Halakhah su Esodo 30:6

Another limitation upon the prohibition against teaching Torah to non-Jews is expressed by Maharsha, Haggigah 13a. Maharsha states that the prohibition is limited to instruction in the "reason and secret of the mizvot."²⁸The Gemara, Ketubot 111a, speaks of a solemn oath sworn by Israel not to reveal “the secret.” Rashi, in one explanation, states that this oath binds Jews not to reveal the “reasons of the Torah.” This position is based on the fact that the terminology employed in the formulation of the prohibition is not: "It is not permitted to teach the words of Torah to non-Jews," but rather: "It is not permitted to give over the words of Torah to non-Jews."²⁹Zekan Aharon, II, no. 71, equates the entire Oral Law with “reasons and secrets.” Other authorities understand the phrase in a much narrower sense; see, for example, Mishpat le-Ya‘akov, no. 24. Similarly, Me'iri, Haggigah 13a, speaks of a prohibition against transmitting "secrets of the Torah" to a non-Jew. Maharsha states that the prohibition against teaching "reasons and secrets" extends to instruction in these aspects of Noachide commandments as well.³⁰See Mishpat le-Ya‘akov, no. 64, who cites an explanation advanced by Keter ha-Melekh in support of this distinction. The biblical passage containing the prohibition reads, “He declareth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and His ordinances unto Israel.” Jews are recipients of both ḥukkim and mishpatim, statutes and ordinances. With regard to non-Jews the Psalmist continues, “He hath not done so with any nation; and as for His ordinances, they have not known them.” Statutes have been bestowed upon non-Jews, but not ordinances. The distinction drawn in rabbinic sources between ḥukkim and mishpatim is well known: ḥukkim are laws for which no reason is given; mishpatim manifest a readily perceived rationale. Non-Jews are recipients of ḥukkim, i.e., unexplained statutes, but are not privileged to receive laws as ordinances whose reasons are conveyed to them. Therefore, continues the explanation, they may be taught Torah as ḥukkim, unexplained law, but not the reasons and explanations associated with mishpatim; cf., Midrash Rabbah, Exodus 30:6. See also R. Elia Menachem Chalfan, Jewish Quarterly Review, IX, 504, who notes that the numerical equivalent of the word “khen” in the passage “lo asah khen le-khol goy” is identical with that of the word “sod,” meaning “secret.” Cf., R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yabi‘a Omer, II, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 17, sec. 8, who states that despite his use of the terms “reason” and “secret,” Maharsha intended to forbid only “secrets” but does not prohibit either “reasons” or explanations which enable the non-Jew to make proper deductive inferences. In direct opposition to this latter point, Me'iri, Sanhedrin 59a, indicates that insofar as the content of the Noachide Code is concerned there are no limitations upon the nature of instruction which may be provided. It would appear then, that, according to Maharsha, there is no restriction upon teaching the factual content of any portion of the Torah to non-Jews.³¹This also appears to be the position of Rashbam, Baba Batra 115b. Teshuvot Be'er Sheva, Be'er Mayim Hayyim, no. 14, makes a similar distinction between "reasons and secrets" and other aspects of Torah study insofar as the prohibition is concerned, but nevertheless cautions against teaching Torah in any form to non-Jews. A similar position is maintained by Teshuvot R. Eliyahu Mizraḥi, no. 57. This authority adds, however, that it is forbidden to disclose the rationale underlying a mizvah or law only when it is possible to avoid doing so. When, however, one cannot readily extricate oneself from such a situation even this information may be provided.