וַיְדַבֵּ֥ר יְהוָ֖ה אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֥ה לֵּאמֹֽר׃
און גאָט האָט גערעדט צו משהן, אַזױ צו זאָגן:
Jerusalem Talmud Makkot
MISHNAH: How are plotting witnesses treated1It is one of the Ten Commandments not to testify falsely. In addition, Deut. 19:16–20 prescribes that a “plotting” false witness has to be punished by the penalty which would have been imposed on his victim had his testimony been found true. By rabbinic definition, a “plotting” witness is one whose testimony not only is false but shown to be impossible, in that there are witnesses to the fact that he testified to be eye witness of a fact which he could not have seen since at the time it was supposed to have happened he was at another place (Sanhedrin Chapter 5, Note 3). There are cases when plotting perjury is proven but the penalty cannot be imposed. Then the false witness must be punished for breaking the Eighth Commandment, which is the standard punishment decreed for breaking any prohibition for which the penalty was not specified, fixed in Deut. 25:3 as at most 40 lashes (which, because the court marshal might err in his count, is limited to 39 lashes).
The Babli (2b) disagrees with this explanation; it classifies simple perjury as “actionless crime” for which no penalty is possible; this clearly is not the Yerushalmi’s position (cf. Ketubot 4:4 Note 196.)? “We testify about this man that he is the son of a divorcee or a woman who had received ḥalîṣah2The son of a Cohen from a woman he is prohibited from marrying (Lev. 21:7,14) is desecrated; he cannot function as a priest and the priestly revenues are forbidden to him. The divorcee is biblically forbidden to the Cohen. The widow receiving halîsah from the former husband’s brother is forbidden rabbinically; her son is rabbinically desecrated, which for practical consequences does not make any difference.” One does not say that he should be decreed to be the son of a divorcee or a woman who had received ḥalîṣah in his stead, but he is flogged 40 [lashes]3If the witness is not a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would not change his status at all. If he is a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would punish not only him but also his descendants, against the biblical text as explained in the Halakhah.. “We testify about this man that he is obligated to go into exile4The unintentional homicide (Num. 35:9–34)..” One does not say, this one should go into exile in his stead but he is flogged 40 [lashes]5As explained in the Halakhah, the perjurer is barred from fleeing to a city of refuge.. “We testify about this man that he divorced his wife but did not pay her ketubaḥ.6When in fact the woman is still married to her husband. Then the witness could be fined only if in the future the ketubah would not be paid, i. e., if the woman stayed married to her husband and predeceased him. He can be fined the current discounted expected value of such a ketubah.” Would he not finally have to pay her ketubah today or tomorrow? But one estimates how much would a man be willing to pay for the ketubah of this woman in case she would be widowed or divorced, but if she died her husband would inherit from her.
The Babli (2b) disagrees with this explanation; it classifies simple perjury as “actionless crime” for which no penalty is possible; this clearly is not the Yerushalmi’s position (cf. Ketubot 4:4 Note 196.)? “We testify about this man that he is the son of a divorcee or a woman who had received ḥalîṣah2The son of a Cohen from a woman he is prohibited from marrying (Lev. 21:7,14) is desecrated; he cannot function as a priest and the priestly revenues are forbidden to him. The divorcee is biblically forbidden to the Cohen. The widow receiving halîsah from the former husband’s brother is forbidden rabbinically; her son is rabbinically desecrated, which for practical consequences does not make any difference.” One does not say that he should be decreed to be the son of a divorcee or a woman who had received ḥalîṣah in his stead, but he is flogged 40 [lashes]3If the witness is not a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would not change his status at all. If he is a Cohen, declaring him as son of a divorcee would punish not only him but also his descendants, against the biblical text as explained in the Halakhah.. “We testify about this man that he is obligated to go into exile4The unintentional homicide (Num. 35:9–34)..” One does not say, this one should go into exile in his stead but he is flogged 40 [lashes]5As explained in the Halakhah, the perjurer is barred from fleeing to a city of refuge.. “We testify about this man that he divorced his wife but did not pay her ketubaḥ.6When in fact the woman is still married to her husband. Then the witness could be fined only if in the future the ketubah would not be paid, i. e., if the woman stayed married to her husband and predeceased him. He can be fined the current discounted expected value of such a ketubah.” Would he not finally have to pay her ketubah today or tomorrow? But one estimates how much would a man be willing to pay for the ketubah of this woman in case she would be widowed or divorced, but if she died her husband would inherit from her.
Jerusalem Talmud Terumot
Rebbi Jacob ben Zavdi asked in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If he was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known to him that he was the son of a divorcee or a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah Moëd, how do you treat him32This thoroughly theoretical case deals with a High Priest who is informed that the special court judging the status of priests has stripped him of his office because he was found to be the son of a divorcee, or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, by the testimony of two reliable witnesses. The problem concerns a person found guilty of involuntary or negligent homicide sentenced to exile in a city of refuge (Num. 35:9–34). He may return to his home town only after the death of the High Priest during whose term of office he was sentenced (v. 28). This implies that if he was sentenced while there was no High Priest, he is sentenced to life in exile.? As if he had died and the homicide might return to his home town, or as if [the latter’s] trial had been concluded when there was no High Priest, when he never could leave from there?33The answer will be given in the paragraph after the next.