Halakhah sa Deuteronomio 17:6: Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat & Sefer HaChinukh

The Judge should not hear [the pleas of the litigant] from the mouth of an interpreter.²⁸Yad, Sanhedrin XXI, 8. Derived from Mak. 6b: ‘Certain foreigners came (with a lawsuit) before Raba and he appointed an interpreter. How could he act thus? Have we not learnt (in the Mishna a.l. ref. to another interpretation of the words, At the mouth of two witnesses [Deut. XVII, 6]) that the Sanhedrin should not hear (the evidence) from the mouth of an interpreter? — Raba knew well what they were saying but he did not know how to reply.’ Maim. in Yad ibid. explains that the above case (in Mak.) of ‘foreigners’ refers to litigants (note the expression דאתו לקמיה דרבא ‘who came before Raba’), i.e., the Judge must not hear the pleas of the litigants from the mouth of an interpreter, but it does not refer to the witnesses. However, all the commentators state that the above case refers to witnesses (v. RaN ibid.) , W.G. to § 26, 6 infra where the same applies to the witnesses and in reality it refers to witnesses too, since Mak. ibid. (v. Mishna) speaks of witnesses. The underlying reason for the prohibition against hearing the pleas from the mouth of an interpreter is that when the Judge listens to the claims of the litigants directly, he has first hand information and is in a much better position to clarify the case. If the Judge requires no interpreter even to reply, only that one of the litigants desires to have an interpreter repeat his pleas, it is permissible. So too, if the litigant appointed the interpreter to be his mandatory, it is permissible, for then the interpreter has the status of the litigant. In the case of litigants who speak only a foreign language, it is permissible to have an interpreter, for then it is as though they agreed to be tried under these conditions (כקבלו עליהם) — M.E. In monetary cases the prohibition against an interpreter is applicable only in the first instance (לכתחילה. Mak. ibid. deals with capital cases), but ex post facto it is valid — BaḤ. [However,] if he knows their language and understands their pleas, save that²⁹The translation follows corrected text by Neth. he does not know their language well enough that he should know how to reply to them, [viz.,] to inform them the verdict, — he is permitted to appoint an interpreter. Gloss: , supra §13, par. 3 whether they may present their pleas in writing. If one party desires to plead in one language and the other party in another language, [the law is that] one [litigant] cannot compel his fellow [litigant] to plead in his language].³⁰MaHaRIW s. 101 — G.

11. A testimony sent in writing to the court is not testimony because the Torah states, “al pi shenayim edim”- it must be from their mouths and not from their writing. This is in fact our custom, not like those who allow it for otherwise valid witnesses who are not mutes.

And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 3:4) that the main testimony of the Torah is from the mouth of witnesses and not from the mouth of their writing, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 17:6), “By the mouth, etc.”; except that because of the betterment of the world, such that people would find [those from whom] to borrow, the Sages ordained that we establish law with regard to money according to witnesses in a deed, the same as from their mouth. But Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (in the Sefer HaMitzvot at the end of the second root) challenged him greatly about this in the Sefer HaMitzvot. And if I would come to write the whole matter, it would be lengthy. But the essence of the thing is that Ramban, may his memory be blessed, holds that the testimony of a deed is from Torah writ, as it is written (Jeremiah 32:44), “write in the book, and seal.”