Halakhah su Deuteronomio 20:7

The Gemara seeks to discover a concrete halakhic application, as distinct from a purely semantic difference, of the issue that divides the Sages and R. Judah. A practical difference arising from their controversy is found by the Gemara in the application of a general principle that provides that a person engaged in performance of a mizvah is exempt from the fulfillment of other commandments. R. Judah considers the waging of preemptive war to constitute fulfillment of a mizvah; hence, according to R. Judah, combatants are exempt from fulfilling other commandments while engaged in military duties associated with preemptive war. The Sages regard such incursions as discretionary in nature and hence regard soldiers engaged in such battles as being fully obligated with regard to the fulfillment of other commandments.³The text of the Gemara reads as follows:
The Gemara does not tell us explicitly whether it is R. Judah or the Sages who consider war “to diminish the heathens” to constitute a commanded war. Rashi and Rambam, in their respective commentaries, explain that R. Judah deems such war to be commanded while the Sages consider such war to be discretionary. (The interpretation of these authorities have been followed in the parenthetical interpretations within the translation above.) Indeed, Rashi’s interpretation is taken directly from the words of R. Yoḥanan: [A war which is designated] as permitted by the Sages is identical with [war which is designated as] commanded by R. Judah, i.e., there is a category of war which is deemed to be “commanded” by R. Judah while, according to the Sages, the identical war is merely “discretionary.” The war in question is then identified by Rava as war “to diminish the heathens so that they shall not march against them.” Thus there is no dispute between Rava and R. Yoḥanan; Rava merely amplifies the statement of R. Yoḥanan. According to both, the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is with regard to whether participants in a war “to diminish the heathens” are exempt from fulfillment of other precepts. All are in agreement that the provisions of Deuteronomy 20:5-8 that apply to discretionary wars apply as well to war undertaken “to diminish the heathens.”
This interpretation is contradicted by Me’iri in his commentary on Sotah 43a. Me’iri declares that it is the Sages who deem such war to be commanded while R. Judah regards it as merely “permitted.” Of course, this understanding appears to be at variance with the statement recorded by the Gemara in the name of R. Yoḥanan.
R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Hilkhot Medinah, II, sha’ar 4, chapter 1, secs. 2-3, explains that Me’iri must have posited a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava: R. Yoḥanan declares the sole controversy between the Sages and R. Judah to be entirely a matter of nomenclature having no practical application; Rava contradicts this analysis and, referring directly to the Mishnah, declares that the Sages posit a “commanded” war that is governed by the selfsame regulation that applies to obligatory wars, viz., the nonexclusion from military service of the individuals described in Deuteronomy 20. R. Judah, on the other hand, equates such war with “discretionary” wars and maintains that those persons described in Deuteronomy 20 are conscripted only in obligatory wars but not for service in wars “to diminish the heathens.” The phraseology employed by Rava, “The difference is with regard to [application of the principle that] one who is engaged in performance of a commandment is exempt from the performance of [another] commandment” is understood by Me’iri as referring to exemption from an obligation associated with warfare itself, i.e., the obligation devolving upon those described in Deuteronomy 20 to recuse themselves from battle. That obligation is variously regarded as based upon the words expressed repeatedly in Deuteronomy 20 “let him go and return to his house” or the verse “he shall be free for his house one year” (Deuteronomy 24:5). See Rashi, Deuteronomy 20:7, Sotah 43a, and Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 7:10. The Sages regard participation in war “to diminish the heathens” as a miẓvah and hence incumbent upon even those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20. Since participation in a war “to diminish the heathens” constitutes a miẓvah, such participation serves to exempt those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20 from the commandment to remove themselves from the battle arena.
[The Tosefta, Sotah 7:15, as apparently understood by Rashi, Deuteronomy 20:7, and Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 7:11, maintains that those exempt from conscription in milḥamot reshut may not serve even on a voluntary basis. See also the discussion in Sotah 44a concerning a prohibition against a bridegroom’s participation in battle. Rabbi Waldenberg’s analysis of Me’iri is apparently predicated upon this premise. One difficulty with this explanation lies in the fact that Rambam, on the basis of Sotah 44a, maintains that military service by such individuals involves, not a simple violation of a positive commandment, but transgression of two negative commandments, viz., “When a man takes a wife he shall not go out in the army, nor shall he be charged with any matter” (Deuteronomy 24:5). The principle that one engaged in fulfillment of a miẓvah is exempt from fulfillment of other precepts applies only to positive commandments but does not permit violation of negative precepts. (The usual explanation of why the exclusions from military service found in Deuteronomy 20 do not apply to commanded or obligatory wars is based upon rabbinic exegesis of the prefatory phrase in that section. “Ki teẓei la-milḥamah” is understood as meaning “If you go forth to war” rather than “When you go forth to war.” The reference must then be to discretionary war since commanded war cannot be described in hypothetical terms.)
See also Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 581, who apparently maintains that the exclusion of those enumerated in Deuteronomy 20 means simply that they cannot be compelled to perform military service but does not forbid voluntary enlistment. If so, the phrase “let him go and return to his house” cannot be understood as a miẓvah. However, Rava’s comment may be understood in an alternative manner. It may be understood to mean that the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is also with regard to application of the principle that one who is engaged in fulfillment of a commandment is exempt from the fulfillment of another commandment. It would be regarded as self-understood that exemption or non-exemption from participation in a war “to diminish the heathens” flows from its categorization as miẓvah or reshut. See Knesset ha-Gedolah, Hilkhot Melakhim, chapter 5, appended to Knesset ha-Gedolah, vol. IV.]
Rabbi Waldenberg finds support for Me’iri’s interpretation in the parallel discussion found in the Palestinian Talmud that reports that R. Yoḥanan declared that the dispute between the Sages and R. Judah is entirely one of nomenclature, while R. Ḥisda declared that there is a substantive dispute between them. The identical controversy, according to this analysis, is posited by the Babylonian Talmud as a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava.
This analysis of Me’iri’s comments yields a conclusion of crucial halakhic import. In this controversy the normative halakhah is decided in accordance with the majority position, i.e., that of the Sages. According to the interpretation of Me’iri, the Sages maintain that war to diminish the heathens is a milḥemet miẓvah rather than a milḥemet reshut.
It should, however, be noted that there is a distinct possibility that the text of the Me’iri’s commentary contains a scribal error and that Me’iri actually wrote that war “to diminish the heathens” is a milḥemet miẓvah according to R. Judah but a milḥemet reshut for the Sages. In citing the text of Me’iri’s remarks, R. Shlomoh Yosef Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah (Tel Aviv, 5717), p. 13, makes precisely this correction without further comment.
Knesset ha-Gedolah, IV, Hilkhot Melakhim, chapter 5, similarly explains that there is a dispute between R. Yoḥanan and Rava. According to Knesset ha-Gedolah, Rava declares that both the Sages and R. Judah maintain that war “to diminish the heathens” is a milḥemet miẓvah in the sense that the exemptions recorded in Deuteronomy 20 do not apply in the conduct of such warfare. The sole dispute is whether combatants engaged in such warfare are exempt from fulfilling other precepts. According to the Sages they are exempt while according to R. Judah they are not exempt. For that reason R. Judah terms such war milḥemet reshut, i.e., participants are not viewed as engaged in an activity exempting them from fulfillment of other precepts. It is the view of Knesset ha-Gedolah that Rambam rules in accordance with the opinion of the Sages and includes preemptive war in the category of war “to deliver Israel from an enemy” which is classified by Rambam as a milḥemet miẓvah. This interpretation of Rambam is, however, contradicted by Rambam’s own comments in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah, 8:7; see below, note 14.

The king may first wage only a milḥemet mizvah. What is a milḥemet mizvah? It is the war against the Seven Nations,¹⁰The obligation to annihilate the Seven Nations assumes two distinct forms. A communal obligation to engage in war against those nations is here posited by Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1, and by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 425. A personal obligation to eliminate the members of those nations is formulated by Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:4, and by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 425.
Various aspects of the commandment may be explained on the basis of this two-fold formulation. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh declares that the obligation to annihilate the Seven Nations is incumbent upon both males and females equally and also expresses the view that the obligation is suspended when fulfillment would entail self-endangerment. Minḥat Ḥinnukh notes two apparent contradictions: (1) Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 525 and no. 603, in contradistinction to Rambam, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, introduction, shoresh 14, rules that women are exempt from participation in all wars including milḥamot miẓvah. (2) The waging of war, almost by definition, entails self-endangerment. Hence a commandment to wage war must be understood as explicitly requiring the placing of one’s life at risk in fulfilling that obligation.
These problems are resolved if it is understood that the obligation is two-fold in nature: a communal obligation to wage war against the Seven Nations and a personal obligation to eliminate the members of those nations. Although women are exempt from conscription for purposes of engaging in communal warfare, they are required to eliminate members of the Seven Nations by virtue of their personal obligation. Conversely, in the absence of a state of war declared by the sovereign, no individual is obligated to endanger his life in an attempt to discharge his personal obligations with regard to eradication of the Seven Nations. See R. Moshe Sternbuch, Mo’adim u-Zemanim, II, no. 164; R. Judah Gershuni, Mishpat ha-Melukhah, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:2; and R. Shlomoh Goren, Torat ha-Mo‘adim, (Tel Aviv, 5714), pp. 180f.
One significant difficulty remains. The biblical source of the commandment to annihilate the Seven Nations is the injunction “you shall utterly destroy them” (Deuteronomy 7:2 and Deuteronomy 20:7). This biblical passage might well be interpreted as establishing either a communal or a personal obligation; it is difficult to deduce a two-fold obligation from a single phrase.
In order to resolve this difficulty, it should first be noted that in delineating a milḥemet miẓvah the Gemara, Sotah 44b, speaks of the “wars of Joshua to conquer,” i.e., war for the conquest of the land of Canaan. Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 5:1, speaks, not of conquest of the land of Canaan, but of war against the Seven Nations. Of course, conquest of the land of Canaan involved war against the indigenous inhabitants, viz., the Seven Nations. However, Rambam’s substitution of his own terminology for that of the Gemara is significant in that it places negative emphasis upon such war as serving to destroy the Seven Nations rather than upon its positive aspect as a war for the conquest of the Land of Israel.
Conquest of the land of Canaan as an end in itself, as well as settlement in the Land of Israel, is deemed by Ramban to be mandated by the verse “And you shall drive out the inhabitants of the land and dwell therein” (Numbers 33:53). See Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, ad loc., and idem, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, Miẓvot aseh, addenda, no. 4. Rambam, as is well known, fails to record any positive commandment predicated upon that verse. Hence it may be assumed that, for Rambam, neither settlement in the land of Israel nor conquest of the territory so designated constitutes a miẓvah. (See, however, Megillat Esther, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, Miẓvot aseh, addenda, no. 4, who asserts that Rambam understands this passage as establishing a commandment to conquer the land, but that this commandment was binding only upon the generation of the original conquest rather than for posterity.) Indeed, Rashi understands the verse as constituting only prudent counsel, viz., in order to assure permanence of settlement it is necessary first to drive out the inhabitants. See Contemporary Halakhic Problems, II, 193-99. It may be suggested that Rambam views the first clause of this passage as a commandment or, more precisely, as an amplification of the commandment recorded elsewhere, viz., “you shall utterly destroy them.” The latter passage establishes a personal obligation with regard to annihilation of the Seven Nations. That obligation is quite independent of considerations of settlement. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh explains that eradication of paganism is the rationale underlying the commandment “you shall utterly destroy them.” Indeed, the commandment is presented in precisely that context both in Deuteronomy 7 and in Deuteronomy 20. “You shall drive out the inhabitants of the land and dwell therein” may well have been understood by Rambam as a reiteration of the commandment recorded in Deuteronomy 7:2 and Deuteronomy 20:7 and hence this injuction is not enumerated by Rambam as a new commandment. However, in Numbers 33:53 an entirely different telos is presented, viz., “and dwell therein:” Annihilation of the Seven Nations makes permanence of settlement a greater likelihood. Since, according to Rambam, residence in the Land of Israel is not a personal obligation, establishment of a permanent settlement must be a matter of communal concern. Hence “You shall drive out the inhabitants of the land” (in contradistinction to “you shall utterly destroy them”) must also be addressed to the community in general rather than to individuals qua individuals. Thus the communal obligation to wage war against the Seven Nations is derived from Numbers 33:53 but is not deemed by Rambam to be a distinct miẓvah. Rather, he regards it as merely supplementary to the general commandment formulated in Deuteronomy 7:2 and Deuteronomy 20:7 that serves to establish a personal obligation. the war against Amalek and [a war] to deliver Israel from an enemy who has attacked them (she-ba aleihem). Thereafter he may wage a milḥemet reshut, which is a war against other people in order to enlarge the borders of Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige.¹¹Rashi, Sotah 44b, describes the “wars of the House of David” as wars “which he fought in Aram Zoba in order to annex it to the Land of Israel and against others of his neighbors in order that they bring him tribute and servants to do taskwork.” A literal reading of a narrative reported in Berakhot 3b and Sanhedrin 16a would yield the inference that a milḥemet reshut may be undertaken for economic reasons; see, however, below, notes 42 and 51.

In my humble opinion, the Halakhic authorities do not differ at all, for behold, it is true that the word “ḥupah” is not written in the Torah, only the word (for) marriage, as it is written: “(In the case of) one who betrothes a woman but has not (yet) taken her…”
[illegible] marriage, since, according to Torah law proper, when he has intercourse with her for the sake of marriage, she is (considered) his wife completely and she is (considered) married. So wrote the Rambam.
However, it is not the way for Israelites to have this intercourse in public, and therefore, we would require witnesses to the “yiḥud” for intercourse. And even if it was possible that there was no need for witnesses to this (“yiḥud”), as it is written in paragraph 5, in every instance the matter would be in public (in reality) - for behold, (we) must bless them with the seven benedictions immediately before the marriage (ceremony). Therefore, our rabbis, may their memories be for a blessing, established that the “ḥupah” will be (can be) in place of the “nisuin” (i.e. the two terms can be used synonymously). It has always been this way; even in the time of the prophets, as it is written: “like a groom going out from his ‘ḥupah’ ” (Psalm 19:6), and, it says: “and a bride from her ‘ḥupah’ ” (Joel 2:16). (Cf. VIII) Obviously (then), thus did Moses our Rabbi instruct (lead) Israel.