Halakhah zu Dewarim 24:78

And now I shall begin, with the help of the Blessed L–rd to explain how many positive commandments one transgresses in speaking lashon hara and rechiluth, as we projected above.
One who bears tales against his friend, aside from transgressing the negative commandments we mentioned above, also transgresses several positive commandments, which I shall explain, with the help of the Blessed One, one by one.
(1) He transgresses thereby (Devarim 24:9): "Remember what the L–rd your G–d did to Miriam on the way when you went out of Egypt." The Torah exhorted us hereby that we mention verbally, always, the great punishment [leprosy] that the Blessed L–rd brought upon the tzadeketh, Miriam the prophetess — who spoke only about her brother, whom she loved as her soul, whom she raised on her knees, and for whom she endangered her life, to rescue him from the Nile. And she did not speak in denigration of him, but only compared him to other prophets. And she did not speak so to his face to shame him, and not in public, but only to her brother Aaron, privately. And he [Moses] was not offended by all this, viz. (Bamidbar 12:3): "And the man Moses was extremely humble, more than any man on the face of the earth" — in spite of which all her good deeds did not avail her and she was punished with leprosy for this. How much more so will other people, the fools, who are prolix in speaking "great and awesome things" against their friends, be severely punished for this.

3) And the speaker also transgresses (Devarim 24:8): "Be heedful of the plague-spot of leprosy to take great care," which Sifra (1:3) interprets as [Take great care] not to forget to be heedful of lashon hara so that leprosy not come upon you [as it came upon Miriam for speaking lashon hara against Moses].

The marriage bond, in particular, must remain inviolate if legitimacy of birth is to be preserved and the continued manifestation of the Divine Presence to be assured. A marriage can be terminated only by death or by means of a get, a properly executed bill of divorce. This realm of Halakhah is singled out for the most stringent safeguards. Lest the ignorant wreak untold havoc, the Sages admonish that one who is not proficient in the laws of marriage and divorce should have no traffic with the performance of marriage or, most emphatically, with the execution of a bill of divorce. The bill of divorce must be drawn up by the husband, or his proxy, and delivered to the wife (Deut. 24:1). Jewish law is quite specific with regard to the formula to be employed in this instrument and with regard to its mode of execution. A woman who remarries without benefit of a get (religious divorce) is guilty of adultery. Children born of such a union bear the stigma of bastardy,

Sometimes the reasons for commandments are similar to negative commandments and are thought of as being included in that which should be counted by itself. And this is like its stating, "Then the first husband who sent her away shall not take her to wife again [...] you must not bring sin upon the land" (Deuteronomy 24:4): Its stating, "you must not bring sin upon the land," is the reason for the prohibition that preceded it. It is as if it is saying that if you do this, you will cause great loss to the land. An it is [also] like its stating, "Do not profane your daughter and make her a harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry" (Leviticus 19:29). For its stating, "lest the land fall into harlotry," is the reason. It as if it said that the reason of this prohibition is so that "the land not fall into harlotry." And so too, its stating, "you shall not make yourselves unclean therewith and become unclean with them" (Leviticus 11:43): After mentioning the prohibition of the various species that are forbidden to eat, it gave a reason for this and said, "you shall not make yourselves unclean" by eating them. It is as if it is saying that which caused this to be prohibited is the making of oneself impure. And to explain that which He, may He be blessed, said after He prefaced not taking ransom from a murderer, "You shall not defile the land" (Numbers 35:34) - they said in the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 160:13), "The verse is telling us that spilling blood defiles the land." Hence behold it is clear that this negative statement is the reason for the previous negative commandment, not something else. And likewise regarding that which is stated, "He shall not go outside the sanctuary and not profane" (Leviticus 21:12) - if he does go outside, he profanes. And someone besides us already erred about this principle as well, and counted all of these [as] negative commandments, without observation. However whoever counted them will be embarrassed when they ask him and say, "What thing does this negative commandment prohibit?" And he will not have anything to answer at all. So through this, it becomes clear that it is not be counted. And this is what we intended to clarify about this principle.

However, regarding the matter of lashes, there is a difference between [the examples]. As all those [simply] specified in one negative commandment only receive one [set of] lashes - for example, "the wage of a harlot and the price of a dog"(Deuteronomy 23:19); and "leaven and [...] honey" (Leviticus 2:11); "the case of a stranger [or] an orphan" (Deuteronomy 24:17), and all that is similar to them. But the negative commandments that [also] have a general category and are specified at the beginning or end [of the category] - for example, this negative commandment that specified "uncooked and boiled" and is [then] generalized, "Do not eat [...] but only roasted with fire"; and so [too], with a nazerite (Numbers 6:4), "from anything that is obtained from the grapevine [...] may he not eat," and afterwards it specifies, "seeds [...] or skin," ('and grapes wet and dry,' Numbers 6:3) - with these and those similar to them, we give lashes for each and every one. [This is] because the inclusion of the specification that was not needed, indicates lashes for each one [of them], as we have said. And the teacher was prolific in his proofs about this in the ninth shoresh in his Book of the Commandments - that the calculation of commandments is not the same as the calculation of [which commandments require] lashes [independently]. And that which I have said that Ramban, may his memory be blessed, will count each of the ones specified by their names individually - each one by itself - only when they are separate in their content, as we have written; [it] is, for example, [in the case of] 'leaven and honey,' [and] 'the wage and the price.' But in a case where it is the same content - even if they are specified by different names - they are only counted as one commandment. For example, "All male first-borns that are born in your herd and in your flock" (Deuteronomy 15:19) is only one commandment to sanctify all of the first-borns; and the specification is [also] only one commandment. And so [too], "All tithes of the herd or flock" (Leviticus 27:32) is only one commandment to separate to give the tithes of these animals. And so [too], "Judges and officers" (Deuteronomy 16:18) is only that we should establish justice through these people and it is one commandment. And so [too], "An honest balance, honest weights, an honest ephah, and an honest hin" (Leviticus 19:36) is all one commandment, that we should not lie about measures.

Behold it is already been completely explained that it is inappropriate to count every negative or positive commandment that is found in the Torah, for it [may be] a repetition. Indeed it is appropriate to count [only] the content that we are commanded about or prohibited from. And it is impossible to have knowledge of a repeated negative or positive commandment that is coming to give additional content, without a teacher that instructs it. And [these teachers] are those that received the traditional explanation, peace be upon them. And do not err also because the prohibition is repeated with different words - like His, may He be exalted, saying (Leviticus 19:10), "You shall not pick (teollel) your vineyard bare," once He also said (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it," and He said (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not extract (tefaer) again." For these are not two negative commandments, but rather one prohibition about one matter - and that is that he not take that which he overlooked from the grain or the fruits when he gathers them. And He brought two examples about them - from grapes and from olives. And He called what is left of the grapes ollelot; and of the olives, "pe'erot. And the understanding of tefaer is do not remove that which you have overlooked in some of your pe'erot - and those are the branches. (See the glosses on this book.) And to this principle, it is appropriate to attach that which I will [now] say. And that is that when I say that it is appropriate that they count the content about which we are commanded or from which we are prohibited, it is on condition that the content that we are prohibited is a separate negative commandment for each and every matter; or that the transmitters [present] a proof that separates one matter from another and that each of them requires [its own] prohibition. However when there is one negative commandment that includes many matters, only that negative commandment is counted, and not all of the content that is included in that negative commandment. And this is a general prohibition, for which we do not give lashes - as we will now explain. And that is that they said (Sanhedrin 63a) in explanation of His saying, "You shall not eat upon the blood" (Leviticus 19:26), "From where [do we know] that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? As it is stated, 'You shall not eat upon the blood.' Another matter: From where is it derived that one who eats the meat of an offering before the blood has been sprinkled [on the altar] is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? We learn to say,'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you shall not eat the meat when the blood is still in the bowl. Rabbi Dosa says, 'From where [do we know] that we do not provide a meal for mourners of those executed by the court? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Akiva says, 'From where [do we know] that a Sanhedrin that killed a soul (i.e., that sentenced a person to death) may not taste anything that entire day? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Yochanan says, 'From where [do we know] the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."'" Behold that we are prohibited from all of these five things, but they they are all included under one negative commandment. And they also said (Berakhot 10b), "From where [do we know] that a person should not taste anything until he prays? We learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you may not eat before you pray for your blood." And in explanation, they said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 63a), "For all of [these specific prohibitions], he is not given lashes - as it is a general negative commandment." And they also explained that a general negative commandment is when two or three prohibitions come from one negative commandment. So it is inappropriate that they should count each and every prohibition it included as a separate negative commandment; but rather only the one negative commandment that includes all of them. And similar to this negative commandment - meaning, "You shall not eat upon the blood," - is His saying, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). As it also includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). And likewise, His saying, "You must not carry a false rumor" (Exodus 23:1) - behold, it too includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 281). And this is one of the types of general negative commandments.

Behold it is already been completely explained that it is inappropriate to count every negative or positive commandment that is found in the Torah, for it [may be] a repetition. Indeed it is appropriate to count [only] the content that we are commanded about or prohibited from. And it is impossible to have knowledge of a repeated negative or positive commandment that is coming to give additional content, without a teacher that instructs it. And [these teachers] are those that received the traditional explanation, peace be upon them. And do not err also because the prohibition is repeated with different words - like His, may He be exalted, saying (Leviticus 19:10), "You shall not pick (teollel) your vineyard bare," once He also said (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it," and He said (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not extract (tefaer) again." For these are not two negative commandments, but rather one prohibition about one matter - and that is that he not take that which he overlooked from the grain or the fruits when he gathers them. And He brought two examples about them - from grapes and from olives. And He called what is left of the grapes ollelot; and of the olives, "pe'erot. And the understanding of tefaer is do not remove that which you have overlooked in some of your pe'erot - and those are the branches. (See the glosses on this book.) And to this principle, it is appropriate to attach that which I will [now] say. And that is that when I say that it is appropriate that they count the content about which we are commanded or from which we are prohibited, it is on condition that the content that we are prohibited is a separate negative commandment for each and every matter; or that the transmitters [present] a proof that separates one matter from another and that each of them requires [its own] prohibition. However when there is one negative commandment that includes many matters, only that negative commandment is counted, and not all of the content that is included in that negative commandment. And this is a general prohibition, for which we do not give lashes - as we will now explain. And that is that they said (Sanhedrin 63a) in explanation of His saying, "You shall not eat upon the blood" (Leviticus 19:26), "From where [do we know] that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? As it is stated, 'You shall not eat upon the blood.' Another matter: From where is it derived that one who eats the meat of an offering before the blood has been sprinkled [on the altar] is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? We learn to say,'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you shall not eat the meat when the blood is still in the bowl. Rabbi Dosa says, 'From where [do we know] that we do not provide a meal for mourners of those executed by the court? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Akiva says, 'From where [do we know] that a Sanhedrin that killed a soul (i.e., that sentenced a person to death) may not taste anything that entire day? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Yochanan says, 'From where [do we know] the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."'" Behold that we are prohibited from all of these five things, but they they are all included under one negative commandment. And they also said (Berakhot 10b), "From where [do we know] that a person should not taste anything until he prays? We learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you may not eat before you pray for your blood." And in explanation, they said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 63a), "For all of [these specific prohibitions], he is not given lashes - as it is a general negative commandment." And they also explained that a general negative commandment is when two or three prohibitions come from one negative commandment. So it is inappropriate that they should count each and every prohibition it included as a separate negative commandment; but rather only the one negative commandment that includes all of them. And similar to this negative commandment - meaning, "You shall not eat upon the blood," - is His saying, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). As it also includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). And likewise, His saying, "You must not carry a false rumor" (Exodus 23:1) - behold, it too includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 281). And this is one of the types of general negative commandments.

And after it has been explained that His saying, "Do not eat any of it raw or boiled" is [only] one commandment; and likewise all of the negative commandments that arise from the prohibition for the nazirite of all that comes out from the vine are one commandment, since they are all details, as is explained in the Gemara; and they likewise said that, "any leaven and any honey," is one commandment - we should also count, "No Ammonite or Moabite shall be admitted" (Deuteronomy 23:4), as one commandment. And likewise, His saying, "You shall not ill-treat any widow or orphan" (Exodus 22:21). And likewise, His saying, "You shall not subvert the rights of the stranger or the orphan" (Deuteronomy 24:17). And likewise, His saying, "he may not diminish her food, her clothing or her conjugal rights" (Exodus 21:10). Each of these negative commandments is one commandment. This means to say that each of these is exactly like, "Do not eat any of it raw or boiled in any way," and like, "for no leaven or honey may be turned into smoke as an offering." There is no difference between them. And likewise, His saying, "You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the sale revenue of a dog" (Deuteronomy 23:19), is one commandment. And likewise, His saying, "Drink no wine or other intoxicant, etc. And to differentiate [...] And to instruct" (Leviticus 9-11). That is to say, with one negative commandment did He prohibit [a priest] to enter the Sanctuary or to give instruction while drunk. And that is one of the divisions of the second type of general negative commandments. And the second division is [made up of cases with] words exactly like those of the previous division. However [in such cases], it is the traditionally received explanation that we give separate lashes for each and every one of those connected matters. And that is that when he does them all - even at one time - he is given lashes for each and every one as a distinct prohibition. Of this type is His saying, "You may not eat within your gates of the tithes of your new grain or your wine or your oil" (Deuteronomy 12:17). They said in Keritot (Keritot 4b), "[If one] ate the tithe of grain, wine, and oil (outside Jerusalem), he is liable [separately] for each and every one." And they raised a difficulty and said, "But is one given lashes for a general negative commandment?" And the answer was, "The verse is written superfluously. How is this? It is written, 'And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place where He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, etc.' (Deuteronomy 14:23); why did He need to come back and write, 'You may not eat within your gates?' And if you shall say that it is to [make it into a full-fledged] negative commandment - if so, let the verse say, 'You may not eat them within your gates.' Why did the verse need to go back and write all of them ('your new grain or your wine or your oil')? We hear from this, that it is to separate [it into three distinct commandments]." And there, after give and take, it is clarified that it was not necessary for Him to say, "and parched grain" (Leviticus 23:14), such that it was truly mentioned to separate - that one would be liable for parched grain on its own. And in the Talmud, they asked by way of rejection, "Maybe one is separately liable to receive lashes for parched grain" - for it is truly mentioned for this - "whereas for bread and fresh stalks, one is [only] liable for one [set of] lashes?" So they answered, "For what law did the Merciful One write, 'parched grain,' in between [the others]? To tell you that one who eats bread, parched grain and fresh stalks is liable for each and every one [individually]."

The Gemara seeks to discover a concrete halakhic application, as distinct from a purely semantic difference, of the issue that divides the Sages and R. Judah. A practical difference arising from their controversy is found by the Gemara in the application of a general principle that provides that a person engaged in performance of a mizvah is exempt from the fulfillment of other commandments. R. Judah considers the waging of preemptive war to constitute fulfillment of a mizvah; hence, according to R. Judah, combatants are exempt from fulfilling other commandments while engaged in military duties associated with preemptive war. The Sages regard such incursions as discretionary in nature and hence regard soldiers engaged in such battles as being fully obligated with regard to the fulfillment of other commandments.³The text of the Gemara reads as follows:
The Gemara does not tell us explicitly whether it is R. Judah or the Sages who consider war “to diminish the heathens” to constitute a commanded war. Rashi and Rambam, in their respective commentaries, explain that R. Judah deems such war to be commanded while the Sages consider such war to be discretionary. (The interpretation of these authorities have been followed in the parenthetical interpretations within the translation above.) Indeed, Rashi’s interpretation is taken directly from the words of R. Yoḥanan: [A war which is designated] as permitted by the Sages is identical with [war which is designated as] commanded by R. Judah, i.e., there is a category of war which is deemed to be “commanded” by R. Judah while, according to the Sages, the identical war is merely “discretionary.” The war in question is then identified by Rava as war “to diminish the heathens so that they shall not march against them.” Thus there is no dispute between Rava and R. Yoḥanan; Rava merely amplifies the statement of R. Yoḥanan. According to both, the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is with regard to whether participants in a war “to diminish the heathens” are exempt from fulfillment of other precepts. All are in agreement that the provisions of Deuteronomy 20:5-8 that apply to discretionary wars apply as well to war undertaken “to diminish the heathens.”
This interpretation is contradicted by Me’iri in his commentary on Sotah 43a. Me’iri declares that it is the Sages who deem such war to be commanded while R. Judah regards it as merely “permitted.” Of course, this understanding appears to be at variance with the statement recorded by the Gemara in the name of R. Yoḥanan.
R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Hilkhot Medinah, II, sha’ar 4, chapter 1, secs. 2-3, explains that Me’iri must have posited a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava: R. Yoḥanan declares the sole controversy between the Sages and R. Judah to be entirely a matter of nomenclature having no practical application; Rava contradicts this analysis and, referring directly to the Mishnah, declares that the Sages posit a “commanded” war that is governed by the selfsame regulation that applies to obligatory wars, viz., the nonexclusion from military service of the individuals described in Deuteronomy 20. R. Judah, on the other hand, equates such war with “discretionary” wars and maintains that those persons described in Deuteronomy 20 are conscripted only in obligatory wars but not for service in wars “to diminish the heathens.” The phraseology employed by Rava, “The difference is with regard to [application of the principle that] one who is engaged in performance of a commandment is exempt from the performance of [another] commandment” is understood by Me’iri as referring to exemption from an obligation associated with warfare itself, i.e., the obligation devolving upon those described in Deuteronomy 20 to recuse themselves from battle. That obligation is variously regarded as based upon the words expressed repeatedly in Deuteronomy 20 “let him go and return to his house” or the verse “he shall be free for his house one year” (Deuteronomy 24:5). See Rashi, Deuteronomy 20:7, Sotah 43a, and Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 7:10. The Sages regard participation in war “to diminish the heathens” as a miẓvah and hence incumbent upon even those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20. Since participation in a war “to diminish the heathens” constitutes a miẓvah, such participation serves to exempt those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20 from the commandment to remove themselves from the battle arena.
[The Tosefta, Sotah 7:15, as apparently understood by Rashi, Deuteronomy 20:7, and Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 7:11, maintains that those exempt from conscription in milḥamot reshut may not serve even on a voluntary basis. See also the discussion in Sotah 44a concerning a prohibition against a bridegroom’s participation in battle. Rabbi Waldenberg’s analysis of Me’iri is apparently predicated upon this premise. One difficulty with this explanation lies in the fact that Rambam, on the basis of Sotah 44a, maintains that military service by such individuals involves, not a simple violation of a positive commandment, but transgression of two negative commandments, viz., “When a man takes a wife he shall not go out in the army, nor shall he be charged with any matter” (Deuteronomy 24:5). The principle that one engaged in fulfillment of a miẓvah is exempt from fulfillment of other precepts applies only to positive commandments but does not permit violation of negative precepts. (The usual explanation of why the exclusions from military service found in Deuteronomy 20 do not apply to commanded or obligatory wars is based upon rabbinic exegesis of the prefatory phrase in that section. “Ki teẓei la-milḥamah” is understood as meaning “If you go forth to war” rather than “When you go forth to war.” The reference must then be to discretionary war since commanded war cannot be described in hypothetical terms.)
See also Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 581, who apparently maintains that the exclusion of those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20 means simply that they cannot be compelled to perform military service but does not forbid voluntary enlistment. If so, the phrase “let him go and return to his house” cannot be understood as a miẓvah. However, Rava’s comment may be understood in an alternative manner. It may be understood to mean that the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is also with regard to application of the principle that one who is engaged in fulfillment of a commandment is exempt from the fulfillment of another commandment. It would be regarded as self-understood that exemption or non-exemption from participation in a war “to diminish the heathens” flows from its categorization as miẓvah or reshut. See Knesset ha-Gedolah, Hilkhot Melakhim, chapter 5, appended to Knesset ha-Gedolah, vol. IV.]
Rabbi Waldenberg finds support for Me’iri’s interpretation in the parallel discussion found in the Palestinian Talmud that reports that R. Yoḥanan declared that the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is entirely one of nomenclature, while R. Ḥisda declared that there is a substantive dispute between them. The identical controversy, according to this analysis, is posited by the Babylonian Talmud as a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava.
This analysis of Me’iri’s comments yields a conclusion of crucial halakhic import. In this controversy the normative halakhah is decided in accordance with the majority position, i.e., that of the Sages. According to the interpretation of Me’iri, the Sages maintain that war to diminish the heathens is a milḥemet miẓvah rather than a milḥemet reshut.
It should, however, be noted that there is a distinct possibility that the text of the Me’iri’s commentary contains a scribal error and that Me’iri actually wrote that war “to diminish the heathens” is a milḥemet miẓvah according to R. Judah but a milḥemet reshut for the Sages. In citing the text of Me’iri’s remarks, R. Shlomoh Yosef Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah (Tel Aviv, 5717), p. 13, makes precisely this correction without further comment.
Knesset ha-Gedolah, IV, Hilkhot Melakhim, chapter 5, similarly explains that there is a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava. According to Knesset ha-Gedolah, Rava declares that both the Sages and R. Judah maintain that war “to diminish the heathens” is a milḥemet miẓvah in the sense that the exemptions recorded in Deuteronomy 20 do not apply in the conduct of such warfare. The sole dispute is whether combatants engaged in such warfare are exempt from fulfilling other precepts. According to the Sages they are exempt while according to R. Judah they are not exempt. For that reason R. Judah terms such war milḥemet reshut, i.e., participants are not viewed as engaged in an activity exempting them from fulfillment of other precepts. It is the view of Knesset ha-Gedolah that Rambam rules in accordance with the opinion of the Sages and includes preemptive war in the category of war “to deliver Israel from an enemy” which is classified by Rambam as a milḥemet miẓvah. This interpretation of Rambam is, however, contradicted by Rambam’s own comments in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah, 8:7; see below, note 14.

These authorities explain that Halachah views a woman who marries as moving to a new community — her husband’s home. Rav Moshe cites a number of biblical verses that demonstrate that the Torah views marriage as a woman moving into her husband’s home. For example, the Torah (Devarim 24:1), in describing the procedure for a divorce, states that the husband “shall send her from his home.” We see that the Torah considers a wife to be in her husband’s domain during the marriage. Accordingly, the wife must accept the customs of her husband’s family. Rav Ovadia and Rav Felder also cite the Tashbeitz as a precedent for their ruling.

The textual locus of the primary objection—and ostensibly of the proposal itself—is the statement of the Gemara, Gittin 19a, presented in the context of procedures to be employed in drafting of a bill of divorce: "Witnesses who do not know how to sign, we tear a blank paper on their behalf and they fill the torn spaces with ink." Deuteronomy 24:1 provides that a husband desirous of divorcing his wife must "write her a bill of divorcement." The Gemara, Gittin 19a, cites a beraita containing two opinions with regard to the procedure to be followed in situations in which the witnesses do not know how to affix their signatures. One opinion rules that a non-durable substance should be employed to outline the letters of their signatures. The witnesses, using those letters as guidelines, should write their names over that substance with ink. The second opinion maintains that "we tear a blank piece of paper on their behalf and they fill in the torn spaces with ink."

An intriguing and unprecedented argument forbidding the woman to remarry was forwarded by R. Mordecai Jaffe, the author of the Levush. Scripture states, "and if it come to pass that she does not find favor in his eyes … and he should write her a bill of divorce and give it into her hand and send her out of his house. And she shall go out of his house and became a wife to another man …" (Deut. 24:1–2). R. Mordecai Jaffe contended that a woman may "become a wife of another man" only if she has been divorced by her husband because "she does not find favor in his eyes." A bill of divorce whose presentation is not motivated by a loss of "favor" but by other considerations—a "divorce of love" is the term coined by R. Mordecai Jaffe—is not effective as an instrument empowering marriage to another.

Rabbi Gross suggests that the concept formulated by Ritva and Rabbenu Crescas is rooted in a discussion of the Palestinian Talmud, Gittin 2:3 and Shabbat 12:4. Citing the verse "and he shall write her a bill of divorcement" (Deuteronomy 24:1) the Palestinian Talmud declares: " 'He shall write,' but not gouge (ve-lo ha-ḥokek); 'he shall write,' but not drip (ve-lo ha-matif); 'he shall write,' but not spill (ve-lo ha-shofekh)." As an example of "but not spill," the Palestinian Talmud describes a type of "invisible ink" employed by the wise men of Medenha. The ink of antiquity included a variety of components including an apparently colorless substance known as mei afazim. That ingredient used in isolation was the invisible ink of the "wise men of Medenha." The recipient of a seemingly blank piece of paper would make the writing appear by pouring a specially prepared ink lacking mei afazim over the paper. Upon coming into contact with the mei afazim already imbedded in the paper, the letters originally formed by the invisible mei afazim became clearly legible.

King David was now apprised of the transgression for which his people were punished. He sought to make amends and called the Gibeonites and asked of them, "What shall I do for you and wherewith shall I make atonement, that you may bless the inheritance of the Lord?" (II Samuel 21:2). The Gibeonites declined to accept gold or silver in expiation for Saul's transgression or as compensation for the harm and grief that they had suffered. But Saul was no longer alive and could not be punished. Instead they demanded, "… let seven men of his sons be delivered unto us and we will hang them up unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord" (II Samuel 21:6). David's response was immediate and forthright: "and the king said, 'I will deliver them' " (II Samuel 21:6). Scripture then proceeds to describe how David caused the grandchildren of Saul to pass before the urim ve-tumim and how he delivered to the Gibeonites the seven individuals selected by the urim ve-tumim. Assuredly, King David would not have acceded to the demands of the Gibeonites had there not been a clear indication of divine approval. Nevertheless, the Gemara questions the inherent propriety of such a course of action. "Fathers shall not be put to death for children, neither shall children be put to death for fathers" (Deuteronomy 24:16). The Gemara answers, "Rabbi Hiya the son of Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, 'Better that a letter be eradicated from the Torah than that the Divine Name be publicly profaned.' " Rashi, commenting upon the nature of the ḥillul ha-Shem (profanation of the Divine Name) which David sought to avert, explains that failure to exact punishment for the death of the Gibeonites would, in and of itself, constitute profanation of the Divine Name in the eyes of the world. Gentile nations would conclude that the Jewish people had acted unjustly in allowing strangers to be deprived of their livelihood without in any way avenging the evildoers.

If a rumor spread that she was married to s0-and-so, and another man came forth and betrothed her in front of court, we examine the circumstances of the rumored betrothal. If definite eyewitnesses testified that she is betrothed to the first man, the second betrothal is null. If not, the first man whose betrothal was imputed by rumor grants her divorce, and the second man marries her, since his betrothal was definite. If the second man divorced her, the first man may not marry her lest people will say that he remarried his ex-wife from betrothal after she had subsequently betrothed another (which is forbidden explicitly in Deuteronomy 24:4). If the second man brought her under the chupa (i.e. completed the marriage) before she was divorced from the first man, she is forever forbidden to him (the second man), even after divorce from the first man (See supra chapter 31 se'if 4).

Professor Silberg's views are carefully analyzed and refuted by Rabbi Judah Dick in the Tishri 5732 issue of Ha-Pardes. Rabbi Dick is a member of the staff of the corporation counsel of New York City and an officer of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA). In his article, Rabbi Dick points out that Silberg's thesis contains an inherent self-contradiction. Rambam indeed maintains that cohabitation with a mamzer outside of marriage does not constitute an infraction of the prohibition against entry by a bastard into the "assembly of God." Yet it is Rambam himself, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:4, who maintains that concubinage is a royal prerogative and is forbidden to commoners. Moreover, Rabbi Dick notes that, according to Rambam, any form of sexual intercourse outside of marriage is biblically forbidden. There is some question as to whether the basis for this ban is the prohibition "There shall be no harlot among the daughters of Israel" since Leḥem Mishneh, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:4, maintains that this prohibition is limited to intercourse with a promiscuous woman who dispenses her favors indiscriminately.³Cf., however, Kesef Mishneh and Maggid Mishneh, Issurei Bi’ah 15:2. In any event, the verse "When a man takes a wife" (Deut. 24:1) is understood by Rambam, Hilkhot Ishut 1:1, as constituting a positive commandment regarding marriage and as a prohibition against fornication outside of matrimony. On the other hand, those authorities who disagree with Rambam and permit concubinage nevertheless maintain that all forms of sexual intercourse between a mamzer and a person of legitimate birth are forbidden.

It is correct that when you say "and chose us" to remember standing at Mt. Sinai , concerning 'chose us", as it is written "lest you forget the things....the day you stood before the Eternal Your God at Horeb(Deuteronomy 4:9)." And when you say, "Your great name, " remember the incident of Amalek that The Name is not whole until one wipes out the descendants of Amalek, as it is written, "Remember what Amalek did to you ..."(Deuteronomy 25:16)" And when you say, "To acknowledge You" remember that the mouth was created to acknowledge Him who is blessed and not to speak words of gossip. And remember the incident of Miriam, as it is written, "Remember what the Eternal your God did to Miriam...(Deuteronomy 24:8)" And when you say "In love" remember concerning what is written, "Remember how you provoked the Eternal your God in the wilderness (Deuteronomy 9:7)." And when you read, "And when you remember all of God's commandments", remember that Shabbat is equal to all the commandments, as it is written, " Remember the Sabbath day (Exodus 20:8)." As it is said, never forget the Sabbath day. And like Amram of blessed memory: From one Sabbath to the next Sabbath. And therefore in the Psalm of the day we read: "This is the first day of the Sabbath....." And when we say, "from the four corners of the earth," place the corners of the tallit that are upon his shoulders to fall downward. (Magen Avraham, small paragraph, Bet, and we are not concerned with this. See Pri Etz Chayim, Gate of the Recitation of the Shma, Chapter 3, and you will understand what we are not accustomed to. And be precise and find easy.)

Quite to the contrary, self-endangerment that would not be sanctioned for the purpose of preserving cultural legacies might well be regarded as legitimate if assumed for purposes of securing a livelihood. In a responsum which has become classic in the annals of rabbinic law, R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Tinyana, Yoreh De'ah, no. 10, ruled that hunting, when pursued as a sport, is forbidden because of the attendant danger but is nevertheless permitted to a person who earns his livelihood thereby "since everything which is for the purpose of one's sustenance and livelihood" is permitted by Jewish law. In support of this position, Noda bi-Yehudah cites the statement of the Gemara, Baba Mezi'a 112a, exhorting the timely payment of a laborer's wages. The Gemara cites the verse "for he setteth his soul upon it" (Deuteronomy 24:15) and comments: "Why did he go up on a ladder, hang from the tree, deliver himself to death, if not for his wages?" It is clear, asserts Noda bi-Yehudah, that the Gemara recognizes an exemption from the general prohibition against exposing oneself to danger when the danger is assumed for the sake of earning a living.

We don't write a divorce document on [something] attached, even if he gives to her the attached thing as it is, since we need "and he puts it in her hand" (Deuteronomy 24:1). And even if the witnesses signed after it was detached, and then he gives it to her, it's not a [valid] divorce document. And if he wrote it on a leaf that was planted in a flowerpot (explanation: like a half potter pot that you plant in it) that was holed, even though he gave her the entire flowerpot, it's invalid, lest it be cut off. But he [can] write it on the pottery of a flowerpot and give it to her, and provided there are witnesses of the exchange in front of us, since pottery is something that can be forged. Ram"a: The same law applies to a flowerpot that is not holed; and some say that when it's not holed we don't decree perhaps it will be cut off (you will find the two opinions explained in the Beit Yosef).

When he gives her the divorce document, he should say to her, "Behold you are divorced from me with this divorce document and permitted to [remarry] any other," or "Behold you are sent away from me." If his messenger gives it to her, he says, "Behold you are divorced from so-and-so with this divorce document, and behold you are permitted to [remarry] any other." If he says [instead], "I am not your spouse," or "I am not your husband," some say that is not a divorce, even if he discussed with her the process of the divorce, as it says (Deuteronomy 24:1, Deuteronomy 24:3) "And he sent her away", and not that he sent himself away. And some say that if he discussed the process of divorce with her, it is a divorce of doubtful [legality].

When he gives her the divorce document, he should say to her, "Behold you are divorced from me with this divorce document and permitted to [remarry] any other," or "Behold you are sent away from me." If his messenger gives it to her, he says, "Behold you are divorced from so-and-so with this divorce document, and behold you are permitted to [remarry] any other." If he says [instead], "I am not your spouse," or "I am not your husband," some say that is not a divorce, even if he discussed with her the process of the divorce, as it says (Deuteronomy 24:1, Deuteronomy 24:3) "And he sent her away", and not that he sent himself away. And some say that if he discussed the process of divorce with her, it is a divorce of doubtful [legality].

If he says to her: pick your get (that is, a bill of divorce) up from the ground, it means nothing [i.e., the divorce is not valid]. And even if it sitting in his hand, and she is close to him and she picks it up from there, it is not a [valid] get, since he did not help her take it. Even if his hand was closed with the get inside, and he opened his hand and she took it from there, that he did help her take it, even so it is not a get, since he did not bring his body near to her. And if the get was buried under the belt on his waist and he pulled in his stomach and loosened it, and tilted himself to her and she took it, we call that legitimate "and he gave" [which is a requirement for a valid get, as it it written:] (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3). However, if he pulled in his stomach but didn't tilt himself toward her, or if he tilted himself toward her but did not pull in his stomach, that is not considered [as if he is] giving [her the get]. And there are those that say that if it was attached on his hand or his hip and he bent his body to her or he tilted his hand until the get fell on its own and he said to her: "this is your get," then this is a [valid] get.

That is that He commanded us to return the surety to its Jewish owner at the time that he has a need for it: If the surety is from that which he needs during the day - such as tools of his craft or his activity - he returns it to him during the day and holds it in surety at night; and if it is from that which he needs at night - such as a pillow or a blanket - he returns it to him at night and holds it in surety during the day. And the language of the Mekhilta is, "'Before the sun goes down, you shall return it to him' (Exodus 22:25) - this refers to a day-garment, that you can return the entire day. [...] From where [do you know about] a night-garment that it can be returned the entire night? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall surely return the pledge to him when the sun goes down' (Devarim 24:13). From here the Sages said, 'A day-garment that is taken as a pledge is returned during the whole day, and a night-garment is returned during the whole night." And it is already been explained in the Gemara, Makkot (Makkot 16a), that His, may He be exalted, saying, "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" (Deuteronomy 24:10), is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. And the positive commandment is His saying, "You shall surely return." [This verse also] teaches that we return a night-garment at night and a day-garment during the day. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 8 of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 3).

He prohibited us from harvesting the ollalot (incomplete clusters) of the vineyard at the time of the harvest. And that is His saying, "You shall not pick your vineyard bare" (Leviticus 19:10). Rather one must leave them for the poor. But this law is not with other trees (see the Ramban in his Introduction to the Positive Commandments - Hasagot HaRamban on Sefer HaMitzvot, On the counting of Mitzvot), even ones similar to the vineyard. For [their] prohibition is with His saying, "When you beat your olive tree, etc." (Deuteronomy 24:20) - and that is that you do not take what is forgotten of the olives. Know [then] that other trees are [only] forbidden concerning [what is] forgotten. And this too is rectified by a positive commandment; and the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Peah. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 1.)

That is that He commanded us to marry with kiddushin: To give something into the hand of the woman; through a contract; or through sexual intercourse. And that is the commandment of kiddushin. And the hint to this is, "When a man takes a wife, and marries (which can also mean, has intercourse with) her etc." (Deuteronomy 24:1) - indicating that he effectuates [the marriage] with intercourse; and His saying, "And she leaves [...] and becomes" (Deuteronomy 24:2) - since just like the leaving (divorce) is with a contract, so too is the becoming (marriage) with a contract. And likewise have we learned that [it is effectuated] with money, from His saying about a Hebrew maid-servant, "there is no money" (Exodus 21:11) - to this master, there is no money, but there is money to another master. And who is that? The father [of a bride]. But kiddushin from the Torah is nevertheless explained to be with intercourse, as is explained in [various] places in Ketubot, Kiddushin and Niddah. And the regulations of this commandment have already been completely explained in Tractate Kiddushin. But women are not obligated in this commandment. And in the explanation, they said (Kiddushin 9b), "Kiddushin with intercourse, which is from the Torah." (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Marriage.)

That is that He commanded us to marry with kiddushin: To give something into the hand of the woman; through a contract; or through sexual intercourse. And that is the commandment of kiddushin. And the hint to this is, "When a man takes a wife, and marries (which can also mean, has intercourse with) her etc." (Deuteronomy 24:1) - indicating that he effectuates [the marriage] with intercourse; and His saying, "And she leaves [...] and becomes" (Deuteronomy 24:2) - since just like the leaving (divorce) is with a contract, so too is the becoming (marriage) with a contract. And likewise have we learned that [it is effectuated] with money, from His saying about a Hebrew maid-servant, "there is no money" (Exodus 21:11) - to this master, there is no money, but there is money to another master. And who is that? The father [of a bride]. But kiddushin from the Torah is nevertheless explained to be with intercourse, as is explained in [various] places in Ketubot, Kiddushin and Niddah. And the regulations of this commandment have already been completely explained in Tractate Kiddushin. But women are not obligated in this commandment. And in the explanation, they said (Kiddushin 9b), "Kiddushin with intercourse, which is from the Torah." (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Marriage.)

To not finish the corner of the vineyard: To not finish all of the fruit of the vineyard at the time of the grape harvest, but [rather, one] leaves a corner from them to the poor, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "And [in] your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes" - this is the corner of the vineyard. So wrote Rambam, may his memory be blessed. And he said further that, that which is written (Deuteronomy 24:20), "you shall not take from the branchlets after you" with olives, also instructs about the corner of the olive tree. As the corner of the olive trees is called branchlets (porot), and the corner of the vineyard is called bunchless grapes (ollalot). And from the both of them we learn [this] for all the trees. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, argued against him about this and said (in his introduction to the details of the commandments) that it is all a mistake. And he said that the negative commandment of "And [in] your vineyard," is unique specifically to the vineyard - and it is that we leave over all of the small grapes in it that do no have a katef or a natef. And the understanding of katef is sprigs one over the other (clusters); [of] natef is that they all hang and descend. And it comes out according to this that the ollalot are the small grapes sometimes found in the vineyard that are called gatimas in the vernacular. And this is certainly a small thing, according to that which we see in our vineyards. And so did they, may their memory be blessed say (Mishnah Peah 7:4), "Which are ollalot? All that do not have a katef nor a natef."

And (for Ramban,) besides this obligation of bunchless grapes, there is an obligation upon us to leave over the corner. And with the corner of the vineyard, the verse did not come clearly about it, but rather we learn [by a comparison of the words], "after you," from olives. And [it is] as we say in the Gemara Chullin 131a explicitly, "There are four gifts in the vineyard: the fallen grapes; the bunchless grapes; the forgotten [grapes]; and the corner. [There are] two in the trees: forgotten [fruit]; and the corner." And there, it learns the corner in the vineyard, from that which it is written (Deuteronomy 24:21), "you shall not take the bunchless grapes after you": And Rabbi Levi said, "'After you' is the forgotten [grapes]" - meaning what remains after you, which is the forgotten [grapes]. And the corner we learn [from a comparison of] "after you" [and] "after you" from olives, as it is written about the olive tree (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat your olive tree, you shall not take from the branchlets (tefaer) after you" - and the House of Rabbi Yishmael learned, "That you should not takes its splendor (tiferet) from it" - which is the corner. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, learns the corner of all trees from the olive tree - for which the verse explicitly obligated the corner - and from the vineyard, about which we learned it from the expression, "after you." And he, may his memory be blessed, said that Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote the matter corrected in his great essay (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 4:17). But there is no addition or subtraction in the tally of the negative commandments implied in this disagreement of theirs. As the disagreement is only that Rambam, may his memory be blessed, explains "you shall not take the bunchless grapes," [to be] for the corner, whereas Ramban, may his memory be blessed, explains it literally as bunchless grapes, and learns the corner of the vineyard from the expression, "after you"; as we have written that we learn [by a comparison of the words], "after you," from olives. And this negative commandment is also rectified by a positive commandment - as if he transgressed and finished all [of the grape harvest], he is obligated to give the bunchless grapes to the poor (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 4).

And (for Ramban,) besides this obligation of bunchless grapes, there is an obligation upon us to leave over the corner. And with the corner of the vineyard, the verse did not come clearly about it, but rather we learn [by a comparison of the words], "after you," from olives. And [it is] as we say in the Gemara Chullin 131a explicitly, "There are four gifts in the vineyard: the fallen grapes; the bunchless grapes; the forgotten [grapes]; and the corner. [There are] two in the trees: forgotten [fruit]; and the corner." And there, it learns the corner in the vineyard, from that which it is written (Deuteronomy 24:21), "you shall not take the bunchless grapes after you": And Rabbi Levi said, "'After you' is the forgotten [grapes]" - meaning what remains after you, which is the forgotten [grapes]. And the corner we learn [from a comparison of] "after you" [and] "after you" from olives, as it is written about the olive tree (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat your olive tree, you shall not take from the branchlets (tefaer) after you" - and the House of Rabbi Yishmael learned, "That you should not takes its splendor (tiferet) from it" - which is the corner. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, learns the corner of all trees from the olive tree - for which the verse explicitly obligated the corner - and from the vineyard, about which we learned it from the expression, "after you." And he, may his memory be blessed, said that Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote the matter corrected in his great essay (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 4:17). But there is no addition or subtraction in the tally of the negative commandments implied in this disagreement of theirs. As the disagreement is only that Rambam, may his memory be blessed, explains "you shall not take the bunchless grapes," [to be] for the corner, whereas Ramban, may his memory be blessed, explains it literally as bunchless grapes, and learns the corner of the vineyard from the expression, "after you"; as we have written that we learn [by a comparison of the words], "after you," from olives. And this negative commandment is also rectified by a positive commandment - as if he transgressed and finished all [of the grape harvest], he is obligated to give the bunchless grapes to the poor (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 4).

I have written above in this Order on the commandment of the corner (Sefer HaChinukh) a little of the roots of the commandment and its laws. And there, it is written in which place it and all of the other gifts to the poor are practiced, and that the details of the commandment of the corner are elucidated in Tractate Peah. And we still must write here that which they, may their memory be blessed, said about bunchless grapes (Mishnah Peah 7:7): That if the whole vineyard was bunchless grapes, all of it is for the poor, as it is stated, "And [in] your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes" - and they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Mishnah Peah 7:7), "even all of it [being] bunchless grapes." And [also that] the poor do not have the right to take the bunchless grapes until the owner of the vineyard begins to harvest his vineyard, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 24:21), "When you harvest your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes."

To not delay the wage of a wage worker: That we not delay the wage of a wage worker, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:13), "you shall not lay over the salary of a wage worker with you until the morning." And they, may their memory be blessed, said that this verse is referring to a day wage worker (Bava Metzia 110b). And the Torah extended the time of his payment the entire night, as it is stated, "until morning." And we learned about a night wage worker from another place, that the time of his payment is the whole day, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 24:15), "On its day you shall give his wage, and the sun should not set upon it." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Bava Metzia 110b) that this verse is referring to a night wage worker. And the language of the Mishnah is "A day wage worker collects the whole night, and a night wage worker collects the whole day. And even though two verses came about this commandment, they are only one commandment; and the one is stated to complete the law of the commandment. And we should not count that which the Torah has come to complete the law of a commandment [to be a commandment] on its own. And the content of this commandment - that we not delay payment to the wage worker, but rather we pay him at a set time - that is the principle of the commandment. And with the two negative statements mentioned about it, we knew when is the time of the payment of wage workers - whether a day wage worker or a night wage worker. And remember this principle [mentioned above] for all of the commandments; as it is a great principle in the calculation of the commandments. And it is a principle that two of the pillars of the world agreed about - Rambam, may his memory be blessed (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 238), and Ramban, may his memory be blessed.

It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because God, blessed be He, desires the preservation of Man which He created. And it is well-known that with the delay of nourishment, the body will be destroyed. And therefore we were commanded to give the wage of the wage earner - as 'he urgently depends upon it,' to sustain himself from it. And it appears that therefore did he place the limit of its time to be one day and not more - as it is the way of people to sometimes fast for a day. And explicitly did the verse give a reason for the thing, in its stating (Deuteronomy 24:15), "he urgently depends upon it." And even though they, may their memory be blessed, expounded it for a different matter, its simple understanding implies that which we wrote.

He prohibited us - not to oppress the employee and not to delay his wage with us. And that is His saying, "there shall not abide with you the wages of a worker" (Leviticus 19:13). And that is that if he was a day-worker, he collects the whole night, from His saying, "until morning." And if he was a night-worker - behold the time of his payment is the whole night and the whole day, and the sun may not set before one pays him. And that is His saying, "You must pay him his wage on the same day, etc." (Deuteronomy 24:15). And the language of the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 110b) is, "A day-worker is to collect [his wage] during any of the night, and a night-worker is to collect during any of the day." And these are not two commandments. Rather it is one commandment, but two negative statements have appeared about it in order to fill out the law of the commandment. And that is that with these two negative statements, we know when is the time of payment. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the ninth [chapter] of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Hiring 11.)

He prohibited us from taking collateral from borrowers into our hands except by the order of the judge and through his messenger; and that we not come, ourselves, into the debtor's house and take [something] as collateral. And that is His saying, "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" (Deuteronomy 24:10). And the language of the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 113a) is, "One who lends money to another may take collateral only by means of the court. And he may not enter his house to take his collateral, as it is stated, 'You shall stand outside' (Deuteronomy 24:11)." And it is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. And that is His saying, "You must surely return the pledge to him" (Deuteronomy 24:13). And so is it explained at the end of Tractate Makkot (Makkot 16a). And know that if he does not return it and does not fulfill the positive commandment in it, he is liable for lashes and pays the money of the collateral - as it is explained at the end of Makkot. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the ninth [chapter] of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 3.)

He prohibited us from taking collateral from borrowers into our hands except by the order of the judge and through his messenger; and that we not come, ourselves, into the debtor's house and take [something] as collateral. And that is His saying, "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" (Deuteronomy 24:10). And the language of the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 113a) is, "One who lends money to another may take collateral only by means of the court. And he may not enter his house to take his collateral, as it is stated, 'You shall stand outside' (Deuteronomy 24:11)." And it is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. And that is His saying, "You must surely return the pledge to him" (Deuteronomy 24:13). And so is it explained at the end of Tractate Makkot (Makkot 16a). And know that if he does not return it and does not fulfill the positive commandment in it, he is liable for lashes and pays the money of the collateral - as it is explained at the end of Makkot. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the ninth [chapter] of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 3.)

He prohibited us from taking in pawn, vessels with which people prepare their food, such as tools for grinding, kneading and cooking and tools for the slaughter of animals and other ones besides this that are grouped by the name, 'something with which food of sustenance (okhel nefesh) is made' - as it is stated, "for it is a soul that he takes in pledge" (Deuteronomy 24:6). And it remains for us here to explain their saying (Bava Metzia 115a), "And he is liable on account of two vessels, as it is stated, 'One shall not take as a pledge, a lower millstone nor an upper millstone.'" For this may make us think that they are two commandments - and all the more so, with their saying (Bava Metzia 116a), "And he is liable for the lower millstone on its own." And the content of this statement is that anyone who takes, as collateral, a vessel with which we make food of sustenance, transgresses a negative commandment, as it is explained; and one who takes several vessels - each one of which is used for food of sustenance - as collateral, is liable for each and every vessel. For example, if he takes as collateral, a tool for grinding, a tool for kneading and a tool for the making of bread. And this is something that does not need explanation; as it is like one who takes the garment of Reuven's widow as a pledge, and [likewise] the garment of Shimon's widow [and likewise the garment of Levi's widow] - that he transgresses for each and every garment. However the question is about one who takes as a pledge, two vessels with which, both together, he makes food of sustenance: Do we say that since the [specific preparation of] food is in fact only finished by both of them, the two of them are surely one vessel, and he should [only] be liable on account of one vessel; or since they are two vessels, he should be liable for each one on its own? And they explained to us that he is liable with them on account of two vessels - even though the work is done by bringing the two of them together, like a lower millstone and an upper millstone, as the grinding will not be done by one [of them] alone. And the language of the Mishnah is, "'One shall not take as a pledge, a lower millstone nor an upper millstone': Not only these did they say [is prohibited], but anything with which we make food of sustenance, as it is stated, 'for it is a soul that he takes in pledge'" - that he is liable for them on account of two tools, not that they are two [separate] commandments. And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 272:1) about this matter is - they said, "Just as a lower millstone and an upper millstone are distinct in being tools performing one task, for which one is liable for this one on its own and that one on its own; so [too for] all two tools performing one task is one liable for this one on its own and that one on its own." And the explanation of the statement is that even though they are used to do the same task, he is liable for this one on its own [and for that one on its own]. If one transgressed - took it as collateral and grabbed it from him - they remove it from his hand and return it to its owners. But if [it was lost] or burnt before he returned it, he is lashed; and likewise with the garment of a widow. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the ninth [chapter] of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 3.)

He prohibited us - regarding that which is found with us that we owe, not to withhold it and not give it. And that is His saying, "You shall not exploit" (Leviticus 19:13). And that is that theft is taking something that is with someone else by ruses and in secret; and we have been prohibited this action with His saying, "You shall not steal" (Leviticus 19:11), as we explained. And robbery is the taking of something that is with another by force, duress and fighting, like the robbers in the cities do; and we were prohibited this action by His saying, "and you shall not rob." Whereas exploitation is that someone else has something of value - meaning money that is coming to him - that one is holding and not giving to him; either by force or not by force, but [always] through deception. And He prohibited this action also, with His saying, "You shall not exploit." And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:9): "'You shall not exploit' - monetary exploitation. And which is that? One who retains the wage of a wage-worker" - and all that is similar to it. However the example is that of a wage-worker, because it is a full obligation upon you - even though he did not give you money from himself and money did not come to you from him; nevertheless since he came to you with a well-known obligatory arrangement, [you are] obligated. And this prohibition about this matter has already been repeated, and He took the example of this matter itself and said, "Do not exploit the worker, who is poor and destitute" (Deuteronomy 24:14). His intention with this is, do not exploit a worker, since he is poor and destitute - as He said about him, "neither shall the sun set upon it, etc." (Deuteronomy 24:15). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 278:1) is, "'Do not exploit the laborer, who is poor and destitute' - is it not already stated, 'you shall not rob?' It [hence] teaches that anyone who retains the wage of a wage-worker transgresses, 'You shall not exploit,' 'you shall not rob,' 'there shall not abide,' and on account of, 'You must pay him his wage on the same day' (Deuteronomy 24:15)." And there (Sifrei Devarim 278:2), they said in explanation of, "poor and destitute": "'Poor and destitute' - I hasten to exact payment for one who is poor and destitute." And the one who transgresses exploitation has the same law as a robber. [This is from] His saying, "and denies to his kinsman, a deposit or a pledge or robbery or exploitation from his countryman" (Leviticus 5:21). (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 1)

He prohibited us - regarding that which is found with us that we owe, not to withhold it and not give it. And that is His saying, "You shall not exploit" (Leviticus 19:13). And that is that theft is taking something that is with someone else by ruses and in secret; and we have been prohibited this action with His saying, "You shall not steal" (Leviticus 19:11), as we explained. And robbery is the taking of something that is with another by force, duress and fighting, like the robbers in the cities do; and we were prohibited this action by His saying, "and you shall not rob." Whereas exploitation is that someone else has something of value - meaning money that is coming to him - that one is holding and not giving to him; either by force or not by force, but [always] through deception. And He prohibited this action also, with His saying, "You shall not exploit." And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:9): "'You shall not exploit' - monetary exploitation. And which is that? One who retains the wage of a wage-worker" - and all that is similar to it. However the example is that of a wage-worker, because it is a full obligation upon you - even though he did not give you money from himself and money did not come to you from him; nevertheless since he came to you with a well-known obligatory arrangement, [you are] obligated. And this prohibition about this matter has already been repeated, and He took the example of this matter itself and said, "Do not exploit the worker, who is poor and destitute" (Deuteronomy 24:14). His intention with this is, do not exploit a worker, since he is poor and destitute - as He said about him, "neither shall the sun set upon it, etc." (Deuteronomy 24:15). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 278:1) is, "'Do not exploit the laborer, who is poor and destitute' - is it not already stated, 'you shall not rob?' It [hence] teaches that anyone who retains the wage of a wage-worker transgresses, 'You shall not exploit,' 'you shall not rob,' 'there shall not abide,' and on account of, 'You must pay him his wage on the same day' (Deuteronomy 24:15)." And there (Sifrei Devarim 278:2), they said in explanation of, "poor and destitute": "'Poor and destitute' - I hasten to exact payment for one who is poor and destitute." And the one who transgresses exploitation has the same law as a robber. [This is from] His saying, "and denies to his kinsman, a deposit or a pledge or robbery or exploitation from his countryman" (Leviticus 5:21). (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 1)

He prohibited us from exploiting a captive woman (yefat toar) after one has sexual intercourse with her. [This] means to say that he does not work her and leave her to be like one of the other maidservants that serve as slaves. And that is His saying, "you shall not exploit her, since you have afflicted her" (Deuteronomy 21:14). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 214:5) is, "'You shall not exploit her' - you shall not use her." Behold it has been made clear to you that these two negative commandments are prohibiting two separate matters. And that is that He prohibits from selling her to someone besides him; and also from leaving her with him in the manner of slavery. Rather he should do, like that which He, may He be exalted, commanded - "you shalt let her go where she will." And so did they explain in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 85b) about one who kidnaps a soul, from His saying, "and he exploited him and sold him" (Deuteronomy 24:7). They said, "It is from when he brings him into his domain and uses him." And the laws of the captive woman have been explained in the first [chapter] of Kiddushin. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 8.)

With regard to a woman's bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: "And he shall write to her, “for her sake” and a document free a female (canaanite) slave reads “Nor was freedom given to her," Leviticus 19:2 teaching that the bill of release must be written for her sake.

With regard to a woman's bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: "And he shall write to her, he who does not (the bill should be written) on a substance that is lacking only to be given. This excludes a bill of divorce that is written while the article on which it is written is attached and afterwards detached. For it is lacking both being detached and being given. Similarly, with regard to a bill of release, it is written: "given to her," (Lev 19:2) teaching that the bill of release should be lacking only being given.

He prohibited a groom from leaving his home in order to be involved with one of the burdens for an entire year - not to go out to war, and not for anything besides it. Rather we remove every burden and onus that he is obligated, to leave them the entire year. And that is His saying, "neither shall he be charged with any matter; he shall be free for his home" (Deuteronomy 24:5). And the Gemara, Sotah (Sotah 44a): "'He shall not go out with the army'; it is possible that with the army he does not go out, but he does fix weapons and supplies water and food. [Hence] we learn to say, 'neither shall he be charged [with any matter.' Perhaps it is that I include even one who has built a house and has not dedicated it, one who has planted a vineyard and has not redeemed it [and] one who has betrothed a woman and has not taken her? (Hence) we learn to say, 'he be charged'] - you do not charge him, but you do charge others. But since it is derived from, 'neither shall he be charged,' why do I need, 'He shall not go out with the army?' So that he will transgress two negative statements." However we have already explained in Principle 9 that not everything for which we would be liable for two negative statements are [counted separately as] two commandments. And know that the groom himself is prohibited from going out of his house for trade the entire year (In Radbaz Part I:238, he wrote that this is a copier's mistake). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 8 of Sotah. (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars 6-7.)

Which time is this, hired by day, the time to give it to him is all night; if it is not given to him, he [the employer] transgressed it in the morning because of the prohibition of holding onto the wages (from Vayikra 19:13). Hired by night, the time to give it to him is all day; it is not given to him, he [the employer] transgressed it in the evening, because of “At this day you shall give him his hire” (Devarim 24:15). Note: And the workers to them, that there isn’t making work until night, since that investment upon him a hot transgression upon him because of “At this day you shall give him his hire”; at night, and if he made work until night, he has time even though that his didn’t pay him according to his proper fee.

Not to make her serve after he has intercourse with her: That we should not make a [captured] 'woman of beautiful form' serve, after intercourse with her. And about this it is stated (Deuteronomy 21:14), "you shall not abuse (titaamer) her, since you afflicted her." The explanation of "abuse" is that is an expression of service. And so did they say in Sifrei, "'You shall not abuse her' - you shall not take service from her." And the matter is that we should not set her up as a concubine or as maid-servant in bondage. And the matter of the verse is not that we should not have her serve any service that women do for their husbands. [Rather] Scripture prohibits making her into a maid-servant, [just] like it is also forbidden to sell her as a maid-servant, and the intention is one. And so too with the stealing of a soul from his brothers (kidnapping), about which it is written (Deuteronomy 24:7), "and he abused (hitaamer) him" - they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Sanhedrin 85b), that [it means that] he brought him into his domain and made him serve.

To marry a woman with a marriage contract and betrothal: That we were commanded to acquire a woman in one of three ways before the marriage. And the sages elucidated these ways (Kiddushin 2a) - that they are money (monetary value), a contract and sexual relations with her. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:13), "If a man takes a woman and has sexual relations with her," which is to say [that] if a man wants to take (marry) a woman for himself, he should acquire her first with sexual relations. And about that which the verse stated (Deuteronomy 24:2), "And she shall go out [...] and she shall be," the traditional understanding came [to explain] that [just] like the departure (divorce) of a woman is with a contract - as we will write in this Order (Sefer HaChinukh 579), with the help of God - so too is [her] being with him; meaning to say, the acquisition of a woman is with a contract. And they, may their memory be blessed, also learned (Kiddushin 4b) that she is acquired with monetary value, since it is written about an Israelite maidservant (Exodus 21:11), "and she shall go out, there is no silver (monetary value)" - and the understanding about it came [to explain] (Kiddushin 3b), "'There is no monetary value' for this master, but there is monetary value (when she goes) from another master. And who is he? Her father."

That one who wants to divorce his wife divorce her with a bill (get): That we were commanded that if we want to divorce our wives, [it is required] to divorce them in writing. And about this writing the verse states, "a book of cutting" - and it is what our rabbis, may their memory be blessed, called a bill (get); and so too the Translator, translated it as a book of get (Onkelos Deuteronomy 24:1). And about this does it state (Deuteronomy 24:1), "and he writes her a book of cutting, gives it to her, and sends her away from his house."

That he not bring back his ex-wife from when she has married: That we have been prevented from bringing back a woman after we have divorced her and she has married another. And [that is] specifically when she married or became engaged (with formal erusin); but if she was promiscuous after he divorced her, it is permissible to bring her back. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:4), "The first husband who divorced her may not take her to wife again." And this is speaking about after she married another - as it stated first, "and becomes the wife of another man." As if it is before she married [another], it is permissible to bring her back; and it is also appropriate to do so, if she is not an evildoer.

That a groom should not go out from his home the whole year, even for the needs of the community: That the groom is prevented from going out from his house the entire [first] year, meaning to say to go on distant trips. And also the army officer is prevented from taking him out by force, meaning to say, from taking him out to war or to do work needed for the war - for example, to supply water and food to his brothers or to fix matters in the city, to guard it from the enemy. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:5), "nor have any purpose assigned to him." And they said in Tractate Sotah 44a, "'He shall not go out with the army' - it is possible that with the army he shall not go out, but he should fix weapons or supply water and food; [hence] it is taught to say, 'nor have any purpose assigned to him.'" And they inferred further,"[it is] 'to him' that you do not assign, but you do assign to others," meaning to say to those that return from the war because of weak-heartedness, or because of the dedication of a house or vineyard. And there they also said, "And since it comes out from 'nor have assigned to him,' why do I have 'he shall not go out with the army?' To have him transgress on two negative commandments."

The commandment that a groom rejoice with his wife for one year: That we have been commanded that a groom rejoice with his his wife for one year - meaning to say that he not travel outside of the city to go out to war, nor for other matters, [such that] he would dwell without her for many days; but rather he should dwell with her for a whole year from the day of the marriage. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:5), "he shall be exempt one year for the sake of his household, to give happiness to the woman he has married."

That we not take as surety vessels in which life-sustaining food (ochel nefesh) is made: That we have been prevented from taking as surety vessels that are the means for the preparation of food for people - for example (see Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 242), a vessel for grinding and a vessel for kneading and a vessel for cooking and a vessel for slaughtering animals and the others of what are grouped as that with which we make life-sustaining food. And about this is stated (Deuteronomy 24:6), "A handmill or an upper millstone shall not be taken in pawn, for that would be taking someone’s life in pawn." And the language of the Mishnah (Mishna Bava Metzia 9:13) is "And they did not refer only to a mill and an upper millstone, but anything that is used to make life-sustaining food, as it states, 'For that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge.'"

To not detach signs of tzaraat (a Biblical skin disease): That we have been prevented from cutting off signs of tzaraat or to burn it to the point that its appearance changes. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:8), "Be careful with the blemish of tzaraat, etc. And the language of Sifrei is "'Be careful with the blemish of tzaraat' is a negative commandment." And the language of the Mishnah Negaim 7:4 is "One who removes the signs of impurity or burns the healthy patch of skin transgresses a negative commandment."

To not take surety from a debtor by force: That we have been prevented from taking surety from a debtor - meaning to say a borrower - with our hands by force, bur rather through the command of a judge and through his agent; that we should not jump and come to the house of a debtor and take surety from him or grab a surety from him when we find him in the marketplace. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:10), "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" - and it is not specifically the house [that was intended], but the same is true of one who grabs it from his hand in the marketplace. And the language of the Mishnah Bava Metzia 9:13 is "[If] one lends to his fellow, he may not extract surety except through the court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as is written (Deuteronomy 24:11), 'You must remain outside.'"

To not take surety from a debtor by force: That we have been prevented from taking surety from a debtor - meaning to say a borrower - with our hands by force, bur rather through the command of a judge and through his agent; that we should not jump and come to the house of a debtor and take surety from him or grab a surety from him when we find him in the marketplace. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:10), "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" - and it is not specifically the house [that was intended], but the same is true of one who grabs it from his hand in the marketplace. And the language of the Mishnah Bava Metzia 9:13 is "[If] one lends to his fellow, he may not extract surety except through the court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as is written (Deuteronomy 24:11), 'You must remain outside.'"

To not prevent surety from its needy owner: That we have been warned not to prevent the surety from its owner at the time that he needs it, but rather to return it to him - a vessel for the day during the day, and a vessel for the night during the night. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:12), "you shall not go to sleep in his pledge." And the language of Sifrei is "Do not go to sleep when the pledge is with you, but rather return it when he will not have with what to replace it, from the weakness of his poverty" - as the verse (Exodus 22:26) explains, "It is his only clothing, the sole covering for his skin."

To return the surety to the owners at the time that he needs it: That we were commanded to return the surety to its Israelite owners at the time that it will be needed by him; meaning to say that if the surety is something that a person needs during the day - for example, the tool for his work - he should return it to him during the day, and the borrower brings it back to him during the night, and if it is a vessel that he needs during the night - for example, bedding or a blanket - he should return it to him during the night, and the borrower brings it back to the creditor during the day. And the language of Mekhilta, Mishpatim 186 is "'You must return it to him before the sun sets' (Exodus 22:25) - this is the clothing of the day, that you must return it to him [the whole day. That you must return the clothing of the night] for the whole night, from where [do I know it]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You must surely return the pledge to him at sundown' (Deuteronomy 24:13). From here they said, we take the clothing of the day for surety during the night and the clothing of the night during the day." And the proof that this is from the count of positive commandments is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in the Gemara in Makkot 16a that the negative commandment of "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge," is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment - and [that] positive commandment is "You must surely return."

To give the wage of a wage-worker on its day: To give the wage of a wage-worker on its day; and we do not delay his wage to a different day, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 24:15), "You must pay him his wages on the same day." And they, may their memory be blessed, elucidated in the ninth chapter of Bava Metzia 111a, that whether it is an Israelite wage-worker or even a resident alien, there is an obligation to pay him on its day; but the negative commandment that comes upon this is not [applicable] with a resident alien.

That a relative not testify, one about the other: That we have been commanded not to accept the testimony of some relatives about some relatives. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:16), "Parents shall not be put to death for children, nor children be put to death for parents" - and concerning this came the traditional understanding (Sanhedrin 27b) [that it means that] fathers should not be put to death from the testimony of the sons, and sons should not be put to death from the testimony of the fathers. And the same is true of financial cases - that we do not believe some relatives about some relatives. However it is mentioned regarding laws [involving] death sentences by way of hyperbole - that we should not say, since this is [causing] the loss of life, we should not suspect the relative about him, but rather do like his testimony; since his testimony is to lose the life of his relative. And even though the verse only mentioned the fathers and the sons, the same is true of several of the other relatives. But it mentioned sons and fathers by way of an example; saying that [even though] one loves the other very much, and [yet the Torah] stated that also these are not believed that one should condemn the other and - there is no need to say - exonerate [him]. And the same is true of some of the [other] relatives, as the tradition about them has come to us - and we shall mention them in the laws of the commandment, with God's help.

To not sway the judgement of a stranger or an orphan: That the judge is prevented from hiding his eyes, to sway the judgement of a stranger or an orphan. And about this it states (Deuteronomy 24:17), "Do not sway the judgement of a stranger or an orphan, etc." I have written what is needed about the matter of swaying judgement above in the Order of Kedoshim (Sefer HaChinukh 233) and Mishpatim (Sefer HaChinukh 81), according to the way of this book - and take it from there.

To not take the garment of a widow as surety: That we have been prevented from taking surety from a widow, as it states (Deuteronomy 24:17), "you shall not take a widow’s garment in pawn." And the language of the mishnah is (Mishnah Bava Metzia 9:13) "From a widow, whether she be poor or she be rich, we do not extract surety."

To leave what is forgotten to the poor: That we were commanded when we forget a sheaf in the field to leave it there, and that we not return to take it when the thing becomes known to us. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and you forget a sheaf in the field [...]; it shall go to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow" - meaning to say, leave it there for them.

To not go back to take what is forgotten: That we have been prevented from taking the sheave of what is forgotten, as it states (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and forget a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it" (See Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 214). And the commandment of what is forgotten is also [applicable] with trees.