Talmud su Levitico 4:78

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.⁴Lev. 4:2,3.” This makes the Anointed like a private person⁵In v. 2, the High Priest is mentioned as “a person”; only in v. 3 as Anointed. It is concluded that the Anointed Priest follows the rules of private persons unless there is an indication to the contrary. Babli 7b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršeta 2(1).. Since the private person is not liable if he ate⁶Taking eating forbidden fat as standard example of a forbidden action. on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling⁷The question is raised why does the Mishnah require a sacrifice only if the Anointed Priest first gives an inadvertent wrong instruction and then acts on it without realizing his error? This mixes required features of the purification offerings both of the Court (only after issuing a prescript, not acting on it themselves) and the private person (not instructing anybody but acting).; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm⁹Babli 7a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq2(1,4). who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned¹⁰Including the Court. Since the High Priest is mentioned before the Court, his purification offering cannot be dependent on the Court’s ruling.. Rebbi Jacob¹¹In B: R. Jacob bar Aha. It is impossible to decide which reading is preferable or whether the same person is meant in both sources. in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice¹²This shows that the rules are applicable to the High Priests of the Second Temple, who were invested but not anointed. The High Priests of the First Temple were supposed to be the guardians of the Law. The Hasmonean kings and the later High Priests mostly had no claim to learning.. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing¹³The translation follows B. The text of the ms., “since the prescript of others is by all their prescripts” does not make any sense. compared to their prescripts¹⁴As explained in Note 10, the High Priests cannot be made dependent on the prescripts of others. The High Priest is “not dependent on the Court” ex officio. But as explained earlier, he cannot bring his purification offering unless his action was based on his own ruling.. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly¹⁵It is not required that the High Priest have original thoughts when acting; he is presumed to follow (correct) precedent..

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.⁴Lev. 4:2,3.” This makes the Anointed like a private person⁵In v. 2, the High Priest is mentioned as “a person”; only in v. 3 as Anointed. It is concluded that the Anointed Priest follows the rules of private persons unless there is an indication to the contrary. Babli 7b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršeta 2(1).. Since the private person is not liable if he ate⁶Taking eating forbidden fat as standard example of a forbidden action. on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling⁷The question is raised why does the Mishnah require a sacrifice only if the Anointed Priest first gives an inadvertent wrong instruction and then acts on it without realizing his error? This mixes required features of the purification offerings both of the Court (only after issuing a prescript, not acting on it themselves) and the private person (not instructing anybody but acting).; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm⁹Babli 7a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq2(1,4). who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned¹⁰Including the Court. Since the High Priest is mentioned before the Court, his purification offering cannot be dependent on the Court’s ruling.. Rebbi Jacob¹¹In B: R. Jacob bar Aha. It is impossible to decide which reading is preferable or whether the same person is meant in both sources. in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice¹²This shows that the rules are applicable to the High Priests of the Second Temple, who were invested but not anointed. The High Priests of the First Temple were supposed to be the guardians of the Law. The Hasmonean kings and the later High Priests mostly had no claim to learning.. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing¹³The translation follows B. The text of the ms., “since the prescript of others is by all their prescripts” does not make any sense. compared to their prescripts¹⁴As explained in Note 10, the High Priests cannot be made dependent on the prescripts of others. The High Priest is “not dependent on the Court” ex officio. But as explained earlier, he cannot bring his purification offering unless his action was based on his own ruling.. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly¹⁵It is not required that the High Priest have original thoughts when acting; he is presumed to follow (correct) precedent..

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues, from where that he who eats with permission is free¹⁴This is not an attack on the argument of R. Ḥanina; if a person has no intention of breaking the law and is not breaking the law, obviously he is free not only of guilt but of all monetary obligations.
The parallel to this text is in Horaiot 1:1, fol. 45c; a text which differs in places from the text here. The commentaries assume that the text there is the better one; they take the question of R. Ḥaggai as directed against the argument of R. Ḥaninah; therefore, they are forced in the next sentence to follow the Horaiot text and to switch the terms “Israel” and “Cohen”, an emendation not supported here by any manuscript and contradicted by the third question of R. Ḥaggai.? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out that it was heave, who is obligated¹⁵An Israel who ate what he thought was profane food. If it turns out that it was heave, he has to pay as stated in Mishnah 6:1. If it turns out that he was in fact a Cohen but did not know it, he does not have to pay even though at the time of eating he thought he was an Israel. If payment were a punishment for negligence, there is no reason why he should not be held liable.
In the Horaiot text, speaking of a person who thought he was a Cohen when he was not, the reference would be to the position of R. Joshua in the Mishnah here and the “declaration of the court” is the court decision which strips him of his priesthood, on the testimony of two cross-examined credible witnesses. The conditions under which an action of the court obligates him to bring a sacrifice are noted Horaiot 1:1; the reading of Horaiot is appropriate there, the reading of Terumot is appropriate here., and him who thought that he was an Israel but it turned out that he was a Cohen, who is free? They said to him, by the declaration of the court¹⁶The interpretation of the biblical law quoted later.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was a weekday but it turned out that it was a Sabbath¹⁷The person violating the Sabbath in error has to bring an expiatory sacrifice., who is obligated, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out that it was a well-being offering, who is free¹⁸This refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim6:4. The Passover sacrifice, a lamb or kid goat, has to be sacrificed during the afternoon of Nissan 14, even if that day is a Sabbath. It also has to be designated beforehand as Passover sacrifice and is counted as a special kind of well-being offering. If the 14th falls on a weekday, a festival offering, which is a well-being offering, is also slaughtered at the same time (cf. the author’s The Scholar’s Haggadah, Northvale NJ 1995, p. 248.) On the Sabbath, any slaughtering not directly mandated by the biblical verse is forbidden. On that the Mishnah states: “If the Passover sacrifice [which is valid only if slaughtered for this particular purpose] was slaughtered not for its purpose on the Sabbath, one is obligated for an expiatory sacrifice. For any well-being offering slaughtered as a Passover sacrifice which was not usable [a calf or an old sheep or goat], one is obligated. If it was usable, R. Eliezer obligates him for an expiatory sacrifice, R. Joshua declares him free.” Why should he be free?? They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission¹⁹The language refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim 6:6: “If he slaughtered [the Passover sacrifice on a Sabbath] and it turned out to have a blemish, he is obligated [for an expiatory sacrifice]. If it turned out to be unusable because of an internal defect [which could not have been detected by inspection when the animal was alive], he is free. If he slaughtered and then it turned out that the owners had withdrawn from it [they chose another lamb as their sacrifice], or that they had died [and the sacrifice became unusable because nobody may eat from the Passover unless he joined the group before the lamb was slaughtered], or had become impure, he is free since he slaughtered with permission.” Since R. Joshua declares him free and the animal could have been a valid Passover sacrifice, he slaughtered with permission.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted fat but it turned out that it was forbidden fat, who is obligated, and him who thought that it was forbidden but it turned out that it was permitted, who is free²⁰He thought the fat he ate was forbidden when in fact it was permitted. Then in his mind he should be more guilty of negligence than the one who thought the fat was permitted when it was in fact forbidden.? They did not answer him. What did he say to them? Let us take counsel! (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring.²¹The involved statement is explained to mean that one became aware of the sinful character of what he had done inadvertently. If a person never knew that certain acts are forbidden, he cannot become obligated for an expiatory sacrifice since no negligence was involved. If he knew and then did something inadvertently, he is obligated for his negligence. But if he knew beforehand that, had he known then what he knows now, his action would have been legitimate, there is no negligence and no sacrifice.” He who returns from his prior knowledge is obligated for his error; this excludes one who would not stop even if he knew! Rebbi Assi went to see them and said, why did you not answer him (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring”? They said to him, he asked the question and gave the answer²²This paragraph is more explicit in Horaiot, and written in better style..

¹⁰This paragraph has a parallel in Terumot 8:1, Notes 14–22. As explained there, the background of the paragraph in Terumot is different from the one presumed here; therefore at a place where the readings there and here seem to be opposite to one another, both are correct in their settings. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable¹¹Referring to Mishnah Terumot 8:1; a childless woman of non-priestly birth, married to a Cohen, was eating heave in purity, as is her right and duty, when she was informed of her husband’s death. By this death she returns to her non-priestly status and heave is forbidden to her. Nevertheless, she is not liable for a reparation sacrifice nor to pay for the heave eaten in error. This is the topic of Terumot 8:1, it is not followed up here.? What is the difference between him¹²An Israel to whom heave is forbidden, Mishnah Terumot 6:1. who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable¹³He had been told from childhood that he was a Cohen; he was stripped of his priesthood by a court on the testimony of two witnesses that one of his female ancestors had been forbidden to her Cohen husband. His case is not different from that of the woman in Note 12.? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath¹⁴This is a paradigm of an inadvertent sin as mentioned in Lev. 4:27., who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah Pesahim 6:4).. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Mishnah Pesahim 6:4)., who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat¹⁶Fat of animals which would be burned on the altar if these animals were sacrifices, and the fat into which ischiatic tendons are embedded, is forbidden for human consumption. All other fat is permitted. If a person intended to commit a sin but, unknown to him at the time, failed to commit the sin, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice. and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself¹⁷Translated using the Bomberg Babli text.: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues, from where that he who eats with permission is free¹⁴This is not an attack on the argument of R. Ḥanina; if a person has no intention of breaking the law and is not breaking the law, obviously he is free not only of guilt but of all monetary obligations.
The parallel to this text is in Horaiot 1:1, fol. 45c; a text which differs in places from the text here. The commentaries assume that the text there is the better one; they take the question of R. Ḥaggai as directed against the argument of R. Ḥaninah; therefore, they are forced in the next sentence to follow the Horaiot text and to switch the terms “Israel” and “Cohen”, an emendation not supported here by any manuscript and contradicted by the third question of R. Ḥaggai.? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out that it was heave, who is obligated¹⁵An Israel who ate what he thought was profane food. If it turns out that it was heave, he has to pay as stated in Mishnah 6:1. If it turns out that he was in fact a Cohen but did not know it, he does not have to pay even though at the time of eating he thought he was an Israel. If payment were a punishment for negligence, there is no reason why he should not be held liable.
In the Horaiot text, speaking of a person who thought he was a Cohen when he was not, the reference would be to the position of R. Joshua in the Mishnah here and the “declaration of the court” is the court decision which strips him of his priesthood, on the testimony of two cross-examined credible witnesses. The conditions under which an action of the court obligates him to bring a sacrifice are noted Horaiot 1:1; the reading of Horaiot is appropriate there, the reading of Terumot is appropriate here., and him who thought that he was an Israel but it turned out that he was a Cohen, who is free? They said to him, by the declaration of the court¹⁶The interpretation of the biblical law quoted later.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was a weekday but it turned out that it was a Sabbath¹⁷The person violating the Sabbath in error has to bring an expiatory sacrifice., who is obligated, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out that it was a well-being offering, who is free¹⁸This refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim6:4. The Passover sacrifice, a lamb or kid goat, has to be sacrificed during the afternoon of Nissan 14, even if that day is a Sabbath. It also has to be designated beforehand as Passover sacrifice and is counted as a special kind of well-being offering. If the 14th falls on a weekday, a festival offering, which is a well-being offering, is also slaughtered at the same time (cf. the author’s The Scholar’s Haggadah, Northvale NJ 1995, p. 248.) On the Sabbath, any slaughtering not directly mandated by the biblical verse is forbidden. On that the Mishnah states: “If the Passover sacrifice [which is valid only if slaughtered for this particular purpose] was slaughtered not for its purpose on the Sabbath, one is obligated for an expiatory sacrifice. For any well-being offering slaughtered as a Passover sacrifice which was not usable [a calf or an old sheep or goat], one is obligated. If it was usable, R. Eliezer obligates him for an expiatory sacrifice, R. Joshua declares him free.” Why should he be free?? They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission¹⁹The language refers to Mishnah Pesaḥim 6:6: “If he slaughtered [the Passover sacrifice on a Sabbath] and it turned out to have a blemish, he is obligated [for an expiatory sacrifice]. If it turned out to be unusable because of an internal defect [which could not have been detected by inspection when the animal was alive], he is free. If he slaughtered and then it turned out that the owners had withdrawn from it [they chose another lamb as their sacrifice], or that they had died [and the sacrifice became unusable because nobody may eat from the Passover unless he joined the group before the lamb was slaughtered], or had become impure, he is free since he slaughtered with permission.” Since R. Joshua declares him free and the animal could have been a valid Passover sacrifice, he slaughtered with permission.. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted fat but it turned out that it was forbidden fat, who is obligated, and him who thought that it was forbidden but it turned out that it was permitted, who is free²⁰He thought the fat he ate was forbidden when in fact it was permitted. Then in his mind he should be more guilty of negligence than the one who thought the fat was permitted when it was in fact forbidden.? They did not answer him. What did he say to them? Let us take counsel! (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring.²¹The involved statement is explained to mean that one became aware of the sinful character of what he had done inadvertently. If a person never knew that certain acts are forbidden, he cannot become obligated for an expiatory sacrifice since no negligence was involved. If he knew and then did something inadvertently, he is obligated for his negligence. But if he knew beforehand that, had he known then what he knows now, his action would have been legitimate, there is no negligence and no sacrifice.” He who returns from his prior knowledge is obligated for his error; this excludes one who would not stop even if he knew! Rebbi Assi went to see them and said, why did you not answer him (Lev. 4:23,28): “Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring”? They said to him, he asked the question and gave the answer²²This paragraph is more explicit in Horaiot, and written in better style..

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together²⁶Lev. 4:2 reads: If a person should sin inadvertently against any of the prohibitions of the Eternal and did one of these. The complicated structure of this verse is analyzed in detail in Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra II) Parshata 1, Pereq 1. The analysis of the Yerushalmi is attributed in the Babli 103b to R. Yose ben Ḥanina, mentioned at the end of the preceding Paragraph. Echoes of the discussion in Sifra are in the Babli 70a.
The questions raised about the verse are twofold. If it had simply said and did one, we would have inferred that every single infraction needs a separate sacrifice. If it had said and did these, all infractions committed in one state of inadvertence would be covered by one sacrifice. The mention of one in parallel with these creates a seeming contradiction. In addition, in each case the prefix מ “of” in standard rabbinic interpretation is read as “not all”. Then what does it mean that a single prohibition is partially violated?. Of these, to obligate for derivatives²⁷The last question is easily answered for the Sabbath. Later in the Chapter the forbidden actions on the Sabbath are described by 39 categories. The particular actions labelling the categories are called אַב מְלָאכָה “primary actions”; any other action subsumed under the same category is a תּוֹלְדָה “derivative”. All actions subsumed under the same category are considered identical in some abstract sense even if they actually are very different; e. g. plucking feathers from a bird is forbidden as a derivative of shearing. Any one of the actions subsumed under one category triggers the liability for a sacrifice; it is not necessary that all actions carrying the same label be acted on. On the other hand, most actions trigger liability only if a certain minimum of work was done, as will be detailed in the following Chapters; an action which is too insignificant remains forbidden but does not trigger liability for a sacrifice.. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken²⁸The expression is difficult to understand since one does not cross rivers (in this case Tigris, Euphrates, and Jordan) by hand but by boat. Since the expression is confirmed later in the Chapter and in Nazir 6:1, it cannot be emended. It seems that Rav (not Rebbi) Zakkai swam crossing the rivers on his way to Palestine.; he is liable only once²⁹Sanhedrin Chapter 7:11 Note 256. Worshipping strange deities in the way prescribed for Jewish worship in all its forms is one and the same offense. But worshipping strange deities in their own characteristic ways is a separate offense for each deity.. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one³⁰Since the question was raised whether Lev. 4:2 could be interpreted to refer only to idolatry the answer seems to be in the negative, since for R. Zakkai there are only single offenses (one) and no general category (these) whereas for R. Joḥanan the situation is the inverse, in contrast to the Sabbath when liability for a sacrifice can be triggered either by a single action (one) or by a multiplicity of different actions all falling under the same category (these).. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them³¹Since in the Second Commandment prostration is mentioned before worship of strange deities it clearly is a separate offense. Cf. Sanhedrin 7:11 Notes 252 ff.. Like prostration to obligate for partial action³²It is punishable even if not executed in the full manner prescribed for the Temple, lying down flat with outstretched arms and legs.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written³³Lev. 4:3., if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat³⁴Horaiot Mishnah 2:8.. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives³⁵Fat is forbidden if it is from an animal whose kind is acceptable as a sacrifice and which is of the kind exactly prescribed in Lev. to be burned on the altar. There are no extensions or derivatives.. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse³⁶Forbidden sexual relations are exactly those described in Lev. 18. In addition in Lev. 20:18 the sex act is defined at touching of sexual organs; the only actions triggering the liability for a sacrifice are explicitly spelled out in the verses; there are no categories nor derivatives. Cf. Sanhedrin 7:5 (Notes 72–85).. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath³⁷Lev. 23:3. Since the attempt to derive the rules of the Mishnah from Lev. 4:2 ran into difficulties, they propose a direct interpretation of verses referring to the Sabbath only.. Rebbi Ila said, it is written³⁸Ex. 35:2. The Sabbath is mentioned in the singular.: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate³⁹That Sabbaths do not combine means that if somebody did less than a punishable amount of work on one Sabbath and again less than a punishable amount the next Sabbath they do not add up to the liability for a sacrifice even if the actions were committed in the same period of oblivion of the rules of the Sabbath. In this the rules of the Sabbath parallel the rules of forbidden fat. Eating forbidden fat triggers the liability for a sacrifice only if a minimum was eaten within the time of a meal (defined as time needed to eat half a loaf of bread, Horaiot 3:3 Note 66). Less than minimum amounts eaten at different times do not trigger liability. On the other hand, once liability was triggered within one period of oblivion, it automatically covers all other offenses of the same kind during the same period of oblivion. The question is now asked whether if an inadvertent desecration of the Sabbath triggered the obligation of a sacrifice and the perpetrator did not become aware of his offense before committing the same also on another Sabbath, he is liable for only one or for several sacrifices?? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun⁴⁰Since the father is known in the Babli as Rabin, the reading of G, בין, seems better than the reading everywhere in the Leiden ms., בון. said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable¹⁹This paragraph has no direct connection with the theme of the Mishnah, but is added here to elucidate Lev. 4:27. Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering.. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated²⁰Mishnah Keritut 6:4; Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah 3(1), 6(1), Ahare Mot Parašah4(8).
Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution (Lev. 5:20–26; Num. 5:5–10), (2) misappropriation of sancta(Lev.5:14–16), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease (Lev. 14). A suspended reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away all iniquities (Lev. 16:21).: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God., or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. ²¹This copy from the first paragraph has no discernible meaning here. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent}⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah23b, Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin 15a,44b,66a, Makkot 9b, Ševuot 7b, Menahot 9b,67a, Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. on the Court is not liable.

From where these things? He did one, and did these, and did of these. He did one, to obligate for each one separately; and did these, to obligate for all of them together²⁶Lev. 4:2 reads: If a person should sin inadvertently against any of the prohibitions of the Eternal and did one of these. The complicated structure of this verse is analyzed in detail in Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra II) Parshata 1, Pereq 1. The analysis of the Yerushalmi is attributed in the Babli 103b to R. Yose ben Ḥanina, mentioned at the end of the preceding Paragraph. Echoes of the discussion in Sifra are in the Babli 70a.
The questions raised about the verse are twofold. If it had simply said and did one, we would have inferred that every single infraction needs a separate sacrifice. If it had said and did these, all infractions committed in one state of inadvertence would be covered by one sacrifice. The mention of one in parallel with these creates a seeming contradiction. In addition, in each case the prefix מ “of” in standard rabbinic interpretation is read as “not all”. Then what does it mean that a single prohibition is partially violated?. Of these, to obligate for derivatives²⁷The last question is easily answered for the Sabbath. Later in the Chapter the forbidden actions on the Sabbath are described by 39 categories. The particular actions labelling the categories are called אַב מְלָאכָה “primary actions”; any other action subsumed under the same category is a תּוֹלְדָה “derivative”. All actions subsumed under the same category are considered identical in some abstract sense even if they actually are very different; e. g. plucking feathers from a bird is forbidden as a derivative of shearing. Any one of the actions subsumed under one category triggers the liability for a sacrifice; it is not necessary that all actions carrying the same label be acted on. On the other hand, most actions trigger liability only if a certain minimum of work was done, as will be detailed in the following Chapters; an action which is too insignificant remains forbidden but does not trigger liability for a sacrifice.. Or should we say that the verse refers to idolatry? Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Babylonian! You crossed by hand three rivers and were broken²⁸The expression is difficult to understand since one does not cross rivers (in this case Tigris, Euphrates, and Jordan) by hand but by boat. Since the expression is confirmed later in the Chapter and in Nazir 6:1, it cannot be emended. It seems that Rav (not Rebbi) Zakkai swam crossing the rivers on his way to Palestine.; he is liable only once²⁹Sanhedrin Chapter 7:11 Note 256. Worshipping strange deities in the way prescribed for Jewish worship in all its forms is one and the same offense. But worshipping strange deities in their own characteristic ways is a separate offense for each deity.. Before it was broken in his hand there was one but no these; after it was broken in his hand there was these but no one³⁰Since the question was raised whether Lev. 4:2 could be interpreted to refer only to idolatry the answer seems to be in the negative, since for R. Zakkai there are only single offenses (one) and no general category (these) whereas for R. Joḥanan the situation is the inverse, in contrast to the Sabbath when liability for a sacrifice can be triggered either by a single action (one) or by a multiplicity of different actions all falling under the same category (these).. But it could be idolatry worshipped by the rules of worship of Heaven as by prostration. In its own worship to obligate for each one separately. By the rules of worship of Heaven to obligate one for all of them³¹Since in the Second Commandment prostration is mentioned before worship of strange deities it clearly is a separate offense. Cf. Sanhedrin 7:11 Notes 252 ff.. Like prostration to obligate for partial action³²It is punishable even if not executed in the full manner prescribed for the Temple, lying down flat with outstretched arms and legs.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac. It is written³³Lev. 4:3., if the anointed priest should sin to damage the people … he has to bring a bull. This excludes idolatry for which he does not bring a bull but only a she-goat³⁴Horaiot Mishnah 2:8.. They objected, are there not fat and sexual taboos for which the Anointed brings a bull? We come only to state things that have derivatives. Fat has no derivatives³⁵Fat is forbidden if it is from an animal whose kind is acceptable as a sacrifice and which is of the kind exactly prescribed in Lev. to be burned on the altar. There are no extensions or derivatives.. For sexual taboos He made one who touched equal to one who had full intercourse³⁶Forbidden sexual relations are exactly those described in Lev. 18. In addition in Lev. 20:18 the sex act is defined at touching of sexual organs; the only actions triggering the liability for a sacrifice are explicitly spelled out in the verses; there are no categories nor derivatives. Cf. Sanhedrin 7:5 (Notes 72–85).. The colleagues say, a Sabbath it is for the Eternal, to obligate for each single Sabbath³⁷Lev. 23:3. Since the attempt to derive the rules of the Mishnah from Lev. 4:2 ran into difficulties, they propose a direct interpretation of verses referring to the Sabbath only.. Rebbi Ila said, it is written³⁸Ex. 35:2. The Sabbath is mentioned in the singular.: Anybody doing work on it shall by put to death, not one who does on it and another. You are saying, the Sabbaths do not combine. Do they separate³⁹That Sabbaths do not combine means that if somebody did less than a punishable amount of work on one Sabbath and again less than a punishable amount the next Sabbath they do not add up to the liability for a sacrifice even if the actions were committed in the same period of oblivion of the rules of the Sabbath. In this the rules of the Sabbath parallel the rules of forbidden fat. Eating forbidden fat triggers the liability for a sacrifice only if a minimum was eaten within the time of a meal (defined as time needed to eat half a loaf of bread, Horaiot 3:3 Note 66). Less than minimum amounts eaten at different times do not trigger liability. On the other hand, once liability was triggered within one period of oblivion, it automatically covers all other offenses of the same kind during the same period of oblivion. The question is now asked whether if an inadvertent desecration of the Sabbath triggered the obligation of a sacrifice and the perpetrator did not become aware of his offense before committing the same also on another Sabbath, he is liable for only one or for several sacrifices?? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun⁴⁰Since the father is known in the Babli as Rabin, the reading of G, בין, seems better than the reading everywhere in the Leiden ms., בון. said, just as they do not combine they do not separate.

²²Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz., the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Lev. 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable²³To bring the sacrifice. for something²⁴An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them²⁵They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden²⁶Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. ²⁷There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew²⁸Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges²⁹One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times³⁰R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Ševuot 14b, Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, ³¹Returning to our topic, Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

³⁴The parallel text is in Sanhedrin1:3. There³⁵Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:3., we have stated: The leaning of the hands of the Elders³⁶Lev. 4:15. If the entire community (or their representative, the High Court) have erred, the purification offering requires that the Elders shall lean their hands on the head of the bull. and the breaking of the neck of the calf is done by three [judges]; Rebbi Jehudah says, by five. What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “The Elders shall lean³⁷Lev. 4:15; Babli 44b. The quote of the verb is unnecessary. The plural “Elders” means “at least two Elders,”, cf. Note 5.,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “They shall lean,” two; “the Elders,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes five. And for the calf whose neck is broken, what is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “Your Elders, your judges,³⁸Deut. 21:2; Sifry Deut. 205.” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “Your Elders shall go out,” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds, that makes five. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands and those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck. The words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands, for he does not refer to “they shall lean”³⁹Since the number of the verb is in general determined by the number of the subject, this number cannot be considered independent information.. And those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck, for he does not refer to “they shall go out.⁴⁰This argument is less clear since R. Simeon likewise does not refer to the verb. The difference between R. Simeon and R. Jehudah is that for R. Jehudah “Elders, judges” represent independent plurals but for R. Simeon one is restricted to “judges who are Elders” (the Babli concurs in this, 34b).” If you would say that the words of Rebbi Jehudah are reasonable for the calf whose neck is broken because he refers to both to “they shall lean” and “they shall go out,” it turns out that you have to say “there shall go out” two, “your Elders” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes seven⁴¹Since this number is never mentioned, no author considers the plural form of the verb as information.. How do the rabbis⁴³In the Babli, “the select of your judges”, i. e., one disqualifies any judges who are not members of the High Court. explain “your Elders and your judges”? Your Elders who are your judges⁴³In the Babli, “the select of your judges”, i. e., one disqualifies any judges who are not members of the High Court.. It was stated⁴⁴Babli 45a, Sanhedrin 14b.: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says “your Elders,” that is the High Court; “and your judges” these are king and High Priest⁴⁵He requires the entire High Court to appear (Rashi in Babli 45a). The king (or, in a tribal society, the head of the tribe) is involved since he represents the police powers who alone can determine whether the murderer is unknown. The High Priest is involved since he has to send the priests to conduct the ceremony..

²⁹Bikkurim 3:5 (Notes 85–87,א). Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Jeremiah. One says, one repeats “vessels”³⁰While in principle the translator may choose his own words (since he is forbidden to read from a prepared text), in a few places rabbinic authorities insist that certain expressions are too imprecise. The first one is the translation of טנא (Deut. 26:2) by “vessel” instead of “basket”, the second one that of מצות ומרורים (Num. 9:11) by “unleavened bread and vegetables.”. The other one says, one repeats “unleavened with vegetables” because you have to say “unleavened with bitter herbs”. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi [Jonah] said³¹Bikkurim 3:5, Note 84, referring to the presentation of First Fruits in the Temple., may one bring in large silver baskets, it shows that he must have said that one repeats “vessels”. One has to say “basket”. Rebbi Phineas said, one must repeat “fattened ones and young bulls” because one must say “bulls and young bulls.³²Lev. 4:3, in both Onkelos and Pseudo-Jonathan.”

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says⁵⁵Lev. 4:27., [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them)⁵⁶The text is a baraita in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err(Lev. 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull⁵⁷A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁸This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption⁵⁹Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.? The statement of a baraita⁶⁰Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed⁶¹If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says⁵⁵Lev. 4:27., [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them)⁵⁶The text is a baraita in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err(Lev. 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull⁵⁷A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁸This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption⁵⁹Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.? The statement of a baraita⁶⁰Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed⁶¹If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..

Now Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisda, Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, both of them say, he asked him about intent regarding the Sabbath but error regarding works. Can anybody become liable intentionally⁷⁸Intentional sins can never be atoned by a sacrifice.? You superimpose the error regarding works over the intent regarding the Sabbath⁷⁹Even though he knows that it is the Sabbath and he intentionally does the work, if he does not know that this particular action is forbidden, it is an unintentional sin and creates liability for a sacrifice.. Similarly, in case of error regarding the Sabbath but intent regarding the work you superimpose the error regarding the Sabbath over the intent regarding works to hold him liable for each single occurrence. Does Rebbi Eliezer not accept one, to obligate for each one separately^26,Lev. 4:2 reads: If a person should sin inadvertently against any of the prohibitions of the Eternal and did one of these. The complicated structure of this verse is analyzed in detail in Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra II) Parshata 1, Pereq 1. The analysis of the Yerushalmi is attributed in the Babli 103b to R. Yose ben Ḥanina, mentioned at the end of the preceding Paragraph. Echoes of the discussion in Sifra are in the Babli 70a.
The questions raised about the verse are twofold. If it had simply said and did one, we would have inferred that every single infraction needs a separate sacrifice. If it had said and did these, all infractions committed in one state of inadvertence would be covered by one sacrifice. The mention of one in parallel with these creates a seeming contradiction. In addition, in each case the prefix מ “of” in standard rabbinic interpretation is read as “not all”. Then what does it mean that a single prohibition is partially violated?⁸⁰Probably the reference to these, etc., is missing since the quote of part of the baraita from Sifra is intended to refer to all its parts.? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: An adult who was abducted among Gentiles⁴¹He is now living in a society which knows no weeks. From the moment in which he realizes that he has lost track of the days of the week in one opinion he presumes that this day be Sunday and keeps his week or he presumes that it is Sabbath and continues from there. Babli 69b, the dispute is between a student and the son of Rav. is liable for each single one⁸¹For each single Sabbath..

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If he was standing in the public domain, threw, and then caught it, what⁹³Transporting something in the public domain for a distance of at least 4 cubits is a desecration of the Sabbath. Therefore, throwing something a distance of at least 4 cubits creates liability the moment the thrown object touches the ground. The question is whether there is liability if the thrower himself runs and catches the object in the air, at a distance of at least 4 cubits from where it was thrown. Babli 5a.? Is that not a Mishnah⁹⁴Mishnah 11:7. The thrower did not intend to throw it to another person or to a dog; the object was intercepted. Therefore, the original intent was not fulfilled; there is no liability. If the object was burned in flight, there is no putting down; the action is incomplete and there is no liability even if the original intent was that it should be burned in flight., “if another person caught it, a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable”? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: So it is if he snatches; therefore if he caught it he is liable⁹⁵In the question asked by R. Joḥanan one has to distinguish whether the original intent was that the object should be caught in flight, when there is liability, or whether the object was snatched in flight against the original intent, when there is no liability.. What is the difference between its coming to rest on the ground to coming to rest in his arm? There⁹⁶In the Mishnah there is liability if the object is a ball thrown from one person to another and the recipient is supposed to catch the ball., why is he liable? There he threw and another one received it but here he threw, he received it⁹⁷The Mishnah does not directly address R. Joḥanan’s problem.. Should it be obvious for him that he is not liable? Would he not be liable because of his mouth⁹⁸This refers to the explanation given earlier by R. Yudan (Note 67) which shows that receiving an object in his mouth is a valid putting down. if he threw with his right hand and received with his left? Is his mouth not like another person? Here, his left hand should be like another person⁹⁹And the legal situation depends on the original intent.. Rebbi Yudan said, it is obvious to Rebbi Joḥanan that he is liable if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. What was his problem? If he threw with his right and and received with his right hand¹⁰⁰Throwing from one hand to the other is a normal action but throwing with one hand and receiving with the same has to be classified “as if with the back of one’s hand” (Note 80) and automatically exclude liability.. The rabbis of Caesarea, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: He¹⁰¹R. Joḥanan. is in doubt whether he is liable even if he threw with his right hand and received with his left. If you want to say “his mouth⁹⁸This refers to the explanation given earlier by R. Yudan (Note 67) which shows that receiving an object in his mouth is a valid putting down.”, his mouth is like another person since he ate it; but is here his hand like another person¹⁰²Does it make any difference which hand is used since it always is the same person?? Rebbi Mana asked, if this be so, then even if he exported the volume of a dried fig in both hands he should be not liable because of one action executed by two persons¹⁰³Therefore it is not possible to distinguish between hands in these matters.! Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said to him, is that when he did it¹⁰⁴Lev. 4:27. The verse is emphatic that purification sacrifices are available only for single perpetrators acting in error: If one person of the people of the land sin in error, if he act in one of the commandments of the Eternal which is a prohibition, and be damaged.? But was it not stated: An individual who acted is liable, two or three who acted are not liable¹⁰⁵Babli 3a,5a; Sifra Wayyiqra I Parashah 7(9)..

“Neither is liable.¹³³Quote from Mishnaiot 3–4, starting the discussion of these.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Ḥizqiah, the rabbis in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In the category of two people performing one work¹⁰⁴Lev. 4:27. The verse is emphatic that purification sacrifices are available only for single perpetrators acting in error: If one person of the people of the land sin in error, if he act in one of the commandments of the Eternal which is a prohibition, and be damaged.. Rav asked Rebbi, if another person put a bundle on his back, when he forgot and brought it out¹³⁴Is this considered an incomplete action since another person lifted and put the load on him (Babli 3a).? On the occasion of the second repetition¹³⁵The Babli (3b) reports that the question was asked when Rebbi was teaching (or editing) another tractate; it was Rebbi’s practice not to answer questions which did not concern the subject he was currently concerned with. He gave the answer only when he took up Mishnah Šabbat another time. he told him, he is liable because it does not compare to this. Rebbi is of the opinion that when he started to walk it is as if he had taken up the object¹³⁶If the other person had put the load on him while he was walking, there could be no liability since the action was not that of a single person. But if the load was resting on his back, when he then started walking he started moving the object and this makes the action complete.. In the opinion of Rebbi, if he stood in the public domain and threw but ran and caught it¹³⁷If this is a question different from the one asked earlier, it must mean that “absorbed it” has to mean that his body absorbed the shock of impact of the object, not that he caught it in his hands. in a private domain, what? But is that not Rebbi since Rebbi made the airspace enclosed by walls like its essence¹³⁸Therefore automatically the action is completed and there is liability.? It is only necessary in case he stood in the private domain and threw but ran and and caught it in a public domain, what? It was found stated: Rebbi declares him not liable until the moment it comes to rest¹³⁹Public domain by definition is not enclosed by walls; an object is at rest only at the moment it stopped moving. If the object fell down because it hit his body, there was no putting down and no completed action..

MISHNAH: If they sinned before being appointed; when afterwards they were appointed, they remain commoners^1,Since at the moment of the sin they became obligated for the sacrifices, a later change of status has no influence. The difference between ecclesiastical and political offices will become clear in Mishnah 2.⁷For the purposes of this sacrifice.. Rebbi Simeon says, if it became known to them before they were appointed, they are obligated; if after they were appointed they are not liable. Who is the Prince? This is the king, as it is said⁸Lev. 4:22., if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God; a Prince who has none above him but the Eternal, his God. And who is the Anointed? This is one anointed with the anointing oil, not one clothed in multiple garb⁹Making the anointing oil was commanded personally to Moses (Ex.30:25). All High Priests up to the time of king Josiah were anointed with it. Since that time, the oil was no longer available; it cannot be reconstituted. The later High Priests were inducted into their office by investiture with the High Priest’s garments..
The only difference between the priest anointed with the anointing oil and the one clothed in multiple garb is the bull brought for all commandments¹⁰The rules about the High Priest’s purification sacrifice explained in Chapter 2 became obsolete with the destruction of the First Temple and could be restored to validity only if a dig on the Temple Mount would recover the flask containing the original oil. The High Priests of the Second Temple had the status of commoners in this respect.. And the only difference between an officiating High Priest and a deposed one is the bull of the Day of Atonement¹¹Which has to be acquired by the High Priest with his own money together with a goat (Lev. 16:3). and the tenth of an ephah¹²The personal daily offering of the High Priest, Lev. 6:12–16, of about 3.84 l of fine flour..
Both are equal in the office of the day of Atonement¹³If the acting High Priest becomes impure or otherwise incapacitated, a former High Priest can replace him without special dedication. No common priest can perform any of the prescribed acts of the Day of Atonement., commanded about the virgin¹⁴Lev. 21:13. This applies only if the High Priest marries while High Priest. If he married a widow while a common priest, he still may be elevated to High Priest., and prohibited for a widow¹⁵Lev. 21:14., and do not defile themselves for close relatives¹⁶Lev. 21:11., and may not let their hair grow¹⁷Lev. 21:10. or rend their garments¹⁸Lev. 21:10. These are forbidden as mourning rites., and let the homicide return¹⁹Num. 35:25 (where anointing is mentioned), 32 (where anointing is not mentioned)..

HALAKHAH: “If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. ²⁰The entire Halakhah is found also in Ketubot 13:2 (35d line 30 ff.) Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons²¹Ketubot Mishnah 13:2: “If somebody went overseas and another person paid for the upkeep of his wife (without a court order or a contract with the wife), Ḥanan said, that person lost his money. The High Priest’s sons disagreed with him and said, he shall swear how much he spent and collect it.”? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that nobody expects his wife to die from hunger. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel¹⁴If A has vowed that B should have nothing from him, A may pay B’s Temple tax of half a šeqel due every year. Since the money is paid to the Temple, B does not receive anything.. If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated²²Mishnah 3, a continuation of Mishnah 2 about the person to whom usufruct from another was forbidden.: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges²³“Nest” is the technical term for a couple of birds from the pigeon family, prescribed sacrifice for the person healed from genital discharge before he could enter the Temple. For a male, Lev. 15:14. For a female, Lev. 15:29., nests for childbirth²⁴Due before the mother could enter the Temple, Lev. 12:8, for the wife of a man who could not afford a sheep, Lev. 12:6., purification and reparation offerings²⁵Lev. 4:27–5:26. These sacrifices are in part burned on the altar, in part eaten by the priests; nothing is given to the offerer and his family, in contrast to well-being offerings.” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here²⁶In the case of a debt paid by the third party, the deal has to be structured so that nothing ever comes into the possession of the debtor. also, that nothing should come into his hand.

Rebbi Bun asked, if he did not know at the end, how could be bring a sacrifice⁶⁵Since any obligatory offering cannot be brought voluntarily, the fact that a sacrifice is commanded implies that the person can prove it is obligatory, i. e., he knows that a sin has been committed. Therefore the mention of ‘knowledge” in the verse cannot refer to his knowledge at the moment he offers the sacrifice.? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the end, let it refer to knowledge at the beginning⁶⁶And the mention of forgetting must be interpreted as read by R. Aqiba here and R. Ismael in the Babli sources.. They objected: Is it not written, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring⁶⁷Lev. 4:23, about the purification offering of the prince. Purification offerings are for inadvertent sins; nowhere is prior knowledge and intermediate forgetting indicated. R. Bun’s argument would force the transfer of the rules for variable sacrifices to purification ones against all tradition.? Then if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end⁶⁸A “suspended” reparation sacrifice is brought if the person suspects but is not sure that he has sinned (Lev. 5:17–18). If he then gains certainty that he has committed an inadvertent sin, a purification sacrifice is due if and only if he gains this knowledge before the next Day of Atonement. R. Bun’s argument is justified.! Explain it as referring to those who are obligated for certain purification and reparation offerings for which the Day of Atonement has passed who have to bring after the day of Atonement, while those obligated for suspended reparation sacrifices are no longer liable. The verse says, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring even after the Day of Atonement⁷⁰Yoma 8:6 (45b l. 47), Babli Keritut 25b..

From where for purification offerings? He shall slaughter it as purification offering⁵³Lev. 4:33.. From where the remainder of its actions? [He]shall make⁴⁹Deut. 16:1. The unspecific עשה always is interpreted to include all necessary actions. one as purification offering⁵⁴There is no verse exactly as quoted in the text. The reference seems to be to Lev.16:30, the Cohen shall bring one as purification offering.. But then also the burning of its parts⁵⁰Greek αἱ μοῖραι [τοῦ θεοῦ], the fat which is forbidden for human consumption.? The verse says, he shall slaughter. Since slaughter is particular in that it invalidates expiation, this excludes the burning of its parts which does not invalidate expiation.

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument⁵⁷דִּין usually introduces an informal argument de minore ad majus.? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure⁵⁸Sacrifices of the uncircumcised (e. g., a hemophiliac who may not be circumcised) or an impure person (e. g., a resident outside the Land) sent through third persons are accepted in the Temple. But any uncircumcised is excluded from the Pesaḥ(Ex.12:48) and the person who will not be pure by nightfall is excluded by the requirement that the Pesaḥ be slaughtered for the group of subscribers (Ex. 12:3–4); adding the name of a person prohibited from eating sacred food will invalidate the slaughter. This argument is somewhat circular; since the argument is rejected for other reasons, this does not have to be pointed out. does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy⁵⁹It may be eaten only by male Cohanim in the Temple precinct., would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum⁶⁰It may be eaten by every pure person within the walls of the city of the Temple.? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new⁶¹As stated in Mishnah Menaḥot 9:6, no purification offering other than that of the sufferer from skin disease needs accompanying offerings of flour and wine. The offering of flour is explicit in Lev. 14:10; that of wine is inferred in Sifra Mesoraˋ Pereq 2(10).? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new⁶²This is R. Ismael’s 12th hermeneutical principle: Anything which was in a group, but is taken from the group to be under a separate rule, cannot be returned to its original group unless the verse returns it explicitly. An example is the reparation sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease, whose blood is not for the altar but for the right thumb and right great toe of the owner, but which Lev. 14:13 declares to follow the rules of reparation sacrifices in all respects. Such a note is missing for the purification sacrifice. The Babli, Zevaḥim 8a, accepts the argument as valid.. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice⁶³Lev. 4:33. Sifra Wayyiqra II (Ḥovah)
Pereq 11(3)., and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice⁶⁴Lev. 6:18. Babli Zevaḥim 9a. Interpreted differently in Sifra Ṣaw Parašah 3(1).. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences⁶⁵Since the flour offering does not accompany the purification offering of the sufferer from skin disease but his elevation offering (14:20), the attribution of the wine offering to the purification offering is an inference of the oral tradition which cannot override Lev. 6:18..

[It is written]¹⁰¹From B, missing in L.: If the Prince sin.¹⁰²Lev. 4:22. The sermon is mentioned in the Babli 10, Tosephta Bava qamma 7:5, Sifra Hova (Wayyiqra II) Parašah 5(1). It is standard homiletics to derive the conjunction אֲשֶׁר from the root אשר “to be fortunate.” Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, fortunate [is the generation]¹⁰¹From B, missing in L. whose Prince brings a purification sacrifice. He brings it for his inadvertent sin, not so much more for his intentional one¹⁰³There is no formal atonement for intentional sin. If the Prince is aware of his unintentional missteps, he will be careful to avoid intentional ones.? If its Prince brings, not so much more the commoner?

“The Prince.” I could think a tribal chieftain like Naḥshon; the verse says, “if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God⁸Lev. 4:22.; and further it says, that he may learn to fear the Eternal, his God¹⁰⁴Deut. 17:19. This is justification for the short statement in the Mishnah. Babli 11a/b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra II) Parašah5(1).. “His God, [his God]” for an equal cut. Since “his God” mentioned there refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal]¹⁰¹From B, missing in L. his God, so also “his God” mentioned here refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal]¹⁰¹From B, missing in L. his God⁹⁵The argument is the same as in the case of three pieces discussed earlier; one constructs a case for five only because for R. Joḥanan in the case of three only one animal was needed. One could have done with four pieces.
For R. Joḥanan, the validity of the dedication of the first animal can be extended to cover all five pieces. The other four animals cannot be used, but dedicated animals cannot become undedicated. They are sent to graze until they either develop a defect which makes them unfit for the altar or they exceed the age limit for sacrificial animals (Mishnah Parah 1:1) when they can be sold and the money used for voluntary elevation offerings..

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable⁹⁸Since anything written in the Torah is public knowledge and nobody would listen to them.. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable⁹⁹In rabbinic medical theory, the minimum time which must elapse between one menstrual period and the next is the seven days of the niddah(Lev.15:19) followed by another 11 days. If a woman has a discharge on one of these 11 days, she is not classified as niddah but as zavah, whose rules are spelled out in Lev.15:25–30. Since the verse speaks of a discharge of many days, it is concluded that the full rules of zavah only apply after 3 days. For the first and second discharges in that 11 day period, the woman is called “watching one day to the next day”. For a day she is under the rules of niddah(Lev. 15:25) and therefore forbidden to her husband. But since the verse uses the expression all the days of the flow of her impurity shall be like the days of her menstruation, one could think that she is impure only during the day and not during the following night, or that a discharge during the night does not make her impure. This is clearly a matter of rabbinic interpretation.; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable¹⁰⁰The pentateuchal root of the prohibition to carry from a private to the public domain is Ex. 16:29, nobody should go out from his place, which is explained in Jer. 17:22 by do not move a load from your houses. Since as a matter of principle prophetic utterances should not be used as legal texts, the ruling of the Court could not be dismissed out of hand.; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable¹⁰¹This is more difficult to understand since Deut. 17:3 clearly defines prostrating oneself in idolatry as a capital crime. Therefore, one has to agree with Maimonides’s Commentary that the Court changed the definition of “prostration”, e. g., ruling that kneeling down, bowing the head to the ground, is not punishable as long as one does not lie on the ground with outstretched hands and feet.; these are liable for it is said¹⁰²Lev. 4:13. Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah4(7–8). something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

MISHNAH: Also he⁴⁵The person who made a vow that the other shall have no profit from him. Heave and tithes diminish the farmer’s wealth; they do not increase it. can separate his heave and tithes with the other’s knowledge, and can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges²³“Nest” is the technical term for a couple of birds from the pigeon family, prescribed sacrifice for the person healed from genital discharge before he could enter the Temple. For a male, Lev. 15:14. For a female, Lev. 15:29., nests for childbirth²⁴Due before the mother could enter the Temple, Lev. 12:8, for the wife of a man who could not afford a sheep, Lev. 12:6., purification and reparation offerings²⁵Lev. 4:27–5:26. These sacrifices are in part burned on the altar, in part eaten by the priests; nothing is given to the offerer and his family, in contrast to well-being offerings. and teach him interpretations⁴⁶Rabbinic interpretations of biblical verses, of the kind preserved in the Mekhiltot, Sifra, and Sifry., religious rules, and sermons⁴⁷As the Halakhah explains, in imitation of Moses who taught the Children of Israel without taking money, one may not take money for teaching the Oral Law. (In rabbinic practice, one may take money for teaching during regular business hours to make up for the loss incurred by not being in business at that time.); but he may not teach him Bible; he may teach Bible to his sons and daughters⁴⁸Since Moses wrote the Torah only at the end of his life, he never taught it. Therefore, one may take money to teach to read, sing, and understand the biblical text. This anonymous Mishnah proves that practice should not follow R. Eliezer in Mishnah Soṭah 3:4, Note 85.. Also, he can feed his wife and children⁴⁹If they are needy, since charity is a universal obligation. even though the other is obligated for their upkeep. But he cannot feed his animals⁵⁰Since this would increase the animal’s worth; i. e., the other man’s property., whether pure or impure; Rebbi Eliezer says, he may feed his impure⁵¹Those which cannot be eaten. animals but not the pure ones. They asked him, what is the difference between pure and impure animals? He said to them, the pure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his⁵²As food., but the impure’s soul and body is Heaven’s. They said to him, also the impure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his, since he could sell it to Gentiles⁵³Who may eat any kind of animal; Gen. 9:3. or feed it to the dogs.

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, “of a subject,” not the entire subject. Rebbi Hila said, “of the commandments”, not entire commandments¹⁰³In Lev. 4:13, R. Hizqiah reads דָּבָר וְנֶעֱלַם as וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר, presupposing a script which does not differentiate between regular and final mem. R. Hila’s comment is really unnecessary since מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת already means “of any commandments” but not entire commandments. In all situations, prefix mem is read as partitive, some but not all; cf. Nazir 5:4 Note 105.. ¹⁰⁴The following text also is found in Sotah 5:1, explained in Notes 8–10, Nazir5:1 Note 56. Is that written? As Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from the beginning of the paragraph to its end. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. You have to pour oil on it, it is a flour offering, to include all flour offerings for pouring¹⁰⁵Sifra Wayyiqra 1 Pereq 12 on Lev.2:6. The ms. text follows the argument of Sifra while B reproduces the text of Sotah and Nazir. The argument of Sifra has no connection with the theories of RR. Johanan and Jeremiah; it is a straightforward reading of the verse. Since it is stated that one has to pour oil on the bread crumbs because it is a flour-offering, it follows that a flour-offering requires pouring oil over it unless it be explicitly excluded as in the purification offering of v. 5:11..

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..

HALAKHAH: When she was doing it⁴⁹Lev. 4:27, establishing the qualifications for a purification offering. The feminine refers to נֶפֶשׁ “a person”. The singular both of verb and suffix shows that the verse refers to a single person and a single action. Babli 93a; cf. Horaiot 1:1 Note 8, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra II) Parashah 7(4,9).
The paragraph refers to Mishnah 6 which frees from liability two or more people engaged in transporting on the Sabbath.. The individual who did it is liable; two or three who were doing it are not liable. Rebbi Joshua the Southerner said before Rebbi (Yasa) [Yose]⁵⁰Since R. Joshua the Southerner was a contemporary of R. Yose, two generations after R. Yasa, the reading of A in [brackets] has to be accepted. in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: A weaver’s beam, Rebbi declares not liable, but Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, he is liable⁵¹Cf. Babli 93b, where this tradition is rejected at the end. The weaver’s beam usually is operated by a single person; what is the situation if it was carried into the public domain by two people? It can be carried by one person; by the criterion of Mishnah 5 there should be no liability. But since the beam is large, it is inconvenient to be carried by one person; there is an argument to be made that there is liability.
The spelling of A is correct in normative grammar.. Rebbi said to him, so I heard from your father. He answered him, I served my father standing more than you served him sitting. But was Rebbi the student of Rebbi Simeon (bar) [ben] Yoḥai⁵²In the Leiden ms., this sentence is a corrector’s addition. The spelling “bar Yoḥai” is a clear Babylonism; the reading of A in [brackets] is preferable.? Was he not the student of Rebbi Jacob bar (Qodshai) [Qorshai]⁵³Probably the reading of the ms. in (parentheses) is preferable. In Pesaḥim 10:1 (37b line l. 62) the scribe first wrote קורשיי but then corrected it to קודשיי. In the Babli, Horaiot 13b, the early prints and the Munich ms. read קדשי (cf. Diqduqe Soferim,Abodah sarah etc. Horaiot p. כג, Note ח֜.)
R. Eleazar ben R. Simeon indicates that from the incidental remarks of his father he learned more than Rebbi did in his formal studies.? But so he must have said to him, He answered him, I served my father standing more than you served your teacher sitting. When Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon came to the house of assembly, Rebbi’s face darkened⁵⁴Because R. Eleazar ben R. Simeon always tried to prove him wrong.. His father told him, it is correct so, for he is a lion son of a lion, but you are a lion son of a jackal⁵⁵Babli Bava meṣi aˋ 84b.. When (Rebbi Eleazar) [he]⁵⁶The reading of A in [brackets] is preferable. died, Rebbi sent to ask his wife in marriage. She said to him, a vessel which was used in holiness should be used in a profane way?

It is difficult for Bar Qappara. Setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah; they are all for a need, itself not for a need¹⁵⁹As explained later, the question is asked why setting a fire is singled out in Ex.35:3 as forbidden on the Sabbath since all work is forbidden. One opinion is that it was mentioned to indicate that doing each category of work is a separate offense on the Sabbath. The other opinion is that setting a fire on the Sabbath is no capital crime since no punishment is indicated in Chapter 35. It is clear that Bar Qappara cannot hold the first opinion since he holds that setting a fire is criminal even for no purpose while he must agree that for all (or most) other categories a purpose is needed.? Rebbi Yose said, if (Rebbi Eleazar)¹⁶⁰The scribe wrote “R. Lazar”, the corrector crossed it out because he was of the opinion that this name is an intrusion here, referring to the Amora R. Eleazar the student and frequent opponent of R. Joḥanan. But in this paragraph “R. Lazar” means the Tanna R. Eleazar the Qappar, i. e., Bar Qappara. The proof is that later a baraita is quoted in his name and also in a disagreement with R. Joḥanan he is mentioned first, having precedence in time. would think with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, setting fire taught about all work [mentioned] in the Torah. Rebbi Eleazar said, setting fire taught about itself¹⁶¹In the wording of the Babli 70a in the name of the Tanna R. Yose, “setting fire is a separate prohibition”. Yebamot 6b,33b; Sanhedrin 35b,62a; Keritut 20b.. Does Rebbi Eleazar not have about one¹⁶²Lev. 4:2: A person who sins inadvertently about any of the commandments of the Eternal that should not be done, but he did one of these. If one stresses the “one” one infers that each single offense requires its own purification sacrifice. If one stresses “these” it follows that one sacrifice atones for multiple infractions. The harmonization of both approaches is a topic for Chapter 7; Sifra Ḥovah (Wayyiqra II) Pereq 1(7).
Naḥmanides reads אחרת instead of אחת, “does he not have another (reason)”? The reading of the ms. is preferable. to make him liable for each single one? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, of these, to make him liable once for all of them. We understand setting fire. A wound? Its main point¹⁶³The actions forbidden on the Sabbath are codified in 39 categories. The heading of the category is called its main point, אָב מְלָאכָה “father of action”, anything else subsumed under the same category is תּוֹלְדָה “born from it”, derivative.
To build the Tabernacle one needed the skins of red goats and of taḥaš. Therefore slaughter of these animals was part of the building activity and defines a category of work forbidden on the Sabbath. for a need, itself not for a need? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree. One said, slaughter is the main point and a wound derivative; the other one switches¹⁶⁴Cf. Chapter 7, Note 422..

HALAKHAH: 6. When she was doing it⁷⁵Lev. 4:27. This paragraph is from Chapter 10, Note 49.. The individual who did it is liable; two or three who were doing it are not liable. Rav Ḥuna said, if one was healthy and one weak. If the sick person locked completely⁷⁶This refers to Mishnah 6. A deer ran into a house, the healthy person closed the door but did not lock it. The sick person locked the door; he is liable even if he could not have closed the door by himself since the healthy person stopped before he incurred liability. but the healthy one incompletely, the sick one is liable but the healthy one is not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥuna: If a deer was running normally and he intended to lock the door for himself and he locked for himself and the deer, it is permitted⁷⁷If the deer was not chased and the person did not intend to catch it, the catch was unintentional and cannot be sanctioned.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥuna: If he saw a child gurgling in a river⁷⁸The child was drowning. It is an obligation for the onlooker to save him; anything he does in saving the baby is privileged. The Babli, Yoma 84b, approves of catching the fish but not of intending to catch them. and he intended to bring him up together with a school of fish, it is permitted. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥuna: If he was digging in a pile⁷⁹The pile is the rubble from a collapsed house. There might be people buried under it alive. This is the same situation as the one described in the preceding case. and was intending to bring him⁸⁰A person buried under the collapsed house. up together with a hoard of gold coins, it is permitted.

Rebbi Zeriqan said that Rebbi Zeˋira asked: If bulls and he-goats to be burned became impure, may they be burned according to their rules¹⁰⁸If the carcasses are pure, then they have to be burned on the Day of Atonement by biblical decree, Lev. 16:27, and by practice of the Temple service at a place different from that where disabled sacrifices are usually burned (Mishnah Zevaḥim 12:5). If in impurity they follow the rules of disabled sacrifices, they can be burned only in the following night and at a different place.? What is his problem? If they became impure before the blood was poured, but if they became impure after the blood was poured¹⁰⁹Then the sacrifice is valid and does not have to be repeated even if some subsequent action would have been required which now becomes impossible. I am applying to it, at its appointed time¹¹⁰Num. 9, 2 28:2. Sifry Num. 65, 142; Mekhilta Ba 5 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 17), Tosephta Pisha 4:14; Pesaḥim 6:1 Notes 9, 10, Babli Pesaḥim 66a., even on the Sabbath, at its appointed time, even in impurity. [Rebbi Yose said, there where it is written at its appointed time; you do not infer anything from it¹¹¹Since in Lev. 16 neither the expression “at its appointed time” nor an equivalent is mentioned, the argument simply does not apply in our case..]¹¹²Addition of the corrector, in good Yerushalmi language. The addition is necessary to understand R. Mana’s remark and must have been taken from a manuscript source. Rebbi Mana said, does not Rebbi Yose refrain from applying it here? He applies it to the bull of the Anointed and the Congregation¹¹³Lev. 4:1–21. Since these sacrifices can only be brought on a weekday, the only problem is that of the place of burning as given in Mishnah Zevaḥim 12:5. He will accept that they not be burned on the appointed place only if they become invalid by a cause other than impurity. {he said to him}¹¹⁴It seems that this has to be deleted..

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Eleazar asked: If bulls and he-goats to be burned were taken out and brought back¹¹⁸Since it was established in the previous paragraph that the carcasses are the cause of severe impurity by biblical decree once the majority of the limbs was removed from the Temple precinct, the question necessarily refers to single limbs which do not constitute a majority of the carcass. The question is different in the Babli, Zevaḥim105a.? It is obvious for us that in returning they do not make garments impure¹¹⁹A limb even partially taken out of the sacred precinct becomes disqualified. Even if a person other than the carrier who touches a limb while it is taken back may become impure in his person, the impurity does not extend to his clothing since the biblical conditions for this are not satisfied.. What our problem is, do they make garments impure from the moment they started to be brought out¹²⁰As will be seen, the question is about people other than the carriers of the carcass or its limbs. If the carcass was partially taken out but then returned, and a third party touched the body, do his garments become impure?? Rebbi Abba objected, did we not state¹²¹Mishnah Zevaḥim 12:6.: “They were carrying them on yokes. If the front carriers left the walls of the Temple courtyard while the back carriers did not yet leave, the front carriers make garments impure while the back carriers do not make garments impure until they also leave. After they left, these and those make garments impure.” Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, there is a difference, for it is written, then he shall take out¹²²Lev. 4:12, about the purification sacrifice of the anointed priest., until he completely leave the domain from which it is taken out¹²³The carriers become impure the moment they are completely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, but the carcass becomes a source of severe impurity for any who touch it only after it was completely taken out of the sacred domain. The carriers become impure even if they never come in contact with the carcass. The wooden bars on which the carcass is carried do not transmit impurity by touch; the impurity of the carriers is induced by the motion of the carcass, not by contact..

¹⁸⁵Sifra Wayyiqra II (Ḥovah) Parashah 3(12); Babli 52a.“And all blood of the bull he shall pour¹⁸⁶Lev. 4:7., to include the blood of the bull of the Day of Atonement in pouring.” And why did he not say, “and the he-goat”? Rebbi Mana said, is it not required to be mixed¹⁸⁷If the bull’s blood has to be poured on the base of the large altar, the pouring of the he-goat’s blood is an automatic consequence and does not have to be spelled out as a separate commandment. Cf. Chapter 1, Note 200.? You conclude in saying, and all blood of the bull he shall pour, to include the blood of the bull and the he-goat of the Day of Atonement in pouring.

¹⁴⁸Bulls and he-goats to be burned.And he who burns¹⁴⁹Lev. 16:28.. Not the one who starts the fire, and not the one who prepares the stake. Who is he who burns? That is the one who helps during the burning. [Rebbi Yose said, this implies that the one who helps during the burning]¹⁵⁰Corrector’s addition. makes his garments impure. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One who turns over an olive-sized piece¹⁵¹Less than this amount is not considered “consumed”. makes his garments impure. The problem is only one who stands inside¹⁵²The Temple domain, or possibly the city of Jerusalem. and in his hand is a beam with which he turns over an olive-sized piece, [what is the rule]¹⁵³Unnecessary corrector’s addition.? Let us hear from the following: And he shall take out, and he shall burn¹⁵⁴Lev. 4:12, about the Anointed Priest’s bull.. Since one who takes out, only after he took to the outside, also he who burns only if he burns outside¹⁵⁵Since the two expressions are written in the same verse.. There¹⁵⁶About burning the carcass of the Red Cow. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be impure until the evening¹⁵⁷Num. 19:7.; to include him who burns¹⁵⁸Even though the verse speaks only of the Cohen who directs the ceremony, all his helpers are included.. Here it is the same¹⁵⁹About bulls and he-goats to be burned; Sifry Num. 124..

MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat⁹⁴Lev. 4:28,32., the Prince a he-goat⁹⁵Lev. 4:23, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull⁹⁶Cf. Mishnaiot 1:6, 2:1.. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice⁹⁷Num. 15:22–25..
For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable⁹⁸Mishnah 5.. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable⁹⁹The reparation sacrifices for robberies or defrauding (Lev. 5:20–26), larceny of sancta(Lev. 5:14–16), the semi-manumitted slave girl (Lev. 19:20–22), the nazir(Num. 6:12), and the healed sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:1–32). Since no extirpation is involved, the Court is not liable for a sacrifice in case they rule wrongly in one of these matters.. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable¹⁰⁰Mishnah 6. but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon⁸⁴He is not mentioned in our Mishnah text, but Mishnah 8 states that the High Priest is exempt according to everybody; only for the king does R. Aqiba disagree; Babli 9a. According to Tosephta 1:10, the king is exempted only for disregarding a request for testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (since his diadem is a permanent atonement for imperfect sacrifices, Ex. 28:38.)
The High Priest is required (Lev.21:10) to be the richest priest; if he is not, the other priests have to make him so. R. Joseph David Sinzheim (Yad David on Horaiot) notes that the High Priest had the choice always to officiate at the burning of incense. Any other priest was given only a once in a lifetime occasion for this (Mishnah Yoma 2:4) since presenting the incense made the presenter rich (explicit in the Babli, implicit in the Yerushalmi, Yoma Halakhah 2:4, 40a 12). The king naturally has taxing powers.
Since king and High Priest are never able to bring a sacrifice according to the rules of the poor (Lev. 5:7–10) or the very poor (vv. 11–13), they are prohibited from ever bringing a sacrifice depending on the offerer’s wealth.. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat¹⁰¹This is qualified in the Halakhah..

MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat⁹⁴Lev. 4:28,32., the Prince a he-goat⁹⁵Lev. 4:23, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull⁹⁶Cf. Mishnaiot 1:6, 2:1.. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice⁹⁷Num. 15:22–25..
For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable⁹⁸Mishnah 5.. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable⁹⁹The reparation sacrifices for robberies or defrauding (Lev. 5:20–26), larceny of sancta(Lev. 5:14–16), the semi-manumitted slave girl (Lev. 19:20–22), the nazir(Num. 6:12), and the healed sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:1–32). Since no extirpation is involved, the Court is not liable for a sacrifice in case they rule wrongly in one of these matters.. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable¹⁰⁰Mishnah 6. but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon⁸⁴He is not mentioned in our Mishnah text, but Mishnah 8 states that the High Priest is exempt according to everybody; only for the king does R. Aqiba disagree; Babli 9a. According to Tosephta 1:10, the king is exempted only for disregarding a request for testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (since his diadem is a permanent atonement for imperfect sacrifices, Ex. 28:38.)
The High Priest is required (Lev.21:10) to be the richest priest; if he is not, the other priests have to make him so. R. Joseph David Sinzheim (Yad David on Horaiot) notes that the High Priest had the choice always to officiate at the burning of incense. Any other priest was given only a once in a lifetime occasion for this (Mishnah Yoma 2:4) since presenting the incense made the presenter rich (explicit in the Babli, implicit in the Yerushalmi, Yoma Halakhah 2:4, 40a 12). The king naturally has taxing powers.
Since king and High Priest are never able to bring a sacrifice according to the rules of the poor (Lev. 5:7–10) or the very poor (vv. 11–13), they are prohibited from ever bringing a sacrifice depending on the offerer’s wealth.. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat¹⁰¹This is qualified in the Halakhah..

MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat⁹⁴Lev. 4:28,32., the Prince a he-goat⁹⁵Lev. 4:23, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull⁹⁶Cf. Mishnaiot 1:6, 2:1.. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice⁹⁷Num. 15:22–25..
For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable⁹⁸Mishnah 5.. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable⁹⁹The reparation sacrifices for robberies or defrauding (Lev. 5:20–26), larceny of sancta(Lev. 5:14–16), the semi-manumitted slave girl (Lev. 19:20–22), the nazir(Num. 6:12), and the healed sufferer from skin disease (Lev. 14:1–32). Since no extirpation is involved, the Court is not liable for a sacrifice in case they rule wrongly in one of these matters.. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable¹⁰⁰Mishnah 6. but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon⁸⁴He is not mentioned in our Mishnah text, but Mishnah 8 states that the High Priest is exempt according to everybody; only for the king does R. Aqiba disagree; Babli 9a. According to Tosephta 1:10, the king is exempted only for disregarding a request for testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (since his diadem is a permanent atonement for imperfect sacrifices, Ex. 28:38.)
The High Priest is required (Lev.21:10) to be the richest priest; if he is not, the other priests have to make him so. R. Joseph David Sinzheim (Yad David on Horaiot) notes that the High Priest had the choice always to officiate at the burning of incense. Any other priest was given only a once in a lifetime occasion for this (Mishnah Yoma 2:4) since presenting the incense made the presenter rich (explicit in the Babli, implicit in the Yerushalmi, Yoma Halakhah 2:4, 40a 12). The king naturally has taxing powers.
Since king and High Priest are never able to bring a sacrifice according to the rules of the poor (Lev. 5:7–10) or the very poor (vv. 11–13), they are prohibited from ever bringing a sacrifice depending on the offerer’s wealth.. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat¹⁰¹This is qualified in the Halakhah..

MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes¹⁵⁸The tribal High Court. ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah¹⁵⁹Since he holds that the expression קָהָל refers to each of the tribes.. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation¹⁶⁰Lev. 4:13. The verse is misquoted; the masoretic text reads הַקָּהָל “the public” instead of הָעֵדָה “the congregation”, supporting R. Jehudah. In most Mishnah sources, only the first clause of the verse is copied., not the congregation of that tribe.

HALAKHAH: "If the Court of one of the tribes ruled," etc. ¹⁶⁴The Halakhah does not refer to Mishnah 8 but to Mishnaiot 6-7, to explain why R. Meïr requires only one bull, R. Jehudah 12, and R. Simeon 13.Rebbi Meïr says, it is the Court's obligation. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the public's obligation. Rebbi Simeon said, it is an obligation of the Court and an obligation of the public. What is Rebbi Meïr's reason? It is said here from the eyes¹⁶⁵Lev. 4:13., and it is said there from the eyes¹⁶⁶Num. 15:24.. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, here it also refers to the Court¹⁶⁷ This argument is difficult to explain. In Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Parasah 4(2), the expression עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל used in Lev. 4:13 is explained as referring to the High Court, the selected group from Israel, based on v. 15 which makes it clear that the bull has to be presented by the Elders, the members of the High Court. Then R. Meïr's argument is to infer from Lev. 4:13 to Num. 15:24: Since the bull is the responsibility of the Court, the goat for idolatry also must be the responsibility of the Court. . What is Rebbi Jehudah's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public¹⁶⁸His argument is straightforward. Since the entire paragraph Num. 15:22-26 speaks only about עֵדָה, without any mention of the Elders, it is addressed to the public. Then the use of parallel terms is taken to transfer the setting to Lev. 4: 13.. What is Rebbi Simeon's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, also from the eyes here refers to the Court. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public¹⁶⁹He accepts arguing both from Lev. 4: 13 to Num. 15:24 and vice versa.. For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to bring¹⁷⁰They have to pay for the bull from their own money and present it in the Temple. . For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who brings¹⁷¹Who has to pay and who has to officiate?? As we have stated¹⁷²One imposes a tax and collects from everybody. In all other sources, Babli 3b, Menahot 52a; Tosephta Seqalim 2:6, the argument is between R. Jehudah and R. Simeon. This is the reasonable reading since for R. Meïr the Court pays from their own means., "one imposes and collects, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, they are brought from the Temple tax". For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to lay their hands on. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who lays their hands on¹⁷³Since obviously not every single Israelite can be called to lay his hands on the bull.? As we have stated, three from every tribe, ¹⁷⁴This follows R. Simeon in Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq 6(2); R. Jehudah requires five. led by the president of the Court, lay their hands on the head of the bull. "Their hands, the hands of each single one. Their hands on the head of the bull; the bull needs laying on of hands but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon said, the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders; for Rebbi Simeon says, every public purification offering whose blood is brought inside¹⁷⁵The only sacrifices whose blood is brought inside the sanctuary to be sprinkled on the incense altar are the purification offerings of the High Priest and the Community as well as the offerings of the Day of Atonement. The body of any such sacrifice must be burned outside the holy precinct (Lev. 6:23,16:27). needs laying on of hands. ¹⁷⁶Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq 6(3); Tosephta Menahot 10:9; Babli Menahot 92a." One objected to Rebbi Jehudah, is it not written, they presented the goats of the purification offering¹⁷⁷ 2Chr. 29:23. As usual, the argument is from the part of the verse which was not quoted: they presented the goats of the purification offering before the king and the public; they laid their hands on them. The goats were offered by Josiah to atone for the idolatry of his father Ahas.? Rebbi Hiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling¹⁷⁸A temporary deviation from Torah norms acceptable by prophetic instruction as long as it does not violate prohibitions. The absence of a bull and the presence of multiple goats both deviate from Torah prescriptions..

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon⁵²¹Tosephta Zevaḥim13:15. The only sacrifices authorized on a public altar are those fixed beforehand, not depending on circumstances. In the Tosephta, the statement is attributed to R. Jehudah. But since the following text starts with “in addition, R. Simeon says …”, the prior text must be R. Simeon’s (Note of Pene Moshe.): “The community only brings what Scripture fixed for it.” Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that since when Second Tithe was introduced it was not interrupted⁵²²This statement does not belong here, it was copied from Halakhah 14. Second Tithe is the farmer’s property to be consumed in purity “before the Eternal” (Deut. 14:23). When the Tent was at Nob, the altar at Gibeon, and the Ark at Qiryat Yearim, it is difficult to see where “before the Eternal” was. He posits that the duty of Second Tithe was in force in the interval between Siloh and Solomon’s Temple.. What is between them⁵²³R. Simeon and the majority who permit on the public altar anything sacrificed in the desert.? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, the bull of hidden things⁵²⁴Lev. 4:13–21, the purification offering for erroneous acts of the community. is between them. Rebbi Yose says, voluntary offerings of the community are between them. It was stated, both men and women⁵²⁵May sacrifice on a private altar.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no woman here, “man” is written in the paragraph⁵²⁶Deut. 12:8.. It was stated, also a nazir’s sacrifices⁵²⁷May be brought on a private altar. Babli Temurah 14b.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are no nazir’s sacrifices here; nazir’s sacrifices are an obligation. It was stated, also libations⁵²⁸As detailed in Num. 15:1–16, required for the sacrifices authorized on private altars. Babli Zevaḥim 111a.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he who states “libations” does not hold with Rebbi, as it was stated, Rebbi says, I am saying that also after Israel entered the Land, libations only are brought inside⁵²⁹At the altar standing in a sanctified enclosure of the Tabernacle.. What is the reason? In the Sanctuary pour alcoholic libations to the Eternal⁵³⁰Num. 28:7.. A prohibition is written only for inside; from where for the outside? Let us hear from the following. From where that one who slaughters as Pesah for an individual on a private altar or the public altar in a time where altars are forbidden, that he transgresses a prohibition? The verse says, you may not slaughter the Pesaḥ at one⁵³¹Deut. 16:6, read as: only at one place for all of Israel.. He is punished with extirpation and you are saying so⁵³²Since the sacrifice as described is one at an unauthorized place and this is punished by extirpation (Lev. 17:4), whereas the verse quoted treats this as a simple misdemeanor.? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is about one who slaughters in the afternoon not for its name⁵³³Which disqualifies the sacrifice from fulfilling any obligation; Mishnah Zevaḥim 1:1. in a time when altars are permitted. Then why does he say, in a time when altars are forbidden? In a time when his altar is forbidden⁵³⁴Since Pesaḥ may not be brought on a private altar and is a modified well-being offering, a private altar on the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan is disqualified for any kind of well-being offering.. Why not for its name? That you should not say, it is well-being offering⁵³⁵An animal vowed for Pesaḥ but not used for this purpose automatically is dedicated as well-being offering. and qualified. In addition, from the following: I could think that if he slaughtered it in the afternoon it should be qualified. Why do you have (in the afternoon it should be qualified) [in the morning it should be disqualified]⁵³⁶The corrector’s text is to be deleted.? No. It is not for its name⁵³³Which disqualifies the sacrifice from fulfilling any obligation; Mishnah Zevaḥim 1:1.. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that well-being sacrifices brought because of Pesaḥ⁵³⁶The corrector’s text is to be deleted. are qualified on an altar. Would an elevation offering be brought because of a reparation sacrifice be qualified on an altar according to Rebbi Eleazar? Let us hear from the following: “This is the principle: Anything which can be vowed or donated²²³Dedications of animals as Temple sacrifices. is sacrificed on a private altar; but nothing which cannot be vowed or donated is sacrificed on a private altar.”

Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? ²¹⁹A very shortened version is in Horaiot 2:4; much more truncated in Babli Horaiot 8a. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard²²⁰All incest prohibitions (including adultery) promulgated under one heading, as one set, in Lev. Chapter 18 are punishable by divine extirpation as made clear in Chapter 20. The verses about the connection between the father’s wife and the bastard are in Deut. 23. The father’s wife represents a single element of the set of incest prohibitions. Deut. 23 has no penalties spelled out. It is presumed that the penalty common to all sins mentioned in Lev. 18 is also understood in Deut.23. Cf. Chapter 11, Note 63.. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here²²¹The topic of Horaiot 2:4, for which transgressions a purification sacrifice is due, viz., those under penalty of divine extirpation. [Simple transgressions are expiated either by the punishment imposed by the court or by sincere repentance and the Day of Atonement (Mishnah Yoma 8:7)]. he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,²²²Lev. 4:2, the introduction to the laws of the purifying sacrifice: “If a person sins inadvertently against any of the Eternal’s commandments about what should not be done, but he did one of these.” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things²²³Forbidden in Lev. 11; these are simple prohibitions, at most punishable by whipping.. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes²²⁴“Here” is the purification offering of the congregation due (Lev. 4:13) “if the entire congregation of Israel errs and something is hidden from the eyes of the community and they do one of the actions which by the commandments of the Eternal should not be done, and they do damage.” This is part of a series of 5 different statements on purification offerings. “There” is the isolated statement about the particular purification offering due for the sin of apostasy (i. e., idolatry, Num. 15:22–28). Num. 15:24 reads: “If from the eyes of the congregation it was done in error.” By the hermeneutic rule of גזירה שוה “equal cut”, parallel expressions imply parallel meanings.” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case²²⁵Idolatry. involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation²²⁶The only penalty mentioned is extirpation in Num. 15:30 for the blasphemer and idolator, offenses which at other places are classified as capital crimes.. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice²²⁷Since for idolatry the sacrifices are different from those for all other sins, it is necessary to treat this separately.. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.