Talmud su Levitico 4:23

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues, from where that he who eats with permission is free¹⁴This is not an attack on the argument of R. Ḥanina; if a person has no intention of breaking the law and is not breaking the law, obviously he is free not only of guilt but of all monetary obligations.
The parallel to this text is in Horaiot 1:1, fol. 45c; a text which differs in places from the text here. The commentaries assume that the text there is the better one; they take the question of R. Ḥaggai as directed against the argument of R. Ḥaninah; therefore, they are forced in the next sentence to follow the Horaiot text and to switch the terms “Israel” and “Cohen”, an emendation not supported here by any manuscript and contradicted by the third question of R. Ḥaggai.? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out that it was heave, who is obligated¹⁵An Israel who ate what he thought was profane food. If it turns out that it was heave, he has to pay as stated in Mishnah 6:1. If it turns out that he was in fact a Cohen but did not know it, he does not have to pay even though at the time of eating he thought he was an Israel. If payment were a punishment for negligence, there is no reason why he should not be held liable.
In the Horaiot text, speaking of a person who thought he was a Cohen when he was not, the reference would be to the position of R. Joshua in the Mishnah here and the “declaration of the court” is the court decision which strips him of his priesthood, on the testimony of two cross-examined credible witnesses. The conditions under which an action of the court obligates him to bring a sacrifice are noted Horaiot 1:1; the reading of Horaiot is appropriate there, the reading of Terumot is appropriate here., and him who thought that he was an Israel but it turned out that he was a Cohen, who is free? They said to him, by the declaration of the court¹⁶The interpretation of the biblical law quoted later.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was a weekday but it turned out that it was a Sabbath¹⁷The person violating the Sabbath in error has to bring an expiatory sacrifice., who is obligated, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out that it was a well-being offering, who is free¹⁸This refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim6:4. The Passover sacrifice, a lamb or kid goat, has to be sacrificed during the afternoon of Nissan 14, even if that day is a Sabbath. It also has to be designated beforehand as Passover sacrifice and is counted as a special kind of well-being offering. If the 14th falls on a weekday, a festival offering, which is a well-being offering, is also slaughtered at the same time (cf. the author’s The Scholar’s Haggadah, Northvale NJ 1995, p. 248.) On the Sabbath, any slaughtering not directly mandated by the biblical verse is forbidden. On that the Mishnah states: “If the Passover sacrifice [which is valid only if slaughtered for this particular purpose] was slaughtered not for its purpose on the Sabbath, one is obligated for an expiatory sacrifice. For any well-being offering slaughtered as a Passover sacrifice which was not usable [a calf or an old sheep or goat], one is obligated. If it was usable, R. Eliezer obligates him for an expiatory sacrifice, R. Joshua declares him free.” Why should he be free?? They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission¹⁹The language refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim 6:6: “If he slaughtered [the Passover sacrifice on a Sabbath] and it turned out to have a blemish, he is obligated [for an expiatory sacrifice]. If it turned out to be unusable because of an internal defect [which could not have been detected by inspection when the animal was alive], he is free. If he slaughtered and then it turned out that the owners had withdrawn from it [they chose another lamb as their sacrifice], or that they had died [and the sacrifice became unusable because nobody may eat from the Passover unless he joined the group before the lamb was slaughtered], or had become impure, he is free since he slaughtered with permission.” Since R. Joshua declares him free and the animal could have been a valid Passover sacrifice, he slaughtered with permission.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted fat but it turned out that it was forbidden fat, who is obligated, and him who thought that it was forbidden but it turned out that it was permitted, who is free²⁰He thought the fat he ate was forbidden when in fact it was permitted. Then in his mind he should be more guilty of negligence than the one who thought the fat was permitted when it was in fact forbidden.? They did not answer him. What did he say to them? Let us take counsel! (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring.²¹The involved statement is explained to mean that one became aware of the sinful character of what he had done inadvertently. If a person never knew that certain acts are forbidden, he cannot become obligated for an expiatory sacrifice since no negligence was involved. If he knew and then did something inadvertently, he is obligated for his negligence. But if he knew beforehand that, had he known then what he knows now, his action would have been legitimate, there is no negligence and no sacrifice.” He who returns from his prior knowledge is obligated for his error; this excludes one who would not stop even if he knew! Rebbi Assi went to see them and said, why did you not answer him (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring”? They said to him, he asked the question and gave the answer²²This paragraph is more explicit in Horaiot, and written in better style..

Rebbi Bun asked, if he did not know at the end, how could be bring a sacrifice⁶⁵Since any obligatory offering cannot be brought voluntarily, the fact that a sacrifice is commanded implies that the person can prove it is obligatory, i. e., he knows that a sin has been committed. Therefore the mention of ‘knowledge” in the verse cannot refer to his knowledge at the moment he offers the sacrifice.? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the end, let it refer to knowledge at the beginning⁶⁶And the mention of forgetting must be interpreted as read by R. Aqiba here and R. Ismael in the Babli sources.. They objected: Is it not written, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring⁶⁷Lev. 4:23, about the purification offering of the prince. Purification offerings are for inadvertent sins; nowhere is prior knowledge and intermediate forgetting indicated. R. Bun’s argument would force the transfer of the rules for variable sacrifices to purification ones against all tradition.? Then if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end⁶⁸A “suspended” reparation sacrifice is brought if the person suspects but is not sure that he has sinned (Lev. 5:17–18). If he then gains certainty that he has committed an inadvertent sin, a purification sacrifice is due if and only if he gains this knowledge before the next Day of Atonement. R. Bun’s argument is justified.! Explain it as referring to those who are obligated for certain purification and reparation offerings for which the Day of Atonement has passed who have to bring after the day of Atonement, while those obligated for suspended reparation sacrifices are no longer liable. The verse says, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring even after the Day of Atonement⁷⁰Yoma 8:6 (45b l. 47), Babli Keritut 25b..

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..