ייִדישער מחשבֿה אויף קהלת 7:20

Since becoming a morally perfect personality is impossible unless one is in possession of all possible virtues, it is almost impossible to encounter a morally perfect human being, since no one has been endowed with all these virtues. The only way to progress towards moral perfection then is to refine and and constantly purify one's personality. First, impure elements in one's personality have to be eliminated, then the remaining acceptable raw material has to be brought to a state high polish. Just as a mirror which has been silvered with faulty material and the backing of which has not been polished properly, cannot reproduce a true image, so a person cannot reflect Torah and truth in a proper manner unless he has perfected himself in the aforementioned fashion. In Deut. 4,9-10, Moses warns the Jewish people that if they allow the purity they had enjoyed at Mount Sinai to become tainted, they will be headed down the path of corruption. Our soul is like a mirror which reflects the images it has absorbed. Unless the mirror is kept in perfect condition, it will reflect distorted images. Even marginal failings in a person's character distort his whole personality. Maimonides points this out in Chapter seven of his introduction to the tractate Avot. Prophetic visions departed from the prophets when they were angry, i.e. when they suffered personality lapses. A perfect character can also not be attained unless it is accompanied by a high level of intellectual accomplishments. Similarly, true wisdom cannot be attained without accompanying moral accomplishments. Since we come across many people who possess either moral or intellectual accomplishments but rarely both, we must assume that what we observe are the results of natural endowment only. These endowments do not reflect the results of their owners having refined them in order to attain the maximum achievements they are capable of in either field. Only when morality is the outgrowth of one's intellect can we be sure that such morality is comprehensive and extends to a person's entire personality. This in spite of the fact that certain traits are not necessarily observable by outsiders unless the need arises to demonstrate that their owner indeed possesses such good traits. In Proverbs 20,5-12, Solomon points out that it is a common error to attribute a virtuous personality to someone who has merely displayed a few virtues, without our probing if these virtues are natural or have been acquired, i.e. developed. If these virtues are natural, they are quite meaningless in an ethical sense. Only the Lord can pronounce judgment about whose virtue has been acquired and whose constitutes a natural trait. One way of realizing that it is natural is if one sees a person practice one particular virtue, whereas in all other areas of life that person disregards most virtues. This would prove that such an individual did not come by the virtue he did practice thanks to his own efforts, but that he was fortunate enough to have been born with it. Our sages in Kiddushin 39 tell us that "He who performs one mitzvah is given credit, his lifespan is extended, and he inherits the land of Israel. He, however, who neglects to perform one mitzvah will experience the reverse." Obviously, the performance of one single mitzvah cannot qualify for all that much reward, something which is normally made contingent on the fulfilment of all mitzvot. It is equally obvious that a person who fails to perform a single mitzvah does not need to be told that he does not rate a reward for that failure. The meaning of the passage then is that he who performs one mitzvah in all its ramifications, qualifies for this great reward, because in order to do what he did, all his virtues had to be involved. The manner in which we relate to the that we have an opportunity to perform, reveals the attitude we have towards all mitzvot if we were able to perform them. The Talmud, when questioning the special reward offered those who perform the commandment of honoring father and mother, answers that anyone who performs a commandment thereby exceeding his natural inclination to do so, is in line for such special reward. Since it is natural for a person to honor his father and mother, the Torah, and subsequently the Talmud, use this mitzvah as the example to illustrate the principle involved. Similarly, when the Talmud (Sotah 3) says that if someone has commenced performing a mitzvah, one urges him to complete it. The word "a mitzvah,” is the same as "any mitzvah" or all mitzvoth. The attitude displayed when performing a mitzvah signals whether such an act would lead to the performance of other mitzvoth. The famous principle of "mitzvah gorreret mitzvah," that performance of one good deed leads to the performance of other good deeds, reflects the same thought. If any of these good deeds have been performed because of natural inclinations, such performance is no guarantee of the performance of other good deeds in the future; therefore, no credit is given to the one performing it. The Talmud in Horiot 10 tells us that the verse "The ways of the Lord are straight, the righteous can walk therein, whereas the wicked will stumble therein" (Hoseah 14,10), means that he who eats the Passover because he is hungry and wants to stuff himself is called a sinner though he complies with the ritual; this teaches us the same lesson. Abstention from pork should not be dictated by one's natural revulsion to eating pork, but should be due to the Torah having prohibited it (compare Torat Kohanim Parshat Kedoshim 89). Rabbi Akiva in Sofrim 4 relates how it happened to him that even preoccupation with a mitzvah due to a pure motivation, involved him in a sinful act, because he did not have his priorities right. He had dragged a body for six miles on the Sabbath in order to bring it to proper burial. He had been unaware that such a body, if there are no relatives whose duty it is to perform the burial rites on it, automatically acquires the ground it lies on. This would make the act of moving it on the Sabbath unnessary and a transgression against the law of carrying in the public domain on the Sabbath. The Rabbis chided Rabbi Akiva, saying that he had been guilty of a transgression every step of the way. Aristotle in Ethics Chapter four, also argues that the validity of, say, generosity as a virtue derives from the nature and personality of the donor. Therefore, he who gives to the wrong cause or for the wrong motive, cannot be described as "liberal" or "generous." This trait of "generosity of heart" was an essential ingredient in Abraham's personality, which is always in evidence in conjunction with other virtues, all of which contributed to refinement of his personality even further. No doubt, Abraham had recognized that the acquisition of material wealth could not be the ultimate purpose in life, that there had to be higher values than that. Not only that, but such knowledge could only be attained through prophetic insight. In his search for truths, of which Isaiah 64,3 has said, "No human eye has beheld them without the help of G-d," the term machazeh, vision, is most appropriate at this point. Maimonides in his Moreh, chapter forty-five section two, already pointed out that the lowest level of such prophetic insight is comprehension by means of the parable. Indeed, most of the message Abraham receives during the revelation at the "covenant between the pieces" is by means of the parable. Concerning man's natural fear of the day when the strange union of body and soul is dissolved, the day of death, G-d reassures Abraham that he should not entertain any fear. Concerning all his other worries, G-d reassures him of His continued support. He also tells him that the reward will be of quite a different calibre than is normally understood by the term "reward." G-d’s promise regarding future possession of the land by Abraham's descendants is believed. Abraham, aware of the great difficulties faced by any human being who tries to live up to these lofty principles, asks for a sign to reassure him that his heirs will be able to muster the moral strength to qualify for the fulfilment of these promises. The answer, couched in terms of the sacrifice and what it symbolized, is in accordance with both the views of Rabbi Nechemyah and those of Rabbi Chiyah as stated in Bereshit Rabbah 44. The divided animals represent the nations and their respective leaders, all headed for eventual destruction. The undivided bird, by contrast, represents the Jewish people who will endure and withstand the attack by the vultures, thanks to the merit of their ancestor Abraham. But over and above that, there are inherent values that guarantee the fulfilment of G-d’s promise in due course.

Our sages tell us in Sotah 3, that man does not sin unless he has temporarily taken leave of his senses. They quote Numbers 12, 11, in support of this. Aaron says to Moses "because of our foolishness we have sinned." If this is indeed so, our sages seem to agree with Socrates who believed that man's intellect is apt to arrive at true, valid conclusions. We must ask that if sin is the result of a functional disability of the mind, how can a person be held responsible for such sin? The dilemma can be resolved in the following manner. We need to understand that there are three categories of people. The first category is composed of people in whom the intellect is predominant, and governs practically all their activities so that sin is almost inconceivable. The second group comprises people who are so enslaved to their physical urges, that their intellect is for all practical purposes paralysed. The third group comprises the vast majority of people, who face an ongoing confrontation between their physical urges, yetzer hara, and their intellect, i.e. yetzer tov. All the people belonging to this latter group suffer from the fact that gratification of one's urges is immediate or almost immediate. On the other hand, the price to be paid for having gratified one's urges is usually some time in the future, and therefore not of immediate concern. The reward for acting in accordance with the dictates of the yetzer tov, i.e. the dictates of one's intellect, may be quite some time away. For that reason, such an eventual reward may not play a decisive role when a decision is made between conflicting choices available. The reason that G'd has arranged matters in such a way is due to the fact that otherwise bechirah, free choice would not be a really viable option. In order to demonstrate that it does not pay to give in to physical passion when it leads to the performance of immoral acts, we have the example of sotah.

Just as G'd is unable to make the diameter of a square equal the length of its sides at one and the same time, so He cannot make man "in His image and his own form," and at the same time keep him free from sin entirely. The reason is that the definition of being human includes being fallible, being prone to err. Infallibility is reserved for celestial beings that are devoid of bodies. Their perfection derives from their not being physical. Man's perfection on the other hand, is merely potential, inasmuch as his body has been equipped with a spiritual soul. That potential will be achieved only after much practice and study. The very necessity to attend to the needs of his body, creates a time frame during which man cannot concentrate on his spiritual tasks. The Midrash tells us that when the angels first beheld Adam, they wanted to worship him, since they marvelled at the spiritual powers man had been equipped with. Thereupon, G'd showed them man asleep. Only then did the angels realise that owning a body and therefore having physical needs, made man at times much inferior to what they had believed at first. When Isaiah 2,22, exlaims "leave man alone, for his soul is in his nostrils, in what way is he of any consequence?" the idea is that man cannot possibly be considered a deity, since he is matter-bound. Midrash Tanchuma tells us that the emperor Hadrianus, after having conquered much of the then civilised part of the world, wanted to be deified in Rome. There were three philosophers who expressed opposition to this idea. The first one said that it is not proper to start a rebellion while in one's king's palace. If one wants to start a rebellion, believing in the merit of one's cause, one first leaves the palace, and raises the flag of revolt outside. What this philosopher meant was quite simple. Once one has demonstrated one's ability to survive outside the king's palace, -in this case the earth,-which is G'ds palace, one may have established an a priori claim to provide an alternative to G'd. As long, however, as one depends on the palace, i.e. the earth, one should leave well enough alone. The second philosopher said that it was too late to start a rebellion, since both heaven and earth had been created already. There was therefore no way in which a new deity could possibly claim to demonstrate originality. The third philosopher offered to accept Hadrianus' claim on condition that the latter prove his worthiness by helping him out. The philosopher had a treasure laden ship that had run aground three miles from shore. He asked Hadrianus to rescue the ship and its contents. Hadrianus said that he would send a legion of soldiers to do the job. The philosopher told him that no soldiers were needed. All that was needed was a little wind, blowing in the right direction. To this Hadrianus replied: "where am I supposed to take the wind from?" Upon hearing this, the philosopher said to him: "if you cannot even control a little wind, how do you expect to control the whole universe?" Hadrianus returned home, bitterly disappointed. His wife said to him: "these philosophers have deceived you. You are a great king. If you will give me a security deposit, you will indeed become a deity." Said he: "what kind of security deposit?" Said she: "the soul in your body." Said he: "if my soul leaves me, I will be powerless." Said she: "if you cannot even make dispositions regarding your own soul, how can you expect to be a deity? You are only an ordinary mortal." The wife, of course, had hit the nail on the head. Man's potential is only capable of fulfilment within a physical framework, i.e. he cannot dissociate himself from his body; otherwise he dies and is unable to achieve anything at all. Since this is so, the question may well be asked: "what about his freedom of choice? If, by nature, man must sin, how can he be held responsible?" We must distinguish between two causes of sin. If sin is due to causes that are inherent in man's very nature, he is not held responsible for such sin. If sin is the result of a lapse on the part of the sinner, then he is held responsible. When Moses is described as "the most humble of all human beings," (Numbers 12,3) the emphasis is on the word "human being." His perfection is not absolute. To the extent that it is humanly possible, Moses had mastered that virtue, but only to the extent that it is humanly possible. This is in line with the statement by Solomon in Kohelet 7,20. "No human being is so righteous that he will do only good, and never sin." According to Maimonides, the sin Moses allowed himself to fall prey to, was anger when it was not justified. (introduction to Avot chapter 4) Maimonides endeavours to prove that the greater the stature of a person, the less is his tolerance for weakness in others who fail to achieve basic standards of behaviour.