Kommentar zu Wajikra 17:10

כל דם [WHATSOEVER MAN THERE BE … THAT EATETH] ANY BLOOD — Since Scripture states (v. 11) “[for it is the blood] with the life that maketh expiation", I might think that one is liable only for eating the blood of consecrated animals, (i. e. sacrifices), for it is only the blood of such animals that makes expiation. Scripture therefore states here “[Whatsoever man there be … that eateth] any blood [I will cut him off from among his people]" (Sifra, Acharei Mot, Section 7 3).

ואיש איש מבית ישראל אשר יאכל, "And any person from the house of Israel who will eat, etc." Torat Kohanim explains the repetition of the word איש in these words: "The word ישראל refers to the Israelites; the word גר refers to a proselyte; the letter ה before the word גר refers to the wife of the proselyte; the word בתוכם refers to women and slaves. In view of this, why did the Torah have to repeat the word איש? Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon answers that it is meant to include a baby of a Jewish mother fathered by a stranger or a slave." We need to know why the Torah had to write so many words to include all these details just as the Baraitha in Sukkah 28 asked concerning the word האזרח including the wives, etc. In that instance we find the following discussion [concerning who has to observe the commandment of fasting on the Day of Atonement, (Leviticus 23,27) a positive commandment applicable only at a certain time, something not normally applicable to women, Ed.]. "Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav that the Torah compared men and women as being equal when it comes to the penalties for violations of Torah laws. As a result, the question arises why the Torah had to write words such as האזרח to restrict the law to adult males, or the words איש או אשה in Numbers 5,6 where clearly we speak of violation of a negative commandment, something that applies to women even if the Torah did not write the word אשה?" The answer given there is that the Torah included the application of the law even to the additional time before nightfall. Without the extra word I might have assumed that seeing neither men nor women are culpable for failure to observe that part of the fast, women would not even be obligated to observe it; therefore the Torah had to write a word indicating that observance is obligatory for women also. Using the approach underlying the discussion in the Talmud, we are entitled to ask here also why the Torah needed to write anything to include women? Who would have thought that women are relieved of the prohibition to eat blood? It is a negative commandment and it goes without saying that women are culpable if they violate it! Besides, why would we have made a difference between a baby born by a proselyte and one born by a natural-born Jewess that the Torah had to write something special to include such a woman? Furthermore, whom did the author of Torat Kohanim refer to when he spoke about a baby fathered by a proselyte so that the Torah had to specifically include such a child in its legislation by writing איש איש? If such a child reverts to paganism when he grows up, clearly the legislation does not apply to him. If, on the other hand, he grows up as a Jew, why would we need a word in the Torah in order to let us know that this legislation applies to him? In view of the fact that Torat Kohanim describes the child as an Israelite, it is clear that the assumption is that the child remained Jewish willingly. There is no reason why he should be inferior to a proselyte who was not even born as a Jew!

The verse says: Any blood. Re’m writes: You might ask, why do we need “any” to include not eating the blood of unconsecrated animals? Derive this from the verse in parshas Re’ey, “However, you may not eat the blood; on the earth are you to spill it like water,” where Chazal expound that even where there is no throwing [of blood] on the altar, there is a negative commandment [against eating blood]. He answers: It is written in both places [even though once would have been enough], similar to what the Gemara (Pesachim 28b) says regarding the obligation to eat matzoh nowadays [when there is no Pesach sacrifice]. (Nachalas Yaakov) With all due respect, it seems that Re’m fails to distinguish between the expression חייב(liable), which means [to the punishment of] excision, and the expression “do not eat,” which is [in violation of] a negative commandment. This difference is obvious. Re’m forgot what Chazal said in the first chapter of Kerisus (4a): Rava said, “The three excisions regarding blood, are for what [reason]...” See there.

אשר יאכל כל דם, “who eat any blood;” the Torah has repeated its warning not to eat blood on many occasions as it is something that will be absorbed by our tissues whereas fat and tendons are not so absorbed.

ונתתי פני I WILL SET פני [AGAINST THAT SOUL] — ‎פני is taken to mean as much as פנאי שלי My leisure — i.e. I will turn away (פונה) from all My affairs and concern Myself only with him (Sifra, Acharei Mot, Section 7 4; cf. also Targum Jonathan)

I will turn from all My [other] concerns. [Rashi says that פני means “free time” and not Hashem’s “face”], because wherever the Torah speaks of Hashem directing his face it is for good, and here it is for bad [Re’m]. It seems to me that Rashi is answering the question of how can [the expression] “I shall direct” apply to anger? It should have said would be “rest” or “set down.” Therefore he explains, “I will turn away etc. and concern Myself with him” to give him according to the fruit of his deeds. This is easy to understand. (R. Yaakov Taryosh)

The author of Korban Aharon writes that the correct wording in the Baraitha quoting Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon should be: מן הגוי ומן העבד. The lesson would be that although the father of such a child is or was a pagan or a slave who had not been forbidden to eat blood, the child is forbidden to eat blood as he is considered part of the people his mother belongs to. The child of any union between a male Gentile and female Jewess is considered Jewish as we know from Yevamot 23, where the Talmud bases this on Deut. 7,3-4 the word בנך referring to a grandchild whose father was a Gentile. Thus far Korban Aharon. I find it difficult to accept a distinction between the son of such a mixed union who has decided to opt out of Judaism and one who has not. Once the Torah designated such a son as Jewish he is Jewish in the full sense of the word. If the Torah spoke of a son who did not want to remain Jewish, he has thrown off all of Torah! The Torah certainly does not address such a person! If we are able to impose Torah law on such a youngster we are obligated to do so just as we do with any natural-born Israelite who defies Torah law. If he is not under our control, what point is there in the Torah writing laws concerning such a person?

I believe that in order to understand what motivated the comments of Torat Kohanim and Korban Aharon it would help if we first examined the reason underlying the prohibition to eat blood which is the subject of our paragraph. Our sages have enlightened us in describing the souls of all Israelites as of a quality which is unmatched, when they interpreted Deut. 32,9 כי חלק ה׳ עמו, to mean that "His people are part of G'd Himself." They also added that although we live our lives in the "lower" world, physically distant from the "higher" celestial regions, we nonetheless retain a חוט של חסד, an umbilical cord of love which ties us to the celestial regions as demonstrated by the words יעקב חבל נחלתו, that "Jacob is the "rope" of His inheritance" (ibid.). The "soul" of an animal, on the other hand, is rooted in the "lower" world. It is related only to the spiritual forces of the lowest order, the קליפת נוגה. Whenever man -knowing it is forbidden-consumes the life-blood of an animal i.e. blood whose loss would result in the death of that animal (as opposed to blood of the capillaries), such eating is punishable by כרת, the premature death and/or extinction of the Jew eating such blood. The reason is very simple. By eating such blood and absorbing a lower category of animal soul thus diluting the "higher" soul G'd has equipped him with, one demonstrates his contempt for higher spiritual values, denying his דבקות, attachment, to one's celestial origin. The Torah writes: "I will set My face against the person (soul) who eats the blood and will cut him off from amongst his people." The Torah refers to what we have called the חוט החסד, the "thread (or rope) of love" which connects the Jewish soul to its celestial origin. All Jewish souls have a common celestial origin near the throne of G'd; this is why the Torah spoke of מקרב עמה, "from the midst of his people."

Furthermore, it is a well known fact that though the Jewish people share a common root, they are different individually in their relative spiritual levels. This is the mystical dimension of Kohelet 5,7: כי גבוה מעל גבוה שומר וגבוהים עליהם, "for there is One higher than the high Who watches and there are high ones above them." Seeing this is so, one might reason that in view of the fact that this animal which is ritually fit to be eaten cannot therefore have a ritually impure "soul," (life-force) and that imbibing its soul could not be damaging to our souls. I would have reasoned that if consumption of blood is capable of contaminating Jewish souls at all, it can have such an effect only on the most superior of souls, i.e. that of the males. It would follow that the penalty decreed by the Torah is restricted to Jewish males. This is why the Torah had to write words which make it plain that women are no less culpable for infraction of this prohibition than are men. Once the Torah had to write words or letters to include people whom we would not normally have included in that legislation, it had to spell out all the ones included or I would have reasoned that the respective inclusion applied only to the particular "lower" category of person singled out by special reference. The Torah therefore had to demonstrate that though Jewish souls are not all of the same calibre, all are holy enough to jeopardise their holiness if the bodies they inhabit consume animal blood.

You may also choose to pursue a different approach to our problem. You may argue that consumption of animal blood, i.e. the "soul" of such an animal could prove damaging only to the lowest categories of Jewish souls, and that therefore only those kinds of Jews should be prohibited from eating animal blood. A superior soul would be able to resist the subversive influence of such an animal's "soul" although it might not be totally immune to it. Such potential damage would certainly not be sufficient to rate the harsh כרת penalty. The Torah therefore carefully phrased the legislation in such a way that we cannot arrive at such faulty conclusions. By writing a series of expressions each one designed to include more and more categories of people in this legislation the Torah makes it clear that it applies to both people equipped with superior souls and those whose souls are on a lower level.

Here is a list of different levels of sanctity. The highest level belongs to the Israelite males; the second highest level belongs to their wives seeing that a female soul is not on the same level of spirituality as is that of a male; the next lower level is the son of a union between a natural born Jewish father and a proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the son of a proselyte married to a natural-born Jewish woman. Next in line is the female proselyte, daughter of either of the two last mentioned unions. Below this is the son of a union between a male proselyte and a female proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the daughter born from a union between a male and a female proselyte. Finally, there is the level of the proselyte himself. All of the above-mentioned levels are alluded to in the Torah at some point or other. The first and highest category of sanctity from birth is spelled out in the Baraitha of Torat Kohanim when they interpret the word ישראל in our verse as a reference to a male, natural-born, Israelite. Proselytes are mentioned twice in that paragraph when the words הגר הגר are understood as referring to two separate types of proselytes. You will also find that in Sukkah 28 they interpret the letter ה of the word האזרח as including the wives of the proselytes. This teaches us that the letter ה in the word הגר is to be understood as a רבוי, an additional dimension of the word גר. This means that the words הגר הגר in our verse really include four different kinds of combinations of proselytes. You therefore have a total of 4 extra words or letters each including additional categories of proselytes. Perhaps the wording of the author of our paragraph in Torat Kohanim who wrote גר אלו גרים, instead of זה גר as we would have expected, reflects that what he had in mind are two different categories of proselytes as opposed to a multiplicity of proselytes all of the same category, whereas the letter ה in front of the first גר refers to the wives of the proselytes. When the author of Torat Kohanim went on to write that the word בתוכם refers to the wives and slaves, he meant natural-born Jewish wives and slaves whose status in Jewish halachah is the same as that of women. Do not query the need for these people to have been especially included in the legislation seeing we could have included them by applying a קל וחומר from the application of the legislation to proselytes, i.e. if even proselytes are included what possible reason could there be for not including natural-born Jewish women? After all, natural-born Jewish women possess souls that are intrinsically less holy than those of their husbands, and if so what need was there for the Torah to mention them as being included in the group of people to whom the כרת penalty applies if even their husbands are so vulnerable that they are liable to the כרת penalty if they eat blood? Remember that if it had not been for the inclusive word בתוכם which we used to include women in the prohibition to eat blood and the resultant penalty, we would not have used the letter ה in the word הגר to include two categories of proselytes as we have described. Altogether we are faced with six different "inclusive" words or letters. The Torah wrote איש איש i.e. 2 more "inclusive" words which the author of Torat Kohanim uses to include the child born of an Israelite woman from a union with either a proselyte of a slave i.e. a child containing Jewish seed albeit seed from a Jew who was not a natural-born Jew. This is why the Torah wrote the additional words מן הגר, "originating in a proselyte." The intention of the verse was to refer to a proselyte who had married a natural-born Jewess or vice versa. These last named two categories are derived from the words איש איש.

Do not raise the objection that there was no need to write extra words or letters to include all these different levels of proselytes and the offspring of their unions seeing that even a total proselyte, i.e. one in whose veins not a drop of "Jewish" blood flows is subject to this legislation? If it had not been for the extra word איש which tells us that the proselytes mentioned in this verse were second generation proselytes, i.e. those whose father or mother or both had already been Jewish at the time they were conceived, I would not have known all this. Having written the extra word איש enabled the Torah to describe that there are different levels of proselytes, the most spiritually endowed being the ones in whose veins there flows some blood of a natural-born Jew. These are followed by the proselytes in which no such blood of natural-born Jews flows at all. You may ask whence do we know that a female child whose father was a proselyte and whose mother was a natural-born Jewess is subject to this legislation? Answer: if even a proselyte in whose veins no Jewish blood flows at all is included in the above legislation there was no need to add further רבויים, letters of an inclusive nature, to add such people to the groups of people covered by our verse.

בנפש האכלת, against the person (soul) eating, etc. Torat Kohanim understands the word בנפש in the singular as teaching that G'd does not punish a community who collectively consume blood with the כרת penalty, as the sin does not have the power to destroy the holiness of a group of people.

מקרב עמה, from amongst his people. According to Torat Kohanim the purpose is ועמה שלום, "and his people will be at peace." I am not sure what this is supposed to mean. If the people are guilty of that penalty because they are each responsible for the proper conduct of a fellow Jew, why should they not be punished? If, on the other hand, the Torah does not speak of people whose culpability originates in the הלכה of ערב, i.e. that each Jew is a sort of guarantor vis-a vis-G'd of a fellow Jew's behaviour, such as in instances when the sin was committed accidentally or unbeknown to the fellow Jew, why would the Torah have to even hint that such people are free from this penalty or any penalty at all? I believe that what Torat Kohanim had in mind was that when you cut off diseased branches from a tree you thereby improve what remains of the tree. The words מקרב עמה, from the midst of his people, mean that G'd decided to cut off this branch in order for the diseased branch not to infect the rest of the tree so that the tree itself remains healthy, שלם.