Talmud su Esodo 21:38

MISHNAH: But the following are strangled¹Since no particular form of execution is prescribed for them.: One who hits his father or his mother²Ex. 21:15., and one who kidnaps a person from Israel³In order to sell him or her as a slave, Ex. 21:16, Deut. 24:7., and the Elder who rebels against the Court⁴The Supreme Court sitting in the Temple court. Deut. 17:12., and the false prophet⁵Deut. 18:20–22., and one who prophesies in the name of foreign worship⁶Deut. 13:6., and one who copulates with a married woman⁷Deut. 22:22. This also applies to the woman., and the perjured witness of a Cohen’s daughter and her paramour⁸Even though the adulterous daughter of a Cohen is burned, there is no verse to apply the same punishment to the adulterer. Since witnesses to adultery are witnesses simultaneously to both parties, they cannot be punished more than the adulterer would be..
One who hits his father or his mother is not punishable unless he inflict a wound on them. The following is more aggravating about one who curses¹⁵Father or Mother; Mishnah 7:14. than one who hits, in that one who curses is punishable even after death, but one who hits after death cannot be prosecuted.

MISHNAH: The obligation to make double restitution¹The general punishment of a thief, Ex. 22:3,8. is more frequent than that of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution since the obligation to make double restitution applies both to living things and to inanimate objects; but the obligation of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution only applies to oxen and sheep, as it is said: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep,²Ex. 21:37 decrees quintuple payment for stolen cattle sold or slaughtered by the thief and quadruple payment for stolen sheep or goats.” etc. He who steals from a thief does not pay double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay quadruple or quintuple restitution.

MISHNAH: If one deposited an animal or vessels with another¹Without paying for the service. The paid trustee has to pay except for an act of God or armed robbery. and they were stolen or lost: If the other paid and did not want to swear²Since he avoids all oaths because of religious scruples. although they said that the unpaid trustee swears and is absolved³Mishnah 7:8, based on Ex. 22:6–8. He has to swear (1) that the object deposited is not in his possession and (2) that he was not negligent., in case the thief was found, he pays double restitution⁴Ex. 22:6.; if he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution⁵Ex. 21:37.. To whom does he pay? To the person with whom it was deposited⁶Who had acquired the right to the deposited object by paying for it..
If the other had sworn and did not pay, in case the thief was found, he pays double restitution; if he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. To whom does he pay? To the owner of the deposit.

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. ⁹This text is copied in Qiddušin1:1, explained there in detail in Notes 77–98. Parallels are in the Babli Qiddušin11b.
The question is, why do the House of Hillel require a larger minimal amount for litigation before a court than the House of Shammai but a much smaller sum than the House of Shammai for legal marriage by symbolic acquisition. The answer is that different biblical verses are the basis. Since a Hebrew slave girl is a minor sold by her father for a maximum of 6 years, or until she reaches the age of 12, or until she is married by the person who buys her or one of his sons. In order to get the maximum for his money, the man buying her might use her as a servant up to the last day of her servitude and then marry her on that day. Since if the original price is divided by the sum of all days of her servitude and only pennies pay for the service of one day, only pennies are left on the last day but nevertheless the marriage is legal. Therefore only pennies are needed for a legal marriage ceremony. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver¹⁰Ex. 21:10.. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos²“Silver” denotes the smallest silver coin struck in Hasmonean times, the obolos, ¹/₆ of a denar. The silver half- oboloi minted in Yehud in Persian times had long disappeared when the Mishnaic system of currency was formulated.. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was taken out by Gentiles,” etc. Otherwise²¹Translating G; the text of L makes little sense. what would we say? He should be considered like someone who left with permission²²Since he did not leave intentionally or even accidentally. Either he was taken by force or he left when insane and not obligated to keep any commandment. and he should have 2’000 cubits in every direction. Therefore [it is necessary]²³Added from G. to say that “he only has four cubits.” From where the four cubits? Stay everybody at his spot²⁴Ex. 16:29.. And from where 2’000 cubits? A person should not leave his place on the Seventh Day²⁴Ex. 16:29.. Or switching, as (we have stated) [it was stated so:]²⁵The correct text is that of G in brackets since the quote is a baraita, not a Mishnah as implied by the text of L (in parentheses). Mekhilta dR. Ismael, ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 262 (Yalqut Shimˋony Qonteros Aḥaron, ed. Ginzberg p. 318, Siddur Rash i #461.) “Issy ben Aqiba says “place, place”²⁶An argument by “equal cut”; the meaning of a word does not change from one use in the Pentateuch to another.. It is said here place, and it is said there, I shall Give you a place²⁷Ex. 21:13. The reference is to the cities of refuge which as levitic cities included a domain extending 2’000 cubits outside the built-up area.. Since the place mentioned there includes 2’000 cubits, so the place mentioned here includes 2’000 cubits.” ²⁸Tosephta 3:11, Babli 48a, Tanḥuma Buber Bemidbar #9 (p. 8, Note 74)“The four cubits which they mentioned are his full length and outstretched arms²⁹When he lies down with arms out-stretched behind his head. These justifications point more to a (Greek) cubit of 63cm than one of 55cm; cf. the Introduction.. Rebbi Jehudah says, he and three cubits³⁰The text of the Tosephta seems to make more sense: “3 cubits for his body and in addition 4 cubits so he can take …”. This reading is required since the bottom of an amphora is at least one cubit in diameter; if he is permitted to move it from above his head to below his feet he already has at least 5 cubits., so he can take an amphora from above his head and put it below his feet.” If he relieves himself, he relieves himself at the side; if he prays, he prays in the diagonal³²The meaning of this sentence is not clear; every explanation must be tentative. Since a person may not stay in two different domains on one Sabbath, and since the person started the Sabbath in his domain, it would be logical to infer that once he leaves this domain he is without a domain and if his 4 cubits intersect with an established Sabbath domain he may walk through the entire domain. But if his 4 feet constitute his new domain then intersection with any other domain is irrelevant for him..

HALAKHAH: “The deviant and rebellious son,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. It is written: If a man would concoct against his neighbor to kill him slyly⁷Ex. 21:14. The argument is an almost untranslatable pun, identifying the two meanings of the root זוד “to plot, to be mischievous” and “to cook” (Babli 69a). (Gesenius-Buhl also notes the two meanings for the root; modern Jewish lexicographers following Ben Jehudah prefer to derive the hapax “to cook” from a root נזד.). When does he become a man? When he concocts. When is he done cooking? When his palm⁸Palm as anatomic detail denotes the mons veneris of a woman (Yebamot 1:2, Note 143); it is used here for the corresponding pubic area of the man. expands. A simile: If the seed is fully cooked inside, the pot becomes black on the outside. Rebbi Zeˋira said that Rebbi Shila bar Bina stated: If a man have a son, not that the son be a father. From the moment that he may come to a woman and make her pregnant, he is a potential father, not a son⁹While it is accepted that from the age of 9 years a male may be able to have full intercourse with a woman (Yebamot 3:10 Note 143), he cannot be held responsible for his actions before he reaches age 13. Therefore, he can be a responsible father only at age 13. The Babli (68b,69b) and the Yerushalmi (Yebamot 10:14, Notes 209–211; copied Qiddušin 1:2 59c l. 26, p. 73) recognize the fact that an underage male may become a father. The son born to an underage father can never become deviant and rebellious since he is not the son of a man as required by the verse.. But the Torah said, a son, not a father. It parallels what Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Sabbatai: The entire period of a “deviant and rebellious son” is only six months¹⁰Since everywhere in talmudic literature the period between onset of female puberty and full feminine development is taken to be six months, the same is asserted here for the male. In the Babli, 69a, R. Sabbatai determines this period as three months..

¹¹This paragraph is quoted from Mishnah Ḳid. I, 2 (Sonc. ed., p. 59). A Hebrew slave is acquired by money purchase or by document, and he acquires his freedom by years of service,¹²Cf. Ex. 21, 2; Deut. 15, 12. through the advent of the Jubilee¹³Cf. Lev. 25, 40f. and by deduction of money.¹⁴i.e. by repaying his master his purchase price less the value of the service he has completed. The Hebrew handmaid has an advantage over him in that she acquires her freedom by the signs [of puberty]. The nirẓa‘ is acquired by the boring [of his ear] and acquires his freedom through [the advent of] the Jubilee or through the death of his master.

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of execution was the court empowered to impose,” etc. But to the government²The Roman Imperial government. When Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire, he thereby abolished crucifixion (except for slaves). only decapitation was given. From where stoning? You shall stone them with stones that they die³Deut. 17:5.. Burning, for it is written, in fire you shall burn him and them⁴Lev. 20:14.. Avenging is written here⁵Ex. 21:20. The slave slain by his master shall be avenged. Babli 52b; the Babli text in Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 273, dR. Simeon bar Iohai p. 175., and there it is written: I shall bring over you a sword which avenges the vengeance of the Covenant⁶Lev. 26:25.. Since avenging mentioned there is by the sword, also avenging mentioned here is by the sword. Strangling? You do not find it⁷It is not mentioned anywhere in biblical literature as a recognized form of execution. The Babli’s discussion, 52b, is inconclusive.. You say that for any death penalty mentioned in the Torah with no particular indication, you are not empowered to make it more stringent, but only to make it less so; they assigned this to strangling.

HALAKHAH: “There are four main categories of damages,” etc. The bull means the horn, as is written: “If a man’s bull smite another person’s bull,⁹Ex. 21:35.” etc. So far a harmless animal¹⁰It has no history of attacking other animals. The owner only has to pay half the damage caused.. From where a notorious [dangerous] one¹¹For which full damages have to be paid.? “Or it was known that it be a goring bull,¹²Ex. 21:36.” etc. The pit, “if a man open a pit,” etc.; “the pit’s owner has to pay,³A person digging a pit in the public domain is responsible for any damage caused by his action; Ex. 21:33–34.” etc. The devourer: “If a person causes a field or a vineyard to be despoiled by sending his animals;¹³Ex. 22:4. The meaning of יַבְעֵר is in doubt because of lack of parallels. It might as well be referring to damage by excessive grazing as to destruction by trampling.” this is the foot as it is written¹⁴Is. 32:20. The same explanation of Ex. 22:4 by Is. 32:20 is in the Babli, 2b.: “Those who send the foot of bull and donkey.” And it is written¹⁵Is. 5:5.: “Remove its cover and it will be despoiled,” that is the tooth, “tear down its fence and it will be trampled,” that is the foot. And the setting on fire, as it is written⁵Ex. 22:5.: “If fire starts and finds thistles,” etc.

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property³A statement by R. Aqiba in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 14, also quoted by the Babli, 48b..” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold⁴What does the statement about Temple property mean?? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox⁵Ex. 21:35; Mishnah Baba Qama 4:3. The rules of damages do not apply to Temple property, not for damages inflicted by Temple animals nor damages done to them. Quoted in the Babli, 49a.” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple⁶The formulation is ambiguous; it also could mean that the Temple never pays damages.? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, ⁷The following clause is missing in the quote of the passage by Tosaphot Giṭṭin 49a, s. v. שור, and in the Constantinople edition of the Yerushalmi. If one accepts the text as it stands, one has to explain that the person making the vow thought that he could pay his vow in cash, but before he could do this, he had to pay damages and now he is short of cash. If one does not read the clause, then there is a straightforward statement that debts to the Temple in all cases are privileged like debts for damages (a statement considered and rejected by the Babli, 49a). The interpretation of the Babli, that damages inflicted on Temple property always must be paid in full, is incompatible with the Yerushalmi. when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

HALAKHAH: “There are four main categories of damages,” etc. The bull means the horn, as is written: “If a man’s bull smite another person’s bull,⁹Ex. 21:35.” etc. So far a harmless animal¹⁰It has no history of attacking other animals. The owner only has to pay half the damage caused.. From where a notorious [dangerous] one¹¹For which full damages have to be paid.? “Or it was known that it be a goring bull,¹²Ex. 21:36.” etc. The pit, “if a man open a pit,” etc.; “the pit’s owner has to pay,³A person digging a pit in the public domain is responsible for any damage caused by his action; Ex. 21:33–34.” etc. The devourer: “If a person causes a field or a vineyard to be despoiled by sending his animals;¹³Ex. 22:4. The meaning of יַבְעֵר is in doubt because of lack of parallels. It might as well be referring to damage by excessive grazing as to destruction by trampling.” this is the foot as it is written¹⁴Is. 32:20. The same explanation of Ex. 22:4 by Is. 32:20 is in the Babli, 2b.: “Those who send the foot of bull and donkey.” And it is written¹⁵Is. 5:5.: “Remove its cover and it will be despoiled,” that is the tooth, “tear down its fence and it will be trampled,” that is the foot. And the setting on fire, as it is written⁵Ex. 22:5.: “If fire starts and finds thistles,” etc.

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Full and partial damages are collected from encumbered property.” One understands full damages⁸Ex. 21:36 requires the owner of an animal with a history of causing damages to pay all damages in full. If the animal’s owner cannot pay cash, the Mishnah decrees that the damages be liquidated by the best available land, even if mortgaged.. Are partial damages not collected from the animal’s body⁹Ex. 21:35 requires the damages inflicted by an animal which never before had caused damage to be paid from proceeds of a sale of the animal itself.? Rebbi Yose said, explain it when it was a docile ox which did damage and then his owner went and sold it. Its body already was encumbered to the injured party¹⁰The “encumbered property” mentioned in the baraita is not mortgaged land but the animal causing the damage, which can be repossessed by the owner of the damaged property from a buyer of the agressive animal.. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he converted it¹¹The owner of the injured animal did not insist on immediate payment but agreed that the debt be liquidated as if it were a loan. into a loan. Then it should be foreclosed only by average quality land! Since the debt originated in a damage claim, he may collect from best quality.

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Full and partial damages are collected from encumbered property.” One understands full damages⁸Ex. 21:36 requires the owner of an animal with a history of causing damages to pay all damages in full. If the animal’s owner cannot pay cash, the Mishnah decrees that the damages be liquidated by the best available land, even if mortgaged.. Are partial damages not collected from the animal’s body⁹Ex. 21:35 requires the damages inflicted by an animal which never before had caused damage to be paid from proceeds of a sale of the animal itself.? Rebbi Yose said, explain it when it was a docile ox which did damage and then his owner went and sold it. Its body already was encumbered to the injured party¹⁰The “encumbered property” mentioned in the baraita is not mortgaged land but the animal causing the damage, which can be repossessed by the owner of the damaged property from a buyer of the agressive animal.. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he converted it¹¹The owner of the injured animal did not insist on immediate payment but agreed that the debt be liquidated as if it were a loan. into a loan. Then it should be foreclosed only by average quality land! Since the debt originated in a damage claim, he may collect from best quality.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶Tosaphot in Giṭṭin 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1.. From your own they¹⁸The developers of rabbinic doctrine. gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰As if he were the property of a Cohen., and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²²This baraita holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion., as we have stated²⁴Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer.; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave.. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸Ex. 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property.
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³²Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶Tosaphot in Giṭṭin 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1.. From your own they¹⁸The developers of rabbinic doctrine. gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰As if he were the property of a Cohen., and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²²This baraita holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion., as we have stated²⁴Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer.; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave.. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸Ex. 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property.
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³²Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth¹⁰Lev. 24:20, speaking of payment for either animal or man..” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.¹¹Deut. 19:21, 25:12.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones¹²Cf. Sifry Deut. 293. The quote Deut. 19:21 refers to the punishment of the perjured witnesses. Since in injury cases the false accuser wanted to extort money and therefore would have to pay money, it is concluded that Deut. 25:12 which prescribes punishment for intentional injury also must mean payment of money. Therefore Lev. 24:20 refers to payment for unintentional injury.. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent]¹³Text missing in the Leiden ms., supplied from E and supported by the Genizah text. he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”¹⁴Deut. 19:19, referring to the punishment of perjured witnesses. The quote is confirmed by all three ms. sources but probably the reference should be to Lev. 23:19: “As a person injures another, so should be done to him”. The Babli, 84a, in quoting a similar baraita refers to Lev. 24:22: “A uniform law shall it be for you”; cf. also Sifra Emor Pereq 20(7).? This indicates that he only pays money.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶Tosaphot in Giṭṭin 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1.. From your own they¹⁸The developers of rabbinic doctrine. gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰As if he were the property of a Cohen., and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²²This baraita holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion., as we have stated²⁴Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer.; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave.. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸Ex. 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property.
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³²Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

“His field¹²Ex. 22:4: “If a person destroys a field or a vineyard through animals by sending his livestock to graze on another’s field, the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall give in payment.” This is the basis of the Mishnah requiring that damages be paid with best quality real estate.”, except if it was mortgaged¹³“His field” excludes third-party interests.. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold¹⁴What relation can Temple property have with damages due from a private person?? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated¹⁵Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:2: “If somebody dedicated his property to the Temple while he owed a ketubah to his wife or a debt to a creditor, neither the woman nor the creditor can collect from the Temple; but the redeemer redeems on condition to pay the ketubah to the woman or the debt to the creditor. If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the redeemer] adds another denar and redeems these properties on condition to pay the debt to the creditor.” In order to combine two conflicting principles, viz., that vows cannot be used to escape obligations towards third parties, and that Temple obligations override all others, it is decreed that the Temple has to put the dedicated properties up for sale but collects only for the amount by which the value of the properties exceeds the obligation, with the third party buyer accepting the obligation to pay off the liens on the property. (It has to be a third party buyer since the person making the dedication would have to add another 25% to the redemption amount, Lev. 27:19.) Claims for damages have to be handled in the same way.: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox⁵Ex. 21:35; Mishnah Baba Qama 4:3. The rules of damages do not apply to Temple property, not for damages inflicted by Temple animals nor damages done to them. Quoted in the Babli, 49a.’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses¹⁶Not in documented form; the witnesses do not sign anything. Such a loan is not a mortgage and is not privileged. damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property¹⁷The statement about Temple property is not to exclude Temple property from damage claims but to privilege Temple property relative to all civil claims..

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead²³Everybody agrees that there exist situations in which an agent acts with the full authority of a principal and others where only the person himself can act. The question is, what is the normal case and what is the exception?. “If he definitively will substitute²⁴This seems to be a quote from Lev. 27:10, but there the masoretic text is הָמֵר יָמִיר. If the word יְמִירֶנּוּ is not a slip of the scribe’s pen, the reference might be to יַחֲליפֶנּוּ (“he himself may exchange it”) in the same verse. There is no explicit baraita in rabbinic literature which would invalidate substitution by agent; the double expression is always interpreted as an addition in R. Aqiba’s system. In Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 9(6), the double expression is interpreted to include a woman for her own sacrifice and an heir for an inherited one. Since the agent is not mentioned, he is excluded. In the Babli, Temurah 2a, the statement of Sifra is characterized as R. Meïr’s., if he himself will dissolve²⁵Num. 30:14. This does not refer to an infinitive construction but to the use of the word יְפֵרֶנּוּ instead of the simple יָפֵר. In R. Aqiba’s system, suffixes always carry a special meaning. The argument is explicit in the Babli, Nazir 12b, where the Tanna R. Joshia quotes Num. 30:14 to prove that a husband cannot delegate his power over his wife’s vows to an attorney. R. Jonathan holds that an agent always can act for his principal..” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,²⁶Lev. 1:4;3:2,8,13;4:24,29,33, a necessary action to validate a sacrifice. The repetition of his hand in all these verses is taken in the Babli, Menaḥot93b, as proof that any agency is impossible for animal sacrifices.” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent²⁷This formulation is in Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 4(2).. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl²⁸Ex. 21:6, speaking of the Hebrew slave; cf. Chapter 1:2.;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent²⁹Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 253), dR.Simeon ben Ioḥai Mišpaṭim 6:6.. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority³⁰This opinion is not found in any parallel source..

“Suffering: If he burned him with a spit, or with a nail, even on his fingernails where it does not cause a wound.” How is this¹⁵The Genizah and E texts do not have דמי; cf. Chapter 7, Note 50.? If he wounded him so that he lost blood, it already is written: “A wound for a wound¹⁶Ex. 21:25. Of the three expressions mentioned there, the third one, חַבּוּרָה, “contusion”, already seems to be subsumed under the first, כְּוִיָּה, “burn”, or the second, פצע, “open wound”. A similar discussion is in the Babli, 84b..” Why does the verse say “a contusion”? To tell you that if he burned him with a spit on the palm of his hand and it swelled, on the sole of his foot and it swelled, or he put snow or ice on him at a place which is not visible, he has to pay his medical expenses.¹⁷A somewhat different text is in Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 8: “If he wounded him so that he lost blood, it already is written: ‘A wound for a wound’; if he caused a contusion, is there not written ‘a contusion for a contusion’? Why is written ‘a burn for a burn’? To tell you that if he burned him with a spit on the palm of his hand or on the sole of his foot and it was not noticeable, or he put snow on his head and gave him a cold, he has to pay for his suffering.”

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner¹⁸Ex. 21:33, speaking of somebody digging a hole in the public domain which then causes injury to another person’s animal. This damage has to be paid in money (or, in the Babli’s interpretation, in money’s worth). In the Babli, Baba Qama 7a, 14b, money is legal tender to liquidate all debts. The Yerushalmi gives the injured party the right to claim real estate in those cases in which the verse prescribed payment in real estate..” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or¹⁹אי is Babylonian spelling for Galilean אוֹ “or”, אִין “if”, אֵי “not”. The first alternative applies here. should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern²⁰In the public domain, cf. Note 18. which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death²¹The injury claim was not paid during the father’s lifetime. By accepting the inheritance, the son became liable to pay the injury claim. If later he received inheritance from another source, e. g., grandparents, the later inheritance is not liable for claims stemming from a prior inheritance even if the son was the only known heir and therefore the grandparent’s property was potentially his.. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

Is it free²⁶This refers back to the argument (Notes 9–12) that the uncircumcised is barred from eating heave. It is claimed that the conditions for application of rule 2, גזרה שוה, are not fulfilled.? Has it not been used for a derivation? As it was stated²⁷Babli 70a, Qiddushin 4a, Zebaḥim 62a; Sifra Emor Pereq 4(17).: “Sojourner”, that is the one who is permanently acquired, “hireling” the one temporarily acquired²⁸Lev. 22:10: “A Cohen’s sojourner or hireling shall not eat from sanctified food.” Who are sojourner and hireling? They cannot be Gentiles; these were excluded in the first part of v. 10. They cannot be slaves; these are included (when circumcised) in v. 11. They must be Hebrew “slaves”, i. e., indentured servants. The verse states that the money paid in acquiring a Hebrew slave is paid not to acquire his person but his working and earning power. Therefore, they are not able to partake of sanctified food. The Hebrew slave who is permanently acquired is the one who refuses to leave when his six years of indenture are passed; Ex. 21:5–6, Deut. 15:16–17.
According to tradition, the institution of Hebrew slaves disappeared with the first commonwealth and could never be re-introduced. The argument here is purely one of biblical interpretation, not of actual law.. It should only say “sojourner”; why does the verse mention “hireling”? Should the one who is permanently acquired be forbidden to eat and the one temporarily acquired be permitted? But I would have said that “sojourner” means the one temporarily acquired; the mention of the “hireling” teaches that “sojourner” means the one permanently acquired. Rebbi Mathias²⁹He is mentioned only here. said, since it is written “no uncircumcised person may eat from it,³⁰Ex. 12:48.” it is as if free from one side³¹While the verse in Lev. is used for clarification about the Hebrew slave, Ex. 12:46 cannot speak about him since no circumcised Jew is excluded from the Passover sacrifices. Therefore, the verse is not used for other deductions and the application of rule 2 might be justified.
The Yerushalmi does not clarify the difference between a straight גזרה שוה in which neither part is used for other implications (cf. Note 12), and a conditional one in which only one of the conditions is fulfilled, which may be rejected on logical grounds. This is made explicit in the Babli, 70b..

If a man sells his daughter on condition of her not being betrothed by the master, his sale is valid but his condition is void, because he made a condition overriding what is written in the Torah,²⁰Which declares, If she please not her master who hath espoused her to himself (Ex. 21, 8). The Rabbis took this to mean that he bought her for the purpose of espousing her. and whoever makes a condition which overrides a prescription of the Torah [does something which] is void.

Do not robberies and injuries fall under the same rules²⁶The same question is asked in the Babli, 2b. In contrast to the Babli, here it is understood that torts do not necessarily follow the same rules as disputes over money, and it is not obvious that a panel of three judges would be sufficient for these.? It was found that Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: These are the procedures which you shall put before them. It serves to explain to you the plain sense of the verse²⁷Ex. 21:1. As in Ex. 21–23, pure money matters are treated first, then torts. The order of the Mishnah follows the order of topics in these chapters.. This follows Rebbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta.

It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai said, by the mouth of two witnesses shall the dead die²⁰Deut. 17:6. In the Babli, this is an Amoraic argument. The verse is read as: by the mouth of two witnesses shall the dead kill himself, i. e., in the presence of two witnesses he accepts to be killed.. Does he die when dead? But to tell him by which kind of death he will be executed. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Illai said, and if a man intentionally kill his neighbor knowingly²¹Ex. 21:14, Babli 41a. Babli and Mekhiltot read the verse as freeing the mentally disabled from prosecution.; they shall inform him by which kind of death he will be executed.

In a baraita²⁶The baraita as stated here is not found in any other source except the Yerushalmi parallels Pesaḥim 28c, Avodah Zarah 45b. In Mekhilta Mišpaṭim 19; quoted in Babli Pesaḥim22b, Qiddušin 56b, Baba Qama 41a the text explicitly notes that, since “its meat shall not be eaten” is included in the statement of the sentence to be passed by the court, only after judgment is rendered does slaughter become ineffective. This may also be the rule implied by the Yerushalmi Targum to Ex. 21:28: וְלָא יִתְנְכַס לְמֵיכוּל יַת בִּשְׂרֵיהּ “it should not be slaughtered to make its flesh edible.” Since the Babli follows R. Eleazar, no discussion of the prohibition of usufruct is necessary. one disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “What does one understand from what has been said (Ex. 21:28): ‘The ox shall certainly be stoned’? Do we not know that its meat is forbidden as food²⁷As carcass meat.? Then why does the verse say, ‘its meat shall not be eaten’? To tell you that just as it is forbidden as food so it is forbidden for usufruct.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explained it if the owners slaughtered it before sentence was pronounced²⁸This statement directly contradicts the position of the Babli. R. Yoḥanan will hold that the prescriptive commandment to stone the ox after judgment has been passed automatically makes any slaughter invalid; that would not need a proof from the verse..

If the father wants to betroth her and the son wants to betroth her, the father takes precedence. If the son wants to betroth her and the father to redeem her, the son takes precedence, because the precept of betrothing takes precedence over the precept of redeeming, as it is stated, Who hath espoused her to himself, then shall he let her be redeemed.^20a(20a) Ex. 21, 8. Two must not be betrothed together.²¹A master cannot be betrothed to two maidservants simultaneously.

In a baraita⁴¹The baraita as stated here is not found in any other source except the Yerushalmi parallels in Orlah and Avodah Zarah 5:12 (Note 155). In Mekhilta Mišpaṭim 19; quoted in Babli 22b, Qiddušin 56b, Bava Qamma 41a the text explicitly notes that, since “its meat shall not be eaten” is included in the statement of the sentence to be passed by the court, only after judgment is rendered does slaughter become ineffective. This may also be he rule implied by the Yerushalmi Targum to Ex.21:28: וְלָא יִתְנְכַס לְמֵיכוּל יַת בִּשְׂרֵיהּ “it should not be slaughtered to make its flesh edible.” Since the Babli follows R. Eleazar, no discussion of the prohibition of usufruct is necessary. one disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: What does one understand from what has been said⁴²Ex. 21:28.: the ox shall certainly be stoned? Do we not know that its meat is forbidden as food⁴³As carcass meat.? Then why does the verse say, its meat shall not be eaten? To tell you that just as it is forbidden as food so it is forbidden for usufruct. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explained it if the owners slaughtered it before sentence was pronounced⁴⁴This statement directly contradicts the position of the Babli. R. Joḥanan will hold that the prescriptive commandment to stone the ox after judgment has been passed automatically makes any slaughter invalid; that would not need a proof from the verse..

A brother²²Of the master of the maidservant. must not betroth her. [This had to be mentioned] because it might have been argued: Seeing that the son who does not take the place of his father to act as levir may betroth her, does it not stand to reason that one who takes the place of his brother to act as levir should betroth her! Hence [the Torah] states, And if he espouse her unto his son,²³Ex. 21, 9. thus excluding the brother.

“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.⁴¹As explained in this paragraph, ownership is transferred immediately but possession is deferred for thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”⁴²Ex. 21:20–21. Killing a slave is murder. But if the slave dies because of a punishment he receives from his owner and lives at least 24 hours after the punishment, the owner’s act is not prosecutable.. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He⁴³In the Babli, Baba batra 50a, R. Meïr. who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession⁴⁴Ex. 21:20, the verse which declares the owner guilty of murder if he kills his slave..” He⁴⁵In the Babli, R. Jehudah. who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money⁴⁶Ex. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership..” He⁴⁷In the Babli, R. Yose. who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He⁴⁸In the Babli, R. Eleazar. who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.

“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.⁴¹As explained in this paragraph, ownership is transferred immediately but possession is deferred for thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”⁴²Ex. 21:20–21. Killing a slave is murder. But if the slave dies because of a punishment he receives from his owner and lives at least 24 hours after the punishment, the owner’s act is not prosecutable.. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He⁴³In the Babli, Baba batra 50a, R. Meïr. who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession⁴⁴Ex. 21:20, the verse which declares the owner guilty of murder if he kills his slave..” He⁴⁵In the Babli, R. Jehudah. who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money⁴⁶Ex. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership..” He⁴⁷In the Babli, R. Yose. who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He⁴⁸In the Babli, R. Eleazar. who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.

“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.⁴¹As explained in this paragraph, ownership is transferred immediately but possession is deferred for thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”⁴²Ex. 21:20–21. Killing a slave is murder. But if the slave dies because of a punishment he receives from his owner and lives at least 24 hours after the punishment, the owner’s act is not prosecutable.. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He⁴³In the Babli, Baba batra 50a, R. Meïr. who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession⁴⁴Ex. 21:20, the verse which declares the owner guilty of murder if he kills his slave..” He⁴⁵In the Babli, R. Jehudah. who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money⁴⁶Ex. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership..” He⁴⁷In the Babli, R. Yose. who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He⁴⁸In the Babli, R. Eleazar. who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit⁴⁷He wants to prove that the different categories mentioned in the biblical text are necessary; one cannot be subsumed under the other.. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving⁴⁸But for damages inflicted through goring by an animal which has no history of doing so the owner pays only half, Ex.. 21:35.? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages⁴⁹This is the preceding argument in a different formulation. Since the rules of payment are different for bull and pit, they cannot be subsumed under one rule.. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things⁵⁰The later text shows that one should read here: “Because there are many things to be stated;” the differences between the rules for bull and pit are many.. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat⁵¹In the rules of impurity of the sufferer from gonorrhea, Lev. 15:4–5 proclaims the impurity of his bed and v. 6 that of his seat. Why do seat and bed have to be mentioned separately? In the baraita of R. Ismael (Sifra, Introduction 5) the rules common to seat and bed are declared valid for any implement used for human rest, as illustration of the third hermeneutical rule “a principle derived from one paragraph”.. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure⁵²Babli Me‘ilah 18a. While textiles in general can become impure, small snippets cannot. Cloth being woven cannot become impure unless it has a size which makes it usable. This depends on the intended use. Cloth intended as cover of a seat becomes impure once it contains a square of side length of one handbreadth (probably 9.1 cm); for the cover of a bed one requires a square of four handbreadths.. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure⁵³There is no logical necessity here. The rules for the impurity of beds are detailed in Sifra Meṣora‘, Pereq Zabim, Pereq 2, Parašah 2; those for seats are in Pereq 3:1–4.? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles⁵⁴Baraita of R. Ismael (Sifra, Introduction 6) as illustration of the second part of the third hermeneutical rule “a principle derived from two paragraphs”; the main argument is in Sifry Num. 1. In Num. 5:1–4, Moses is instructed to command the Children of Israel to remove lepers, sufferers from gonorrhea, and those impure from the impurity of the dead from the camp. It is noted that the command was executed immediately. In Num. 8:3 it is stated that Aaron lit the lights in the Sanctuary exactly as the Eternal had commanded Moses. R. Ismael infers that everywhere in the Pentateuch, a command is to be executed immediately (and permanently).. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated⁵⁵As Ravad notes in his Commentary to Sifra, these differences are nowhere noted.. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations⁵⁶Quoted in Sifra Ṣaw 1:1, Emor Parašah 13:1;. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all⁵⁷The four categories mentioned in the Mishnah. be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver⁵⁸Ex. 21:36, speaking of the bull with a history of goring, requires the owner of the goring bull to pay full damages and concludes “the cadaver shall be his.” This “his” (and the parallel in v. 34) is interpreted as “the claimant’s” in Babli 10b,53b; Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 11,12; Mekhilta dR. Simeon b. Ioḥai p. 186. The argument is that since full damages are due, one could assume that the payor had acquired the carcass and no mention of it would be necessary.. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”⁵⁹This seems to disprove R. La’s statement. If the same rule is explicit for the agressive goring bull and the pit, one would have to assume that it does not hold for any other kinds of damages.! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved⁶⁰This is difficult to understand since real estate cannot fall into a pit. In Tosephta 6:14, one excludes payment for broken vessels if there is no residual value in the pieces.; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death⁶¹Similarly in Tosephta 6:14; Babli 53b.. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents⁶²This is another commentary on R. La’s statement. Also damages for losses by fire teach another principle. Since Ex. 22:5 reads “If fire gets out of control … the person who started the fire has to pay,” even if he started the fire perfectly legally on his own property. This establishes general liability for damages caused by accident. A similar text is in Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 14. The Babli, 26b, derives a similar principle from Ex. 21:24–25..

It¹¹⁴The exact parallel is in Sifra Qedoshim 2–7; an almost identical quote is in Babli Qidddushin 30b. is said (Lev. 19:3): “Everybody must fear his mother and his father,” and it is said (Deut. 6:13): “You must fear the Eternal, your God, and serve Him.” This brackets the fear of father and mother with the fear of Heaven. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” This brackets the honor of father and mother with the honor of the Omnipresent. Is is said (Ex. 21:17): “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death,” and it is said (Lev. 24:19): “Everybody who curses his God must bear his sin.” This brackets cursing father and mother with cursing the Omnipresent. It is impossible to speak about hitting relative to the Deity¹¹⁵It is written (Ex. 21:15): “He who hits his father or mother must be put to death.” This law cannot have a parallel in relation to the Deity.. All this is logical since all three of them are partners in his creation¹¹⁶Since father and mother contribute the animal part of his being and God gives soul, spirit, and life (Babli Niddah 31a)..

MISHNAH: Whipping by three [judges]; in the name of Rebbi Ismael they said, by 23¹⁰⁷The imposition of corporal punishment needs an official court of duly ordained judges. The Mishnah is a reconstruction of what was assumed to be the historic procedure; R. Ismael lived about 70 years after the removal of criminal jurisdiction from Jewish courts and R. Meïr, represented by the anonymous opinion, more than 100 years afterwards. But the prescription of the Mishnah certainly was followed by the autonomous Jewish courts under the Parthians.. The lengthening of a month by three [judges]¹⁰⁸Whether a thirtieth day should be counted for the current month. Fixing the calendar was the sole privilege of a committee of the Patriarch’s court as a successor to the Synhedrion. The current computed calendar was promulgated by such a court in the middle of the Fourth Century (Eruvin 3:11 21c l. 24)., the intercalation of a year by three [judges]¹⁰⁹In the current calendar, the addition of 30 days to the lunar year, labelled as “First Adar.”, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one starts with three, one discusses with five, and one votes with seven¹¹⁰A committe of three has to decide whether the year be a candidate for intercalation; an enlarged committe of five has to do the detailed computations; a further enlarged committee of seven has to confirm the computations. Intercalated months in the lunar year are necessary to keep Passover in the “month of spring” as required by Ex. 13:4.
There is no basic disagreement between R. Meïr and Rabban Simeon, since the latter agrees that in an emergency situation, a duly empowered committee of three is competent. Since Rabban Simeon was the Patriarch of the restauration during the second half of the Second Century, his procedure was the one actually used.. But if they voted with three, it is intercalated.
The leaning of Elders²²⁰Lev. 4:15. If the High Court realized that they had erred in a ruling and permitted something which is biblically prohibited, they have to bring a purification sacrifice and a deputation of the Court has to lean with their hands on the head of the sacrificial animal while confessing their error, as detailed in Traxtate Horaiot. and the breaking of the calf’s neck²²¹The ritual of atonement for an unsolved murder, Deut. 21:1–9, Soţah Chapter 9. by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Simeon, but Rebbi Jehudah says, by five. Ḥalîṣah²²²The ceremony by which the widow of a childless man is freed from levirate marriage, which requires involvement of “the Elders”, Deut. 25:5–9. and repudiations²²³The repudiation of a marriage by an underage girl, married off by her mother or brothers after her father’s death and whose marriage during her minority is valid only rabbinically; cf. Yebamot Chapter 13. by three [judges], [redemption of] the growth of the fourth year²²⁴The fruits of a tree in the fourth year after planting, the first year they are permitted as food, have to be eaten in holiness by the rules of Second Tithe (Lev.19:24; Maˋaser Šeni Chapter 5). They may be redeemed under the rules of Second Tithe, the sanctity being transferred to the redemption money. and Second Tithe²²⁵Cf. Maˋaser Šeni 4:2, Note 51. Second Tithe remains the farmer’s property but must be eaten in purity at the site of the Temple. If there is any danger of spoilage in transport, the produce may be redeemed and the sanctity transferred to the redemption money, Deut. 14:22–26; cf. Introduction to Tractate Maˋaser Šeni. whose value is not known by three [appraisers], also of Temple dedications²²⁶Property donated to the Temple which will be sold by the Temple treasurer upon appraisal by a committee of three; Lev.27:11. by three. Estimations of movables²²⁷If a person makes a vow to donate the estimated value of a person to the Temple, the amount payable is specified in Lev.27:2–7 depending on age and sex. If the person wants to pay with movables in lieu of money, their value has to be determined by a committee of three. These rules are detailed in Tractate ˋArakhin. by three [appraisers], Rebbi Jehudah says that one of them must be a Cohen; of real estate²²⁸Lev. 27:14–25. In all verses speaking of redemption of property donated to the Temple, ‘the Cohen” is mentioned in the singular. nine and a Cohen. The same holds for humans²²⁹Somebody promising to pay to the Temple the value a person would fetch if sold as a slave..
Capital crimes [are judged] by 23. The participants in active or passive bestiality²⁵⁹Whether human or animal; the additional statement is needed only for the animal. [is judged] by 23, as it is said, you shall slay the woman and the animal²⁶⁰Lev. 20:16. Since woman and animal are mentioned together, the animal can be condemned only by a court empowered to judge the woman who had sex with the animal., and it says, and you shall slay the animal²⁶¹Lev. 20:15, about male bestiality.. The bull to be stoned²⁶²Which had killed a human. [is judged] by 23, as it is said, the bull shall be stoned, also its owner shall die²⁶³Ex. 21:29.; like the owner’s death sentence so is the ox’s death sentence. The wolf and the lion, the bear, and the tiger, and the panther, and the snake are sentenced to death by 23²⁶⁴He does not need permission; it is no case for a court.. Rebbi Eliezer says, anyone quick to kill them is meritorious²⁶⁵End of Halakhah 1, Notes 103–106.; Rebbi Aqiba says, they are sentenced by 23.

MISHNAH: A Hebrew slave¹⁵⁰The rules are based on Ex. 21:2–6, Lev. 25:39–43, Deut. 15:12–18. The Lev. source clearly refers to the person who sells himself as indentured servant because he cannot fend for himself. Ex. 22:2 provides for judicial sale of the thief who cannot pay the required double restitution.
Separate rules for the Hebrew slave acquired by a Gentile are given in Lev. 25:47–54. In that case, the slave regains his freedom automatically only in the Jubilee year but the family can force his redemption by repaying the portion of his buying price not amortized by the time passed (Lev. 25:50). is acquired by money or a document; he regains his autonomy by years¹⁵¹The maximum time of a contract of an indentured servant was 6 years; Ex. 21:2, Deut. 15:12., or the Jubilee¹⁵²Lev. 25:40. Since the Jubilee brings back everybody to his ancestral land, everybody is presumed to be able to feed himself. The dependence of the rules of the Hebrew slave on the Jubilee implies that Hebrew slavery disappeared with the Jubilee; it never existed during the Second Commonwealth and is not to be re-instituted in the times of the Messiah (Ševi‘it 10:3, Notes 83–88; Giṭṭin 4:3, Note 65). The discussion about the rules of Hebrew male slavery are a purely theoretical reconstruction of the past whose interest is not in statements but in the rules of inference., or reduction of the amount¹⁵³If the slave or his family buy his freedom, the master is required to accept payment proportional to the time not yet served.. The Hebrew slave girl¹⁵⁴While the rules for the Hebrew slave girl are not tied to the Jubilee, the verses Deut. 15:12,17 equate the rules for male and female slaves. Therefore, all the detailed rules developed in this Halakhah are purely theoretical interpretations of the biblical text; they never were operational within the rabbinic framework. in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty¹⁵⁵While a father can forcibly marry off his daughter until she has reached adulthood (12 years six months and one day) he cannot sell her into slavery beyond adolescence (12 years and a day if she shows signs of puberty). He cannot sell her to work for longer than he had the right to sell.. The pierced slave is acquired by piercing¹⁵⁶The slave who does not want to regain his freedom after six years, whose earlobe is pierced (Ex. 21:6, Deut. 15:17).; he regains his autonomy in the Jubilee or by the master’s death¹⁵⁷Ex. 21:5, Deut. 15:16 make it clear that the relationship of the “pierced” slave to his master is a personal one, not transferable to his heirs..

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female¹⁵⁹Deut. 15:12. The Babli, 14b, points out that the verse only covers persons sold by others, the girl by her father and the man by the court, not the person who sells himself. Sifry Deut. 118 disputes the entire argument and holds that the female had to be mentioned separately from the male since the rules of her acquisition and liberation are distinct from those of the male. (E. g., the female cannot sell herself; the adult female cannot be a Hebrew slave.). Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written¹⁶⁰Ex. 21:11. Since after six years, or after she reached adulthood, she leaves without payment, it follows that her work was worth money; cf. Note 18.: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman¹⁶¹Ex. 21:10 equates the marriage of the Hebrew slave girl to her master to the latter’s marriage with another, free, woman. (Babli 16a; Mechilta dR. Šimon b.Jochai, ed. Epstein-Melamed, p. 167)., and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences¹⁶²Except for texts based on Lev. For the intricacies of his position, cf. H. Guggenheimer, Über ein bemerkenswertes logisches System aus der Antike, Methodos 1951, pp. 150–164; Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Confrontations with Judaism, ed. Ph. Longworth, London 1966, pp. 171–196.
The problem before the rabbis of the second and third generations of Tannaïm was to derive a consistent legal system which intellectually could compete with the Roman law from the scattered remarks offered in the Biblical text. R. Ismael allows no more than one intermediate step between biblical text and legal statement.. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה¹⁶³The expression חפשי is used in Ex. 21:2,5 in reference to the male Hebrew slave. In R. Ismael’s opinion, the ḥâruphah slave girl is a former Gentile who needs manumission (Notes 147,148) and חֻפְשָׁה mentioned in Lev. 19:20 is her bill of manumission. Since the Gentile slave girl can be manumitted by a document, it is concluded that the Hebrew slave can be acquired by a document. As noted later, this is a non sequitur.. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages¹⁶⁴This translation follows the sentence structure of A.. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract¹⁶⁵Divorce, which requires a written document, is called “sending away” (of the wife) in Deut. 24:1. Therefore, the “sending away” of the Hebrew slave (Deut. 15:12,13) also refers to a written document. As noted immediately, this only would prove that the master can terminate the indenture by a written document, not that he could acquire the Hebrew’s services by a document.. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah¹⁶⁶In A: “Rebbi said, a baraita.” This reading is preferable since a fifth-generation Amora is unlikely to appear in a Tannaïtic discussion. said, “sale, sale”¹⁶⁷In Lev. 25:42 it is stated that a Hebrew “shall not be sold as in the sale of a [Gentile] slave.” In Deut. 15:12 it says, “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you.” It is an accepted principle (Sifry Deut. 72, Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:5 (16b), Babli Temurah5a) that if the verse notes that “something shall not be done,” if it is done it is sinful but legally valid since an invalid action does not have to be forbidden. Since the Gentile slave can be bought by contract (Mishnah 3), the Hebrew slave also can be bought by contract. The question remains whether he can be bought by contract without the buyer sinning.. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there¹⁶⁸Since the laws regarding Gentile slaves in general follow the rules of real estate, undisturbed possession for three years accompanied by a claim of rightful acquisition legally establishes ownership. Nobody claims that the same holds for Hebrew slaves. it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada¹⁶⁹A: R. Ḥiyya bar Abba (an Amora of the third generation). The reading of L is the only one acceptable, referring to R. Ḥiyya bar Ada I, of the generation of transition between Tannaïm and Amoraïm. said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew¹⁷⁰This essentially is the argument given at the start of this paragraph, Note 159. The reason for the female to be mentioned in Deut. 15:12 at the start of rules mostly dealing only with the male, is to transfer the rules of acquisition from the female to the male..

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female¹⁵⁹Deut. 15:12. The Babli, 14b, points out that the verse only covers persons sold by others, the girl by her father and the man by the court, not the person who sells himself. Sifry Deut. 118 disputes the entire argument and holds that the female had to be mentioned separately from the male since the rules of her acquisition and liberation are distinct from those of the male. (E. g., the female cannot sell herself; the adult female cannot be a Hebrew slave.). Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written¹⁶⁰Ex. 21:11. Since after six years, or after she reached adulthood, she leaves without payment, it follows that her work was worth money; cf. Note 18.: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman¹⁶¹Ex. 21:10 equates the marriage of the Hebrew slave girl to her master to the latter’s marriage with another, free, woman. (Babli 16a; Mechilta dR. Šimon b.Jochai, ed. Epstein-Melamed, p. 167)., and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences¹⁶²Except for texts based on Lev. For the intricacies of his position, cf. H. Guggenheimer, Über ein bemerkenswertes logisches System aus der Antike, Methodos 1951, pp. 150–164; Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Confrontations with Judaism, ed. Ph. Longworth, London 1966, pp. 171–196.
The problem before the rabbis of the second and third generations of Tannaïm was to derive a consistent legal system which intellectually could compete with the Roman law from the scattered remarks offered in the Biblical text. R. Ismael allows no more than one intermediate step between biblical text and legal statement.. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה¹⁶³The expression חפשי is used in Ex. 21:2,5 in reference to the male Hebrew slave. In R. Ismael’s opinion, the ḥâruphah slave girl is a former Gentile who needs manumission (Notes 147,148) and חֻפְשָׁה mentioned in Lev. 19:20 is her bill of manumission. Since the Gentile slave girl can be manumitted by a document, it is concluded that the Hebrew slave can be acquired by a document. As noted later, this is a non sequitur.. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages¹⁶⁴This translation follows the sentence structure of A.. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract¹⁶⁵Divorce, which requires a written document, is called “sending away” (of the wife) in Deut. 24:1. Therefore, the “sending away” of the Hebrew slave (Deut. 15:12,13) also refers to a written document. As noted immediately, this only would prove that the master can terminate the indenture by a written document, not that he could acquire the Hebrew’s services by a document.. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah¹⁶⁶In A: “Rebbi said, a baraita.” This reading is preferable since a fifth-generation Amora is unlikely to appear in a Tannaïtic discussion. said, “sale, sale”¹⁶⁷In Lev. 25:42 it is stated that a Hebrew “shall not be sold as in the sale of a [Gentile] slave.” In Deut. 15:12 it says, “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you.” It is an accepted principle (Sifry Deut. 72, Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:5 (16b), Babli Temurah5a) that if the verse notes that “something shall not be done,” if it is done it is sinful but legally valid since an invalid action does not have to be forbidden. Since the Gentile slave can be bought by contract (Mishnah 3), the Hebrew slave also can be bought by contract. The question remains whether he can be bought by contract without the buyer sinning.. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there¹⁶⁸Since the laws regarding Gentile slaves in general follow the rules of real estate, undisturbed possession for three years accompanied by a claim of rightful acquisition legally establishes ownership. Nobody claims that the same holds for Hebrew slaves. it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada¹⁶⁹A: R. Ḥiyya bar Abba (an Amora of the third generation). The reading of L is the only one acceptable, referring to R. Ḥiyya bar Ada I, of the generation of transition between Tannaïm and Amoraïm. said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew¹⁷⁰This essentially is the argument given at the start of this paragraph, Note 159. The reason for the female to be mentioned in Deut. 15:12 at the start of rules mostly dealing only with the male, is to transfer the rules of acquisition from the female to the male..

HALAKHAH: “The ketubah of a virgin is 200 and that of a widow one mina,” etc. Huna in the name of Samuel: In the Temple šeqel¹¹²The Temple šeqel coins struck in Jerusalem during the first war with the Romans are silver coins weighing between 13.5 and 14.3 g. The corresponding Tyrian coinage is about 13.5 g. A Temple šeqel in Babylonian theory is twice the weight of a common šeqel, which is the name of the two-denar coin. This means that the Temple šeqel is equal, both in the Yerushalmi and in the Babli, to the Roman tetradrachma (סֶלַע), based on an unadulterated silver denar (drachma, זוּז) of 3.4 g. Tyre ceased to mint coins between the reigns of Augustus and Septimius Severus, meaning that Tyrian coins in the Mishnaic period were unadulterated silver. Samuel requires that the ketubah be adjusted for the inflation caused by the debasement of the currency in circulation. It may be that he holds that the basic ketubah amount is a biblical requirement (cf. Halakhah 13:11).. Rebbi Abba bar Bina said, circulating coin¹¹³The value of the ketubah has to be computed on the basis of the currency in circulation.. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Abba bar Bina¹¹⁴Mishnah Bekhorot 8:7; cf. Tosephta Ketubot 12:6.: “The five tetradrachmas of the firstborn¹¹⁵The redemption of the firstborn, Num. 3:47, identifying the biblical šeqel as tetradrachma. are in Tyrian coinage, the 30 of the slave¹¹⁶30 šeqel weregilt for the killing of another person’s slave by one’s ox, Ex. 21:32., the 50 of the rapist and the seducer¹¹⁷50 šeqel bride money paid by the rapist (Deut. 22:29) and, by inference, the seducer (Ex. 22:15–16) of a girl., the 100 of the slanderer¹¹⁸The fine imposed on a man wrongly accusing his wife of committing adultery during her preliminary marriage period, Deut. 22:19., are all computed in Temple šeqels in Tyrian coinage.” A woman’s ketubah is not stated with them. Rebbi Abin said, did they not learn the ketubah of a woman from the rapist and the seducer¹¹⁹Since the 50 tetradrachmas due from the rapist and the seducer are exactly 200 denarii; either these 200 denarii are the “bride money” described in the verse Ex. 22:16 or at least they are the inspiration for the rabbis to fixate the minimum ketubah at 200 zuz.? Since the rapist and the seducer are mentioned, it is as if women’s ketubah was stated with them¹²⁰The Mishnah from Bekhorot does not prove anything..

It is written: “Six years he shall work¹⁸⁵Ex. 21:2..” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave¹⁸⁵Ex. 21:2..” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]¹⁸⁶In Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai(ed. Epstein-Melamed) p. 160 the argument is made that the slave should leave only at the end of the year since debts are remitted only at the end of the Sabbatical. A similar argument is presupposed here.. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world¹⁸⁷The Sabbatical year. Mekhilta dR.Ismael (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 249).. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh¹⁸⁸It seems that the correct interpretation is the one given by Qorban Ha‘edah: One has to read the word וּבַשְּׁבִעִית as if it were written twice with two different meanings. “Six years he shall work, including the Sabbatical; but in the seventh he shall leave.””. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free¹⁸⁹Since the 49th year of a cycle is a Sabbatical, if the slaves left then, nobody would be freed in the 50th, the Jubilee.? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period¹⁹⁰The Sabbatical period following the first Jubilee starts only in year 51; there is a Jubilee in every year which is a multiple of 50 in the Jubilee calendar; Babli Nedarim 61a. This is the calendar also underlying the Saducee Jubilee.. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period¹⁹¹Since year 49 was a Sabbatical, the next Sabbatical is in year 55, and the next Jubilee in year 100 is in year 2 of the Sabbatical cycle. The Jubilee in year n∙50 falls on year n (mod 7) of a Sabbatical cycle, it will eventually fall on any of the years of the cycle.. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones¹⁹²The preceding argument cannot be used to prove that the “seventh’ mentioned in the verse is not the Sabbatical; the argument at the start of the paragraph is the only valid one. (The emendation of this sentence by the classical commentaries has to be rejected since the text is confirmed by A.).

From where even if he fell ill¹⁹³He could not work the entire six years. Nevertheless, he leaves on time. The same argument in the Babli, 17a. In Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai, p. 161, the word “gratis” is interpreted to mean that the master has no regress on the slave for his medical costs.? The verse says¹⁸⁵Ex. 21:2., “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says¹⁸⁵Ex. 21:2., “six years he shall work.¹⁹⁴Babli 16b; Massekhet ‘Avadim 1.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.”¹⁹⁵A rewording of Mishnah Ketubot 5:9, Notes 199–100. The wife refuses marital relations with her husband; the court deducts from her future claim of ketubah. And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir¹⁹⁶Ketubot 5:10, Babli Ketubot 63b.. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel¹⁹⁷Since sexual relations with menstruating women are forbidden.. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes¹⁹⁸Once she refused marital relations, one fines her by reducing the sum due from her ketubah the entire time she had no relations, irrespective of the cause. By analogy, the runaway slave has to make up the time lost, including the time he was ill and could not have worked while in his master’s house.. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards¹⁹⁹If he was ill when he fled, he has to make up even the times of his sickness., he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

²²⁶Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 3; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 168; Midrash Wehizhir Mišpaṭim p. 130; alluded to in Babli Qiddušin 4a.“She leaves gratis,²²⁷Ex. 21:11. Here starts the discussion of the rules for the girl sold by her father.” these are the days of adulthood²²⁸The indicators of adolescence are two pubic hairs after the girl has reached the age of 12 years and one day (cf. Nedarim 10:1, Note 1.) An adolescent is legally responsible for her actions but still under her father’s authority (cf. Yebamot 1:2, Note 159). She becomes an independent adult six months after becoming an adolescent. (A male becomes an adult only at age 13 years and one day if he did grow two pubic hairs.) Since the adult girl is not under her father’s authority, she cannot be under the authority of a master to whom she was given by her father even though she remains legally married by biblical standards if she was married off by her father when underage or adolescent. The double expression in the verse is taken to mean that the master’s authority ends when she reaches the stage of adolescent.; “without money²²⁷Ex. 21:11. Here starts the discussion of the rules for the girl sold by her father.,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them²²⁹When the text of the laws was given to Moses.? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood]²³⁰It would be reasonable to emend סימנין to בגר, to keep unity of style (Qorban Ha‘edah), but A confirms the text as it stands., she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master²³¹Babli Ketubot 46b, as proof that the father retains the right to marry off his daughter and pocket the valuables offered for the preliminary marriage, even though the master’s authority already expired at the girl’s adolescence..

“If he did not allot her, he must let her be redeemed²³²Ex. 21:8. Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 166; Babli 19a. “Allotment” is the legal term for the preliminary marriage of the slave girl to her master or his son..” This teaches that he cannot allot her for himself unless there is time for her handywork to be worth a peruṭah and that a peruṭah be left to be deducted, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah²³³If he wants to marry her but first extract the maximum of work from the girl, he must divide the money he paid by the number of days of her prospective servitude and marry her as long as at least a peruṭah is not worked off by her. (Since she works at most 6 years, at most 2190 days, if the buying price was at least 11.5 denars he can marry her early on the last day of her servitude.). But the Sages say, he allots any time until sundown²³⁴On the last day of her servitude; Babli 19b.. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada²³⁵In A: “Abba”. Cf. Note 169. said, everybody agrees that for a Hebrew slave only if a peruṭah’s worth is left. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says it correctly, what is the rabbis’ reason? There is no money left, there is no handiwork left? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he allots her by speech²³⁶The money he paid to the father was not given for preliminary marriage but to acquire the right to make her his wife by declaration (Interpretation of Maimonides; cf. S. Z. Brauda, בגדרי יעוד, Moriah 23 fasc. 6–7, 2000, p. 100–107.).

²⁶²Babli 19b; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b,Jochai, p. 165.“As a slave girl.²⁶³Ex. 21:7” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.”²⁶⁴Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a 7:14. But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”²⁶⁵Since the Mishnah is anonymous and is based on R. Meïr’s compilation, it is assumed that it represents R. Meïr’s position.? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end²⁶⁶This is explicitly stated in Baba meṣi‘a 7:14. Since the master is not required to marry his servant, he will not infringe on any biblical obligation by agreeing not to marry her. Everybody will agree that if a man marries a woman on condition that she be freed from levirate or ḥalîṣah if he should die childless, the stipulation is invalid since it infringes on obligatory biblical law.. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters²⁶⁷For which it is formulated in Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a 7:14; cf. Ketubot5:10 Note 227 where all references are given., but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations²⁶⁸In the Babli, 19b, it reads: “A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations; she is married and the stipulations are void, the words of R. Meïr; R. Jehudah says, in money matters his stipulation is valid.” As noted in Ketubot 5:10 Note 227, R. Jehudah’s opinion is accepted in the Yerushalmi as generally valid.? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl²⁶⁹Who does not expect sexual relations.. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”²⁷⁰R. Meïr who denies the ability of the father to exclude allotment.? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest²⁷¹The father may sell her to a person unable to marry her by biblical law (Babli 19b; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b,Jochai, p. 165).. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage²⁷²Since an underage girl is emancipated from her father by definitive marriage (Ketubot 4:3, Note 42), the girl sold as a widow or divorcee must be a widow or divorcee after preliminary marriage only. The mention of ḥăliṣah is a slip of the pen because of the usual combination of the terms; for the House of Hillel ḥălîṣah is possible only after definitive marriage (Yebamot 1:6, Note 192).. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage²⁷³Preliminary, not definitive. and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage²⁷⁴Babli 18a; Massekhet ‘Avadim 1.? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”²⁷⁵As servant only, excluding the possibility of marriage; cf. Note 243.? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister²⁷¹The father may sell her to a person unable to marry her by biblical law (Babli 19b; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b,Jochai, p. 165)..

Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Abun²⁹⁷In the Babli, 21b, and Sifry Deut. #122, he seems to be identified as R. Jehudah (bar Ilai); explicitly so in Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin 2. The opinion ascribed here to R. Meïr there is that of the anonymous Sages. preached: The earlobe was pierced, lest a Cohen become disqualified. Rebbi Meïr says, he was pierced at his cartilage. Therefore, Rebbi Meïr says that a Cohen cannot be pierced lest he become blemished and be disqualified for service²⁹⁸Mishnah Bekhorot 6:1 notes that both sacrificial animal and priest are disqualified for Divine service if the cartilage of their ears be punctured in the size of a vetch seed.. Could not the cartilage be pierced less than the size of a vetch seed? Maybe it would result in the size of a vetch seed. Let it be the size of a vetch! The Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance²⁹⁹Lev. 25:27. This is the wrong quote since it refers to real estate returned to its original owner in the Jubilee. The verse referring to the Hebrew slave released in the Jubilee is v. 41, “he shall return to his family, to his forefathers’ inheritance he shall return.” The inheritance of a priest is the Divine service (Num. 18:20).,” as he was. He cannot be pierced unless he had a wife and children³⁰⁰A Jewish wife and children, whom he is unable to support by himself. Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin2, dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 163.. “By an awl”³⁰¹Ex. 21:6.. Not only an awl, from where even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass? The verse says, “he pierces”³⁰²This interpretation seems to be the reason for the masoretic accents which introduce a dividing accent: “he shall pierce his ear, with an awl”, taking “as an awl” as an afterthought. The Babli, 21b, refers to Deut 15:17: “You shall take the awl,” anything that can be used to serve as an awl.. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated³⁰³Babli Soṭah 16b; Sifry Deut. #122.: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”³⁰⁴This is a wrong quote, referring to Num. 6:23, the text of the incantations required in the rite of the wife suspected of infidelity. But that text has to be written on a scroll; cf. Soṭah 2:4, Notes 143-144. Here, it should say סֵפֶר "book", referring to the divorce document mentioned in Deut. 24:1 which can be written on anything not connected to the ground; Mishnah Giṭṭin 2:3. The quote is correct in the sources quoted in the preceding Note., but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”³⁰⁵Lev. 17:13. The blood of slaughtered wild animals or birds has to be covered “in dust”., but practice said in anything on which plants grow³⁰⁶Mishnah Ḥulin 6:6.. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation³⁰⁷R. Ismael’s own hermeneutical rules.: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair³⁰⁸Lev. 14:9, speaking of the ritual purification of the healed sufferer from skin disease. All the quotes are from this verse.,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail³⁰⁹By the seventh hermeneutical rule one has to try to find an intensional definition of the properties common to the examples given as detail; these then are the properties referred to by the inclusions.. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd³¹⁰Shaving completely every exposed hair; Mishnah Nega‘im 14:4. (Sifra Meṣora‘ Pereq 2 disagrees with the baraita here and the Mishnah and holds that the insistence on the shaving of all hair in both inclusions requires that any single one of the properties mentioned in the analysis of the detail, hair growing in bunches or visible, has to be shaved but nothing else. The Tanna of Sifra holds that practice follows interpretation closely.). “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal³¹¹In Babylonian sources, Babli 21b, Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin 2, Sifry Deut # 122, this is an argument of Rebbi, in Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai, of R. Yose ben Jehudah: Any metal implement which can be used for piercing is called “awl”. The most detailed analysis of the verse is in the Babli, 21b, (Midrash Haggadol Deut. 15:17) where the inclusion-exclusion methodology of R. Ismael is shown to lead to the admissibility of any metal piercing instrument and the addition-subtraction methodology of R. Aqiba to the inclusion of all mechanical and the exclusion of chemical means.. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill³¹²In Sifry Deut # 122, Midrash Haggadol Deut. on Deut. 15:17: This is the large awl. The Yerushalmi text seems to be the original.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.³¹³Ex. 21:6; cf. Deut. 15:17.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright³¹⁴Babli 22b, Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin 2, Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 163.: a shame to him and to his family³¹⁵They violated their obligation to support their relative when he could not fend for himself..

“His ear³¹⁸Ex. 21:6..” Since “his ear” mentioned there³¹⁹This may refer either to the induction ceremony of the priests (Lev. 8:23,24) or the purification of the sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:14,17,25,28). In both cases, it is spelled out that blood was given on the right ear’s cartilage. means the right ear, also here the right ear³²⁰Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2; Sifry Deut. #122.. “If the slave says saying³²¹Ex. 21:5. The interpretation of the emphatic infinitive construction as additional condition is characteristic of R. Aqiba’s interpretation; it is rejected by R. Ismael who considers it a regular feature of biblical syntax.”, two sayings, one at the end of the sixth year and one at the start of the seventh year³²²The slave has to give notice of his intention to remain in his servile state while he still is indentured and has to repeat it at the moment he should become free again. Babli 22a, Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Mišpaṭim 2; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 162; Sifry Deut. #121.. One at the end of the sixth year, while he still is in his servitude and one at the start of the seventh year, “I will not go free.³²³This is the statement required at the time of his planned release.” “I love my master, my wife, and my children.³²⁴Ex. 21:5.” This teaches that he cannot be pierced unless he have a wife and children, unless he love his master and his master love him; unless the property be blessed because of him³²⁵Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Mišpaṭim2; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 162; Sifry Deut. #121; Midrash Tannaïm preserved in Midrash Haggadol Deut. 15:17. The last source is the only one which explicitly refers the mention of “the wife” to the Canaanite slave given to him by his master (cf. Rashi to Ex. 21:5), not to the Jewish wife and her children who also have to be sustained by his master (Ex. 21:3). as it is said: “For he feels well with you³²⁴Ex. 21:5..”

“His ear³¹⁸Ex. 21:6..” Since “his ear” mentioned there³¹⁹This may refer either to the induction ceremony of the priests (Lev. 8:23,24) or the purification of the sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:14,17,25,28). In both cases, it is spelled out that blood was given on the right ear’s cartilage. means the right ear, also here the right ear³²⁰Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2; Sifry Deut. #122.. “If the slave says saying³²¹Ex. 21:5. The interpretation of the emphatic infinitive construction as additional condition is characteristic of R. Aqiba’s interpretation; it is rejected by R. Ismael who considers it a regular feature of biblical syntax.”, two sayings, one at the end of the sixth year and one at the start of the seventh year³²²The slave has to give notice of his intention to remain in his servile state while he still is indentured and has to repeat it at the moment he should become free again. Babli 22a, Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Mišpaṭim 2; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 162; Sifry Deut. #121.. One at the end of the sixth year, while he still is in his servitude and one at the start of the seventh year, “I will not go free.³²³This is the statement required at the time of his planned release.” “I love my master, my wife, and my children.³²⁴Ex. 21:5.” This teaches that he cannot be pierced unless he have a wife and children, unless he love his master and his master love him; unless the property be blessed because of him³²⁵Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Mišpaṭim2; Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai p. 162; Sifry Deut. #121; Midrash Tannaïm preserved in Midrash Haggadol Deut. 15:17. The last source is the only one which explicitly refers the mention of “the wife” to the Canaanite slave given to him by his master (cf. Rashi to Ex. 21:5), not to the Jewish wife and her children who also have to be sustained by his master (Ex. 21:3). as it is said: “For he feels well with you³²⁴Ex. 21:5..”

General²⁶⁶Greek ἡγεμῶν “leader, commander.” In 19c l. 61 (Note 366) his name is Antoninus, in 19d l. 4 (Note 373) Antigonos. The story has many parallels in which various forms of the name appear. Jastrow and Krauss think of Quietus, a general of Trajan not likely to have conversed with a person who died under Vespasian. A Genizah text shows that אגנטוס is the correct form. {Perhaps it is not a name but a title, εὐγενής “noble, well-born.”(E. G.)} אגנטוס asked Rebbi²⁶⁷His title should be Rabban. Joḥanan ben Zakkai: the bull shall be stoned, also its owner shall die²⁶³Ex. 21:29.? He answered, the robber’s²⁶⁸Greek, λῃστής, ληϊστής. partner is like the robber. When he had left, his students asked him, rabbi, this one you pushed away with a cane²⁶⁹Since the owner is not executed, the answer cannot be correct.; what are you telling us? He said to them, it is written, the bull shall be stoned, also its owner shall die, like the owner’s death sentence so is the ox’s death sentence. Since the owner’s death sentence would be by a court of 23, investigation²⁷⁰An exact investigation into the circumstances of the crime; the evaluation of the evidence is within the purview of the court. and cross-examination²⁷¹The determination when, where, and how the crime was committed. Discrepancies in testimony about these questions make prosecution impossible; cf. Mishnah 5:1–2., so the ox’s death sentence is by a court of 23, investigation and cross-examination²⁷²Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai 21:29..

MISHNAH: The one who comes to his daughter, his granddaughter from his daughter or his son, his wife’s daughter, his wife’s granddaughter from her daughter or her son⁴²These are the only cases among the incest prohibitions of Lev. 18,20 which are both capital crimes and may involve a virgin girl. does not pay the fine since he committed a capital crime and should be executed by the court; for anybody committing a capital crime⁴³Even if he cannot be executed because of missing eyewitnesses to a due warning and the deed. does not pay cash as it is said⁴⁴Ex. 21:22. The next verse reads: “But if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life.” This excludes the imposition of a fine in a murder trial.: “If there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed.”

MISHNAH: The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of Temple property or the bull of Temple property which gored a bull of an Israel are not liable since it was said “his neighbor’s bull”³⁵Ex. 21:35., not a bull of Temple property.
The bull of an Israel which gored a bull of a non-Jew is not liable; the bull of a non-Jew which gored a bull of an Israel pays full damages, whether tame or notorious.

MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable⁷¹Even though he swore under a false category, since he swore correctly to the fact that he does not have to pay he is not liable for the sacrifice required for a false oath..
“Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value⁷²He has to pay restitution. But since he did not claim falsely that it was stolen, there is no fine. In general there is no fine imposed if the culprit confesses before witnesses testify against him.. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice⁷³Following Lev. 5:20–25..
“Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution⁷⁴This is not the double restitution of the common thief (since the owner himself handed the animal or vessel over to him) but the double restitution required by Ex. 22:8.. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice⁷³Following Lev. 5:20–25..
He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution⁷⁴This is not the double restitution of the common thief (since the owner himself handed the animal or vessel over to him) but the double restitution required by Ex. 22:8.. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution⁷⁵Ex. 21:37.. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value⁷⁶He did not swear; there is no additional fifth and sacrifice. There is no fine for the confessed thief; therefore he pays only the value even though he falsely claimed not to have slaughtered or sold the animal..

The nirẓa‘ should not have his ear pierced until he declares and repeats [his desire to remain in servitude], as it is stated, But if the servant shall plainly say.¹Ex. 21, 5. The Heb. is lit. ‘saying shall say’, i.e. say and say again. If the slave has a wife and children but the master has no wife and children, or if the master has a wife and children and the slave has no wife and children, he should not have his ear pierced. That is the view of R. Ishmael; R. ‘Aḳiba said: In either case he should have his ear pierced.
Anything may be used for the piercing, even a scissors,²Another reading is ‘nail’. but [the proper instrument for] the command to pierce is an awl, as it is stated, And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl.³ibid. 6. He should only be pierced at the top of the ear according to R. Meir; but R. Judah said: He can be pierced also on the flap. He should be pierced only in the right ear in the presence of the Beth Din, as it is stated, Then his master shall bring him unto the Elohim.⁴ibid. Elohim is understood as ‘judges’. Both door and doorpost are mentioned [in the verse]; why are they both mentioned? It is to compare the door to the doorpost: as the doorpost is upright, so the door must be upright.

HALAKHAH: “The order of beheading,” etc. ⁴¹Babli 52b; Tosephta 9:11.“Rebbi Jehudah agrees that there is no death uglier than this but the Torah said⁴²Lev. 18:3., in their statutes you shall not walk.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, also it was stated thus: One shall murder the murderer⁴³Num. 35:30: Any homicide; following witnesses one shall murder the murderer., the way he murdered. I could think that if he killed with a sword, one should kill him with a sword, with a rod one should kill him with a rod? Avenging is written here⁵Ex. 21:20. The slave slain by his master shall be avenged. Babli 52b; the Babli text in Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 273, dR. Simeon bar Iohai p. 175., and there it is written: I shall bring over you a sword which avenges the vengeance of the Covenant⁶Lev. 26:25.. Since avenging mentioned there is by the sword, also avenging mentioned here is by the sword. I could think that he⁴⁴The avenger. should kill him between the arms? It is said here⁴⁵Deut. 19:19. Since this refers to perjured witnesses, it includes all kinds of death penalties., you shall eliminate the evil from your midst, and it is said there⁴⁶Deut. 21:9., you shall eliminate the innocent blood from your midst. Elimination, elimination; breaking the neck, breaking the neck⁴⁷By the doctrine of invariability of lexemes the meaning of “elimination” must be the same in Deut. 19:19 and Deut. 21:9. That of “breaking the neck” in Deut. 21:4 is defined by “neck” in Lev. 5:8. Since elimination in Deut. 21 is by breaking the neck, Deut. 19:19 also must refer to the neck. Since strangulation is not mentioned in the Pentateuch, the only method of execution to which this may refer is beheading.. Since elimination here is at the neck, also there it is at the neck. Since breaking the neck there implies chopping off the head, also here chopping off the head.

HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. ¹³⁸The Halakhah is a parallel, shorter version of Tosephta 1:2,3 and parallel beraitot in the Babli, 14b, 15a. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole¹³⁹In Tosephta and Babli (and a Genizah fragment of the Yerushalmi): “a cow is compensated for by a stole and a stole by a cow”, explained in the Babli that the stole injured the cow and the cow tore the stole. This sentence is only an amplification of the expression “estimation of money’s worth”., but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property¹⁴⁰The Babli, 14b, after a lengthy discussion comes to the conclusion that “money’s worth” in contrast to “money” means real estate whose value can only be established by appraisal, not by barter.. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those¹⁴¹The two Babylonian sources point out that in case the person liable for damages had died, the injured party is absolutely barred from appropriating movables from the estate.. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court¹⁴²The two Babylonian sources insist that the only court competent in the matter is the permanent court of the community. This interpretation also has to be accepted in the Yerushalmi since imposing fines is restricted to judges qualified to sit in criminal cases.. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony¹⁴³Since payment of half the damages has the status of a fine, not of restitution, the court cannot recognize an admission of liability by either of the parties since “nobody can be sentenced to a fine based on his confession” (Babli 14b).. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony¹⁴⁴While the same statement is also found in the Tosephta, it is clear that people disqualified for testimony, such as professional gamblers, are excluded by the requirement of testimony in court.. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse¹⁴⁵Ex. 21–22. speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them¹⁴⁶The introductory sentence, Ex.21:1, is formulated gender neutral. In the Babli, 15b, this argument is attributed to R. Eleazar.” “And sometimes¹⁰It has no history of attacking other animals. The owner only has to pay half the damage caused. both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said⁴⁴Ex. 21:22. The next verse reads: “But if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life.” This excludes the imposition of a fine in a murder trial. “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning⁴⁸Which is a case where a person actually could face execution.. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. ⁴⁹Cf. fol. 27b, line 30; Terumot 7:1, Notes 16,18; Babli 35a.Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita⁵⁰Lev. 24:21.: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

There⁷¹Mishnah Baba Qama 3:3., we have stated: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain and a third party was hurt, is liable for damages.” It was also stated⁷²Tosephta Baba Qama 2:8: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain in order to acquire it, and another person was hurt by it, he is liable, and it is forbidden because of robbery. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it is not robbery to impair the public domain.” The person who acquired the dung is liable but, since he acquired it, one is forbidden to take it from him, but he may take it from the owner of the cattle since it was in the public domain and an obstacle to travelers.: “It is forbidden because of robbery.” Cahana⁷³It is impossible to decide whether Cahana here is Rav Cahana I, a companion of Rav in Babylonia, or Rav Cahana II; see note in Berakhot p. 247. said, only if he turned it over in order to acquire it. But if he did not turn it over in order to acquire it, about that one does not speak. But as regards damages, there is no difference whether he turned it over in order to acquire it or he did not turn it over in order to acquire it; if a third party was hurt, he is liable for damages⁷⁴This contradicts statements of Ḥizqiah in Yerushalmi Baba Qama 3:3, fol. 3c, and of R. Eleazar in Babli Baba Qama 29b.. And here, you say so? Rebbi Abun said, there it is written (Ex. 21:34): “The one responsible for the pit⁷⁵An unauthorized open pit in the public domain. shall pay,” the one responsible for the damage shall pay. But here (Deut. 14:22): “You shall give tithes,” you give tithes from your property but not from other people’s property.

There⁷¹Mishnah Baba Qama 3:3., we have stated: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain and a third party was hurt, is liable for damages.” It was also stated⁷²Tosephta Baba Qama 2:8: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain in order to acquire it, and another person was hurt by it, he is liable, and it is forbidden because of robbery. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it is not robbery to impair the public domain.” The person who acquired the dung is liable but, since he acquired it, one is forbidden to take it from him, but he may take it from the owner of the cattle since it was in the public domain and an obstacle to travelers.: “It is forbidden because of robbery.” Cahana⁷³It is impossible to decide whether Cahana here is Rav Cahana I, a companion of Rav in Babylonia, or Rav Cahana II; see note in Berakhot p. 247. said, only if he turned it over in order to acquire it. But if he did not turn it over in order to acquire it, about that one does not speak. But as regards damages, there is no difference whether he turned it over in order to acquire it or he did not turn it over in order to acquire it; if a third party was hurt, he is liable for damages⁷⁴This contradicts statements of Ḥizqiah in Yerushalmi Baba Qama 3:3, fol. 3c, and of R. Eleazar in Babli Baba Qama 29b.. And here, you say so? Rebbi Abun said, there it is written (Ex. 21:34): “The one responsible for the pit⁷⁵An unauthorized open pit in the public domain. shall pay,” the one responsible for the damage shall pay. But here (Deut. 14:22): “You shall give tithes,” you give tithes from your property but not from other people’s property.

“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written³⁴Ex. 21:19. but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs³⁵This still belongs to Halakhah 3. Since we have a principle that nobody subject to criminal punishment pays damages, why was it stated earlier that if medical opinion was that the victim would survive, the attacker has to pay the victim’s expenses and loss of earnings even though in the end he faces prosecution for murder? His monetary obligation starts immediately with the act of agression; he faces trial only after the victim’s death.. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs³⁶The moment it becomes clear that the agressor does not face criminal charges, the monetary obligations are activated..

MISHNAH: This is more severe regarding a human than an ox since a human pays damages³⁷And the other four categories of payments mentioned in Mishnah 1. These are enumerated by the Mishnah in the Babli and most independent Mishnah mss. and pays for unborn children³⁸Ex. 21:22 prescribes that an attack on a woman which leads to a miscarriage but does not endanger the woman’s life entitles the woman’s husband to go to court and exact payment for the loss of prospective children., but the ox pays only damages and does not pay for unborn children.
A person who hits his father or mother without causing a concussion³⁹Ex. 21:15 declares hitting father or mother to be a capital crime. Hitting one of the parents without causing visible damage is a sin but not a crime. Therefore there is no obstacle to pressing monetary claims. Cf. Mishnah 7. or who causes injury on the Day of Atonement⁴⁰Desecrating the Day of Atonement is a deadly sin but not a prosecutable crime; it is outside the purview of the human court. Injuring somebody on the Sabbath is a capital crime. Cf. Mishnah 7. is liable for everything. He who injures a Hebrew slave⁴¹Hebrew slavery was an institution permanently abolished, never resurrected in the Second Commonwealt; cf. Qiddušin 1:2, Note 150. The argument is purely theoretical. is liable for everything except for lost earnings if he is his own. He who injures another person’s Canaanite slave⁴²Any Gentile slave becoming potentially Jewish by circumcision and immersion in a miqweh; cf. Qiddušin 1:3, Note 328. A person severely injuring his own slave has to set him free (Ex. 21:26–27). is liable for everything. Rebbi Jehudah says, slaves have no claim for embarrassment.

MISHNAH: This is more severe regarding a human than an ox since a human pays damages³⁷And the other four categories of payments mentioned in Mishnah 1. These are enumerated by the Mishnah in the Babli and most independent Mishnah mss. and pays for unborn children³⁸Ex. 21:22 prescribes that an attack on a woman which leads to a miscarriage but does not endanger the woman’s life entitles the woman’s husband to go to court and exact payment for the loss of prospective children., but the ox pays only damages and does not pay for unborn children.
A person who hits his father or mother without causing a concussion³⁹Ex. 21:15 declares hitting father or mother to be a capital crime. Hitting one of the parents without causing visible damage is a sin but not a crime. Therefore there is no obstacle to pressing monetary claims. Cf. Mishnah 7. or who causes injury on the Day of Atonement⁴⁰Desecrating the Day of Atonement is a deadly sin but not a prosecutable crime; it is outside the purview of the human court. Injuring somebody on the Sabbath is a capital crime. Cf. Mishnah 7. is liable for everything. He who injures a Hebrew slave⁴¹Hebrew slavery was an institution permanently abolished, never resurrected in the Second Commonwealt; cf. Qiddušin 1:2, Note 150. The argument is purely theoretical. is liable for everything except for lost earnings if he is his own. He who injures another person’s Canaanite slave⁴²Any Gentile slave becoming potentially Jewish by circumcision and immersion in a miqweh; cf. Qiddušin 1:3, Note 328. A person severely injuring his own slave has to set him free (Ex. 21:26–27). is liable for everything. Rebbi Jehudah says, slaves have no claim for embarrassment.

MISHNAH: Plotting witnesses cannot be executed unless judgment was rendered, for the Sadducees say, unless he was executed, for it says, a life for a life³⁸This is a misquote. It should be בְּנֶ֗פֶשׁ נֶ֣פֶשׁ (Deut. 19:21), not נֶפֶ֭שׁ תַּ֥חַת נָֽפֶשׁ (Lev. 24:18) which applies to an animal.. The Sages told them, was it not already said, do to him as he plotted to do to his brother³⁹Deut. 19:19. It says “he plotted”, not “he did”. This implies that the plot was discovered before it succeeded., does this not imply that his brother is alive? Then why does it say, a life for a life? I could think that they would be executed once they had testified, but the verse says, a life for a life; i. e., they cannot be executed unless judgment was passed⁴⁰The court might not believe the witnesses even if no formal perjury was proved. Then the testimony becomes irrelevant and cannot be sanctioned. If no sentence had been passed on the accused, it is impossible to sentence the witnesses to the same penalty..

HALAKHAH: “If one intended to hit someone on his hips,” etc. Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a deadly stone which killed one person and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other³⁹In Ex. 21:22–23 it is spelled out that in case of injuries, payment is due only if there is no criminal case. But this refers only to one person. If the stone had killed one person and broke the same person’s vessels, no payment for the vessels would be due. But this says nothing about the obligations of the thrower towards a third person, not involved in the personal injury case.? Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a stone which was not deadly but which killed one person⁴⁰Assuming that in the previous case the law was that the thrower could not be sued by the owner of the vessels, the question remains open whether he can be sued if the thrower cannot be sued for murder (Num. 35:17) but only sued for money by the heirs of the slain person. In the Babli 79b both questions are answered in the negative. and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other?

HALAKHAH: “This is more severe regarding a human than an ox,” etc. “A person who hits his father or mother,” etc. It was stated⁴³A similar statement is in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Neziqin 9.: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded both of his eyes simultanously, or that he knocked out two of his teeth simultaneously, he does not have to pay anything. One after the other, he gains his freedom by the first and he pays him damages for the second⁴⁴Ex. 21:26–27 states that a slave gains his freedom if his master blinds him or knocks out one of his teeth. If the master injures the slave repeatedly, the slave gains his freedom by the first injury and, therefore, can claim full payment for the second as a free Jew (Babli Giṭṭin 42b). But if a double injury was inflicted in one blow, the slave was not free and has no claim beyond his automatic freedom.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This implies that one estimates embarrassment for slaves⁴⁵Since there is no exception made for shame in the previous statement.
The statement is difficult to understand since at the moment of the second injury the slave already is a free Jew rather than a slave. As R. Eliahu Fulda points out, it also is superfluous since R. Joḥanan always follows the anonymous Mishnah as practice. Since the Yerushalmi is so elliptic, it may not be excluded that it follows the Babli (Giṭṭin 42b) in holding that the slave is automatically free only for eye and tooth which are mentioned in the verse, but for other injuries for which the court will force the slave’s freedom a bill of manumission would be required. Then R. Abbahu’s statement becomes relevant for the case of a slave in his period between servitude and freedom.. ⁴⁶A text similar to the remainder of this paragraph is in Ketubot 5:5, Notes 120–130. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a person dedicates his earnings, he dedicates everything⁴⁷Everything he earns automatically is Temple property; he cannot take anything to feed himself but has to beg his sustenance from others. Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8 does not support this statement.. If he dedicates the earnings of his slave, he⁴⁸The slave can support himself from his own earnings; only the excess becomes Temple property; Tosephta ‘Arakhin 3:8, Babli Giṭṭin 12a. can take from there his upkeep and the remainder is dedicated. Here you say, the remainder is dedicated, but there you say, everything is holy. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support free people than slaves⁴⁹Slaves would not be able to feed themselves from alms.. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say: If somebody cuts off the hands of somebody else’s slave, his master collects damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earnings, and embarrassment, and that one should be supported by welfare⁵⁰Babli Giṭṭin 12b.. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support amputated slaves than unimpaired ones. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan also give to his slave when he ate meat? Give also to his slave when he drank wine? And recited for himself the verse⁵¹Job 31:15.: “Did not His maker make me in the womb”? They said, there a rule of law, here a rule of mercy.

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” ⁷³This paragraph has a differently worded parallel in Baba qama 4:1 (by a different editorial team) which explains the somewhat cryptic wording here:
תַּמָּן תְּנִינָן. הָאַחֲרוֹן נוֹטֵל מְנָה וְשֶׁלְּפָנָיו חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז וּשְׁנַיִם הָרִאשׁוֹנִים דִּינָרֵי זָהָב. רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי זְעֵירָא, וְכֵן לְשָׂכָר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. הָדָא דְּרִבִּי זֵירָא פְּלִיגָא עַל דְּרַבִּי לָעָזָר. אָמַר רַבִּי מַנִּי. קַשְׁיָתָהּ קוֹמֵי רְבִּי יוּדָן. אָמַר לִי. לֹא מוֹדֶה רְבִּי לָעָזָר שֶׁאִם הִתְנוּ בֵּינֵיהֶן שֶׁזֶּה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ. שְׁוָרִים כְּמֻתָּנִים הֵן. חָזַר וְאָמְרָה קוֹמֵי רְבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. בְּפִירוּשׁ פְּלִיגֵי. רִבִּי לָעָזָר אָמַר. סְתַמָּן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. רְבִּי זְעֵירָא אָמַר, סְתַמָּן זֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ.
וְכֵן שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהִיטִּילוּ לַכִּיס פָּחֲתוּ אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ כָּךְ הֵן חוֹלְקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי בּוּן. נִרְאִין דְּבָרִים אִם נָֽטְלוּ מַרְגָּלִית. דְּיָכוֹל מֵימַר לֵיהּ אִילּוּלֵי עֲשַׂרְתָּא דֵינָרַיי לֹא הֲוִיתָה מְזַבִּין כְּלוּן. אֲבָל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֵחָלֵק מֵבִיאִין לָאֶמְצָע וְחוֹלְקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר וַאֲפִילוּ דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֵחָלֵק. דְּיָכִיל מֵימַר לֵיהּ אַתְּ פְּרַגְמָטַּיָּא דִידָךְ סַגִּין וְאַתְּ מַנְעָא מַזְבִּנְתָּא. אֲנָא פְּרַגְמָטַּיָּא דִידִי קָלִיל וַאֲנַא הֲפַךְ וּמִתְהַפֵּךְ בְּדִידִי וּמַטִּי בָךְ. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּשֶׁהָייְתָה פְּרַגְמָטַּייוֹ נְתוּנָה כָאן. תָֽיְתָה פְּרַגְמָטַּייוֹ נְתוּנָה בְּרוֹמֵי. דְּיָכִיל מֵימַר לֵיהּ. עַד דְּאַתְּ סְלִיק לְרוֹמֵי אֲנַא הֲפַךְ וּמִתְהַפֵּךְ בְּדִידִי וּמַטִּי בָךְ.
"Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner." Rebbi Abun said, the statement looks reasonable if they bought a precious stone because he can say to him, without my ten denars you could not have bought anything. But anything that usually is split {smaller units that can be bought with less capital) one adds together and splits (proportionally to the capital invested). Rebbi Eleazar says, even things that usually are split [are divided evenly], because he can say to him, you have a lot of merchandise and you have difficulty selling it. 1 have little merchandise and turn it over rapidly and make as much as you do. So far if his merchandise was here. What if his merchandise was in Rome? He can say to him, by the time you went to Rome, I turn mine over rapidly and make as much as you do.
There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mani said, I asked this before Rebbi Yudan. He said to me: does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said this before Rebbi Yose, who answered him, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution. {This paragraph is a direct quote from Ketubot since the quote from “there” refers to here, Baba qama 4:1}. Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly⁷⁴Only results of financial operations are split per share. Results of personal effort by the shareholders are split evenly; they are socii pro aequa parte of Justinian’s legislation.. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise⁷⁵Expensive items, as explained in the parallel text.. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There⁷⁶Mishnah Baba qama 4:1. Ex. 21:35 decrees that if an ox kills another ox, the owner of the attacking animal and the owner of the victim become co-owners of both the living and the dead animal. If the attacking ox attacks another one before it can be slaughtered, its co-owners now become co-owners with the owner of the second victim. The case quoted in the Mishnah is about an ox worth 200 zuz which attacks three oxen, each of which was worth 200 zuz but whose carcasses are not worth anything after the attack. Then the owner of the ox which was killed last takes half the combined value of the attacker and its victim as prescribed in the verse, 100 zuz. The owner of the second ox has a claim of 50% of the value of the combined value of the attacker and its victim. But since only 100 zuz remain of the value of the attacker and the victim is not worth anything, the second owner gets only 50 zuz. By the same argument, the owner of the first ox gets 25 zuz, the same amount as the owner of the attacker retains., we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings⁷⁷R. Ze‘ira interprets the Mishnah in Baba qama that in the company created by the attacking ox, the owner of the third victim contributed 200, the owner of the second 100, the owners of the first and of the attacker 50 each, and 50% of the value was lost as prescribed in the verse. Therefore, the Mishnah precribes proportional appropriations for a case which is not a financial operation; the Mishnah in Ketubot can be interpreted that in a company, all gains and losses have to be distributed in proportion to the capital invested.. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution⁷⁸Since in money matters, biblical law is not prescriptive.? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution⁷⁹Since R. Ze‘ira is the later and higher authority, the Yerushalmi decides that all distributions must be proportional. The Babli, 93b, quotes the opinion attributed here to R. Eleazar in the name of Samuel as interpreted by Rav Hamnuna, it clearly decides that all distributions must be split equally..

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom⁹⁸Ex. 21:26–27 ordains freedom to a slave whose owner destroys one of his eyes or teeth. By rabbinic interpretation, this is extended to all important body parts.. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second⁹⁹For the second injury, the slave can already require the damages due to a free person.. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him¹⁰⁰In the Babli, 42a (quoted also Qiddušin 24b), this is a dispute among Tannaïm which is resolved by deciding that a bill of manumission is not needed for injury to teeth or eyes since the verse represents the bill of manumission, but is needed for all other body parts whose loss results in freedom to the slave only by rabbinic interpretation. The following sentence shows that this interpretation is not accepted in the Yerushalmi. In case a bill of manumission is required, damages can be claimed only after delivery of the bill.
It seems that the baraita in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 9, contains a polemic against the argument here since it emphasizes that the verse requires to send the slave to freedom for his tooth or for his eye; the singular implies that the slave can request payment for the second injury independent of his legal status.? Not only does this¹⁰¹Even an authority who requires a bill of manumission for the slave freed by the Torah will not insist that the rules of these bills be followed to the letter but all forms of manumission accepted in Gentile courts are acceptable. apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap¹⁰²A Phrygian cap given to the slave by his master as a sign of freedom., or הרנירק טיאונוס¹⁰³These words are unexplained. In the Babli 20a, speaking of manumission in general, not of the slave freed by the Torah, it is stated that a bill of manumission engraved on a writing tablet is valid, but not one written on a cap and אנדוכתרי (var. אנדרכתן, אדוכתן, אנדרוכתרי) explained in Arukh as text woven into the cloth (but see next paragraph).
In Massekhet ‘Avadim, end of Chap. 3, the baraita quoted here appears in one ms. as: “If he broke his two teeth simultaneously, or blinded his two eyes simultaneously, the slave goes to freedom and is not paid anything, one after the other he obtains his freedom for the first and is paid for the second. If he cut his flesh or destroyed a tooth which did not come out yet, he is freed by אנטוקטא, a tablet, a writing tablet, but not by קיפה of kings.” The word אנטוקטא was read by Pineles, דרכה של תורה, as vindicta, a reading accepted by all later lexicographers. It is likely that אנדוכתרי and its variants also represent forms of vindicta in Babylonian spelling, which does not show the usual exactness of transliterations in the Yerushalmi, standing for manumissio per vindictam, manumission by having the slave touched with a vindicta, or staff, by a duly authorized government official. Such a manumission is invalid in any case not ordered by the Torah., or the king’s freedom¹⁰⁴The acts of manumission recognized in Roman law, manumissio per vindictam, inter amicos, and per epistulam, also manumission in Egyptian law by declaration before a notary public and payment of the applicable tax (cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in Light of the Papyri, New York 1944, p.73).? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his¹⁰⁵This should read “her” here and in the sequel since a male slave cannot marry and has no family relationship with his children. children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

“And they spread out the cloth.⁸⁸Deut. 22:17. It was proven that this sentence cannot mean what it says.” That is all simile. Rebbi Ismael stated: That is one of three verses in the Torah which have been written as simile⁸⁹Sifry Deut. 237; in Finkelstein’s opinion not of the original Sifry text. A slightly enlarged version is in Sanhedrin 8:8, 26c 1. 6.. “If he gets up and walks outside on his support, the one who hit him is not prosecuted.⁹⁰Ex. 21:19, speaking of a person who deliberatly injures another. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 6; Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai p. 174.” Could anybody think that one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But what is “on his support”, in his health⁹¹If the injured person regains his health but then has a relapse and dies, the person who injured him cannot be prosecuted for murder.. “If the sun shone on him, he has blood.⁹²Ex. 22:2, speaking of a thief digging a tunnel under a house, who can be killed with impunity if found out since in the tunnel “he has no blood”.” Does the sun shine only on him? But just as the sun is particular that it brings peace to the entire world, so also this one, if one knows that [the other] is at peace with him and he kills him, he is guilty⁹³In the opinion of the Babli, Sanhedrin 72a/b, this can only be asserted of a father coming to steal from his son. In the opinion of the Yerushalmi (Note 89) it cannot be asserted of anybody. Cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 13; differently in Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai p. 192..

MISHNAH: It is bad to meet a deaf-mute, an insane, or an underage person⁵²These are not prosecutable and cannot be sued. Even if they were healed or grew up they cannot be sued for what they did when they were not responsible.: Anybody who injures them is liable but they who cause injury are not liable. It is bad to meet a woman⁵³A married woman, any of whose private property is administered by her husband who has the usufruct and therefore can block any payment which would diminish his income. A married woman whose husband had waved his right of administration and usufruct before marriage is counted as a male for the rules of this Mishnah. or a slave⁵⁴Any whose property is his master’s. This rule was contested by the Sadducees, Mishnah Yadayim 4:7.: Anybody who injures them is liable but they who cause injury are not liable, but they might have to pay later. If the woman was divorced or the slave manumitted, they have to pay.
A person who hits his father or mother causing a concussion³⁹Ex. 21:15 declares hitting father or mother to be a capital crime. Hitting one of the parents without causing visible damage is a sin but not a crime. Therefore there is no obstacle to pressing monetary claims. Cf. Mishnah 7. or who causes injury to a fellow man on the Sabbath⁴⁰Desecrating the Day of Atonement is a deadly sin but not a prosecutable crime; it is outside the purview of the human court. Injuring somebody on the Sabbath is a capital crime. Cf. Mishnah 7. is not liable for anything since he is tried for his life⁶⁰Even if he cannot be tried because of lack of eyewitnesses or other reasons; cf. Terumot 7:1, Note 16.. One who injures his own Canaanite slave is not liable for anything.

MISHNAH: If a bull intended [to hurt] another bull but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he is not liable. But if a man intended [to hurt] a neighbor but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children³³Ex. 21:22 speaks only about quarrelling men hitting a woman, not animals attacking.. How does he pay for the children? One estimates the worth of the woman before and after she gave birth³⁴How much she would be worth on the slave market.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, but the value of a woman increses after giving birth!³⁵Before she gave birth, a potential buyer would discount the price to account for the risk of death in childbirth. But one estimates how much the children would have been worth and gives [the value] to the husband; if she does not have a husband, to the latter’s heirs. If she was a freedwoman or a proselyte³⁶If she was pregnant when she was manumitted or converted, she has no legal father of the children. Also if a woman was married to a freedman or a proselyte who died childless, the attacker does not have to pay since the husband has no heir (but cf. Babli 49a/b, Mekhilta dR. Simeon b. Ioḥai21:22)., he is not liable.

MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt⁶⁶Ex. 21:30., if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed⁶⁷Ex. 21:28,29.. The same holds for a son or a daughter⁶⁸There is no difference whether the victim was adult or underage. The statement is only necessary since the verse, Ex. 21:31, stresses that the same rules apply to underage as to adult victims.. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas⁶⁹Ex. 21:32., whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold⁷⁰This reading is also found in some Babli mss., Alfasi, and the Naples print of the Mishnah. In other texts: “one (silver) denar”. denar.

MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt⁶⁶Ex. 21:30., if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed⁶⁷Ex. 21:28,29.. The same holds for a son or a daughter⁶⁸There is no difference whether the victim was adult or underage. The statement is only necessary since the verse, Ex. 21:31, stresses that the same rules apply to underage as to adult victims.. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas⁶⁹Ex. 21:32., whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold⁷⁰This reading is also found in some Babli mss., Alfasi, and the Naples print of the Mishnah. In other texts: “one (silver) denar”. denar.

MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt⁶⁶Ex. 21:30., if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed⁶⁷Ex. 21:28,29.. The same holds for a son or a daughter⁶⁸There is no difference whether the victim was adult or underage. The statement is only necessary since the verse, Ex. 21:31, stresses that the same rules apply to underage as to adult victims.. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas⁶⁹Ex. 21:32., whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold⁷⁰This reading is also found in some Babli mss., Alfasi, and the Naples print of the Mishnah. In other texts: “one (silver) denar”. denar.

MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt⁶⁶Ex. 21:30., if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed⁶⁷Ex. 21:28,29.. The same holds for a son or a daughter⁶⁸There is no difference whether the victim was adult or underage. The statement is only necessary since the verse, Ex. 21:31, stresses that the same rules apply to underage as to adult victims.. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas⁶⁹Ex. 21:32., whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold⁷⁰This reading is also found in some Babli mss., Alfasi, and the Naples print of the Mishnah. In other texts: “one (silver) denar”. denar.

MISHNAH: The wolf and the lion, the bear, and the tiger¹⁵¹As in Arabic, the word denotes leopard, panther, or tiger, i. e., a predator with a striped or dotted fur., and the panther¹⁵²Most moderns identify the word as Greek πάρδαλις “panther”, Arabic ابرد. Rashi everywhere translates putois “pole cat”. In the Babli, 16a, Rav Jehudah translates ברדלס by נפריזא which the later Rav Joseph explains as אפא, ὕαινα ὄφις “hyena-snake”. The latter explanation is excluded here by the Halakhah., and the snake, are notorious¹⁵³The owner of dangerous pets is always 100% responsible.. Rebbi Eliezer says, when they are trained¹⁵⁴Trained circus performers. they are not notorious; except for the snake which always is notorious¹⁵⁵The snake charmer does not control his snakes the way a trainer controls his performing animals.. What is the difference between tame and notorious? The tame pays half the damages from its body¹⁵⁶Ex. 21:35: “They shall sell the bovine and split the money.” and the notorious pays full damages from the storage room¹⁵⁷I. e., from the owner’s valuables if he does not have enough cash..

HALAKHAH: ¹⁶³The origin of this and the following paragraphs is in Sanhedrin 9:3 (fol. 27a). The first part of our text is almost identical with the text there; the second part is badly garbled and can be understood only from the Sanhedrin text. (ג denotes a Genizah reading.) So¹⁶⁴Reading כיני as in Sanhedrin, in place of מני “who is the author”? is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated¹⁶⁵The expression רגלים לדבר “the thing has feet” formulates prima facie evidence of guilt, not an argument which prohibits prosecution.. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation¹⁶⁶Any “estimation” here is a judicial act. If the physician in charge as an officer of the court considered the victim as critically ill both at the beginning and at the end of treatment, this overrides the fact that for some time the victim was taken off the critical list. The attacker can be jailed only if the victim is in danger of his life and there is the possibility that the case may become one of capital crime (Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 6; Babli Sanhedrin 78b, Ketubot 33b).; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two¹⁶⁷Once the victim was taken off the critical list, it is impossible to convict the attacker of premeditated murder.. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated¹⁶⁸Ex. 21:19. Both Targum Onqelos and Mekhilta dR. Ismael explain משענת not as “cane” but as “health”. This meaning seems to be understood here..’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him¹⁶⁹The verse seems to be superfluous (but its continuation, spelling out the financial obligations of the attacker, is not.)? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted¹⁷⁰The term “exonerated” is read as “permanently exonerated.”.”¹⁷¹Babli Sanhedrin 78a/b, Ketubot 33b; Tosephta Baba qama 9:7; Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai pp. 174–175. What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden¹⁷²Ex. 21:18..” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden¹⁷³Otherwise there could not be any monetary claim derived from this paragraph. (There could be a claim under rabbinic rules for insult, etc.)? But if they estimated¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die. If they estimated¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die? If they did not estimate¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay¹⁷⁵As a matter of principle, a person convicted of a crime cannot be made to pay since that would constitute multiple punishment (cf. Terumot 7:1, Notes 3–73; Ketubot 3:1). Therefore, a verse is needed to force the potential murderer to pay if his victim survives.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation¹⁷⁶If the victim survives, it is proof that the first estimation was wrong; there is no criminal case and the civil case can proceed unhindered.. ¹⁷⁷From here on, the sentences have to be re-ordered as indicated by the text in Sanhedrin (different text in Sanhedrin is in parentheses and italicized):
What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay, if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay¹⁷⁸Even if the victim later dies. (does he have to pay?).
For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation, if he did not pay one does not order him to pay¹⁷⁸Even if the victim later dies.. If he paid, can he take it back?
A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves¹⁷⁹But for R. Simeon ben Laqish he has to pay for disability from the moment of the injury.. (It proves that the estimate was wrong.)
This (A baraita) supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died (die but he lived). From when does he have to pay him (count for him)? From the moment he turns worse¹⁸⁰That means, even if he turns worse, since he had to pay from the start by court order. For R. Yose ben Hanina, he never pays once the case has turned into a criminal matter.. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.¹⁸¹Then the baraita is no support for R. Simeon ben Laqish since R. Yose ben Hanina will agree that the agressor has to pay the victim who is getting better.” (but from the start. That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.) What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: ¹⁶³The origin of this and the following paragraphs is in Sanhedrin 9:3 (fol. 27a). The first part of our text is almost identical with the text there; the second part is badly garbled and can be understood only from the Sanhedrin text. (ג denotes a Genizah reading.) So¹⁶⁴Reading כיני as in Sanhedrin, in place of מני “who is the author”? is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated¹⁶⁵The expression רגלים לדבר “the thing has feet” formulates prima facie evidence of guilt, not an argument which prohibits prosecution.. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation¹⁶⁶Any “estimation” here is a judicial act. If the physician in charge as an officer of the court considered the victim as critically ill both at the beginning and at the end of treatment, this overrides the fact that for some time the victim was taken off the critical list. The attacker can be jailed only if the victim is in danger of his life and there is the possibility that the case may become one of capital crime (Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 6; Babli Sanhedrin 78b, Ketubot 33b).; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two¹⁶⁷Once the victim was taken off the critical list, it is impossible to convict the attacker of premeditated murder.. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated¹⁶⁸Ex. 21:19. Both Targum Onqelos and Mekhilta dR. Ismael explain משענת not as “cane” but as “health”. This meaning seems to be understood here..’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him¹⁶⁹The verse seems to be superfluous (but its continuation, spelling out the financial obligations of the attacker, is not.)? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted¹⁷⁰The term “exonerated” is read as “permanently exonerated.”.”¹⁷¹Babli Sanhedrin 78a/b, Ketubot 33b; Tosephta Baba qama 9:7; Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai pp. 174–175. What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden¹⁷²Ex. 21:18..” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden¹⁷³Otherwise there could not be any monetary claim derived from this paragraph. (There could be a claim under rabbinic rules for insult, etc.)? But if they estimated¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die. If they estimated¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die? If they did not estimate¹⁷⁴In Sanhedrin: “estimated” and “did not estimate” are exchanged everywhere. This seems to be the correct version; in v. 18 the imperfect לא יָמוּת is read as “not expected to die”, since it does not say לֹא מֵת. But then v. 19 could simply mean that [the attacker] has to pay for disability and medical costs; the long introductory clause therefore refers to another case. For the Sages, the medical prognosis is irrelevant. that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay¹⁷⁵As a matter of principle, a person convicted of a crime cannot be made to pay since that would constitute multiple punishment (cf. Terumot 7:1, Notes 3–73; Ketubot 3:1). Therefore, a verse is needed to force the potential murderer to pay if his victim survives.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation¹⁷⁶If the victim survives, it is proof that the first estimation was wrong; there is no criminal case and the civil case can proceed unhindered.. ¹⁷⁷From here on, the sentences have to be re-ordered as indicated by the text in Sanhedrin (different text in Sanhedrin is in parentheses and italicized):
What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay, if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay¹⁷⁸Even if the victim later dies. (does he have to pay?).
For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation, if he did not pay one does not order him to pay¹⁷⁸Even if the victim later dies.. If he paid, can he take it back?
A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves¹⁷⁹But for R. Simeon ben Laqish he has to pay for disability from the moment of the injury.. (It proves that the estimate was wrong.)
This (A baraita) supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died (die but he lived). From when does he have to pay him (count for him)? From the moment he turns worse¹⁸⁰That means, even if he turns worse, since he had to pay from the start by court order. For R. Yose ben Hanina, he never pays once the case has turned into a criminal matter.. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.¹⁸¹Then the baraita is no support for R. Simeon ben Laqish since R. Yose ben Hanina will agree that the agressor has to pay the victim who is getting better.” (but from the start. That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.) What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated⁷¹Babli 41b; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 10 (Horovitz-Rabin p. 283); Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai21:28, Midrash Tannaïm(Midrash Haggadol Ex. 21:28, ed. Margaliut p. 484.): “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place⁷³As the formulation of the Babli makes explicit, since any damages caused by a tame animal are paid from its body and a bull which killed a human is stoned and its carcass forbidden for usufruct, there is nothing from which either damages or fine might be paid.? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human⁷⁴The bull was attacking another animal when a human intervened and was killed. In that case, the bull is not condemned to be stoned and is not forbidden for usufruct., etc.⁷⁵A list of similar situations as given later in the paragraph. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it⁷⁷As stated in Mishnah 9, the bull’s meat becomes forbidden only when it is stoned. If the owners slaughter it immediately after the attack, before the court had time to intervene, the meat is valuable and its proceeds are available to cover damages.. But some want to say, from what⁷⁸Reading מִן “from” instead of מאן “who” (I. Lewy). we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel⁴⁰It is stressed in Ex. 21:1 that the laws of that Chapter is before them; it applies only to intra-Israelite lawsuits. An application to suits involving Gentiles is illegitimate (Sifry Deut. 16; Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 1). Gentile law does not recognize payment for half the damages., still birth but killed a viable [child]⁷⁹Killing a fetus or a newborn which is not viable is forbidden but not prosecutable as murder; the same holds for killing a ṭerepha, a terminally ill person., he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”⁷²Ex. 21:28.’⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,⁸⁰Ex. 21:30.” the verse speaks of the notorious⁸¹Therefore, the notion of weregilt is not applicable to the tame bull; the exemption needs no verse.. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned⁸²Ex. 21:29. This verse imposes weregilt for the killing of a free person by a notorious bull.,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.⁸³Ex. 21:32. This verse imposes a fine for the killing of a slave.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull.. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned⁷²Ex. 21:28.”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull..

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated⁷¹Babli 41b; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 10 (Horovitz-Rabin p. 283); Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai21:28, Midrash Tannaïm(Midrash Haggadol Ex. 21:28, ed. Margaliut p. 484.): “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place⁷³As the formulation of the Babli makes explicit, since any damages caused by a tame animal are paid from its body and a bull which killed a human is stoned and its carcass forbidden for usufruct, there is nothing from which either damages or fine might be paid.? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human⁷⁴The bull was attacking another animal when a human intervened and was killed. In that case, the bull is not condemned to be stoned and is not forbidden for usufruct., etc.⁷⁵A list of similar situations as given later in the paragraph. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it⁷⁷As stated in Mishnah 9, the bull’s meat becomes forbidden only when it is stoned. If the owners slaughter it immediately after the attack, before the court had time to intervene, the meat is valuable and its proceeds are available to cover damages.. But some want to say, from what⁷⁸Reading מִן “from” instead of מאן “who” (I. Lewy). we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel⁴⁰It is stressed in Ex. 21:1 that the laws of that Chapter is before them; it applies only to intra-Israelite lawsuits. An application to suits involving Gentiles is illegitimate (Sifry Deut. 16; Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 1). Gentile law does not recognize payment for half the damages., still birth but killed a viable [child]⁷⁹Killing a fetus or a newborn which is not viable is forbidden but not prosecutable as murder; the same holds for killing a ṭerepha, a terminally ill person., he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”⁷²Ex. 21:28.’⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,⁸⁰Ex. 21:30.” the verse speaks of the notorious⁸¹Therefore, the notion of weregilt is not applicable to the tame bull; the exemption needs no verse.. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned⁸²Ex. 21:29. This verse imposes weregilt for the killing of a free person by a notorious bull.,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.⁸³Ex. 21:32. This verse imposes a fine for the killing of a slave.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull.. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned⁷²Ex. 21:28.”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull..

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated⁷¹Babli 41b; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 10 (Horovitz-Rabin p. 283); Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai21:28, Midrash Tannaïm(Midrash Haggadol Ex. 21:28, ed. Margaliut p. 484.): “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place⁷³As the formulation of the Babli makes explicit, since any damages caused by a tame animal are paid from its body and a bull which killed a human is stoned and its carcass forbidden for usufruct, there is nothing from which either damages or fine might be paid.? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human⁷⁴The bull was attacking another animal when a human intervened and was killed. In that case, the bull is not condemned to be stoned and is not forbidden for usufruct., etc.⁷⁵A list of similar situations as given later in the paragraph. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it⁷⁷As stated in Mishnah 9, the bull’s meat becomes forbidden only when it is stoned. If the owners slaughter it immediately after the attack, before the court had time to intervene, the meat is valuable and its proceeds are available to cover damages.. But some want to say, from what⁷⁸Reading מִן “from” instead of מאן “who” (I. Lewy). we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel⁴⁰It is stressed in Ex. 21:1 that the laws of that Chapter is before them; it applies only to intra-Israelite lawsuits. An application to suits involving Gentiles is illegitimate (Sifry Deut. 16; Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 1). Gentile law does not recognize payment for half the damages., still birth but killed a viable [child]⁷⁹Killing a fetus or a newborn which is not viable is forbidden but not prosecutable as murder; the same holds for killing a ṭerepha, a terminally ill person., he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”⁷²Ex. 21:28.’⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,⁸⁰Ex. 21:30.” the verse speaks of the notorious⁸¹Therefore, the notion of weregilt is not applicable to the tame bull; the exemption needs no verse.. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned⁸²Ex. 21:29. This verse imposes weregilt for the killing of a free person by a notorious bull.,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.⁸³Ex. 21:32. This verse imposes a fine for the killing of a slave.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull.. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned⁷²Ex. 21:28.”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull..

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated⁷¹Babli 41b; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 10 (Horovitz-Rabin p. 283); Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai21:28, Midrash Tannaïm(Midrash Haggadol Ex. 21:28, ed. Margaliut p. 484.): “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place⁷³As the formulation of the Babli makes explicit, since any damages caused by a tame animal are paid from its body and a bull which killed a human is stoned and its carcass forbidden for usufruct, there is nothing from which either damages or fine might be paid.? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human⁷⁴The bull was attacking another animal when a human intervened and was killed. In that case, the bull is not condemned to be stoned and is not forbidden for usufruct., etc.⁷⁵A list of similar situations as given later in the paragraph. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it⁷⁷As stated in Mishnah 9, the bull’s meat becomes forbidden only when it is stoned. If the owners slaughter it immediately after the attack, before the court had time to intervene, the meat is valuable and its proceeds are available to cover damages.. But some want to say, from what⁷⁸Reading מִן “from” instead of מאן “who” (I. Lewy). we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel⁴⁰It is stressed in Ex. 21:1 that the laws of that Chapter is before them; it applies only to intra-Israelite lawsuits. An application to suits involving Gentiles is illegitimate (Sifry Deut. 16; Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 1). Gentile law does not recognize payment for half the damages., still birth but killed a viable [child]⁷⁹Killing a fetus or a newborn which is not viable is forbidden but not prosecutable as murder; the same holds for killing a ṭerepha, a terminally ill person., he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”⁷²Ex. 21:28.’⁷⁶Below, R. Aqiba is quoted as holding that the verse frees the owner of a tame bull from paying for the death of a slave. He should have told himself that his interpretation is impossible.? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,⁸⁰Ex. 21:30.” the verse speaks of the notorious⁸¹Therefore, the notion of weregilt is not applicable to the tame bull; the exemption needs no verse.. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned⁸²Ex. 21:29. This verse imposes weregilt for the killing of a free person by a notorious bull.,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.⁸³Ex. 21:32. This verse imposes a fine for the killing of a slave.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull.. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned⁷²Ex. 21:28.”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”⁸⁴Therefore, no fine is imposed for the killing of a slave by a tame bull..

HALAKHAH: “If a woman was waiting for her levir,” etc. Following Rebbi Aqiba⁵⁸For whom the right of dissolution depends on his relationship with the woman defining adultery, can the husband dissolve in questionable cases? The answers, which are not given, are obviously “no”., who can dissolve? For example, what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddušin are valid for her⁵⁹Babli Qiddušin 60a; Yerushalmi Yebamot 3:4 (Notes 102–104), 5:1 (Note 35); Qiddušin 3:1, (63c 1. 71). A man gives something of value to a woman to serve as qiddušin money for a preliminary marriage in a month’s time. If other men also give her deferred qiddušin, they all might end up preliminarily married to her and none of them can marry her. In that case, she is not bound to any one by marriage in the sense of R. Aqiba., who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob⁶⁰In the source of this statement, Qiddus̄in 1:2, 59c 1. 8, one reads: “R. Joḥanan said.” Since there is no R. Jacob without father’s name among the students of R. Joḥanan (there are R. Jacob bar Aḥa and R. Jacob bar Idi), the name has to be considered a scribal error. said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he can allot her to his underage son⁶¹This refers to the Hebrew slave girl (Ex. 21:7–11), about a situation intrinsically connected to the Jubilee year which became void with the exile of the Ten Tribes. The verse gives the master the right to marry the girl by considering the price he paid for her as qiddušin money, or to give her to his son as wife without additional expenditure. If the son is a minor, she becomes his wife by biblical decree, But the wife of a minor cannot be prosecuted for adultery [Sifra Qedošim Pereq 9(11)]. Can the underage husband, biblically married to his underage wife, dissolve her vows?, who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa sind in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she does not even need a reparation offering for a possible sin⁶²The wife of a deaf-mute or of an insane person (at the time of marriage) is not married by biblical standards and cannot commit adultery. Yebamot, Babli 113a, Yerushalmi 14:1 Note 7. (The rules of reparation offerings for possible sins are in Lev. 5:17–19)., who dissolves?

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something⁸⁵A baraita. from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them⁸⁶Ex. 21:28 discusses the tame bull which kills a human. Verses 29–32 deal with the notorious bull which is killing. Verses 35–36 then deal with both kinds of bulls as damaging goods.. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave⁸⁷Since the payment for killed slaves is not treated as weregilt but as payment of damages to the owner for the loss of his slave, might it not be trated as part of the rules for payment of damages?; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said⁸⁸A different but parallel argument is in the Babli, 42b., everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother)⁸⁹It seems that one has ro read: “a male or female slave”. the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for fetuses⁹⁰There is an obvious lacuna here which is filled by E: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah: “but the owner of the bull is free,” free from paying for fetuses.
The scribe’s error was induced by the repetition of the same text. For the statement of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, cf. Note 71.
The payment for fetuses refers to Ex. 21:22: If quarelling people unintentionally hit a pregnant woman who then has a miscarriage, they have to indemnify her husband. The argument in the text presupposes the statement later in the text: “ ‘people’ but not bulls.” (cf. Midrash Haggadol to Ex. 21:22) This exempts the owner of a notorious bull from payment if it causes a miscarriage. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the owner of a tame bull should pay. Why should R. Eleazar b. Azariah have to mention it?. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “If people quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “When they quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.,” “when they brawl⁹⁴Ex. 21:18, specifying the payments due for intentionally inflicted injuries.”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl⁹⁵There is missing the corresponding rhetorical question “and fight the same as quarrel”? It is in E. The arguments are used to impose the payments mentioned in Ex. 21:18 for intentional injuries on the unintentional injuries mentioned in 21:22, and vice-versa (Nazir 9:5, Notes 183–184; Sanhedrin 9:3, 27a l. 58; Midrash Haggadol21:22).? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this⁹⁶Which of the two contradictory arguments is to be accepted? Neither.? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]¹⁸²Reading of Sanhedrin. The reading here, הָעֶבֶד “the slave” is an obvious misspelling for הָאֵבֶד “the limb”. Throughout the Halakhah, the scribe is not sure in his distinction between ע and א.
It is clear that the attacker has to pay for the operation since this is medical treatment. The question is whether he also has to pay for the permanent impairment of the victim’s earning power caused by the loss of his hand.? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel¹⁸³Ex. 21:22, speaking of the injury to an innocent bystander, the unintended victim of an intended hit. The verse decrees the responsibility of the attacker for pain and impairment of the victim.,” “if people brawl.¹⁸⁴Ex. 21:18, the paragraph under discussion, about the intended victim of an intended hit. The verse decrees the responsibility of the attacker for medical cost and disability.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended¹⁸⁵In both cases, all four payments are due from the attacker.. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]¹⁸²Reading of Sanhedrin. The reading here, הָעֶבֶד “the slave” is an obvious misspelling for הָאֵבֶד “the limb”. Throughout the Halakhah, the scribe is not sure in his distinction between ע and א.
It is clear that the attacker has to pay for the operation since this is medical treatment. The question is whether he also has to pay for the permanent impairment of the victim’s earning power caused by the loss of his hand.? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand¹⁸⁶Since the attacker has to pay for the operation, he has to pay for the permanent impairment..

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something⁸⁵A baraita. from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them⁸⁶Ex. 21:28 discusses the tame bull which kills a human. Verses 29–32 deal with the notorious bull which is killing. Verses 35–36 then deal with both kinds of bulls as damaging goods.. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave⁸⁷Since the payment for killed slaves is not treated as weregilt but as payment of damages to the owner for the loss of his slave, might it not be trated as part of the rules for payment of damages?; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said⁸⁸A different but parallel argument is in the Babli, 42b., everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother)⁸⁹It seems that one has ro read: “a male or female slave”. the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for fetuses⁹⁰There is an obvious lacuna here which is filled by E: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah: “but the owner of the bull is free,” free from paying for fetuses.
The scribe’s error was induced by the repetition of the same text. For the statement of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, cf. Note 71.
The payment for fetuses refers to Ex. 21:22: If quarelling people unintentionally hit a pregnant woman who then has a miscarriage, they have to indemnify her husband. The argument in the text presupposes the statement later in the text: “ ‘people’ but not bulls.” (cf. Midrash Haggadol to Ex. 21:22) This exempts the owner of a notorious bull from payment if it causes a miscarriage. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the owner of a tame bull should pay. Why should R. Eleazar b. Azariah have to mention it?. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “If people quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “When they quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.,” “when they brawl⁹⁴Ex. 21:18, specifying the payments due for intentionally inflicted injuries.”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl⁹⁵There is missing the corresponding rhetorical question “and fight the same as quarrel”? It is in E. The arguments are used to impose the payments mentioned in Ex. 21:18 for intentional injuries on the unintentional injuries mentioned in 21:22, and vice-versa (Nazir 9:5, Notes 183–184; Sanhedrin 9:3, 27a l. 58; Midrash Haggadol21:22).? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this⁹⁶Which of the two contradictory arguments is to be accepted? Neither.? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

It was stated: “I am selling you a fertile slave girl, her children increase her value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, this is buttocks⁴⁰Greek κάθισμα “buttocks, behind; seat; sinking”. It may be that the word is used here in a slightly pornographic meaning..” It is written⁴¹Ex. 21:22.: “If quarrelling men hit a pregnant woman and she loses her children.” ⁴²Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 8; partially quoted in the Babli, 49a. Abba Yose ben Ḥanan said, from the meaning of “and she loses her children” would I not know that she was pregnant? Then why does the verse say “pregnant”? It tells you that he is not liable unless he hits her at the place of her pregnancy. Therefore, if he hit her on the palm of her hand or the sole of her foot, he is not liable⁴³In E and Or Zarua‘ (vol. 3, #236), one reads: “If he hit her on the palm of her hand or the sole of her foot, on her head or any of her limbs, would we understand that he be liable? The verse says, “pregnant” (it tells you that he is not liable …).. “As the woman’s husband will put on him”. Do I understand, even if the pregnancy is not his⁴⁴If he married a pregnant girl.? The verse says, “pregnant”. It tells that he pays only to the master of the pregnancy. Rebbi Uqba⁴⁵In the Medieval parallel sources [Tosaphot 43a, Or zarua‘, Yalqut Šim‘oni Qonṭeros Aḥaron (Ashkenazi), Rashba ad 43a (Sephardi)], “R. Aqiba”, an unlikely text. asked, if somebody sleeps with his mother or his sister, is that one not also the master of the pregnancy? The verse says “husband”, somebody who may be called “husband”. This excludes those who cannot be called^45aThe translation follows the reading להיקרות of E, not the bland “to be” of L. “husband”⁴⁶Since an incestual marriage is no marriage at all (Qiddušin 3:12), Or zarua‘ (loc. cit.) deduces from here that the adulterous father of a bastard fetus has a claim on the money since he could have married the woman had she not been otherwise married. The Babli, 43a, explicitly gives the claim to the money to the boyfriend of an unmarried pregnant woman..

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]¹⁸²Reading of Sanhedrin. The reading here, הָעֶבֶד “the slave” is an obvious misspelling for הָאֵבֶד “the limb”. Throughout the Halakhah, the scribe is not sure in his distinction between ע and א.
It is clear that the attacker has to pay for the operation since this is medical treatment. The question is whether he also has to pay for the permanent impairment of the victim’s earning power caused by the loss of his hand.? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel¹⁸³Ex. 21:22, speaking of the injury to an innocent bystander, the unintended victim of an intended hit. The verse decrees the responsibility of the attacker for pain and impairment of the victim.,” “if people brawl.¹⁸⁴Ex. 21:18, the paragraph under discussion, about the intended victim of an intended hit. The verse decrees the responsibility of the attacker for medical cost and disability.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended¹⁸⁵In both cases, all four payments are due from the attacker.. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]¹⁸²Reading of Sanhedrin. The reading here, הָעֶבֶד “the slave” is an obvious misspelling for הָאֵבֶד “the limb”. Throughout the Halakhah, the scribe is not sure in his distinction between ע and א.
It is clear that the attacker has to pay for the operation since this is medical treatment. The question is whether he also has to pay for the permanent impairment of the victim’s earning power caused by the loss of his hand.? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand¹⁸⁶Since the attacker has to pay for the operation, he has to pay for the permanent impairment..

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something⁸⁵A baraita. from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them⁸⁶Ex. 21:28 discusses the tame bull which kills a human. Verses 29–32 deal with the notorious bull which is killing. Verses 35–36 then deal with both kinds of bulls as damaging goods.. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave⁸⁷Since the payment for killed slaves is not treated as weregilt but as payment of damages to the owner for the loss of his slave, might it not be trated as part of the rules for payment of damages?; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said⁸⁸A different but parallel argument is in the Babli, 42b., everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother)⁸⁹It seems that one has ro read: “a male or female slave”. the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for fetuses⁹⁰There is an obvious lacuna here which is filled by E: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah: “but the owner of the bull is free,” free from paying for fetuses.
The scribe’s error was induced by the repetition of the same text. For the statement of R. Eleazar ben Azariah, cf. Note 71.
The payment for fetuses refers to Ex. 21:22: If quarelling people unintentionally hit a pregnant woman who then has a miscarriage, they have to indemnify her husband. The argument in the text presupposes the statement later in the text: “ ‘people’ but not bulls.” (cf. Midrash Haggadol to Ex. 21:22) This exempts the owner of a notorious bull from payment if it causes a miscarriage. Therefore, there is no reason to think that the owner of a tame bull should pay. Why should R. Eleazar b. Azariah have to mention it?. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “If people quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free⁷²Ex. 21:28.;” free from paying for a slave⁹²It seems that one has to read here: “for fetuses”.. But is it not written: “When they quarrel⁹³Ex. 21:22.,” “when they brawl⁹⁴Ex. 21:18, specifying the payments due for intentionally inflicted injuries.”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl⁹⁵There is missing the corresponding rhetorical question “and fight the same as quarrel”? It is in E. The arguments are used to impose the payments mentioned in Ex. 21:18 for intentional injuries on the unintentional injuries mentioned in 21:22, and vice-versa (Nazir 9:5, Notes 183–184; Sanhedrin 9:3, 27a l. 58; Midrash Haggadol21:22).? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this⁹⁶Which of the two contradictory arguments is to be accepted? Neither.? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

From where damages for a slave⁹⁷If a slave was injured by an animal but was not killed. May his owner sue the animal’s owner for damages.? The verse says, “or it gores a son, or it gores a daughter, …, and if a slave⁹⁸Verses Ex. 21:31,32 treat attacks on minors and on slaves in parallel. It is implied that any payments due for an injured child are due for a slave., etc.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel bar Isaac. One said, the addition may not be more than the main thing⁹⁹Since for a slave killed the payment is 30 tetradrachmas, payments for an injured slave can be at most 30 tetradrachmas. This opinion is not found in the Babli.. But the other said, he has to pay the entire damages.¹⁰⁰All payments due for a free person (medical costs, lost wages, payment for pain and suffering) are due for a slave without limitation. The Babli, 43b, attributes this opinion to R. Samuel b. R. Isaac.

MISHNAH: Any person who has a child¹²⁴Even illegitimate or bastard. anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]¹²⁷Ex. 21:15,17.; he is his child in every respect¹²⁵Including inheritance. except if he were from a slave woman¹²⁶If she is not his own property. In the latter case, one might assume that he freed the mother of his child. She is a semi-Jew who upon manumission and immersion in a miqweh becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.

MISHNAH: Any person who has a child¹²⁴Even illegitimate or bastard. anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]¹²⁷Ex. 21:15,17.; he is his child in every respect¹²⁵Including inheritance. except if he were from a slave woman¹²⁶If she is not his own property. In the latter case, one might assume that he freed the mother of his child. She is a semi-Jew who upon manumission and immersion in a miqweh becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which was rubbing itself against a wall,” etc. “A man who kills any human soul,¹⁰¹Lev. 21:17.” to include a hit which is potentially deadly. Some Tannaïm state, even if it is not deadly¹⁰²The Babli, Sanhedrin 78a, explains that the verse can be read either as “a man who kills a human totally” or as “a man who kills anything of a man.” In the first version, if one attacker wounds a person and a second one finishes him off, the second attacker is the murderer even if the wounds inflicted by the first are potentially lethal. In the second version, the heirs of a person killed by a gang have indemnity claims against all gang members taking part in the attack even if none of them can be prosecuted for first degree murder.. Rebbi La said, even if it is deadly but a third person came and killed, the killer is guilty¹⁰³A tannaïtic statement in Sifra Emor Pereq 20(1).. “And it killed a man or a woman¹⁰⁴Ex. 21:29.,” just as a man lets his sons inherit his injury claims, so a woman lets her sons inherit her injury claims. But does not a man inherit from his wife¹⁰⁵How can her children (or in the absence of children, her paternal relatives) inherit anything from her if she is survived by her husband?? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, so did Rebbi Hoshaiah, the father of the Mishnah, explain: One teaches here about weregilt which is due after death¹⁰⁶(Mekhilta dR. Simeon b. Ioḥai21:29, p. 181). The biblical right of inheritance by the husband, based on Num. 27:11, excludes future claims (Babli 42b; Bava batra 8:6 Note 129). Since there is no weregilt for a living person, the husband cannot inherit..

HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. ⁸⁹The entire Halakhah is also in Ketubot3:10, Notes 143–156. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine⁸⁶Since the amount payable is the biblically fixed amount of 30 šeqalim, about a Roman pound of silver (Ex. 21:32), it has the status of a fine. or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.⁹⁰This baraita is not found in any other source.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated⁹¹Mishnah `Arakhin3:3, about a person killed by an ox known as goring. The entire sentence is not found in Ketubot; this seems to point to Ševuot as the primary source.: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana<sup>92</sup>In Ketubot: R. Ḥaggai before R. Yose; probably dittography. Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured<sup>93</sup>Ex. 21:30. It is not clear whether “his” refers to the slain person or the owner of the dangerous ox (Bava qamma4:8 Note 108). In Ketubot one reads the verse as referring to the owner of the ox; then it is obvious that the money is a fine even though its amount is not biblically fixed. On the face of it, this reading might be preferred; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael and Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai ad Ex. 21:30. Rashi in `Arakhin points to Ex. 21:30 as the source of the Mishnah there; the addition of the sentence (Note 91) supports the reading here as correct and that in Ketubot as corrected lectio facilior. Even according to the reading here, the identification of the redemption money as weregilt defines it as a fine.. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine

HALAKHAH: “One who digs a pit in the public domain,” etc. It is written⁵⁶Ex. 21:33.: “If a man open a pit” and “if a man dig a pit.” One pit for damages, the other pit for death⁵⁷The verse mentions “opening” for a pit which is not deep enough to kill an animal, and “digging” for a pit deep enough to kill.. Rebbi Isaac said, both the pit of death and the pit of damages were added from the same verse, but when it comes to the pit of death you say he is not liable for vessels, but when it comes to the pit of damages you say he is liable for vessels⁵⁸In the next Halakhah one deduces “an ox but not an ox with his vessels” from the language of the verse. Why does this not apply to damages in case the animal survives the fall? No answer is given; it must be that the award of damages in this case is a matter of common, not biblical law.! This is not only if he dug, from where if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift? The verse says, “if a man acquire a pit.⁵⁹Understanding יכרה as not derived from I כרה “to dig” but from II כרה “to buy” (Deut 2:6, Hos. 3:2); in the Babli (Soṭah 13a, Roš Haššanah 26a) this is charaterized as Phoenician.” Has one the right to abandon his damages in the public domain⁶⁰Since ‘pit’ is an obstacle in the public domain, how is it possible to acquire if from another person?? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths]⁶¹Reading טפחים for דברים “things” in the text. close to a domain are like that domain⁶²This defines what means “close to another domain” in Mishnah 8 (Note 54). In the Babli, 50a, he requires a distance of at least 4 handbreadths. A private domain can be bought or inherited with all its liabilities..

HALAKHAH: “Which one is tame and which one is notorious,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “From yesterday and the day before.⁸⁷Ex. 21:36; a notorious bull is one who was known to gore “yesterday and the day before.” Babli 23b.” How does Rebbi Meїr confirm “from yesterday and the day before”? He explains it by separate gorings⁸⁸In the Rome fragment: כהפליג נגיחות, “if it spread out its gorings”., that if it was let out the first day and gored, the second day and it did not gore, the third day it gored, it is not declared a notorious bull unless it gored on three consecutive days⁸⁹In the Babli, 24a, R. Meïr is credited with the argument that if three different gorings on three different days make a bull notorious then three gorings on the same day certainly will have the same effect. The plural “bulls” in the next sentence negates this interpretation in the Yerushalmi which might follow the Mekhilta and attributes that argument to R. Yose (Note 86).
The Babli, 37a, notes that a bull can be declared notorious on alternate days if it was observed to gore on days 1,3,5 and was tame on days 2,4.. If it was let out the first day and gored bulls, the second it gored dogs, the third it gored pigs: would it be declared a notorious bull for three different kinds on three days⁹⁰The question is not answered, probably because it never arose in practice.? If it was let out the first day and gored, the second day it was not let out, the third day it was let out and gored, we come to the disagreement between Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rav Huna, who disagreed⁹¹In the Babli, Niddah 68a, the opinion attributed here to R. Ada is Rav’s and that of Rav Huna is Levi’s. Since the Babli follows Rav but the opinion of Rav Ada is discredited in the Yerushalmi, the Talmudim come to opposite conclusions.: A menstruating woman⁹²The text here is incomprehensible; one has to insert two words from the parallel Babli text. Lev. 15:19 decrees that a menstruating woman is impure for seven days; then she may immerse herself in a miqweh and is pure. But if she has a disccharge “many days outside her period”, she is declared זָבָה “suffering from flux”, and Lev. 15:25–30 decrees that after she is healed she has to undergo a period of purification and a Temple ceremony to regain purity. Since “days” mean a minimum of two, “many days” mean a minimum of three (cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical problems in Jewish tradition, in: Ph. Longworth, ed., Confrontations with Judaism, London 1966, pp. 171–196.) Therefore it is clear that one deals here with a menstruating woman who checks herself on the seventh day and finds herself impure. She therefore cannot become pure at the end of the seventh day but falls under the severe rules of the sufferer from flux only if she has a discharge during three consecutive days. checked herself the first day and found herself impure. The second day she did not check. On the third day she checked and found herself impure. Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said in the name of Rav: she certainly is niddah⁹³Instead of niddah, “the menstruating woman”, this has to be read zavah, “the woman suffering from flux” instead; cf. the preceding Note.. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: it is doubtful whether she is niddah^93,Instead of niddah, “the menstruating woman”, this has to be read zavah, “the woman suffering from flux” instead; cf. the preceding Note.⁹⁴She has to follow the rules of zavah but, if the Temple will be miraculously rebuilt overnight, she would not bring a sacrifice.. Rav Huna said, I was there at the beginning, I was there at the end, and I was there in the middle when Rav was asked, and he said, it is doubtful. Rav was asked and he said, it is certain; then he reversed himself and said, it is doubtful. Rav Ada bar Aḥawa was only there when he said, it is certain.

Could one not judge him on Fridays, pass sentence on the Sabbath, and execute him after the Sabbath? If you say so, it turns out that his judgment is delayed⁵⁴This argument really implies that capital crimes be tried only by the Supreme Court whose decrees are final.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, could he not be judged on the Sabbath, have his sentence passed on the Sabbath, and be executed on the Sabbath? Temple service, which supersedes Sabbath prohibitions⁵⁵The Sabbath Temple service, as prescribed in Num. 28:10, requires slaughtering and burning. For any other purpose, these are deadly sins and capital crimes if done on the Sabbath., is pushed aside by obligatory executions, since it is said, from My altar take him to be executed⁵⁶Ex. 21:14. The verse is read, not as a denial of asylum for any murderer, but as a commandment to immediately execute a Cohen even if he was officiating when convicted of murder. (The non-Cohen would commit a deadly sin by touching the altar.). Therefore the Sabbath, which is pushed aside by Temple service, logically should be pushed aside by obligatory executions⁵⁷The argument deserves no refutation since the relation “stronger than” underlying an argument de minore ad majus is not transitive (a stronger than b, b stronger than c does not imply a stronger than c. Babli Šabbat 132b; cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Confrontations with Judaism, London 1967, pp. 182–183.) The Babli, 35b, disproves the argument at length.. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This⁵⁸Mishnah 6. implies that courts may not sit on the Sabbath; what is the reason? It is said here, in all your dwellings⁵⁹Ex. 35:3, the prohibition to start a fire on the Sabbath., and it is said there, these shall be for you legal procedures for your generations in all your dwellings⁶⁰Num. 35:29, the law of homicide and murder. The argument (Babli 35b) goes as follows. Some capital crimes are punished by burning. Ex. 35:3, which has been shown to be applicable to court proceedings, forbids executing a convicted criminal who has to be burned. Therefore no capital punishment can be executed on the Sabbath.. Since there the verse refers to courts, so also here the verse refers to courts.

Three expressions of lo’ are written lamed-alef²⁶Meaning ‘not’. but read as lamed-waw.²⁷Which means ‘to him, has’. They are: ’asher lo’²⁸לא, lit. ‘which not’ but read לו ‘which has’. jointed legs above their feet;²⁹Lev. 11, 21. ’asher lo’ ḥomah;³⁰ibid. XXV, 30, lamed-alef, meaning ‘which has no wall’ but read as lamed-waw ‘which has a wall’. E.V. in a walled city. and ’asher lo’ ye‘adah.³¹Ex. 21, 8. The written form with lamed-alef means ‘who hath not espoused her’, but the reading with lamed-waw means, as E.V., who hath espoused her to himself.

Also you say that Joab was of the opinion that the horns of an altar give asylum⁸⁷1K. 2:28, Babli 12a. but only its top gives asylum; in fact only the top of the one in Shilo gives asylum, but that of the Temple does not give asylum. But I am saying that neither the altar gives asylum, nor does its top give asylum, nor the one in Shilo gives asylum, nor that of the Temple gives asylum. Nothing except the six cities of refuge give asylum. Is it possible that Joab, about whom it is written, the most wise, head of the third⁸⁸2S. 23:8. Joab himself is not mentioned in the Chapter. Targum Jonathan and the Babli (Moˋed qatan 16b) read the expression as referring to David. should err in this matter? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, he fled to the Sanhedrin, because it is stated: The property of people executed by the court goes to their heirs; the property of people executed by the government goes to the government⁸⁹This projects Roman practice into Jewish law.. Joab said, it is better that I should be executed by the court and my sons will inherit from me than that the king should execute me and inherit from me. When Solomon heard this he said, do I need his money? Immediately, I shall remove the blood for free⁹⁰1K. 2:31. In the MT, confirmed by LXX, וַהֲסִירֹתָ. The blood is the innocent blood of Abner and Amasa., but his money is not free. He sent through Benaiahu who smote him and killed him; they buried him in his house in the wilderness⁹¹A combination of 1K. 2:29,34.. Was his house a wilderness? But to tell you that when Joab the commander of Israel’s army died⁹²Here starts the second sheet of the Genizah fragment (G)., Israel was turned into a wilderness. If you say that he collected booty to build public baths and baths⁹³A double expression of Greek (Sanhedrin 7:19, Note 357) and Hebrew terms for public baths., this is worthy of praise. But if you say that he collected booty to support Sages and their students, it is worthy of the highest praise⁹⁴Babli Sanhedrin 49a refers to 1Chr.11:8 as proof that Joab used his riches to support scholars.. And from where that the Supreme Sanhedrin is near the altar? Do not ascend on my altar by stairs. What is written next? These are the rules of law you shall put before them⁹⁵Ex. 20:23, 21:1..

MISHNAH: If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse, the House of Shammai say two weeks, the House of Hillel say one week¹⁶⁵If he does not have his vow dissolved by that time, the wife can go to court and force a divorce with full payment of the ketubah.. Students can go to study Torah for thirty days without permission¹⁶⁶Without asking his wife’s permission if she married him knowing he was a student.; journeymen one week¹⁶⁷They can hire themselves out to work at another place where they cannot return to their homes every night.. The period mentioned in the Torah¹⁶⁸Ex. 21:10, where it is spelled out that a man can take a second wife only if he does not reduce the amount of sexual activity with his first wife.: People who do not have to work every day¹⁶⁹If a man marries a woman telling her that he is rich enough not to have to work, he is obligated to sleep with her every night and cannot later reduce this amount without the wife’s consent. Similarly, a donkey driver engaged in local traffic, who is home every week, cannot change his profession to camel driver engaged in long distance caravan traffic without his wife’s consent., journeymen twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once in thirty days, sailors once in three months, the words of Rebbi Eliezer.

MISHNAH: A pit dug by two partners; if the first went by and did not cover it, the second and did not cover it, the second is liable. If the first covered it, the second came and uncovered it, the second is liable. If the first covered it, the second came, found it uncovered but did not cover it, the second is liable. If he covered it appropriately⁶⁵This will be defined in the Halakhah. but an ox or a donkey fell in and died, he is not liable⁶⁶Ex. 21:33 explicitly absolves him if the pit is covered.. If he did not cover it appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell in and died, he is liable. If it fell forward because of the noise of the excavation, he is liable, backward because of the noise of the excavation, he is not liable⁶⁷An animal falling backward is an unusual occurrence that cannot be foreseen; also in this case the animal fell on the ground and not into the pit.. If an ox and its equipment⁶⁸Harness and plough. fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment⁶⁹Cover and saddle. was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment. If the ox falling in was deaf-mute, insane, or young, he is liable⁷⁰These categories do not apply to animals.; a son or daughter, a slave or slave-girl, he is not liable⁷¹Humans are supposed to watch where they are going..

HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;¹¹⁸Ex. 21:29. Tosephta 4:6. The verse speaks of the notorious bull; one seems to understand that no ownerless bull can be brought to court.” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages¹¹⁹Damage claims are possible only against humans. One must refer to a bull who did damage before its owner dedicated it to the Temple, or was property of a proselyte while the latter was still living., Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt¹²⁰The language of the Tosephta seems to support R. Joḥanan. The formulation of the Babli, 44b (in the name of Rav Huna and a baraita) is inconclusive. (The Babli, 44a, reports a similar disagreement, between Rav and Samuel, referring to Mishnah 7.). Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.

¹⁷⁸This Halakhah is copied from Qiddushin 1:2, fol. 59b/c which has a better and more complete text.“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.¹⁷⁹Ex. 21:9, speaking about a minor girl sold by her father as a slave with the understanding that her price would count as betrothal gift in case the owner would desire to marry her or would give her to his son. In that case, the betrothal is called “allotment”. If she is not married, she regains her freedom by reaching adulthood at 12 years of age.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers¹⁸⁰The argument is reproduced in Mekhilta deR. Ismael, Masekhta dinziqin 3, Mekhilta deR. Simeon ben Ioḥai Chap. 21 (p. 167); Babli Qiddushin 17b.. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate¹⁸¹The Babli rejects this argument by noting that levirate presumes the absence of a son.? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance¹⁸²The family estate going back to the distribution of land under Joshua, for which the succession is determined by the rules of Num. 27:6–11., what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.

“If an ox and its equipment⁶⁸Harness and plough. fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment⁶⁹Cover and saddle. and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air⁸¹The bad air exuding from the pit., but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable⁸²In the Babli, 53a, Samuel’s statement is attributed to Rav, R. Joḥanan and Resh Laqish’s to Samuel. Since in the Babli practice follows Samuel and in the Yerushalmi R. Joḥanan, both Talmudim decide in the same way.: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;⁵⁶Ex. 21:33.” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment⁸³Cf. Halakhah 3:1, Note 34, and the references given there.. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages⁵⁸In the next Halakhah one deduces “an ox but not an ox with his vessels” from the language of the verse. Why does this not apply to damages in case the animal survives the fall? No answer is given; it must be that the award of damages in this case is a matter of common, not biblical law., where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels?⁸⁴Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 11 p. 288 l. 16. The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.

Rebbi Simeon ben Ḥalfuta, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. Lambs for your clothing; the price of a field are rams³³⁵Prov. 27:26.. It is written “suppressings³³⁶Identifying שׁ and שׂ for the homily.”. How is this? If the students are young, suppress before them the secrets of the Torah. If they grew and became like rams, reveal to them the secrets of the Torah. This lends support to what Rebbi Simoen ben Ioḥai stated: And these are the laws which you shall put before them³³⁷Ex. 21:1.. Just as this putting is not revealed to everybody³³⁸The laws in Ex. 21–22 are not to be told to Gentiles nor applied to their suits. so you do have permission to immerse yourself in words of the Torah only before legitimate people.

It is said (Lev. 19:3): “Everybody must fear his mother and his father,” and it is said (Deut. 6:13): “You must fear the Eternal, your God, and serve Him.” This brackets the fear of father and mother with the fear of the Omnipresent. [It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” This brackets the honor of father and mother with the honor of the Omnipresent.] Is is said (Ex. 21:17): “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death,” and it is said (Lev. 24:19): “Everybody who curses his God must bear his sin.” This brackets cursing father and mother with cursing the Omnipresent. It is impossible to speak about hitting relative to the Deity. All this is logical since all three of them are partners in him.

MISHNAH: If one dedicates a bull which is led out to be stoned, it is not dedicated, and if it was slaughtered, its meat is forbidden¹²¹Ex. 21:28 reads in part: “The bull shall be stoned; its meat shall not be eaten.” If the bull is killed by stoning, it is not ritually slaughtered and automatically its meat is forbidden as carcass meat. The specific mention of the prohibition of the meat is interpreted to mean that it becomes forbidden the moment sentence is pronounced. If the owner wants to save something of the value of the bull, he has to slaughter it immediately after it killed [Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Neziqin 10; dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai 21:28, p. 178; Yerushalmi Pesaḥim 2:1 (28c l. 34), ‘Orlah 3:1 Note 26; Babli Pesaḥim22b].. If its owner dedicated it before sentence was pronounced, it is dedicated, and if it was slaughtered, its meat is permitted.

MISHNAH: What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams²²¹A man afflicted with skin disease must have dishevelled hair and wear clothes open at the seams (Lev.13:45). It is written in v. 44: He is a man with skin disease., no woman is dishevelled and with open seams. A man can make his son a nazir²²²Mishnah Nazir 4:6. The nazir is forbidden all grape products, may not cut any hair, and may not defile himself in the impurity of the dead. A father can decree that his underage son be a nazir as long as neither the child nor the relatives object. He then is responsible for the cost of all sacrifices due at the end of the nezirut period., no woman can make her son a nazir. A man can shave using his father’s vow of nazir²²³“Shaving” stands here for the entire ceremony which ends the nezirut period, Num. 6:13–21. If both father and adult son were nezirim, the father had already bought the required sacrifices (one male and one female sheep, and one ram) when he died before using them, the father’s dedication is validly transferred to the son., no woman can shave using her father’s vow of nazir. A man can betrothe his daughter²²⁴If a man marries off his underage daughter, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. This is derived from Deut. 22:16, where the father declares: I gave my daughter to this man as a wife. After the father’s death, the widow may only marry off her underage daughter by rabbinic standards. A fully adult daughter must find her own husband., no woman can betrothe her daughter. A man can sell his daughter²²⁵Ex. 21:7: “If a man sell his daughter as a slave”. In rabbinic theory, the institution of Hebrew slavery was bound to that of the Jubilee year. The latter is predicated on the clan holdings of land received under Joshua. Therefore, the Jubilee year should have been disestablished with the first Assyrian deportations of the Ten Tribes., no woman can sell her daughter. A man is stoned naked²²⁶Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:3–4., no woman is stoned naked. A man is hanged²²⁷Deut. 21:22: “If a man was guilty of a capital crime and executed, you should hang him on a wooden pole.” This refers explicitly to a man., no woman is hanged. A man is sold for his theft, no woman is sold for her theft.

HALAKHAH: “The intruder by stealth,” etc. ⁷⁹Parallel texts are in the Babli 72a, Mekhilta dR.. Ismael Mišpaṭim 13, dR. Simeon ben Iohai p. 192, Sifry Deut. 217; partially Yerushalmi Ketubot 4:4 (Notes 88–93). Rebbi Ismael stated: This is one of three verses⁸⁰To the verses Ex. 21:19 and 22:2 mentioned here one has to add Deut. 22:17. which in the Torah have been formulated as a simile: If he gets up and walks outside on his support⁸¹Ex. 21:19.. If the thief is found in the digging, if the sun shone on him, he has blood⁷⁷Ex. 22:2.. Does the sun shine only on him? Does the sun not shine on all beings in the world? But just as sunshine is special in that it brings peace to the entire world, so in any case in which you know that you are at peace with him, whether it be day or night his killer will be killed⁸²The Babli, 79b, states that if a father intrudes in the son’s home, the son does not have the right to kill him. The Yerushalmi does not have this good opinion of family relationships, cf. the next paragraph.. If sometimes he comes to steal, sometimes he comes to kill, you say that if certainly he comes to steal, his killer will be killed⁸³In Tosephta 11:9, this is a declarative sentence; the next sentence is missing there.? Since sometimes he comes to kill, he may be killed. From here you argue about danger to life, to say that just as (foreign worship)⁸⁴Obviously, foreign worship has to be deleted since Mishnah 9 states clearly that a person intent on idolatry cannot be killed before he acts. One must read שְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים “bloodshed” which defiles the Land (Num. 35:33; Babli Šabbat 33a, Yoma 85a); by Mishnah 9 a person intent on committing murder may be killed by any bystander before he commits the murder. If a person with a drawn sword runs after another, it is only a surmise but one which allows the bystander to kill the attacker; maybe the pursuer would not kill his victim. This is the “action in doubt“ referred to in this sentence. is special in that it defiles the Land, desecrates the Name, removes the Divine Presence, and doubts are disregarded, so much more that doubts have to be disregarded in cases of danger to life⁸⁵The Sabbath must be desecrated for the possibility of saving a life. For example, if there was a landslide on the Sabbath and it is only surmised that somebody was buried in it, one starts digging without delay..

HALAKHAH: “The ox and any domestic animal equally are under the rules of falling into a pit,” etc. Falling into a pit, “and an ox or a donkey fell in there.⁵⁶Ex. 21:33.” Separating from Mount Sinai, “neither animal nor man shall live.⁸⁸Ex. 19:13.” Paying double restitution, “from ox to donkey⁸⁹Ex. 22:3, the penalty for the thief found with livestock.”. To return lost property, “you shall certainly return them⁹⁰Deut. 22:1..” Unloading, “do remove⁹¹Ex.. 23:5..” Muzzling, “do not muzzle an ox while threshing⁹²Deut. 25:4..” Interbreeding, “your animal you shall not breed kilaim⁹³Lev. 19:19..” The Sabbath, “that your ox and your donkey may rest⁹⁴Ex. 23:12..”

“A man can sell his daughter,” for it is written²³⁰Ex. 21:7.: “If a man sell his daughter as a handmaid. “A man can betrothe his daughter,” as it is written²³¹Deut. 22:16.: “I gave my daughter as a wife but he hated her.”

“A man is sold for his theft,” for his theft but not for the double restitution²²⁸Lev.13:44: “A man afflicted with skin disease is he, impure is he, the Cohen shall certainly declare him impure if his disease is on his head.”
A slightly more complete text in Sifra Tazria‘ Pereq12(1); a shortened text in Babli 23 a, Keritut8b, Arakhin3a.. For his theft but not for his perjury²²⁹The Babli (Soṭa 23 b; Nazir 25 a/b, 28b, 30a, 61b) and dependent sources [Num. rabba 10 (20] disagree and quote R. Joḥanan insisting that according to the biblical text, nobody can impose a state of nazir on another person but that it is traditional practice (in the words of the Midrash: “going back to Moses on Mount Sinai”) that a father may force his son to be a nazir, implying that nobody can dissent.
The same paragraph is found in Nazir 4:6, fol. 53c.. For his theft he is not sold twice. There is only a monetary claim on him. That means, for one theft, but for two thefts he can be sold a second time²³⁰Ex. 21:7.. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he stole from a partnership, how are you treating this? As one theft or as two thefts²³¹Deut. 22:16.? If he stole and removed [things] in the night, we would say that if the owners realized [the loss] in the meantime, there are two thefts; otherwise, it is one theft.

MISHNAH: Two tame bulls which injured one another; one pays half for the excess damage¹¹⁸Since each owner has to pay damages to the other, in effect only the owner of the bull causing the greater damage has to pay for the excess damage his animal did cause, by the statutory rate of 50% for the tame, 100% for the notorious.. If both are notorious, one pays in full for the excess damage. One tame and one notorious; the notorious over the tame pays in full for the excess damage; the tame over the notorious pays half for the excess damage.
Similarly, two people who injured one another pay in full for the excess damage¹¹⁹Since a human always is notorious (2:10).. A human and a notorious animal, or a notorious animal and a human, one pays in full for the excess damage. A human and a tame animal; the human over the tame pays in full for the excess damage; the tame over the human pays half for the excess damage. Rebbi Akiba says, also a tame animal which injured a human pays the excess damage in full¹²⁰He holds that the rules of Ex. 21 do not apply to damages caused to humans..
A bull worth a mina¹²¹100 denars. which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is not worth anything; he¹²²The owner of the dead bull. It is presumed that the aggressor was tame and the damage be paid from its body (Mishnah 1:5). takes the bull. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is not worth anything; Rebbi Meïr said, about this case it was said¹²³Ex. 21:35.: “They shall sell the living bull and split the proceeds.” Rebbi Jehudah said to him, you upheld “they shall sell the living bull and split the proceeds,” but you did not uphold ¹²³Ex. 21:35.“and also the cadaver they shall split.” What is this? That is a bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is worth 50 zuz¹²⁴The Babylonian half-šeqel, zūz, is identified with the Roman denar., in which case each owner takes half of the living bull and half from the cadaver¹²⁵Tosephta 3:3; Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Neziqin 12..

²¹⁹This is essentially Nedarim, Halakhah 8:3 (Notes 36–45). In G, the entire reference to this text seems to have been in one missing line. There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover⁴⁶Ex. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership.. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.

What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? The verse says, ¹²³Ex. 21:35.“they shall sell the living bull and split its proceeds.” How does Rebbi Jehudah support ¹²³Ex. 21:35.“and also the cadaver they shall split”? From here that each one loses half the damages¹³¹Babli 34a; Tosephta 3:3; Mekhilta dR. Ismael Neziqin 12; cf. Halakhah 1:3, end. The verse proves that half damages for ‘horn’ are paid exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the attacking animal..

Bar Qappara went to this town; when he entered he injured his finger. He went and heard a child’s voice, reciting if he came alone he shall leave alone²³⁵Ex. 21:3.. He said, it seems that only this plastering is going to happen to me. And so it was.

From where a warning for the one who curses father or mother? Everybody has to fear his mother and father³⁴⁶Lev. 19:3.. From where punishment and extirpation? And he who curses his father or mother shall be made to die the death³⁴⁷Ex. 21:17.. And it says, for anybody who would commit any of these abominations will be extirpated^349,This text is also in Ketubot 3:9, explained there with a list of readings in Notes 126–135. The parallel in the Babli is 66b.¹³¹Lev. 18:29..

An ox which was stoned. From the meaning of what was said, the ox shall be stoned¹⁴⁷Which killed a human, Ex. 21:28. would I not know that it cannot be eaten? Why does the verse say, it shall not be eaten? From here that it is forbidden for usufruct¹⁵⁵This is a very short reference to a text in `Orlah 3:1 (Notes 26–28, Pesaḥim 2:1 28c), which is part of a lengthy discussion under which conditions a prohibition as food implies a prohibition of usufruct (`Orlah 3:1, Notes 10–44; Pesaḥim 2:1; Babli Pesaḥim 21b, Qiddušin 56b, Bava qamma 41a, Ḥulin 114b) Since the mention of the prohibition as food is unnecessary, the ox qualifies as a case where the prohibition as food means prohibition of usufruct. In the Babylonian sources (Bava qamma 41a, Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpatim 10) it is agreed that it is obvious that a stoned animal was not ritually slaughtered and therefore is forbidden as meat but it is noted that the prohibition as food is necessary anyhow to show that if the ox was ritually slaughtered after conviction by the court, the slaughter is ineffective and does not permit the carcass to be eaten. Everybody agrees that if the ox was correctly slaughtered before a trial could be held the meat is kosher. The Babli has to find the prohibition of usufruct in another part of the verse which makes the prohibition one of rabbinic interpretation rather than biblical.
Louis Ginzberg in his Yerushalmi Fragments from the Genizah (New York 1909) p. 280 has published a leaf of selections from the entire tractate. The passage referring to the paragraph under discussion reads there (vocalization added):
וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל. סָקֹ֨ל יִסָּקֵ֜ל הַשּׁ֗וֹר וג׳ מִמַּשְׁמַע שנ׳ סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל וְכִי אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לֹא יֵאָכֵל. מַה תַלְמוּד לוֹמַר לֹא יֵֽאָכֵל֙. אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וְאַסוּר בַּהֲנָייָה. ר׳ אַבָּ׳ בְשֶׁם ר׳ יוֹחָנָן כָּל־מָקוֹם שנ׳ לֹא יֵאָכֵל לֹא תֹאכְלוּ … אִסוּר
And an ox which was stoned. The ox should certainly be stoned. From the meaning of what was said, shall certainly be stoned would we not know that it cannot be eaten? Why does the verse say, it shall not be eaten? But that it is forbidden for eating and forbidden for usufruct. Rebbi Abba[hu] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Any place where it says shall not be eaten, you shall not eat [it is forbidden for eating and forbidden for usufruct.]
The addition to the text is from `Orlah 3:1 (Note 10) or Pesaḥim 2:1 l. 15. In these and all Babli sources (quoted above) the statement is attributed to R. Eleazar, not R. Joḥanan (R. Eleazar’s teacher). The addition has to be considered a commentary. .