Kommentar zu Dewarim 22:35

והתעלמת [THOU SHALT NOT SEE ANY OF THY BROTHER'S HERD … GO ASTRAY] AND HIDE THYSELF [FROM THEM] — i.e. one, as it were closes his eyes tight as though one does not see it.

THOU SHALT NOT SEE THY BROTHER’S OX OR HIS SHEEP RUNNING AWAY. This is a commandment explanatory of what He stated in the Torah, If thou meet thine enemy’s ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.¹²²Exodus 23:4. Here he added [that the commandment to return lost property refers also to an animal that was] running away, for going astray¹²²Exodus 23:4. implies that it merely strayed from its path and he can turn it [back] into the path without great effort; and now he mentioned running away, meaning that it escaped from him and is distant from the owner. He mentioned the term sheep for that is liable to be lost,¹²³Psalms 119:176: I have gone astray like a lost sheep. and therefore he explained here, And if thy brother be not nigh unto thee, and thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it home to thy house.¹²⁴Verse 2. He stated, And so shalt thou do with his ass,¹²⁵Verse 3. Ramban attempts to show why each particular loss is specified by Scripture. He explains that in each case we may have reason to think that its return is not required either because it would be too inconvenient for the finder or not important enough for the loser. which is an unclean animal; and so shalt thou do with his garment,¹²⁵Verse 3. Ramban attempts to show why each particular loss is specified by Scripture. He explains that in each case we may have reason to think that its return is not required either because it would be too inconvenient for the finder or not important enough for the loser. even though a garment is not as dear to its owner as are living creatures, and [total] loss is not as common in a garment as it is in animals which may die. And so shalt thou do with every lost thing of thy brother’s which he hath lost,¹²⁵Verse 3. Ramban attempts to show why each particular loss is specified by Scripture. He explains that in each case we may have reason to think that its return is not required either because it would be too inconvenient for the finder or not important enough for the loser. meaning any of his household vessels even though they are not as dear to him as his garment with which he covers himself. And according to the interpretation of our Rabbis he added here many things, such as and thou hide thyself from them,¹²⁶Verse 4. which the Rabbis interpreted to mean:¹²⁷Baba Metzia 30a. “Sometimes you are permitted to hide yourself from them [and ignore the lost article such as where the finder is an elder and it would be degrading for him to attend thereto, as for example to drive an ass back to its owner]. ‘Hasheiv’ (returning),¹²⁸In Verse 1 before us. you are to do it even a hundred times; ‘teshiveim’ (thou art to return them),¹²⁸In Verse 1 before us. even to his garden or deserted house” [i.e., the finder is not obligated to notify the owner that the article has been returned. The requirement that] return be made by [identification of the lost item and description of] its distinctive marks, and other matters are also derived from this section.

The rabbis interpreted (Brachot 19b), with regard to the laws of returning a lost object, it is stated: “You shall not see the ox of your brother or his sheep go astray and ignore them; return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). The baraita explains that the seemingly extraneous expression and disregard them must be understood to give license that at times you disregard lost objects and at times you do not disregard them.

לא תראה את שור אחיך או את שיו נדחים, "You shall not see the ox of your brother or his sheep cast off, etc." This paragraph is an allusion to the need for the scholars to admonish the plain people in order for them to become the true people of the Lord. The term used by the Torah to describe these morally upright righteous people is אחים, brothers. I have already explained to you that this appellation is reserved for the finest group of individuals (compare Shemot Rabbah 52,5). It is these people whom G'd commanded that when they see an "ox" who is lost, i.e. a human being on a lesser moral level who is compared to a beast, to engage in rescuing him. The reason the Torah speaks of "ox and sheep" instead of donkeys, for instance, is that the Jewish people whom the Torah alludes to by the words "ox or sheep" are basically sacred, fit for the altar as opposed to such animals as the donkey. The word אחיך, "your brother," is a simile for G'd who "owns" all of us. The reason that Moses employs this unlikely sounding simile is that the Torah wanted to make plain to which one of His holy people the commandment to restore lost Jewish souls applies, i.e. to the righteous, the Torah scholars.

לא תראה את שור אחיך, “You shall not see (without helping) the ox of your brother, etc.” Nachmanides writes that this verse is necessary, seeing that elsewhere the Torah had written that: “you must restore the ox or donkey of your enemy when it is lost, you must restore it to him.” (Exodus 23,4) Moses now adds the expression נדחים, a different kind of dilemma that these animals find themselves in. You could have thought by reading Exodus 23,4 that all you have to do is point the erring animal in the right direction towards its owner. Here Moses goes beyond this, demanding that you ensure that the animal gets back safely to its master. This may, on occasion, involve far more time and effort on your part.

Avert your eyes as if you do not notice it. Because you cannot say [it means] that the person conceals from telling that he found them, because if so, if should have said “and conceal them,” which would imply that he is concealing [the fact] that he has them. But because it is written “and conceal yourself from them,” it implies that he conceals his eye from seeing it.

V. 1. לא תראה וגו׳. Die hier ausgesprochene Pflicht der Bergung und Zurückgabe eines dem Eigentümer verloren gegangenen Tieres, oder wie V. 3 die Bestimmung auf alle sonstigen in Verlust geratenen Güter erweitert wird, tritt nur ein, wenn, wie es hier von Tieren heißt: נדחים, wenn die Umstände keinen Zweifel darüber zulassen, dass das Tier verlaufen oder das Gut verloren sei. Erscheint es aber als hingelegt und mit Bewusstsein des Eigentümers an dem Fundort, oder selbst, wenn darüber Zweifel obwaltet, darf es nicht von dem Orte entfernt werden. Hat man es aber an sich genommen und sich so von dem Fundort entfernt, dass inzwischen der Eigentümer wieder hingekommen sein könnte, darf man es nicht wieder hinlegen, sondern hat es für den Eigentümer zu bergen und, wenn eine Legitimation desselben möglich (siehe V. 3), zur Öffentlichkeit zu bringen. כל ספק הינוח לכתחלה לא יטול ואם נטל לא יחזיר (B. M. 25 b; siehe ׳תוספו daselbst und nähere Bestimmungen Ch. M. 260, 10 Anm.).

לא תראה את אחיך או את שיו נדחים, “do not inactively watch the ox or sheep of your brother which has gone astray” (voluntarily or against its will); this law applies even in war time when you are on the way to the front; what applies to these categories of domestic animals applies to all categories of domestic beasts.

לא תראה … והתעלמת THOU SHALT NOT SEE … AND HIDE THYSELF [FROM THEM] — “thou shalt not see it, that thou hide thyself from it” (i.e. you see it only to hide thyself from it), this is the plain sense of the verse. Our Rabbis, however, said that the omission of the particle לא before the verb והתעלמת (one would expect כי תראה … לא תתעלם) suggests: There are times when you may hide yourself from it, etc. (Sifrei Devarim 225:4; Bava Metzia 30a).

You may not observe it, etc. Rashi is answering [a difficulty]: The verse seems to be saying, “Do not see, rather conceal, etc.,” which implies that one is permitted to conceal himself [and this is not so].

נדחים, "gone astray;" the word is used in a similar sense in Deut 4,19: "and you are drawn astray." Someone who violates G'd's commandments is considered as having gone astray. The Torah commands that we must not ignore such people but bring them back to one's "brother" i.e. to G'd. The reason the Torah repeats the instruction השב תשיבם, "you shall surely restore them" is that if you will make the first move in setting such people on the right path they will complete the journey back to G'd under their own steam.

For example, a respected elder for whom it is socially inappropriate [to chase after an ox, is exempt from this mitzvah.] And similarly, someone may be exempt in the manner described by the rabbis (Avot 4:18), "Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says...do not seek to see your friend at the time of their humiliation." For there is no distinction between physical or financial humiliation, they are equivalent in the circumstance when it is impossible to rescue them [from that humiliation] and return whatever it is that has wandered off.

Zu dem Satze והתעלמת מהם lehrt die Halacha: פעמים שאתה מתעלם ופעמים שאי אתה מתעלם daselbst 30 a), dass das Verbot לא תוכל להתעלם (V. 3) kein absolutes, sondern ein durch die Persönlichkeit des Findenden und die Natur des gefundenen Gegenstandes bedingtes sei, dass z. B. זקן ואינו לפי כבודו, ein angesehener Mann, der sein eigenes Vieh nicht heimtreiben, seinen eigenen Sack nicht heimtragen würde, dazu auch bei einem Funde des Nächstengutes nicht verpflichtet wäre. Es wird da, dem Anscheine nach, das והתעלמת aus seiner syntaktischen Verbindung mit לא תראה gelöst und als ein selbständiger bejahender Satz gedeutet. Näher erwogen, dürfte sich jedoch vielleicht folgendes ergeben. Es heißt nicht: כי תראה וגו׳ לא תתעלם מהם, in welchem Falle das לא תתעלם allerdings ein absolutes Verbot wäre und untersagen würde, sich der Hilfeleistung zu entziehen. Es heißt vielmehr לא תראה וגו׳ והתעלמת, womit das התעלם zu einer Modalität der ראיה und als solche untersagt wird: du darfst sie nicht mit "Dich-nicht-sehen-machen" sehen, darfst dich ihrem Anblick nicht entziehen, darfst dich ihnen gegenüber nicht verhalten, als sähest du sie nicht, als ginge dichs nicht an. Daraus fließt dann sofort: du hast zu tun, als ob es das deinige wäre, somit alles das zu leisten, was du auch bei dem deinigen tätest, wie denn auch in Wahrheit der Kanon lautet: כל שבשלו מחזיר בשל חברו נמי מחזיר וכל שבשלו פורק וטוען בשל חברו נמי פורק וטוען, was, wenn es das deine wäre, du heimbringen, ab- und aufladen würdest, das musst du auch dem Gute des Nächsten und dem Nächsten gegenüber tun (daselbst 30 b). Erwartet wird (daselbst) jedoch, dass charaktervolle Menschen zu rettendem Nächstengute und zu helfendem Nächsten gegenüber nicht bei der "Schnur der strengen Pflicht" stehen bleiben, sondern לפנים משורת הדין das leisten, was sie selbst bei dem eigenen Gute im eigenen Falle nicht tun würden, und dieses Mehrtun als streng genommen das Gesetz dem Nächsten gegenüber verpflichtet, wird gleichwohl als eine so ernste Forderung der Billigkeit und des sozialen Wohlwollens betrachtet, dass dort der bedeutsame Ausspruch niedergelegt ist: לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין, Jerusalem sei nur zu Grunde gegangen, weil sie im gegenseitigen Verhalten nur die Grundsätze des strengen Rechts und nicht die der Billigkeit und des menschenfreundlichen Wohlwollens hätten walten lassen (siehe auch daselbst 24 b ׳תוספו daselbst; siehe auch Schmot Kap. 18, 20).

והתעלמתם מהם, “and you blithely ignore them or hide from them;” you must not ignore their plight. The examples chosen by the Torah are animals that are too big for you to be able claim that you overlooked them as their owners hid them.

The Rabbis, however, comment: At times, you may conceal yourself, etc. In which case? If he is a kohein and there is a [lost] ox in a cemetery; or if he is an elder and it is not fitting for his honor.

ואם לא קרוב אחיך, "And if your brother is not near, etc." Here the Torah hints that it speaks of a period during our final exile, when we will be quite estranged to our Father in Heaven. The period described is the one of which Bileam spoke in Numbers 24,17 when he said: "I can see it but it is not near." The very fact that the redemption does not seem near at hand is apt to estrange the Jewish people to G'd. Even in the present generation the knowledge that the ultimate redemption is so far away undermines the people's faith in G'd. Nonetheless G'd commands ואספתו אל תוך ביתך, "you are to gather him inside your house." The house the Torah speaks of is the Torah academy, etc. There you will teach him the paths of Torah so that the light radiated by Torah study will save this person spiritually. This process will continue until G'd is placated and will claim him back, i.e. עד דרש אחיך אתו. The words והשבות לו, "and you will return it to him," mean that your concern for the straying Jew will be accounted for you as if you had rescued him from becoming totally lost.

This is what the text is referring to when it literally says, "Do not see the ox of your friend or the sheep that has wandered off," i.e. when they are so completely astray, that they might as well be submerged in the river. In such circumstances, [when the text literally says,] "you should ignore them", [it means that] it is necessary for you to conduct yourself as if you had not seen.

השב תשיבם לאחיך, selbst wiederholt החזירה וברחה החזירה וברחה אפי׳ ד׳ וה׳ פעמים חייב להחזירה (B. M. 30 b), und zwar läge nach daselbst 81 a die unbegrenzt wiederholte Verpflichtung schon in dem aoristischen Ausdruck השב, als Infinitiv. Die Beifügung תשיבם erweiterte nur den Begriff der השבה, dass es genüge, das Tier in einen geschützten Raum des Eigentümers zu bringen und die Pflicht nicht obliege, den Vorgang dem Eigentümer zum Bewusstsein zu bringen דלא בעינן דעת בעלים, eine Verpflichtung, die bei der Zurückgabe eines gestohlenen oder zur Hut anvertraut gewesenen Gutes allerdings obliegt, הכל צריכין דעת בעלים חוץ מהשבת אבדה שהתורה רבתה השבות הרבה (daselbst 31 a). Es ist bei diesen die Rückgabe noch nicht vollzogen und bleibt der Dieb oder der Hüter noch verantwortlich, bis das Wiedervorhandensein des zurückgebrachten Gutes dem Eigentümer zur Kenntnis gekommen, damit er es in gehörigen Gewahrsam nehmen könne, und zwar bei lebendem Gute selbst dann, wenn ihm die Abwesenheit gar nicht zum Bewusstsein gekommen war, weil inzwischen das Tier sich an andere Örtlichkeit gewöhnt hat הואיל ואינקטי נגרי ברייתא (B. K. 118 b wörtlich: es sind ihm Schritte nach außen angewöhnt worden).

השב תשיבם לאחיך, “you must make every effort to restore these animals to your brother.” The Torah is so serious about this demand that it repeats it with slightly different wording in the verse immediately following.

Alternatively, the meaning of the verse is that the Jewish people must engage the common people in the study of both halachah and Mussar, religious law and religious morals, until the day one dies, i.e. we are recalled by G'd. The Torah is particular about describing this as והשבת לו, to warn that if we remain inert in this matter we will be responsible for such people winding up in Hades instead of in the Eternal Life in the hereafter.

Certainly, when the verse says, "you must take it back", it is teaching us that if you have the means to take them back, if they are not so completely astray, but rather it is possible for you [individually] to return that which has wandered away, then you shall return them to your fellow; you are obligated to try to see, in order to rescue them.

וכן תעשה, "And similarly you shall do, etc." These additional examples of animals or objects gone "astray," are due to the fact that man is composed of three components. 1) the composition of the body ; 2) the spiritual part of man; 3) the part of Torah to which every Israelite is "betrothed." The Torah writes כן תעשה לחמרו, "so you shall do to his donkey" as a simile for the body. It writes כן תעשה לשמלתו, regarding the spiritual part of man; we have been told in Shabbat 152 that the spiritual part of man is called שמלה "garment," when the Talmud recounts a parable about a king who has given garments to his various servants. Finally, the Torah describes the part of Torah every Israelite is betrothed to as אבדה when our verse speaks of אבדת אחיך. In Kidushin 2 Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai tells a parable explaining why it is that although the Torah describes a betrothal as something initiated by a man the Talmud describes it as something happening to a woman, According to Rabbi Shimon the Torah considers that man when searching for a wife searches for a part he has lost, i.e. אבדה. It is not woman who has to search for what man had lost i.e. the "rib" G'd had taken from Adam when He created woman. Seeing man's betrothed is the Torah, he has to consider it as a lost object if he has strayed from the path of Torah. It therefore is part of our duty to ensure that this lost object is restored to all those Jews who have lost it.

לא תראה את חמור אחיך..נפלים בדרך, "You must not observe the donkey of your brother falling down, etc." This verse speaks of a state of estrangement from tradition which is far greater than that which the Torah spoke of when it referred to נדחים, "straying," in verse one of our chapter. The Torah warns that one must not use this degree of one's fellow's estrangement from G'd and the Torah as an excuse to remain aloof reasoning that any attempt to bring such people back to the fold would end in failure anyway. As long as the "fallen" Jew co-operates in efforts made to rehabilitate him, i.e. עמו, we are not allowed to ignore him; if; however, he refuses to co-operate in such attempts to lead him back into the fold we are allowed to leave him to his own devices. This is what Solomon had in mind when he wrote (Proverbs 9,8): "Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you."

עד דרש אחיך [AND IT SHALL BE WITH THEE] UNTIL THY BROTHER ENQUIRES [FOR IT] — But would it ever enter your mind that one could give it back before he enquires for it (Scripture distinctly states that you do not know to whom the animal belongs)?! But the meaning of the verse is: Thou shalt make diligent enquiries of him that he should not be a fraudulent claimant (Bava Metzia 27b. 28a; cf. Sifrei Devarim 223:4).

AND IF THY BROTHER BE NOT NIGH UNTO THEE — meaning that he does not reside near you, for it is not your duty to go to another land with the lost article in order to restore it to him, or that you do not know him at all. In the Sifre we find:¹²⁹Sifre, Ki Theitzei 223. “I know only that one is obligated to restore lost property if the loser lives nearby. Whence do I know that he must also do so if he lives far away? From what Scripture states, and thou know him not.”¹³⁰In Verse 2 before us. This indicates that if you do know the rightful owner, you are bound to restore it to him even though he lives far away. And if so, the phrase and if thy brother be not nigh unto thee means that he is “not near you” in your city that you may inquire about him and identify him [as the rightful claimant], then it shall be with thee until thy brother seek after it.

ואם לא קרוב אחיך אליך, “And if your brother is not near you, etc.” you are to keep his belongings safe by bringing them to your own house.

...And the word, "him/it," is to make known that "your brother" is an object; as if it had said, "until you investigate your brother." And at the outset, it appears that that "your brother" is the subject, and "him/it" refers to the lost item. And therefore, [Rashi] raised the difficulty, "But would it ever enter your mind that one could give it back before [the claimant] inquires about it?" So he answered, that "your brother" is the object, and "him/it" [refers to] your brother. And he [hence] comes to clarify that it is an object; and that the subject is the one who has the lost object in his hand, such that he should investigate the claimant of the lost object, that he is not a swindler...

Would it seem reasonable etc. But, rather, ask him [about it]. And the word אותו refers back to “your brother,” meaning that you should inquire of your brother who is the owner of the lost item [by asking] for signs that the lost item had.

The explanation is that he needs to give identifying signs for it. And according to this, "your brother," would be the object, as it is "your brother" that is investigated, that he not be a swindler; and "he/it" refers back to "your brother." And it is like (Exodus 2:6), "When she opened it, she saw him, the child" - wherein the noun comes with its pronoun. Although one is enough, [the noun] comes to add clarification. However it is difficult, as [here] the noun is mentioned before the pronoun - such that if had been written, "until he is investigated, your brother," it would have been fine. But since it is written, "your brother, him," it is difficult - [what is the need for] "him?" So it appears to me that this is the understanding [of Rashi]: But would it ever enter your mind that one could give it back before he inquires about it? But rather investigate him that he is not a swindler - meaning this is why it is written, "until your brother seeks it" - that he is seeking the lost object, and not that he is a swindler seeking to rob his fellow. As that is not seeking the lost object at all. And since it is difficult - how will he know if he is coming to rob his fellow or to seek his lost object, he said, "investigate him to see if he is a swindler or he is not a swindler." And that which Rashi explained, "investigate him," is not the language of the verse - "your brother seek it" - as the verse is certainly like its simple understanding. But rather he came to explain in what way he will know that he is seeking the lost object and is not a robber, about which he said, "investigate him to see if he is a swindler." So does it appear.

V. 2. והיה עמך .ואם לא קרוב וגו׳ usw. Diese Aufgabe des Bergens wird modifiziert durch die Aufgabe: והשבתו לו, in welchem implizite die Pflicht liegt, dafür zu sorgen, dass das verlorene Gut auch dem Eigentümer erhalten bleibe, dass nämlich nicht, wie bei einem Tiere, die zu dessen Erhaltung erforderlichen natürlich zurückzuerstattenden Fütterungskosten den ganzen Wert desselben aufzehren. Daher der Satz: כל דבר שעושה ואוכל יעשה ויאכל ודבר שאין עושה ואוכל ימכר שנאמר והשבתו לו ראה היאך תשיבנו לו, alles, was produziert und verzehrt, produziere und verzehre, was aber nicht produziert, jedoch verzehrt, werde verkauft; denn es heißt והשבתו לו, sorge dafür, wie Du es ihm wieder zurückgeben kannst, d. h. wo möglich den Gegenstand selbst, wo nicht, dessen Schätzungswert (daselbst 28 b) שם דמיהן ומניחן.

והשבתו לו AND THOU SHALT RESTORE IT TO HIM — it is necessary that there be some restoration — that it (the animal) should not eat in your house to its own value, and you claim this from him (in which case there is no actual restoration of what has been lost). From here, they (the Rabbis) derived the law: Whatever works and requires food (as, for instance, oxen, etc., the cost of whose food is set off by the value of its labour) should work and eat; whatever does not work but requires feeding (as, for instance, sheep) should be sold and the money restored to the man who lost it (Bava Metzia 28b).

Provided there is a return, etc. Rashi is answering [the difficulty] that the verse should not have said “and you shall return it to him” [because that is obvious], but [only] “until your brother seeks it,” and if it is known to him that you have it, you are certainly obligated to return it to him.

עד דרש אחיך אתו, du hast die Pflicht, es an dich zu behalten, nicht nur, bis es überhaupt von dir gefordert wird, sondern bis אחיך אתו, bis אחיך, der also V. 1 bezeichnete Eigentümer, אתו, speziell den von dir gefundenen Gegenstand reklamiert, also bis du die Überzeugung hast, es dem rechtmässigen Eigentümer zurückzugeben. אחיך legitimiert sich eben durch אתו, dass seine Forderung den von dir gefundenen Gegenstand in speziellster Weise kennzeichnet. Diese, wie uns scheint, in den Worten des Textes selbst liegende Bestimmung — es hätte ja sonst allgemein heißen können עד אשר יִדָרֶש מעמך והשבת אתו — hält die Halacha durch Umdeutung des דרש אחיך in dem Sinne, wie עד שתדרש אחיך fest, d. h. דרשהו אם רמאי הוא, erfrage ihn, ob er auch kein Betrüger ist (daselbst 28 a). Diese Legitimierung dessen, der einen Fund als sein Eigentum beansprucht, kann entweder durch עדים, Zeugen, oder durch סימנין, Angabe von Merkmalen geschehen. Diese letzteren, סימנין, sind hinsichtlich ihres Wertes für den Erweis einer Identität verschieden. Es gibt deren drei Kategorien: סימנין מובהקים ביותר vorzüglich triftige Merkzeichen, wie z. B. ein Loch, Riss oder sonstige Verletzung an einer bestimmt bezeichneten, namhaft gemachten Stelle, von welchen ein gleiches Zutreffen an einem anderen Gegenstande derselben Art kaum anzunehmen ist, so bei einer verlorenen Schrift סימנין מובהקים אמצעאין ;נקב בצד אות פלוני Merkzeichen von mittlerer Triftigkeit, wie: genaue Größe des Längenmaßes, des Gewichtes, der Zahl, auch die Angabe der örtlichen Stelle eines Fundortes; endlich סימנין גרועין Zeichen von schlechter Triftigkeit, wie Angabe des Größenverhältnisses überhaupt und der Farbe, wie: groß, klein, weiß, rot ארוך וגוץ חיור וסומק usw. Die Frage bleibt unentschieden, ob dem Beweise durch Merkzeichenangabe ursprünglich gesetzliche Geltung oder nur kraft rabbinischer Bestimmung zukommt, ob סימנין דאוריתא oder דרבנן. Merkzeichen der ersten Kategorie sind jedenfalls selbst דאוריתא hinreichend, diejenigen letzterer Art sind an sich durchaus wirkungslos. Die Frage erstreckt sich nur auf Merkzeichen der mittleren Triftigkeit, mit denen man sich in der Regel bei wiederzugebenden Funden begnügt. Soll der Nachweis der Identität von Gegenständen auf Merkzeichen an Geräten, Hüllen etc. beruhen, in welchen sie gefunden worden, oder die, wie Sättel, sich an ihnen befinden (V. 3), so tritt die Frage ein אי חיישינן לשאלה, ob nicht anzunehmen wäre, dass der Eigentümer der Geräte etc. sie dem Eigentümer der Fundobjekte geliehen haben könne, so dass das Eigentumsrecht an den Geräten noch nicht das Eigentumsrecht an dem Inhalt erwiese, und ob es nicht Geräte gebe, von denen anzunehmen wäre, dass man sie in der Regel nicht an andere verleihe דלא מושלי אינשי (B. M. 27 b; Gittin 27 b und Jebamot 120 b).

Which does not produce and eat, shall be sold. So that one can fulfill, “And you shall return it to him.”

Alle diese Momente haben auch bei Feststellung der Identität von aufgefundenen Leichen große Bedeutung.

Ein weit höherer Grad der Zuverlässigkeit wird dem טביעת עין, dem Erkennen eines Gegenstandes beigemessen, das nicht auf einzelnen anzugebenden Merkmalen, sondern auf dem Wiedererkennen des Totaleindrucks beruht. Eine Erkenntnisart, die allerdings objektiv nicht nachweisbar ist und der bei wiederzugebenden Funden nur bei solchen Reklamanten Folge zu geben wäre, hinsichtlich deren Rechtlichkeit und Wahrhaftigkeit die Präsumtion der größten Zuverlässigkeit vorwaltet (B. M. 23 b und Chulin 96 a).

Die Reklamation hat der Fundberger durch הכרזה, durch Veröffentlichung des geschehenen Fundes zu veranlassen (siehe zu V. 3).

לא תוכל להתעלם THOU MAYEST NOT HIDE THYSELF — i.e. You must not cover your eyes, pretending not to see it.

וכן תעשה לשמלתו, even though such a find is far less likely to occur, so that you might consider it as having been abandoned on purpose.

וכן תעשה לחמורו, ...לשמלתו...ולכל אבדת אחיך, “you are to deal in a similar manner with an ass, a garment, or any other object your brother has apparently lost.” The Torah lists different categories of possessions, some that need feeding, others that are relatively inexpensive and do not represent a great loss if the loser does not recover them. Our sages also derive from the words עד דרוש אחיך, “until your brother request said object,” that in order to claim such “lost” property the claimant must furnish proof that these objects are really his.

By averting your eyes, etc. Rashi has to give this explanation [again] even though he had given it above (v. 1), because he [then] explained the verse again according to the teaching of the sages that “at times you may conceal yourself,” so it seems as if he is not sure of the verse’s meaning. Therefore he says here that it is impossible to explain “you may not conceal yourself” except [as meaning] that you should not [conceal yourself, unlike the earlier verse where it also means that you sometimes may conceal yourself, etc.]

V. 3. וכן תעשה לחמרו. In diesem Verse wird der berg- und rückgabepflichtige Fund näher präzisiert. Der Text begnügt sich nicht, zu sagen: וכן תעשה לכל אבדת אחיך, sondern ergänzt die Vers 1 gegebenen Beispiele שור ושה noch durch חמור ושמלה und lehrt B. M. 27 a die Halacha, חמור wolle lehren, dass nicht nur בעדים וסימנין דגופה, nicht nur Zeugen oder Zeichen, die sich auf das Tier selbst beziehen, sondern auch המור בעדים וסימנין דאוכף, ein Esel durch Zeugen oder Zeichen des Sattels zurückzugeben sei (siehe zu V. 2). שור ושה lehre: שור דאפלו לגיזת זנבו ושה לגיזותיו, dass selbst vom Schaf gekommene Wolle, selbst die Schweifhaare des Ochsen zurückzugeben seien. Es muss eben das ganze Schaf und der ganze Ochs dem Eigentümer erhalten bleiben. שמלה lehre: מה שמלה מיוחדת שיש בה סימנין ויש לו תובעין אף כל דבר שיש בה סימנין ויש לו תובעין חייב להכריז, dass nur solche Gegenstände den Finder zum Bergen und zur Zurückgabe verpflichten, die, wie in der Regel ein Kleid, Zeichen und reklamierende Eigentümer haben. Gegenstände aber, die in keiner Weise durch ein besonderes Merkmal kenntlich zu machen und von dem Eigentümer voraussetzlich mit dem Verlust aufgegeben sind, יאוש sind des Finders, jedoch nur dann, wenn anzunehmen ist, dass im Augenblicke des Fundes der Verlust bereits dem Eigentümer zum Bewusstsein gekommen und damit der Gegenstand von ihm aufgegeben war. Lässt aber die Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes dies Bewusstsein nicht voraussetzen und hat der Finder ihn genommen, bevor der Eigentümer sich des Verlustes bewusst geworden, obgleich er nachträglich den Verlust erfahren und den Gegenstand aufgegeben, so war der Gegenstand באיסורו בא לידו in einem Momente in die Hand des Finders gekommen, in welchem noch das Recht des Eigentümers an dem Gegenstande haftete, und das nachträgliche יאוש ergänzt das Eigentumsrecht des Finders nicht. Ein solches nachträgliche und von dem Finder antizipierte יאוש heißt יאוש שלא מדעת und der Rechtskanon lautet: יאוש שלא מדעת לא הוי יאוש (siehe B. M. 21 a-b u. f.). Über die Konstruierung des Eigentumsbegriffs aus einem persönlichen Willensakt und einem sachlichen Besitzakt, und die darin begründete Wirkung des יאוש siehe Wajikra 25, 14.

Es gibt Gegenstände, deren Verlust der Eigentümer von vornherein voraussetzt und aufgibt, z. B. תמרי זיקי, durch den Wind auf die Landstraße hin fallende Baumfrüchte; solche sind in der Regel des Finders, weil der Eigentümer מעיקרא מיאש. Sind die Eigentümer aber Unmündige, יתמי, denen die Rechtsfähigkeit der Besitzentsagung fehlt, דלאו בני מחילה נינהו, so sind die Früchte אסור (B. M. 22 b).

Auf diesen Rechtsgrundsätzen beruhen die (B. M. 21 a u. f.) gegebenen Bestimmungen אלו מציאות שלו ואלו חייב להכריז וכו׳ וכו׳, welche Funde des Finders sind, und welche er zu veröffentlichen verpflichtet ist (siehe daselbst).

לכל אברת אחיך וכן תעשה לכל אבדת אחיך verpflichtet zur Abwendung jeder dem Eigentum des Nächsten drohenden Gefahr, auch אבדת קרקע, auch liegenden Eigentums, so: ראה מים ששוטפין ובאין הרי זה גודר בפניהם, Abwehr einer dem Felde des Nächsten drohenden Überschwemmung.

מי שאבודה הימנו ומצויה אצל כל אדם יצאת אברה :אשר תאבד ממנו ומצאת ששטפה נהר שאבודה ממנו ואינה מצויה אצל כל אדם (B. M. 22 b). Ein berg- und rückgabepflichtiger Fund ist nur ein solcher, der nur dem Eigentümer in Verlust geraten, für alle anderen aber noch zugänglich ist, von einem solchen spricht hier das Gesetz, dass an dem Gute noch das Recht des Eigentümers haftet, bis er durch יאוש es aufgibt, und hier, wie bereits bemerkt, יאוש שלא מדעת לא הוי יאוש. Ein Gut jedoch, das, wie durch einen Strom, in eine solche Lage versetzt ist, dass es der Menschenmacht überhaupt entrissen ist, daran hat objektiv das Eigentumsrecht aufgehört, selbst bevor der Vorgang dem Eigentümer zum Bewusstsein gekommen war (B. M. 22 b ש׳׳מ zur Stelle).

לא תוכל להתעלם. Auch in dieser Fassung des Verbotes liegt, wie wir glauben, dass das Verbot, wie bereits zu V. 1 bemerkt, kein absolutes ist, sondern Ausnahmen zulässt. Absolut hieße es לא תוכל להתעלם .לא תתעלם sagt aber: es liegt nicht in deiner Machtvollkommenheit, dich dieser Aufgabe zu entziehen, du kannst dich nicht aus eigener Willkür davon dispensieren. Implizite ist damit gesagt, dass das Gesetz selbst in bestimmten Fällen einen solchen Dispens erteilt (vergl. לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך Kap. 12.17).

Ob שומר אבדה die Verpflichtung als שומר שכר oder שומר חנם trägt und חייב oder פטור בגנבה ואבדה ist (Schmot S. 269), ist B. K. 56 b Gegenstand der Verhandlung und im letzten Resultat unentschieden (siehe Ch. M. 267, 16 ש׳׳ך daselbst). Für die Hut eines für den Eigentümer zu erhaltenden Fundes und die darauf zu verwendende Mühe und Tätigkeit darf in keiner Weise eine Vergütung genommen werden. Die Ansicht, welche gleichwohl שומר אבדה als שומר שכר betrachtet, erblickt in der an dem Gute des Nächsten zu übenden Mizwa selbst einen als Wertgegenstand zu betrachtenden Gewinnst, und veranschaulicht dies durch die Erwägung, dass, obgleich die Mizwaübung an sich nicht als Nutzen zu betrachten ist, da מצות לאו ליהנות ניתנו, doch nach dem Grundsatz העוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה (siehe Kap. 6, 6) diese ohne pekuniäre Opfer zu übende Mizwa an die Stelle einer sonst in dem Momente der Beschäftigung mit der אבדה zur Übung stehenden mit pekuniären Opfern verbundenen treten könnte, פרוטה דרב יוסף, oder, wie eine andere Auffassung (daselbst) diese Ansicht erläutert: כיון דרחמנא שעבדיה בעל כורחיה ,הילכך בשומר שבר דמי, da die Fundhut keine freiwillig übernommene, sondern eine vom Gesetz auferlegte ist, so ist sie als mit voller Hüterverantwortung auferlegt zu betrachten. Was beim שומר שכר die Bezahlung bewirkt, das bewirkt hier das Diktat des Gesetzes.

Für השבת אבדה, für die Leistung des Zurückbringens eines verlorenen Gutes darf, wie bemerkt, keine Vergütung genommen werden. Es ist eben eine Pflichtleistung, die ihm das Gesetz auferlegt. Ist aber der Finder gerade mit einer ihm lohnbringenden Arbeit beschäftigt, so ist er nicht verpflichtet, diese ohne entsprechende Vergütung liegen zu lassen. Diese Verstattung lautet (B. M. 31 b): נותן לו שברו כפועל בטל, und zwar, wie die Erläuterung sich ausspricht, כפועל בטל של אותה מלאכה דבטל מנה. Diese Bestimmung כפועל בטל של אותה מלאכה וגו׳ wird verschiedentlich aufgefasst. Die Auffassungen differieren wesentlich darin, ob die Beschäftigung mit dem verlorenen Gute als eine zu vergütende Mühe angerechnet wird und שכר כפועל בטל של אותה מלאכה דבטל מנה danach geschätzt wird, wie viel er nehmen würde, um die ihm lohnbringende Arbeit zu lassen und sich mit der müheloseren Arbeit an dem verlorenen Gute zu beschäftigen, oder השבת אבדה als Pflichtleistung gar nicht in Anrechnung käme und פועל בטל וכו׳ danach zu schätzen wäre, wie viel er nehmen würde, seine lohnbringende Arbeit zu lassen und müßig zu gehen. Es ist die Frage, ob פועל בטל absolut ein unbeschäftigt zu bleibender, oder relativ ein mit müheloser Arbeit zu beschäftigender Arbeiter heißt. ש׳׳ך im ח׳׳מ 265, 1 entscheidet sich für die absolute Auffassung. Hat die Leistung an dem verlorenen Gute eine höhere Gebühr zu beanspruchen, als er mit der von ihm zu lassenden Arbeit verdienen würde, so hat er jedenfalls nur dies letztere zu fordern, da die השבת אבדה an sich ja umsonst zu leisten ist. Nach der Auffassung des ר׳׳ח ,ר׳׳יף, und anderer Autoritäten kommt überhaupt die Beschäftigung mit dem verlorenen Gute nicht in Betracht, und פועל בטל bezeichnet nur den Preis der Arbeit, die er um des verlorenen Gutes willen zu lassen hat. Der Preis derselben wäre nicht nach Zeiten zu schätzen, in welcher die Arbeit gesucht ist und hoch im Preise steht, sondern in welcher die Arbeiter einer solchen Branche unbeschäftigt, בטל, sind und es mehr Arbeitsucher als Arbeitgeber gibt (siehe מ׳׳מ zu 4 ,12 הל׳ גזלה). Der Wortlaut der Formel: כפועל בטל של אותה מלאכה und nicht מאותה מלאכה spräche allerdings für diese Auffassung.

הקם תקים [THOU SHALT NOT SEE THY BROTHER’S ASS OR ANY OF HIS HERD FALL DOWN BY THE WAY, AND HIDE THYSELF FROM THEM] THOU SHALT SURELY RAISE UP — This refers to the duty of loading — to re-load the burden that fell from it.

לא תראה את חמור אחיך או שורו נופלים בדרך, “You must not idly look on while the donkey or ox of your brother collapse under their load;” Nachmanides writes that here Moses adds an additional dimension to what the Torah had already written in Exodus 23,5 where the animal was described as רובץ תחת משאו, ”lying down (impotently) under its load” (overload). Whereas in Exodus only a donkey, an animal that is used to carry heavy loads is mentioned, and the owner is your enemy, so that the Torah’s concern appears to be only the suffering of the beast, here Moses speaks about אחיך, “your brother,” to show that another consideration for offering assistance must be the desire to keep alive the concept that all Jews are to relate to fellow Jews as if they were brothers. The hate relationship must be set aside when even only an animal’s suffering is involved.

לא תראה את חמור אחיך, “You must not see the donkey of your brother ..fall;” in a similarly worded commandment in Exodus 23,5 the Torah uses the expression חמור שונאך, “the donkey of one who hates you.” The promise contained in our verse is that if you assist your enemy with his falling donkey he will eventually appreciate you and become אחיך, “your brother.” When you assist him he will forget the “hatred” between you and only remember the bond of love that unites brothers.

This refers to loading — to load the burden, etc. Rashi is answering the question: Why does Scripture change the wording? Here it is written, “You must surely lift it up with him,” but in parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 23:5) it writes, “You shall surely help [etc.]” He explains that there it is talking about unloading, to unload the burden, but the section here deals with loading.

"You shall not see without...." (Deut 22:4), in parshat Mishpati the language if the verse describes a positive commandment and a negative commandment, as it teaches in the Mechilta: "In Exodus it describes the donkey of someone whom you hate and here the donkey of your kinsman, becuase it is forbidden to hate him. Rather it is only the yetzer hara that brings about hatred between them...

In the commandment on assisting someone to lift up his burden, he added a warning thereon constituting a negative commandment [Thou shalt not see thy brother’s ass or his ox fallen down by the way etc.],¹²⁶Verse 4. for in the Torah He stated Thou shalt surely release it with him¹³¹Exodus 23:5. [i.e., by helping to unload the burden] which is a positive commandment [and thus we learn that in failing to render assistance one violates both a positive and a negative commandment].¹³²See “The Commandments,” Vol. II, pp. 254-255. He also adds [here the expression] fallen down by the way,¹²⁶Verse 4. for there He stated, lying under its burden,¹³¹Exodus 23:5. and He mentioned there only the ass¹³¹Exodus 23:5. because it commonly carries a great burden and, therefore, is liable to crouch under it. Also, here it says thy brother’s¹²⁶Verse 4. and there it states thy enemy’s,¹³³Exodus 23:4. and of him that hateth thee,¹³¹Exodus 23:5. meaning [here] to say, “Do thus to him [in assisting him], and remember the brotherhood between you and forget the hatred.”

V. 4. דרמו אינהו וטעונייהו באורחא :נופלים בדרך .לא תראה וגו׳, sie und ihre Last liegen am Wege und es wird dem Führer der Tiere schwer, ihnen die Last aufzulegen und sie aufzurichten (B. M. 32 a). Es ist hier also von טעינה, von der Hilfeleistung beim Aufladen die Rede, während Schmot 23, 5 von פריקה, der Hilfe beim Abladen spricht. Dort wird überhaupt (Verse 4 u. 5) השבת אבדה und פריקה mehr in Beziehung zum אויב und שונא als eine selbst dem Feinde zu leistende Hilfe und auch mit Hinblick auf צער בעלי חיים, auf die dem Tiere zu zollende Pflicht behandelt. Hier aber steht die Pflicht der Vermögensrettung und der Hilfeleistung als allgemeine, den sozialen Verkehr regelnde Bestimmung. B. M. daselbst lehrt die Halacha: פריקה בחנם טעינה בשכר, dass für Abladen ebenso wie für השבת אבדה keine Vergütung genommen werden darf, für die Hilfe beim Aufladen aber eine Vergütung zu nehmen gestattet ist. Bei השבת אבדה und פריקה liegt die Vermögenseinbuße, die abzuwenden ist, unmittelbar vor. טעינה ist aber zunächst nur die Förderung eines Vorhabens. Darin dürfte das Motiv dieser gesetzlichen Unterscheidung liegen. Die gesetzliche Tatsache aber, dass die Hilfe bei טעינה gegen Vergütung zu leistende Pflicht, dass auch unentgeltliche השבת אבדה nur Verpflichtung des Unbeschäftigten ist, das Gesetz aber den Beschäftigten nicht verpflichtet, seinen Erwerb ohne entsprechende Vergütung hintanzusetzen, erscheint als tief charakteristisch für das jüdische Gesetz über das soziale Pflichtleben. Das jüdische Gesetz ist fern von jener Überschwänglichkeit, die die völlige Hintansetzung des eigenen Selbsts und selbstvergessene Aufopferung als das allgemein normale Prinzip des sozialen Zusammenlebens fordert, und erst da die Tugend beginnen lässt, wo die Aufopferung hervortritt, eine Anschauung, die, weil sie nicht allgemeine Maxime zu werden vermag und in ihrer Verwirklichung vielmehr allen sozialen Verkehr aufheben würde, eben durch ihre Überschwänglichkeit als unpraktisches Ideal erscheint und für den "praktischen" Menschen nur dem nackten Egoismus Raum lässt. Das jüdische allgemein verpflichtende soziale Prinzip lässt die Sorge für die eigene Existenz und Selbständigkeit in ihrer vollen sittlichen Geltung, fordert aber ebenso gebieterisch neben dieser Sorge für sich selbst gleichzeitig und mit gleichem Ernst die sorgende hilfreiche Teilnahme für die Erhaltung des Eigentums und Förderung der Unternehmungen des Nächsten. Die jüdische Wahrheit, die, wie wir dies zu Wajikra 19, 17 entwickelt, in tiefem Grunde auch das Streben für das eigene Selbst allen egoistischen Anhauchs entkleidet aus dem Gesichtspunkte gottgebotener Pflicht begreifen lässt, sie allein konnte in Wahrheit ihr: "Liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst" mit dem Gottessiegel: אני ד׳ besiegeln. Daher konnte auch die Mischna (B. M. 33 a) vom Standpunkte der allgemeinen Rechtspflicht lehren: Wenn gleichzeitig das eigene Gut und das Gut des Nächsten der Rettung bedürfen שלו קודם, fordert das Gesetz nicht die Hintansetzung des eigenen, und erläutert רב יהודה אמר רב dies anlehnend an die Worte des beschränkenden Satzes: אפס כי לא יהיה בך אביון (Kap. 15, 4), שלך קודם לשל כל אדם. Diese Anlehnung dürfte sich gleichwohl nicht so ganz von dem eigentlichen Sinn dieses Satzes entfernen. Eine Theorie, welche die völlige Gleichstellung des eigenen Interesses und des Anderinteresses statuieren wollte, würde in letzter Konsequenz kommunistisch den ganzen Begriff des Eigentums juridisch aufheben und den Staat zum Proletarier machen).

או שורו נופלים בדרך, “or his donkey or ox collapsing on the way,” [due to having been overloaded, Ed.] even though the owner is someone who hates you, you must not ignore this, but assist them in helping the animal to get up.

עמו [THOU SHALT SURELY UPLOAD] WITH HIM — i.e. with the owner. But if he goes aside and sits down and says to him, “Since it is a duty for you to load it, if you want to load, go ahead and load!” — [“I” am not commanded to do it”], he is exempt from doing it (cf. Bava Metzia 32a).

Gleichwohl fügt derselbe רב יהודה אמר רב die mahnende Warnung bei: כל המקיים בעצמו כך סוף בא לידי כך, wer sich nur von diesem Grundsatze leiten lässt, verfällt zuletzt dem Mangel, dem er damit entgehen wollte. Denn dasselbe Gesetz, das uns שורת הדין, die Linie des Rechts für all unser Verhalten zeichnet, mit deren Überschreitung das Unrecht beginnt, dasselbe Gesetz erwartet von dem Adel unserer Gesinnungen, לפנים משורת הדין innerhalb dieser Rechtsgrenze uns selbst zu beschränken, und zur Wohlfahrt des Nächsten, rechtverzichtend, das zu tun, was die Beurteilung der Verhältnisse uns als das הישר ׳והטוב בעיני ד erkennen lässt (siehe zu Kap. 6, 18). Die beiden sich ergänzenden Aussprüche des ר׳ יהודה אמר רב setzt Raschis Erläuterung in das gehörige Licht: לא יהיה כך אביון הזהר מן העניות, zuerst das Eigene zu retten, dafür spricht die Pflicht, sich selber vor Verarmung zu schützen. Allein: כל המקיים בעצמו כך וכו׳ אעפ׳י שלא הטילו עליו הכתוב יש לאדם ליכנס לפנים משורת הדין ולא לדקדק שלי קודם אם לא בהפסד מוכיח ואם תמיד מדקדק פורק מעליו עול ג׳׳ה וצדקה וסוף שיצטרך לבריות, obgleich das Gesetz ihm dies nicht auferlegt, hat doch jeder nicht bis zur strikten Rechtslinie zu gehen und nur da seinem Interesse den Vorgang einzuräumen, wo der Schaden einem solchen Verfahren offenbar das Wort redet. Würde jemand immer so genau rechnen und überall sein Interesse voranstellen, so würde er die ebenso gebotene Pflicht der Liebesund Wohltätigkeit gänzlich von sich abwerfen, und ihm wäre hier verheißen, dass er statt Wohlhabenheit zu erreichen, der Hilfsbedürftigkeit verfallen werde.

עמן und ebenso Schmot 23, 5. Die Pflicht der Hilfeleistung liegt nur ob, wenn der der Hilfe Bedürftige mit tätig das Seine leistet. Wenn er aber, ohne schwach oder krank zu sein, הלך וישב לו ואמר הואיל ועליך מצוה אם רצונך לפרוק פרוק פטור, sich müßig abseits setzt und sagt: dir liegt die Mizwapflicht ob, willst du die Mizwa erfüllen, lade ab und auf, so ist der andere nicht verpflichtet, es sei denn beim Abladen aus Rücksicht für das leidende Tier; dann hätte er aber den Anspruch auf Vergütung (B. M. 32 a u. b).

לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה THE APPAREL OF A MAN SHALL NOT BE ON A WOMAN — so that she look like a man, in order to consort with men, for this can only be for the purpose of adultery (unchastity) (cf. Sifrei Devarim 226:1; Nazir 59a).

לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, in order to walk among males and seduce them.

לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, “male apparel shall not be on a woman.” The principal concern of our verse is to deny the woman the right to bear arms (Sifri 227, Nazir 59). She is not to go to war and become a cause for immorality rampant during war. Similar considerations, i.e. the prevention of creating opportunities for sexual promiscuity- are the reason males are forbidden to wear women’s garments. Both of these apparent role reversals of the sexes are an abomination to the Lord.
Our sages in Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 6,1 understand this wording to mean that “garments which will result in, or lead to abominations being perpetrated are forbidden” (compare Yoreh Deyah 156,2). Jewelry which is associated specifically with women is forbidden to be worn by men, as are mannerisms practiced especially by women, such as looking in the mirror. Seeing that they were one of three things which the rabbis had to give a special dispensation to for the household of Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi, it is clear that generally speaking male Jews are not supposed to admire themselves in a mirror. If a barber, in order to trim the client’s hair, needs to look into the mirror to better see the hairs he is looking for, this is in order. If a person was sick and he wishes to reassure himself that he is on the way to recovery by consulting a mirror and confirming that he looks healthier, this too is in order. The last mentioned examples are not uses for the enhancement of one’s exterior, for “dolling oneself up.” Our sages in Shabbat 94 also stated that if one picks a single white hair out of the black hairs in one’s beard one is guilty of violating the basic prohibition not to wear women’s clothing. A further illustration of this subject is found in Yalkut Shimoni on Judges item 56, that the reason Yael slew Siserah with a nail instead of with a knife was that she did not want to violate the commandment of using implements reserved for males.

He may not shave the pubic hairs, etc. I.e. [because] women customarily do this, meaning that he should not ornament himself with women’s adornments. You might ask: Why does Rashi give an alternative explanation [only] to the end of the verse? He should also have given an alternative interpretation to the beginning of the verse as well! For the Gemora (Nazir 59a) explains: R. Eliezer ben Yaakov says: From where [do we know that] a woman may not put on weapons and go out to war, because the verse teaches, “A man’s attire may not be on a woman.” Re”m writes: The same applies too, that a woman may not go out with weapons to war. Another answer why [Rashi offers] the alternative explanation [is because that] answers the question: Why in the beginning of the verse is it written, “A man’s attire may not to be on a woman,” while at the end [of the verse] it writes, “nor may a man wear a woman’s garment”? It should have written, “A woman’s attire should not be on a man”! Since Scripture alters [the wording], the verse is obviously talking about another matter [i.e., shaving the pubic hairs, etc.]. But according to the alternative explanation too, one has to answer why the verse uses a term of “wearing.” It should have said, “He should not adorn with women’s adornments.” Therefore the first explanation is also needed.

V. 5. לא יהיה וגו׳. Nasir 59 a werden diese Verbote verschieden aufgefasst. Nach der einen Auffassung, wäre hier ein Kleiderwechsel der Geschlechter nur zu unzüchtigen Zwecken verboten. Nach der als Halacha rezipierten Lehre des ר׳ אליעזר בן יעקב untersagt aber שלא תצא אשה בכלי זיין למלחמה :לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, dass eine Frau nicht mit Waffen gerüstet in den Krieg ziehe, und לא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה: שלא יתקן איש בתקוני אשה, dass ein Mann sich nicht nach Weiberart schmücke und ziere. Offenbar ist, wie uns scheint, nach dieser Auffassung nicht sowohl ein Verbergen des Geschlechts durch Kleiderwechsel der Gegenstand des Verbotes, als dass jedem Geschlechte dasjenige untersagt wird, was mehr spezifisch der Natur des andern eignet. Es soll das männliche ebenso wenig sich eine der Natur des Weibes gemäße Pflege des äußeren leiblichen Erscheinens gestatten, wie das Weib nicht in einem der männlichen Natur angehörenden Beruf auftreten soll (es heißt ja nicht: שלא תצא אשה בכלי זיין, sondern: בכלי זיין למלחמה). In der Tat ist auch jede mehr als zum männlichen Anstand gehörige Haut- und Haarpflege, Schminken, Haarfärben, zu große Freundschaft des Spiegels etc. ebenso wie weibliche und weibische Kleidung und Putz dem Manne משום לא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה untersagt (Nasir 59 a daselbst; Mackoth 20 b und Aboda Sara 29 a ׳תוספו daselbst).

לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, “a woman must not wear men’s clothing;” it is an act of disgrace and sexual provocation;”Having taken note of this law, Yael, the Kenite woman who killed Sisera, the general who had commanded the army of the Canaanite King Jabin of Chatzor, did not use weapons used by male soldiers, such as arrows or a sword when doing so, but took a tent pin. (Judges, 4,21) This paragraph has been written immediately after those dealing with women and warfare, in order to remind us that warfare is something reserved for men, not women. When men go out to war they are likely to encounter situations making promiscuity a great temptation. They are therefore warned not to add to such temptation by dressing up as women. (Ibn Ezra)

ולא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה NEITHER SHALL A MAN PUT ON A WOMAN’S GARMENT in order to go and stay unnoticed amongst women. Another explanation of the second part of the text is: it implies that a man should not remove the hair of the genitals and the hair beneath the arm-pit (Nazir 59a).

The Torah prohibited only, etc. Rashi wants to explain what he said earlier, “So that she resembles a man, in order to mingle with men,” and also afterwards, “In order to take a place among women,” so that you do not ask, how does he know to explain this way. Perhaps it is forbidden to wear [such clothes] in all circumstances because it is a Scriptural decree? He answers that [it is not a Scriptural decree] as the verse gives a reason [for it], “For the abomination of Adonoy, etc.” This indicates that “the Torah prohibited only, etc.”

כי תועבת FOR [ALL THAT DO SO ARE] AN ABOMINATION [UNTO THE LORD THY GOD] — This implies that the Torah forbids only the wearing of a garb that leads to abomination (unchastity) (cf. Sifrei Devarim 226:1).

כי יקרא IF [A BIRD’S NEST] CHANCE TO BE [BEFORE THEE IN THE WAY … THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE MOTHER WITH THE YOUNG] — If it chance to be, this excludes that which is always ready at hand (in thy court yard) (Sifrei Devarim 227:1; Chullin 139a).

IF A BIRD’S NEST CHANCE TO BE BEFORE THEE. This also is an explanatory commandment, of the prohibition ye shall not kill it [the dam] and its young both in one day,¹³⁴Leviticus 22:28. because the reason for both [commandments] is that we should not have a cruel heart and be discompassionate, or it may be that Scripture does not permit us to destroy a species altogether, although it permits slaughter [for food] within that group. Now, he who kills the dam and the young in one day or takes them when they are free to fly [it is regarded] as though he cut off that species.
Now, he [Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon] wrote in the Moreh Nebuchim¹³⁵Guide of the Perplexed III, 48. that the reason for the commandment to release the mother bird when taking its nest and the prohibition against killing the dam with its young on one day is in order to admonish us against killing the young within the mother’s sight, for animals feel great distress under such circumstances. There is no difference between the distress of man and the distress of animals for their young, since the love of the mother and her tenderness to the children of her womb are not the result of reasoning or [the faculty of intelligent] speech, but are produced by the faculty of mental images¹³⁶“Machshavah.” So in Al Charizi’s translation which was used by Ramban. In Ibn Tibbon’s translation the term is ham’dameh — “imagination.” which exists among animals even as it is present in man. But if so¹³⁷This is Ramban’s reason for disagreeing with Rambam’s explanation. the main prohibition in killing the dam and its young applies only when killing [first] the young and [then] the dam [but not vice versa, whereas the Torah forbids it to be done either way]! But it is all an extraordinary precaution,¹³⁸For — in defense of Rambam’s explanation — we would be forced to add that the primary prohibition is against killing first the young and then the dam; the prohibition against first killing the dam and then the young is but a precautionary measure lest one may accidentally reverse the order. While we might contend this in defense of Rambam’s theory, Ramban concludes, “and it is more correct etc.” This explanation would seem to be more logical because it does not differentiate between the order of taking or slaughtering the dam and its young. Hence Ramban’s language. The full significance of this theory of Ramban will be made clearer further on in the text. and it is more correct [to explain them as prohibitions] to prevent us from acting cruelly.
And the Rabbi [Moshe ben Maimon] said further:¹³⁵Guide of the Perplexed III, 48. “Do not contradict me by quoting the saying of the Sages,¹³⁹Berachoth 33b. See Note 168 further on. ‘He who says in his prayer: Even to a bird’s nest do Thy mercies extend [etc., they silence him,’ which would seem to imply that there is no reason other than the Will of G-d for the commandment to release a dam when taking its nest], for that is one of two opinions, namely, the opinion of the Sage who holds that the commandments [of the Torah] have no other reason but the Will of the Creator. We follow the second opinion that there is a reason for all commandments.” And the Rabbi [Moshe ben Maimon] raised a difficulty from a text in Bereshith Rabbah [which contradicts his theory that there is a reason for every commandment]. The text reads:¹⁴⁰Bereshith Rabbah 44:1. Rambam’s discussion of the text is found in “Guide of the Perplexed,” III, 26. “And what difference does it make to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether an animal is slaughtered from the front of the neck or the back? Surely you must say the commandments have been given only for the purpose of refining [disciplining] men through them, as it is said, Every word of G-d is refined.”¹⁴¹Proverbs 30:5. This text of Bereshith Rabbah implies that some commandments have no other reason than the fact that they were so willed by G-d, which contradicts Rambam’s main thesis that there are reasons for all commandments. Rambam proceeds (“Guide of the Perplexed,” III, 26) to explain this text, in harmony with his theory. In the lengthy discussion to follow, Ramban will strongly agree with Rambam’s main theory that there is a reason for every commandment. As for the difficulty posed by the text of Bereshith Rabbah, he will offer his own solution.
Now, this theory, categorically stated by the Rabbi [Moshe ben Maimon] concerning the commandments that there is a reason for them, is indeed very clear. There is a reason, benefit, and improvement for man in each of them, aside from the reward by Him Who commanded it, blessed be He! Our Sages have already stated:¹⁴²Sanhedrin 21b. “Why were the reasons for the commandments not revealed? etc.”¹⁴³See “The Commandments,” Vol. II, pp. 330-331. And they further interpreted:¹⁴⁴Pesachim 119a. “And for stately clothing¹⁴⁵Isaiah 23:18. The Hebrew reads: v’limchaseh athik, which the Rabbis interpret to mean: “and to the things concealed by the Ancient of days (G-d)” — there will be a special reward for him that reveals these secrets that lie hidden in the commandments of the Torah. — this refers to one who uncovers matters that were concealed by the Ancient of days.¹⁴⁶Daniel 7:13. And what are these matters? They are the reasons for [the commandments of] the Torah.” The Rabbis have further expressed themselves on the subject of the Red Heifer¹⁴⁷Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3-4. concerning which Solomon said, “I achieved [a knowledge of the reasons for] everything, but the section of the Red Heifer I examined, inquired into, and searched; All this have I tried by wisdom; I said, ‘I will get wisdom,’ but it was far from me.¹⁴⁸Ecclesiastes 7:23. And Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Chanina said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses, ‘To you I reveal the reason of the Red Heifer, but for others it is a statute [a commandment for which we know no reason].’ For it is written, And it shall come to pass in that day, that there shall not be light, but heavy clouds ‘v’kipaon’ (and thick).¹⁴⁹Zechariah 14:6. The word is spelled yekipaon,¹⁵⁰In other words, by tradition we are to read the word v’kipaon, although in the Masoretic text it is written yekipaon, in the future tense, as explained in the text. intimating that matters concealed from you in this world are destined ‘to be revealed’ in the World to Come, like a blind man who suddenly sees, as it is written, And I will bring the blind by a way that they knew not,¹⁵¹Isaiah 42:16. and it is further written, These things have I done and I did not leave them undone,¹⁵¹Isaiah 42:16. for I have done them already to Rabbi Akiba” [meaning that the explanations were revealed to Rabbi Akiba].
Thus the Rabbis explained that our lack of knowledge of the reasons of [the commandments of] the Torah is but a barrier in our minds, and that the reason for the most difficult of the commandments [i.e., the Red Heifer] has already been revealed to the Sages of Israel [such as Rabbi Akiba, as mentioned in the above Midrash]. There are many such texts among the words of the Rabbis, and Torah and Scripture, which teach to that effect; and the Rabbi [Moshe ben Maimon] mentioned some of them. But those Agadic [homiletic] statements, presenting difficulty to the Rabbi, are in my opinion, intended to express another thought as follows:
The benefit from the commandments is not derived by the Holy One Himself, exalted be He. Rather, the advantage is to man himself, to withhold from him physical harm or some evil belief, or unseemly trait of character, or to recall the miracles and wonders of the Creator, blessed be He, in order to know the Eternal. It is this [which the Rabbis intended in saying]¹⁴⁰Bereshith Rabbah 44:1. Rambam’s discussion of the text is found in “Guide of the Perplexed,” III, 26. that the commandments were given “for the purpose of refining men,” that they may become like “refined silver,” for he who refines silver does not act without purpose, but to remove therefrom any impurity. So, also, the commandments eliminate from our hearts all evil belief, and [are given] in order to inform us of the truth and to recall it always. Now this very same Agadah [homily] is mentioned in the Yelamdeinu¹⁵²See Vol. II, p. 131, Note 196, for explanation of the term. in the section of These are the living things:¹⁵³Leviticus 11:2. — The text quoted is found in Tanchuma (Buber), Shemini 12. ”And what difference does it make to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether one eats of an animal which is ritually slaughtered or if he just stabs it? Do you benefit Him or harm Him at all? Or what does it matter to Him if one eats clean animals or unclean? If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself.¹⁵⁴Proverbs 9:12. Surely the commandments have been given only to refine men, as it is said, The words of the Eternal are pure words,¹⁵⁵Psalms 12:7. As silver refined in a crucible on the earth, purified seven times. and it is further said, Every word of G-d is refined.¹⁴¹Proverbs 30:5. This text of Bereshith Rabbah implies that some commandments have no other reason than the fact that they were so willed by G-d, which contradicts Rambam’s main thesis that there are reasons for all commandments. Rambam proceeds (“Guide of the Perplexed,” III, 26) to explain this text, in harmony with his theory. In the lengthy discussion to follow, Ramban will strongly agree with Rambam’s main theory that there is a reason for every commandment. As for the difficulty posed by the text of Bereshith Rabbah, he will offer his own solution. Why? So that [the word of G-d] should protect you.” Thus it is clearly stated here that the Rabbis [in this Midrash], meant to say merely that the benefit [accruing from observance of the commandments] is not for His sake exalted be He, [nor] that He is in need of the light of the candelabrum as one might think, or that He needs the food of the offerings and the odor of the incense as might appear from their simple meanings. Even regarding the memorial He hath made for His wonderful works,¹⁵⁶Psalms 111:4. that He commanded us to perform in memory of the Exodus and Creation, the benefit is not for Him, but so, that we should know the truth and be meritorious enough to be worthy that He protects us, for our utterances and remembrances of His wonders are accounted by Him as things of nought, and vanity.¹⁵⁷Isaiah 40:17. And the Midrash brought proof from [the law specifying] slaughter by cutting the neck in front or in the back, meaning to state that all the benefits are to us and not to the Holy One, blessed be He, because it is impossible to say concerning slaughter that there is more benefit and glory to the Creator, blessed be He, by cutting the neck in front than by cutting it in the back or by stabbing the animal. Rather, all these advantages are to us — to lead us in paths of compassion even during [the process of] slaughtering. And then the Rabbis brought another proof: “Or what does it matter to Him if one eats clean things,” — that is, foods permissible to the eater — “or eats unclean things,” that is, forbidden food concerning which the Torah declared they are unclean unto you.¹⁵⁸Leviticus 11:28. However, He implied that [these laws were given to us] so that we might develop a fine soul and be wise men perceptive to the truth. By quoting the verse, If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself¹⁵⁴Proverbs 9:12. the Rabbis [in the above Midrash] mentioned the principle that the commandments pertaining to rites such as slaughter by [cutting of] the neck are to teach us traits of good character. The Divinely ordained commandments which define the species [of animals and birds which are permissible to us] are to refine our souls, just as the Torah has said, and ye shall not make your souls detestable by beast, or by fowl, or by any thing wherewith the ground teemeth, which I have set apart for you to hold unclean.¹⁵⁹Ibid., 20:25. If so, all the commandments are solely to our advantage. This is as Elihu said, If thou hast sinned, what doest thou against Him? And if thy transgression be multiplied, what doest thou unto Him?¹⁶⁰Job 35:6. And again he states, If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him? Or what receiveth He of thy hands?¹⁶¹Ibid., Verse 7. This is a consensus in all the words of our Rabbis. Thus they asked in Yerushalmi Nedarim¹⁶²Yerushalmi Nedarim IX, 1. whether they may open the way [to release one from a vow or oath] by reason of the honor due to G-d¹⁶³Before releasing a person from a vow or oath, the Sage must ascertain that, had the supplicant known of a particular fact, he would not have made the vow or oath. The question arose whether the Sage may say to him, “If you had known that he who vows is evil in the eyes of G-d, would you still have vowed?” See also, Ramban in Numbers 30:2 (Vol. IV, pp. 345-346). in matters between man and G-d. On this question the Rabbis answered [there]: “What is an example of [a vow being released because of] the honor due to G-d? [If you say that it is a case where he swore] ‘I shall not make a Booth, I shall not take the palm-branch, I shall not put on phylacteries’ — but do you call this ‘by reason of the honor due to G-d?’ It is for oneself that [the observance of the commandments] helps, just as it is said, If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him? Or what receiveth He of thy hands?¹⁶¹Ibid., Verse 7. If thou hast sinned, what doest thou against Him? And if thy transgression be multiplied, what doest thou unto Him?”¹⁶⁰Job 35:6. Thus the Rabbis have explained that even the palm-branch, the Booth, and the phylacteries concerning which He commanded that they shall be for a sign upon thy hand, and for frontlets between thine eyes; for by strength of hand the Eternal brought us forth out of Egypt¹⁶⁴Exodus 13:16. — are not ordained to honor G-d, blessed be He, but to have compassion on our souls. And the Sages have already arranged it for us in the [Closing] Prayer on the Day of Atonement, stating: “Thou hast distinguished man from the beginning, and hast recognized him [to be privileged] to stand before Thee, for who shall say unto Thee, ‘What doest Thou?’ and if he be righteous what can he give Thee?” Similarly, it states in the Torah, which I command thee this day for thy good,¹⁶⁵Above, 10:13. as I have explained.¹⁶⁶Ibid., Verse 12. So also, And the Eternal commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Eternal our G-d, for our good always.¹⁶⁷Ibid., 6:24. And the intent in all these expressions is “for our good,” and not for His, blessed and exalted be He! Rather, everything we have been commanded is so that His creatures be refined and purified, free from the dross of evil thoughts and blameworthy traits of character.
So, too, what the Rabbis have stated,¹⁶⁸The Rabbis of the Gemara made the following remark with reference to the Mishnah quoted above (see text at Note 139): “He who says in his prayer: ‘Even to a bird’s nest do Thy mercies extend’ etc., they silence him.” The reason for this law as stated in the Mishnah is now explained by the Rabbis of the Gemara: “Because he [the supplicant] treats etc.” (see text). — Berachoth 33b. “Because he treats the ordinances of G-d like expressions of mercy, whereas they are decrees”¹⁶⁹“To inform them that they are His servants, and that they keep His commandments, decrees and statutes, even such matters concerning which Satan and the nations of the world taunt Israel saying, ‘What need is there for this commandment?’” (Rashi ibid). Now, this text of the Mishnah and Gemara was explained above by Rambam as exemplifying the opinion that there is no reason for fulfillment of the commandments of the Torah other than the Will of the Creator, while we follow the second opinion that there is a reason for every commandment. Ramban will now proceed to explain this text, in accordance with the accepted opinion that there is a reason for every commandment, thus making this text to be the consensus of all Sages. means to say — that it was not a matter of G-d’s mercy extending to the bird’s nest or the dam and its young, since His mercies did not extend so far into animal life as to prevent us from accomplishing our needs with them, for, if so, He would have forbidden slaughter altogether. But the reason for the prohibition [against taking the dam with its nest, or against killing the dam with its young in one day] is to teach us the trait of compassion and that we should not be cruel, for cruelty proliferates in man’s soul as it is known that butchers, those who slaughter large oxen and asses are men of blood;¹⁷⁰Psalms 55:24. they that slaughter men,¹⁷¹Hosea 13:2. are extremely cruel. It is on account of this [cruelty] that the Rabbis have said:¹⁷²Kiddushin 82a. Amalek is the symbol of cruelty, as he attacked the enfeebled, faint and weary, (further 25:18). “The most seemly among butchers is a partner of Amalek.” Thus these commandments with respect to cattle and fowl are not [a result of] compassion upon them, but they are decrees upon us to guide us and to teach us traits of good character. So, too, the Rabbis refer to all commandments of the Torah — positive and negative — as “decrees,” as they said¹⁷³Mechilta, Bachodesh 6. See Vol. II, p. 286, where Ramban quotes the same text with some minor changes. in the parable of “the king who entered a country, and his attendants said to him, ‘Promulgate decrees upon them.’ He, however, refused, saying, ‘When they will have accepted my sovereignty, I will promulgate decrees upon them.’ Similarly did the Holy One, blessed be He, [say to Israel], ‘You have accepted My sovereignty: I am the Eternal thy G-d,¹⁷⁴Exodus 20:2. accept My decrees: Thou shalt have no other gods etc.’”¹⁷⁵Ibid., Verse 3.
However, in the Midrash of Rabbi Nechunya ben Hakanah¹⁷⁶Sefer Habahir, 104-105. See Vol. I, p. 24, Note 42. there is an interpretation with respect to releasing a mother bird when taking its nest, which states that there is a secret in this commandment. “Rabbi Rechimaie said, What is the meaning of that which is written, Thou shalt in any wise let the dam go,¹⁷⁷Verse 7. and it did not say ‘the father?’ [This implies that the verse commands] only Thou shalt in any wise let the dam go with the honor of that ‘understanding’¹⁷⁸Here used in a Cabalistic sense. See my Hebrew commentary p. 451. which is termed ‘the mother of the world,’ as it is written, Yea ‘im’ (if) thou call for understanding.¹⁷⁹Proverbs 2:3. The Sefer Habahir obviously intimates that the word be read eim (mother), thus suggesting: “the mother [of the world] is called ‘understanding.’” And what is the meaning of the phrase, and the young, take thou to thee?¹⁷⁷Verse 7. Said Rabbi Rechimaie, It means those young that she raised. And what are they? They are the seven days of [the Festival of] Tabernacles, and the laws of the seven days of the week etc.” Thus this commandment alludes to a great matter, and therefore the reward for the observance thereof is abundant, [as it is said], that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days.¹⁷⁷Verse 7.

כי יקרא קן צפור, when one chances across this without having planned it.

When you chance upon a nest ~ On the approach of man, were not for the compassion on her young, the dam would naturally leave the chicks in order to escape. But her maternal love prompts her to scorn prudence and risk her life to save them. Man should therefore not take her so that her righteousness and her love with which she loves her young should not lead her to suffer. This is to teach us to respect the good moral qualities and inculcate in our hearts the idea that one never suffers a loss for doing justice. Had we been permitted to take the mother bird away from her young, man would have concluded that pity was an undesirable and foolish quality, bringing suffering on those exercising it. And now, knowing that taking her is forbidden to us, the essence of the quality of mercy will be inculcated in our hearts very deeply.

לא תקח האם על הבנים, “do not take the mother bird with the young birds.” Nachmanides writes that the rationale behind this commandment is the same as the one behind the prohibition to slaughter both a calf and its mother on the same day. The purpose of the legislation in both instances is to ensure that our hearts will not become insensitive to animal’s feelings, as once they have become such, the next step is insensitivity to our fellow humans’ feelings. Alternately, the legislation is a reminder by the Torah that we must not do something, which, if duplicated many times would lead to the extinction of the species in question. Maimonides in his Moreh Nevuchim section 3,48 writes that the reason for both the above-mentioned pieces of legislation is to avoid a mother animal watch its young being slaughtered before its own eyes, as the sensitivity to such a happening is as great among animals as it is among humans. Nachmanides, questioning Maimonides’ approach, writes that if it were correct the legislation of לא תשחטו אותו ואת בנו, “do not slaughter mother animal and its young,” should apply only when the younger animal is slaughtered first. Once the mother animal has been slaughtered there is no reason not to proceed with the slaughter of its young. Halachah forbids the slaughtering of both generations on the same day regardless of the order in which these animals are slaughtered. [Compare Maimonides’ own ruling in chapter 12 of hilchot shechitah, that if someone first slaughters the cow, and then two of her calves on the same day, he has committed 2 transgressions and is punished separately for each. Ed.] It is therefore more likely that the point of these two items of legislation in the Torah is to prevent Jews from becoming cruel.

While on top of her young. But if she is hovering in the air above the young, it is permitted to take her.

V. 6. כי יקרא וגו׳. Die vorhergehenden Gesetze (Verse 1 — 5) haben für das der Begründung und Entwicklung entgegengehende Volksleben die großen Grundsätze der Solidarität und Brüderlichkeit für die Erhaltung des Eigentums und Förderung der Unternehmungen des Nächsten, sowie der Aufrechthaltung der geschlechtlich gesonderten Berufs- und Lebensweise des Mannes und Weibes proklamiert. Jene bilden ebenso die Grundsäulen des sozialen Verkehrs, wie diese dem "Hause" zur Grundlage dient, das ja den Granitboden bildet, auf welchem überhaupt alle nationale Wohlfahrt beruht. Schon V. 5 war in dieser Beziehung das Weib in den Vordergrund gestellt. Davon, dass nicht יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, dass das Weib die ganze Hoheit und Würde seines Berufs als "Mutter des Hauses" begreift und in dieser "Beschränkung" sich hoch achtet und hoch geachtet, geschützt und unangetastet dasteht im Volke, davon wie von nichts anderem hängt das Gedeihen und der ewige Fortschritt des Volkslebens ab, und die allseitige Würdigung des Frauenberufes ist ein bedeutsamer Gradmesser für die sittliche Stufe eines Volkes.

כי יקרא כן צפור לפניך בדרך, “if you encounter by chance a bird’s nest on your way, etc.;” the reason why these paragraphs follow one another is that the performance of one commandment brings in its wake the performance of additional commandments. (Compare Devarim Rabbah, 6,4 on our portion). Seeing that the reward for the performance of the commandment just discussed results in your enjoying long life, you will have the opportunity to devote yourself for more years to Torah study. When you build a house for yourself, you will be able to perform the commandment of erecting a fence on the edges of its roof to protect anyone from falling off it. When the Torah follows with the warning not to mix seeds of different plants when planting a vineyard, you will enjoy harvesting the fruit of that vineyard. When you are warned not to harness an ox and a donkey to the same plough, [as it would result in the donkey suffering pain, seeing it is so much weaker. Ed.] you will enjoy owning many oxen and many donkeys as a result of observing that commandment. When the Torah subsequently warns you not to wear garments in which linen and wool have been woven in the same cloth [except when commanded to do so for the tzitzit in certain situations], you will be able to afford buying a beautiful tallit on which to perform the commandment to attach these fringes. (Compare Tanchuma, section 2). The commandment to own garments which qualify for the attaching of these fringes is extremely important as we know from the Talmud, tractate Shabbat folio 32. According to a statement on that folio, anyone who is meticulous about the observance of that commandment will eventually be in command of 2800 servants. This statement is based on Zecharyah 8,23: בימים ההמה אשר יחזיקו עשרה אנשים מכל לשונות הגוים והחזיקו בכנף איש יהודי לאמר נלכה עמכם כי שמענו אלוקים עמכם, “in those days ten men from nations of every tongue will take hold,-they will take hold of every Jew by a corner of his cloak and say: ‘let us go with you, for we have heard that G–d is with you.’ [There are 70 tongues, multiplied by ten multiplied by four corners on each garment of a Jew adorned with tzitzit. Ed.] This is also the interpretation of Jeremiah 17,11-12: קורא דגר ולא ילד, עושה עושר ולא במשפט, “like a partridge announcing that it has hatched young when this is not true, or like amassing riches illegally;” this is followed by the line: “כסא כבוד מרום מראשון, “o throne of glory exalted from of old;” how does this line connect with the line preceding it?” it teaches that the partridge proclaiming to have hatched young from its eggs had stolen those eggs from another species of bird sitting on them only after they had already been hatched. Then they proceed to eat those chicks which belong to another category of bird. When the chicks try to fly and are unable to, they become victims to predators. Who caused this sequence? Whoever steals eggs that are not his own. The prophet uses this simile to describe the gentiles who boast about their ill gotten gains which are the result of robbery. These gentiles, who destroyed the Holy Temple by burning it, will eventually have to pay for their crime by becoming totally extinct. (Compare Tanchuma, section two on our portion)

כי יקרא קן צפור, “if a bird’s nest happens” (to be along the way you are walking,) the reason why this paragraph has been written here is because it also deals with chance encounters on the way, i.e. בדרך, “on the way,”

לא תקח האם THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE MOTHER so long as she is sitting upon the young.

לא תקח האם על הבנים, I have already elaborated on this verse in connection with the prohibition to boil the young in the milk of its mother (Exodus 23,19) Similar considerations are valid in connection with the prohibition of אותו ואת בנו. The practices, if carried out, look as if the person carrying it out is insensitive, cruel by nature, and is so anxious to satisfy his palate that all considerations of feelings of others are of no concern to him.

Indem daher das Gesetz nun zu Bestimmungen übergeht, die überwiegend der Konstituierung des Familienlebens angehören, stellt es eine Institution an die Spitze, die jedem im Volke zum Bewusstsein bringt, welche hohe Bedeutung dem häuslichen Wirken eines weiblichen Wesens das Gesetz beimisst, indem es diesem Wirken selbst bis in den Kreis des Tierlebens nachgeht, einer Vogelmutter im Momente ihrer Muttertätigkeit Immunität zusichert und die Betätigung dieser Würdigung eines weiblichen Wesens in seinem Berufe von jedem fordert, der die Gelegenheit dazu findet.

קן צפור, “a bird’s nest;” whenever the word צפור instead of עוף occurs in the Torah meaning bird, it refers to a ritually pure bird, one that Israelites are allowed to eat if slaughtered in the prescribed fashion. Therefore the legislation following next applies only to this category of birds. (Compare Rabbi Yitzchok in the Talmud, tractate Chulin folio 139)

כי יקרא וגו׳ (siehe Bereschit S. 326). Das Nest hat bis jetzt in keiner Beziehung zu dir gestanden, es wird jetzt erst von dir betroffen, פרט למזומן: das Gesetz spricht nur von herrenlosen Vögeln, nicht aber von solchen, die dem Menscheneigentum angehören (Chulin 139 b). קֵן von קנן, verwandt mit גנן schützen, bezeichnet zunächst den zur geschützten Vogelwohnung, insbesondere zum Schutz der Jungen dienenden Raum, das Vogelhaus. Übertragen, bezeichnet es aber auch die im Neste wohnenden Jungen. So כנשר יעיר קנו (Kap. 32. 11). — צפור: nur reine Vögel (daselbst siehe Bereschit S. 125 u. 230). Es spricht nur von dir vom Gesetz zum Genuss gestatteten Vögeln, bei welchen dir daher die Veranlassung zur Aneignung nahe liegt.

לא תקח האם על הבנים, “you must not take the mother bird together with its young ones;” it would be an act of cruel insensitivity, comparable to cooking the kid in the milk of itsmother, something the Torah has repeatedly forbidden. (Deut.14,21) as well as the prohibition to slaughter, even as a sacrifice, a mother cow together with its calf on the same day. (Leviticus 22,28) Our author considers the requirement that the fruit of one’s vineyard even after four years may be consumed by the owner only in Jerusalem, as also in a category intended to teach us how not to give in to the urge to indulge in drinking wine, etc.

אפרחים או ביצים, nicht nur, wenn mehrere Junge oder mehrere Eier sich finden, auch nur ein Junges oder ein Ei heißt קן (daselbst 140 b). Wie פרח die aus der Knospe frei gewordene Blüte heißt, so heißt das aus dem Ei geschlüpfte Junge: אפרח.

על הבנים, “with the young.” Other examples of the word על being used as meaning “with,” are found in Leviticus25,31, על שדה הארץ יחשב, “it will be considered as belonging with the fields of the land.” Compare also Numbers 28,10, על עולת התמיד, with the daily burnt offering, or Numbers 19,5: על פרשה ישרוף, “he is to burn it together with its excrement.”

,והאם das Gesetz spricht nur von dem weiblichen Vogel, nicht aber von dem , männlichen, selbst wenn ein solcher mit dem Brüten oder der Pflege der Jungen betroffen würde (daselbst). על האפרחים: sie vor Kälte zu schützen, על הביצים: zum Brüten. Indem על האפרחים או על הביצים wiederholt wird, und es nicht kürzer heißt: עליהם, wird daran (daselbst) gelehrt: לאקושי אפרחים לביצים וביצים לאפרחים, dass sich אפרחים und ביצים gegenseitig näher bestimmen, die Jungen müssen noch wie Eier der Mutterpflege bedürftig, צריכין לאמן, nicht schon flügge, מפריחין, sein, und die Eier wie Junge lebensfähig, בני קיימא, nicht schon verdorben, מוזרות, sein. Ebenso folgt aus תקח לך (V. 7), dass die Jungen noch nicht טרפה, nicht bereits tödlich verletzt seien, לך ולא לכלביך (a). Die Mutterpflege muss noch notwendig und nicht schon zwecklos sein 140.

למען ייטב לך וגו׳ THAT IT MAY BE WELL WITH THEE etc. — If in the case of an easy command which involves no monetary loss, Scripture states “Do this in order that it may be well with thee and thou mayest prolong thy days”, it follows à fortiori that this at least will be the grant of the reward for the fulfilment of commands which are more difficult to observe (Chullin 142a).

למען ייטב לך והארכת ימים, in the matter of dispatching the mother bird before taking her chicks, we find some display of protective concern by the Torah for the preservation of the species, an effort not to destroy the seed of the birds of the field although they are הפקר, unclaimed property. In the example of the dispatch of the mother bird the Torah appears to teach us that even the display by us of concern for such totally unclaimed eggs or chicks is rewarded by the Creator with the party showing this empathy receiving dividends in this life and the principal (reward) in the world to come.

Regarding that which we have previously written that the essence of the Mitzvah not to take the mother bird with its offspring is not to be cruel, do not challenge me using the Mishnah from Berachot 33b on which the Gemara says [the prayer leader is to be silenced] because he implied God's commandments come from mercy while they are Ordinances, from which one it would seem that the reason for [the Mitzvah] has nothing to do with "mercy". This conclusion does not present a difficulty because the intent for which are obligated to observe God's Mitzvoth is only as they are "Royal Ordinances" and not because of the reason deduced [from them]. Were that the case, it would be [too] possible to stray from the true path by relying on the reasoning and inclination of each individual, as it is written in Tractate Sanhedrin (21b), "Why are the reason for Mitzvoth of the Torah not revealed? Because the two instances in which the reasons were revealed led the Gadol Haolam (King Solomon) to stumble".

If, with an easily fulfilled commandment, etc. Rashi is answering the question: It should have said this regarding one of the other mitzvos! He answers that it is written it here because this mitzvah is more easily fulfilled than all, etc.

V. 7. שלח תשלח וגו׳. Wenn also eine reine noch herrenlose Vogelmutter in ihrem Muttergeschäft auf Jungen oder Eiern gefunden wird, somit Gelegenheit zur Aneignung beider gegeben ist, ist es geboten, die Vogelmutter aufzuheben, — sich somit der Möglichkeit der Aneignung bewusst zu machen, — sie aber frei fliegen zu lassen. Der Moment der Ausübung seiner Mutteraufgabe schützt das Vogelweib in seiner Selbständigkeit und Freiheit.

ואת הבנים תקח לך, “and the young ones you may take for yourself,” in order to eat them. We learn from here that the eggs may be eaten even, though they have been taken from a living bird. (Talmud, tractate Chulin, folio 64, and Tossaphot there)

ואת הבנים תקח לך, es ist dies nicht Pflicht, sondern freigestellt, und bildet eben den Gegensatz zur אם.

והארכת ימים, And you will enjoy long life.” The reward will be far greater than if you had ignored G-d’s law and taken mother bird and its young for yourself.

למען ייטב לך והארכת ימים, tue dies in dem Bewusstsein, dass von dem Geiste der Mizwa, die du da erfüllst, von der Hochachtung der Mutterwürde, die du damit zum Ausdruck bringst, das Glück einer jeden Gegenwart und das Heil in aller Zukunft abhängt. Vergleiche die ähnliche Verheißung bei dem Gebote der konkreten Elternehre (Schmot 20. 12 und Dewarim 5, 16) — eine Parallele, in welcher wohl unsere Auffassung eine Bestätigung finden dürfte.

והארכת ימים, the reward matches the fulfillment of the commandment. By not killing both mother bird and all its young, thus not making that family extinct, you will yourself be rewarded with additional years of healthy life.

Chulin 141 a wird gelehrt הנוטל אם על בנים משלח ואינו לוקה: wenn jemand die Vogelmutter von den Jungen sich angeeignet hat, so hat er sie pflichtgemäß frei zu schicken und erliegt dann nicht der מלקות-Strafe. Dies Verhältnis, in welchem hier das Verbot לא תקח אם על בנים zu dem Gebot שלח תשלח את האם steht, dass nämlich nach Übertretung des Verbots die dadurch verwirkte Strafe mit noch nachträglicher Erfüllung des Gebotes der Verbüßung entfällt, wird unter den Begriff: לאו הניתק לעשה, ein durch Verbindung mit einem Gebote in seinen Folgen aufgehobenes Verbot gefasst, und lautet der Kanon: כל מצות לא תעשה שיש בה קום עשה אין לוקין עליו, jedes Verbot, in welchem zugleich ein Gebot begriffen ist, entgeht der מלקות-Strafe (Chulin 141 a). Solche mit Geboten verbundenen Verbote sind auch z. B. לא תותירו וגו׳ והנותר וגו׳ באש תשרפו לא תכלה פאת וגו׳ לעני ולגר תעזוב אותם ,לא תגזול והשיב ולו תהיה לאשה וגו׳ לא יוכל שלחה כל ימיו ,את הגזילה (V. 29). Mackot 15 b wird dies Verhältnis des Verbots zu dem damit verbundenen Gebote verschieden aufgefasst. Nach einer Auffassung ist die straffällige Übertretung eines solchen Verbotes erst dann vollendet, wenn durch denselben auch die Erfüllung des Gebotes vereitelt worden ist, wenn er z. B, nachdem er die Mutter von den Jungen genommen, den Muttervogel auch getötet hat, somit durch ihn auch die fernere Erfüllung des Gebotes unmöglich gemacht worden. Diese Ansicht spricht sich aus: ביטל עשה שבה חייב לא ביטל פטור. Nach der andern ist jedoch die straffällige Begehung des Verbotes mit Übertretung desselben vollendet. Er ist sofort straffällig, wenn er nicht, um der Strafe zu entgehen, das Gebot erfüllt (und zwar nach Raschi Chulin 141 a תוך כדי דבור של התראה sofort nach der Übertretung oder, nach Raschi Mackoth 15 b, sofort nach strafgerichtlicher Aufforderung — siehe ׳תוספו daselbst). Diese Ansicht spricht sich also aus: קיים עשה שבה פטור לא קיים חייב. In dem ersten Falle hängt die Übertretung von der Vereitelung des Gebotes ab. Im zweiten Falle hängt die Bestrafung von Nichterfüllung des Gebotes ab. Es wird dort diese Differenz mit einer anderen Meinungsverschiedenheit in Zusammenhang gesetzt, mit der Frage nämlich, ob התראת ספק שמה התראה oder לאו שמה התראה ob die zur Straffälligkeit einer gesetzwidrigen Handlung erforderliche Verwarnung (Schmot 21, 14 u. 18; Wajikra 20, 17 und Bamidbar 15, 32 u. 33) nur dann wirksam ist, wenn sie den zu Warnenden in zweifellosem Vollzug der Gesetzwidrigkeit trifft, oder selbst dann, wenn dieser Vollzug noch zweifelhaft bleibt. Ist z. B. wie nach der Auffassung ביטלו ולא ביטלו die Straffälligkeit der Übertretung des Verbotes ׳לא תקח וגו noch durch die eine Erfüllung des Gebotes שלח תשלח vereitelnde Handlung bedingt, deren Begehen ja im Augenblick der Verbotübertretung noch zweifelhaft ist, so wäre die im Momente der Verbotübertretung auszusprechende Warnung eine התראת ספק; ist aber, wie nach der Auffassung קיימו ולא קיימו, die Straffälligkeit der Handlung mit der Übertretung des Verbotes לא תקח abgeschlossen, an deren Charakter die eventuell nur die Strafe sühnende Geboterfüllung nichts mehr ändert, so ist eine Verwarnung im Augenblick der Verbotübertretung eine התראת ודאי. Wir haben hier nur allgemeine Umrisse dieser gesetzlichen Begriffe nach רש׳׳י und ׳תוספו verzeichnet (siehe dasselbst). ריף und רמב׳׳ם haben eine zum Teil anderer Lesart beruhende abweichende Auffassung (siehe כ׳׳מ zu 16, 4 הל׳ סנהדרין ).

כי תבנה בית חדש WHEN THOU BUILDEST A NEW HOUSE, [THEN THOU SHALT MAKE A BATTLEMENT FOR THY ROOF] — If thou hast fulfilled the command of שלוח הקן (of letting a mother bird go when the nest is rifled), you will in the end be privileged to build a new house and to fulfill the command of “making a guard-rail”, for one good deed brings another good deed in its train, and you will attain to a vineyard (v. 9), fields (v. 10) and fine garments (vv. 11—12). It is for this reason (to suggest this) that these sections are put in juxtaposition (Midrash Tanchuma, Ki Teitzei 1).

THEN THOU SHALT MAKE A PARAPET FOR THY ROOF. The commandment of the parapet is newly-declared, or it may be explanatory of the prohibition, Neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor.¹⁸⁰Leviticus 19:16. But the commandment concerning mixed seeds¹⁸¹Verse 9. is explanatory, for He has already stated, Thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed.¹⁸²Leviticus 19:19. Now, this [prohibition] implied any place where they are sown; here he added that if a vineyard be sown with mixed seeds that which has been sown ‘tikdash’ (will be forfeited) together with the increase of the vineyard,¹⁸¹Verse 9. meaning to say that any benefit is forbidden just like hekdeish [“holy things” belonging to the Sanctuary from which we are prohibited to derive any benefit]. The meaning of ‘pen tikdash’ (‘lest’ thou forfeit) is like ki tikdash (“for” you shall forfeit). So also, And ye shall not go out from the door of the Tent of Meeting ‘pen tamuthu’ (‘lest’ ye die)¹⁸³Ibid., 10:7. [is like ki tamuthu — “for” you shall die]. Likewise, Neither shall ye touch it ‘pen t’muthun’ (‘lest’ ye die)¹⁸⁴Genesis 3:3. [is like ki t’muthun — “for” you shall die]. It is possible that the meaning of pen tikdash is similar to ‘pen’ their adversaries should misdeem, ‘pen’ they should say, Our hand is exalted¹⁸⁵Further, 32:27. which is like “perhaps.” The verse thus states: Do not sow the vineyard with mixed seeds, for perhaps they will sprout and the whole vineyard will be forbidden to you, for they do not become forfeit [unless they sprout] as we have been taught,¹⁸⁶Shevi’ith 7:7. “A grain crop [sown near a vine] is rendered forfeit after it has struck root, and grapes, after they have grown to the size of a white bean.”

ולא תשים דמים בביתך כי יפול הנופל, if it were to happen that someone falls off that roof you could not have been the indirect cause, seeing you had put up a protective railing. Had you not done so, your family might bear part of the guilt for such a mishap.

מעקה, this word is unique in Scripture, constructed from עקה just as מעשה, a deed, action, is constructed from the root עשה, and מראה, from ראה. However, similar sounding words in Psalms 55,4, מפני עקת רשע, “because of the oppression of the wicked; as well as in Amos 2,13 מעיק תחתיכם, “I will slow you down by force,” follow the pattern of such roots as שב and קם.

He deserves to fall. Rashi is answering the question: Why does the verse say הנופל [lit. the one who falls]? He explains that הנופל means, “He deserves to fall.” He continues and explains that if this person deserves to fall, why does one transgress a negative command if he did not make a fence and a person fell off? He explains because even so, “let his death not come about, etc.”

V. 8. כי תבנה. Das vorhergehende Gesetz hat die Bedeutung des Hauses und für dieselbe die weibliche Wirksamkeit selbst im Vogelnest und der Vogelmutter würdigen gelehrt. Mit der in diesem Verse beginnenden Gesetzesgruppe wird nun die höhere Bedeutsamkeit des Menschenhauses und des Menschenwirkens für das Haus zum Bewusstsein gebracht, wie sich da überall zu dem mit dem Nesterbau und der Jungenpflege sich bereits im Tierleben als Triebtätigkeit ankündenden Streben die Anforderungen des Sittengesetzes gesellen. Der Vogel baut sein Nest für sich und die unmittelbar Seinen, und es ist noch Egoismus, der Selbsttrieb in der Tiefe seiner Mächtigkeit, der ihn irrelos dabei leitet. Der Mensch aber soll sein Haus von vornherein mit Rücksicht auf alle seine gegenwärtigen und künftigen Menschengenossen bauen und in dem ganzen Kreis seiner Häuslichkeit nichts zulassen, wodurch irgend einer zu Schaden kommen könnte (V. 8), soll bei seinem Tun für Genuss und Nahrung, bei seinem ganzen Natur beherrschenden Tun und menschlichen Erscheinen den großen Weltgesetzgeber vor Augen haben, dessen Schöpferwille ebenso ihn zum sittlich freien Gesetzesgehorsam geschaffen, wie er Tier und Pflanze zum unfreien Gesetzesgehorsam gebildet (Verse 9. 10 u. 11); und vor allem soll der Mann sich ewig mahnen, dass, wohin ihn auch sein Beruf führe, er nur in sich selbst überwindender Gesetzestreue seine Mannesstärke und Manneswürde zu bewähren habe (V. 12). Es sind dies alles Gesetze, die bereits in den früheren Büchern (Schmot 21, 28 — 34; Wajikra 19. 19 und Bamidbar 15, 37 — 41) in ihren zivilrechtlichen Folgen, in ihrer Leben heiligenden Bedeutung, in ihrem männliche Besonnenheit pflegenden Ernst zum Ausspruch gekommen waren, die aber zum Teil ergänzend, insbesondere aber für das nun erst recht eigentlich beginnende Haus- und Feld- und Ackerstreben und Manneswirken diesem Kompendium für die ins Land Ziehenden einzuverleiben waren.

כי תבנה בית חדש, “When you build a new house;” if the Torah had only written this line, how would I have known that the legislation which follows also applies to buying a new house, or receiving it as a gift? The Torah added the word בית, i.e. if the house is yours, regardless of how you came by it, you must install these safeguards on your roof.

מעקה means, a fence around the roof. Onkelos renders it by תיקא; the fencing is like a casing (תיק) which guards things that are within it.

As benefit is brought about through the meritorious, and injury through the guilty. And therefore everyone will murmur that you are guilty because this person fell off your roof.

מעקה die Wurzel עקה kommt sonst nicht vor. Nach der Verwandtschaft von דום und בוז ,דמה und צוד ,בזה und צדה und anderen dürfte עקה auch mit עוק, drücken, einengen verwandt sein. Jedenfalls bedeutet מעקה eine Umfriedigung, ein Geländer, und zwar nach der Halacha ein mindestens zehn טפחים hohes.

ועשית, “you must install a parapet for your roof.” If the old roof had collapsed, you must replace it with a new one. This law is introduced here to remind you that after you have completed the conquest of the Holy Land, and have taken over many houses intact from their previous owners, who may not have had such a protective rail or fence on their roof, you must now provide such a parapet. After dealing with one kind of hazard that your property may present to outsiders, the Torah warns against being the cause of other kinds of hazards by writing as a general rule:

כי יפל הנפל [THAT THOU BRING NOT BLOOD UPON THY HOUSE] IF ANY MAN FALL FROM THENCE — (The words may be taken to mean: if he that is to fall (הנופל) falls from it). This suggests: this man deserved to fall to his death (on account of some crime he had committed), nevertheless his death should not be occasioned by your agency, for meritorious things are brought about through the agency of good men and bad things only through the agency of evil men (Sifrei Devarim 229:7).

ולא תשים דמים, während דם im Singular wesentlich das Blut in seiner einheitlichen Bedeutsamkeit als Lebensträger eines Organismus bezeichnet, ist דמים eben das solcher organischen Einheit entrissene, gleichsam Blutstoffatome gewordene, "vergossene" Blut. שום דמים heißt daher eine jede Veranstaltung, durch welche das Leben eines Menschen bedroht wird, und לא תשים דמים בביתך enthält die ganz allgemeine gesetzliche Warnung, nichts Lebengefährdendes im Bereiche unserer Verantwortung zu haben. Daher der Satz: מניין שלא יגדל אדם כלב רע בתוך ביתו ולא יעמיד סולם רעוע בתוך ביתו ת׳׳ל לא תשים דמים בביתך (B. K. 15 b), einen bissigen Hund, eine gebrechliche Leiter im Hause zu haben, ist durch dieses Gesetz verboten und überhaupt die auch durch gerichtliches Einschreiten herbeizuführende Beseitigung alles Schadenbringenden, לסלק הזיקא, auch da geboten, wo der zivilrechtliche Schadenersatz nicht zu bewirken wäre (daselbst). So war z. B. die außerpalästinensische jüdische Gerichtsbarkeit der nicht durch סמיכה Vollberechtigten (siehe Schmot S. 226 f.) nur auf solche Rechtsstreitigkeiten beschränkt, die aus Vorkommnissen des gewöhnlichen Verkehrs entspringen und auf Rechtsschutz des Eigentums oder Anspruchs klagen, מלתא דשכיהא ויש בו חסרון כים. Nur für solche den Verkehr überhaupt bedingende Fälle waren die nicht vollberechtigten außerpalästinensischen Gerichte als Delegierte der nationalen Gesamtautoritäten bevollmächtigt עבדינן שליחותיהו, nicht aber für außergewöhnliche oder solche Fälle, die z. B. wie כפל bei גניבה (Schmot 22. 3) oder חצי נזק bei שור תם (Schmot 21, 35) nur קנס sind, den Charakter einer Pön und nicht eines Ersatzes haben (siehe B. K. 84 b). Eine Bestimmung, die gewöhnlich unter den Kanon begriffen wird: אין דנין דיני קנסות בבבל. Gleichwohl konnte überall auf Grund unseres Textes die Beseitigung alles Gefahr bringenden Besitztums bewirkt werden.

לא תשים דמים בביתיך, “do not place anything in a position in your house that might cause bloodshed.” This includes ferocious dogs and shaky ladders. (Talmud, tractate Ketuvot folio 41)

כי יפל הנפל ממנו, daran, dass hier der Verunglückte schon vor dem Fallen הנופל der Fallende genannt ist, wird Schabbat 32 a der bedeutsame Satz gelehrt: ראוי זה ליפול מששת ימי בראשית שהרי לא נפל והכתוב קראו נופל אלא שמגלגלין זכות על ידי זכאי וחובה על ידי חייב dem Verunglückten war längst ein solcher Unfall nach göttlichem Urteil bestimmt, denn es nennt ihn die Schrift schon vor dem Fall "der Fallende". Allein es wird das verdiente Glück eines Guten durch einen Guten herbeigeführt und das verschuldete Unglück eines Schuldigen durch einen Schuldigen. In jedem von Menschen dem Menschen widerfahrenden Wohl und Weh wirken zwei Momente zusammen: das durch Verdienst oder Schuld des Betroffenen bestimmte göttliche Verhängnis und die freie Wohl- oder Übeltat des Täters. Gott überweist oder überlässt uns nach unserem Verdienst oder unserer Schuld dem Wohltun oder der Übeltat unserer Mitmenschen auf Erden, und auch in dieser Beziehung gilt das große Wort der salomonischen Weisheit: der große Weltenmeister lässt alles gebären, und hat Toren in seinem Dienst und hat Verbrecher in seinem Dienst, רב מחולל כל ושוכר כסיל ושוכר עוברים (Prov. 26, 10). Es ist dies wohl dieselbe Wahrheit, die in dem והאלדים אנה לידו. (Schmot 21, 13) ausgesprochen ist, und welche (Mackot 10 b) in dem "Waltspruch des Urewigen" משל הקדמוני, Ausdruck gefunden: מרשעים יצא רשע (Sam. I. 24, 14).

כלאים [THOU SHALT NOT SOW THY VINEYARD] WITH DIVERSE KINDS OF SEEDS — i.e. wheat and barley together with kernels of grapes with one and the same hand-throw (Berachot 22a; Kiddushin 39a; Chullin 82b).

תקדש, is prohibited just as קדשים, sacred things are prohibited to most people.

לא תזרע כרמך כלאים, “Do not sow your field (vineyard) with a mixture of grapes and other plants.” The Torah had already written a similar verse where instead of כרמך, the word שדך, “your field,” a more inclusive term had been used. (Leviticus 19,19) Basically, what is new and additional here is what follows, i.e.

לא תזרע כרמך כלאים, “Do not sow additional species of seed in the midst of your vineyard.” According to Kiddushin 39 culpability for violating this commandment does not start unless one has taken wheat and barley in one’s hand together with kernels of grapes and flung them into the ground. The wording of our verse may be interpreted as follows: the word כרמך refers to the kernels of the grapes; the word כלאים refers to the mixture of wheat and barley. The reason the sages read this into the text is that the Torah wrote לא תזרע כרמך כלאים, instead of writing כרמך לא תזרע כלאים. They took their cue from Leviticus 19,19 where the Torah wrote שדך לא תזרע כלאים, “your field you must not sow with a mixture of different species of seeds.” Had the Torah used a similar way of phrasing our verse, I would have understood that throwing grain seed into an existing vineyard or one which had already been sown with grape-seeds makes the party doing that culpable for violating this prohibition.
If someone sows the three kinds of seeds we mentioned simultaneously he will be receiving 39 lashes twice, once because he violated the prohibition in Leviticus 19,19, and once for ignoring the prohibition in our verse here. Sowing grain seeds of different kinds in the earth is culpable only if this is done in Eretz Yisrael, whereas the prohibition of mixing grape kernels with other seed is world-wide, at least as a rabbinic decree. This is based on the additional words in our verse פן תקדש, “lest it become forbidden, out of bounds” (like sacred things). Our sages in Kidushin 56 read the words פן תקדש as if the Torah had written פן תוקד אש, “lest it will have to be burned in fire” (seeing its use is totally forbidden). The reason behind the prohibition of mixing these species reflects that what we do on earth has its impact in the celestial regions and will result in changes in those regions also. I have elaborated on this in my commentary on Leviticus 19,19 את חקותי תשמורו.

Wheat, barley, and grapeseed. Not only wheat and barley, but any two kinds of other seeds [are included]. You might ask: How does Rashi know that one needs two other kinds of seeds with the grapeseed, perhaps [only] one other kind with grapeseed is enough? The answer is that if so, the verse should have said, “Do not plant in your vineyard mixed species,” which would then imply that planting one other kind of seed within your vineyard is considered mixed species. But since it is written, “Do not plant your vineyard mixed species,” it implies that mixed species are involved here even without any consideration of your vineyard. You might ask: Why does the Torah add this prohibition here when we see earlier in parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19) it is written that even sewing only two seeds together is forbidden? The answer is that the earlier prohibition forbids [two] mixed seeds as it is written, “Do not sow your field with a mixture of different seeds.” [By doing this] one only transgresses one negative command. But here one transgresses two negative commands, the prohibition of mixed seeds and the prohibition of mixed seeds in a vineyard.

V. 9. לא תזרע כרמך. Wie du bei Gründung deiner Häuslichkeit sofort nicht nur an dich, sondern zugleich an das durch dich nicht zu gefährdende Wohl des Nächsten denken sollst, so sollst du auch bei Bestellung deines Bodens für Nahrung und Genuss dich sofort an den in der ganzen organischen Welt sich offenbarenden Weltengesetzgeber erinnern, der mit seinem למינו-Gesetze Gattungen und Arten der Wesen zur Entfaltung ihres Seins und Lebens in die vorgeschriebenen Bahnen eigentümlicher Besonderheit weist und auch dich mit seinem Gesetze für den jüdischen Menschenberuf verpflichtet, auf dass du auch mit deinem Nahrungs- und Genussesstreben Mensch und Jude seiest und bleibest. Diese כלאים-Gesetze sind für Viehzucht, Baum- und Ackerkultur bereits Wajikra 19, 19. ausgesprochen, und haben wir dieselben dort, sowie bei Gelegenheit der mit ihnen verwandten בשר בחלב-Gesetze (Schmot 23, 18) ausführlich betrachtet. Diese Gesetze werden hier durch das כלאי כרם-Gesetz ergänzt, ein Gesetz, welches auf dem tiefen Grunde der Heiligung des jüdischen Landes als Boden des Gottesgesetzes beruht, und daher vor allem der Einverleibung in dies Kompendium für die in dieses Land Einziehenden sich dargeboten haben dürfte. Wir haben bereits im dritten Buche bemerkt, wie der bloße Anblick des unter dem Regime der כלאים-Gesetze bestellten Bodens jedem Betreter dieses Landes die Mahnung entgegenrufen musste: "Ziehe die Schuhe von den Füßen, denn der Boden, auf dem du stehst, ist ein dem Gottesgesetze heiliger Boden. Dem Gottesgesetze sollen die Menschen huldigen, die dieser Boden nährt und trägt."

לא תזרע כרמך כלאים, “do not sow your vineyard with more than one kind of seed;” previously, in Leviticus 19,19 we had a similar law where we were warned no to sow two seeds in our fields. The reason given is that the seeds might mingle and produce a new species, something that runs counter to the way G-d created the earth, where we were always told the word למינו, “according to its species.” An example of how what is considered harmless can turn into something extremely harmful are the words קדוש, sacred, holy, and קדשה, harlot, the reverse. The Creator knew why He warned us not to temper with nature, as He had created it. The harlot instead of mating with one man, does so indiscriminately, and we know what the results are likely to be. (Compare Deut.23,18)

פן תקדש LEST IT BECOME קדש — Take it as the Targum does: lest it become unclean (unfit for use); to anything for which a man has repugnance to come into contact with, be it on account of its sublimity as, for instance, holy things, or be it on account of some bad quality, as, for instance, something that is forbidden, the term קדוש is appropriate, as, in the latter sense, e.g., (Isaiah 65:5) “Come not near to me for I make thee קדוש".

פן תקדש, “lest it become forbidden (like sacred products, to non priests). It would not only be forbidden to eat, but also for any secondary form of enjoyment, selling it, using its wood to make fires, etc. The expression פן, just as in other instances whenever it appears, is a word “forbidding something on pain of.” It is also possible that the meaning is as in פן ינכרו צרימו, in Deut. 32,27 where it means lest its oppressor misunderstand, i.e. In our verse the meaning is: “lest not only the one crop but also the second crop would be forbidden at different stages of their respective growth processes and you would err in knowing when the product becomes forbidden.” [This interpretation presumes that the farmer, keeping in mind that the grapes will mature much later than the other crop of, say barley, thinks that there is really no mingling going on at all. Ed.]

Ein Gewächs gibt es nun, dessen Pflanzung und Pflege, wie man meinen dürfte, auf diesem Boden des göttlichen Sittengesetzes überhaupt nicht gestattet sein sollte, weil der Genuss der an diesem Gewächse gezeitigten Frucht wie kein anderer zu entsittlichenden Ausschreitungen und zu Menschen entwürdigenden Verirrungen verlockt. Auf dem, dem göttlichen Sittengesetze geheiligten Boden sollte, hätte man meinen dürfen, der Weinbau keine Stätte finden können. Nun aber gestattet nicht nur das Gesetz den Weinbau im jüdischen Lande, sondern macht den Weingenuss zum Opferausdruck des gehobensten, im Liede der Gottesbegeisterung zur Äußerung gelangenden Freudegefühles vor Gott: בקדש הסך נסך ׳שכר לד! Es umgibt daher das Gesetz den Weinbau im jüdischen Lande mit noch markierterer Steigerung der כלאים-Gesetze, gestattet den Weinbau nur unter Fernhaltung einer jeden Gattungsmischung, überweist Saat und Ertrag einer jeden unter Missachtung dieser Gesetze gewachsenen Weinpflanzung der Vernichtung und spricht damit die große, das jüdische Gesetz tief charakterisierende Wahrheit aus: Gottes Gesetz gestattet nicht nur, sondern heiligt selbst die höchste sinnliche Genussesfreude, wenn der Genießende mit seinem Genuss unter der Herrschaft seines Gottesgesetzes bleibt, wenn er nicht damit und dadurch nicht zur Ausschweifung über die von Gottes Gesetz für die jüdische Art der Menschengattung gezogenen Schranken gelangt. Unter Beachtung der göttlichen Gattungsgesetze gewonnener Wein kommt selbst zum höchsten Freudenopferausdruck in Gottes Heiligtum. Unter Nichtbeachtung der göttlichen Gattungsgesetze gepflanzter Wein hat selbst im gewöhnlichen Kreise menschlicher Benutzung keine Stätte berechtigten Daseins, und spricht das Verbrennen einer jeden solchen Pflanzung die Verneinung unter Gesetzesmissachtung gewonnener Genussesfreude und eben damit die Heiligkeit sittlich reinen Genießens aus. Es wird daher dies Verbrennen der כלאי כרם in unserem Texte תקדש genannt. Es ist ein negativer Ausdruck der positiven Heiligkeit des Gesetz achtenden sittlichen Genusses. (ואין זה מה שאמר רב אשי פן יהי׳ קדש ודחי השם קידושין נ׳׳ו ב׳ ע׳׳ש) Vergleiche das Verbrennen von פסולי המוקדשים in der במקום קדש ,עזרה, und bei פגול ונותר sogar ביום (siehe Schmot 12, 10 und Wajikra 6, 23).

כלאים, different kinds of seeds, that are hard to tell apart, and therefore are apt not to be recognised. In order to give the warning more deterrent power, the penalty for having grown crops based on mixing seed is not only that they are forbidden to be eaten, they are forbidden to make any kind of use of. When the mixing of species is more visible, such as mixing linen and wool, or mating two different species of animals, the penalty is less severe.

[המלאה — This is the fullness and increase which the seed produces].

Wir haben bereits im Wajikra zu diesen Gesetzen angemerkt, wie durch die כלאים-Gesetze hinsichtlich des Züchtens der Tiere und Pfropfens der Bäume einer wirklichen Störung der Gattungsgesetze entgegengetreten werde, dass aber schon bei כלאי זרעים das כלאים-Gesetz nur eine huldigende Vergegenwärtigung des in den Gattungsgesetzen sich offenbarenden Weltengesetzgebers bewirkt, da nur eine erkennbare Scheidung der Gattungen gefordert wird und ein Nebeneinandersein verschiedenartiger Samen ja keine wirklichen Gattungsveränderungen erzeugen würde. Es genügt daher für כלאי זרעים entweder eine solche Entfernung, die einer jeden Samengattung genügenden Nahrungsraum lässt: שיעור יניקה, oder eine äußere Scheidung, welche die verschiedenen Gattungen auf den ersten Blick als gesondert zu erkennen gibt: מראית העין. Auch für בלאי כרם gelten ähnliche Bestimmungen und unterscheidet das Gesetz namentlich zwischen einzeln stehenden Weinstöcken, גפן יחידית, und Weinstockgruppen, die als Weinberg, כרם, zu begreifen sind, und würden fünf Stöcke, von denen zwei gegen zwei und einer in der dritten Reihe hervortretend gepflanzt wären: שתים כנגד שתים ואחת יוצאת זנב schon als כרם begriffen werden. Von einem einzeln stehenden Weinstock genügt eine Entfernung von sechs טפחים, während von einem Weinberge allseitig vier Ellen Entfernung, עבודת הכרם, so viel als zur Bestellung eines Weinbergs nötig ist, gefordert werden. Wäre aber eine zehn טפחים hohe Scheidewand zwischen dem Weinberg und den anderen Sämereien, so dürften diese unmittelbar hinter der Scheidewand gesäet werden(siehe Kilajim17).

פן תקדש המלאה. Den Ausdruck קדוש für איסור הנאה der כלאי כדם haben wir schon erläutert. Es bleibt hiervon auch die gesetzliche Bezeichnung dieser איסור הנאה-Wirkung in den Halachoth: קידוש. So z. B. הנוטע ירק בכרם או מקיים הרי זה מקדש ארבעים וחמשה גפנים אימתי שהיו נטועות על ארבע ארבע או על חמש חמש היו נטועות על שש שש או על שבע שבע הרי זה מקדש ט׳׳ז אמה לכל רוח עגולות ולא מרובעות (Kilajim v, 5; — siehe daselbst). Die Überlieferung lehrt, dass dieses "der Heiligung Verfallensein" der כלאי כרם deren איסור הנאה bewirke, so dass sie verbrannt werden müssen, und wird dies (Kiduschin 56 b) an den Wortlaut anklingend ausgesprochen פן תקדש פן תוקד אש, und zwar wird diese Alliteration dort als für das Festhalten der Halacha nicht überflüssig erklärt, weil der Begriff קדש die Möglichkeit einer Auslösung nicht ausschlösse. כלאי כרם gehören somit zu denjenigen איסורי הנאה, die objektiv zu vernichten, zu verbrennen sind. Es gibt andere, die begraben, der Benutzung unzugänglich gemacht werden sollen, und gilt der Kanon: כל הנקברין לא ישרפו וכל הנשרפין לא יקברו הנשרפין אפרן מותר ונקברין אפרן אסור (Temura 34 a; — siehe תוספו׳ daselbst).

המלאה ,פן תקדש המלאה הזרע וגו׳ die Füllung, somit das, was im Weinberge : nach dem Säen und Pflanzen wächst, und הזרע אשר תורע, nach dem Akzent mit als Apposition verbunden: das Gesäete und Gepflanzte. Daher Chulin 116 a המלאה der Satz: תרי קראי כתיבי כתיב פן תקדש המלאה ובתיב הזרע אשר תורע הא כיצד זרוע מעיקרו בהשרשה זרוע ובא הוסיף אין לא הוסיף לא, diese Zusammenstellung lehrt, dass bald nur מלאה, der Zuwachs, bald jedoch auch das Gesäete und Gepflanzte selbst אסור בהנאה wird. War etwas gleich באיסור gepflanzt und gesäet זרוע מעיקרו, es wäre z. B. der Wein und die andere Saat zugleich der Erde übergeben worden, da wird selbst das Gesäete und Gepflanzte אסור, sobald es Wurzeln geschlagen, השרשה, War aber etwas בהיתר gepflanzt oder gesäet, und kommt erst nachher durch die anderartige Saat oder Pflanzung zum זרוע ובא ,איסור, da bleibt das בהיתר Gepflanzte oder Gesäete מותר und nur der Zuwachs wird אסור, und zwar nur, wenn dieser Zuwachs mindestens ein Zweihundertstel des bereits vorhandenen היתר beträgt, הוסיף מאתים אין לא הוסיף לא. Somit wird bald המלאה, bald auch הזרע אשר תורע: אסור. Wenn es nun noch weiter im Texte heißt: ותבואת הכרם, so bezieht sich wohl ׳המלאה הזרע וגו nur auf die anderartige Saat, die eben כלאים in den Weinberg bringt, und der Sinn ist: damit nicht der Issurheiligung verfalle der Zuwachs oder schon die Saat, die du säest, und der Ertrag des Weinbergs.

כלאי כרם sind, ebenso wie מן התורה ,כלאי ,זרעים nur in ארץ ישראל, dem Boden des Gottesgesetzes מדרבנן .אסור ist der איסור כלאי כרם auch auf das nichtjüdische Ausland übertragen, jedoch nur in dem strikten Sinn, wenn mit dem Weine zugleich zwei verschiedenartige Samen gesäet werden, חטה שעורה וחרצן במפולת יד (Kiduschin 39 a).

לא תחרש בשור ובחמור THOU SHALT NOT PLOUGH WITH AN OX AND WITH AN ASS [TOGETHER] — The same law applies to any two different kinds of animals in existence; the same law applies also to merely driving them together (when not ploughing) whilst they are yoked together as a pair carrying any load (Sifrei Devarim 232:1-2; cf. Kilayim 8:2 and 3; Bava Metzia 8b).

He states, Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together.¹⁸⁷Verse 10. The same law applies to all diverse species of animals. It is an explanatory commandment of the prohibitions, Thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind,¹⁸²Leviticus 19:19. for it is the custom of tillers of their soil to bring their working animals into the same stall and gender them.¹⁸⁸See Ramban to Leviticus 19:19 (first part) where the same thought is expressed, but there the ending reads: “and there they might come to gender with a diverse kind.” See also Vol. III, p. 296, Note 101. And in the matter of sha’atneiz [a garment of mingled stuff] he explained here that it applies only to [a combination of] wool and linen. He mentioned Thou shalt not wear¹⁸⁹Verse 11. in order to teach that coming upon thee [Neither shall there ‘come upon thee’ a garment of two kinds of stuff]¹⁸²Leviticus 19:19. is forbidden only if it is worn as a garment [indicated by the term “wear” used in the verse before us].¹⁹⁰Hence clothiers may display garments of diverse kinds in the usual fashion provided they do not intend to use them as protection from the sun or as protection from the rain (Yebamoth 4b).

This applies, as well, to any two species in the universe, etc. You might ask: From where does Rashi know this? Perhaps the prohibition applies only to plowing with an ox and a donkey! The answer is that we derive this by comparing the word “ox” here to the word “ox” regarding Shabbos where it says (above 5:14), “Your ox and your donkey and all your animals.” Just as there, all animals are included, so here too, all animals are included. And because “ox and donkey” is not to be understood literally, so too, “you may not plow” is not to be understood literally, “and applies as well, to leading them together, etc.”

V. 10. לא תחרש. Wie du beim Hausbau der Nächstenpflicht gedenken, beim Weinbau dich an das Sittengesetz erinnern sollst, so sollst du, wenn du das deiner Herrschaft unterstehende Tier in deinen Dienst jochst, dich an die Herrschaft des mahnen, dessen Gattungsgesetz dir auch im Tierleben entgegentritt, dem du ebenso unterstehst, wie dir das Tier, und indem du die Willkür aus deinem Schaffen hinausweisest und nicht von Gott geschiedene Tiergattungen in deinem Dienst zusammenkoppelst, so mahnt dich dies, auch für dein Schaffen und Wirken seines למינו-Rufes an dich eingedenk zu bleiben und dich mit deinem ganzen Schaffen und Wirken als "jüdischer Mensch" im Dienste deines Herrn zu bewähren.

לא תחרוש בשור ובחמור יחדיו, “You shall not plough with and ox and a donkey together.” The ox is a pure species chewing the cud, whereas the donkey is an impure species. When the donkey hears the ox chewing food it pains him. [Apparently, chewing the cud is a noisy procedure. Ed.]

לא תחרוש בשור וחמור, “do not plough with an ox and donkey together pulling the plough.” The ox, being an animal that chews the cud is constantly eating, whereas the donkey in the meantime is being overworked. This is an example of inflicting pain on living creatures. (Baaley Tossaphot.) An alternate interpretation; G-d’s mercy extends not only to human beings but to all of His creatures. Therefore these two categories of beasts being mismatched as one is far stronger than the other, it would be causing the donkey pain to be part of such a team pulling the plough.

שור וחמור unseres Textes ist nur exemplifikatorisch דבר הכתוב בהווה, die Schrift nennt nur die gewöhnlichen Arbeitstiere, ebenso wie bei dem מלאכה-Verbot durch Tiere am שבת (Dewarim 5, 14) שור וחמור selbst durch das hinzugefügte וכל בהמתך erweitert wird, wodurch allen im Gesetze vorkommenden שור וחמור die exemplifikatorische Bedeutung erteilt wird, יליף שור שור משבת Ebenso ist חרישה nur Beispiel und umfasst analog jede durch Tierkräfte zu bewirkende Leistung. Wie Pflügen ist daher Wagen- und Lastenziehen etc. etc. durch zwei verbundene verschiedenartige Tiere jeder Art verboten, und selbst das Antreiben solcher Tiere durch bloßen Zuruf, הנהגה בקול, siele unter dies Verbot (Kilajim 8, 2. 3 und B. M. 90 b).

יחדו, “together;” it is forbidden only when the two animals are tied together to the ploughshare. (Sifri). Our sages in the Talmud, tractate Baba Kama folio 54, state: what is stated here includes any two animals of different species, but excludes two human beings pulling the plough together, even if one is considerably stronger than the other. The reason why this law is written here is that we previously spoke about sowing, and ploughing is closely related to sowing.

שעטנז is an expression for a mixture. Our Rabbis explained it to mean a material that is calendered (pressed, שוע), or woven (טווי), or twisted (נוז) together (Sifrei Devarim 232:1); (שעטנז is taken to be an abbreviation of these words; cf. Rashi on Leviticus 19:19 and our Note thereon).

לא תלבש שעטנז, “you must not dress in a mixture of wool and linen threads.” Moses explains in this verse that this prohibition applies only to mixing wool and linen fibers. He mentions the word לבש to wear, to indicate that only when such mixtures are worn as a single garment is this probation applicable. Wearing a linen shirt and a woolen suit is perfectly in order. Also, even if such a mixture is used, say protectively, but not in the manner one wears clothing, one has not transgressed this commandment.

.לא תלבש שעטנז צמר ופשתים יחדו , “Do not wear a mixture, i.e. wool and linen together.” The Torah forbids this mixture only when woven together or sewn together. This is the meaning of יחדו. It is perfectly in order, however, to wear a linen shirt underneath a woolen jacket (Maimonides Hilchot Kilayim 10,11). It is also permitted to sew together the skins of animals producing wool with linen threads, seeing that this does not constitute a garment. We discussed the mystical aspects of this commandment in Leviticus 19,19.

The meaning is “a mixture.” The Rabbis interpret, etc. This excludes felt, which is not spun and woven. Such cloth is not subject to the prohibition of a mixture of threads. See earlier in parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19).

V. 11. לא תלבש שעטנז. Endlich in deinem ganzen Erscheinen mahne dich das Gewand, in welchem dein Menschencharakter in die Erscheinung tritt, an die Scheidung des Tierlebendigen und des Pflanzentriebhaften in deinem Wesen, an die Nichtdahingebung des ersten an das letztere, vielmehr an die Unterordnung dieses unter jenes und beider unter Gott, als Grundbedingung deines dir von Gott angewiesenen Menschenberufes, und kleide dich nicht in Schaatnes, in "Verkrümmungsgewand", in welchem Tiergewandstoff: Wolle, und Pflanzengewandstoff: Flachs, einheitlich verbunden. Wir haben dies Gesetz bereits zu Wajikra 19, 16 ausführlich betrachtet (siehe daselbst Seite 406 — 411). Die beiden Gesetzesstellen ergänzen sich, wie dort bereits bemerkt, gegenseitig. Hier wird שעטנז durch צמר ופשתים näher präzisiert und dort wird der Begriff לבישה durch העלאה erweitert (siehe daselbst).

לא תלבש שעטנז, “do not wear a garment consisting of wool and linen intertwined.” The reason for this prohibition is that the dividing curtain in the Temple was made of a mixture of fine linen and wool dyed blue. G–d did not want Jews to wear something symbolising that dividing curtain behind which was the Holy Ark from the lid of which the voice of G–d could be heard. (by Moses) The same warning not to duplicate such sacred combinations was issued to the people in connection with the ingredients and quantities of the spices in the k’toret, incense to be offered up twice daily. (Compare Exodus 30,38, and the Talmud in tractate Rosh Hashanah folio 24) People are also not to build annexes to their houses by duplicating measurements used for the Temple. An alternate reason offered for this prohibition of mixing wool and linen, is that Kayin’s offering consisted of linen, and Hevel’s of wool, and is therefore a reminder of jealousy and hatred, the opposite of what the Torah stands for.

צמר ופשתים יחדו, “wool and linen together.” The reason why only these two categories of yarns are forbidden to be mixed is that the two were involved in the first murder, Kayin’s offering to G-d had consisted of leftover flax that he had grown, while Hevel had offered sheep which grow wool. Seeing that these two species had been indirectly responsible for the first disagreement between two human beings ending in the death of one, we are to be forever mindful of this. An alternate interpretation: These two fibers, the ones used in the garments worn by the priests when performing service in the Temple are permitted to be worn in the same garment by the priests on such occasion. This is why the affliction known as tzoraat, does not strike garments consisting of any other fibers. This is a reminder that there is a basic problem involving these fibers, one that is overcome only on holy consecrated ground when used by the priests in their service to G-d. The Torah teaches that the expression shatnes, means a mixture of woolen and flax (linen) fibers.

גדלים תעשה לך THOU SHALT MAKE THEE TASSELS [UPON THE FOUR CORNERS OF THY VESTURE] — be they even from a mixture of wool and linen; for this reason Scripture puts them (the prohibition of שעטנז and the command of צצית) in juxtaposition (Yevamot 4a).

גדילים, tzitzit, fringes, their threads have to be intertwined.

גדלים תעשה לך , you shall make for yourselves twisted threads;” here the tzitzit are referred to as gedilim. Our sages in Yevamot 4 cite a tradition that the appearance of this commandment in a positive connotation immediately after the prohibition of mixing wool and linen is to teach us that for the purpose of tzitzit this prohibition has been waived. The Talmud concludes that the appearance of certain legislation immediately after another legislation has halachic implications and is a legitimate exegetical tool (דרשינן סמוכים). The reasoning goes as follows: “if the Torah had not wanted to permit a mixture of wool and linen threads as the integral parts of the tzitzit, why would the prohibition of kilayim have to be repeated here? We already discussed the mystical aspect of the commandment of making and wearing tzitzit in Numbers 15,38.
The expression גדלים chosen by the Torah here to describe these tassels, fringes, is an allusion to Psalms 104,1: ה' אלו-הי גדלת מאד הוד והדר לבשת, “O Lord, my G’d, You are very great; You are clothed in glory and majesty.” When someone wears tziztiyot, i.e. 32 twisted threads, this is an allusion to the 32 paths of wisdom (discussed in the latter part of Numbers 15,38)

V. 12. גדלים תעשה לך. Wenn die drei vorangehenden Gesetze die Erinnerung an unseren jüdischen Menschenberuf durch die negative כלאים-Fernhaltung mit allem unseren Tun und Erscheinen verwoben haben, und insbesondere das letzte, das שעטנזVerbot, diese Erinnerung durch כלאים-Verneinung in die Stoffe unseres menschlichen Kleides gefügt, schließt daran nun noch das Gesetz das Gebot des positiven Zizitsymbols, durch welches wir überallhin uns die Mahnung an Gott und an unseren jüdischen Menschenberuf positiv vor die Augen führen sollen. Wenn durch das שעטנז-Gesetz jeder Faden an unserem Kleide zu uns spricht: sei kein Tier!" spricht zu uns das Zizitgebot an unserem Kleide: "sei Mensch und Jude!" Dieses Zizitgebot steht ausführlich Bamidbar 15, 37 — 41 und bringt unser Vers dazu nur eine kurze Ergänzung. Wir haben dieses Gebot und auch unseren ergänzenden Text dort ausführlich betrachtet und beschränken uns, hier nur hervorzuheben, wie charakteristisch eben die diesem Kompendium vorbehaltenen Ergänzungen des Gebotes in Beziehung zu dem Zwecke dieses Kompendiums stehen. Von der zwiefachen Bedeutung des menschlichen Kleides, wie wir dort erkannt zu haben glauben, als Verhüllung: בגד, und Schutzbedeckung: כסות, und so von den zwiefachen Bestandteilen der Zizit, des Symbols der freien Entfaltung alles Sinnlich-menschlich-göttlichen im Menschen: ענף, und der festen, bindenden Unterordnung alles Sinnlichen unter das göttlich Menschliche und Jüdische: גדיל, und endlich von der Erinnerung an das zeitlich Unbedingte der Zizitmahnung: לדרתם und das örtlich Unbedingte derselben: ארבע כנפות, sind eben die Momente, גדיל ,כסות und ארבע כנפות diesem Kompendium für die anzutretende Dezentralisation vorbehalten worden. Sagen ja eben diese drei Momente jedem ins Land ziehenden Juden: Wie weit ab von dem Zentrum des Gesetzesheiligtums und seiner Vertreter in Ost und West, in Süd und Nord dich auch deine Niederlassung bringen möge, und welchen nach Örtlichkeit verschiedenen Kampf du auch mit der Natur und ihren dein leibliches Dasein bedingenden Elementargewalten zu bestehen haben mögest, überall sei dein eigener Gesetzeswächter, überall schürze deine leibliche Sinnlichkeit in das starke Band deines göttlich Menschlichen und jüdisch Heiligen, überallhin nimm mit dem תכלת-Faden die Mahnung an deinen priesterlich jüdischen Menschenberuf, überall lass durch ihn und das mit ihm verbundene göttlich Menschliche in dir dein geschöpflich Sinnliches stark und fest überwunden bleiben und den Knoten nie reißen, der dich als Mensch mit Gott und dem Heiligtum seines Gesetzes verbindet. —

גדילים, “twisted strings;” the expression is a variant for קליעה, “plaited work.” This law appears here as in connection with the tzitzit, fringes used in a ritual context that must be attached to four cornered garments, the prohibition for plaiting wool and linen has been waived. (Ibn Ezra)

על ארבע כנפות כסותך “on the four corners of your garment.” Seeing that in Numbers 15,38 the Torah wrote vaguely that the tzitziyot should be על כנפי בגדיהם, “on the corners of their garments,” I would have thought that every garment is to have tzitziyot. This is why the Torah had to be more precise here and tell us that the legislation applies only to garments with four corners. Any garment having fewer than 4 corners is not subject to this legislation, whereas any garment having more than four corners requires to be equipped with tzitziyot in order that it may be worn (Maimonides Hilchot Tzitzit 3,3). Our sages in Menachot 46 derive this from the additional words אשר תכסה בה, “which you cover yourself with.” The reason these words are not used to include three-cornered garments which are large enough to cover you is that four is not part of three, whereas four is part of five.

Diese enge Zusammenstellung der, wie wir glauben, ja auch begrifflich zusammengehörigen שעטנו- und Zizitgesetze — סמוכים — wird Jebamot 4 a u. b als Hinweis auf die gesetzliche Tatsache erläutert, dass vor der Erfüllung des positiven Zizitgebotes die Beachtung des negativen Schaatnesverbotes zurückzutreten habe und der Bamidbar 15. 38 vorgeschriebene תכלת-Wollfaden, wie dort bereits bemerkt, sowohl an leinene als an wollene Gewänder festzuschürzen sei, wie denn auch בגד in der Regel nur Gewänder aus wollenen und leinenen Stoffen in sich begreift. Dieser היתר כלאים בציצת ist ein klassisches Beispiel für den Satz, dass עשה דוחה לא תעשה, dass das Gesetz vor der Erfüllung von Geboten die Beachtung eines Verbotes zurücktreten lasse, oder wie Schabbat 133 a dieser Kanon ausgesprochen wird: כל מקום שאתה מוצא עשה ולא תעשה אם אתה יכול לקיים שניהם מוטב ואם לאו יבא עשה וידחה לא תעשה wo ein Gebot und Verbot kollidieren und die Erfüllung des Gebots ohne Verletzung des Verbots irgend möglich ist, so müssen beide aufrecht gehalten bleiben; kann aber das Gebot unmöglich ohne Verletzung des Verbots erfüllt werden, so hat das Verbot zurückzustehen. Die Anwendung dieses Kanons unterliegt noch wesentlichen Näherbestimmungen, so (daselbst 132 b): בעידנא, der Gleichzeitigkeit, dass בעידנא דמתעקר לאו קא מוקים עשה, dass, wie z. B. bei מילה בצרעת ,כלאים בציצת (Entfernung eines נגע durch Vollziehung der מילה; siehe Kap. 24, 8) die Erfüllung des Gebots mit Verletzung des Verbots in einen Moment zusammenfalle, wo aber, wie die Entfernung eines נגע, um nachher עבודה zu vollziehen, die Verletzung des Verbotes vorangeht, בעידנא דמתעקר לאו לא קא מוקים עשה, da ist das Verbot aufrecht zu halten und die Erfüllung des Gebotes zu unterlassen (siehe jedoch auch ׳תוספו Peßachim 59 a ד׳׳ה אתי עשה)

ארבע כנפות, “four corners.;” only fourcornered garments (or more corners) are subject to this commandment, not threecornered ones. (Ibn Ezra)

Ebenso wie bei ציצת tritt auch bei בגדי כהונה das Schaatnesgesetz zurück und haben wir beides bereits Wajikra 19, 19 betrachtet (siehe daselbst).

ובא אליה ושנאה [IF ANY MAN TAKE A WIFE] AND COME UNTO HER AND HATE HER, the end will be,

IF ANY MAN ‘YIKACH’ (TAKE) A WIFE, AND COME UNTO HER. The meaning thereof is as follows: When a man will take a wife through the means sanctioned by the Torah which is betrothal with money — this being “the betrothed” he [Moses] mentions [further in Verse 23] — and after some time he came unto her, and hate her because she was not pleasant to him in conjugal relation, and so he arose early in the morning and came before the court claiming that he did not find her to be a virgin. Now this person intends to divorce her without the dowry of virgins,¹⁹¹Exodus 22:16. which is the kethubah (marriage contract) that he wrote her. And because she became betrothed to him under the presumption of virginity, he accuses her of having committed adultery after her betrothal to him. Therefore Scripture states, But if this thing be true¹⁹²Further, Verse 20. as the husband said, they shall stone her.¹⁹³Ibid., Verse 21. The truth cannot be known except by the testimony of two witnesses. And because, concerning the illicit relations of virgins, Scripture will clarify¹⁹⁴Ibid., Verses 23-24; 28-29. that if she were betrothed she is stoned, and if she were not betrothed she is absolved from punishment, it was unnecessary to explain here “But if this thing be true that she was unchaste while betrothed, and [what is more] she so acted willingly [with anyone other than her lawful spouse] they shall stone her.” And instead it says by allusion because she has done a base deed in Israel, to play the harlot in her father’s house,¹⁹³Ibid., Verse 21. the base deed being that she did so voluntarily.

כי יקח איש אשה, after the Torah has dealt with matters concerning the settling of the people in the Land of Israel, it turns to instructions designed to ensure that the Shechinah, benevolent Divine presence, will maintain its beneficial presence there. One of the most important elements in ensuring this is the avoidance of forbidden mating and the offspring of such couplings. The Torah therefore addresses both forbidden incestuous relations amongst Jewish partners, and intermarriage or living together of Jews and Non-Jews without the benefit of “marriage,” something which is anyway legally impossible. All of this belongs to the headingוהיה מחניך קדוש ולא יראה בך ערות דבר ושב מאחריך, “your encampment shall be holy. Let nothing unseemly be found among you so that He would turn away from you.” (23,15)

כי יקח איש אשה, "when a man takes a wife, etc." The Torah addresses average people even those who have forsaken the path of Torah because they claim that their time is too short and they are so preoccupied with earning a subsistence that they cannot observe all the Torah's restrictions. The words כי יקח איש אשה may be translated as "when a man decides to betroth himself to Torah (which is supposed to be his life's companion)," ובא אליה, "and he consummates this relationship," i.e. a relationship which had been initiated at the time all the Jewish souls stood at Mount Sinai when G'd revealed Himself and they received the Ten Commandments, and now ושנאה, he hates the path of Torah, and he does not want to grant her the things which are due to his "wife" as a matter of right as spelled out in Exodus chapter 21. When his "wife" remonstrates with him asking why she does not receive her due, her "husband" claims that she has not provided him with what he considers the obligation of any wife to her husband, i.e. food and drink. He also claims that he does not observe that his devotion to Torah has paid any dividends such as his economic situation improving. In fact he claims that when he looks around at all his friends who have not adopted the path of Torah they all seem to be better off than he. This is what the Torah alludes to by the sentence ושם לה עלילת דברים והוציא עליה שם רע ואמר את האשה הזאת לקחתי, "and he accuses her and gives her a bad name saying I have married this woman, etc." He does not deny having "married" the woman, i.e. having made a commitment to Torah. The "husband" claims "when I came near to her I did not find her hymen," i.e. a symbol of strength. He claims that people who relied on Torah were compelled to look elsewhere to find sustenance.

כי יקח איש אשה, “When a man marries a wife, etc.” According to Nachmanides the expression כי יקח here does not refer to the final stage of the wedding, but the initial stage, the betrothal, such a when the man hands the woman a piece of jewelry or other trinket and she accepts it as a promise of marriage. Consummation of the marriage was usually delayed by 12 months. When that has occurred, the groom claims that she had not been a virgin at that point. He intends to cause her loss of her life as he claims that at the time of her betrothal she had still been a virgin, becomes guilty of death by stoning, for if she had lost her virginity prior to becoming betrothed she would not be culpable at all. The Torah here hints strongly how it disapproves of a girl losing her virginity voluntarily before her betrothal by writing (verse 21) כי עשתה נבלה בישראל לזנות בית אביה “that (at any rate, even if completely unattached) it would be an outrage if she demeaned herself while still in the home of her parents.” In Biblical usage, a girl, woman who was unattached at the time when she engaged in sexual intercourse is not considered a זונה, harlot.

He will ultimately. . . Rashi is answering: Why does it say, “And he has relations with her and hates her”? It should have written, “If a man marries a woman, and berates her with calumnies etc.”! He explains, this is to teach you that because he hates her, he will ultimately berate her with etc.

V. 13. כי יקח איש אשה. Die vorangehende Gesetzesgruppe (Verse 5 — 12) hat den einen Gedanken zum Inhalt, die hohe Bedeutsamkeit und die Grundbedingungen der Wirksamkeit beider Geschlechter für die gemeinsame zwischen Mann und Frau geteilte Aufgabe des Menschenhauses ihnen und allen stets zum Bewusstsein zu bringen, und steht in ihnen die hochheilige Bedeutsamkeit des weiblichen Geschlechtes voran. Diese mehr typischen Gesetze bilden die Einleitung zu den nun folgenden Gesetzesgruppen, welche den konkreten Aufbau des Hauses und der Gesellschaft auf den in jenen einleitenden Gesetzen zum Ausdruck kommenden Grundlagen zum Gegenstand haben, und steht auch in ihnen wieder das weibliche Geschlecht in seiner Bedeutsamkeit voran.

כי יקח איש אשה, “When a man marries a woman, etc.” seeing that the Torah had dealt with man’s basic preoccupations previously, i.e. building a house, planting and harvesting a field, and the rules governing his clothing, it is appropriate to add some aspects of marriage and its restrictions at this point.

The Torah replies that the wife's father, i.e. G'd, and the community of Israel, will defend her virtue before the Supreme Court. ולקח אבי הנערה ואמה, "the father and mother will display the בתולים, of the "maiden" (wife), i.e. proof that loyalty to Torah results in spectacular achievements by its adherents. The Torah adds that this defence of the Torah's reputation will be public, i.e. השערה, "in the town square." This is an allusion to what the Zohar volume 3 page 80 writes that in the future G'd will demand that the Torah will be compensated for all the insults it had endured for so long. This is also mentioned indirectly in Avot 6,2 where Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that day after day a heavenly voice goes forth from Mount Chorev proclaiming: "Woe to mankind for their disregard of Torah." In our paragraph G'd is described as demanding the compensation for the insults endured by the Torah throughout the ages at the hands of those who have rejected it and sold it short, something the author in Avot spoke about.

The expression to play the harlot signifies when a wife being under husband, goeth aside,¹⁹⁵Numbers 5:29. for an unbetrothed maiden is not termed “a harlot” if she lies with one of the people, but the betrothed one is espoused to him [her future husband and therefore she is termed “a harlot” if she commits adultery with another man].

Wir haben schon zu Schmot Kap. 21, 7 die drei Altersstadien: נערה ,קטנה, בוגרת bemerkt, in welchen ein weibliches Wesen seiner geschlechtlichen Reife entgegengeht. Von diesen ist נערה das Antrittsstadium der Reife, die aber erst mit בוגרת sich zur Selbständigkeit vollendet. Wir haben ebenso (daselbst Kap. 22, 16 und Wajikra Kap. 22. 11) bereits angedeutet, wie die jüdische Eheinstitution sich durch zwei getrennte Akte: קידושין( אירוסין) und נשואין (siehe Kap. 24, 1) vollzieht. קידושין( אירוסין) bildet die Basis der jüdischen Ehe. Durch sie wird die persönliche Aneignung der Frau vollzogen. Obgleich die geschlechtliche Annäherung noch nicht gestattet ist und die ארוסה als solche noch nicht dem Hause des Mannes angehört, so ist doch das persönliche Eheband geschlossen und die geschlechtliche Annäherung eines anderen Mannes: Ehebruch (vergl. die Verwandtschaft mit ערם (Bamidbar 15, 20). Es blickt das jüdische Gesetz mit dem Ernst einer ganz besonderen Rücksicht auf גערות, auf jenes erste Stadium der jungfräulichen Geschlechtsreife, und ebenso mit dem Ernst einer ganz besonderen Rücksicht auf אירוסין, auf jenen ersten Stand des erst mit rein persönlicher Aneignung geknüpften Ehebandes, einen Stand, in dessen Heilighaltung sich eben die Heiligkeit und Unverbrüchlichkeit des ja nur rein geistig sittlichen Willensaktes offenbart, auf welchem das ganze Institut der Ehe beruht, der ja überhaupt die Ehe zur Ehe macht. Daher kennt das Gesetz kein geschlechtlich höheres weibliches Wesen als נערה בתולה מאורשה לאיש, als eine schon und noch im ersten Stadium der Geschlechtsreife stehende, einem Manne erst durch den Akt persönlicher Aneignung verbundene Jungfrau, und mit dem Problem eines Frevels des Mannes eines solchen jungfräulichen Wesens gegen dessen jungfräuliche Unbescholtenheit beginnt die hier nun folgende Gesetzesgruppe, uns daran die Wahrheit zu veranschaulichen: es hat die Nation keinen höheren Schatz, als die jungfräuliche Reinheit ihrer Töchter; es hat das Haus keinen höheren Stolz, als die jungfräuliche Reinheit seiner Kinder; in der Unschuld der Jungfrau wird die Ehre des Hauses angetastet, das sie erzogen, sowie der Nation, deren Namen sie trägt. —

ובא אליה ושנאה, “and after having had marital relations with her he hates her;” this translation is inaccurate: the Torah means that he had hated her already previously.

G'd is described as the father of the virgin-bride who has been subjected to unjust accusations, her groom denying her virginity at the time of marriage. The father of the bride, i.e. G'd, says: "I have given My daughter to this man." This means that "I have not given her to him in order that he should abuse her in some out of the way corner of the house, but in order for him to bestow upon her all the rights a wife is entitled to, including her entitlement to physical sustenance, clothing and intimacy." According to Tikkuney Zohar section 6 the Torah is entitled to the same considerations as the physical wife of a husband. The Torah is in need of the same three rights by her partner the Israelite as those the husband has to bestow on his physical wife. וישנאה, "and he hates her." Here the Torah explains that the immediate reason for the estrangement between Israel and Torah, i.e. husband and wife, is an emotion called hatred. The Torah also hints at the underlying reason, i. e. the apparent failure of the Torah to live up to the Israelite's expectations. והנה הוא שם עלילת דברים, "Now, behold, he made a wanton accusation against her;" the reason the Torah underlines the (apparently superfluous ) words והנה הוא, "and behold he," is to alert us that the accusation is unwarranted, is false. It is only due to his hatred of her that the husband made such an accusation. ואלה בתולי בתי, "and here are the signs of my daughter's virginity." This is hyperbole for describing something as clear as daylight. Just as one can prove that a bride was a virgin at her wedding by looking at the sheet on which the marriage was consummated, so the fact that Torah did not disappoint in what one could expect of her can be demonstrated beyond doubt. It had been created prior to the universe, which itself was only created for its sake and which continues to exist only on its account. Any good which is available and which is dispensed in this universe is only acquired through Torah either directly or indirectly.

כי יקח ist der oben erwähnte קידושין-Akt.

The Torah continues that the judgment for the Israelite who accused Torah unjustly of having failed him will be pronounced by the court. In the first instance he will receive 39 lashes. The Talmud in Berachot 5 stated that when a man has been subjected to afflictions he should examine his life-style in order to discover which sins he is guilty of. If he cannot find a specific sin that he was guilty of he should attribute his afflictions to his having neglected Torah study. Most commentators find this difficult to understand, claiming that inasmuch as neglect of Torah study is a grave sin, how can the Talmud consider this as a "sin of last resort," i.e. something to fall back on only if one cannot find onself guilty of any other sin? The answer is that the commandment of Torah study and its fulfilment is not one of the commandments that can be measured. Even a person who has studied a relatively great amount of Torah and has devoted many hours to it on a daily basis cannot be sure that he has fulfilled this commandment adequately. If one is stricken with afflictions and knows of no other sin one is guilty of, it is in order therefore to examine how much time one has wasted, time which could have been put to better use studying Torah.

וענשו אתו מאה כסף, "And they shall fine him one hundred shekalim." This is an allusion to the one hundred benedictions each one of us is meant to recite every day as explained in Menachot 43, based on Deut. 10,12: "and now what, מה, does the Lord G'd ask of you, etc." The Talmud interpreted the word מה as equivalent to מאה, i.e. G'd asks that we recite one hundred benedictions. That verse spoke about a penitent as we know from Bereshit Rabbah 21 that the word ועתה or עתה always refers to a penitent sinner.

ונתנו לאבי הנערה, "and the elders shall give (these 100 benedictions) to the Father of the virgin-bride, i.e. to G'd, etc., because he (the Israelite) has slandered the virgin-bride of Israel." This is a reference to the שכינה, the Divine Presence, which includes all of Israel, the tenth emanation [popularly known as כתר. Ed.] or virtue, called the oral Torah, a concept familiar to students of the Kabbalah.

ולו תהיה לאשה, "and she shall be his wife, and he must not divorce her as long as he lives." Although the commandment to study Torah is normally understood to involve setting aside certain parts of the day and night for study, a person who has rejected Torah study previously and who has thereby slighted the Torah must henceforth occupy himself with honouring the Torah all day and all night, i.e. "he cannot send her away as long as he lives." Vayikra Rabbah 25,1 states that if a person was in the habit of studying Torah for an hour daily before committing a sin, then part of his rehabilitation is to study two hours daily. This is applicable to people whose sins did not consist of insulting the Torah. In order to make up for the insult to Torah which the person in our paragraph is guilty of he has to henceforth devote himself exclusively to Torah.

ואם אמת הדבר, "But if the matter was true, etc." If it turns out that the Torah which this person studied and which he examined and found defective, was taught by heretics, such as the Torah taught by Tzadok and Bayssus, such Torah does not give man strength but exerts a negative influence on him. G'd commands to stone such a "Torah" to death until it is completely dead, as per our verse. Whereas the teachers of this kind of Torah employed words spoken by G'd, i.e. the text of the Torah, the intention of the teacher teaching it disqualifies it. We have been taught in Gittin 48 that if a heretic painstakingly writes an entire Torah scroll it must be burned forthwith, as he did something despicable, etc. When the Torah concludes our paragraph with the words: "you shall wipe out evil from your midst," it refers to someone who deliberately distorts the meaning of the Torah.

ושם לה עלילת דברים that HE WILL IMPUTE ACTIONS UPON HER BY MERE WORDS (i.e. he will slander her); one sin brings another sin in its train: if he transgresses the prohibition “thou shalt not hate [thy fellow]” (Leviticus 19:17), the end will be that he will fall into slander (cf. Sifrei Devarim 235:3).

That is that He commanded us to make tzitzit (fringes). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "to make for themselves fringes [...] let them attach to the fringe at each corner" (Numbers 15:38). And [the two colors of strings are] not counted as two commandments, even though the main understanding for us is that the blue-purple does not impede the white and the white does not impede the blue-purple. For it is said in the Sifrei, "It is possible that they are two commandments, the commandment of the white and the commandment of the blue-purple. [Hence] we learn to say (Numbers 15:39), 'That shall be your tzitzit' - it is one commandment and not two commandments." And women are not obligated in it, as is explained in the first [chapter] of Kiddushin (Kiddushin 33b). And the regulations of this commandment were already explained in the fourth chapter of Menachot. (See Parashat Shelach; Mishneh Torah, Fringes 1.)

That is that He commanded us to make tzitzit (fringes). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "to make for themselves fringes [...] let them attach to the fringe at each corner" (Numbers 15:38). And [the two colors of strings are] not counted as two commandments, even though the main understanding for us is that the blue-purple does not impede the white and the white does not impede the blue-purple. For it is said in the Sifrei, "It is possible that they are two commandments, the commandment of the white and the commandment of the blue-purple. [Hence] we learn to say (Numbers 15:39), 'That shall be your tzitzit' - it is one commandment and not two commandments." And women are not obligated in it, as is explained in the first [chapter] of Kiddushin (Kiddushin 33b). And the regulations of this commandment were already explained in the fourth chapter of Menachot. (See Parashat Shelach; Mishneh Torah, Fringes 1.)

We derive from here that no statement may be made, etc. Otherwise, why does the verse write “this”? Maharan asks: Why do we need this verse? Why not learn this law from the verse of parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 23:1), “Do not accept a false report, etc.,” and there Rashi explains, “This is an admonition… to a judge, that he not listen [to the claims of one party until the other party arrives].” The answer is that our verse is necessary to make someone who presents his claims before the other party arrives, liable for violating one negative command and one positive command. In my humble opinion you can answer that if we only had that verse one would think that the prohibition applies only when both parties themselves are making claims. But where the woman herself is not saying anything as we see in the coming verses, one might think the husband may make his claim not in her presence. So the verse tells us that this is not so. (Kitzur Mizrachi)

V. 14. ושם לה עלילת דברים. Aus Versen 20 und 21 ist ersichtlich, dass abseiten des Mannes eine gerichtliche Anklage und zwar eine solche gegen die Frau veranstaltet worden, die, wenn sie begründet befunden wird, die Verurteilung zum סקילהTode zur Folge hat. Er muss sie eines bestimmten Verbrechens und zwar eines solchen beschuldigt haben, auf welches das Gesetz סקילה erkennen lässt. Es ist dies aber kein anderes als Ehebruch im ארוסה-Stande, wie dies Verse 23 und 24 besprochen wird und auch V. 21 durch לזנות בית אביה qualifiziert ist. Nach Kap. 19, 15 f., steht aber fest, dass eine Anklage nur auf Grund der Aussage zweier Zeugen erhoben werden könne, die den Angeklagten im Augenblicke des Begehens mit Entgegenhaltung des gesetzlichen Strafverbots gewarnt haben, עדים והתראה. Diese Veranstaltung einer gerichtlichen Anklage heißt hier: שם לה עלילת דברים. Den Ausdruck דברים für gerichtliche Klage kennen wir aus Schmot 24, 14. Ebenso דבר oben Kap. 19, 15. עלילה von עלל (wovon ja עולל: das noch in Entwicklung begriffene Kind, und עול: das die Kräfte zu einer fortgesetzten Tätigkeit anspannende Mittel, das Joch) bezeichnet nicht eine einzelne Handlung, sondern eine Reihe auf ein Ziel hinstrebender Tätigkeiten, daher ja auch vorzugsweise Bezeichnung der göttlichen Waltungstaten. עלילת דברים sind daher die zu einer. Anklage gehörenden Vorgänge: das Auftreten der Zeugen und deren Aussage vor Gericht. Wir haben es daher: Anklageprozess übersetzt. Diesen שם לה: hat er ihr veranstaltet, er hat die Zeugen vor Gericht gebracht, לא אמר לעדים בואו והעידוני והן מעידין אותו מאליהן הוא אינו לוקה ואינו נותן מאה סלעים (Ketubot 46 a). Nach einer Auffassung (daselbst) läge in ושם sogar das Dingen der Zeugen (siehe daselbst).

ואקרב אליה, “when I wanted to become intimate with her, etc.” an elegant expression for carnal relations. Compare Genesis 20,4: ואבימלך לא בא אליה, “and Avimelech had not slept with her.” Or, Isaiah 8,3: ואקרב אל הנביאה, “I was intimate with the prophetess.”

את האשה הזאת THIS WOMAN — Hence we derive the law that one must not speak anything to the judge except in the presence of the opposing party (Sifrei Devarim 235:6).

אבי הנערה ואמה [THEN SHALL] THE FATHER OF THE DAMSEL, AND HER MOTHER [TAKE AND BRING FORTH etc.] — Let those who have reared this depraved child (lit., “evil plant”) be exposed to contempt because of her (Sifrei Devarim 235:9).

את בתולי, according to the plain meaning this refers to the blood lost when the bride’s hymen was broken, a residue of which is on the sheet of the bed.

ולקח אבי הנערה ואמה, “then the father and the mother of the girl will take (proof).” Nachmanides points out that at this stage both her father and her mother are mentioned as standing up publicly in defense of their daughter, although only her father speaks up in her defense. When submitting their evidence to the elders, father and mother are both involved. The reason why only the father voices his opinions in the forum of the elders is that seeing the indemnification for having slandered his daughter is payable to him, it is he who must submit the claim. On the other hand, all matters connected to שמלה, in this instance a simile for bedclothes, are a woman’s business, a mother’s concern. They are the experts capable of judging what colour blood originates in which part of the body. Normally, the sensitivity of the matter would have required that only the mother concern herself with this, but, seeing that the father had stated that he, as a father, had given this daughter to the man who now has slandered her reputation, and by inference the father’s inability to have brought up his daughter properly, he is invited by the Torah to be present throughout the proceedings.

ולקח אבי הנערה, “the father and the mother of the girl shall take.” if they are alive; if the girl is an orphan, an appointee of the court performs the services of father and mother (Ibn Ezra).

Those who nurtured the evil branch, etc. Otherwise, the verse should have said, “They will take the girl and prove, etc.” Why does it say, “The girl’s father and mother”? Therefore it is to be expounded: See these [i.e., these parents] who nurtured this evil branch, etc.

VV. 15 — 17. ולקח אבי הנערה ואמה (vergl. — ויקח קרח. Bamidbar 16, 1). והוציאו את בתולי הנערה und ebenso כשרי בתולי בתי :ואלה בתולי בתי, die Rechtfertigung der Jungfräulichkeit der Angeklagten durch Gegenzeugen, welche den Zeugen der Anklage mit הזמה (Kap. 19, 17 f.) entgegentreten (Ketubot 46 a; siehe כ׳׳מ zu שמלה ,ופרשו השמלה — .)12 ,3 הל׳ נערה ist überall ein Gewand, worin etwas eingehüllt wird; daher ja auch סמל: die äußere Form, שמלות der ganze Anzug, die Kleider, und לוטה בשמלה (Sam. I. 21, 10), מי צרר מים בשמלה (Prov. 30, 4). Auch Sem und Japhet nehmen ein שמלה zur Verhüllung des Vaters (Bereschit 9, 23). Daher (Ketubot daselbst): מאי ופרשו השמלה אמר רבי אבהו פרשו מה ששם לה, כדתניא ופרשו השמלה מלמד שבאין עדים של זה ובוררין את הדבר כשמלה חדשה sie legen das auseinander, was er gegen sie versteckt angestellt hat (sie bringen seine Hinterlist an den Tag), wie es in der ברייתא erklärt wird: den Zeugen des Mannes gegenüber treten die Zeugen des Vaters auf und so bringt man die Sache zur Klarheit, wie ein neues faltenloses Gewand.

ואמר אבי הנערה AND THE DAMSEL’S FATHER SHALL SAY [UNTO THE ELDERS] — although both parents appear before them, yet the father alone shall speak — this teaches that a woman is not allowed to speak in the presence of her husband (if he, too, is concerned in the matter) (Sifrei Devarim 235:10).

This teaches that a woman is not permitted, etc. Because the woman is also standing in the court as it is written, “The girl’s father and mother will take, etc.” Yet afterwards it is written, “The girl’s father should assert, etc.,” and it is not written, “The girl’s mother should assert.” Therefore, “This teaches, etc.” (In the name of Maharitz). Re”m explains that [this teaching is derived because] otherwise Scripture should have said, “The girl should assert to the elders, ‘Look! This man has promulgated libelous words against me, etc.,” being that she is the defendant.

ופרשו השמלה AND THEY SHALL SPREAD THE CLOTH [BEFORE THE ELDERS OF THE CITY] — This is a figurative expression: they must make the matter as white (as clear) as a sheet (Sifrei Devarim 237:1; Ketubot 46a).

AND THEY SHALL SPREAD THE CLOTH. “This is a figurative expression meaning, the matter is as white [i.e., as clear] as a sheet.” This is Rashi’s language, which is the interpretation of Rabbi Yishmael found in the Sifre¹⁹⁶Sifre, Ki Theitzei 237. and Mechilta.¹⁹⁷Mechilta, Nezikin 13. But there is no need for it. For this was the custom in former time in Israel:¹⁹⁸Ruth 4:7. they would bring the groom and bride into the bridal chamber and examine them, and the witnesses would guard them outside — these being termed shoshbinin (friends)¹⁹⁹Tosephta Kethuboth 1:4: “In Judea they used to appoint two shoshbinin (friends) as guards, one appointed by the groom’s family, and one by the bride’s.” by the Sages. When they separated, the witnesses would enter and take the cloth on which he laid with her and see the proof of her virginity. This [procedure] is known in the Talmud and in books of Agadah [homily], and they would call this cloth sudor.²⁰⁰Kethuboth 10a: “Bring me the sudor (cloth).” Therefore, Scripture states that her father and mother should spread the cloth which they took from the hands of the witnesses and say, These are the tokens of my daughter’s virginity. Now surely there is still a need to clarify matters with respect to many items about which Scripture spoke briefly.²⁰¹Thus, e.g., the husband who accuses his wife committing adultery must first bring witnesses to corroborate his accusation. These witnesses are subject to searching inquiries by the court, and, in the case of a certain specified type of refutation, they are liable to the same punishment as they had planned to have perpetrated against her. Such matters are not mentioned here in Scripture as it discusses the subject briefly. But the intent of [the Sifre and Mechilta in] stating “This is a figurative expression,” is only in accordance with the opinion which holds that the law concerning a man who defames his wife applies even if he has had no sexual relations with her. [It is according to this opinion that the phrase and they shall spread the cloth cannot be literal, for if no cohabitation took place, there can be no evidence in the sheet. Hence, the phrase is figurative, meaning that they are to prove their complaint “as clear as a sheet.”] But the plain meaning of Scripture is in accordance with the Sage²⁰²Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (Kethuboth 46a). that this law applies only after he has had conjugal relations with her [and in that case the phrase and they shall spread the cloth is to be understood literally]. And thus the Rabbis said in the Gemara:²⁰²Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (Kethuboth 46a). “Rabbi Eleazar²⁰³In our Gemara (ibid.): “Eliezer.” ben Yaakov says, The term cloth is literal, and the law is in accordance with his words.” And such indeed is the sense of the section [of the Torah]. For Scripture stated first, Then the father of the maiden, and her mother, shall take and bring forth the tokens of the maiden’s virginity.²⁰⁴Verse 15. Thus the verse is speaking of both [the father and mother]. Afterwards it reverts to the father alone: And the maiden’s father shall say etc.²⁰⁵Verse 16. It then reverts and states, and ‘they’ shall spread the cloth — the two of them. Now, the reason [for these changes] is that [basically] the claim concerns only the father for [if the husband’s accusation is proven false,] the fine [of a hundred silver shekels, imposed upon the husband] belongs to the father.²⁰⁶Verse 19. Scripture, however, made the mother a partner in this affair because women occupy themselves with the subject of the sheet, for it is they who are knowledgeable and expert in blood, and it is proper for the mother to take hold and bring it [the cloth] to court. But the claim, I gave my daughter unto this man to wife²⁰⁵Verse 16. is that of the father, for the mother is not the adversary of her daughter’s husband. Or it may be that after the father presents his arguments in court, he takes hold of the cloth which his wife had brought under the corners of her garment and they both spread it before the court. Thus the mother is not mentioned in the section and did not appear in court at all except for the matter of “the cloth,” which is to be understood in its literal sense, as I have explained.

ופרשו השמלה, ”they will spread out the sheet, etc.” This verse needs to be understood as a simile, i.e. just as a sheet bears clear testimony to what went on while people slept on it, so the facts of the case are made crystal clear by the presentation of the accused girl’s parents. Nachmanides adds that this interpretation is appropriate according to the sages who claim that the slanderer will be found guilty even though he had not even had marital relations with his bride. According to the sage who holds that the slanderer cannot be convicted unless both parties agree that the marriage had been consummated, the verse has to be understood at its face value, i.e. that the שמלה our verse speaks of is the sheet on which the young couple consummated their marriage.

This is figurative, etc. Otherwise, what would happen if the cloth had been lost or laundered; or who knows whether it is hers or whether it is virginal blood?

ויסרו אתו [AND THE ELDERS … SHALL TAKE THE MAN] AND CHASTISE HIM — i.e. with lashes (Sifrei Devarim 238:2; Ketubot 46a; cf. Onkelos).

Flogging. Because we learn “and chastise” from “and chastise” and “son” from “son.” It is written here “and they shall ויסרו (chastise him),” and by the wayward and rebellious son it is written (above 21:18) “and they shall ויסרו (chastise him).” Just as over there it means flogging, so too here it means flogging. And from where do we know [that it means flogging] over there? Because by the wayward and rebellious son it is written “בן (son),” and by flogging (below 25:2) it is written, “Should the wicked one (בן) deserve flogging, etc.” And we learn “son” from “son” as I explained.

VV. 18 u. 19. ויסרו זה מלקות ,ולקחו וגו׳ ויסרו אתו וענשו אתו וגו׳ (Ketubot 46 a). Diese Züchtigung ist die מלקות-Strafe, ebenso wie oben Kap. 20, 18 bei בן סרר ומורה die מלקות-Züchtigung durch יסר ausgedrückt ist. Kennt doch das jüdische Strafrecht nur eine Korrektionsstrafe: מלקות, worauf wir bereits zu Wajikra 19, 20 hingewiesen haben (siehe daselbst). Es wird hier somit der מוציא שם רע gleichzeitig zu Leibes- und Geldstrafe verurteilt. Sonst gilt die allgemeine Rechtsregel: אינו לוקה ומשלם, es verfällt keiner der מלקות- und Geldstrafe zugleich. Vielmehr wenn מלקות und תשלומין zugleich eintreten würde, da לוקה ואינו משלם, da wird nur die מלקותStrafe vollzogen, von תשלומין aber ist er frei, oder, wo wie bei Schädigungen des Nächsten גזלה ,גנבה ,חובל בחברו ausdrücklich vom Gesetze Geldzahlung statuiert ist, und so auch bei עדים זוממין, wenn durch das כאשר ומם usw. Geldleistungen zu fordern sind, da משלם ואינו לוקה, da tritt die Geldesleistung, nicht aber die מלקות-Strafe ein (Mackot 4 a f. und Ketubot 32 b f.).

ויסרו אותו, “they will chastise him;” they will administer punitive lashes to his skin for having transgressed the positive commandment that “you shall love your neighbour as if he were yourself.” (Leviticus 19,18)

Es wird diese allgemeine Rechtsnorm (Mackot 4 b) an der in dem Gesetze über die מלקות-Strafe gegebenen Bestimmung: כדי רשעתו (Kap. 25, 2) festgehalten: משום רשעה אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום שתי רשעיות. In einer pflichtwidrigen Handlung lassen sich zwei Momente unterscheiden, das subjektive: die pflichtwidrige Verwendung der geistigen und leiblichen Kräfte der eigenen pflichtheiligen Persönlichkeit, und das objektive: die durch diese Pflichtwidrigkeit bewirkte Schädigung des Nächstenrechts oder der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung. Beides sind רשעיות, buchstäblich: Gesetzlosigkeiten, deren Sühne und Restitution zum Teil der Wirksamkeit menschlicher Gerichte anheimfallen. Das subjektive Moment, die pflichtwidrige Verwendung geistiger und leiblicher Kräfte, hat מלקות, die Besserung erzielende Züchtigung (siehe zu Kap. 25, 2) zur Folge. Das objektive Moment, die Schädigung des Nächstenrechts oder der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung erzeugt תשלומין: Ersatz, oder קנם: Geldbuße (siehe zu Schmot 21, 37). Es wäre nun allerdings denkbar, dass bei jedem der richterlichen Kognition verfallenden Vergehen dasselbe nach beiden Momenten hin vom Gerichte zum Austrage gebracht werde. Allein das jüdische Gesetz versagt dem menschlichen Gerichte die volle Austragung der Rechtssühne und weist ihm nur,in jedem Falle ein Einschreiten von einem der beiden Momente an, entweder subjektive Korrektion: לוקה ואינו משלם, מכל מקום חיב כדי לצאת ידי שמים וכן במיתה וממון דקם ליה, — ממון קנס פטור לגמרי עי׳ כתובות ל׳׳ג ב׳, בבא מציעא צ׳׳א א׳— oder objektive Restitution: משלם ואינו לוקה (— siehe ferneres zu Kapitel 25, 2 —). Nur unser Fall hier macht eine einzige, völlig allein stehende Ausnahme, מוציא שם רע לוקה ומשלם. In ihm wird das Flagrante des begangenen Unrechts in allen Beziehungen durch richterliches Erkenntnis zum Bewusstsein gebracht. לוקה: der subjektive Missbrauch des Wortes, die Übertretung der Warnung, לא תלך רכיל :אזהרה, obgleich sonst als לאו שאין בו מעשה (siehe Kap. 25, 2) dem מלקות nicht unterliegend, wird hier durch מלקות in seiner ganzen entwürdigenden Schwere dem Manne zum Bewusstsein gebracht. משלם, nicht תשלומין, nicht Entschädigung der jungen Frau für den Versuch einer sie entehrenden Anklage sind die vom Maune zu erlegenden hundert Schekel. Es ist Israel, es ist die Ehre der Gesamtnation, die sich in der sie entehrenden Anklage einer ihrer Töchter verletzt fühlt und an welche direkt das Geld als Pön zu zahlen ist. Es heißt nicht: ושתו עליו מאה כסף לתת לאבי הנערה כי הוציא שם רע על בתו, sondern וענשו אתו וגו׳. Es ist die Nation, welche das Geld als Pön fordert, weil er eine ihrer Töchter beschimpft hat, und aus den Händen der Nation erhält der Vater die vom Manne erlegte Summe, "weil er eine Jungfrau Israels beschimpft hat". Jeder Vater ist ein Delegierter der Nation, dem in der Sittenreinheit und Unschuld seiner Töchter der höchste Schatz seiner Nation anvertraut ist, und wenn der Vater aus den Händen der Nationalrepräsentanz die von dem Verleumder seiner Tochter erlegte Geldbuße empfängt, so spricht sich eben darin die Anerkennung aus, dass die in ihrer Makellosigkeit erwiesene züchtige Unschuld der Tochter in allererster Linie Verdienst des Vaters, Verdienst des Hauses ist, das es verstanden hat, die Perle des jüdischen Nationalreichtums, die jüdische Züchtigkeit des Weibes, in seiner Tochter zu erziehen und zu pflegen, und nur wenn der Vater bereits gestorben, wird der Tochter die von ihrem Verleumder erlegte Summe (Ketubot 44 b). Die von dem מוציא שם רע zu erlegende Summe ist daher קנס, ist eine fixierte Summe, sie richtet sich nicht nach der Individualität, es heißt da nicht: הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש, es ist die Beschimpfung der Nation in einer ihrer Töchter, die Beschimpfung einer "Tochter des jüdischen Volkes", die zur Sühne steht, daher אחד שהוציא שם רע על גדולה שבכהונה ועל קטנה שבישראל נותן ק׳ סלע (Arachin 15 a).

נערה מלא דבר הכתוב ,לאבי הנערה, es ist dies das einzige Mal, dass im Pentateuch das Wort גערה mit ׳ה dem Zeichen des weiblichen Geschlechtes "voll" geschrieben ist. Nur hier, wie ja auch aus dem Verfolg der Verurteilung der schuldig befundenen Angeklagten sich ergibt, ist das Mädchen in einem Alter der weiblichen Geschlechtsreife begriffen, und קטנה, das Mädchen in den Jahren der unmündigen Kindheit ausgeschlossen. Sonst ist überall, wo נערה ohne ה׳ semin. חסר, geschrieben ist, auch das minderjährige Mädchen verstanden, כל מקום שנאמר נער אפי׳ קטנה במשמע (Ketubot 44 b).

ולו תהיה לאשה לא יוכל לשלחה כל ימיו. Der ursprüngliche Standpunkt des jüdischen Gesetzes konnte eine solche Wertschätzung des Weibes in der Ehe voraussetzen, konnte voraussetzen, — wie dies ja in dem ganzen Gebiete des jüdischen Schrifttums zu Tage tritt und dies auch bereits im Jeschurun, Jahrg. 2, nachgewiesen — dass der Mann in seinem Weibe also die Perle seines Herzens und seines Lebensglücks finden und achten werde, dass es dem jüdischen Mann kühn den Entschluss anvertrauen konnte, die Ehe zu lösen, wenn sein Weib das ihm nicht war. Die Ehe — das durfte das jüdische Gesetz voraussetzen — zu deren Lösung ein jüdischer Mann sich entschließen konnte, war der Fortdauer nicht wert. Und nicht einen Fortschritt, einen Rückschritt in der jüdischen Kulturentwicklung dürfte es bezeichnen, als es als zeitliche und örtliche Notwendigkeit erkannt wurde, dem Manne diese einseitige Befugnis zu entziehen (vergl. zu Kap. 24, 1). Dem Mann nun, der, wie in dem Problem unseres Textes, in so schändlicher Weise gegen seine Frau vorgegangen war, um eine gewaltsame Lösung der Ehe herbeizuführen, entzog das Gesetz für alle Zeit diese Befugnis. So weit an ihm liegt, hat die Frau seine Frau für immer zu bleiben, er kann ohne ihre Einwilligung die Ehe nie lösen.

Dies ולו תהיה לאשה לא יוכל לשלחה כל ימיו ist auch ein לאו שניתק לעשה (siehe zu V.7).

AND THEY SHALL FINE HIM A HUNDRED SHEKELS OF SILVER. The meaning thereof is that after the husband was administered stripes — a punishment deduced from the expression and they shall chastise him²⁰⁷Verse 18. Kethuboth 46a. — [he is to be fined a hundred shekels of silver]. For it was customary to write over a dowry of fifty shekels of silver to a virgin, but this person defamed her because he hated her and he wanted to send her away empty-handed. Therefore Scripture punished him with [a fine of] a hundred silver shekels, for the Torah punishes with a twofold measure, as in the case of the verse, he shall pay double.²⁰⁸Exodus 22:3. Although a kethubah (marriage contract) is only a matter of Rabbinic ordinance²⁰⁹See ibid., 22:15 — Vol. II, p. 387. for whoever made such a condition with her, or who married her without qualification, yet it was customary to write a dowry for virgins, just as it is said, according to the dowry of virgins,²¹⁰Ibid., Verse 16. and the majority did so. And if this woman had no kethubah, why should he have put forth wanton charges against her²¹¹Verse 14. because he came to her and he hated her — he should have written her a bill of divorce and be freed of her, as it is written, if you hate [her] send [her] away.²¹²Malachi 2:16. So interpreted by Rabbi Yehudah (Gittin 90b). [Instead he brought wanton charges against her, therefore he is fined double the normal amount of the dowry of virgins even if he had not given her a kethubah.]

וענשו אותו מאה כסף, “they will fine him one hundred pieces of silver;” Nachmanides writes that since it had been the accepted custom to pay a dowry of 50 pieces of silver when marrying a virgin to the father of the bride, or to her if she was of age, and this “groom” wanted to cheat the father out of that amount, the Torah imposes the kind of penalty that reflects the one paid by a thief, i.e. double the amount stolen.

וענשו אותו מאה כסף, Concerning the penalty of 100 silver pieces levied against the husband who slandered the reputation of his bride, Maimonides writes in Moreh Nevuchim 3,49: “seeing that the standard dowry of a virgin is 50 silver pieces (verse 29) and this husband had tried to make her lose her כתובה, her marriage settlement and wanted to divorce her without paying her a penny, the Torah treats him like a thief who has to make restitution of twice the value of the object he has stolen” (Exodus 22,8). Even though, in this case, the husband did not get to carry out his intention, we have a precedent of other witnesses being punished in accordance with the damage they wanted to cause the intended victim in Deut. 19,19 where the Torah discusses עדים זוממים. The corporal punishment administered to him reflects the fact that he tried to assassinate her character, to demean her; therefore her husband is being demeaned by having this corporal punishment inflicted upon him publicly. Seeing he wanted to betray her, divorce her without compensation, he is not allowed to divorce her ever, the opposite of his intent.

ונתנו לאבי הנערה, “and they (the elders of the town) give to the father of the girl;” all of the elders. The word נער is repeatedly spelled without the letter ה at the end of the word in this paragraph, but here it is read as if spelled with that letter, suggesting that harmony is being restored through the procedure decreed by the Torah.

לא יוכל לשלחה, “he can never divorce her at his own initiative;” this is in spite of the fact that generally, when husbands claim to have found that their wives had betrayed them they are considered as telling the truth. This type of individual is not believed unless he can corroborate his claim of her lack of virginity when she got married by eye witnesses. He has been proven a liar, therefore in the future his claims must be substantiated if he is to be taken seriously. A different interpretation: he is being dealt with on the basis of מדה כנגד מדה, “measure for measure,” i.e. tit for tat. He had tried to blacken his wife’s name so that no one would marry her in the future, hence he will not be able to rid himself of her. The Torah decreed the same penalty for someone who had raped (compare verse 29 this chapter). Seeing that he had forced himself upon his partner once, it is likely that sooner or later he will tire of her and try to divorce her. The Torah therefore prevented such a person from doing so. כל ימיו, “all his life.” The Talmud there queries why the Torah used language that implied that he had done such a thing as divorcing her once before, whereas he had actually not done any thing! The answer given by the Talmud is that this is the reason why that person also has not been punished with 39 lashes as he would have been had he violated a negative commandment by performing a forbidden act.

ואם אמת היה הדבר BUT IF THE THING BE TRUE — proven by evidence of witnesses and after legal warning that she had committed adultery after her betrothal (Ketubot 44b).

Through witnesses, and with a pre-warning, etc. Otherwise, why is she stoned? For even if it is true that she behaved promiscuously, perhaps she did so before her marriage. And even if she behaved promiscuously after her marriage, perhaps she acted without witnesses or pre-warning. Therefore Rashi explains, “Through witnesses, etc.”

V. 20. ואם אמת היה הדבר הזה וגו׳, es hat der Vater nicht die Zeugen des Mannes vermittelst Gegenzeugen durch הומה zu entkräften gewusst, oder es sind die Gegenzeugen des Vaters selbst wieder vermittelst anderer Gegenzeugen als עדים זוממין erwiesen worden.

אל פתח בית אביה [THEN THEY SHALL BRING THE DAMSEL] TO THE ENTRANCE OF HER FATHER’S HOUSE — suggesting: “See what a child (lit., a plant) you have reared!” (Ketubot 45a).

לזנות בית אביה, there were witnesses that she had sexual intercourse after being betrothed.

In the presence of all the people of her city. It seems to me Rashi is citing a proof to his explanation that “her father’s house” actually means “in her father’s house,” i.e., the letter ב [and the word “in”] is missing. [He proves this] by explaining that “the people of her city” actually means “in the presence of all the people of her city.” The reason he says this is because the verse states, “The people of her city will stone her with stones,” which implies that they are the ones who begin [stoning], yet this cannot be because it is written (above 17:7), “Let the hand of the witnesses be against him first, etc.” Perforce the verse really means (באנשי עירה) “among the people of her city,” i.e. “in the presence of all the people of her city.” This proves that it is common for a verse to omit the letter ב [the word “in”]. Rashi is also answering another question: The verse implies that the reason she is liable for stoning is “because she committed a disgraceful act ... [in] her father’s house.” However, according to this, why does the Torah make someone liable for stoning if he had relations with a married girl [elsewhere] in the city? She did not behave promiscuously in her father’s house! To answer this question Rashi explains: “And a man encounters her in the city,” this is why he had relations with her. The breach summons the thief.” In other words, because she acted immorally by not remaining at home as is customary for virgins, then she certainly was also promiscuous in her father’s house, and therefore she is liable for stoning. Now we can understand why Rashi explains the verses out of order. [Note: In our text, Rashi explains the verses in their correct order]. This also answers Re”m [who asks this same] question, “I do not know a correct reason, etc.”

V. 21. והוציאו: aus des Mannes Haus, כלומר ראו גידולים אל פתח בית אביה שגידלתם (Ketubot 45 a). Die Unzüchtigkeit der jungen Frau fällt als Schuld auf die Erziehung zurück, die sie im Elternhause genossen, und ist eine Schändung der ganzen Nation ספרי) לא עצמה בלבד ניוולה אלא כל בתלות ישראל .כי עשתה נבלה בישראל).

אנשי עירה [AND] THE MEN OF HER CITY [SHALL OVERWHELM HER WITH STONES] — This means, the witnesses shall stone her, all the men of her city standing by (Sifrei Devarim 240:1; cf. Rashi on Leviticus 24:14).

לזנות בית אביה die Schwere des Verbrechens und der Entartung gipfelt darin, dass eine der elterlichen Obhut noch nicht Entwachsene, dieser Obhut noch Angehörige mit Bewusstsein — es müssen ja עדים und התראה vorangegangen sein — Ehebruch geübt!

לזנות בית אביה TO PLAY THE WHORE “IN” HER FATHER’S HOUSE — The word בית is equivalent to בבית.

ומתו גם שניהם THEN THEY SHALL BOTH OF THEM DIE — The redundant words גם שניהם are intended to exclude a case of unnatural intercourse from which the woman derives no gratification (Sifrei Devarim 242:4; Sanhedrin 66b).

THEN THEY SHALL ‘GAM’ (ALSO) ‘SHNEIHEM’ (BOTH OF THEM) DIE. “This excludes unnatural gratification from which the woman derives no satisfaction. Gam (also) — this is intended to include in the death-penalty those who come after them” [as explained further on]. This is the language of Rabbeinu Shlomo [Rashi]. But I do not understand what this means. Is this the case of a virgin that we must exclude or include those who come after them [to commit adultery with her? The verse here speaks of a married woman, therefore] what difference is there between the first [adulterer] and the second and third? Moreover, the text should have read “those who come after ‘him’” [instead of “after ‘them’ “]! And in our versions of the Sifre it is stated:²¹³Sifre, Ki Theitzei 241. However, the text there is as Rashi has it. See Horovitz’s edition of Sifre, and his note there. “Both of them — this excludes unnatural gratification. Since the verse states ‘gam’ both of them it includes those who come from their backs,” meaning unnatural sexual intercourse [sodomy]. Scripture included it here, but all cases of adultery are deduced from this one.
In line with the simple meaning of Scripture the phrase ‘gam shneihem’ (also both of them) means “[not only] the man who is the more responsible for the sin because he demands it, he seduces her, and commits the act — but ‘gam’ (also) the woman.” Scripture itself mentions this, explaining the phrase also both of them — the man that lay with the woman, and the woman. Such is the customary manner of Scripture to ascribe the sin to the man, as I have explained in connection with the verse, he hath uncovered his brother’s nakedness; they shall be childless.²¹⁴Leviticus 20:21. However in Ramban there it is not found. According to the Techeileth Mordechai, the text here should read: he hath uncovered his sister’s nakedness (ibid., Verse 17), the thought here alluded to by Ramban is developed there.
And some scholars²¹⁵Ibn Ezra on Exodus 35:5. say that the phrase the man that lay with the woman, and the woman is but an additional explanation [of the pronoun — both of them], like let him bring it, the Eternal’s offering;²¹⁶Exodus 35:5 (Vol. II, p. 598). [the kingdom which will not serve] him, Nebuchadnezzar.²¹⁷Jeremiah 27:8. And in the Sifre it is stated:²¹⁸Sifre, Ki Theitzei 241. “The man that lay with the woman — even if she was a minor; and the woman — even if she had intercourse with a minor.” If so, the meaning of also both of them is “also either one of them, the man or the woman who has reached the age to be culpable of punishment.”

ומתו גם שניהם, and they will both die. Rashi explains that the apparently superfluous word גם, “also,” refers to unborn children that these people could have looked forward to having had they remained alive. Nachmanides writes that he does not understand Rashi’s comment [As his comments appear to be based on an erroneous text in a Rashi manuscript, and resolving it is lengthy, I’ll skip this. Ed.] According to the plain meaning of the text, the word גם is not superfluous, but it refers to two separate instances of grossly sinful behaviour, 1) the slanderer in verses 14-20 as well as 2) the seducer in our verse here. According to Sifri the additional dimension derived here is based on the superfluous words האיש השוכב and והאשה, indicating that sometimes only one of the participating parties are executed, such as when one of the parties was a minor. Even though the minor may have been the one that initiated the sin, only the adult pays the penalty.

ומתו גם שניהם האיש השוכב עם אשה , “they shall both die, the man who sleeps with a woman.” if the woman was a married woman at the time. The word והאשה “and the woman,” which appears superfluous seeing the Torah wrote that “both are to die; is to tell us that the man is considered more guilty than the woman. If she had been considered equally guilty, the Torah should have added the word הנשכבת, “who had been slept with.” This is the opinion of Nachmanides.
Our sages in Kidushin 10 understand the words ומתו גם שניהם to mean that both man and woman are equally guilty, i.e. both are adults. If the woman was a minor, she is not to be executed. In Erchin 7 these words are interpreted as referring to any fetus inside the woman. If a woman is pregnant and her labour pains have commenced before she has been sentenced, the court waits until after she has given birth before carrying out the sentence. If she had not reached that stage in her pregnancy her status does not result in a delay of her execution. [The reason is that once the baby (fetus) showed signs of wanting to move out of its mother it is considered a separate body.]

This excludes lascivious activity etc. I.e. if he had intercourse with the woman in a body part [of the body] other than “that place.” For the woman does not derive pleasure, only the man. [In such an instance] they are both exempt because Scripture writes “both of them” which implies that they both derived equal pleasure. Even though [in a case] where he had sodomized her, and the woman does not derive pleasure, they are both liable. That case is different because it is specially included from the words (Vayikra 18:22) “משכבי אשה (lit. the ways of having intercourse with a woman).”

כי ימצא איש שוכב עם אשה בעלת בעל, "If a man be found having intercourse with a woman married to someone else, etc." This verse is best understood with reference to Sanhedrin 59 that if a Gentile engages in Torah study he is guilty of the death penalty. The Torah is already betrothed to her husband the Israelite, she is his bride. ומתו גם שניהם, "Both of them shall die etc." both the Gentile studying the Torah and the "Torah" itself. This means that such "Torah" instead of spreading its spiritual light will darken the horizon of the Gentile who studies it. It will not be perceived as possessing life-giving powers as when it is studied by an Israelite. Torah, which according to Proverbs 4,22 is a source of life to those who encounter it, will not prove to be a source of life to pagans who study it but the reverse.

VV. 22 — 27. כי ימצא וגו׳. Die hier folgenden Gesetze besprechen das Problem bewussten Ehebruchs, dieses Verbrechens gegen die Fundamentalinstitution aller Menschengesittung und Gesellschaft, und zwar nach den bereits oben angedeuteten Momenten, der vollendeten Ehe נשואין nach vorgängigen קידושין (V. 22), und der erst vollzogenen Antrauung: קידושין) אירוסין — Verse 23 - 27), die ja die geistig sittliche Basis des ganzen ehelichen Verhältnisses bildet. Wir haben schon oben bemerkt, wie das Gesetz das Verbrechen gegen אירוסין (bei גערה בתולה) mit der schwersten Strafe, סקילה, trifft und damit eben das geistig sittliche, vom physischen Momente unbeeinflusste Fundament der jüdischen Ehe bedeutungsvoll hervortreten lässt.

ומתו גם שניהם, “and they are both to die as a result.” Rashi comments that the apparently extraneous word גם also, means that also the offspring of such a forbidden union is to die. He adds that if a man had cohabited with the woman in question after she had been condemned to die by the court that man is subject to the same penalty. The Torah had to add this as we might have thought that as soon as the woman had been convicted she was legally already considered as no longer alive.

ומתו גם שניהם, “they will both have to die;” Rashi explains the unusual wording, i.e. not “they will both be executed,” by saying that this includes the descendents of this pair of sinners. We are not to assume that as soon as these people have been convicted, even though not yet executed, any unborn children will not be affected by their deeds, since their parents had already been considered legally dead. What these people had done does not come under the heading of “if the parents sinned why should the children be punished for this? The word גם, “also,” in our verse is the Torah’s hint that this situation is different from other situations in which parents are both guilty of a serious sin violating the laws of chastity. An alternate approach to our verse: the word גם does indeed refer to the descendants of this pair of adulterers. Even if the willing female partner is a minor, she will also be subject to the penalty of having committed adultery. The same is true for an adult married woman who committed adultery with a boy that had not yet reached puberty. This is though even though we had been told in verse 21 that the girl involved who by being described as נערה was not yet an adult was alone in being stoned to death, (seeing she shamed her father under whose roof she had indulged in such shameless conduct). Furthermore, we cannot punish the person with whom she lost her virginity as we do not know who he was. If the adulterer (male) was known and there is evidence against both, they will both be subject to death by strangulation. Another interpretation of the apparently superfluous word גם: even if the woman involved in this adultery is pregnant at the time, we do not wait with carrying out the death sentence until her baby is born. According to an interpretation in Ibn Ezra, the word גם is a hint that more laws concerning forbidden sexual unions will follow.

גם is intended to include those persons who commit adultery with one of this pair after them (i.e. after this pair had been found guilty) (Sifrei Devarim 242:5). Another explanation of גם שניהם is: these words are intended to include in the death penalty the embryo: that if the woman was pregnant the execution is not deferred until after she gives birth (cf. Targum Jonathan on; Arakhin 7a).

This adds those following them. There are varying texts here. In some commentaries it is written, “This adds those following them (אחריהם),” without a מ"ם at the beginning of the word. This means that if she and he were sentenced to death, even so, if he had intercourse with another woman, or if another man had intercourse with her, the secondary individuals too, are executed and we do not say that a person sentenced to death is already considered dead so that the secondary individuals are considered as if they had intercourse with corpses. Rather, these secondary individuals are also liable to the death penalty. And in some commentaries the text reads, “This adds those committing sodomy (מאחריהם, lit. from behind them),” with a מ"ם at the beginning of the word. This means from behind her, i.e. sodomy.

ספרי) בעדים :כי ימצא), wie bereits Schmot zu Kap. 22, 3 bemerkt, ist das zur gerichtlichen Verhandlung führende "Finden" eines Vorgangs immer eine auf eigener Wahrnehmung beruhende Zeugenaussage, die bei Strafverbrechen auch die geschehene Verwarnung, התראה, konstatieren muss (vergl. Bamidbar 15, 32 u. 33). — ׳ומתו וגו, wie bereits zu Wajikra 20, 10 bemerkt, ist diese Todesstrafe חנק, wie כל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם (siehe daselbst). — גם שניהם, bei allen Geschlechtsverbrechen ist die Strafbarkeit beider gleich, mit alleiniger Ausnahme von שפחה חרופה (siehe Wajikra 19, 20). — ׳האיש וגו: Fehlt der einen Seite die Oualifikation der Strafbarkeit, etwa wegen Unmündigkeit, Zwang, oder Irrtum, קטן oder שוגג ,אונם ,קטנה, so erliegt doch die andere der Strafe. Daher die Wiederholung: ספרי) האיש וגו׳ והאשה; Sanhedrin 66 b und Nidda 44 b u. 45 a).

Another interpretation: “Even both of them,” etc. Because according to the first interpretation you might ask that it is obvious he is liable if he had sodomized her, because it is written (ibid) משכבי אשה, which teaches that she has two משכבים (ways to “lie” with her), a normal way and through sodomy. So why do I need the word “also”? Therefore Rashi explains, “Another interpretation, etc.” And according to the other interpretation you might ask that it should have said, “They shall both die, the man who had intercourse with the woman [and] also (גם) the woman.” Therefore he gives the first interpretation.

את הנערה על דבר וגו׳: צ׳׳ע מאחר דקי׳׳ל דאין מיתה בלא התראה ואפי׳ חבר צריך התראה וצריך לקבל עליו התראה ולהתיר עצמו למיתה (עי׳ סנהדרין מ׳ ב׳ ,מא׳ א׳) ואם כן מה בכך שלא צעקה אפי׳ שתקה אפי׳ הרכינה ראשה אינה נהרגת כל שלא התירה עצמה למיתה ואמרה על מנת כן אני עושה (שם פא ב׳) ולולא דמסתפינא הייתי אומר ודאי כל שהעובר עבירה עושה מעשה די כשעושה המעשה המכוער תוך כדי דבור לקבלתו ההתראה והתירו עצמו למיתה. אכן כשהעובר עבירה אינו עושה מעשה אלא סובל אחרים עושים בו מעשה הרי הוא כקרקע עולם אף שקיבל התראה והתיר עצמו למיתה צריך הוכחה בשעת מעשה שסובל מעשה אחרים ברצון דאי לא כן איכא למימר אף שקבל עליו ההתראה והתיר עצמו למיתה לולא נאנס לא היה עובר. ואם כן מיירי הכא ששניהם קבלו ההתראה והתירו עצמן למיתה והוא עשה את המעשה תוך כדי דבור ואעפ׳׳י כן אי צעקה כשבא לעשות מעשהו עצמו למיתה והוא עשה את המעשה תוך כדי דבור ואף על פי כן אי צעקה כשבא לעשות מעשהו אינה נהרגת וכיון שלא צעקה במקום שהיה לה לצעק מוכח שברצונה נעשה המעשה אכן בפסוק כ׳׳ה אדרבא נתברר על ידי עדים שהחזיק בה כלומר שנאנסה לבא עליה אחר שקבלו שניהם התראה הא דלא צעקא אז אינו מוכיח שנתרצית קדם המעשה מפני שהיה במקום שצעקתה לא הועילה לה ואם כן חיזקתה שבאנס נעשה המעשה ואף שקבלה ההתראה אינה נהרגת כד נראה לע׳׳ד.

Adds the fetus — if she was pregnant, etc. Regarding a similar matter Rashi explains in Erchin (7a), “Because it should [only] say ומתו (they shall die), and I would know that “they shall die” cannot mean less than two. (Nachalas Yaakov)

התראה :כלומר ,על עסקי דבור ,על דבר וגו׳ (Sanhedrin 41 a).

אונס רחמנא פטריה ,ולנערה לא תעשה דבר: für eine unter zwingender Gewalt geübte Handlung macht das Gesetz nicht verantwortlich (B. K. 28 b. — Dieser Begriff von אונס hat auch in zivilrechtlichem Gebiete Folge. So hat z. B. eine infolge höheren Zwanges nicht erfüllte Bedingung nicht die Folge einer freiwilligen Unterlassung. Jedoch ist dabei zu unterscheiden, z. B. אונסא דשכיח, oder wie es Nedarim 27 b heißt אונסא דמיגליא, eine nicht ungewöhnliche, vorauszusehende Verhinderung, die dem Kontrahierenden im Momente der Bedingungfeststellung hätte gegenwärtig sein können — siehe daselbst und Ketubot 2, 3).

אין לנערה חטא מות, nicht nur אין מות לנערה, sondern אין לנערה חטא מות: אונס wird nicht als חטא behandelt und hat keine gesetzliche Folge, auch nicht (ספרי) קרבן חטאת.

כי כאשר וגו׳ ,כן הדבר הזה, als Motiv des vorhergehenden אין לנערה חטא מות dürfte sich dieser Satz zunächst dahin aussprechen: wie niemand für das Verbrechen des Mordes verantwortlich ist, den jemand gewaltsam an ihm begeht (mit seiner Zustimmung oder auch nur Zulassung fiele es dem Begriffe des Selbstmordes anheim), so ist auch keiner für das Verbrechen des Ehebruchs und der ihm gleichen Verbrechen der Unzucht verantwortlich, die jemand gewaltsam mit ihm begeht. Sofort ist aber damit Unzucht und Mord hinsichtlich der Verantwortlichkeit vor Gott gleichgestellt und, wenn es selbstverständlich ist, dass niemand sein Leben durch den Mord eines ihn nicht Bedrohenden retten darf, da dessen Leben mindestens dem seinigen gleich wiegt und er nicht Leben mit Leben erkaufen darf, nach dem Ausdrucke der Weisen: מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דחברך סומק טפי, "wer sagt dir, dass dein Blut das rötere ist!", so folgt aus dieser Gleichstellung des Verbrechens der Unzucht mit Mord hinsichtlich der Verantwortlichkeit, dass ebenso auch niemand sein Leben durch Begehung eines Verbrechens der Unzucht retten darf, dass vielmehr für Unzucht wie für Mord, ebenso wie dies bereits für ע׳׳ז (Kap. 6, 5 אפי׳ נוטל את נפשך) ausgesprochen ist, der Grundsatz gilt: יהרג ואל יעבר man darf sich das Leben nicht durch eines dieser Verbrechen erhalten. Daher auch die Norm: בכל מתרפאין חוץ מע׳׳ו וגילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים, mit allem darf man Heilung suchen, außer mit Übertretungen der Gesetze über Götzentum, Unkeuschheit und Mord (Peßachim 25 a; — vergl. Wajikra 18, 5).

Gleichzeitig ist aber auch diese Gleichstellung von dem נערה מאורסה-Verbrechen mit Mord für dieses letztere Verbrechen lehrreich. Von dem נערה מאורסה-Verbrechen setzt das Problem unseres Textes (V. 7) voraus אין מושיע לה, dass es vollzogen worden, "weil ihr kein Retter war". Damit ist gegeben: הא יש מושיע לה בכל דבר שיכול להושיע, dass, wenn jemand dagewesen wäre, er sie auf jegliche Weise zu retten verpflichtet gewesen wäre, selbst, wenn nicht anders möglich, mit dem Leben des Verbrechers, ניתן להצילה בנפשו. Dieselbe Norm gilt auch für das Verbrechen des Mordes, so dass, wenn auf andere Weise nicht möglich, selbst mit dem Tode des Mörders das Leben des von ihm Bedrohten durch jeden zu retten ist, הרודף אחר חברו להורגו מצילין אותו בנפשו (Sanhedrin 73 a).

Diese gegenseitige Erläuterung von נערה מאורסה durch רוצח und רוצח durch נערה מאורסה wird (daselbst a und 74 b) also ausgesprochen: רבי אומר כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה למדנו מרוצח (der פטור für אונס bei נערה מאורסה ist ja ohnehin ausdrücklichst ausgesprochen ולנערה לא תעשה דבר, es kann daher dieser Hinweis auf רוצח nur eine allgemeine und zwar auch für רוצח rechtsgesetzliche Belehrung bezwecken):

מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד (פירשי׳ אף למד) מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילה בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו ומקיש נערה המאורסה לרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבר אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבר. (גי׳ הילקוט: וכי מה למדנו מרוצח מעתה אלא הרי זה וכו׳ וא׳׳כ מעתה שייך למעלה וקשה להבין). (וצ׳׳ע על אותה המדה כיון שבא על כל פנים ללמד מנא לן דבא אף ללמוד ועוד למה מקדים הקיש המלמד ללמד להיקש למד למלמד שהוא עיקר הפשט, ואפשר הוא הנותן כיון היקש מלמד ללמד הוא החידוש חשיב אתיא מדרשא חביבא ליה מקדים ליה וצ׳׳ע (רשי׳ פסחים כ׳ה פירש שהוא כמו והיה בעם ככהן שניהם שוין ע׳׳ש עי׳ יומא פב א׳ תוספות ד׳׳ה מה רוצח)

ומצאה איש בעיר [IF A DAMSEL THAT IS A VIRGIN BE BETROTHED UNTO A MAN] AND A MAN FIND HER IN THE CITY [AND LIE WITH HER] — (Because he found her outdoors) therefore he lay with her: a breach in the wall invites the thief; if she had remained at home (as becomes a chaste Jewish girl) this would not have happened to her (Sifrei Devarim 242:2-3).

The subject of the betrothed maiden²¹⁹Verses 23-27. concerns a case of witnesses seeing from afar a man taking hold of a maiden and lying with her in the city, whereupon the witnesses shouted and warned them [of the sin thereof and its death-penalty]. In the opinion of our Rabbis, both of them are liable to stoning, for the woman also is under presumption of voluntary adultery since she did not cry out at all, for, it is normal for any woman who is raped in the city to scream for help and to be saved. If, however, the witnesses saw in the field that the man grabbed her and lay with her, she is under presumption of having been raped and is therefore free of punishment. The meaning of the phrase [For he found her in the field;] she cried²²⁰Verse 27. is thus “that she probably screamed” [for even though the witnesses did not hear her cry it is presumed that she cried for help; or it may mean even if she had cried — there was none to save her,” for even if they heard that she did not cry she is free of punishment since there was none to save her. In general, if there are people to save her [and she did not cry] whether it be in the city or the field she is guilty; where there is none to save her whether it be in the city or the field she is free. Scripture speaks of the common case [i.e., that in the city there are people to save her, and in the field there are none — but the law as explained is the same in all cases].

Scripture states, and the man, because he afflicted the wife of his fellow.²²¹Verse 24. Now the term “affliction” applies only to forcible cohabitation, and yet the same verse already declared her guilty as if she committed adultery voluntarily!²²²Verse 24 reads: Then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them … the maiden, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he afflicted the wife of his fellow. Ramban asks: Since the term “affliction” applies only to forcible rape, how could she be condemned as if she had submitted voluntarily? The answer follows in the text. But the purport thereof is as follows: When we see a man take hold of a woman and lie with her we adjudge the woman to be consenting because she could have been saved from him, and we consider the man as if he is afflicting her for he did not entice her nor appeal to her to submit to him.
Now, I know not the precise meaning of this law of “crying out.” If we see a maiden being overpowered by a man and she fights him with all her strength, weeps and takes hold of his clothes or his hair to save herself from him, and she did not realize [enough] to cry out, why should she be stoned? Rather, the “crying out” of which Scripture speaks is also the common case to deduce that ordinarily [if she did not cry for help] in the city it was a seduction [for had she cried out, people would have come to her rescue] and in the field [we presume] she was forced.

אשר ענה את אשת רעהו, he violated her and made her unfit to continue being the wife of her betrothed. We find a similar expression in Michah 2,9 נשי עמי תגרשון מבית תענוגיה, “you drive the women of My people away from their pleasure homes.” [compare Nachmanides who explains that the woman is not considered as an unwilling helpless victim in the scenario described by the Torah here. Hence the comparison with the chapter in Michah by our author is not so baffling. Ed.]

על דבר שלא צעקה בעיר, “because she did not even cry out in the city;” Nachmanides writes that the example quoted here by the Torah is the scenario that usually occurs. Normally, when the girl about to be raped cries out, there will be someone in the city that responds to her outcry. Failure to cry out may therefore be interpreted as consent by her. Similarly, seeing that there is only a remote chance that one’s outcry is heard in the field, her failure to cry for help does not incriminate her. If it can be proven that there were people passing by in the field while all this was taking place, she is considered as having consented because she had not tried to attract attention. If the woman did not know how to attract attention by crying out, but she is found weeping bitterly, this is also considered a behaviour that exonerates her from being labeled a harlot. Alternately, any attempt on her part to escape her attacker by struggling with him in silence also is interpreted as conduct that exonerates her.

על דבר אשר ענה, “on account of his having violated (raped) the wife of his fellow.” We would have expected the Torah to write: “on account of his having slept with his fellow’s wife.” If he had to use force to make her submit, she is a victim of violence and innocent. How then could the Torah punish her with death by stoning? The reason the Torah describes the man as having violated her, forced her, is that the Torah considers the male as if he had raped her, whereas she is considered as if she had been quite willing to engage in this encounter. Seeing the incident occurred in town where her cries for help would likely have resulted in her being rescued she is guilty of death for failing to cry out. The man, on the other hand, is treated as if he had violated her against her will instead of having merely seduced her first, and we apply the death penalty to him.
If the Torah mentions “city” and “field” as the locations where these illicit sexual unions take place, this is not to be understood literally, i.e. that only adultery by consent in the city makes the woman guilty of the death penalty, whereas she is free from guilt only if she had been raped in the field. The words “field” and “city” are illustrations of a likely scenario. If a woman was raped in the city she is most certainly not convicted, whereas if she chose to commit adultery in the field she is most certainly a candidate for the death penalty. In the final analysis both parties’ fate depends on the testimony of the witnesses.

וסקלתם אותם באבנים, “you shall stone them (to death) with stones. The Torah decrees a harsher mode of death for the woman who committed an adulteress act while betrothed, seeing that still having been a virgin, and not having tasted the physical gratification of sexual intercourse, she nonetheless shamed her family; this is a sin which reflects on her father and her family in whose house she lost her innocence and therefore reflects on there having been something wrong in her upbringing. Once she has been married and lived in her husband’s home, the family can blame her aberration as connected to her having left her father’s home.

על דבר אשר ענה את אשת רעהו, “for his having raped the wife of his fellow;” Nachmanides writes that although, generally, the expression עינוי, affliction, is used only when actual rape takes place, as in Genesis 34,2 with Dinah daughter of Yaakov, whereas here the woman in question was a willing partner in the act, why else would the Torah declare her guilty? However the situation described here is one where the man in question has been seen taking hold of her, and was lying down with her and she made no attempt to be rescued or to rescue herself; she is guilty while the man, at the same time, is considered as having raped her, since he initiated the crime without her consent being expressed, and he had made no attempt to seduce her, i.e. to secure her freely given consent.

על דבר אשר לא צעקה בעיר, “because she did not loudly protest being violated,” even though in a city where help would have been at hand. Her silence is proof that she did not really object to being violated by the rapist. She had no reason to fear being killed as the rapist would surely have been found and brought to justice.

'ואם בשדה וגו, if this rape had taken place on an field, far from civilization and help; you might argue that there is not much difference between rape in this paragraph and that in the previous paragraph, as the fact that the Torah decrees the death penalty for her attacker makes it is clear that witnesses must have been at hand, otherwise how could her attacker have been brought to justice? We have to answer that there is a basic difference between a rape that takes place in an open field, of a woman who walked there without a chaperone, and rape in a city where a woman feels safe in walking the streets alone, unaccompanied. If the victim did not raise her voice in the city when attacked, where the chances are great that her cries will be heard, we must interpret this as tacit consent on her part, hence the more severe type of the death penalty. If that woman was attacked while walking alone in the field, and she had raised her voice and by chance her rape had been observed by witnesses who had heard her cries, and the attacker had been caught then he is brought to justice; he would be brought to justice even if she had not cried out, as we give her credit for having been afraid that if she cried out her attacker would also kill her. She is therefore not considered as having consented to her violation. The Torah does not justify her tacit compliance, but even if she told the witnesses not to interfere, she is not executed, as her compliance is presumed to have been influenced by fear for her life. The Torah even excuses her behaviour if when the witnesses arrived the rape was in full progress and her libido had been aroused by her attacker. Whenever there exists doubt about the victim of a rape having consented tacitly, no court will punish her. [Public opinion might. Ed.]

כי כאשר יקום וגו׳ FOR AS WHEN A MAN RISETH [AGAINST HIS FELLOW MAN, AND SLAYETH HIM, EVEN SO IS THIS THING] — According to its plain sense the following is what it implies: there is in the damsel no sin deserving death, because she was coerced and he, (the man) attacked her with violence, just as when a man attacks his fellowman to kill him. — Our Rabbis, however, gave it (the verse) a Halachic interpretation as follows: Behold, this simile is intended to elucidate the law in question but at the same time turns out to be itself elucidated by that law (lit., this comes as a teacher and is found to be a learner) (Sanhedrin 73a).

אין לנערה חטא מות, even though in the end she stopped resisting, i.e. she became a willing partner; seeing that initially she had been forced she is exonerated by judicial prosecution. Our sages go so far as to state “even if she said that had she not been forced she would have hired the man in question to sleep with her,” (Ketuvot 51) [the rapist kindled her libido so that she lost control over her emotions. Ed.]

This (the murderer) appears to teach, etc. Rashi is answering the question: The wording of the verse implies that the murderer is teaching us something about the married girl, whereas we actually learn nothing from the murderer! [Actually] the murderer “learns” from the married girl. Just as the married girl can be saved from sin by killing the rapist as the verse indicates by saying, “there was no one to rescue her,” implying that if there was someone to rescue her, he could do so by using any means, so too in the case of the murderer, one may save the [intended] victim by killing the pursuer.

'כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו וגו, this situation is not comparable to someone having sexual intercourse with a beast when the Torah condemns the “innocent” beast to share the death penalty with the human being. (Leviticus 20,15). The difference is that the animal in question did not offer any resistance at all, whereas the woman in question in our verse initially did offer resistance. What happened to her is comparable to a murdered person who had been forced to commit a sin and who was murdered for having refused to do so.

צעקת הנערה, we give her the benefit of the doubt, assuming she had cried for help.

VV. 28 u. 29. כי ימצא איש וגו׳ ist eine Ergänzung des bereits Schmot 22, 15 besprochenen Falles (siehe daselbst). Das hier zur Besprechung stehende Problem unterscheidet sich von jenem dadurch, dass dort von מפתה, hier von אונס die Rede ist, weshalb denn auch, wie bei מוציא שם רע die erschwerende Folge eintritt: לו תהיה לאשה וגו׳ לא יוכל שלחה כל ימיו. Bei מוציא שם רע heißt es: לא יוכל לשלחה, hier לא יוכל שלחה. Dort hatte er bis jetzt die Befugnis der Scheidung, hier wird ihm von vornherein, indem sie seine Frau wird, die Befugnis versagt, vielleicht motiviert dies die Ausdrucksnuance.

כי ימצא איש נער בתולה, “if a man finds a young girl who is a virgin, etc.;” this paragraph is added at this point as other laws concerning virgins preceded it.

לא יוכל שלחה, “he is not permitted to divorce her;” he cannot do so even if she was blind or lame. (Talmud tractate Ketuvot folio 39)

The same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we should let the mother fly away when we take the young. The eggs over which the bird sits, and the young that are in need of their mother, are generally unfit for food, and when the mother is sent away she does not see the taking of her young ones, and does not feel any pain. In most cases, however, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest untouched, because [the young or the eggs], which he is allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food.