הַ֭עֹ֣זְבִים אָרְח֣וֹת יֹ֑שֶׁר לָ֝לֶ֗כֶת בְּדַרְכֵי־חֹֽשֶׁךְ׃
yaitu orang-orang yang meninggalkan jalan-jalan kelurusan untuk berjalan di jalan-jalan kegelapan,
Eight Chapters
Chapter III
Concerning the Diseases of the Soul1For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XLVI pp. 10—11; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 77 ff. A short summary is contained in H. Deot, II, 1.
The ancients2See Foreword, p. 35 n. 3. maintained that the soul, like the body, is subject to good health and illness. The soul’s healthful state is due to its condition, and that of its faculties, by which it constantly does what is right, and performs what is proper, while the illness of the soul is occasioned by its condition, and that of its faculties, which results in its constantly doing wrong, and performing actions that are improper.3Cf. Pirḳe Mosheh, in Ḳobeẓ, II, 20b, אמר משה מן הידוע מאמר הפילוסופים שיש לנפש בריאות וחולי וכ׳. The science of medicine investigates the health of the body. Now, just as those, who are physically ill, imagine that, on account of their vitiated tastes, the sweet is bitter and the bitter is sweet—and likewise fancy the wholesome to be unwholesome—and just as their desire grows stronger, and their enjoyment increases for such things as dust, coal, very acidic and sour foods, and the like—which the healthy loathe and refuse, as they are not only not beneficial even to the healthy, but possibly harmful—so those whose souls are ill, that is the wicked and the morally perverted, imagine that the bad is good, and that the good is bad. The wicked man, moreover, continually longs for excesses which are really pernicious, but which, on account of the illness of his soul, he considers to be good.4Aristotle, in discussing Pleasures (Eth. Nic., X, 5), says, “Yet in the case of human creatures they (pleasures) differ not a little; for the very same things please some and pain others; and what are painful and hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet things; the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in health; nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also.” Cf., also, H. Deot, II, 1, “To those who are diseased the bitter tastes sweet and the sweet bitter. Some sick people, moreover, crave and long for food that is unfit to eat, such as dust and charcoal, spurning food that is beneficial, such as bread and meat, according to the intensity of their illness. Likewise, people whose souls are diseased desire and love evil characteristics, and hate the moral path, being loathe to pursue it, since, on account of their illness, it is very difficult for them to do so. Thus, Isaiah says of such people, ‘Wo unto those that say of the evil it is good, and of the good it is evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter’ (V, 20). Concerning them it is also said that ‘(they are those) who leave the path of uprightness to walk in the ways of darkness’ (Prov. II, 13).”
Concerning the Diseases of the Soul1For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XLVI pp. 10—11; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 77 ff. A short summary is contained in H. Deot, II, 1.
The ancients2See Foreword, p. 35 n. 3. maintained that the soul, like the body, is subject to good health and illness. The soul’s healthful state is due to its condition, and that of its faculties, by which it constantly does what is right, and performs what is proper, while the illness of the soul is occasioned by its condition, and that of its faculties, which results in its constantly doing wrong, and performing actions that are improper.3Cf. Pirḳe Mosheh, in Ḳobeẓ, II, 20b, אמר משה מן הידוע מאמר הפילוסופים שיש לנפש בריאות וחולי וכ׳. The science of medicine investigates the health of the body. Now, just as those, who are physically ill, imagine that, on account of their vitiated tastes, the sweet is bitter and the bitter is sweet—and likewise fancy the wholesome to be unwholesome—and just as their desire grows stronger, and their enjoyment increases for such things as dust, coal, very acidic and sour foods, and the like—which the healthy loathe and refuse, as they are not only not beneficial even to the healthy, but possibly harmful—so those whose souls are ill, that is the wicked and the morally perverted, imagine that the bad is good, and that the good is bad. The wicked man, moreover, continually longs for excesses which are really pernicious, but which, on account of the illness of his soul, he considers to be good.4Aristotle, in discussing Pleasures (Eth. Nic., X, 5), says, “Yet in the case of human creatures they (pleasures) differ not a little; for the very same things please some and pain others; and what are painful and hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet things; the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in health; nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also.” Cf., also, H. Deot, II, 1, “To those who are diseased the bitter tastes sweet and the sweet bitter. Some sick people, moreover, crave and long for food that is unfit to eat, such as dust and charcoal, spurning food that is beneficial, such as bread and meat, according to the intensity of their illness. Likewise, people whose souls are diseased desire and love evil characteristics, and hate the moral path, being loathe to pursue it, since, on account of their illness, it is very difficult for them to do so. Thus, Isaiah says of such people, ‘Wo unto those that say of the evil it is good, and of the good it is evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter’ (V, 20). Concerning them it is also said that ‘(they are those) who leave the path of uprightness to walk in the ways of darkness’ (Prov. II, 13).”