Halakhah su Deuteronomio 23:16

Indeed, a significant number of authorities, both early and late, state explicitly that the prerogatives of the monarch are not limited to kings of Israel but extend equally to non-Jewish kings as well.²⁴One authority, R. Zevi Hirsch Chajes, Torat Nevi’im, chap. 7, develops the position that disobedience to the edict of the monarch may legitimately be punished not because lèse majesté is punishable per se, but on other grounds entirely. According to R. Chajes, disobedience of the king’s law, if widespread, would lead to anarchy; hence the violator of the king’s law is, in effect, a rodef, i.e., his actions endanger the lives and safety of all members of society. He may, therefore, be put to death by virtue of the “law of pursuit.” According to R. Chajes, this line of reasoning serves to make Jews legitimately subject to the penal authority of non-Jewish courts. It is clear that for R. Chajes non-Jewish courts enjoy the selfsame penal authority as do Jewish courts in the administration of “the king’s justice.” Many of these authorities explain that the principle dina de-malkhuta dina is predicated upon the concept of the "king's law" which they regard as binding not only when decreed by kings of Israel but even when promulgated by non-Jewish monarchs as well.²⁵See Ramban, Rashba, Ran and Ritva in their respective commentaries to Baba Batra 55a; R. Meir ha-Kohen of Saracusto, Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Kamma 97b; Teshuvot ha-Rashba, II, no. 134 and III, no. 109; Migdal Oz, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:1; Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 4:1; Derashot ha-Ran, no. 11; R. Shimon ben Ẓemaḥ Duran, Teshuvot Tashbaẓ, I, no. 158; R. Joseph Karo, Teshuvot Avkat Rokhel, no. 47; R. Moshe Trani, Kiryat Sefer, Hilkhot Gezeilah 8; Taz, Yoreh De‘ah 157:8 (the comment of Migdal Oz, Even Boḥen 1:73, with regard to the position of Taz appears to be inaccurate); R. Elijah of Vilna, Bi’ur ha-Gra, Ḥoshen Mishpat 369:34; R. Abraham Rodrigez, Teshuvot Oraḥ la-Ẓaddik, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 1; Rabbi A. A. Kaplan, Divrei Talmud, I, 171-172; and Shmuel Shilo, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina, pp. 65-79. On the other hand, one authority explicitly rejects the thesis that gentile kings enjoy the prerogatives of “the king’s law”; see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 20b, and cf., Dvar Avraham, I, no. 1, p. 14f. Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:8, states that monarchical prerogatives are vested solely in a king who is “enthroned by a prophet or who is accepted by all of Israel.” On the basis of a narrative recorded in Bereshit Rabbah 94:9 and Va-Yikra Rabbah 19:6 it would appear that the question of whether or not lèse majesté vis-à-vis a gentile king constitutes a capital crime was a matter of dispute between King Jehoiakim and the Sanhedrin. The Midrash relates that Nebuchadnezzar demanded of the Great Sanhedrin that the rebellious Jehoiakim be delivered to him and he would depart in peace. Jehoiakim, viewing his relationship to Nebuchadnezzar as that of a vassal to a lord rather than as that of a subject to a sovereign, reacted by citing the verse, “You shall not deliver a servant to his master” (Deut. 23:16). The members of the Great Sanhedrin, however, countered by comparing the matter with the turning over of Sheba ben Bichri (II Samuel 20:1-22) for execution in punishment for lèse majesté against King David. See R. Chajes, Torat Nevi’im, chap. 7 and this writer’s Hebrew article, “Be-Inyan Tenu Lanu Eḥad mi-Kem,” Or ha-Mizraḥ, Tishri 5743; cf., Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 296, s.v. u-mevu’ar. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, authority to legislate and to administer punishment for infractions of such legislation is not tantamount to authority to ignore rules of evidence as well. It remains to be established that even a Jewish monarch is empowered to administer punishment on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Not to turn over a slave that fled from his master: That we have been prevented from returning a slave that fled form his master outside of the land, [who came] to the Land of Israel (see Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 254). And even if his master is an Israelite, we do not return [the slave] to him. But [rather], we free him and write down his value as a debt on himself. And about this is it stated, (Deuteronomy 23:16), "You shall not turn over a slave to his master." And so is it elucidated in Tractate Gittin 45a, that the verse is speaking about a slave that fled from outside of the Land to the Land of Israel. And they said there that the law about him is that we write a contract with his value [as a debt] for him and we [also] write a contract of [his] freedom; and that we not return him to slavery in any way - since he entered the chosen valley of purity to serve God, may He be blessed, there.