וּמַכֵּ֥ה בְהֵמָ֖ה יְשַׁלְּמֶ֑נָּה וּמַכֵּ֥ה אָדָ֖ם יוּמָֽת׃
At ang nanakit ng isang hayop ay magbabayad para rito; at ang pumatay ng isang tao ay papatayin.
Rabbeinu Bahya
Seeing the principle called קל וחומר, an inference arrived at by means of simple logic, is one of the thirteen methods of valid exegesis and it is the first one mentioned in the famous list by Rabbi Yishmael which we recite in our prayers daily, I have decided to list all thirteen principles at this point.
The principle of the קל וחומר is derived from our verse here as well as from Exodus 23,5 where the Torah commands us to assist our enemy whose beast has collapsed under its load in unloading it. If we are to do this for our enemy, the Torah implies that we most certainly have to do this when the animal in question is the property of a friend of ours.
The second principle which is a legitimate vehicle for arriving at a valid interpretation of Torah legislation is called גזרה שוה, and is almost the precise opposite of the former, seeing that it is based on similar expressions in matters which have no conceptual relation to each other; the words used for comparison are words which the text could have done without, hence they are perceived as alerting our attention to such legislation. In Leviticus 18,10 the Torah writes ערות בת בנך או בת בתך לא תגלה ערותן כי ערותך הנה; “do not uncover the nakedness of either the daughter of your son or the nakedness of the daughter of your daughter, for they are the same as your own nakedness. There is a pointed absence of mentioning that uncovering the nakedness of your daughter is prohibited. In Leviticus 18,17 the Torah writes: ערות אשה ובתה לא תגלה, את בת בנה ואת בת בתה לא תקח לגלות ערותה שארה הנה זמה היא, “you must not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you must not marry either the daughter of her son or the daughter of her daughter as they are close relatives, it is a depraved plot to do so.” In either instance no mention is made of not sleeping with, i.e. marrying one’s daughter. The words הנה “they are,” are superfluous in each verse. The sages therefore derive the prohibition of marrying or sleeping with one’s daughter from these superfluous identical words. These two words made it unnecessary for the Torah to write a verse prohibiting marrying one’s daughter (or one’s son).
The third category of valid exegetical tools is called בנין אב and implies that if the Torah permitted a particular procedure or prohibited it, say on one festival, then, unless there was a verse disallowing such a conclusion the rule applying to the first procedure mentioned also applies to similar procedures on other festivals. If, say, the Torah permitted using fire on the Passover in order to prepare food, then it is presumed that on other festivals where a general work prohibition exists also the preparation of food is excluded from such a prohibition. An example of such an exegetical tool is Exodus 12,16 אך אשר יאכל לכל נפש הוא לבדו יעשה לכם, “except that which must be eaten by any person-- only that may be done for you.” Our sages considered this verse as a precedent, בנין אב, for all the festivals. Another example for something similar is Leviticus 20,9 where the Torah discusses the penalty for cursing father and mother, concluding with the words דמיו בו, “his blood is upon himself.” Our sages in Sanhedrin 54 state that wherever this wording appears either in the singular or in the plural, i.e. דמיהם בם, this means that the applicable death penalty is סקילה, “stoning to death of the guilty party.” They use as the precedent the word in Leviticus 20,27 (where sorcery etc. is discussed) מות ימותו באבן ירגמו אותם דמיהם בם, “they shall die by execution, they shall pelt them with stones, their blood is upon themselves.” This method of exegesis is known as בנין אב מכתוב אחד, “a textural precedent based on a single verse.”
There is a similar principle where the same rule is derived by the Torah having employed two verses to teach us the precedent, a sub-category of what we just explained. The example is found in connection with blemishes of human beings which disqualify a priest afflicted by them from functioning in the Temple or Tabernacle. In Leviticus 21,20 the Torah lists או גבן או דק או תלול בעינו או גרב או ילפת או מרוח אשך, “or who has abnormally long eyebrows, or a membrane in his eye, or a blemish in his eye, or a dry skin eruption, or a moist skin eruption, or has crushed testicles.” In that context a blemish known as יבלת (split eyelid) is omitted although that blemish is listed as disqualifying a sacrificial animal from being offered on the altar (compare Leviticus 22,22). Our sages concluded that wherever a blemish is mentioned in the Torah, be it in connection with an animal or a human being, such blemish is disqualifying regardless of whether it is written in connection with animals or humans. This exegetical method is known as a בנין אב משני כתובים, ”precedent based on two verses.”
A fourth exegetical method in the list by Rabbi Yishmael is called כלל ופרט, a general rule mentioned in the Torah followed by an example illustrating that rule. The Torah writes in Deut. 22,11: לא תלבש שעטנז, “do not wear a garment made of two different kinds of materials.” It proceeds to give an example, i.e. a mixture of wool and linen. The reason the Torah gave us this example is that this is the only combination of the principle not to wear a mixture which is forbidden, i.e. subject to the principle enunciated in the general rule. Whenever the Torah first writes a general rule followed by such a detailed example, the rule applies only when it also corresponds to what is mentioned in the detailed example which followed the rule.
The fifth exegetical rule is the reverse of that which we just described, i.e. the Torah lists a specific item as being either forbidden or permitted, and then follows that example by a general rule. We find this rule illustrated in connection with the legislation to restore lost property (which one has found) to its owner. In that connection the Torah writes in Deut. 22,3: “thus you shall do to all the lost property of your brother.” It is understood, based on the wording of this verse, that only items which correspond to the example mentioned by the Torah first are subject to the general rule of restoring lost property to the owner. The words: “thus you shall do to all” are understood as the general rule, whereas the words: “lost property of your brother,” are the specific detail. In all such instances the general rule determines the application of the legislation contained in the detailed example.
A sixth rule is known as כלל ופרט וכלל, “a legislation couched in general terms, followed by an example, followed by a reiteration of the general principle mentioned first. In such instances the general rule is applicable only when it corresponds to the main features present in the detailed example mentioned by the Torah. We read in Exodus 22,8: על כל דבר פשע, “concerning all matters involving misappropriation, etc.” This is a general principle involving any wrongdoing. The Torah follows this by citing examples such as oxen, sheep, etc., which are the subject of theft or other kinds of misappropriation. The Torah concludes by repeating once more ”concerning any lost object, etc.,” that disputes like this must be adjudged before a judge. The examples cited all have the following common denominators: they are portable, are chattels. This excludes a slave and landed property both of which are not considered as chattels from the legislation described in that paragraph. We have a special verse in the Torah comparing the status of slaves to that of landed property (compare Leviticus 25,46) “you may bequeath them to your children” (the slaves) [just like you bequeath property]. Due to such considerations documents which though they declare that something belongs to someone are not comparable to chattels as the documents have no inherent value other than the paper they are written on.
Another instance of the principle of כלל ופרט וכלל, occurs in Deut. 14,27 in connection with מעשר שני, the second tithe. Concerning what may be done with the money which was realized in redeeming the produce of the second tithe which was too bulky to transport to Jerusalem, the Torah wrote in verse 26 that “you may spend this money (in Jerusalem) for all that your heart desires.” It proceeds to give examples of what your heart desires such as “beef, sheep, wine, alcoholic drink,” repeating once more “and all that your heart desires.” In such a situation where the general rule is followed by examples only to be followed again by the general rule, the substance of the items cited as the examples is the guideline for what is included in the general rule. In this case, the examples are all edibles, produce of the ground (animals which feed on produce of the ground are considered as in the same class). It follows that any other edibles which are produce of the ground are included in the general rule though they have not been enumerated here in detail. Synthetic foods might not qualify as matters for which money from the proceeds of the second tithe may be spent.
The seventh rule is known as כלל שצריך לפרט, “a general rule which is indispensable for understanding the detailed examples.” We find an example of this principle in Numbers 3,40 פקוד כל בכור זכר לבני ישראל, “count every male firstborn of the Children of Israel.” Had the Torah written the word “male” without also writing the word “firstborn” would have assumed that all the males whether firstborn or not have to be included in that census. Had the Torah only written the word “firstborn”, I would have thought that female firstborn are also included in that legislation. Therefore the word בכור in that verse is a general rule which is indispensable for understanding what is included in the detailed example.
Rule number eight is described as כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא, “any matter which was included in a general rule but is singled out to teach something pertaining to this legislation does not teach only regarding this specific example but teaches something regarding the general rule from which it was singled out.” In connection with the prohibition of sacrificing children to the Moloch cult the Torah writes in Leviticus 20,2 “if any man (person) from among the Children of Israel or from a resident stranger (proselyte) hand over any of his children to that idol, such a man shall be executed. The common people shall pelt him to death with stones.” Up until the appearance of this verse the Moloch cult was just one of many forms of idolatry and the death penalty had already been provided for anyone serving idols. In this verse this particular form of idolatry (abomination) was singled out by the Torah. Why was the penalty spelled out in detail here? [the kind of death penalty]. Rabbi Yishmael teaches that the Torah did not mean that only this particular form of abomination qualifies for the most severe death penalty; rather, it was singled out as an example of the kind of death penalty applicable to people guilty of performing other abominations.
Rule number nine: כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא לטעון טען אחר שלא כענינו יצא להקל ולהחמיר, “any matter which had already been included in a general rule but was singled out in order to teach something out of the context in which it had appeared, does so in order to either reveal an advantage or a disadvantage as the case may be.” In Exodus 21,2 the Torah writes: כי תקנה עבד עברי שש שנים יעבד ובשביעית יצא לחפשי חנם, “when you purchase the services (labor) of a Jewish servant he will serve with you for six years and will leave in the seventh year free of charge.” It is clear that a female Jewish servant was not included in this legislation as the Torah details rules applicable to the release of female Jewish servants when it writes in verse seven of the same chapter what the rules are when a father sold the labor of his daughter while she was a minor. Why was the word אמה mentioned in verse 7 seeing that a Jewish girl was already included in the general legislation mentioned in Deut. 5,12 when the Torah spoke about a Jewish servant with these words: “if your brother a Jewish man or Jewish woman is sold to you, etc. etc.?” The only reason the Jewish maid servant was singled out from the general rule governing both male and female Jewish servants is to legislate certain advantages she enjoys vis-a-vis her male counterpart. Whereas a male Jewish servant does not leave the service of his master merely by displaying signs of puberty, his counterpart the female Jewish servant does so. A male Jewish servant does not leave the employ of his master when the master dies but only at the end of six years service. In other words, one reason the Torah singled out the female once more was to reveal certain advantages she enjoys as compared to the general rules pertaining to the service of Jews who have been acquired by Jewish masters. At the same time there is also an aspect which is to the disadvantage of such a maid servant in that her master can marry her against her consent while she is in his service, seeing that at the time she was sold this was the understanding with her father.
Rule number 10. כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא לטעון דבר אחר שהוא כענינו יצא להקל ולא להחמיר, “any legislation which was part of a general rule and has been singled out to describe an example pertaining to the context of that legislation, has been singled out only in order to introduce an ameliorating circumstance, not the reverse.” In Deut. 19,5 where the Torah discusses the law about involuntary manslaughter, we read: “or who will come with his fellow into the forest to chop down trees and his hand swings the ax to cut the tree and the iron slips from the handle, etc.,” such a person has to seek refuge in the city of refuge to protect him from the avenger of the slain party. Nonetheless, the Torah makes it clear that such involuntary manslaughter is under the general heading of “murderer,” seeing the Torah wrote in Leviticus 24,21 (without mentioning an exception) ‘anyone striking dead a human being is to be executed.’” The example cited in Deut. 19 then teaches that there are exceptions to the death penalty, namely when the killing was under the heading of involuntary manslaughter. Both verses speak of the same subject, i.e. killing; however the involuntary killer is exempt from the death penalty seeing his situation was singled out by the Torah which provided cities of refuge.
Rule number 11: When a matter which had been subject to legislation of a general rule had been singled out by the Torah to provide a totally new perspective, it will not again become part of the original general rule unless the Torah writes so specifically. An example is Leviticus 22,11: “when a priest acquires a slave who becomes his physical property he may eat (terumah) just as may someone born in his house, etc.” In the verse following the Torah writes that such a priest’s daughter cannot eat such terumah anymore once she marries a husband who is not a priest. Seeing that up until her marriage she had been part of her father’s household, the Torah had to inform us that her status changes drastically upon her marriage. Once she has forfeited the right to eat terumah there is no way she can regain this right unless the Torah legislates so specifically. This is why in verse 13 the Torah writes that if this daughter who had forfeited her right to eat terumah through marriage to a non-priest had become widowed or divorced she may again eat terumah in her father’s house.
Rule number 12. דבר הלמד מענינו ודבר הלמד מסופו, “A legislative matter derived through study of its context or from its subsequent passage.” We find an illustration of this principle in connection with the laws of the Sabbath. The Torah writes (Exodus 16,29) שבו איש תחתיו, “let every man remain in his place;” this does not mean that one is not to move for the entire period of the Sabbath but that one must not distance himself from one’s home (starting from the city’s boundary) for a distance of more than 2,000 cubits (1300 yards approx.) in any one direction. This is an example of deriving something from the context in which the passage is written. Seeing that the Israelites had to walk up to that distance to collect the manna during the week days and there was no manna on the Sabbath, it is reasonable to interpret the word ממקומו, “from his place,” as meaning the distance he had to move in a certain direction on days other than the Sabbath. We now have to show an example of deriving legislation by studying a passage in conjunction with the passage following it. In Leviticus 18,6 the Torah writes: איש איש אל כל שאר בשרו לא תקרבו לגלות ערוה, “any man shall not approach his close relative to uncover nakedness;” on the face of it this is a prohibition against sexual contact with any blood relative. Later on, in verses 7-18, the Torah spells out the list of blood-relations which are covered by the general statement in verse 6. This list enables us to derive which blood-relations are permitted as marriage partners, i.e. any not included in the verses 7-18. This is an example of what Rabbi Yishmael means when he says that deriving something from the end of a passage is a legitimate exegetical tool.
Rule number 13 deals with two verses in the Torah which appear to contradict each other and which require a third verse for clarification. The Torah writes in Genesis 1,1 that “G’d created heaven and earth.” From this verse it appears as if the creation of the heaven preceded the creation of the earth. On the other hand, we read in Genesis 2,4: “these are the products of ....on the day the Lord G’d created earth and heaven.” This verse creates the impression that earth preceded heaven at the time of creation. We therefore need a third verse in Scripture which resolves this apparent contradiction. This verse is found in Isaiah 48,13: ”My own hand founded the earth, My right hand spread out the skies. I call upon them, let them stand up.” Another example of apparently contradictory statements in the Torah occurs in Exodus 20,22: “You have seen that I spoke to you out of the heaven.” This verse gives the impression that G’d’s voice at that time did not emanate from Mount Sinai but from the celestial regions. On the other hand, in Deut. 5,4 the Torah writes: “face to face the Lord spoke to you at the Mountain out of the fire.” The third verse which resolves the apparent contradiction is found in Deut. 4,36: “From the heaven He let you hear His voice to discipline you; on earth He let you see His great fire; and from amidst that fire you heard His words.” A third example of such a need for a third verse reconciling two apparently contradictory ones is the subject of consumption of fat and blood. In Leviticus 3,17 the Torah writes: “you must not eat any fat or blood.” This verse gives the impression that the prohibition applies equally to free-roaming beasts and to domesticated animals. On the other hand, in Deut 12,22 we read that the free-roaming beasts may be consumed (apparently without restriction). In Leviticus 7,23 the Torah writes that “all the fat of ox sheep or goat you must not eat.” This verse indicates that it is in order to consume the fat of free-roaming animals.
The principle of the קל וחומר is derived from our verse here as well as from Exodus 23,5 where the Torah commands us to assist our enemy whose beast has collapsed under its load in unloading it. If we are to do this for our enemy, the Torah implies that we most certainly have to do this when the animal in question is the property of a friend of ours.
The second principle which is a legitimate vehicle for arriving at a valid interpretation of Torah legislation is called גזרה שוה, and is almost the precise opposite of the former, seeing that it is based on similar expressions in matters which have no conceptual relation to each other; the words used for comparison are words which the text could have done without, hence they are perceived as alerting our attention to such legislation. In Leviticus 18,10 the Torah writes ערות בת בנך או בת בתך לא תגלה ערותן כי ערותך הנה; “do not uncover the nakedness of either the daughter of your son or the nakedness of the daughter of your daughter, for they are the same as your own nakedness. There is a pointed absence of mentioning that uncovering the nakedness of your daughter is prohibited. In Leviticus 18,17 the Torah writes: ערות אשה ובתה לא תגלה, את בת בנה ואת בת בתה לא תקח לגלות ערותה שארה הנה זמה היא, “you must not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you must not marry either the daughter of her son or the daughter of her daughter as they are close relatives, it is a depraved plot to do so.” In either instance no mention is made of not sleeping with, i.e. marrying one’s daughter. The words הנה “they are,” are superfluous in each verse. The sages therefore derive the prohibition of marrying or sleeping with one’s daughter from these superfluous identical words. These two words made it unnecessary for the Torah to write a verse prohibiting marrying one’s daughter (or one’s son).
The third category of valid exegetical tools is called בנין אב and implies that if the Torah permitted a particular procedure or prohibited it, say on one festival, then, unless there was a verse disallowing such a conclusion the rule applying to the first procedure mentioned also applies to similar procedures on other festivals. If, say, the Torah permitted using fire on the Passover in order to prepare food, then it is presumed that on other festivals where a general work prohibition exists also the preparation of food is excluded from such a prohibition. An example of such an exegetical tool is Exodus 12,16 אך אשר יאכל לכל נפש הוא לבדו יעשה לכם, “except that which must be eaten by any person-- only that may be done for you.” Our sages considered this verse as a precedent, בנין אב, for all the festivals. Another example for something similar is Leviticus 20,9 where the Torah discusses the penalty for cursing father and mother, concluding with the words דמיו בו, “his blood is upon himself.” Our sages in Sanhedrin 54 state that wherever this wording appears either in the singular or in the plural, i.e. דמיהם בם, this means that the applicable death penalty is סקילה, “stoning to death of the guilty party.” They use as the precedent the word in Leviticus 20,27 (where sorcery etc. is discussed) מות ימותו באבן ירגמו אותם דמיהם בם, “they shall die by execution, they shall pelt them with stones, their blood is upon themselves.” This method of exegesis is known as בנין אב מכתוב אחד, “a textural precedent based on a single verse.”
There is a similar principle where the same rule is derived by the Torah having employed two verses to teach us the precedent, a sub-category of what we just explained. The example is found in connection with blemishes of human beings which disqualify a priest afflicted by them from functioning in the Temple or Tabernacle. In Leviticus 21,20 the Torah lists או גבן או דק או תלול בעינו או גרב או ילפת או מרוח אשך, “or who has abnormally long eyebrows, or a membrane in his eye, or a blemish in his eye, or a dry skin eruption, or a moist skin eruption, or has crushed testicles.” In that context a blemish known as יבלת (split eyelid) is omitted although that blemish is listed as disqualifying a sacrificial animal from being offered on the altar (compare Leviticus 22,22). Our sages concluded that wherever a blemish is mentioned in the Torah, be it in connection with an animal or a human being, such blemish is disqualifying regardless of whether it is written in connection with animals or humans. This exegetical method is known as a בנין אב משני כתובים, ”precedent based on two verses.”
A fourth exegetical method in the list by Rabbi Yishmael is called כלל ופרט, a general rule mentioned in the Torah followed by an example illustrating that rule. The Torah writes in Deut. 22,11: לא תלבש שעטנז, “do not wear a garment made of two different kinds of materials.” It proceeds to give an example, i.e. a mixture of wool and linen. The reason the Torah gave us this example is that this is the only combination of the principle not to wear a mixture which is forbidden, i.e. subject to the principle enunciated in the general rule. Whenever the Torah first writes a general rule followed by such a detailed example, the rule applies only when it also corresponds to what is mentioned in the detailed example which followed the rule.
The fifth exegetical rule is the reverse of that which we just described, i.e. the Torah lists a specific item as being either forbidden or permitted, and then follows that example by a general rule. We find this rule illustrated in connection with the legislation to restore lost property (which one has found) to its owner. In that connection the Torah writes in Deut. 22,3: “thus you shall do to all the lost property of your brother.” It is understood, based on the wording of this verse, that only items which correspond to the example mentioned by the Torah first are subject to the general rule of restoring lost property to the owner. The words: “thus you shall do to all” are understood as the general rule, whereas the words: “lost property of your brother,” are the specific detail. In all such instances the general rule determines the application of the legislation contained in the detailed example.
A sixth rule is known as כלל ופרט וכלל, “a legislation couched in general terms, followed by an example, followed by a reiteration of the general principle mentioned first. In such instances the general rule is applicable only when it corresponds to the main features present in the detailed example mentioned by the Torah. We read in Exodus 22,8: על כל דבר פשע, “concerning all matters involving misappropriation, etc.” This is a general principle involving any wrongdoing. The Torah follows this by citing examples such as oxen, sheep, etc., which are the subject of theft or other kinds of misappropriation. The Torah concludes by repeating once more ”concerning any lost object, etc.,” that disputes like this must be adjudged before a judge. The examples cited all have the following common denominators: they are portable, are chattels. This excludes a slave and landed property both of which are not considered as chattels from the legislation described in that paragraph. We have a special verse in the Torah comparing the status of slaves to that of landed property (compare Leviticus 25,46) “you may bequeath them to your children” (the slaves) [just like you bequeath property]. Due to such considerations documents which though they declare that something belongs to someone are not comparable to chattels as the documents have no inherent value other than the paper they are written on.
Another instance of the principle of כלל ופרט וכלל, occurs in Deut. 14,27 in connection with מעשר שני, the second tithe. Concerning what may be done with the money which was realized in redeeming the produce of the second tithe which was too bulky to transport to Jerusalem, the Torah wrote in verse 26 that “you may spend this money (in Jerusalem) for all that your heart desires.” It proceeds to give examples of what your heart desires such as “beef, sheep, wine, alcoholic drink,” repeating once more “and all that your heart desires.” In such a situation where the general rule is followed by examples only to be followed again by the general rule, the substance of the items cited as the examples is the guideline for what is included in the general rule. In this case, the examples are all edibles, produce of the ground (animals which feed on produce of the ground are considered as in the same class). It follows that any other edibles which are produce of the ground are included in the general rule though they have not been enumerated here in detail. Synthetic foods might not qualify as matters for which money from the proceeds of the second tithe may be spent.
The seventh rule is known as כלל שצריך לפרט, “a general rule which is indispensable for understanding the detailed examples.” We find an example of this principle in Numbers 3,40 פקוד כל בכור זכר לבני ישראל, “count every male firstborn of the Children of Israel.” Had the Torah written the word “male” without also writing the word “firstborn” would have assumed that all the males whether firstborn or not have to be included in that census. Had the Torah only written the word “firstborn”, I would have thought that female firstborn are also included in that legislation. Therefore the word בכור in that verse is a general rule which is indispensable for understanding what is included in the detailed example.
Rule number eight is described as כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא, “any matter which was included in a general rule but is singled out to teach something pertaining to this legislation does not teach only regarding this specific example but teaches something regarding the general rule from which it was singled out.” In connection with the prohibition of sacrificing children to the Moloch cult the Torah writes in Leviticus 20,2 “if any man (person) from among the Children of Israel or from a resident stranger (proselyte) hand over any of his children to that idol, such a man shall be executed. The common people shall pelt him to death with stones.” Up until the appearance of this verse the Moloch cult was just one of many forms of idolatry and the death penalty had already been provided for anyone serving idols. In this verse this particular form of idolatry (abomination) was singled out by the Torah. Why was the penalty spelled out in detail here? [the kind of death penalty]. Rabbi Yishmael teaches that the Torah did not mean that only this particular form of abomination qualifies for the most severe death penalty; rather, it was singled out as an example of the kind of death penalty applicable to people guilty of performing other abominations.
Rule number nine: כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא לטעון טען אחר שלא כענינו יצא להקל ולהחמיר, “any matter which had already been included in a general rule but was singled out in order to teach something out of the context in which it had appeared, does so in order to either reveal an advantage or a disadvantage as the case may be.” In Exodus 21,2 the Torah writes: כי תקנה עבד עברי שש שנים יעבד ובשביעית יצא לחפשי חנם, “when you purchase the services (labor) of a Jewish servant he will serve with you for six years and will leave in the seventh year free of charge.” It is clear that a female Jewish servant was not included in this legislation as the Torah details rules applicable to the release of female Jewish servants when it writes in verse seven of the same chapter what the rules are when a father sold the labor of his daughter while she was a minor. Why was the word אמה mentioned in verse 7 seeing that a Jewish girl was already included in the general legislation mentioned in Deut. 5,12 when the Torah spoke about a Jewish servant with these words: “if your brother a Jewish man or Jewish woman is sold to you, etc. etc.?” The only reason the Jewish maid servant was singled out from the general rule governing both male and female Jewish servants is to legislate certain advantages she enjoys vis-a-vis her male counterpart. Whereas a male Jewish servant does not leave the service of his master merely by displaying signs of puberty, his counterpart the female Jewish servant does so. A male Jewish servant does not leave the employ of his master when the master dies but only at the end of six years service. In other words, one reason the Torah singled out the female once more was to reveal certain advantages she enjoys as compared to the general rules pertaining to the service of Jews who have been acquired by Jewish masters. At the same time there is also an aspect which is to the disadvantage of such a maid servant in that her master can marry her against her consent while she is in his service, seeing that at the time she was sold this was the understanding with her father.
Rule number 10. כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא לטעון דבר אחר שהוא כענינו יצא להקל ולא להחמיר, “any legislation which was part of a general rule and has been singled out to describe an example pertaining to the context of that legislation, has been singled out only in order to introduce an ameliorating circumstance, not the reverse.” In Deut. 19,5 where the Torah discusses the law about involuntary manslaughter, we read: “or who will come with his fellow into the forest to chop down trees and his hand swings the ax to cut the tree and the iron slips from the handle, etc.,” such a person has to seek refuge in the city of refuge to protect him from the avenger of the slain party. Nonetheless, the Torah makes it clear that such involuntary manslaughter is under the general heading of “murderer,” seeing the Torah wrote in Leviticus 24,21 (without mentioning an exception) ‘anyone striking dead a human being is to be executed.’” The example cited in Deut. 19 then teaches that there are exceptions to the death penalty, namely when the killing was under the heading of involuntary manslaughter. Both verses speak of the same subject, i.e. killing; however the involuntary killer is exempt from the death penalty seeing his situation was singled out by the Torah which provided cities of refuge.
Rule number 11: When a matter which had been subject to legislation of a general rule had been singled out by the Torah to provide a totally new perspective, it will not again become part of the original general rule unless the Torah writes so specifically. An example is Leviticus 22,11: “when a priest acquires a slave who becomes his physical property he may eat (terumah) just as may someone born in his house, etc.” In the verse following the Torah writes that such a priest’s daughter cannot eat such terumah anymore once she marries a husband who is not a priest. Seeing that up until her marriage she had been part of her father’s household, the Torah had to inform us that her status changes drastically upon her marriage. Once she has forfeited the right to eat terumah there is no way she can regain this right unless the Torah legislates so specifically. This is why in verse 13 the Torah writes that if this daughter who had forfeited her right to eat terumah through marriage to a non-priest had become widowed or divorced she may again eat terumah in her father’s house.
Rule number 12. דבר הלמד מענינו ודבר הלמד מסופו, “A legislative matter derived through study of its context or from its subsequent passage.” We find an illustration of this principle in connection with the laws of the Sabbath. The Torah writes (Exodus 16,29) שבו איש תחתיו, “let every man remain in his place;” this does not mean that one is not to move for the entire period of the Sabbath but that one must not distance himself from one’s home (starting from the city’s boundary) for a distance of more than 2,000 cubits (1300 yards approx.) in any one direction. This is an example of deriving something from the context in which the passage is written. Seeing that the Israelites had to walk up to that distance to collect the manna during the week days and there was no manna on the Sabbath, it is reasonable to interpret the word ממקומו, “from his place,” as meaning the distance he had to move in a certain direction on days other than the Sabbath. We now have to show an example of deriving legislation by studying a passage in conjunction with the passage following it. In Leviticus 18,6 the Torah writes: איש איש אל כל שאר בשרו לא תקרבו לגלות ערוה, “any man shall not approach his close relative to uncover nakedness;” on the face of it this is a prohibition against sexual contact with any blood relative. Later on, in verses 7-18, the Torah spells out the list of blood-relations which are covered by the general statement in verse 6. This list enables us to derive which blood-relations are permitted as marriage partners, i.e. any not included in the verses 7-18. This is an example of what Rabbi Yishmael means when he says that deriving something from the end of a passage is a legitimate exegetical tool.
Rule number 13 deals with two verses in the Torah which appear to contradict each other and which require a third verse for clarification. The Torah writes in Genesis 1,1 that “G’d created heaven and earth.” From this verse it appears as if the creation of the heaven preceded the creation of the earth. On the other hand, we read in Genesis 2,4: “these are the products of ....on the day the Lord G’d created earth and heaven.” This verse creates the impression that earth preceded heaven at the time of creation. We therefore need a third verse in Scripture which resolves this apparent contradiction. This verse is found in Isaiah 48,13: ”My own hand founded the earth, My right hand spread out the skies. I call upon them, let them stand up.” Another example of apparently contradictory statements in the Torah occurs in Exodus 20,22: “You have seen that I spoke to you out of the heaven.” This verse gives the impression that G’d’s voice at that time did not emanate from Mount Sinai but from the celestial regions. On the other hand, in Deut. 5,4 the Torah writes: “face to face the Lord spoke to you at the Mountain out of the fire.” The third verse which resolves the apparent contradiction is found in Deut. 4,36: “From the heaven He let you hear His voice to discipline you; on earth He let you see His great fire; and from amidst that fire you heard His words.” A third example of such a need for a third verse reconciling two apparently contradictory ones is the subject of consumption of fat and blood. In Leviticus 3,17 the Torah writes: “you must not eat any fat or blood.” This verse gives the impression that the prohibition applies equally to free-roaming beasts and to domesticated animals. On the other hand, in Deut 12,22 we read that the free-roaming beasts may be consumed (apparently without restriction). In Leviticus 7,23 the Torah writes that “all the fat of ox sheep or goat you must not eat.” This verse indicates that it is in order to consume the fat of free-roaming animals.
Siftei Chakhamim
Which causes a wound. [Rashi knows this] because it says (Vayikra 24:21): “Whoever smites an animal shall pay for it, and whoever smites a man shall be put to death.” [This implies a comparison between the two:] just as smiting an animal [is liable only] when there is a wound [as otherwise there is no damage to the animal], so too with smiting a man, [one is liable only] when he inflicts a wound.
Da'at Zekenim
ומכה אביו ואמו, “and if someone strikes his father or his mother;” the Torah here spells out the penalty, i.e. legal execution, without even having informed us that this is forbidden, an unusual construction. This question is raised by the Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, folio 54. We have a rule that no court can convict a sinner except where the Torah has warned us of the sin in question being a sin. Granted that in the case of someone cursing a crowned head or even a deaf person who cannot even hear the curse, is forbidden, i.e. both a low-ranking person and a high ranking person must not be cursed, it is obvious that the same rule applies to social strata in between, and therefore each strata does not need to be written separately; compare (Exodus 22,7 and Leviticus 19,7) but where did the Torah spell out the prohibition to strike a human being without the penalty being spelled out simultaneously? We must fall back on Deuteronomy 25,3, where the Torah warns the court’s clerk not to apply more than the permitted number of lashes to a person convicted of these. If in the case where the physical punishment is mandatory even a minutely excessive force is specifically forbidden, it is clear that striking someone without the consent or even instruction by the court is forbidden, how much more so is striking someone without such legal cover forbidden! In fact, concerning the subject of physical punishment, the halachah is according to the view of Rabbi Meir, who said that if someone is guilty of two penalties, both physical punishment and a financial penalty, (and we do not apply both for the same sin) the physical punishment is not administered. (Talmud, tractate Ketuvot, folio 32) The only exception is if the financial penalty amounts to less that the lowest coin in circulation at the time in the country. In this respect, the halachah does not treat sins committed against father or mother differently from offences committed against someone else. If you were to ask that seeing the verse deals with the prohibition of striking one’s father, a sin which carries the death penalty, how could anyone have even imagined that the penalty would be 39 lashes, seeing that we have a rule that physical lashes are never an option for committing such a sin, (compare Talmud tractate Makkot folio 13), the answer is that we have two different expressions in the verse dealing with that subject in Deuteronomy 25,3. It says both: ארבעים יכנו לא יוסיף,, as well as פן יוסיף להכותו על אלה מכה רבה, “forty lashes he may give him, he must nor exceed this,” and “lest he should exceed above by inflicting a severe wound, etc.;” you may also argue that seeing the subject in our chapter deals with inflicting wounds, how could the penalty be one of execution by a court? How would I know that if the blow administered did not result in a visible wound that it would be punishable altogether? Furthermore, when the Torah speaks about cursing father and mother (Leviticus 20,9) execution is the penalty, how could it occur to anyone to think that the penalty would be 39 lashes? We would have to look at Leviticus 24,21 where the Torah decrees the death penalty for striking a human being, any human being, i.e. ומכה אדם יומת, “if he strikes a human being she shall be executed!” On that verse Rashi felt compelled to explain that the human being meant in that verse is one’s father, and that the reason is to contrast and to compare the penalty for striking animals and striking one’s father, where the former is punishable only by financial compensation to the owner of that animal. We could conclude that just as when said animal did not die from its wounds only a financial penalty is imposed, the same would be true for striking human being who does not die a result. The Torah therefore wrote the word יומת, “he shall be executed,” to show that the verse speaks of a human being who is the father of the man who struck him.(Compare Rashi on that verse.) It is not possible to say that the Torah there speaks of someone who had struck one’s father after he was dead, but the verse speaks of living animals and a living father being the victim. What is the difference between יומת and מות יומת, the usual term for legal execution? The former refers to a financial penalty, just as in Exodus 21,29, where the owner is not executed, but the Torah uses this word to show that he deserves to be executed. We know this as previously the Torah had written: כן ינתן בו, “thus it shall be rendered to him.” (verse 20) This was a clear reference to a financial penalty. In light of the above, we must understand the word יומת in Leviticus 20,9 as having been meant literally and applying to someone who struck his father or mother.