וְאֶל־בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל תְּדַבֵּ֣ר לֵאמֹ֑ר אִ֥ישׁ אִ֛ישׁ כִּֽי־יְקַלֵּ֥ל אֱלֹהָ֖יו וְנָשָׂ֥א חֶטְאֽוֹ׃
At sa mga anak ni Israel ay magsasalita ka, na nagsasabi: Sinumang tao na sumumpa sa kaniyang Diyos ay magpapasan ng kaniyang kasalanan.
Tosafot
The verse equates a woman with a man. Most of the Torah is written in the masculine term. There are some verses where the Torah specifically addresses a man. Tosafot explains that the principle that we are presently discussing which teaches that women are equal to men in regard to all penalties of the Torah refers only to those verses that are written in the masculine term. However, where the Torah specifically mentions that it is speaking to a man, a special inclusion is needed to teach us that the mitzvah applies to woman as well.
This rule that equates women to men as far as all penalties of the Torah is specifically when the passage is said in the masculine term. Where there is no explicit reference to a male we are to assume that the Torah is speaking to women as well, even though the verse is written in the masculine term. That is the lesson of our Gemara.
Tosafot offers an illustration of his explanation that this rule applies when the verse is written in the masculine term:
כי ההיא דריש תמורה (דף ב:) דפריך אמאי איצטריך רבוי לענין תמורה לפי שהפרשה נאמרה בלשון זכר והא השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש
As can be seen from that Gemara at the beginning of Masechet T’muroh (2b),1The Gemara there says that the superfluous word in Vayikra 27, 10,-- וְאִם־הָמֵ֨ר יָמִ֤יר בְּהֵמָה֙ בִּבְהֵמָ֔ה וְהָֽיָה־ה֥וּא וּתְמוּרָת֖וֹ יִֽהְיֶה־קֹּֽדֶשׁ --teaches us that women are also included in this prohibition. where the Gemara asks: why is it necessary to have a specific inclusion to include women in the matter of T’muroh? Since the passage was said in the masculine term, the question was asked: but the Torah equated a woman to a man for all penalties of the Torah?
This is not so when the Torah specifically speaks of a “man”.
However, where “man” is clearly written in the verse, there, we definitely require an inclusion to include women in the mitzvah.
Tosafot offers proof that when the verse specifically mentions a “man” a special inclusion is needed to inform us that the rule applies to females:
As we find in that Gemara in Perek Arba Meesos (Sanhedrin 66a) where the Gemara is discussing the negative commandment prohibiting cursing one’s parents: The verse (Vayikra 24, 15) reads: a man who will curse his father and his mother. The Gemara asks: I would only know that this applies to a man, from where do we learn that it applies to a woman? We see that in this case since “man” is specifically mentioned a special inclusion is needed to teach us that the mitzvah applies to women as well. We cannot make use of the general rule that women are equal to men for all penalties of the Torah.
Based on this understanding, that when the Torah does not specifically mention “man” we utilize the general rule that equates women to men for all penalties of the Torah, we are faced with the following question:
If you ask: later in Perek Shor Shenogach Arbo’oh vaChameeshoh (44b, and Tosafot ד"ה שור האשה) where the Gemara says the word shor is repeated seven times, to include among others the ox of a woman in regard to an ox that killed, the verse is teaching us that there is liability for a woman’s ox as well.
Why is an inclusion needed, but there in that verse the word “man” is not written and we should utilize the general rule that includes women in all mitzvos of the Torah? And even though it is written in that verse “and also his owner will die” that is not a specific mention of “man”,2See Rashi 44b ד"ה שור האשה. See also Tosafot Rabbeinu Peretz. but merely a masculine term, where no special inclusion for women is needed.
Rabbeinu Tam answers this question:
Says Rabbeinu Tam: that the Gemara there 44a expounds3The word דמקשינן – literally - that we compare, appears in brackets in our Tosafot. Elsewhere in Sukoh 28b the word דדרשינן is used as is mentioned on the gloss. that the word יגח is repeated in Shemot 21, 31, twice to apply the word נגיחה" – goring” to the verse that speaks of an ox killing and to apply the word נגיחה" – goring" to the verse that speaks of an ox damaging. It is as if the Torah is telling us that whatever is true of one verse that discusses goring is true of any other verse that discusses goring, and we would derive from the verse that discusses damages, where the word “man” is written in the verse (Shemot 21, 35): if the ox of a man will shove etc. This would come to exclude a woman from liability, if not for the inclusion of the verse that repeated the word shor seven times to include the ox of a woman as well. Without the special inclusion of the repetition of shor seven times we would say that a woman is excluded from liability for her ox damaging as well as for her ox that kills. Now that we have that inclusion, a woman is liable for her ox that damages as well as for her ox that kills.
This rule that equates women to men as far as all penalties of the Torah is specifically when the passage is said in the masculine term. Where there is no explicit reference to a male we are to assume that the Torah is speaking to women as well, even though the verse is written in the masculine term. That is the lesson of our Gemara.
Tosafot offers an illustration of his explanation that this rule applies when the verse is written in the masculine term:
כי ההיא דריש תמורה (דף ב:) דפריך אמאי איצטריך רבוי לענין תמורה לפי שהפרשה נאמרה בלשון זכר והא השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש
As can be seen from that Gemara at the beginning of Masechet T’muroh (2b),1The Gemara there says that the superfluous word in Vayikra 27, 10,-- וְאִם־הָמֵ֨ר יָמִ֤יר בְּהֵמָה֙ בִּבְהֵמָ֔ה וְהָֽיָה־ה֥וּא וּתְמוּרָת֖וֹ יִֽהְיֶה־קֹּֽדֶשׁ --teaches us that women are also included in this prohibition. where the Gemara asks: why is it necessary to have a specific inclusion to include women in the matter of T’muroh? Since the passage was said in the masculine term, the question was asked: but the Torah equated a woman to a man for all penalties of the Torah?
This is not so when the Torah specifically speaks of a “man”.
However, where “man” is clearly written in the verse, there, we definitely require an inclusion to include women in the mitzvah.
Tosafot offers proof that when the verse specifically mentions a “man” a special inclusion is needed to inform us that the rule applies to females:
As we find in that Gemara in Perek Arba Meesos (Sanhedrin 66a) where the Gemara is discussing the negative commandment prohibiting cursing one’s parents: The verse (Vayikra 24, 15) reads: a man who will curse his father and his mother. The Gemara asks: I would only know that this applies to a man, from where do we learn that it applies to a woman? We see that in this case since “man” is specifically mentioned a special inclusion is needed to teach us that the mitzvah applies to women as well. We cannot make use of the general rule that women are equal to men for all penalties of the Torah.
Based on this understanding, that when the Torah does not specifically mention “man” we utilize the general rule that equates women to men for all penalties of the Torah, we are faced with the following question:
If you ask: later in Perek Shor Shenogach Arbo’oh vaChameeshoh (44b, and Tosafot ד"ה שור האשה) where the Gemara says the word shor is repeated seven times, to include among others the ox of a woman in regard to an ox that killed, the verse is teaching us that there is liability for a woman’s ox as well.
Why is an inclusion needed, but there in that verse the word “man” is not written and we should utilize the general rule that includes women in all mitzvos of the Torah? And even though it is written in that verse “and also his owner will die” that is not a specific mention of “man”,2See Rashi 44b ד"ה שור האשה. See also Tosafot Rabbeinu Peretz. but merely a masculine term, where no special inclusion for women is needed.
Rabbeinu Tam answers this question:
Says Rabbeinu Tam: that the Gemara there 44a expounds3The word דמקשינן – literally - that we compare, appears in brackets in our Tosafot. Elsewhere in Sukoh 28b the word דדרשינן is used as is mentioned on the gloss. that the word יגח is repeated in Shemot 21, 31, twice to apply the word נגיחה" – goring” to the verse that speaks of an ox killing and to apply the word נגיחה" – goring" to the verse that speaks of an ox damaging. It is as if the Torah is telling us that whatever is true of one verse that discusses goring is true of any other verse that discusses goring, and we would derive from the verse that discusses damages, where the word “man” is written in the verse (Shemot 21, 35): if the ox of a man will shove etc. This would come to exclude a woman from liability, if not for the inclusion of the verse that repeated the word shor seven times to include the ox of a woman as well. Without the special inclusion of the repetition of shor seven times we would say that a woman is excluded from liability for her ox damaging as well as for her ox that kills. Now that we have that inclusion, a woman is liable for her ox that damages as well as for her ox that kills.
English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
This mishnah lists all of those who are executed by stoning and then begins to explain some of the details. Most of these crimes are specifically listed in the Torah as being punishable by stoning. Some are learned through an analogy with other crimes. We will mention the verses for each crime.(1) one who has sexual relations with his mother: Leviticus 18:7, 20:11. (2) with his father's wife: Leviticus 18:8, 20:11. (3) with his daughter -in-law: Leviticus 20:12. (4) with a male: Leviticus 20:13. (5) with a beast: Leviticus 20:15. (6) a woman who commits bestiality with a beast: Leviticus 20:16. (7) a blasphemer: Leviticus 24:15-16. (8) an idolater: Deuteronomy 17:2-5. (9) one who gives of his seed to molech: Leviticus 20:2. (10) a necromancer or a wizard: Leviticus 20:27. (11) one who desecrates the Sabbath: Number 15:35. (12) he who curses his father or mother: Exodus 21:17, Leviticus 20:9. (13) he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman: Deuteronomy 22:23-24. (14) one who incites [individuals to idolatry: Deuteronomy 13:7-11. (15) one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]: Deuteronomy 13:7-11. (16) a sorcerer: Exodus 22:17, Deuteronomy 18:10. (17) a wayward and rebellious son: Deuteronomy 21:18-21. The rest of chapter seven will deal with the first 16 of these issues.
English Explanation of Mishnah Sanhedrin
The blasphemer is punished only if he utters [the divine] name.
Rabbi Joshua b. Korcha said: “The whole day [of the trial] the witnesses are examined by means of a substitute for the divine name:, ‘may Yose smite Yose.”
When the trial was finished, the accused was not executed on this evidence, but all persons were removed [from court], and the chief witness was told, ‘State literally what you heard.’
Thereupon he did so, [using the divine name].
The judges then arose and tore their garments, which were not to be resewn.
The second witness stated: “I too have heard thus” [but not uttering the divine name], and the third says: “I too heard thus.”
Mishnah five deals with the blasphemer and the special circumstances of his trial.
With regards to the blasphemer the Torah states (Lev. 24:15): “Anyone who blasphemes his God shall bear his guilt. If he also pronounces the name of the Lord, he shall be put to death.” From these verses the Rabbis learned that the blasphemer was obligated for the death penalty only if he used God’s four letter name.
The problem with putting the blasphemer on trial is that when the witnesses testify and repeat what they heard, they too will be blaspheming God’s name. Although they certainly would not receive the death penalty for doing so, it was nevertheless seen to be unacceptable for even a witness to repeat what he heard, especially in a public trial. Therefore, during the court’s deliberation they used a code word, “may Yose smite Yose”. However, in order to complete the trial the witnesses needed to state what they heard explicitly at least one time. Therefore, at the end of the trial they would remove everyone from the court and only the witnesses and the judges would remain. They would then ask the eldest witness to say explicitly what he heard. So painful was it for the judges to hear God’s name being blasphemed that they would tear their clothes and not repair them. This was a typical sign of mourning. The remaining witnesses would not need to say exactly what they heard, thereby repeating the blasphemy. Rather they would merely say that they heard what the first person heard.
Rabbi Joshua b. Korcha said: “The whole day [of the trial] the witnesses are examined by means of a substitute for the divine name:, ‘may Yose smite Yose.”
When the trial was finished, the accused was not executed on this evidence, but all persons were removed [from court], and the chief witness was told, ‘State literally what you heard.’
Thereupon he did so, [using the divine name].
The judges then arose and tore their garments, which were not to be resewn.
The second witness stated: “I too have heard thus” [but not uttering the divine name], and the third says: “I too heard thus.”
Mishnah five deals with the blasphemer and the special circumstances of his trial.
With regards to the blasphemer the Torah states (Lev. 24:15): “Anyone who blasphemes his God shall bear his guilt. If he also pronounces the name of the Lord, he shall be put to death.” From these verses the Rabbis learned that the blasphemer was obligated for the death penalty only if he used God’s four letter name.
The problem with putting the blasphemer on trial is that when the witnesses testify and repeat what they heard, they too will be blaspheming God’s name. Although they certainly would not receive the death penalty for doing so, it was nevertheless seen to be unacceptable for even a witness to repeat what he heard, especially in a public trial. Therefore, during the court’s deliberation they used a code word, “may Yose smite Yose”. However, in order to complete the trial the witnesses needed to state what they heard explicitly at least one time. Therefore, at the end of the trial they would remove everyone from the court and only the witnesses and the judges would remain. They would then ask the eldest witness to say explicitly what he heard. So painful was it for the judges to hear God’s name being blasphemed that they would tear their clothes and not repair them. This was a typical sign of mourning. The remaining witnesses would not need to say exactly what they heard, thereby repeating the blasphemy. Rather they would merely say that they heard what the first person heard.
Rabbeinu Bahya
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ותלית אתו על עץ [AND IF THERE BE IN A MAN A SIN DESERVING THE JUDGMENT OF DEATH] THOU SHALT HANG HIM ON A TREE — Our Rabbis said, All those who have to be put to death by stoning must afterwards be hanged, for it is said here (v. 23) “for cursing of God ends in hanging”, and we are told that one who curses God is punished with stoning (cf. Leviticus 24:15—16; Sanhedrin 45b).