Halakhah zu Schemot 25:2

The prohibition against divulging a non-personal confidential communication is formulated by the Gemara, Yoma 4b: "Whence is it derived that [if] one relates something to one's fellow [the latter is commanded], 'Thou shalt not tell' until [the former] tells him 'Go tell'? For it is said, 'And the Lord spoke to him from the tent of meeting l'emor' " (Leviticus 1:1). Rashi understands the prohibition to be based upon talmudic exegesis interpreting the word "l'emor," which is spelled lamed, alef, mem, resh, as a contraction of two words "lo emor—do not say."¹¹See Maharsha, ad locum. Thus, the written word vocalized in two alternative ways literally constitutes a double entendre: "to say" and "do not say." As explained by Or ha-Hayyim, Exodus 25:2, the initial phrase of the immediately following sentence beginning "Speak to the children of Israel" clearly places upon Moses an affirmative obligation to repeat what he has been told. Taken together, the two sentences declare, in effect, that Moses may not speak other than when expressly directed or granted permission to speak. As formulated by the Gemara, Moses is admonished "Do not tell!" unless and until he is told "Go tell!" Prior to their communication to Moses, the contents of revelation were reserved to the Deity and, accordingly, the contents of revelation would have been held inviolate by Moses on the basis of the injunction "Do not say" had he not been commanded explicitly "l'emor," to speak and disclose that information to Israel. Interpreting the statement of the Gemara in a manner consistent with that of Rashi, Sefer Mizvot Gadol, lo ta'aseh, no. 9, regards violation of this injunction as transgression of a biblical commandment.¹²However, Sefer Miẓvot Gadol’s interpretations of the word “l’emor” is somewhat different from that of Rashi. Sefer Miẓvot Gadol also interprets that word as a contraction, but as the assimilated contraction of the words “lav amur,” i.e., “a negative commandment has been stated [with regard to this matter].”
R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimmah, Leviticus 1:1, regards the statement of the Gemara, Yoma 4b, as establishing a rabbinic prohibition. Cf., however, Bet ha-Beḥirah, Yoma 4b, who describes the stricture against disclosure of a non-personal communication, imparted in a confidential manner, as merely a matter of derekh ereẓ or unseemly behavior. This talmudic statement is cited as normative by Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 156:2, and serves to establish a formal obligation to regard the communication of any personal or proprietary information as confidential unless permission for disclosure is explicitly granted.

Both Maharsha, ad locum, and R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimmah, Leviticus 1:1, offer an interpretation of the derivation that is less elegant but far simpler than that advanced by Rashi.¹³This interpretation of Yoma 4b is inherent in the comments of Or ha-Ḥayyim, Exodus 25:2. See infra, note 15. According to those scholars the prohibition is predicated upon the plain meaning of the word "l'emor." The term "l'emor" is rendered in English translations as "saying." That translation portrays the entire sentence, "And God spoke to Moses saying," as a preferatory comment conveying the notion that the ensuing passages constitute the content of what was "said" to Moses. In effect, the sentence is rendered as a declaration indicating that what follows constitutes the content of God's communication to Moses. The translation of "l'emor" as "saying," although it serves to make the sentence read smoothly in the vernacular, is contrary to the plain meaning of the text and is probably incorrect. The initial letter lamed is a prefix meaning "to" and hence the word "l'emor" should properly be understood as a contraction of "le-emor" and translated as "to say," i.e., God commanded Moses "to say" the words of the verses that follow. Accordingly, the import of the sentence is not a declaration to the effect that the subsequently recorded verses were communicated to Moses, but that Moses was commanded to declare those verses to the children of Israel. The appropriate, albeit infelicitous, translation would be: "And God spoke to Moses to say."¹⁴This nuance of meaning is accurately captured in the standard Yiddish translation published in the Bet Yehudah edition of the Pentateuch which renders the “l’emor” as “zu zogen” rather than as “zogendig.” However, although linguistically accurate, this rendition of the passage seems to render the entire verse redundant. The very next verse begins with the phrase "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them." That phrase is synonymous in meaning with "l'emor" and renders "l'emor" superfluous. The plain inference, comments Maharsha, is that Moses would not have had the right to transmit the divine communication unless given express permission by God to do so.¹⁵Torah Temimmah differs from Maharsha only in understanding that the principle is derived from the plain meaning of “l’emor” and is not based upon its redundancy in light of the immediately following “Speak to the children of Israel.” Or ha-Ḥayyim, Exodus 25:2, understands the Gemara’s comment much in the same manner as Torah Temimmah but comments that “l’emor” alone would have served only to give Moses discretionary license to divulge the prophetic message he received; the phrase “speak to the children of Israel” is in the imperative voice and serves to make it incumbent upon Moses to do so. Hence that directive is recorded in order to teach that, absent such a waiver, all communications are to be regarded as confidential.

(Yod) “A person should engage in Torah [study] and the commandments, even if not for their own sake; as through [that which is] not for their own sake, one comes to [engage in them] for their own sake” – as it is [found] in the Talmud (Pesachim 50b). But behold on the verse (Exod. 25:2), “And they shall take an offering for Me,” Rashi explains, “‘For Me’ – for My sake.” And why this offering must be for its own sake more than the other commandments, requires elucidation. Just the opposite: let one be engaged in it, even not for its own sake, etc., as mentioned. And it appears that [it can be explained by noting that] there is a disagreement about acquisition with a handkerchief⁷⁵Such that acquisition of another item is effected by the symbolic exchange of a handkerchief or some other similar item. between Rav and Levi in the chapter [entitled] HaZahav (Bava Metzia 47a): Rav reasons [the handkerchief should be] from the [possessions] of the purchaser, whereas Levi reasons that [it should be] from those of the seller. And we establish [the law] to be like [the opinion of] Rav. And Ran⁷⁶Rabbeinu Nissim of Gerona (Spain, 14th century). in the first chapter of Kiddushin⁷⁷Kiddushin 7a. is troubled about Rav who holds that it is specifically from the items of the buyer and not of the seller, even if he is an important man. As in Kiddushin, we conclude that [a woman becomes] married if she gave something to an important man [to wed him], because of the enjoyment [she gets] from that which he accepted it from her.⁷⁸While marriage is not a commercial transaction, many of the laws of acquisition apply, such that the man is acquiring certain rights from the woman. And see there; that he wrote to resolve [this] – and these are his words, “When we say that if an important man receives a present, it is considered enjoyment [for the giver], that is when he receives a true present, but when it is on condition that [it] be returned, it is not considered so. And since an undifferentiated acquisition with a handkerchief is on condition that [the handkerchief] be returned, is has to specifically be from the items of the buyer.” See there. And see in Beit Chadash⁷⁹A commentary on the Shulchan Arukh by Rabbi Yoel Sirkis (Poland, 1560-1640). on Choshen Mishpat 190:4 who deduced from this that if one gives [such a gift] on condition to return [it] to an important man, it is not effective. [As] even though a gift given on condition that [it] be returned is considered a gift, it is not credited to the giver in this way. See there. And is it has already been written in Toldot Yitschak⁸⁰A commentary on the Torah by Rabbi Yitschak Karo (Spain, Turkey, Israel 1458-1535). and in [the commentary of R. Moshe] Alshekh [about] “And they shall take an offering for Me,” [that] it is fitting that it should [rather] say, “And they shall give.” And they wrote that the receiving of an important man is considered like giving; and [so in that case], the receiver is the giver. [Hence] all the more so [with] the Creator, may His name blessed, is that which is given to Him as if it is taken from Him. See there. And behold with all of the commandments, one who says, “I am contributing this small coin in order that my son will live,” behold he is a full-fledged righteous person;⁸¹Pesachim 8a-8b. and his present is a present – even if it is on condition that [it] be returned. And the same is the law here with offerings – even if he gives [it] for the sake of some reward, it is [still considered] giving. If so [however], we would still have the problem that it should have stated, “And they shall give” – like it is written in Toldot Yitschak and in Alshekh. And it is not relevant to answer like the commentators have answered, that giving to an important “person” is like receiving, since it is on condition that [it] be returned (in that the giver expects a reward) – and as I wrote in the name of Ran. Therefore Rashi explained, “For My sake” and not on condition to receive a reward. And then, “And they shall take an offering for Me,” fits – as mentioned above. And see there in my book, Ketzot HaChoshen on Choshen Mishpat 190:4. Nevertheless, it should appear to each person about himself that he has not yet been sufficiently righteous in his actions in front of his Creator, may He be blessed. Yet he should hope that he shall arrive above, as we will say at the beginning of the next section after this.

The prohibition against divulging personal information concerning another person is derived from the biblical verse "Thou shalt not go as a bearer of tales among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). Such activity is forbidden even when it is not accompanied by malicious intent and even if the information is not derogatory in nature. As formulated by Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 7:2, "Who is a tale-bearer? One who carries reports and goes from one person to another and says, 'So-and-so said this' or 'Such and such have I heard about so-and-so.' Even if he tells the truth, [the tale-bearer] destroys the world.¹³Although not in the category of talebearing and hence not the object of a negative commandment, the Gemara, Yoma 4b, declares disclosure of even a non-personal communication to be improper unless prior permission has been granted for such disclosure. See also commentary of Oraḥ Ḥayyim on Ex. 25:2. Sefer Miẓvot Gadol, lavin, no. 9, interprets Yoma 4b as establishing a negative prohibition (interpreting the word “lamor” as “lo emor”) forbidding disclosure of such information; see, however, Torah Temimah, Lev. 1:1, who understands Sefer Miẓvot Gadol as positing a rabbinic rather than a biblical prohibition. Cf., Bet ha-Beḥirah, Yoma 4b, who describes the stricture against disclosure of a non-personal communication which has not been imparted in a confidential manner as a matter of derekh ereẓ or seemly behavior.