Tafsiran yang Mengutip untuk Keluaran 21:20

סדן – a thick piece of wood inserted into the ground like that of smiths, and they explained it like the Baraitha (Talmud Sanhedrin 52b), that the reason that Rabbi Yehuda disputes the Sages, since the Torah states (Leviticus 18:3): “…nor shall you follow their laws,” to which the Rabbis responded to him since it is written with a sword in the Torah and the Biblical verse stated (Exodus 21:20): “[When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod, and he dies there an then], he must be avenged,” so we don’t derive it from them, and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

If there was a goat tied to it ... he is liable - for the goat, since living creatures are also included [in the law of fire] by "or standing" [Exodus 22:5]. We do not exempt him [from payment] due to [the rule of] "he receives the greater [punishment]", since he is not liable to the death penalty on account of the [death of the] slave -- since he was not tied up, he should have escaped; therefore he is exempt from death and payment on [the slave's] account. But if the slave was tied up, he is exempt even for the goat and for the stack, since he is liable to the death penalty for the slave, as it is written: "this must be avenged" [Exodus 21:20]. "He receives the greater [punishment]" even if [the witnesses] did not warn him, so that he does not get executed; we have established that those who unwittingly [commit crimes that would cause them to be] liable to the death penalty are exempt [from monetary payments as well]. [Ketubot 34b:9] Regarding the goat, it makes no difference whether it is tied up or not; but once [the mishna] made the choice [of language] regarding the slave, it made the [parallel] choice [of language] regarding the goat. Another explanation is that the choice [of language] regarding the goat is also precise: if [the goat] is next to [the stack] he is exempt, since it should have escaped. This is what it is saying: if a slave was tied to it or if a goat was next to it, he is exempt. Even though it was explained at the end of the second chapter that "the ox is comparable to other property" [Bava Kamma 27a:11] and if one placed a coal on it and it burned, he is liable -- [that applies only] there, where he put it upon an ox, which was not expected to remove it. But here, [the goat] should have escaped.

ומכה אביו ואמו, “and if someone strikes his father or his mother;” the Torah here spells out the penalty, i.e. legal execution, without even having informed us that this is forbidden, an unusual construction. This question is raised by the Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, folio 54. We have a rule that no court can convict a sinner except where the Torah has warned us of the sin in question being a sin. Granted that in the case of someone cursing a crowned head or even a deaf person who cannot even hear the curse, is forbidden, i.e. both a low-ranking person and a high ranking person must not be cursed, it is obvious that the same rule applies to social strata in between, and therefore each strata does not need to be written separately; compare (Exodus 22,7 and Leviticus 19,7) but where did the Torah spell out the prohibition to strike a human being without the penalty being spelled out simultaneously? We must fall back on Deuteronomy 25,3, where the Torah warns the court’s clerk not to apply more than the permitted number of lashes to a person convicted of these. If in the case where the physical punishment is mandatory even a minutely excessive force is specifically forbidden, it is clear that striking someone without the consent or even instruction by the court is forbidden, how much more so is striking someone without such legal cover forbidden! In fact, concerning the subject of physical punishment, the halachah is according to the view of Rabbi Meir, who said that if someone is guilty of two penalties, both physical punishment and a financial penalty, (and we do not apply both for the same sin) the physical punishment is not administered. (Talmud, tractate Ketuvot, folio 32) The only exception is if the financial penalty amounts to less that the lowest coin in circulation at the time in the country. In this respect, the halachah does not treat sins committed against father or mother differently from offences committed against someone else. If you were to ask that seeing the verse deals with the prohibition of striking one’s father, a sin which carries the death penalty, how could anyone have even imagined that the penalty would be 39 lashes, seeing that we have a rule that physical lashes are never an option for committing such a sin, (compare Talmud tractate Makkot folio 13), the answer is that we have two different expressions in the verse dealing with that subject in Deuteronomy 25,3. It says both: ארבעים יכנו לא יוסיף,, as well as פן יוסיף להכותו על אלה מכה רבה, “forty lashes he may give him, he must nor exceed this,” and “lest he should exceed above by inflicting a severe wound, etc.;” you may also argue that seeing the subject in our chapter deals with inflicting wounds, how could the penalty be one of execution by a court? How would I know that if the blow administered did not result in a visible wound that it would be punishable altogether? Furthermore, when the Torah speaks about cursing father and mother (Leviticus 20,9) execution is the penalty, how could it occur to anyone to think that the penalty would be 39 lashes? We would have to look at Leviticus 24,21 where the Torah decrees the death penalty for striking a human being, any human being, i.e. ומכה אדם יומת, “if he strikes a human being she shall be executed!” On that verse Rashi felt compelled to explain that the human being meant in that verse is one’s father, and that the reason is to contrast and to compare the penalty for striking animals and striking one’s father, where the former is punishable only by financial compensation to the owner of that animal. We could conclude that just as when said animal did not die from its wounds only a financial penalty is imposed, the same would be true for striking human being who does not die a result. The Torah therefore wrote the word יומת, “he shall be executed,” to show that the verse speaks of a human being who is the father of the man who struck him.(Compare Rashi on that verse.) It is not possible to say that the Torah there speaks of someone who had struck one’s father after he was dead, but the verse speaks of living animals and a living father being the victim. What is the difference between יומת and מות יומת, the usual term for legal execution? The former refers to a financial penalty, just as in Exodus 21,29, where the owner is not executed, but the Torah uses this word to show that he deserves to be executed. We know this as previously the Torah had written: כן ינתן בו, “thus it shall be rendered to him.” (verse 20) This was a clear reference to a financial penalty. In light of the above, we must understand the word יומת in Leviticus 20,9 as having been meant literally and applying to someone who struck his father or mother.

או בכלי עץ יד OR [IF HE SMITE HIM] WITH A WEAPON OF WOOD IN HIS HAND — Because it has been stated, (Exodus 21:20) “And if a man smite his bondman or his bondwoman with a rod”, one might think that it means whatever size it may be! Therefore it states here of the wooden instrument אשר ימות בה — meaning that it must have a size sufficient to cause death (Sifrei Bamidbar 160:4).