against Sichon and Og, was that when most or all the people have become ritually contaminated many laws of ritual contamination do not apply. [How can you exile most of the population from their homes for a week? Ed.] Seeing that in this instance only 2% of the arms-bearing men took part, things were different.
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