Halakhah su Deuteronomio 19:5

If [a person] throws a stone into his courtyard and slays: if the victim had permission to enter therein [the slayer] goes into exile; but if not, he does not go into exile, as it is written "and when a person goes with his friend into a forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5)—just as a forest [both] the victim and the slayer are permitted therein, similarly [the law applies] in every domain in which [both] the victim and the slayer are entitled to enter, to the exclusion of the courtyard of the householder since the victim does not have the right to enter therein. Abba Saul says: Just as the cutting of wood is a discretionary act, similarly [the law applies] in all instances of discretionary acts, to the exclusion of a father who beats his son, a teacher who strikes his pupil and a messenger of the court [who administers lashes].⁹There is a significant disagreement among early-day authorities with regard to the nature of the activity undertaken by the agent of the bet din that, when it results in unforeseen death, is not punishable by exile. Rambam, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 5:16, codifies the rule formulated in the Mishnah as applicable to a bailiff who seeks to compel a litigant to appear before the court. Ra’avad, ad locum, disagrees and asserts that the reference in the Mishnah is to an agent of the court who administers the punishment of flogging. Rabbenu Yonatan of Lunel limits the agent’s immunity from exile to situations in which the judges erred in ordering more than the appropriate number of lashes and the agent simply carried out their instruction. R. Jacob Reischer, Teshuvot Shevut Ya’akov, III, no. 140, understands Ra’avad as adopting that position as well. However, Ramban, Makkot 8a, apparently understands the reference to be to an agent of the bet din who administers the proper number of lashes as determined by the bet din in accordance with the transgressor’s physical condition but who nevertheless causes the death of the transgressor. See also R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh la-Ner, Makkot 22b; R. Zevi Alexander Halperin, Imrei ha-Ẓevi, Bava Kamma 32b; and R. Yitzchak Ya’akov Weisz, Teshuvot Minḥat Yiẓḥak, III, no. 10, sec. 2.

In enumerating situations of involuntary manslaughter in which the individual responsible for shedding innocent blood is not exiled to one of the designated cities of refuge, the Mishnah, Makkot 8a, cites the verse "and who comes with his fellow in the forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5) that occurs in the context of the Bible's description of an act of manslaughter necessitating exile. The Mishnah regards the reference to the forest as paradigmatic of the type of misadventure entailing such punishment. The Sages understand the term "forest" as restricting the penalty to manslaughter occurring at a particular site and declare that exile is warranted only if the accident occurs in a place comparable to a forest, i.e., a locale in which aggressor and victim equally enjoy a right of entry. Accordingly, they rule that no exile attends upon manslaughter that occurs pursuant to trespass by the victim upon the domain of the person responsible for his death. Abba Sha'ul, however, understands the verse as establishing a paradigm for the nature of the act itself rather than for the locale in which it is committed. Accordingly, Abba Sha'ul declares that exile is merited only if manslaughter results from an act that is entirely discretionary—as is the chopping of wood. Excluded from that penalty, declares Abba Sha'ul, is a father who strikes his son, a teacher who smites his pupil and a person deputized by the Bet Din to administer corporal punishment who in carrying out those acts inadvertently causes the death of the person he intends only to beat. Those acts are privileged since each of the enumerated persons acts with authority in administering punishment or chastisement and in order to achieve an end which those persons are charged with achieving. Such acts do not merely lie outside the ambit of prohibited "wounding," but are affirmatively required. Thus the actions of those individuals are not a matter of "discretion" (reshut) but constitute the discharge of a duty. Accordingly, bona fide misadventure in discharging those duties entails no penalty. Although the Sages disagree with Abba Sha'ul with regard to the implication of such categorization in establishing an exclusion to the punishment of exile, there is no dispute regarding the underlying premise, viz., that those acts are privileged batteries.