ייִדישער מחשבֿה אויף שמות 10:1

Yet one may strive to understand why the generation of Jews in Egypt was subjected to such a cruel fate at the hands of the Egyptians and Pharaoh. Especially, are we entitled to do so, since scripture does not offer a list of specific wrongdoings of the people? The author rejects many solutions offered by his predecessors as being inadequate. Most of those explanations would violate the principle of our freedom of choice in one form or another. The author insists that statements such as "he went down to Egypt," ((Deut. 26,5) or "and Jacob and his sons went down to Egypt," (Joshua 24,4) have to be understood at face value, and confirm that the move to Egypt was entirely voluntary, not pre­ordained in any way. It is interesting that throughout the events leading up to the arrival of Jacob in Egypt, G-d ascribes all happenings to Himself, except this last one (compare Joshua 24,3): "I took your father, I multiplied his seed, I gave him Isaac. I gave Jacob to Isaac,” but "Jacob and his sons went down to Egypt."The statement G-d made to Jacob while the latter was on his way to Egypt (Genesis 46,3), "Do not be afraid to go down to Egypt," is to be understood as permission, as an assurance of G-d’s continued support. Just as the spies Moses had sent out to check out the land of Canaan were not prevented from setting out on their mission (Numbers Chapter 13), so Jacob was not prevented from going down to Egypt. According to all this, the statement on the occasion of the covenant between the pieces (Genesis 15,13), "Know that your seed will be a stranger in a land that is not theirs etc.," was simply a piece of information to Abraham, not an evil decree. The Torah, by not stating that this occurrence would be due to Divine intervention, as could have been implied by such statements as "I will make them strangers" or "I will bring them down to Egypt," draws our attention to the fact that this was merely an announcement of an event in the future, but was not a decree. The most difficult example in the series dealing with the apparent suspension of free will is the repeated statement by G-d, "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh" or "I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh," as found in the chapters dealing with the ten plagues (Exodus Chapters 4-10). On the other hand, we find that repentance by even the worst sinners is readily accepted, such as the repentance of Achav and Menashe, son of Chiskiyahu (compare Kings I 16 and Kings I 21, Kings II 21, Chronicles II 33,13). The Bible describes those two as being wicked par excellence; yet in the case of Pharaoh it seems that whenever he began to repent, obstacles were placed in his way to prevent him from repenting effectively. The author argues against Maimonides's view (Hilchot Teshuvah 6) that wickedness is cumulative, so that at some point the sinner forfeits his right to free will. The author feels that the repeated missions to Pharaoh by Moses would have been wasted, had they not been intended to produce a change of heart in Pharaoh. Also, since G-d had already told Moses at the burning bush (Exodus 3, 19) that Pharaoh would not release the Israelites of his own accord, this had been prior to any mention having been made that "I will harden his heart."

The Ramban's approach that, having refused to repent during the first five plagues, Pharaoh was no longer entitled to repentance, is also not considered satisfactory, even though it is based on Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in Shemot Rabbah 17. The proof for that view, namely the changes in grammar describing Pharaoh's obstinacy during the first five plagues as being self-induced, and that during subsequent plagues as being induced by G-d, (distinctions such as vayechezak versus vayachazek- 7,15, 9,12) would force us to believe that Moses was told in advance that at some stage Pharaoh would no longer be a free agent, that because he only mouthed thoughts of repentance without meaning them, G-d would force him to act in accordance with his true feelings. This is also what Rashi meant in his commentary on Exodus 7,3. The problem with this approach is that if G-d knows that the sinner does not plan to repent, why interfere with his decisions? His actions would automatically expose him to further punitive action by G-d. Surely it would be viewed as a greater success for G-d if His creatures are forced by circumstances to comply with His wishes! If this is indeed what happened after the tenth plague, what reason do we have to assume that Pharaoh's last pronouncement was any more sincere than his earlier ones? In fact, G-d would have delayed the deliverance of the Israelites by having interfered with Pharaoh's free will! For this and other reasons, the author prefers an approach supported by many Midrashim which state clearly that there had been no interference with Pharaoh's free will. Any person guilty of a variety of crimes, deserves a number of penalties to square the account. Even a single act can be a multiple offense, punishable by several penalties, such as the consumption of a hornet (Makkot 16). Pharaoh, having committed a variety of crimes against the Jewish people, had to endure a string of chastisements. Intervals between administering these various punishments were needed, so that he did not escape the impact by being unconscious at the time some of the punishments were inflicted. When each stage of the punishment is not as severe as it could be, namely resulting in probable death, the victim is far less likely to really repent. The major incentive for repentance is fear and terror. When this incentive is absent, the psychological climate for remorse has not been created. When the Torah in Deut 13,12 says, "All of Israel shall listen and be afraid, and will not continue to do such in your midst," the objective is twofold: a) destruction of evil by destroying the perpetrator; b) to frighten the population out of imitating the wrongdoer. Were the wrongdoer to be welcomed as a repentant sinner, all the onlookers would lose all their restraint and proceed to sin and expect to escape the consequences. This is the reason Moses’ss and Aaron's repentance did not help when they had publicly desecrated G-d’s name by striking the rock instead of talking to it (Numbers 20,12). Our sages (Yuma 86) tell us that when a sin includes chilul hashem, public desecration of the holy name of G-d, all the conventional ways of repentance do not help without the addition of the sinner's death. Only in this manner can atonement become complete. In Pharaoh's case, a period of respite between the plagues was mandatory, as otherwise he would not have received all the chastisements due him. The crimes of maltreating a people whose founder had been the savior of Egypt and whose only crime against Egypt had been their high birthrate, is unforgivable. The progressively harsher measures enacted against this people called for strong punitive action by G-d. The "great judgments" of which G-d speaks to Moses at the burning bush are these acts of multiple retribution. The Egyptians had been aware that the Jewish people were loyal to their G-d. Their whole behavior then was a rebellion against G-d, and as such it was not likely to lead to repentance. Since it was G-d’s stated purpose to convince the Egyptians that He was (1) a deity, (2) a power controlling the earth, and (3) a deity the like of which did not exist on the whole earth, the torture visited upon Egypt had to be staggered in such a way as to allow the Egyptians to recover from blow after blow and to absorb their lesson in the end. All the references made in the Torah to G-d hardening the heart of Pharaoh etc. have to be understood as the recovery Pharaoh was allowed to make between the plagues, so he could be made to feel the full impact of the next instalment. The Talmud in Makkot 10 produces proof from all parts of the Bible that the path in life a person wishes to take he is allowed to travel, i.e. freedom of choice is absolute. An example is the prophet Bileam who was first told by G-d not to accompany the messengers of Balak, but who, once it had become clear that he had made up his mind to go with them, was permitted to proceed (Numbers 22,12-20). The reference of Avshalom preferring the advice of Chushai, (Samuel II 17,14) is another such example. The classic example would be the deliberate turnabout by the Jewish people in the desert when facing Baal Tzefon (Exodus 14,1-3). All these examples illustrate that G-d does indeed provide opportunities for sinners to err, to draw false conclusions which will enmesh them in further difficulties. At the sea of reeds also the Egyptians chose to interpret that a twelve hour wind that had dried out the bed of the sea was a natural phenomenon and that the bottom of the sea was as safe for them as it had proved to be for the Israelites. It was in this indirect manner that G-d encouraged the Egyptians to fall into the trap He had set for them.

The observation about G-d having hardened the spirit of Sichon King of the Emorites, which was referred to earlier, is to be understood in a similar vein. Sichon, who had observed that Israel seemed to have avoided battling the Moabites or the Edomites and had detoured around their respective countries, concluded that Israel's motive had been fear. Thus he felt encouraged to assume a militant posture. This resulted in his defeat and the conquest of his lands by the Israelites. But there had been no interference with his freedom of choice.