ייִדישער מחשבֿה אויף משלי 16:32

In the Book of Proverbs (14:29) [it says]: "He that is slow to anger is of great understanding; But he that is hasty of spirit exalteth folly." King Solomon wanted to say that a person who does not anger easily is of great understanding, and this is as Solomon says in Ecclesiastes (7:9): "For anger resteth in the bosom of fools." And this is because when anger easily excites someone, all of this excitement is material in nature, and therefore he [Solomon] says 'For anger resteth in the bosom of fools' and the fool is far from one who is enlightened by higher elements, but one who is a possessor of slowness to anger [lit. of long breath] is slow to anger, and this teaches that he is of great understanding – because he is enlightened by his higher elements, therefore he is slow to anger. And he [Solomon] says “But he that is hasty of spirit exalteth folly” – this means when someone is of hasty spirit, this means folly is exalted out of them as one sifts out gold, because even if he is intelligent, in any case when he is quick to anger this exalts his folly. And in another place (Proverbs, 16:32), he [Solomon] says: “He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; And he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city”, read: one who is slow to anger is mighty because he stands like a hero and is not easily excited, and one who rules and conquers his spirit so that it will not leave him is greater than one who taketh a city, for one who conquers a city is conquering something material in nature, but one that conquers his spirit – this is something that is not material in nature, therefore he is greater. And this quality, slowness to anger [lit. of long breath], is from the qualities of God, may He be blessed, which is called ‘slowness to anger’ [lit. of long breath]....

Our sages tell us in Sotah 3, that man does not sin unless he has temporarily taken leave of his senses. They quote Numbers 12, 11, in support of this. Aaron says to Moses "because of our foolishness we have sinned." If this is indeed so, our sages seem to agree with Socrates who believed that man's intellect is apt to arrive at true, valid conclusions. We must ask that if sin is the result of a functional disability of the mind, how can a person be held responsible for such sin? The dilemma can be resolved in the following manner. We need to understand that there are three categories of people. The first category is composed of people in whom the intellect is predominant, and governs practically all their activities so that sin is almost inconceivable. The second group comprises people who are so enslaved to their physical urges, that their intellect is for all practical purposes paralysed. The third group comprises the vast majority of people, who face an ongoing confrontation between their physical urges, yetzer hara, and their intellect, i.e. yetzer tov. All the people belonging to this latter group suffer from the fact that gratification of one's urges is immediate or almost immediate. On the other hand, the price to be paid for having gratified one's urges is usually some time in the future, and therefore not of immediate concern. The reward for acting in accordance with the dictates of the yetzer tov, i.e. the dictates of one's intellect, may be quite some time away. For that reason, such an eventual reward may not play a decisive role when a decision is made between conflicting choices available. The reason that G'd has arranged matters in such a way is due to the fact that otherwise bechirah, free choice would not be a really viable option. In order to demonstrate that it does not pay to give in to physical passion when it leads to the performance of immoral acts, we have the example of sotah.

When looking at the proof quoted for the statement that the true hero is he who controls his passions, Ben Zoma quotes "better the long patience than a hero, and someone who is in control of his spirit, than the conqueror of a city." (Proverbs 16,32) We must approach this with a similar yardstick. Aristotele defines bravery in his book of ethics, as a person who is prepared to be a martyr and brave death for the sake of what he believes to be ethically good and noble. In fact, if we examine David's heroism, such as when he volunteered to do battle with Goliath, he fits the bill exactly. His motivation, as has been stated, was that someone who blasphemes the Lord G'd of Israel must not be allowed to get away with it. Pinchas, who killed Zimri, (Numbers 25,8) displayed similar emotions. Aristotele's definition appears quite appropriate then. Also Isaiah 63,5, seems to bear out this definition. Ben Zoma's quotation does not seem to prove much, stating only that conquests alone do not constitute bravery. Even a weak king can conquer cities, when he has armies at his command. What Ben Zoma wishes to tell us, however, is that to describe someone as brave merely because he conquers, is foolish. If a king cannot control his own passions, how can he expect to control his soldiers? Only after he has learned to be in charge of himself, can he be trusted to be in charge of others. Concerning David and Pinchas, it is true that had they not done what they did, they would not have been known for the heroes that they undoubtedly were. It is the normal reaction of a person who observes violence being perpetrated on an innocent human being, to rationalise that his own life is more precious than that of his fellow human being. Therefore, he refrains from a rescue operation that would put his own life at grave risk. This is especially so, when the prospect of success of the rescue operation is only marginal. In order to do what one has at first glance perceived as one's moral duty, one needs to conquer the voices that tell one not to risk one's life and become a dead hero. Both David and Pinchas became heroes when they had successfully conquered those voices. They conquered the urge that had prompted their peers to refrain from becoming involved. Engaging in dangerous action was not something impetuous then, but on the contrary, it resulted from deliberation, having one's passions under control. Had the undertaking been unsuccessful, the potential hero risked derision rather than admiration, even though he might have given his life for the cause. Relying on one's strength, as mentioned in Isaiah 63,5, is not the antithesis of our concept of bravery, provided such reliance is not the result of bravado, showmanship and quest for personal glory. The hero feels that his life is not worth living, if the only way he can live it is by permitting great evils to go unchecked, and thus allow the name of G'd to continue to be desecrated. Ben Zoma's definition of true heroism then includes two important elements: A) Preparedness for martyrdom in order to achieve an ideal, or wipe out an evil; B) an awareness that the risks involved are undertaken deliberately, not impulsively. The hero faces up to unpopularity or even scorn that his action may arouse.