Halakhah zu Schemot 22:78
Chofetz Chaim
Just as it is forbidden to shame one's friend in matters between man and his Maker, so is it forbidden to shame him in matters between man and his neighbor, even if what is said contains no admixture of falsehood. And I will not "conceal under my tongue" that there are in this [principle] many roots and branches, and that often this din changes [with the circumstances]. We shall speak about this at length, the L–rd willing, below in Principle X. But now we shall discuss one element that is forbidden beyond a doubt. That is, if one sees another asking his friend to lend him money (even though this [i.e., to lend] is a positive commandment of the Torah, viz. Shemoth 22:24: "When you lend money, etc.," as explained in the Book of the Mitzvoth of the Rambam, Positive Commandments 197), or [asking him] for some other favor, which he does not grant him; or [if he sees one transgressing] negative commandments between man and his neighbor, such as taking revenge and bearing a grudge, as is explained in Yoma (23a): "Which is revenge and which is bearing a grudge, etc.?" — since he [the object of the lashon hara] did not do him [the speaker] any evil (and there is also no benefit accruing to the affected party by his [the speaker's] recounting this to others), therefore, if he goes and recounts this to others, it is called "lashon hara" according to the din. And all this, even if it happened to [the speaker] himself, and it was also clear to him that he could have done him this favor, but refused to do so out of the perverseness of his nature. And there obtain here [also] all the elements of the issur which were explained in the preceding principle in section 3 concerning "between man and his Maker." And even if the withholding of the favor was to another, and the speaker's intent were only zeal for the truth (how much more so if the withholding of the favor were to the speaker himself!), it is certainly forbidden thereafter, to go and demean him for this. And one who transgresses this, aside from stumbling into the sin of lashon hara, also stumbles in this into the transgression of (Vayikra 19:18): "You shall not bear a grudge." And if he intends by what he says to take revenge of him for this, and to publicize the other's perverseness, he transgresses in addition (Ibid) "You shall not take revenge," aside from the issur of lashon hara.
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Gray Matter IV
The Torah (Shemot 22:13-14) sets forth the rule of ba’alav imo, that a watchman or borrower is exempt from payment for loss of an item if he employs the owner of that item (see the Torah Temimah ad. loc. for explanations of this rule; one thought is that one cannot simultaneously be obligated to a person and have that person be obligated to him/her). The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 346:13, based on Bava Metzia 97a) sets forth the rules regarding teachers and students in relation to the rule of ba’alav imo:
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Gray Matter IV
The Torah identifies two institutions of authority. First, the Torah speaks of the beit din, specifically the Sanhedrin, whose Torah leadership we must follow. In this regard, the Torah exhorts us, "Based on the rulings they rule for you, and [based] on the justice they tell you you shall act" (Devarim 17:11). The Torah subsequently speaks of the leadership of a king. The Torah forbids rebellion against either of these institutions of authority. In fact, both a rebel against Torah authorities (zaken mamreih) and a rebel against political authorities (mored bemalchut) are punished by death, because such people threaten the stability and viability of society. The Ramban (Shemot 22:27) and Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 71), in explaining the prohibition of cursing a leader, write that the Torah forbids cursing any national leader, be he from the political authority or from the Torah authority.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol IV
A person had a lawsuit. He came to the judge and was exonerated. The person who was exonerated departed and said, "There is no one in the world who compares to that judge." After a time he had [another] lawsuit. He came to [the judge] and was found liable. He departed and said, "There is no judge who is a greater fool than he! They said to him, "Was [the judge] splendid yesterday and today a fool?" Therefore Scripture admonishes, "Do not curse the court" (Exodus 22:27).
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Gray Matter IV
The Halachah of rodeif is similar to the Halachah of ba b'machteret that is presented in Shemot 22:1. The Torah teaches that one may kill a thief who is tunneling into one's house, since one may assume that the thief is armed and constitutes a danger to life. The Torah permits the householder to kill the thief in self-defense. Chazal (Sanhedrin 72a) phrase this rule accordingly, "If someone comes to kill you, act first and kill him." The Gemara (Sanhedrin 73a), in turn, presents the sources in the Torah that teach that one must kill someone who is attempting to kill another person. This rule applies not only to self-defense but also to defending the lives of others. It applies even to someone who engages in sexual assault (Sanhedrin 73a). Thus, if no other option is available, one must kill someone who is attempting to murder or rape.62For a discussion of the subtle distinctions between the cases of rodeif and one who tunnels into a house, see my Peninei Torah (Sanhedrin pp. 7-8).
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Gray Matter II
The Torah (Shemot 22:8) commands that the litigants’ “words should be spoken to the judges.” The Mechilta comments that this verse teaches that the litigants (ba’alei din) may not use lawyers in beit din. The Torah Temimah explains:
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I
Despite the great reluctance of the talmudic Sages to offer a rationale for the fundamentals of kashrut, others were not similarly reticent. The interpretations which have been advanced over the course of centuries are varied and sundry. The explanation which has probably enjoyed the widest circulation is the one which sees a connection between these laws and physical health and well-being. This concept gained currency in the days of antiquity: it is expressed in the Pseudepigrapha1IV Macc. 5:25–27. and alluded to in the works of Philo.2De Specialibus Legibus, IV, 119. Translated by F. H. Colson (Cambridge, 1939), VIII, 81. Although these writings are not necessarily indicative of rabbinic thought, similar concepts are expressed by Maimonides,3Guide of the Perplexed, III, chap. 48. Nachmanides,4Commentary on the Bible, Lev. 11:43. Gersonides,5Commentary on the Bible, Parshat Ekev, To‘elet 26. and others.6Abraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on the Bible, Exod. 22:30; Rashbam, Commentary on the Bible, Lev. 11:3; Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, nos. 72 and 147. However, other rabbinic scholars were most emphatic in their denial of a hygienic interpretation of the laws of forbidden foods. Thus, R. Isaac Abarbanel writes, "Heaven forfend that I should believe so. For if that were to be so, the Book of God's Law would be in the same category as any of the brief medical books…. This is not the way of God's law or the depth of its intentions." 7Commentary on the Bible, Lev. 11:13. In almost identical language, R. Isaac Arama disparages this explanation, commenting that such an interpretation would "lower the status of divine Law to the status of any brief medical composition." 8Akedat Yiẓḥak, Sha‘ar 60. See also Kli Yakar, Lev. 11:1 and Menachem ha-Bavli, Ta‘amei ha-Miẓvot, negative commandments, no. 84.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from bowing to an idol. And that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "You shall not bow to them" (Exodus 20:5). And it is clear that by our saying, idol, we mean anything worshipped besides God. And the intention is not only bowing, and nothing else. Indeed, He mentioned one of the ways of worship - meaning to say, bowing - but we are also prohibited from sacrificing to them, offering libations and burning incense [to them]. And one who has transgressed one of these and bowed, sacrificed, offered libations or burned incense is liable for stoning. And the language of the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:19) is, "'One who sacrifices to gods shall be proscribed' (Exodus 22:19) - we have [thus] heard the punishment. From where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not bow to them and you shall not worship them.' Sacrifice was included (in serving), and it was singled out to teach [that] just as sacrificing is distinctive, in that we worship the Heavens in a similar way and one is liable for it, whether he worships it or he does not not worship it - so too, one is liable for all the ways that are similar to how we worship the Heavens, whether he worships it or he does not not worship it." And the content of this statement is that these four types of worship - being bowing, sacrificing, offering libations and burning incense - through which we have been commanded that we worship God, may He be blessed: Anyone who worships an idol through one of them is liable for stoning, even if this is not one of the ways of worshipping this thing that was worshipped. And that is what is called, not in the way of its worship. [Yet] since he worshipped in one of these ways, he is liable for stoning if he was volitional; excision if the court did not know about him or they did not execute the punishment; or to bring a sacrifice if he was inadvertent. And likewise when one accepts something as a god in a way of accepting. And this prohibition has already been repeated - meaning to say, the prohibition of their worship through one of these four ways, and even [when] it is not in its way. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "And that they may offer their sacrifices no more to the goats" (Leviticus 17:7). And the language of the Sifra (Sifra, Acharei Mot, Chapter 9:8) is, "'Goats,' is nothing other than demons." And in the Gemara, Zevachim (Zevachim 106a), it is explained, however, that this negative commandment is with slaughtering to the idol, even if the slaughtering is not the way of its worship. They said, "From where [do we know about] one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury, that he is liable (even though this is not its way of worship)? As it is stated, 'And that they may offer their sacrifices no more.' If its content is not [applied to] in its way [of worship], as [that is already derived from] its being written, 'How do these nations serve' (Deuteronomy 12:30); then apply its content to [worshipping] not in its way." And one who transgresses it volitionally [gets] excision and stoning - as we said - and must bring a sacrifice if it was inadvertent. And the language of Scripture is, "One who sacrifices to gods shall be proscribed." And the laws of this commandment have already been explained in the seventh chapter of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Yitro; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 3.)
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol IV
Yet, collectively and individually, the American Jewish community is guilty of continuous and ongoing violation of one of the six hundred and thirteen commandments. "Judges and court officers shall you place unto yourself in all your gates (Deuteronomy 16:17) is cited by numerous early authorities, including Rambam, Sefer ha-Mizvot, mizvot aseh, no. 176 and Hilkhot Sanhedrin 1:1; Sefer Mizvot Gadol, esin, no. 87; and Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 491, as establishing an obligation to institute ecclesiastic courts, or Batei Din, in every locale. Rambam, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 1:2, explicitly rules that the commandment is binding, not only in the Land of Israel, but in the Diaspora as well.1There is no suggestion in Rambam’s statement indicating that the commandment is no longer binding in our day. See Kiryat Sefer, Hilkhot Sanhedrin, chap. 5. See also Revid ha-Zahav, Exodus 22:7 and Netivot ha-Mishpat 1:1.
A somewhat different view is expressed by Ramban in his commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 16:18. Ramban asserts that the biblical command applies only to the appointment of judges who have been ordained, i.e., the recipients of the unbroken chain of semikhah, or ordination, originating in Moses’ conferral of ordination upon the judges appointed by him in the wilderness. Subsequent to the abrogation of semikhah during the period of Roman persecution, rabbinic courts enjoy limited authority as the “agents” of the judges of antiquity. Their authority, asserts Ramban, is rooted in rabbinic edict. Since such courts lack authority in biblical law, their establishment cannot be mandated by biblical law and, accordingly, Ramban concludes, “we are not at all biblically obligated with regard to the commandment concerning appointment of judges” (emphasis added). The implication is that the obligation continues in our day by virtue of rabbinic decree as a concomitant of the rabbinic legislation establishing the authority of non-ordained judges. Rabbenu Yerucham, Sefer Meisharim 1:4, explicitly declares that, in the absence of ordained judges, the obligation to establish Batei Din is rabbinic in nature.
Ramban’s assertion that appointment of judges is no longer biblically mandated is predicated upon his formulation of the antecedent premise that the “agency” of present-day rabbinic courts is rooted in rabbinic legislation. That view is also espoused by Ran, Sanhedrin 23a; Ramah, Sanhedrin 23a; Rashba, Gittin 88b; Ramban himself, Sanhedrin 23a; and Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 1:3. However, elsewhere, Yevamot 46b, s.v. shemat minah, Ramban concludes his comments with the remark that “it is possible” that the authority of non-ordained judges to act as “agents” of the ordained judges of an earlier era is biblical in nature. Cf. also the comments of Me’iri, Bet ha-Beḥirah, Baba Kamma 84b, also cited in Shitah Mekubeẓet, ad locum, to the effect that, absent such a rule, all biblical laws regarding jurisprudence would be abrogated and the world would be destroyed. If, even in our day, authority to sit in judgment continues to be rooted in biblical law, it then follows that establishment of Batei Din remains a biblical obligation. Cf., Imrei Binah, Ḥoshen Mishpat, chap. 1 and Encyclopedia Talmudit, III, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem, 5715), p. 162, note 366a. The sole distinction between the Land of Israel and the Diaspora with regard to the ambit of this commandment is that the obligation to establish Batei Din in each district is limited to the Land of Israel, while the obligation to establish Batei Din in each city is binding in the Diaspora as well. Kesef Mishneh, on the basis of a statement in the Gemara, Makkot 7a, suggests that the Maimonidean text should read that the obligation incumbent in the Diaspora is to appoint judges in every district, but not in each city.2For citation of sources regarding the role and function of regional Batei Din see Encyclopedia Talmudit, III, 151.
A somewhat different view is expressed by Ramban in his commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 16:18. Ramban asserts that the biblical command applies only to the appointment of judges who have been ordained, i.e., the recipients of the unbroken chain of semikhah, or ordination, originating in Moses’ conferral of ordination upon the judges appointed by him in the wilderness. Subsequent to the abrogation of semikhah during the period of Roman persecution, rabbinic courts enjoy limited authority as the “agents” of the judges of antiquity. Their authority, asserts Ramban, is rooted in rabbinic edict. Since such courts lack authority in biblical law, their establishment cannot be mandated by biblical law and, accordingly, Ramban concludes, “we are not at all biblically obligated with regard to the commandment concerning appointment of judges” (emphasis added). The implication is that the obligation continues in our day by virtue of rabbinic decree as a concomitant of the rabbinic legislation establishing the authority of non-ordained judges. Rabbenu Yerucham, Sefer Meisharim 1:4, explicitly declares that, in the absence of ordained judges, the obligation to establish Batei Din is rabbinic in nature.
Ramban’s assertion that appointment of judges is no longer biblically mandated is predicated upon his formulation of the antecedent premise that the “agency” of present-day rabbinic courts is rooted in rabbinic legislation. That view is also espoused by Ran, Sanhedrin 23a; Ramah, Sanhedrin 23a; Rashba, Gittin 88b; Ramban himself, Sanhedrin 23a; and Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 1:3. However, elsewhere, Yevamot 46b, s.v. shemat minah, Ramban concludes his comments with the remark that “it is possible” that the authority of non-ordained judges to act as “agents” of the ordained judges of an earlier era is biblical in nature. Cf. also the comments of Me’iri, Bet ha-Beḥirah, Baba Kamma 84b, also cited in Shitah Mekubeẓet, ad locum, to the effect that, absent such a rule, all biblical laws regarding jurisprudence would be abrogated and the world would be destroyed. If, even in our day, authority to sit in judgment continues to be rooted in biblical law, it then follows that establishment of Batei Din remains a biblical obligation. Cf., Imrei Binah, Ḥoshen Mishpat, chap. 1 and Encyclopedia Talmudit, III, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem, 5715), p. 162, note 366a. The sole distinction between the Land of Israel and the Diaspora with regard to the ambit of this commandment is that the obligation to establish Batei Din in each district is limited to the Land of Israel, while the obligation to establish Batei Din in each city is binding in the Diaspora as well. Kesef Mishneh, on the basis of a statement in the Gemara, Makkot 7a, suggests that the Maimonidean text should read that the obligation incumbent in the Diaspora is to appoint judges in every district, but not in each city.2For citation of sources regarding the role and function of regional Batei Din see Encyclopedia Talmudit, III, 151.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
And after it has been explained that His saying, "Do not eat any of it raw or boiled" is [only] one commandment; and likewise all of the negative commandments that arise from the prohibition for the nazirite of all that comes out from the vine are one commandment, since they are all details, as is explained in the Gemara; and they likewise said that, "any leaven and any honey," is one commandment - we should also count, "No Ammonite or Moabite shall be admitted" (Deuteronomy 23:4), as one commandment. And likewise, His saying, "You shall not ill-treat any widow or orphan" (Exodus 22:21). And likewise, His saying, "You shall not subvert the rights of the stranger or the orphan" (Deuteronomy 24:17). And likewise, His saying, "he may not diminish her food, her clothing or her conjugal rights" (Exodus 21:10). Each of these negative commandments is one commandment. This means to say that each of these is exactly like, "Do not eat any of it raw or boiled in any way," and like, "for no leaven or honey may be turned into smoke as an offering." There is no difference between them. And likewise, His saying, "You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the sale revenue of a dog" (Deuteronomy 23:19), is one commandment. And likewise, His saying, "Drink no wine or other intoxicant, etc. And to differentiate [...] And to instruct" (Leviticus 9-11). That is to say, with one negative commandment did He prohibit [a priest] to enter the Sanctuary or to give instruction while drunk. And that is one of the divisions of the second type of general negative commandments. And the second division is [made up of cases with] words exactly like those of the previous division. However [in such cases], it is the traditionally received explanation that we give separate lashes for each and every one of those connected matters. And that is that when he does them all - even at one time - he is given lashes for each and every one as a distinct prohibition. Of this type is His saying, "You may not eat within your gates of the tithes of your new grain or your wine or your oil" (Deuteronomy 12:17). They said in Keritot (Keritot 4b), "[If one] ate the tithe of grain, wine, and oil (outside Jerusalem), he is liable [separately] for each and every one." And they raised a difficulty and said, "But is one given lashes for a general negative commandment?" And the answer was, "The verse is written superfluously. How is this? It is written, 'And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place where He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, etc.' (Deuteronomy 14:23); why did He need to come back and write, 'You may not eat within your gates?' And if you shall say that it is to [make it into a full-fledged] negative commandment - if so, let the verse say, 'You may not eat them within your gates.' Why did the verse need to go back and write all of them ('your new grain or your wine or your oil')? We hear from this, that it is to separate [it into three distinct commandments]." And there, after give and take, it is clarified that it was not necessary for Him to say, "and parched grain" (Leviticus 23:14), such that it was truly mentioned to separate - that one would be liable for parched grain on its own. And in the Talmud, they asked by way of rejection, "Maybe one is separately liable to receive lashes for parched grain" - for it is truly mentioned for this - "whereas for bread and fresh stalks, one is [only] liable for one [set of] lashes?" So they answered, "For what law did the Merciful One write, 'parched grain,' in between [the others]? To tell you that one who eats bread, parched grain and fresh stalks is liable for each and every one [individually]."
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The Sabbath Epistle
I mention this interpretation to counter the heretics who do not believe the words of our Rabbis that the Sabbath extends from dusk to dusk. The true interpretation is what the Rabbis recorded, namely, that the Sabbath was given at Marah.7 “Israel was instructed in ten laws at Marah. Seven of these were accepted by the descendents of Noah. Three additional laws were courts, Sabbath, and respect for parents” (Sanhedrin 56b). The incident at Marah (Exodus 15:22–26) took place before the appearance of the manna (ibid., chapter 16). Scripture mentions “tomorrow” and not “this night,” for Scripture usually speaks of what is common, namely, that people work during the day. The meaning of “holy Sabbath” is that they should rest, and that is what they did, “The nation rested on the seventh day” (ibid. 16:30). In Jeremiah it is written: “to sanctify the Sabbath day by not working on it” (17:24). Moses mentioned “tomorrow,” which is daytime, because he addressed what is common. Similarly, “Man goes out to his activity and to his work until evening” (Psalms 104:23). Likewise, “You should not eat meat that was torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30), although the same prohibition applies to what was torn in a house. Similarly, “an occurrence at night” (Deuteronomy 23:11);8 This does not exclude an occurrence of the day. “an ox or a donkey fell there” (Exodus 21:33);9 Ox or donkey are not exclusive. and many more in the Torah like these.
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Chofetz Chaim
(15) And if the other were an orphan or a widow, even if they were wealthy, and he spoke demeaningly before them, he also transgresses (Shemoth 22:21): "Every widow and orphan you shall not afflict," the Torah exhorting hereby not to taunt them or sadden their heart with any kind of sorrow. The punishment for this is explicit in the Torah (Ibid 23): "And My wrath shall burn, and I shall kill you by the sword, and your wives will be widows, and your children, orphans."
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol III
To be sure, wars of self-defense are recognized by Halakhah, not only as permissible, but as mandatory in nature. Such military action is the sole form of warfare requiring neither a king, Sanhedrin nor urim ve-tumim. Nevertheless, self-defense on the part of an individual is justifiable on entirely different grounds. Self-defense is recognized by Jewish law as justifiable homicide. Not only is the taking of the life of an aggressor sanctioned when necessary to preserve one's own life but such action is obligatory. Moreover, unlike common law, Judaism regards such intervention as also mandatory in order to save the life of a third person who is putatively the innocent victim of an aggressor.15See Rambam, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 1:9. There also are situations in which homicidal intent is imputed to a malevolent individual even in the absence of overt demonstration of murderous intent. The Bible declares, "If a thief be found breaking in and he be smitten so that he dies, there shall be no bloodguiltiness for him" (Exodus 22:1). The verse refers to a burglar who has designs only upon the property of his victim. Since he is not intent upon bloodshed, killing the perpetrator would consititute force that, under the circumstances, would appear to be entirely disproportionate. Yet the Gemara, Sanhedrin 72a, elucidates the biblical exoneration of the victim in his use of lethal force with the explanation, "It is to be presumed that a person [faced with loss] of his money does not restrain himself. This [perpetrator] says to himself, 'If I go [there], he will oppose me and not let me [steal his property]; if he opposes me, I will kill him.' "
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Shev Shmat'ta
(Alef) The Psalmist said in Ps. 50:18, 20, “When you see a thief, you fall in with him, and throw in your lot with adulterers. You are busy maligning your brother, defaming the son of your mother.” It appears to me [that this can be explained] according to that which is written in Netsach Israel, chapter 25:68Maharal, Netsach Yisrael, pp. 126-127 in London edition.
We were asked, “How is it that Israelites are constantly yearning to [do] bad, etc.? As he seeks evil for the one who is his compatriot in Torah and in the commandments. And [yet] the Torah states (Lev. 19:18), ‘and you shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” And I answered him, etc. However this trait is not in Israel from the angle of ‘an evil soul desires evil.’ As from the angle of their essence, this holy people is deserving of all the importance and status, etc. And the one who is important based on his own nature will [naturally] seek status (and this is what causes the Jews to hurt each other). As you will not find a villager jealous of a great minister, but rather a sage of another sage, a wealthy man of a wealthy man and a strong man of a strong man, etc. Rather this thing comes from [their appropriate] sense of importance. And the proof to this is that it is perfectly obvious that when one of them is in distress, all of them step forward like ‘a brother for adversity.’ And that is because Israel is one nation, etc. And it is not like the traits of licentiousness, etc., as that thing would show great lowliness, etc. And they are stiff-necked from repenting, etc. Because they are far from physicality, they are not [easily] impacted, but rather hold on to their traits, etc. [See there.]
And for this reason, he said, “When you see a thief, you fall in with him, and throw in your lot with adulterers” – and that is from the side of crass physicality and it is lowliness. But, “You are busy maligning your brother, etc.,” is from the side of an elevated form, and as is written in Netsach Yisrael. And they are two opposites of one issue. And ‘there should not be [lowliness] like this in Israel’ – the holy people that comes from a good nature. And that which is in Parashat Netzaivm (Deut. 29:21-26) is elucidated by this:
And later generations will ask—the children who succeed you, and foreigners who come from distant lands and see the plagues and diseases that the Lord has inflicted upon that land. All its soil burnt by sulfur and salt, etc. And all the nations will say, “Why did the Lord do thus to this land; wherefore that awful wrath?” And they will be told, “Because they forsook the covenant that the Lord, etc. And they turned to the service of other gods and worshiped them – gods whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them. So the Lord was incensed at that land, etc.”
And Rashi explained [the phrase], “whom they had not known,” [as] they had not known the strength of divinity in them. And Onkelos translated [it as, these gods] did not do good to them – as the one they selected for a god did not give them any inheritance or portion. See there. And at first glance, [this needs] precision – as had it given them an inheritance and a portion, the ‘prohibition [against worshiping it] would still stand in its place. [It is] as we expound in the Gemara,69See Bamidbar Rabbah 20:9. “He exalts (masgi, which can also be read as fools) nations, then destroys them” (Job 12:23); such that it appears to them that they are healed by idolatry, etc. And see that with the generation of the flood it is written (Gen. 6:13), “and behold I will destroy them with the earth.” And the Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, expounded [it as] (Bereishit Rabbah 31:7), “with the land” – three handbreadths of the depth of a plow were despoiled. And the sin of the land was that the Lord said (Gen. 1:11) that the land should give forth “trees of fruit” – that the taste of the tree be like the fruit; but it made “trees that made fruit” (Gen. 1:12).70Bereishit Rabbah 5:9. [It did this] because [its] material was coarse; and this caused man to incline towards physicality. And [so] the Lord said (Gen. 3:17), “Cursed is the earth for the sake of man” – as the damage was evident in man. And for this reason, [people] in the generation of the flood also sinned in physicality – violent theft, sexual immorality and murder; and this was because of the sin of the land. And therefore it was punished. And in the Guide71Guide for the Perplexed 1:36., [Rambam] wrote that we only find [the terms], awful wrath and jealousy [attributed to God] with idolatry, [since it is understandable that] the Lord has awful wrath about this. See there. But the sin of idolatry is from the angle of the form (the spiritual side) – and that it is the loss of the intellect, as it is written in Gur Aryeh.72Perhaps the reference is to Gur Aryeh on Exodus 22:30. That is why the verse stated, “And all the nations will say, ‘Why did the Lord do thus to this land’” – since if their sin was from the spiritual side, the land did not sin. But if we say that the sin was from the side of physicality; you would still ask, “‘wherefore that awful wrath,’” as this is only with idolatry – as is written in the Guide – and that is from the angle of the intellect. “And they will be told, ‘Because they forsook, etc. and worshiped other gods’” – and the awful wrath was for that. And “whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them” – meaning that they did not apportion them any good and they did not know them [to be] with divine powers, and this was not from a confused intellect, such that ‘He fools the nations.’ Rather it was from the side of crass physicality that [such] anarchy was pleasing to them. And that was the sin of the land, and hence, “all its soil was burnt.” However, if people do righteous deeds, ‘the desolate land will be worked.’
We were asked, “How is it that Israelites are constantly yearning to [do] bad, etc.? As he seeks evil for the one who is his compatriot in Torah and in the commandments. And [yet] the Torah states (Lev. 19:18), ‘and you shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” And I answered him, etc. However this trait is not in Israel from the angle of ‘an evil soul desires evil.’ As from the angle of their essence, this holy people is deserving of all the importance and status, etc. And the one who is important based on his own nature will [naturally] seek status (and this is what causes the Jews to hurt each other). As you will not find a villager jealous of a great minister, but rather a sage of another sage, a wealthy man of a wealthy man and a strong man of a strong man, etc. Rather this thing comes from [their appropriate] sense of importance. And the proof to this is that it is perfectly obvious that when one of them is in distress, all of them step forward like ‘a brother for adversity.’ And that is because Israel is one nation, etc. And it is not like the traits of licentiousness, etc., as that thing would show great lowliness, etc. And they are stiff-necked from repenting, etc. Because they are far from physicality, they are not [easily] impacted, but rather hold on to their traits, etc. [See there.]
And for this reason, he said, “When you see a thief, you fall in with him, and throw in your lot with adulterers” – and that is from the side of crass physicality and it is lowliness. But, “You are busy maligning your brother, etc.,” is from the side of an elevated form, and as is written in Netsach Yisrael. And they are two opposites of one issue. And ‘there should not be [lowliness] like this in Israel’ – the holy people that comes from a good nature. And that which is in Parashat Netzaivm (Deut. 29:21-26) is elucidated by this:
And later generations will ask—the children who succeed you, and foreigners who come from distant lands and see the plagues and diseases that the Lord has inflicted upon that land. All its soil burnt by sulfur and salt, etc. And all the nations will say, “Why did the Lord do thus to this land; wherefore that awful wrath?” And they will be told, “Because they forsook the covenant that the Lord, etc. And they turned to the service of other gods and worshiped them – gods whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them. So the Lord was incensed at that land, etc.”
And Rashi explained [the phrase], “whom they had not known,” [as] they had not known the strength of divinity in them. And Onkelos translated [it as, these gods] did not do good to them – as the one they selected for a god did not give them any inheritance or portion. See there. And at first glance, [this needs] precision – as had it given them an inheritance and a portion, the ‘prohibition [against worshiping it] would still stand in its place. [It is] as we expound in the Gemara,69See Bamidbar Rabbah 20:9. “He exalts (masgi, which can also be read as fools) nations, then destroys them” (Job 12:23); such that it appears to them that they are healed by idolatry, etc. And see that with the generation of the flood it is written (Gen. 6:13), “and behold I will destroy them with the earth.” And the Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, expounded [it as] (Bereishit Rabbah 31:7), “with the land” – three handbreadths of the depth of a plow were despoiled. And the sin of the land was that the Lord said (Gen. 1:11) that the land should give forth “trees of fruit” – that the taste of the tree be like the fruit; but it made “trees that made fruit” (Gen. 1:12).70Bereishit Rabbah 5:9. [It did this] because [its] material was coarse; and this caused man to incline towards physicality. And [so] the Lord said (Gen. 3:17), “Cursed is the earth for the sake of man” – as the damage was evident in man. And for this reason, [people] in the generation of the flood also sinned in physicality – violent theft, sexual immorality and murder; and this was because of the sin of the land. And therefore it was punished. And in the Guide71Guide for the Perplexed 1:36., [Rambam] wrote that we only find [the terms], awful wrath and jealousy [attributed to God] with idolatry, [since it is understandable that] the Lord has awful wrath about this. See there. But the sin of idolatry is from the angle of the form (the spiritual side) – and that it is the loss of the intellect, as it is written in Gur Aryeh.72Perhaps the reference is to Gur Aryeh on Exodus 22:30. That is why the verse stated, “And all the nations will say, ‘Why did the Lord do thus to this land’” – since if their sin was from the spiritual side, the land did not sin. But if we say that the sin was from the side of physicality; you would still ask, “‘wherefore that awful wrath,’” as this is only with idolatry – as is written in the Guide – and that is from the angle of the intellect. “And they will be told, ‘Because they forsook, etc. and worshiped other gods’” – and the awful wrath was for that. And “whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them” – meaning that they did not apportion them any good and they did not know them [to be] with divine powers, and this was not from a confused intellect, such that ‘He fools the nations.’ Rather it was from the side of crass physicality that [such] anarchy was pleasing to them. And that was the sin of the land, and hence, “all its soil was burnt.” However, if people do righteous deeds, ‘the desolate land will be worked.’
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Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat
One who curses an Israelite,1Mishna Sheb. 35a and Gemara ibid. 36a. and even [if] he curses himself,2Tur — G. Mishna and Gemara ibid.: ‘For it is written, Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul (life) diligently (Deut. IV, 9. In Ber. 32a this verse is taken to mean that one should take good care of the body and its needs and not subject himself to dangers whence it is implied that it is forbidden to curse oneself) and … wherever it is said, take heed, lest, or not, it is nothing but a negative precept (Hence, in this verse take heed to thyself also means ‘do not invoke any curse upon thyself’).’ — by the [Divine] Name or by a substitute,3Mishna ibid.: ‘(If one said to witnesses, I adjure you) by Alef-Daleth (the first two letters of Adonai, the Lord) or by Yod-He (the Tetragrammaton) or by Shaddai (the Almighty) or by Ẓebaoth ([Lord] of Hosts) or by the Merciful and Gracious One, or by Him that is long-suffering and of great kindness, or by any of the substitutes of the Name, they are liable … If a man cursed himself or his fellow by any of them, he transgresses a negative precept.’ Gemara ibid. 36a: ‘R. Jannai said: This is the view of both (i.e., R. Meir and the Sages both agree that one who curses himself or his neighbour not merely by the Name, but even by any of the substitutes, transgresses a negative precept).’ or by one of the names that the heathens call the Holy One, Blessed be He,4 San. 60a whence it is derived that substitutes for the Divine Name employed by heathens are considered valid substitutes. Cf. also Ned. 3a, 10a where substitutes regarding vows are considered the foreign equivalents of the Hebrew. Thus Yad, Sanhedrin XXVI, 3 and Tur a.l. — if this took place in the presence of witnesses5 Deut. XIX, 15. and [was preceded by] warning,6 Ket. 33a. he receives lashes7Thus was the procedure in Temple days. Derived from Tem. 3a-b, 4a: ‘R. Iddi b. Abin stated on the authority of R. Amram, R. Isaac and R. Joḥanan: R. Jose the Galilean reported: With regards to every negative precept laid down in the Torah, if one performs an act (in violating it) he is punished with lashes, but if he does not perform an act (in violating it) he is exempt, save in the case of one who takes an oath, exchanges (an unconsecrated animal for one that is consecrated), and curses his fellow with the Name, in which cases, although he performed no act, he is punished (with lashes) … And he who curses his neighbour with the Name: Whence is this derived? — R. Eleazar stated on the authority of R. Oshaia: The text reads, If thou wilt not observe to do etc. (Deut. XXVIII, 58. The verse continues: That thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord thy God, which intimates that one should not utter the Divine Name in vain and likewise one who curses his neighbour with the Divine Name is included in the same category). And it is written, Then the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful (v. 59). Now I do not know what is the nature of this wonder (peculiarity of punishment). But when it says (ibid. XXV, 2): That the judge cause him to lie down to be beaten (והפילו which is similar to the expression והפלא He will make … wonderful), this indicates that the wonderful (punishment) refers to punishment with lashes … Why not say … since he transgresses two things, first in uttering the Lord’s Name in vain and then in irritating his fellow, consequently, punishment with lashes should not suffice? — You cannot say thus, for it is written, Thou shalt not curse the deaf (Lev. XIX, 14 whether with or without the Divine Name).’ Thus also in Y. Sheb. IV, 10(35d) in accord with R. Jose contra the Colleagues. , however, RaBaD to Yad ibid. who on the basis of Y. ibid. deduces that if one cursed with a substitute he is not punished by lashes. It is only when he curses with the Tetragrammaton, although no act is performed, yet lashes are administered. , Kes. Mish. to Yad ibid. who defends Maim. against RaBaD’s stricture. on account of [the negative precept] 'Thou shalt not curse the deaf,'8Lev. XIX, 14. Actually the negative precept Thou shalt not curse the deaf includes all persons. The deaf was singled out, although he does not hear and is not subjected to any suffering, so that people should not take advantage of his infirmity. Thus Yad, Sanhedrin XXVI, 1 and Tur a.l. — M.E. Cf. also Sifra to Lev. ibid. and if [the cursed person] was a Judge, he receives additional lashes on account of [the negative precept] 'Thou shalt not curse the Judges.'9Ex. XXII, 27. Thus San. 66a. This, however, refers to a permanent Judge — P.Tesh. And [if one cursed by] Arur it is considered a form of curse.10Sheb. 36a. It must, however, contain the Name or its substitutes — M.E.
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Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
You should be very careful [in the way you treat] orphans and widows, to speak only kindly to them, to treat them respectfully, not to hurt them even with words,59This prohibition includes taunting widows and orphans, causing them anger, wounding their feelings, oppressing them, and causing them financial loss. because their souls are very depressed and their spirits are low, even if they are wealthy. Even [regarding] the widow and the orphans of a king, we are warned [in the Torah], for it is said: "Do not mistreat a widow or an orphan."60Exodus 22:21. A covenant was made [with widows and orphans] by Him Whose Word called the world into being, that whenever they cry because of an injustice that was done to them, their [cries] will be answered, for it is said: "For if he cries out to Me I will hear his cry."61Ibid. 22:22. This applies only where someone hurts them for his own benefit. But if a teacher afflicts them in order to teach them Torah or a trade, or to lead them on a straight path, this is permitted. Nevertheless, [the teacher] should be careful to guide them gently and with great compassion, for it is said: "For God will plead their cause."62Proverbs 23:11. [In all of these laws, it makes no difference] whether he is an orphan from his father or an orphan from his mother. And for how long are they considered orphans in this regard? Until they are able to take care of all their needs by themselves as all other adults.
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Gray Matter III
In addition, Rav Zev Weitman observes (Techumin 22:460-463) that today, a significant number of cows throughout the world undergo a surgical procedure that renders them (and the milk they produce) tereifot.21The third chapter of Masechet Chullin outlines eighteen defects in an animal from which one could expect that the animal will die within a year, rendering it forbidden to eat due to the prohibition to eat a tereifah (Shemot 22:30). A perforation in an animal’s stomach is one of these eighteen defects, and a contemporary surgical procedure involves making a hole in the animal’s stomach, albeit for therapeutic purposes. Rabbinic monitoring of the situation is necessary to ascertain that this procedure does not become common enough to render generic milk as non-kosher.22Rav Weitman believes that this would cause all milk to become problematic because the lenient approaches outlined above all rely on the assumption that the milk supply is uncontaminated with non-kosher milk. Since milk from treifot is not kosher (following the rule “yotzei min hatamei tamei,” “that which emerges from a non-kosher source is not kosher;” see Bechorot 5b), the original reasons that prompted Chazal to prohibit chalav akum would again apply. One could argue, though, that the enactment stems only due to concern for milk from a non-kosher animal, not milk from an animal defined as a tereifah. The Orthodox Union (see Mesorah 10:62-68), though, follows the rulings of Rav Yisroel Belsky and Rav Moshe Heinemann that this currently is not a problem in the United States, but one may not assume that this is not a problem in other parts of the world without consulting a competent Rav.23See Rav Michoel Zylberman’s essay in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (54:93-113) for a presentation of the lenient considerations and opinions regarding the concern that most dairy cows today are treifot. See also Rav J. David Bleich’s essay on this topic in Tradition (41:1:55-70).
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Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
It is a positive commandment to give charity to poor Jewish people, as it is said "Open your hand to him."1Deuteronomy 15:8. And it is said: "That your brother may live with you."2Leviticus 25:36. Anyone who sees a poor person seeking help and ignores him, and does not give him charity, transgresses a prohibitive commandment, as it is said: "Do not harden your heart nor shut your hand from your brother in need."3Numbers 15:7. [Giving] charity is a characteristic of the descendants of Abraham, as it is said: "For I have a special love for him because he commands his children and his household after him [to preserve the way of Hashem] doing charity and justice."4Genesis 18:19. And the throne of Israel will be established and the religion of truth confirmed only through charity, as it is said: "Through charity will you be reestablished."5Isaiah 54:14. Greater is he who performs acts of charity than [one who brings] all the sacrifices, as it is said: "Performing acts of charity and justice is more desirable to Hashem than sacrifices."6Proverbs 21:3. The Jewish people will be redeemed only through [the merit of] charity, as it is said: "Zion will be redeemed through justice and its captives through acts of charity."7Isaiah 1:27. A person never becomes poor through giving charity, nor will any evil or harm befall him because of his giving charity, as it is said: Through acts of charity, there will be peace."8Isaiah 32:17. Whoever is merciful with others will be treated with mercy [from Heaven], as it is said: "He [God] will show you mercy; and have compassion upon you and multiply you."9Deuteronomy 13:18. Anyone who is cruel, causes his lineage to be suspect.10The descendants of Abraham are known for their kindness and generosity. One who does not possess this attitude causes his lineage to be doubtful. The Holy One blessed is He, is near to the cry of the poor, as it is said: "He will hear the cry of the poor."11Job 34:28. Therefore one must beware of their anguished cry, for a covenant was made with them, as it is said: "When he cries out to me I will listen, for I am compassionate."12Exodus 22:26. The Jerusalem Talmud says: The door that doesn't open for the poor will open for the doctor. A person should consider, that he continually requests his sustenance from the Holy One blessed is He; and just as he requests that the Holy One blessed is He, listen to his cry and prayer, so should he listen to the cry of the poor. A person should also consider that [fortune] is a wheel that revolves in the world, and in the end he or his children or his children's children might [have to] accept charity. Let no man think: "Why should I diminish my wealth by giving it to the poor?" For he should know that the money is not his, but rather [it was given to him as] a trust, with which to do the will of the One Who entrusted the funds to him. And this [charity giving] will be his real share from all his toils in this world, As it is written:13Isaiah 58:8. "Your acts of charity shall preceed you [into the World to Come]. Charity voids evil decrees and prolongs life.
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Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer
All the Laws Concerning Betrothal of a Minor • 27 Paragraphs
The father may betroth his daughter without her consent, all the time she is a minor. Likewise when she is a na’arah47op. cit., note 36. the father has control over her and the betrothal money belongs to him. Likewise he is entitled to her finds, to the production of her hands, and to her wedding contract.48Ketubah in Hebrew. A document recording the financial obligations which the husband undertakes toward his wife in respect of, and consequent to, their obligations, which are imposed upon him by law. The main component is the amount determined by law as the minimum that the wife is entitled to receive from her husband or his estate on dissolution of the marriage. The liability of payment is pentateuchal. Exodus 22:15-16 but the halakhah is that the Ketubah is rabbinical law. If she be widowed or divorced from the betrothal, he is entitled to everything until she comes of age. Therefore the father accepts the betrothal money, etc. of his daughter from the day she is born until she comes of age. Even if she was a deaf-mute or insane and the father betrothed her, behold she is a fully married woman. If she were three years old and one day she may be betrothed by means of Bi’ah49If a man in the presence of two competent witnesses, says to a woman. “Behold you are consecrated to me with this act of sexual intercourse according to the law of Moses and of Israel,” and in their presence the groom takes the bride into a private place for the purpose of Kidushin, she will upon completion of the act be betrothed. with the consent of her father. If she is younger than this, if her father hands her over for intercourse, she is not betrothed. [Note: There are those who say that there is no binding betrothal with a non-viable infant,50In Hebrew Nephel. The term refers to an infant which has not survived a minimum of thirty days after birth. This concept developed so that all children could be considered to have had a full nine month gestation period. if his father accepted for her a betrothal and the one who betrothes her later betrothes her sister, she needs a bill of divorce.] (Or Zarua)
The father may betroth his daughter without her consent, all the time she is a minor. Likewise when she is a na’arah47op. cit., note 36. the father has control over her and the betrothal money belongs to him. Likewise he is entitled to her finds, to the production of her hands, and to her wedding contract.48Ketubah in Hebrew. A document recording the financial obligations which the husband undertakes toward his wife in respect of, and consequent to, their obligations, which are imposed upon him by law. The main component is the amount determined by law as the minimum that the wife is entitled to receive from her husband or his estate on dissolution of the marriage. The liability of payment is pentateuchal. Exodus 22:15-16 but the halakhah is that the Ketubah is rabbinical law. If she be widowed or divorced from the betrothal, he is entitled to everything until she comes of age. Therefore the father accepts the betrothal money, etc. of his daughter from the day she is born until she comes of age. Even if she was a deaf-mute or insane and the father betrothed her, behold she is a fully married woman. If she were three years old and one day she may be betrothed by means of Bi’ah49If a man in the presence of two competent witnesses, says to a woman. “Behold you are consecrated to me with this act of sexual intercourse according to the law of Moses and of Israel,” and in their presence the groom takes the bride into a private place for the purpose of Kidushin, she will upon completion of the act be betrothed. with the consent of her father. If she is younger than this, if her father hands her over for intercourse, she is not betrothed. [Note: There are those who say that there is no binding betrothal with a non-viable infant,50In Hebrew Nephel. The term refers to an infant which has not survived a minimum of thirty days after birth. This concept developed so that all children could be considered to have had a full nine month gestation period. if his father accepted for her a betrothal and the one who betrothes her later betrothes her sister, she needs a bill of divorce.] (Or Zarua)
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol III
In analyzing the "law of the pursuer": formulated in Exodus 22:2, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 72a, states, "… if the matter is clear to you as the sun that he is not at peace with you, slay him; but if not, do not slay him."8See R. Isaac Schorr, Teshuvot Koaḥ Shor, no. 20; R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, Teshuvot Aḥi‘ezer, I, no. 23, sec. 2; and R. Moses Feinstein, Ha-Pardes, Nisan 5728, reprinted in Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Maran ha-Gri Abramsky (Jerusalem, 5738), and in Iggerot Mosheh, Ḥoshen Mishpat, II, no. 69, sec. 2. This is true whether the putative aggressor be a Jew or a non-Jew. While the taking of the life of a non-Jew does not occasion capital punishment at the hands of a human court, Ravan, Baba Kamma 111b, and Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 2:11, are quite clear in ruling that taking the life of a non-Jew is encompassed in the prohibition against homicide. Explicit authority for that ruling is found in Mekhilta, Mishpatim 4:58. Indeed, there are many forms of homicide for which Jewish law does not prescribe capital punishment. The nature of the punishment administered and the absence of the severest form of punishment does not at all indicate that the act is to be condoned.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge concerning damages of destruction: To judge concerning the damages of the tooth and the foot - meaning to say one who damaged his fellow with a damage that came as a result of [his animal's] foot or tooth - that we must obligate him in payment from his choice properties for all that he destroyed, as it is stated (Exodus 22:4), "If a man destroys the field, etc. For example, one who brings his animal into the field of his fellow and he ate there; or destroyed those things that sustain themselves from it, when it passed through there with its feet. And they, may their memory be blessed, explained that it is [referring to] the tooth (Bava Kamma 2b). And they, may their memory be blessed, explained that that which is written afterwards, "and he sent its destroyer, etc." [refers to] the foot. And it is stated about both of them, "and with the best of his field and the best of his vineyard shall he pay.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge damages from fire: To judge and obligate one, who has damaged his fellow with fire, to pay - for example, [if] he lit his stockpile or burned anything of his - as it is stated (Exodus 22:5), "If a fire goes out, etc." The understanding of "goes out" implies even if it went out on its own (Bava Batra 22b), and it comes to warn even if one lit [a fire] on his own [property] and it went out on its own and it damaged, that he is liable - since he did not watch his coals. As a man is obligated to watch his fire that it not [spread] and damage, since it is the way of fire to spread on its own, even though it is not a living being.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
Ralbag may, however, be understood as asserting that any natural act performed in common with lower animals does not constitute a form of labor provided that the act is final rather than instrumental in nature. Eating is clearly such an act. Capturing an animal, when carried out by a human being, is far different from capture of one animal by another. The animal consumes its prey immediately; a man does not. For man, the normal way for obtaining milk is by a process of manual milking, an act that is only preparatory to drinking the milk, as opposed to an act of suckling in which the purpose is achieved immediately.32This understanding of Ralbag is reflected in a note by R. Ya’akov Leib Levy on Exodus 22:9 in the Mossad Harav Kook edition of Ralbag’s commentary on the Torah, Perushei ha-Torah le-Rabbenu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag) (Jerusalem, 5755) edited by Rabbi Levy. It therefore stands to reason that activities yielding effects produced as a result of entirely usual human and animal function, e.g., locomotion and the giving off of body heat, and not designed for any further purpose should not be among activities forbidden on Shabbat.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge the case of an unpaid guardian: To judge the case of an unpaid guardian, as it is stated (Exodus 22:6), "If a man gives his neighbor silver or vessels to keep, etc." And the explanation that comes for it (Bava Metzia 94b) is that this section is stated about an unpaid guardian. And therefore it exempted him from [liability for] theft. And the understanding of "unpaid" is that the [guardian] did not receive any wage for his guardianship from the [owner].
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge the case of a plaintiff and a defendant: That we have been commanded to judge the case of a plaintiff and a defendant in a court, meaning to say that we adjudicate the case of anyone who makes a claim against his fellow about anything - or that he lent him or deposited with him or that [the other] stole from him or exploited him or extorted him - as it is stated (Exodus 22:8), "About any misdeed, etc. about which he will say that this is it." And the explanation comes about this expression of "that this is it," that we do not make an oath by writ of the Torah unless the defendant admits to part of the loan. But if he says, "There never were [such] things," or " I returned it all," with a loan and even with a deposit, he is exempted from an oath by writ of the Torah (Bava Kamma 106b). And this is what they, may their memory be blessed, said in the Gemara (Bava Kamma 107a) that when it is written, "that this is it," it is written about a loan; meaning to say about the claim of a loan, which is that I paid it or that there were never [such] things. But about the claim of guardians - which is a claim of matters beyond his control or [of] theft - even if he does not admit to part [of the claim] but rather says that everything was beyond his control, he is obligated to take an oath. And included in this verse are all of the claims between people that bring with them admission or denial.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge the case of one who takes a wage and of a renter: To judge the case of one who takes a wage and a renter. And the understanding of one who takes a wage is someone who guards a deposited item for a wage they give to him for guarding [it]; and [of] a renter is like its simple meaning, that he rented an animal from his fellow to ride or to do work, or he rented movable objects from him. And [if a] disagreement arose between the renter and the owner or between the owner of the deposited item and the one guarding it for a wage, it is a commandment upon us to adjudicate between them, as it is written in this section (Exodus 22:9), "If a man gives to another a donkey, an ox, a sheep or any animal to guard, etc."
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment to judge the case of the borrower: To judge the case of the borrower, meaning to say a man who borrows any object or animal from his fellow. And borrowing is without a wage at all, but rather, he is doing a kindness for him to do him this favor. And if a disagreement breaks out between them about the matter, we must judge the law that is stated about this [upon] them, as it is written in this section (Exodus 22:13), “And if a man borrows from his neighbor, etc.” And regarding the law of the borrower, the Torah made [him] liable even for things of duress (out of his control) - as it is his responsibility: Since he borrowed it and did not put out any thing of his for it, behold he is like one who took out a monetary loan - who if something beyond his control occurred to him could not be exempt from [paying the] creditor, with the claim that it was duress. And about the matter that he is exempt if borrowing in the presence of the owners, we can say according to the simple understanding that the Torah did not make the borrower liable since the owner of the vessel or or the animal is with him - as since he is there, he will guard what is his. And even though the borrower is [still] exempt after the owners left [him], if they were there at the time of the borrowing - it is possible to answer about this that the Torah did not want to give different measures for its words and state that if the owners stay long, he will be exempt, but if [only] a little, he will be liable. [Instead,] the Torah commanded more generally that so long as the owners are there at the time of the borrowing, he will be exempt. And this is the reason that they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 95b), that if he was there with him at the time of the borrowing – even if he was not with him at the time of it breaking or dying – he is exempt; but if he was with him at the time of the breaking or the dying but he was not there at the time of the borrowing, he is liable. As the procedure depends on the beginning of the matter. And this very same reason suffices for us regarding that which he is also exempt if he rents [something] in the presence of the owners.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that we were commanded that any animal sacrifice that we offer be eight days old or more - and not less. And this is [the commandment of] that which is lacking time in its body. And that is His saying, "it shall stay seven days with its mother" (Leviticus 22:27). And this commandment has already been repeated with a different language. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "seven days it shall stay with its mother" (Exodus 22:29). And this commandment completely includes all of the sacrifices. And there is a proof that it is not accepted before then from His saying, "and from the eighth day, it will be accepted as a burnt-sacrifice to the Lord" (Leviticus 22:27). Behold the prohibition of offering that which is lacking time has already been demonstrated. However it is a negative commandment derived from a positive commandment. Hence we do not give lashes for it. So one who sacrifices [an animal] which is lacking time does not receive lashes, as it is explained in the chapter [entitled] Oto ve'et Beno (Chullin 80b). And there, it is said, "Leave that which is lacking time, as Scripture rectified it by a positive commandment." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the Sifrei and at the end of Tractate Zevachim. (See Parashat Emor; Mishneh Torah, Things Forbidden on the Altar 3).
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment on the court to judge the case of a seducer: To judge the case of a seducer - meaning to say one who seduces a virgin – that we should judge him according to his statute that is written about him in the section, as it is stated (Exodus 22:15), "And if a man seduces a virgin, etc." And the matter of seduction is that he tells her things that are false or [even] true until she gives in to him.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not keep a witch alive: To not keep a witch alive. Rather, we kill her, as it is stated (Exodus 22:17), "You shall not keep a witch alive." And it is not specifically a witch, but rather anyone that does magic. It is just that it stated it according to what is common, as women are more involved with magic than men (Sanhedrin 67a).
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not oppress the convert with words: That we have been prevented from oppressing converts, even [only] with words - and that is one from the [other] nations who converted and entered our religion - such that is forbidden for [one] to disgrace him even with words, as it is stated (Exodus 22:20), "and you shall not oppress a convert." And even though we are warned about this with [Jews] and since this one entered our religion, behold is like [any other Jew], Scripture added a warning to us and also redoubled the prohibition for him, as it is written (Leviticus 19:33), "do not oppress" another time; because the issue of oppression is more relevant to a convert than it is to [another Jew], as [another Jew] has redeemers who will redress his insult. And there is another reason, [and that is] because there is a concern that [the convert] might return to his deviance out of anger over the disgraces. And they said in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:2) that one shouldn't say, "Yesterday you were an idolater and now you entered under the wings of the Divine Presence."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not oppress the convert regarding money: That we have been prevented to not oppress the convert regarding money - that if we have give and take (business matters) with him, to not oppress him - as it is stated (Exodus 22:20), "you shall not pressure him." And they said in the Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:2, "'You shall not pressure him' is regarding money." And this negative commandment is in addition to the negative commandment in which he is included with all of Israel, as they are [covered] by the [that] negative commandment of monetary oppression. And they are warned about him [both] regarding words and regarding money, due to the reason that we have written. All of its statutes are in the commandment that preceded this (Sefer HaChinukh 63). And in the negative commandment of monetary oppression of Israel (Sefer HaChinukh 337), we will write a few of the details of fraud, with God's help (see Tur, Choshen Mishpat 307).
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not abuse the orphan and the widow: That we have been prevented from burdening - by action or even by speech - the orphans and the widows, as it is stated (Exodus 22:20), "Every widow and orphan you shall not abuse." Rather, all of a person's give and take (business matters) with them should be calm and with kindness and pity.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not abuse the orphan and the widow: That we have been prevented from burdening - by action or even by speech - the orphans and the widows, as it is stated (Exodus 22:20), "Every widow and orphan you shall not abuse." Rather, all of a person's give and take (business matters) with them should be calm and with kindness and pity.
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Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
Preface
The Torah writes: אִם כֶּסֶף תַּלְוֶה אֶת עַמִי אֶת הֶעֳנִי עִמָךְ לאׁ תִהְיֶה לוֹ כְּנוֹשֶׁה לאׁ תְשִׂימוּן עָלָיו נֶשֶׁךְ "When you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, do not press him for payment, do not take interest payment from him" (Ex. 22:24).The Torah obligates us to lend money to one less fortunate than we, but, at the same time, forbids us to derive benefit from making this loan. Any benefit derived thereof is called רִבִּית—interest.There are two major categories of ribis:1) Ribis deoraisa (רִבִּית דְאוֹרַייתָא) i.e. interest that is Scripturally prohibited. The classic case is when the lender stipulates at the time of the loan that the money is being lent with the condition that it be paid back with a set rate of interest. It makes no difference how high or how low the rate may be; in either case, it is ribis deoraisa and the lender must return the interest payment to the borrower. This holds true even where the borrower willingly agreed to the interest payment.2) Ribis derabanan (רִבִּית דְרַבָּנָן), i.e. interest that is Rabbinically prohibited, such as a) sa'ah besa'ah (see para. 11); b) avak ribis (אֲבַק רִבִּית), i.e. "a shade of ribis." The Torah prohibited only interest charged for a loan. The Rabbis added a prohibition on interest charged for a purchase; c) ribis mukdemes (רִבִּית מֻקְדֶמֶת), i.e. "pre-loan" ribis. The borrower sends money or gifts to the lender so that he will lend him money at a later date; d) ribis me'ucheres (רִבִּית מְאֻחֶרֶת), i.e. "post-loan" ribis. The lender did not set interest payments at the time of the loan, but the borrower paid interest at a later date. In cases of ribis derabanan, the Bais Din [Court] does not have the power to force the lender to return the interest collected, but it is, nevertheless, preferable in some cases that he do so on his own.The laws of ribis are complex and this chapter will only touch some of the fundamentals of this important subject. It is, therefore, extremely advisable that when a question of ribis arises, a competent rabbi, well-versed in these laws, should be consulted.
It being the nature of man to desire and lust after money, and it being more likely for man to transgress the prohibition of interest than other prohibitions concerning money, because where robbery and fraud and the like [are concerned], the victim usually protects himself against robbery or fraud. Also, one who wants to rob or defraud another, will often be inhibited because of shame or because of fear. This is not so concerning interest, for the borrower willingly pays and is happy that he has found a place to borrow even with interest. The lender, too, thinks to himself that he is doing a great favor to the borrower by enabling him to profit with this money, many times more than the interest. It is, therefore, very easy for the person to be seduced, Heaven forbid, by his evil inclination to transgress this prohibition. Therefore, the Torah was very stringent with this prohibition. And many prohibitary laws are said concerning it. The lender transgresses six prohibitory laws, and will not be included in the resurrection of the dead, for it is said: "He gave money [in return] for interest and he accepted interest, he shall not live."1Ezekiel 18: 13. The borrower transgresses three prohibitory laws. The scribe,2Who draws up the loan contract. the witnesses3Who witnesses the loan and sign the contract. and the co-signer each transgress one prohibitory law. [This applies] also [to] the broker who brought them together or if he was of help to one of them, for instance, directing the borrower to one from whom he could borrow, or if he directed the lender to one to whom he could lend, he, too, transgresses one prohibitory law.
The Torah writes: אִם כֶּסֶף תַּלְוֶה אֶת עַמִי אֶת הֶעֳנִי עִמָךְ לאׁ תִהְיֶה לוֹ כְּנוֹשֶׁה לאׁ תְשִׂימוּן עָלָיו נֶשֶׁךְ "When you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, do not press him for payment, do not take interest payment from him" (Ex. 22:24).The Torah obligates us to lend money to one less fortunate than we, but, at the same time, forbids us to derive benefit from making this loan. Any benefit derived thereof is called רִבִּית—interest.There are two major categories of ribis:1) Ribis deoraisa (רִבִּית דְאוֹרַייתָא) i.e. interest that is Scripturally prohibited. The classic case is when the lender stipulates at the time of the loan that the money is being lent with the condition that it be paid back with a set rate of interest. It makes no difference how high or how low the rate may be; in either case, it is ribis deoraisa and the lender must return the interest payment to the borrower. This holds true even where the borrower willingly agreed to the interest payment.2) Ribis derabanan (רִבִּית דְרַבָּנָן), i.e. interest that is Rabbinically prohibited, such as a) sa'ah besa'ah (see para. 11); b) avak ribis (אֲבַק רִבִּית), i.e. "a shade of ribis." The Torah prohibited only interest charged for a loan. The Rabbis added a prohibition on interest charged for a purchase; c) ribis mukdemes (רִבִּית מֻקְדֶמֶת), i.e. "pre-loan" ribis. The borrower sends money or gifts to the lender so that he will lend him money at a later date; d) ribis me'ucheres (רִבִּית מְאֻחֶרֶת), i.e. "post-loan" ribis. The lender did not set interest payments at the time of the loan, but the borrower paid interest at a later date. In cases of ribis derabanan, the Bais Din [Court] does not have the power to force the lender to return the interest collected, but it is, nevertheless, preferable in some cases that he do so on his own.The laws of ribis are complex and this chapter will only touch some of the fundamentals of this important subject. It is, therefore, extremely advisable that when a question of ribis arises, a competent rabbi, well-versed in these laws, should be consulted.
It being the nature of man to desire and lust after money, and it being more likely for man to transgress the prohibition of interest than other prohibitions concerning money, because where robbery and fraud and the like [are concerned], the victim usually protects himself against robbery or fraud. Also, one who wants to rob or defraud another, will often be inhibited because of shame or because of fear. This is not so concerning interest, for the borrower willingly pays and is happy that he has found a place to borrow even with interest. The lender, too, thinks to himself that he is doing a great favor to the borrower by enabling him to profit with this money, many times more than the interest. It is, therefore, very easy for the person to be seduced, Heaven forbid, by his evil inclination to transgress this prohibition. Therefore, the Torah was very stringent with this prohibition. And many prohibitary laws are said concerning it. The lender transgresses six prohibitory laws, and will not be included in the resurrection of the dead, for it is said: "He gave money [in return] for interest and he accepted interest, he shall not live."1Ezekiel 18: 13. The borrower transgresses three prohibitory laws. The scribe,2Who draws up the loan contract. the witnesses3Who witnesses the loan and sign the contract. and the co-signer each transgress one prohibitory law. [This applies] also [to] the broker who brought them together or if he was of help to one of them, for instance, directing the borrower to one from whom he could borrow, or if he directed the lender to one to whom he could lend, he, too, transgresses one prohibitory law.
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Sefer HaChinukh
And the orphans never receive [a curse] for anything that the custodian does; nor also does the custodian - since he is recalling on their behalf (Bava Metzia 74b). And so [too] is the law more generally regarding an agent who gives and takes with the knowledge of his sender, that neither of them receive [a curse]. And nonetheless, they said about them that it is permitted to oppress them a little for their benefit - for example a teacher towards his student in Torah or in a craft. However even for their benefit, it is a commandment to be more lenient upon them than upon other people. And they also said that there is a covenant made with them that their cries will be answered, as it is stated (Exodus 22:22), "I will surely hear his cry"; and that they are called orphans regarding the matter of this commandment until they do not need an adult for their business affairs, but rather administer all of their own needs like all other adults. And the rest of its details are elucidated in scattered places in the Gemara and in Midrash (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Human Dispositions 6).
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Sefer HaChinukh
And this commandment is practiced in every place and at all times by males and by females, that all people are obligated to treat them gently and honorably. And behold, one who transgresses it and angers them or taunts them or afflicts them or subjugates them or destroys their money - and all the more so, if he hits them - violates a negative commandment. And even though we do not administer lashes for this - as the affliction is not something [clearly] defined, such that we can give lashes for it, since the evil afflicter can make the lying claim that he afflicted them according to the law or for their benefit - God, may He be blessed, who examines the hearts, will [redress] their pain. And behold his punishment is explicit in the Torah, as it is stated (Exodus 22:23), "and I shall kill you with the sword" - meaning to say, measure for measure, such that the wives of the afflicters become widows and their children, orphans, and not find someone who has mercy upon them. As in the way that a person measures, so will he be measured (Sotah 8b). And if the afflicter is a female, she will die and her husband will marry another woman who will afflict her children. And they, may their memory be blessed, expounded, "if he will surely cry to Me" - a son complains to his father, a wife to her husband, a widow and orphan to Me, "and I will listen, as I am gracious" (Exodus 22:26). And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (on Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 256) counts the prohibition towards the orphan and the widow as two negative commandments, because of the reason we wrote above (Sefer HaChinukh 7).
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Sefer HaChinukh
And this commandment is practiced in every place and at all times by males and by females, that all people are obligated to treat them gently and honorably. And behold, one who transgresses it and angers them or taunts them or afflicts them or subjugates them or destroys their money - and all the more so, if he hits them - violates a negative commandment. And even though we do not administer lashes for this - as the affliction is not something [clearly] defined, such that we can give lashes for it, since the evil afflicter can make the lying claim that he afflicted them according to the law or for their benefit - God, may He be blessed, who examines the hearts, will [redress] their pain. And behold his punishment is explicit in the Torah, as it is stated (Exodus 22:23), "and I shall kill you with the sword" - meaning to say, measure for measure, such that the wives of the afflicters become widows and their children, orphans, and not find someone who has mercy upon them. As in the way that a person measures, so will he be measured (Sotah 8b). And if the afflicter is a female, she will die and her husband will marry another woman who will afflict her children. And they, may their memory be blessed, expounded, "if he will surely cry to Me" - a son complains to his father, a wife to her husband, a widow and orphan to Me, "and I will listen, as I am gracious" (Exodus 22:26). And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (on Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 256) counts the prohibition towards the orphan and the widow as two negative commandments, because of the reason we wrote above (Sefer HaChinukh 7).
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment of lending to the poor person: To lend to the poor person - according to what is in reach of one's hand - in accordance with what [the poor person] needs, in order to give him space and to lighten his distress from upon him. And this commandment of lending is stronger and more obligatory than the commandment of giving charity. As the duress and the darkness of one who whose duress is [already] known and revealed among people and has [already] asked from them is not the same as the one who has not yet come to this embarrassment and is [still] afraid to enter into it. And if he would have a little assistance of a loan with which to make a little profit, maybe he will never need to come to asking. And [then] if God has mercy upon him with profit, he will pay his creditors, and he will live on the remainder (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Ase 197). And therefore, our perfect Torah warned us about this to assist the impoverished man with a loan before he needs to come to ask, as it is stated (Exodus 22:24), "If you lend money to My people." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:24:1 [that] each and every, "if" in the Torah is optional except for three that are obligatory - and this is one of them. And they proved the matter from that which it is written in the way of a command in a different place, "you shall surely pledge" (Deuteronomy 15:8).
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I
The Jewish community has frequently been remiss in its treatment of righteous proselytes. Indeed, one of the interpretations of the talmudic dictum that "proselytes are as burdensome unto Israel as leprosy," advanced by Tosafot, Yevamot 47b, is based upon Tosafot's recognition that oftimes we do wrongs to the convert. Such practices are a violation of the admonition "And a proselyte you shall not wrong, neither shall you oppress him …" (Exod. 22:20). Since our conduct in this regard is not exemplary, explains Tosafot, the greater the incidence of conversion, the greater the instances of transgression and the graver the punishment.
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Sefer HaChinukh
That we not demand the debt of a poor person that does not have with what to pay: That we have been prevented from demanding the debt of the borrower at the time that we know that he can not pay his debt, since he does not have [the money] - as it is stated (Exodus 22:24), "do not be to him as a creditor." And know that this preventing also includes not to lend with interest to [another Jew].
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Sefer HaChinukh
That we not give a hand between the borrower and the creditor with interest: To not be involved in an interest loan between the borrower and the creditor - meaning to say that we do not act as a guarantor for them and that we do not write a deed for them that has a mention of interest - as it is stated (Exodus 22:24), "you shall not place interest upon him." And the explanation comes in Bava Metzia 75b that this negative commandment is stated about those involved in the matter, such as the guarantor, the witnesses and the scribe. And there it is said also that the creditor is included with them in this negative commandment, besides the other negative commandments that are specific to him. And the general principle of the matter is that which Abbaye said there that the creditor transgresses six negative commandments, the borrower two and those involved, one.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not curse the judge: To not curse the judges, as it is stated (Exodus 22:27), "Lords (elohim) shall you not curse." And the understanding of elohim [here] is judges, as [in] (Exodus 22:8), "that the elohim deem guilty." And the verse [chose] this expression [which can also mean, God], so that another negative commandment would be included in this negative commandment, and that is the negative commandment of 'blessing' God. As they, may there memory be blessed, said in the Mekhilta and the Sifri, "The warning for 'blessing God' is from that it is written, 'Elohim shall you not curse.'" And that which is written in another place, "And the one that blasphemes the name of the Lord will surely die" (Leviticus 24:16), is [the mention of] its punishment. But the warning (prohibition) is from here. As mention of the punishment of a commandment without its warning is not sufficient for us. And this is what our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, always said (Sanhedrin 54a), "We have heard the punishment, from where is the warning?" And the matter is because of this: That if the prevention of God did not come to us in the matter, but it would [only] state, "One who does thing x will be punished with this," it would be implied that there is permission to transgress the commandment in the hand of anyone who is willing to take the punishment and is not concerned with his pain, and that he will not go against the will of God and His commandment with this. And [so] the matter of the commandment will turn into a type of give and take, meaning to say that one who wants to do thing x, can give such and such and do it, or bare his shoulder to suffer such and do it. And the intention of the commandments is not like this, but rather that God prevented us from things for our [own] good, and informed us in some of them of the punishment that comes to us immediately, besides transgressing His will, which is weightier than anything. And this is [the meaning] of that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in every place (Yoma 81a), "He did not punish, unless He warned," meaning to say, God did not inform of the punishment that comes for a sin, unless He first informed us that His will is that we do not do that thing for which the punishment is coming.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not curse the judge: To not curse the judges, as it is stated (Exodus 22:27), "Lords (elohim) shall you not curse." And the understanding of elohim [here] is judges, as [in] (Exodus 22:8), "that the elohim deem guilty." And the verse [chose] this expression [which can also mean, God], so that another negative commandment would be included in this negative commandment, and that is the negative commandment of 'blessing' God. As they, may there memory be blessed, said in the Mekhilta and the Sifri, "The warning for 'blessing God' is from that it is written, 'Elohim shall you not curse.'" And that which is written in another place, "And the one that blasphemes the name of the Lord will surely die" (Leviticus 24:16), is [the mention of] its punishment. But the warning (prohibition) is from here. As mention of the punishment of a commandment without its warning is not sufficient for us. And this is what our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, always said (Sanhedrin 54a), "We have heard the punishment, from where is the warning?" And the matter is because of this: That if the prevention of God did not come to us in the matter, but it would [only] state, "One who does thing x will be punished with this," it would be implied that there is permission to transgress the commandment in the hand of anyone who is willing to take the punishment and is not concerned with his pain, and that he will not go against the will of God and His commandment with this. And [so] the matter of the commandment will turn into a type of give and take, meaning to say that one who wants to do thing x, can give such and such and do it, or bare his shoulder to suffer such and do it. And the intention of the commandments is not like this, but rather that God prevented us from things for our [own] good, and informed us in some of them of the punishment that comes to us immediately, besides transgressing His will, which is weightier than anything. And this is [the meaning] of that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in every place (Yoma 81a), "He did not punish, unless He warned," meaning to say, God did not inform of the punishment that comes for a sin, unless He first informed us that His will is that we do not do that thing for which the punishment is coming.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not curse a chieftain (nassi): To not curse a chieftain, as it is stated (Exodus 22:27), "and a chieftain among your people shall you not malign." And the explanation upon it came that the nassi is the king (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 26:1). But nonetheless, this negative commandment also includes the nassi of Israel and that is the head of the Great Sanhedrin, who is also called the nassi; since the intention of the verse is about anyone who is the head authority over Israel, whether it is the government of the kingdom or whether it is the government of the Torah.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not skip in the laws of produce: To not skip in the laws of produce - some of them over [others] of them - but we should rather extract them in order. The elucidation of the matter is that after the wheat is threshed and cleaned, it is tevel, and the understanding of tevel is produce that has not been separated. And the obligation upon us with it, is to first remove the priestly tithe from it. And by Torah writ, even one [kernel of] wheat exempts the threshing floor (Kiddushin 29b), but the Sages said that [the mandatory amount] is one part in fifty. And afterwards, the obligation upon us from that which is left over is to remove the tithe from it, and that is called the first tithe. And afterwards, the obligation upon us from that which is left over is to remove another tithe, and that is the second tithe. And the priestly tithe is given to the priest, the first tithe to the Levite, and the second tithe [is kept,] that it be eaten by its owner in Jerusalem. And we are obligated to separate these portions from the produce in this order. And upon this came the preventing, that we not do first from this what is fitting to delay, and not delay what is fitting to do first (Mishnah Terumot 3:10) - as it is stated (Exodus 22:28), "Your fullness and your offering you shall not delay." And it is as if it stated, "From your fullness and your offering, you shall not delay what is fitting to do first."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not eat a torn animal: To not eat from a torn animal, as it is stated (Exodus 22:30), “and meat in the field of a torn animal, you shall not eat.” And the obvious understanding of this verse is to warn us about an animal that a wolf or a lion tore in the field, and that it is torn in a way that it is inclined to die from this tearing. As certainly, its understanding does not include that if [the wolf or lion] touched the tip of its ear or tore from its wool, that it be called a torn animal for this. Rather, its correct understanding - and the tradition supports this - is that it was torn enough that it will die in the hour, or soon, because of that tearing. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Chullin 57b) that this time is [up to] a year. And it should also be understood by all those that understand, that the Torah is not exacting that the tearing be by a wolf or a lion or a bear, but rather any animal that inflicts a wound which brings [another animal] to die is forbidden regardless. And those are the wounds that the sages enumerated that kill, and it is as it comes in the Mishnah (Chullin 42a), "This is the general rule: anything that nothing like it stays alive is a torn animal." And that which the verse stated, "in the field," is not specific, but rather it is the way of Scripture to always state what is common, and it is the way of animals to get torn in the field. And so is it [found] in the Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 23:30), "The Torah stated what is common." And it was also needed to write, "in the field," in order to teach many other things. As the words of the Torah are expounded in different ways - outside, they wear clothing of majesty, pure linen and silk and embroidery, and inside, there is gold and many pearls. And the clothing of this verse that is revealed and more obvious at the beginning of its study is to teach only about the torn animal, as we have written; and [also] about meat from a living animal, which is included in the [concept of] meat of a torn animal. And that which is inside is this - that it teaches about any meat that went out of its boundary, that it is forbidden and becomes like a torn animal - for example consecrated meats that went outside [the Temple] courtyard, and lightly consecrated meats that went outside of [Jerusalem's] wall, and the meat of a Pesach sacrifice that went outside of its assemblage and so [too,] a limb that went out from its mother's womb. And the understanding of the Scripture comes like this, as if it stated, "and meat in the 'field' is 'torn,'" meaning to say, meat that went out of its boundary - as that is [the meaning of] the expression, 'field,' that it has no boundaries - is a 'torn' animal. And the law of all of these that we mentioned is like a torn animal, and one who ate a kazayit from them is lashed.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol III
The law of pursuit has two distinct formulations. When the pursuer is intent upon the death of his victim there is an absolute duty to eliminate such threat. Even a bystander must intervene and dare not plead that he declines to save one human life at the cost of another. Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:9, writes, "This, too, is a negative commandment: not to spare the life of a pursuer." The positive obligation is cited by Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:7, and predicated upon the verse "And you shall cut off her hand, your eye shall not pity her" (Deuteronomy 25:12). Yet another formulation of the law of pursuit is found in Exodus 22:1: "If a thief be found breaking in, and be smitten that he die, there shall be no blood shed for him." Scripture here provides that one who kills a thief incurs no punishment. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 72a, explains that it is to be assumed that a person will not permit his property to be seized unlawfully without offering resistance. The thief is deemed to be well aware of this instinctive psychological reaction and hence it is presumed that he is prepared to use lethal force should he meet with resistance in carrying out his design. Accordingly, the thief is presumed to be a "pursuer" whose life is forfeit. However, in codifying this law, Rambam, Hilkhot Geneivah 9:7, states only that "All persons have permission to kill [the thief] whether on a weekday or on the Sabbath" but fails to posit an absolute obligation to eliminate the thief as a pursuer. It may be posited that the distinction between the thief who is the subject of this ruling and the aggressor described in Hilkhot Rozeaḥ whose life is always forfeit lies in the fact that the latter is actually intent upon an act of aggression while the former, although he may become an aggressor, is not yet engaged in an actual act of aggression. Elimination of the thief is a preemptive act. Such an act is permissible but is not mandatory.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
And that is that He commanded us to redeem the firstborn man, that we should give the money to the priest. And that is His saying, "you shall give me your firstborn sons" (Exodus 22:28). And He explained to us how this giving should be: And it is that we redeem him from the priest; and it is as if [the priest] already acquired him, and we purchase him from him for five sela - and that is His saying, "but surely redeem the firstborn man" (Numbers 18:15). And this commandment is the commandment of redeeming the son. And women are not obligated in it - indeed it is one of the commandments of the son that is upon the father, as it is explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 29a). And all of the laws of this commandment have already been explained in Bekhorot. However Levites are not obligated in it. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Firstlings.)
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol II
Minḥat Hinnukh cogently argues that the commandments expressed in Leviticus 19:16 and Deuteronomy 22:27 are incumbent only upon Jews and hence cannot establish obligations upon non-Jews who are bound only by the provisions of the Noachide Code. Minḥat Hinnukh does, however, adduce another source which serves as a basis for derivation of the "law of the pursuer" and which is applicable to Noachides as well. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, cites the verse "Whosoever sheddeth the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis 9:6) as granting dispensation to preserve the intended victim by eliminating the pursuer. The phrase "by man" is understood as calling for the shedding of blood "by any man," i.e., by persons witnessing the act, rather than as a reference to punitive measures to be undertaken subsequent to the act. Thus the Gemara understands the verse as referring, not to an act of homicide which has already been committed, but to the prevention of a would-be homicide. The verse, which was addressed to Noah, establishes a law not only for Jews, but for Noachides as well. The general principle is that any commandment given prior to Sinai is binding upon Noachides even subsequent to the Sinaitic revelation provided it has been reiterated at Sinai. The law of the pursuer is indeed repeated in Exodus 22:1. In the course of the same discussion, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, states that the statute formulated in this passage, which provides that a thief who breaks into a dwelling during the night may be smitten without penalty, is based upon the assumption that the thief is intent not only upon larceny but will commit homicide as well if he meets resistance. Hence the thief is in effect a pursuer and may be put to death if necessary by virtue of the "law of the pursuit." Tosafot, Sanhedrin 72a, commenting on the redundancy of the multiple scriptural sources for the "law of pursuit" states that Exodus 22:1 serves only to establish a license for execution of the pursuer but does not make such a course of action obligatory. The obligation, according to Tosafot, is expressed solely in Deuteronomy 22:27. Minḥat Hinnukh assumes that Tosafot intends this comment to apply as well to the interpretation of Genesis 9:6, which presents the same difficulty. The phrase ba-adam damo yishafekh, according to Minḥat Hinnukh's understanding should thus be translated "by man may his blood be shed" and serves to grant permission to put the aggressor to death when necessary to preserve the life of the victim, but does not mandate such action.13R. Shlomoh Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah, p. 17, argues against Minḥat Ḥin nukh’s position and maintains that Noachides are not merely permitted, but are obligated, to execute the pursuer in order to preserve the pursued. He argues that this is evident from the phrase “domo yishafekh” which he maintains must be translated “by man shall his blood be spilled.” It would, however, appear that the question raised by Tosafot, Sanhedrin 73a, s.v. af, with regard to the earlier cited verse which speaks of the ba ba-maḥteret applies with equal validity to this verse. It would appear that Tosafot’s statement that the verse establishes permission rather than obligation applies to the subsequently cited verse “ba-adam damo yishafekh” as well. Accordingly, concludes Minḥat Hinnukh, Noachides are justified not only in acting in self-defense but may eliminate a threat to the lives of others as well, even though, in contradistinction to Jews who are bound by Sinaitic revelation, they are under no obligation to do so.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol VI
2) As recorded in Exodus 22:14, a bailee is not liable in situations in which the bailor accompanies his property at the inception of the bailment and is himself in a position to participate in the safeguarding of his property. Granted that the patient has the status of a bailed item, the patient, who is also the bailor, is physically present during treatment81As stated by Ra’avad in a gloss to a ruling of Rambam, Hilkhot Sekhirut 2:1, presence of the owner does not serve to exonerate the bailee from liability in tort. This is true despite the ostensibly contradictory ruling of Ra’avad, Hilkhot Ishut 21:9, declaring that, by virtue of the husband’s presence in the home, a housewife is exempt from liability for household utensils that she may break. The housewife, however, is exempt from tort liability because she has the status of an artisan and an artisan who labors with permission of his or her client is not liable in tort for unintentional damage. See Teshuvot Rabbi Eli’ezer, no. 2. Cf., Maḥaneh Efrayim, Hilkhot Shomrim, no. 39. and indeed is present at the time that the harm occurs.82See R. Mordecai Elon, Torah she-be-al Peh, XVIII, 76. That factor would serve to exonerate the physician from liability as a bailee.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited having some laws of [produce] precede others, but they should rather be executed in their order. And the explanation by way of illustration is with wheat: When it is winnowed, it is tevel. First the priestly tithe is separated from it - and that is one part in fifty. And afterwards, one should separate the first tithe from the remainder. And afterwards, he should separate the second tithe from the remainder [of that]. And he should give the great priestly tithe to the priest, the first tithe to the Levite; and the owners should eat the second tithe in Jerusalem. And it is appropriate that he do it according to this order. And the prohibition about bringing forward what is appropriate to delay or to delay what is appropriate to bring forward is from His saying, "You shall not delay the first of your ripe fruits and of your liquor" (Exodus 22:29) - as if He said, "Do not delay that which is appropriate to bring forward from your ripe fruits and liquor." And in the Mishnah of Terumah (Terumot 3:6): "He who brings forward the priestly tithe before firstfruits, or the first tithe before the priestly tithe, or the second tithe before the first tithe: Even though he transgresses a negative commandment - as it is stated, 'You shall not delay the first of your ripe fruits and of your liquor' - what is done is done." And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:28:1) "'Your ripe fruits' - these are the firstfruits, which are taken from the ripe fruits. 'And of your liquor' - that is the priestly tithe. 'Do not delay' - you shall not bring forward the second tithe before the first-tithe, the first [tithe] before the priestly tithe, or the priestly tithe before the firstfruits, [etc. From here they said, 'If one brings forward the priestly tithe before the firstfruits or the first tithe before the priestly tithe] or the second tithe before the first [tithe] - even though he transgresses a negative commandment, what is done is done.'" And it has already been explained in the first chapter of Temurah (Temurah 4a) that one who brings [a category] forward is not lashed. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Heave Offerings 3.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that He commanded us to return the surety to its Jewish owner at the time that he has a need for it: If the surety is from that which he needs during the day - such as tools of his craft or his activity - he returns it to him during the day and holds it in surety at night; and if it is from that which he needs at night - such as a pillow or a blanket - he returns it to him at night and holds it in surety during the day. And the language of the Mekhilta is, "'Before the sun goes down, you shall return it to him' (Exodus 22:25) - this refers to a day-garment, that you can return the entire day. [...] From where [do you know about] a night-garment that it can be returned the entire night? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall surely return the pledge to him when the sun goes down' (Devarim 24:13). From here the Sages said, 'A day-garment that is taken as a pledge is returned during the whole day, and a night-garment is returned during the whole night." And it is already been explained in the Gemara, Makkot (Makkot 16a), that His, may He be exalted, saying, "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge" (Deuteronomy 24:10), is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. And the positive commandment is His saying, "You shall surely return." [This verse also] teaches that we return a night-garment at night and a day-garment during the day. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 8 of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 3).
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that He commanded us to love converts. And that is His saying, "And you shall love the stranger" (Deuteronomy 10:19). And even though he was included regarding this with [all of] Israel, in His saying, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Leviticus 19:18) - since this stranger is a convert (and a full member of Israel) - however because he entered into our Torah, God added love upon love and designated an additional commandment for him. [This is] as He did with the prohibition of, "And you shall not oppress" (Leviticus 25:17); He [also] said, "And you shall not oppress a stranger" (Exodus 22:20). And it is explained from the language of the Gemara (Bava Metzia 59b) that we are liable by oppressing the convert on account of, "And you shall not oppress," and on account of, "And you shall not oppress a stranger." [So] we are also obligated to love him on account of, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself," and on account of, "And you shall love the stranger." And this is clear - there is no doubt about it. And I do not know a [single] man from whoever counted the commandments that botched this. And in most [books of] Midrash, they explained that God commanded about the convert, just like He commanded us about Himself - He said, "And you shall love the Lord, your God" (Deuteronomy 6:5), and He said, "And you shall love the stranger." (See Parashat Ekev; Mishneh Torah, Human Dispositions 6.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 61b) that it is forbidden from the Torah to steal even in order to return [what was stolen] or in order to vex - meaning to say, to anger the owner of the stolen item, to confound him temporarily, and to give the thing back to him afterwards. And so did they say in Sifra Kedoshim, Section 2:1-2, "Because it is written [with respect to] theft (Exodus 22:3), 'he shall pay double,' we know the punishment. From where is the warning? [Hence,] we learn to say, 'You shall not steal.' 'You shall not steal,' even in order to vex'; 'You shall not steal,' even in order to pay four or five [times the price]."
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Sefer HaChinukh
And this prohibition is practiced in every place and at all times by males and females. And one who transgresses this negative commandment is obligated to pay, as is explicit in Scripture (Exodus 21:37, 22:3). If he stole a gold coin or clothing or a donkey or a camel, he pays twice their value, and it comes out that he loses that which he sought to remove from his fellow. And payments of double are practiced for everything except for an ox and a sheep, as there are situations in which he pays four and five for them - such as if he slaughtered or sold [them], as appears clearly in Scripture. And when he pays double - or four or five for an ox and a sheep - it is specifically when witnesses testified about him, and he paid according to their [testimony] in a court. But one who admits on his own (Bava Kamma 75a) is exempted with the payment of the principal alone, as it is stated (Exodus 22:8), "the one that the powers deem guilty shall pay two" - and they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Bava Kamma 64b), "To exclude one who deems himself guilty." And this is the law for all penalties, that one who admits [his guilt] is exempt. And I have already written above (Sefer HaChinukh 49) that we only judge cases of penalties in the Land.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not curse an Israelite, whether a man or a woman: To not curse an Israelite, whether a man or a woman; and even though he does not hear the curse, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:14), "You shall not curse the deaf" - and the explanation comes about this [that it is] one who does not hear your curse. And so did Onkelos translate [it]. And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:13 [is] "I only have a deaf person, from where do I include every man? [Hence] we learn to say (Exodus 22:27), 'among your people, you shall not maledict.' If so, why does it state, 'deaf?' Just like a deaf person is unique that he is alive - to exclude the dead that is not alive." Even thought we do not have the power to know in which way a curse impacts upon the one cursed, and with what power within speech there is to bring [that impact] upon him, we know more generally that people are concerned about curses - whether Israel or other nations - and say that curses of people, and even curses of commoners, have an impact on the one cursed and attaches malediction and distress to him. And since we know this thing from the mouth of the creatures, we will say that it is from the roots of the commandment that God prevented us from injuring others with our mouths, [just] like he prevented us from injuring them with action. And similar to this did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Moed Katan 18a), "A covenant is made with the lips" - meaning to say that there is power in the words of a person's mouth.
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Sefer HaChinukh
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shevuot 35a) that it is forbidden to curse in any way. But nonetheless, he is not lashed unless he cursed with a name of one of the names [of God], such as Y-ah, Sha-dai, E-loah and similar to them, or with any appellation of one of the appellations [of God], such as Compassionate, Jealous and similar to them. And he is liable in any language that he curses with a name or appellation, as the names that the gentiles call the Holy One, blessed be He, are among the appellations (even though they are in their languages). And [also] that which they said (Shevuot 36a) that even one who curses himself is lashed, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 4:9), "But you shall guard yourself and guard your soul much." And also that [which they said] in Mekhilta (see Sanhedrin 66a), "'You shall not curse the deaf' - [it is speaking] about the wretched among men." And they also said there (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yismael 22:27) that when the verse (Exodus 22:27) states, "a chieftain (nassi) among your people, you shall not maledict, etc.," it implies both a chieftain and a judge. What [then] do we learn by saying, "[Judges] shall you not curse"? To impose liability for this one in itself and for that one in itself. From here they said, "One may speak one thing and be liable for four things. (How so?) If the son of a chieftain curses his father, he is liable on account of chieftain, on account of father, on account of judge, and on account of 'among your people you shall not maledict'" (see Tur, Choshen Mishpat 26).
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that He commanded us about the law of fire damage. And that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "When a fire extends, etc." (Exodus 22:4). And the details of this law have already been explained in the second and sixth [chapters] of [Bava] Kamma. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Damages to Property 14.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us - that we not steal money. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "You shall not steal" (Leviticus 19:11). And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 20:13:3): "'You shall not steal,' is the prohibition against stealing money." And one who transgresses this negative commandment is liable to pay that which is mentioned by Scripture - whether it is double-payment, four times or five times or just to return the principal. And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:1-2): "Because it is stated about stealing, 'He shall pay double' (Exodus 22:6), we know the punishment. From where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not steal.' [Even if only] to taunt [the owner]" - its explanation being, to annoy the owners and to hurt them; and to return it afterwards. "'You shall not steal' - even in order to pay four times or five times." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the seventh [chapter] of [Bava] Kamma. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Theft 1.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not soothsay: To not soothsay, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:26), "and you shall not soothsay (teonenu)." And the understanding of the matter is like they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 6:2, that it is an expression of a time period (onah). [This] means to say that we do not fix time periods to say time x is good to do action y; and anyone who does it at that time will be successful, but one who does it at time z will not be successful - like the empty clairvoyants say. And the negative commandment about this matter is repeated in the Order of Shoftim, as it is written there (Deuteronomy 18:10), "There shall not be found in you, etc. a soothsayer." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 65b) that included in this negative commandment of the soothsayer is the fooling the eyes that people do. And this matter is a great type of machination that is connected with lightness of hand and its powerful quickness to the point that it appears to people that the trickster is doing fantastic things, meaning to say that they are supernatural. As what those that make efforts in this always do, such that they take a rope and put it into the corner of their clothes in front of people's eyes, and afterwards they take out a snake; and so [too,] they throw a ring into the air, and afterwards they take it out from the mouth of one of the bystanders in front of them; and many things similar to these. And each one of these evil acts is forbidden, and one who does it is called a fooler of the eyes. And it is included in the prohibition of the soothsayer and we administer lashes for it. And even though [the prohibition of the] soothsayer is stated next to the sorcerer in one verse, it is not precisely a type of magic. As if the prohibition about it was on account of the negative commandment of the sorcerer, we would not administer lashes for it, since the negative commandment of the sorcerer is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court, as it is stated (Exodus 22:17), "You shall not keep a witch alive." And it is established for us (Eruvin 17b) that we do not administer lashes for any negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us from wronging the convert with words. And that is His stating, "You shall not wrong a convert" (Exodus 22:20). And the prohibition was repeated with His saying, "you shall not wrong him" (Leviticus 19:33). And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:2): "You shall not say to him, 'Yesterday you worshipped idolatry, and now you have entered under the wings of the Divine Presence.'" (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Sales 14.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not curse father and mother: To not curse father and mother, as it is stated (Leviticus 20:9), "Any man that curses his father and his mother, etc." And the truth is that the main warning of cursing father and mother is not from Scripture, since here it only mentions the punishment of the one that curses; and so [too,] that which is written in the Order of Mishpatim (Exodus 21:17), "And he who curses his father and his mother shall surely be killed" - there too, it only spoke about the punishment. And that is what they said in Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:3, "'And he who curses his father and his mother, etc.' - we have heard the punishment, but from where is the warning? [Hence] we learn to say (Exodus 22:27) 'Lords you shall not curse[, etc.]' If his father is a chieftain (nassi), behold he is included in 'and a chieftain in your people you shall not malign.' If he is a boor, behold he is included in 'You shall not curse the deaf.' Hence it is to be derived by a constructive paradigm (binyan av) through the three of them, etc." until, "Their common denominator is that they are 'in your people,' and you are exhorted against cursing them. Your father, too, is 'in your people,' and you are exhorted against cursing him." And so did they say in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 10:7, "'And he who curses his father and his mother - we have heard the punishment, etc." exactly like the language of the Mekhilta. And since there is no specific [textual] negative commandment to this warning - but rather it is comes out from the principle [understand by an analysis] of three negative commandments - I have written it on this verse that is speaking about the punishment [for it]. And likewise, Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote about "he who curses his father and his mother shall surely be killed," that it is speaking about the punishment (Sefer Ha Mitzot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 318).
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us from keeping a sorcerer alive. And that is His saying, "You shall not keep a sorceress alive" (Exodus 22:17). And if we pardon him, we transgress a negative commandment - we do not only negate a positive commandment - and it is as if we pardoned one of those liable for one of the death penalties of the court. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 14.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us from cursing any Israelite person. And that is His saying, "You shall not curse a deaf person" (Leviticus 19:14). And understand the content of this, 'deaf person,' from me: And that is that when the spirit is moved to take revenge upon the injurer according to the nature of the imagined injury - behold it will not veer from its activity until the injurer is repaid according to the injury recorded by the imagination. And when his repayment is complete, the activity then departs from the imagination. So sometimes he will repay him only with a curse and disparagement, and his mind will be calmed by the measure of injury caused by those statements and by the disparagement. But sometimes the matter will be harsher, and the activity will not be stilled until he destroys [the offender's] property. Then his mind is calmed by the measure of pain caused to [the other] by the loss of his property. However sometimes the matter is [even] harsher, such that he will not be calmed until he takes revenge on [the other's] body with different injuries and the destruction of [his] limbs. And sometimes the matter will be harsher [still] and the [mental] activity will not cease until he takes the life of the injurer and his portion of existence; and that is the extreme. But sometimes the activity of the soul will be gentler than to seek the punishment of the injurer - due to the smallness of the crime - to the point that the activity will end with [just] yelling, anger and cursing [of the other], even though that other person does not hear [it] and is not present. And this is well-known about the actions of temperamental and angry people - that their minds are calmed from light offenses with this measure, even though the offender does not know of their anger and does not hear their disparagement. And perhaps we would have in our mind that the point of what is forbidden to us is the curse of an Israelite when he hears it, such that distress and pain come to him; but since a deaf person does not hear [it] and it does not hurt him, the curse would not be a sin. Hence Scripture is informing us that it is forbidden, and we are prohibited from [doing] it. For the Torah was not only concerned exclusively with the state of the one cursed, but also with that of the one cursing - in that it forbade him to move his soul towards vengeance, and that he not become accustomed to getting angry. And the masters of the tradition accordingly brought a proof about the cursing of any Israelite from His saying, "You shall not curse a deaf person": And the language of the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:13) is, "I only know of a deaf person. From where [do we know] to include all people? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not curse a nassi (elevated person) among your people' (Exodus 22:27). If so, why is it stated, 'a deaf person?' Just as a deaf person is distinctive in being alive [so too is it the case for anyone alive] - to exclude a dead man, who is not alive." And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:3): "'You shall not curse a deaf person' - the most abject of people." And everything that we have said is on condition that it be with [God's] name. And one is also lashed when he curses himself. Behold it has already been explained that one who curses his fellow with [God's] name is transgressing a negative commandment - and that is, "You shall not curse a deaf person." And one who curses a judge is transgressing two negative commandments, and is lashed twice. But one who curses a nassi is lashed three times. And the language of the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:27:2) is, "When he says, 'You shall not curse a nassi among your people,' both a nassi and a judge are implied. So what do we learn to say [from], 'You shall not curse the powers (judges)' (Exodus 22:27)? To make liable for this on its own and for that on its own. From here, they said, 'One may speak one thing and be liable on account of four things. On account of, "You shall not curse a deaf person," on account of the father, on account of a judge and on account of "a nassi among your people," in any event.'" Behold, what we mentioned has become clear. And the regulations of this commandment have been explained in the fourth [chapter] of Shevuot. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 26.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited - not to curse father and mother. Indeed, the language of the Torah is clear about its punishment, when He says, "And if one curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die" (Exodus 21:17); and he is among those that are stoned. And even if he [only] cursed one of them with [God's] name after [the parent's] death, he is stoned. However the prohibition is not explicit in Scripture. For it does not say, "You shall not curse your father." But it already preceded that a prohibition came about cursing every Israelite; and that includes a father and anyone besides him. And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:3), they said, "'And if one curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die' - we have heard the punishment; from where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not curse the powers' (Exodus 22:27). If your father is a judge, behold he is included in the powers. And if he is a nassi, behold he is included in, 'and do not maledict a nassi among your people.' And if he is a boor, behold he is included in, 'You shall not curse a deaf person' (Leviticus 19:14). [If he is not a judge, not a nassi and not a deaf person,] behold, you can argue by induction (binyan av) from the three of them, according to the common element among them: That they are, 'among your people,' and you are prohibited [from] cursing them." And it is written in the Sifra (Sifra Kedoshim, Chapter 10:7), "'If any man curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die' (Leviticus 20:9) - we have heard the punishment; from where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not curse the powers'" - exactly like the language of the Mekhilta. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the seventh [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Rebels 5.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
However according to what it seems, it is not understood that if an Israelite came and began to be wicked to pain his fellow with his bad words, that the listener should not answer him. For it is not possible for a man to be 'like a stone that cannot be overturned' - moreover, that he will be in his silence like one who concedes to the insults. And in truth, the Torah did not command for a man to be like a stone, silent to those who insult him and to those who bless him alike. Rather it commands us to distance ourselves from this trait and that we should not begin to quarrel and insult people. And like this, every man will be saved from all this - since one who doesn't quarrel will not be insulted by people, except for [by] complete fools; and we should not pay attention to fools. And if perhaps some insulting person will force him to answer his words, it is fitting for a wise person to reply to him in a roundabout and pleasant way, and not become very angry; as 'anger rests on the bosom of fools.' And he will [so] save himself before those who listen to his insults, and he will cast the burden upon the one who insults [him]; and this is the way of the best among men. And we should learn this thing - that it is permitted to us to reply to a fool - according to what it seems from how the Torah permitted one who comes to rob secretly to be preceded and killed (Exodus 22:1). As there is no doubt that a man is not obligated to bear harm from his fellow; as he has permission to save himself from his hand - and similarly from the words of his mouth that are full of deceit and cunning - with anything that he is able to save himself from him. However there is a group of people the righteousness of which rises so much that they do not want to include themselves in this teaching - to reply something to those that insult them, lest anger will overpower them and they become involved in the matter more than is necessary. And about them they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shabbat 88b), "Those who are humiliated but do not humiliate [back], who hear their insult and do not reply - about them the verse states (Judges 5:31), 'but those who love Him are like the sun coming out in its strength.'"
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment of loving the strangers (converts): That we were commanded to love the converts, meaning to say that we be careful not to cause them pain in any thing, but [rather to] do them good and grant them kindness according to what is proper and is possible. And converts are anyone who connects with us from the other nations, that leaves his religion and enters into our religion. And about them is it stated (Deuteronomy 10:19), "And you shall love the stranger, etc." And even though the commandment (Sefer HaChinukh 243) about the Israelite includes him, as it is stated about him (Leviticus 19:18), "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself" - since behold, a righteous convert is included in "your neighbor" - God added for us a specific commandment about his love. And so too is the thing in the prevention against cheating him. As even though he was included in "A man shall not wrong his countryman" (Leviticus 25:17, Sefer HaChinukh 338), Scripture added a specific prevention about him in its stating, "You shall not wrong a stranger" (Exodus 22:20, Sefer HaChinukh 23). And they said in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 59b) that one who wrongs the convert transgresses because of "[A man] shall not wrong" and because of "You shall not wrong a stranger." And so too [with this], he nullifies the commandment of "and you shall love your neighbor" and the commandment of "And you shall love the stranger."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not eat a limb from the living: That we were prevented that we not eat a limb from the living - meaning to say, a limb that we cut from an animal when it is still alive. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 12:23), "and you shall not eat the soul with the meat." And so they did they say, "'And you shall not eat the soul with the meat' - that is a limb from the living." And we say in Tractate Chullin 102b, "One who ate a limb from the living and meat from the living is lashed twice" - since there are two negative commandments about it: the one which we mentioned; and the second [is] "and flesh torn in the field shall you not eat" (Exodus 22:30), which is a negative commandment about the one that eats meat from the living, as I have written in the commandment not to eat a 'torn' animal (Sefer HaChinukh 73). And the warning for the limb from the living was repeated in another place in Parshat Noach, as it is stated (Genesis 9:4), "But meat with the soul, its blood, you shall not eat."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not do magic: That we not make efforts with any act of magic at all. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 18:10), "There shall not be found in you, etc. or a sorcerer." And the content of magic is generally well-known to all - that people do machinations without end with types of grasses and stones, or [by] adhering things that people use, one to another. And some of them arrange these evil actions at certain known times or specific months that are fit for those crafts. And the Torah distances us with total distancing from all of these disgusting and ugly things, because they are vanities. And it is not fit for a holy people that holds the true religion to put their thought to these ugly things, but rather only to His service, may He be elevated. As He will fulfill every want of His people for the good, in their being sheltered by His great name, and their placing all of their trust and their reliance upon His kindnesses alone. And since these matters are very remote and ugly in front of Him, blessed be He, and there is a spark of matters of idolatry in them, He warned us about it with a negative commandment, and made liable for stoning anyone who makes efforts with this if it is volitional, and a fixed sin-offering if it is inadvertent. And it is also from the weightiness of the matter that Scripture warns the court not to forgive one who transgresses this, [more] than with other sins; and as it is stated (Exodus 22:17), "Do not keep alive a witch." And I have already spoken about the roots of this commandment on the negative commandment of "Do not keep alive a witch," in the Order of Veeleh HaMishpatim (Sefer HaChinukh 62).
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not prevent surety from its needy owner: That we have been warned not to prevent the surety from its owner at the time that he needs it, but rather to return it to him - a vessel for the day during the day, and a vessel for the night during the night. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:12), "you shall not go to sleep in his pledge." And the language of Sifrei is "Do not go to sleep when the pledge is with you, but rather return it when he will not have with what to replace it, from the weakness of his poverty" - as the verse (Exodus 22:26) explains, "It is his only clothing, the sole covering for his skin."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To return the surety to the owners at the time that he needs it: That we were commanded to return the surety to its Israelite owners at the time that it will be needed by him; meaning to say that if the surety is something that a person needs during the day - for example, the tool for his work - he should return it to him during the day, and the borrower brings it back to him during the night, and if it is a vessel that he needs during the night - for example, bedding or a blanket - he should return it to him during the night, and the borrower brings it back to the creditor during the day. And the language of Mekhilta, Mishpatim 186 is "'You must return it to him before the sun sets' (Exodus 22:25) - this is the clothing of the day, that you must return it to him [the whole day. That you must return the clothing of the night] for the whole night, from where [do I know it]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You must surely return the pledge to him at sundown' (Deuteronomy 24:13). From here they said, we take the clothing of the day for surety during the night and the clothing of the night during the day." And the proof that this is from the count of positive commandments is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in the Gemara in Makkot 16a that the negative commandment of "you must not enter his house to seize his pledge," is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment - and [that] positive commandment is "You must surely return."
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