Talmud su Levitico 5:78

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony¹Lev. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment. applies to men but not to women²Since women are not admitted as formal witnesses in court, the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them., to unrelated persons but not to relatives³Since relatives are barred from appearing as witnesses in court, the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them., to qualified but not to disqualified ones⁴Felons are not permitted to appear as witnesses in court; the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them.; it applies only to those admitted to testify⁵Even if their disability only is a rabbinic tradition they will not be heard and the rule of an oath of testimony cannot apply to them., in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court⁶Since testimony is used only in court, a refusal to testify outside of court is irrelevant and cannot trigger liability..
They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one²⁷If he swore falsely that he did not know testimony but did not know that this makes him liable for a sacrifice., and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally²⁸If honestly he was erroneously thinking that he did not know testimony.. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds¹Lev. 5:4 requires a reparation sacrifice for inadvertent breach of a commitment made by oath, “what was pronounced, negatively or positively.” The standard example of a positive oath is somebody swearing that he will eat certain foods. The corresponding negative is an oath that he will refrain from eating certain foods. The exact expression used, לְהָרַ֣ע ׀ א֣וֹ לְהֵיטִ֗יב, by its hiph`il form points to the future. A natural complement are backward looking oaths, if a person swears that he ate or did not eat certain foods in the past (Mishnah 3:1). These four cases are equal in sanctions for willful or inadvertent breach.. There are two kinds of awareness of impurity which are four kinds²Lev. 5:2–3 requires a reparation sacrifice for a person who became impure, forgot it, and then either ate sancta in his impurity or entered the Sanctuary. The two added cases are that he knew about being impure but forgot that the food was holy or that the place was a Sanctuary.. There are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds³It is forbidden to transport anything on the Sabbath from a private domain to the public domain (Mishnah Šabbat 1:1). “Transport” includes lifting up, moving, and setting down. The two cases where one is liable (for a sacrifice if the sin was unintentional, punishment if the transgression was intentional, and is prosecutable, or extirpation by Divine decree if the crime was intentional but is not prosecutable) are “export” by a person standing inside the private domain, lifting something up inside the domain and putting it down on the outside (e. g., through a window) even without moving his feet, or “import”, somebody lifting an object from the outside to the inside and depositing it there. The two cases where one is not liable refer to a person inside who lifts an object, hands it to a person outside (so that the object never is at rest) and the second person puts it down. Since no one person completed a criminal act, no one can be held liable even though the combined action clearly is forbidden.. There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds⁴Lev. 13:2 defines impure skin disease as שְׂאֵ֤ת אֽוֹ־סַפַּ֨חַת֙ א֣וֹ בַהֶ֔רֶת “as elevated spot, or sapaḥat, or a white spot.” This is read as “an elevated spot (which makes the surrounding skin look elevated over the whitish spot) and a really white spot and their appendages”, deriving sapaḥat from the root ספח, “to append, adjoin.” This extends the definition of impure skin disease from two relatively well defined cases to two additional weaker symptoms..

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth¹In this respect the oath about money matters is equal to the rules of a blurted oath (Mishnah 3:11–12), not to the oath of testimony. All restrictions about women, relatives, and disqualified persons, refer only to witnesses and judges, not to parties in adversary proceedings.. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter²The sacrifice prescribed in Lev. 5:25 (in addition to restitution of 125% of the amount embezzled) is due if the false oath was intentional, or if the oath was in error but the embezzling was intentional; it is not due if the oath was factually false because the maker of the oath did not realize that he had the deposit, or forgot about it. The Babli (but not Maimonides) reads the last word as שִׁגְגָתָהּ referring to the oath; he is not liable if he was ignorant of the fact that false oaths are forbidden and that they trigger liability for a sacrifice.. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim³Lev. 5:25 prescribes a reparation offering “in its value”; the value defined in 5:15 as “Šeqalim”. An indeterminate plural always means 2 (Chapter 4, Note 8). The biblical Šeqel is the traditional “King’s weight” of about 12g silver, about equal to the tetradrachma of the early Principate, and double the rabbinic Šeqel of two zuz (cf. Qiddušin 1:1, Note 122.) Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 13(14)..

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds¹Lev. 5:4 requires a reparation sacrifice for inadvertent breach of a commitment made by oath, “what was pronounced, negatively or positively.” The standard example of a positive oath is somebody swearing that he will eat certain foods. The corresponding negative is an oath that he will refrain from eating certain foods. The exact expression used, לְהָרַ֣ע ׀ א֣וֹ לְהֵיטִ֗יב, by its hiph`il form points to the future. A natural complement are backward looking oaths, if a person swears that he ate or did not eat certain foods in the past (Mishnah 3:1). These four cases are equal in sanctions for willful or inadvertent breach.. There are two kinds of awareness of impurity which are four kinds²Lev. 5:2–3 requires a reparation sacrifice for a person who became impure, forgot it, and then either ate sancta in his impurity or entered the Sanctuary. The two added cases are that he knew about being impure but forgot that the food was holy or that the place was a Sanctuary.. There are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds³It is forbidden to transport anything on the Sabbath from a private domain to the public domain (Mishnah Šabbat 1:1). “Transport” includes lifting up, moving, and setting down. The two cases where one is liable (for a sacrifice if the sin was unintentional, punishment if the transgression was intentional, and is prosecutable, or extirpation by Divine decree if the crime was intentional but is not prosecutable) are “export” by a person standing inside the private domain, lifting something up inside the domain and putting it down on the outside (e. g., through a window) even without moving his feet, or “import”, somebody lifting an object from the outside to the inside and depositing it there. The two cases where one is not liable refer to a person inside who lifts an object, hands it to a person outside (so that the object never is at rest) and the second person puts it down. Since no one person completed a criminal act, no one can be held liable even though the combined action clearly is forbidden.. There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds⁴Lev. 13:2 defines impure skin disease as שְׂאֵ֤ת אֽוֹ־סַפַּ֨חַת֙ א֣וֹ בַהֶ֔רֶת “as elevated spot, or sapaḥat, or a white spot.” This is read as “an elevated spot (which makes the surrounding skin look elevated over the whitish spot) and a really white spot and their appendages”, deriving sapaḥat from the root ספח, “to append, adjoin.” This extends the definition of impure skin disease from two relatively well defined cases to two additional weaker symptoms..

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. ⁴For this and part of the next Halakhah there exists a rudimentary Genizah fragment edited by L. Ginzberg, Yerushalmi Fragments, New York 1909, pp. 285–286 (G). It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation⁵It was established in 4:14 (Note 119) that for requests of testimony imprecations without oaths and oaths without imprecations trigger liabilities for a sacrifice. As noted before, the natural setting of an oath or imprecation for testimony is one formulated by the claimant; for oaths about deposits it is one formulated by the defendant. No imprecations are mentioned in connection with oaths about deposits. The unresolved questions are whether an imprecation formulated by the potential witness triggers liability and what the status is of an imprecation substituting for an oath is a case of disputed monetary claim?? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person⁶Lev. 5:1; cf. Chapter 4:3 Note 31.”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages⁷Not only oaths; Mishnah 4:1.. ⁸The following is also quoted by Alfassi (Shevuot Chapter 5) and is the subject of extensive commentaries by Nachmanides, R. Nissim Gerondi, and Rosh. Cf. Babli 36a.He lied to his fellow man⁹Lev. 5:21., if his confession was eliminated by the oath¹⁰Liability for a sacrifice is created only if the false oath saves the defendant from a sentence which would obligate him to pay the claimant. Cf. S. Liebermann, Review of S. Asaph מספרות הגאונים, Tarbiz 5(1934) pp. 395–400.. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document¹¹Swearing falsely to only one of the partners has no monetary consequences as long as the defendant did not also lie to the other partners. Swearing falsely about an obligation which can be proven by witnesses or documents is pointless.. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this¹²The implication that rules governing one debtor and two creditors can be applied to one creditor and two debtors is not found in the Babli but accepted by Rif (§1043) and all subsequent codifiers; the note that one does not act on this, but writes joint liabilities in all contracts, was not accepted by Rif and his successor Josef ibn Migash (cf. I. Tashma and H. Ben Shammai, Kobez al Yad 8(18) Jerusalem 1975 p. 179 Note 10).. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him¹³Without explicit authorization by one of the depositors to the trustee, a joint deposit may be returned only to the joint depositors.. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable¹⁴If both trustees denied the existence of the deposit at different times, both are liable.. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁵A peruṭa (a Hasmonean coin of about 2g bronze) is the smallest amount for which one may go to court. (Half- peruṭa coins have been found.) Since a half-peruṭa cannot be the subject of a law suit, it cannot be the cause of liability for any kind of oath. Should not the sacrifice for an oath about a half-peruṭa be forbidden as false dedication?? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁶Since he has to bring three sacrifices for oaths about one peruṭa, each one is for a third of a peruṭa.? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth¹⁷The previous argument is wrong. Multiple infractions all concerning the same peruṭa need separate atoning. A deposit given to two people jointly must be at least two peruṭas worth to trigger liabilities for sacrifices..

HALAKHAH: “A preliminarily married woman or one who waits for her brother-in-law,” etc. Why can he not make her drink? It is a decision of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the Cohen¹⁰Lev. 5:15. A man can bring his wife only if he is living with her..” Then he should not be able to declare his jealousy¹¹If “his wife” in this paragraph means only the definitively married one, the entire procedure should be impossible for the preliminarily married woman.! The Torah said, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,¹²Lev. 5:14; if the meaning of “his wife” were constant in this verse, the second clause should have read “and he declared his jealousy to her.” The woman who is a wife but not a wife in the first sense is the preliminarily married one. Therefore, the second mention of “wife” adds the preliminarily married one as object of jealousy.” even if she is only partially his wife.

HALAKHAH: “A preliminarily married woman or one who waits for her brother-in-law,” etc. Why can he not make her drink? It is a decision of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the Cohen¹⁰Lev. 5:15. A man can bring his wife only if he is living with her..” Then he should not be able to declare his jealousy¹¹If “his wife” in this paragraph means only the definitively married one, the entire procedure should be impossible for the preliminarily married woman.! The Torah said, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,¹²Lev. 5:14; if the meaning of “his wife” were constant in this verse, the second clause should have read “and he declared his jealousy to her.” The woman who is a wife but not a wife in the first sense is the preliminarily married one. Therefore, the second mention of “wife” adds the preliminarily married one as object of jealousy.” even if she is only partially his wife.

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. ⁴For this and part of the next Halakhah there exists a rudimentary Genizah fragment edited by L. Ginzberg, Yerushalmi Fragments, New York 1909, pp. 285–286 (G). It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation⁵It was established in 4:14 (Note 119) that for requests of testimony imprecations without oaths and oaths without imprecations trigger liabilities for a sacrifice. As noted before, the natural setting of an oath or imprecation for testimony is one formulated by the claimant; for oaths about deposits it is one formulated by the defendant. No imprecations are mentioned in connection with oaths about deposits. The unresolved questions are whether an imprecation formulated by the potential witness triggers liability and what the status is of an imprecation substituting for an oath is a case of disputed monetary claim?? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person⁶Lev. 5:1; cf. Chapter 4:3 Note 31.”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages⁷Not only oaths; Mishnah 4:1.. ⁸The following is also quoted by Alfassi (Shevuot Chapter 5) and is the subject of extensive commentaries by Nachmanides, R. Nissim Gerondi, and Rosh. Cf. Babli 36a.He lied to his fellow man⁹Lev. 5:21., if his confession was eliminated by the oath¹⁰Liability for a sacrifice is created only if the false oath saves the defendant from a sentence which would obligate him to pay the claimant. Cf. S. Liebermann, Review of S. Asaph מספרות הגאונים, Tarbiz 5(1934) pp. 395–400.. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document¹¹Swearing falsely to only one of the partners has no monetary consequences as long as the defendant did not also lie to the other partners. Swearing falsely about an obligation which can be proven by witnesses or documents is pointless.. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this¹²The implication that rules governing one debtor and two creditors can be applied to one creditor and two debtors is not found in the Babli but accepted by Rif (§1043) and all subsequent codifiers; the note that one does not act on this, but writes joint liabilities in all contracts, was not accepted by Rif and his successor Josef ibn Migash (cf. I. Tashma and H. Ben Shammai, Kobez al Yad 8(18) Jerusalem 1975 p. 179 Note 10).. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him¹³Without explicit authorization by one of the depositors to the trustee, a joint deposit may be returned only to the joint depositors.. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable¹⁴If both trustees denied the existence of the deposit at different times, both are liable.. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁵A peruṭa (a Hasmonean coin of about 2g bronze) is the smallest amount for which one may go to court. (Half- peruṭa coins have been found.) Since a half-peruṭa cannot be the subject of a law suit, it cannot be the cause of liability for any kind of oath. Should not the sacrifice for an oath about a half-peruṭa be forbidden as false dedication?? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁶Since he has to bring three sacrifices for oaths about one peruṭa, each one is for a third of a peruṭa.? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth¹⁷The previous argument is wrong. Multiple infractions all concerning the same peruṭa need separate atoning. A deposit given to two people jointly must be at least two peruṭas worth to trigger liabilities for sacrifices..

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it²Lev. 5:3 requires a sacrifice if after forgetting about impurity he knew and felt guilty. Since as a general rule no obligatory sacrifice can be offered voluntarily, the verse implies that a variable value sacrifice for violations involving impurity is possible if the offerer can prove that he is liable for the sacrifice.. Is the same true for the first awareness³There can be no forgetting if there was no prior knowledge. Must this prior knowledge be one of certainty or can it be one of possibility?? Let us hear from the following⁴Babli 19a, Tosephta Ṭahorot 6:7 (the full text later, Note 41).: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them⁵It was known that one of the paths passed over a spot where a corpse was buried. The spot is no longer recognizable and people do no longer remember which of the paths it was. Anybody walking on one of the paths is possible impure by forming a “tent” over a corpse., entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself⁶He observed the ritual of removing the impurity of the dead (Num. 19) by being sprinkled with water containing ashes of the Red Heifer on the 3rd and 7th days and then immersing himself in a miqweh., walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable⁷Since he walked both paths, he certainly polluted the Sanctuary by entering while impure. Even though he cannot determine which time he entered while impure, he can be sure that he did it exactly once; this is enough to trigger the obligation of a sacrifice. and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s⁸Mishnah 2:6. who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure⁹This implies that R. Simeon ben Laqish holds that for R. Aqiba, who admits a variable sacrifice only for cases where impurity was known, forgotten, and remembered, no sacrifice was possible in this case since the impurity was never known. It only is known that the two possibilities both were realized and there is no third alternative.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness¹⁰Since we accept the principle of the excluded middle (i.e., a statement is either true or false) a proof that the person could not have been pure both times is proof that he was impure (at least) once. For awareness of impurity no awareness of the exact time of impurity is needed. The Babli (19b) points out that this argument is needed only for variable reparation sacrifices since for purification sacrifices no prior knowledge is required.. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness¹¹It is irrelevant to him if he does not know when the obligation of a sacrifice started since the competent Temple authority can determine that his obligatory sacrifice is legitimate..

“With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind; the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obligated until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.

Rebbi Jehudah asked: As you say, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,¹²Lev. 5:14; if the meaning of “his wife” were constant in this verse, the second clause should have read “and he declared his jealousy to her.” The woman who is a wife but not a wife in the first sense is the preliminarily married one. Therefore, the second mention of “wife” adds the preliminarily married one as object of jealousy.” even if she is only partially his wife, similarly, “under your husband,” even if he is only partially your husband¹⁷R. Jehudah notes that “under your husband” is repeated (vv. 19,20). Therefore, if the repetition of “his wife” (cf. Note 12) also includes a partial wife ( preliminarily married or one who waits for her brother-in-law), the repetition here should also give the partial husband the right to bring his partial wife to the Temple. There is no answer given; R. Jehudah’s argument is contradicted by the verse he himself quotes, cf. Chapter 1, Notes 154–156.. How is that? If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he wed her¹⁸“He took her in”, i. e., he brought her to his house in the final wedding ceremony to live with him., and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy¹⁹The final wedding activates the prior declaration of jealousy. The Babli agrees, 25a.. If he²⁰The brother-in-law. declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he²⁰The brother-in-law. wed her, and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy¹⁹The final wedding activates the prior declaration of jealousy. The Babli agrees, 25a.. If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah²¹As stated in Mishnah 3:6, the ceremony is ineffective for a woman whose husband had slept with her while she was forbidden to him. Since it is his action that (a) keeps his wife permanently forbidden to him and, (b) prevents his wife from proving her innocence, he as the guilty party is forced to divorce her and to pay the full amount of the ketubah.; otherwise²²If the husband did not sleep with his wife after she became forbidden to him, he has the choice to divorce her because of her fault, without paying any of his own money. she has to leave without ketubah. [If he declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah; otherwise without ketubah.]²³From the Rome ms., probably omitted by the scribe of the Leiden ms. because of the parallel text. If her husband declared his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who married her, then she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of [the first husband’s] declaration of jealousy²⁴Since by biblical standards the brother-in-law’s marriage is an automatic consequence of the first husband’s death.. If her husband did not declare his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who declared his jealousy but did not manage to take her in before he died and she became destined for his brother, the latter cannot make her drink since she became destined for him only because of the first brother²⁵Since the second brother never became her husband, his declaration is irrelevant to the third brother.. But if her brother-in-law declared his jealousy, took her in, and died, then she became destined for a brother-in-law who took her in, when she went to a secluded place he makes her drink on the basis of his²⁰The brother-in-law. declaration of jealousy.

He denied it²⁷Lev. 5:22., not him²⁸In Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 22(6) more in detail: “About it but not about its finder.” This Tanna and both Talmudim reject the understanding of the verse as given in the Targumim, that the person swearing had found the lost property and now denies it. This would be covered by “robbery” listed in v. 21. Rather it is that the person searching for his lost property, such as his donkey mares, asks a person whether he knows either of the property or of the person who might have taken it. If he under oath falsely denies any knowledge, according to this Tanna be becomes liable for a sacrifice only if he wrongly denies knowledge about the property, not about the person who might have appropriated it.
The big question then becomes, why should the person asked for testimony be liable for anything since by necessity he is a single person and the testimony of a single person cannot force a judgment. As Ravad explains in his Commentary to Sifra, this argument would be unconditionally valid only for oaths about testimony, not for oaths about causing monetary loss. His scenario is, e. g., that the lost animal was standing on another person’s property. The original owner took it but now the person from whom it was taken claims ownership and wants it back. The second person agrees that he found the animal but he disputes the fact that it is the animal which had belonged to the first. In this situation, testimony of one witness about ownership of the animal is sufficient for a judgment in favor of the first person since it is not a judgment to transfer property but to confirm an existing status. On the other hand, testimony that the second person took possession of some lost property but which failed to identify the property is worthless and its denial cannot trigger any liability by the potential witness.. ²⁹Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 22(6), Babli Bava qamma 105b. In the Babli: “Three kinds of oaths [about lost property.]”“Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability³⁰In the Babli, this is attributed to the early Galilean Amora R. Ḥanina.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so³¹In the Babli, this is the authoritative opinion of Samuel.. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.³²As the Babli points out, if somebody swears although he does not not know about the whole affair he swears truthfully and no liability of any kind can arise. In place of “neither about it nor about its finder” one must read “about it and its finder.”” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder³³Only the middle clause is in dispute between Ben Azzai and the first Tanna.. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

²²Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz., the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Lev. 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable²³To bring the sacrifice. for something²⁴An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them²⁵They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden²⁶Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. ²⁷There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew²⁸Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges²⁹One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times³⁰R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Ševuot 14b, Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, ³¹Returning to our topic, Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

⁷⁸There exists a parallel text, from a different redaction, in Qiddušin1:4, Notes 466–468. Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Does one estimate for the extortionist, the thief, and the robber? He anwered him: one estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber. From where that one does not estimate for them? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double⁷⁹Ex. 22:3; the thief has to pay in full if he cannot return the stolen animal in the shape in which he stole it.;” alive, not dead. That refers to theft; from where for robbery? Rebbi Abin said, “he shall return the robbed object in the state in which he robbed it.⁸⁰Lev. 5:23. The explanation adds one letter to the biblical text, changing the somewhat redundant description וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת־הַגְּזֵלָה אֲשֶׁר גָּזַל “let him return the robbed object which he robbed” into וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת־הַגְּזֵלָה כַּאֲשֶׁר גָּזַל “let him return the robbed object in the state in which he robbed it.””

“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment^21aLev. 5:1. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.

“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment^21aLev. 5:1. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable¹Lev. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment.. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable²⁹Since refusal of testimony outside of court is irrelevant (Note 6).. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit³⁰Since the courts operate on the principle that a witness can testify only once, i. e., he cannot change his testimony, after a first refusal in court the witness would not be permitted to change his statement. The additional oaths put on the witnesses are pointless; the court should prohibit them. In the language of the Babli, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד “after he told, he does not return to tell”..

BARAITHA.⁵K 16. The elders were once sitting in the gate when two young lads passed by; one covered his head and the other uncovered his head. Of him who uncovered his head R. Eliezer remarked, ‘He is a bastard’; R. Joshua remarked, ‘He is the son of a niddah’; R. ‘Aḳiba said, ‘He is both a bastard and the son of a niddah’. They said to R. ‘Aḳiba, ‘How did your heart induce you to contradict the opinion of your colleagues?’ He replied, ‘I will prove it concerning him’. He went to the lad’s mother and found her sitting in the market selling beans. He said to her, ‘My daughter, if you will answer the question which I will put to you, I will bring you to the World to Come’. She said to him, ‘Swear it to me’. R. ‘Aḳiba, taking the oath with his lips but annulling it in his heart, said to her, ‘What is the status of your son?’ She replied, ‘When I entered the bridal chamber I was niddah and my husband kept away from me, but my best man had intercourse with me and this son was born to me’. Consequently the child was both a bastard and the son of a niddah. It was declared, ‘R. ‘Aḳiba showed himself to be a great man when he contradicted his teachers’. At the same time they added, ‘Blessed be the God of Israel Who revealed His secret to R. ‘Aḳiba b. Joseph’.
GEMARA. Where can R. ‘Aḳiba [find support for his opinion] from the Torah? For it is written, They have dealt treacherously against the Lord, for they have begotten strange children.⁶Hosea 5, 7. Dealt treacherously means nothing else than immorality, as it is stated, Surely as a wife treacherously departeth from her husband;⁷Jer. 3, 20. and strange children mentioned in the verse are none but the bastard.
‘One uncovered his head’: infer from this that bare-headedness is a gross form of bold-facedness. ‘R. ‘Aḳiba, swearing with his lips’: how could he do this seeing that it is written, Or if any one swear clearly with his lips to do evil?⁸Lev. 5, 4. But not in his heart.⁹An oath to be valid must be uttered with the lips and needs no confirmation by a decision of the mind. Here R. ‘Aḳiba uttered the oath with his lips and therefore it was valid, and no annulment in the mind could render it invalid. Cf. Shebu. 26b (Sonc. ed., p. 143). [An oath] needs no [confirmation by the decision of the] mind. He swore to her in a manner similar to which R. Joḥanan swore to the heathen lady and said to her, ‘I will bring you to the God of Israel’,¹⁰[Cf. Marmorstein, Studies in Jewish Theology, p. 167.] but annulled the oath in his mind.
‘And my best man had intercourse with me.’ How did he chance to be there? As it has been taught:¹¹Keth. 12a (Sonc. ed., p. 63). Formerly the best man slept in the house where the bridegroom and bride slept to examine¹²Emending leshammesh in V to lemashmesh in agreement with Keth. which Rashi explains, ‘So that they should not deceive one another with respect to the evidence of virginity’. the bridegroom and bride [when they entered] the bridal chamber. When the husband discovered that she was niddah he kept away from her. But are best men appointed who are of doubtful character? No; but he pursued her.¹³lit. ‘he attached himself to her’. ‘It was declared: “R. ‘Aḳiba showed himself to be a great man” ’, etc. They¹⁴R. Eliezer and R. Joshua. are described as ‘his teachers’ and also as ‘his colleagues’! When they saw that he prevailed over them, they acknowledged him as ‘colleague’.

HALAKHAH: “If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. ²⁰The entire Halakhah is found also in Ketubot 13:2 (35d line 30 ff.) Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons²¹Ketubot Mishnah 13:2: “If somebody went overseas and another person paid for the upkeep of his wife (without a court order or a contract with the wife), Ḥanan said, that person lost his money. The High Priest’s sons disagreed with him and said, he shall swear how much he spent and collect it.”? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that nobody expects his wife to die from hunger. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel¹⁴If A has vowed that B should have nothing from him, A may pay B’s Temple tax of half a šeqel due every year. Since the money is paid to the Temple, B does not receive anything.. If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated²²Mishnah 3, a continuation of Mishnah 2 about the person to whom usufruct from another was forbidden.: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges²³“Nest” is the technical term for a couple of birds from the pigeon family, prescribed sacrifice for the person healed from genital discharge before he could enter the Temple. For a male, Lev. 15:14. For a female, Lev. 15:29., nests for childbirth²⁴Due before the mother could enter the Temple, Lev. 12:8, for the wife of a man who could not afford a sheep, Lev. 12:6., purification and reparation offerings²⁵Lev. 4:27–5:26. These sacrifices are in part burned on the altar, in part eaten by the priests; nothing is given to the offerer and his family, in contrast to well-being offerings.” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here²⁶In the case of a debt paid by the third party, the deal has to be structured so that nothing ever comes into the possession of the debtor. also, that nothing should come into his hand.

HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. ⁶¹Babli 4a. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten⁶²Lev. 5:2,3. two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta⁶³In Babylonian sources [Babli 14b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 12(7)] this is consistently attributed to R. Ismael. The difference between the two is that R. Aqiba considers every stylistic variation a change in meaning whereas R. Ismael holds that “the Torah is written in the manner of common speech.”. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty^62,Lev. 5:2,3.⁶⁴The first quote is from the verse about human impurity, the other about impurity from extra-human sources. While it was argued before that one can only forget what one knew, the knowledge explicitly required in v. 3 must be explicit, it cannot have been unconsciously absorbed.? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.

HALAKHAH: “In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. ⁶¹Babli 4a. From where that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgotten⁶²Lev. 5:2,3. two times; this implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. So far for Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? For Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi. As Rebbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knew,” there is knowledge two times. Hence Rebbi Ismael [argues] like Rebbi, and Rebbi like Rebbi Ismael. This comes even according to Rebbi Aqiba; it is the same for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary as for knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sancta⁶³In Babylonian sources [Babli 14b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 12(7)] this is consistently attributed to R. Ismael. The difference between the two is that R. Aqiba considers every stylistic variation a change in meaning whereas R. Ismael holds that “the Torah is written in the manner of common speech.”. But some want to understand it from the following: He knew and felt guilty. Was it not already said, he became impure and felt guilty^62,Lev. 5:2,3.⁶⁴The first quote is from the verse about human impurity, the other about impurity from extra-human sources. While it was argued before that one can only forget what one knew, the knowledge explicitly required in v. 3 must be explicit, it cannot have been unconsciously absorbed.? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.

New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.^84,Missing here: “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta,” i. e., the laws of restitution only apply to profane objects.¹⁰⁷The laws of torts are “between a man and his neighbor,” which exludes all Temple property and those sacrifices which do not remain the owner’s property.” As it was stated: “These properties¹⁰⁸Since this baraita is not quoted elsewhere, it is not known what “these properties” are. Some commentators want to read הַנְּכָסִים שֶּׁחִלְּלוֹ “properties which he redeemed” (from the Temple administrator). This is very farfetched. are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta¹⁰⁹Since the Temple acquires and sells property by monetary transaction without any other act of acquisition (Qiddušin 1:6), other property can be acquired together with Temple property under the same rules. For example, if the Temple treasurer sold some Temple property together with his own, the entire transaction is legal if done under Temple rules. Similarly, if a person acquires two animals, one dedicated as “Heaven’s property” (elevation, purification, or reparation offering) subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta, the other as “simple sacrifice” (well-being sacrifice) which remains private property, the holier sacrifice determines the rules..” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This¹¹⁰He disagrees with the interpretation given and holds that the Mishnah means what it says; only sacrificial animals not under the laws of misappropriation of sancta are subject to the laws of torts. follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated¹¹¹Sifra Wayyiqra Dibbura Deḥoba Pereq 22(3); Babli Bava qama 12b–13a, Temurah 8a; a related text in Tosephta 7:21. Partial quotes in Bava batra123b, Qiddušin 52b, Sanhedrin 112a, Zebaḥim 114a, Bekhorot 53b.: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal¹¹²Lev. 5:21.,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta¹¹³In the Babli: “Simple sancta which are his property.” The question raised is the status of firstlings and animal tithe, which are Heaven’s property in the hands of the rancher. Since Lev. 5:21 reads: “If a person sins, commits fraud against the Eternal, and lies against his fellow …” it perfectly describes wrongdoing involving simple sancta which in one action represents wrong both against the Eternal and one’s fellow man.. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices¹¹⁴And all sacrifices following rules of well-being sacrifices, firstlings, and animal tithe. The firstling has to be given to a Cohen, the animal tithe is eaten by the rancher and his family in Jerusalem; in both cases the altar only receives the blood but no part of the meat.. Abba Yose ben Dosai¹²⁵Since this statement is already implied by the preceding one. says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling¹¹⁶Animal tithes..” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes¹¹⁷It seems that in the entire argument one should read “tithes” instead of “firstling” and vice versa. While the unblemished firstling at some time has to be handed over to a Cohen, as long as it is in the rancher’s hand it is his property and can be sold; but the unblemished animal tithe by its count becomes Heaven’s property and cannot be sold. The blemished firstling may be sold as food.. But he who says tithes¹¹⁷It seems that in the entire argument one should read “tithes” instead of “firstling” and vice versa. While the unblemished firstling at some time has to be handed over to a Cohen, as long as it is in the rancher’s hand it is his property and can be sold; but the unblemished animal tithe by its count becomes Heaven’s property and cannot be sold. The blemished firstling may be sold as food. excludes the firstling¹¹⁷It seems that in the entire argument one should read “tithes” instead of “firstling” and vice versa. While the unblemished firstling at some time has to be handed over to a Cohen, as long as it is in the rancher’s hand it is his property and can be sold; but the unblemished animal tithe by its count becomes Heaven’s property and cannot be sold. The blemished firstling may be sold as food.. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated¹¹⁸If a person vows “an animal” as sacrifice and anything happens to the animal designated as sacrifice, he is obligated to provide a replacement; he is responsible for its alienation. But if he vows “this animal” and anything happens to it, he is not obligated to provide a replacement; he is not responsible for its alienation. In Lev., the first kind of vow is called נֶדֶר “vow”, the second kind is נְדָבָה “free offering”., I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied¹¹²Lev. 5:21.’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”¹¹⁹An anonymous baraita in the Babli, Bava meṣi‘a 58a/b. Debts towards Heaven have to be discharged at the rate of 125%; those towards one’s fellow man by the rate of 100%.. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta¹²⁰Which for some reason are not accepted by the altar., if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal¹²¹Most holy sacrifices which either are holocausts on the altar or whose meat is eaten by male Cohanim within the Temple precinct., I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated¹²²Even for well-being sacrifices, most of which is eaten by the donor’s family., I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good³³Lev. 5:4..” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment³⁴In the Babli, 16b/17a, this verse, dealing with the obligation of a sacrifice for an oath inadvertently not kept, only frees the maker of an oath to violate some commandment from the obligation to bring a sacrifice.. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,³⁵Num. 30:3. In the Babli, this verse frees him from the sin of not keeping his vow. In the Yerushalmi, it extends the rule to any oath, including an intentional one.” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven³⁶Mishnah Temurah 7:2: Anything whatsoever can be vowed to support the Temple..

⁷¹Babli 6b; Sifra Ḥovah (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 11(9). And from where that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta? He warned and punished about impurity⁷²In Lev. 22:15–16, both warning and punishment are written for priests who would violate the purity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. For the laity the corresponding verses are Lev. 7:19–20. The sacrifice for violations in purity is mentioned in Lev. 5:2–3; one has to establish that no sacrifice is possible for violations of sancta which do not belong to the Sanctuary such as heave. and required a sacrifice about impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta⁷³Deut. 26:14. The person who comes to eat his Second Tithe at the place of the Sanctuary has to make a declaration that he followed all the rules; in particular that he did not eat of it while in “deep mourning”, occupied in burying a close relative. Second Tithe has to be eaten in purity but no sanction for violation of its purity is spelled out anywhere in the Pentateuch., also when He made liable for a sacrifice it is about impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourning⁷⁴Deut.14., I could think that an Israel who ate tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from thes e⁷⁵Lev. 5:4. Prefix מ always is read as partitive, “some but not all.” Since it is not spelled out which infractions of the laws of impurity (or of testimony, or oaths) are included, and which are excluded, the detailed rules are left to rabbinic interpretation. Babli 33b.. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not a deadly sin but will not exclude heave which is a deadly sin as it is said, they would die from it for they desecrated it⁷⁶Lev. 22:9. First Tithe (of which heave of the tithe was separated) is totally profane in the hand of the Levite. Second Tithe has to be eaten in purity at the place of the Sanctuary but there is no penalty for violation of its purity. But heave has to be eaten by the Cohen in purity and violation of its purity is a deadly sin.. The verse says from thes e; for some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there⁷⁷The verse mentioned in Note 76. [one speaks about] heave, also here heave. But did you not learn it from foreign worship⁷⁸The sacrifice atoning for inadvertent idolatry is declared paradigmatic for all sins in Num. 15:22.? Since foreign worship teaches about all transgressions in the Torah, to say that as foreign worship is special that one is liable for extirpation if done intentionally and for a sacrifice if done unintentionally⁷⁹The sacrifice is spelled out in Num. 15:22–29; extirpation in vv. 30–31. Babli Šabbat 69a.. This excludes heave which only is a deadly sin⁸⁰But no extirpation is mentioned for violating purity of heaves..

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what³⁷Again this is a question following R. Meїr. It is clear that the demand that they answer to an oath formulated by the person who wants to force testimony must be made in court. Therefore, one has to assume that the first five oaths were made outside of court. Then they are not subject to the rule that there can be only one testimony. The next question is about the status of an oath of denial of knowledge before the other even had asked for their testimony.? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following:³⁸Cf. Tosephta 2:11 (Babli 31b). The baraita is formulated independently from the Babylonian Tosephta. “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation³⁹Lev. 5:1.. Only one who hears an imprecation⁴⁰The Tosephta states clearly, “they are not liable unless he requested [the testimony]”.. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate⁴¹All examples in Lev. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1.? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines⁴²These fines are biblically imposed for misdeeds. Whether there can be an oath about these is in dispute between the majority and R. Simeon, Mishnah 5:6.? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice⁴³From the equal cut (Note 32) we know that for a false oath regarding testimony formulated by the potential witness he is liable for a sacrifice. Is that the variable value sacrifice for a false oath regarding testimony or a fixed value sacrifice required for a false testimony about deposits??

Rebbi Ḥanina⁸¹Read: Ḥinena. said before Rebbi Mana: Did you learn this from foreign worship? Then one should learn from foreign worship that for everything one needs one knowledge⁸²Since neither prior awareness nor forgetting are mentioned as prerequisite for a sacrifice for unintentional idolatry (nor for any other sacrifice not depending on the sinner’s wealth) one would have to explain away the mention of prior awareness for infractions of the laws of purity.! He told him, foreign worship requires a fixed value [sacrifice] but the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta an increasing or decreasing one. One cannot infer about a fixed value [sacrifice] from an increasing and decreasing one, nor for an increasing or decreasing from a fixed value one⁸³Therefore the previous argument is invalid; one has to find another argument to exclude any sacrifice for violations of the sanctity of heave.. How did you understand to say that the verse⁸⁴Lev. 5:2–3. Babli 7a. speaks about impurity of Sanctuary sancta? It is said here an impure animal⁸⁵Lev. 5:2. and it is said further on an impure animal⁸⁶Lev. 7:21.. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta. Not only Sanctuary sancta; from where the impurity of the Sanctuary⁸⁷Babli Zevaḥim 43b. The question is whether a violation of the purity of the Sanctuary can be expiated by a sacrifice or whether any such violation requires the full ceremony of Lev. 16 describing the Day of Atonement.? ⁸⁸Sifra Ṣav Pereq 14(3–6), partially quoted in Zevaḥim 43b.“The verse says: his impurity is on him⁸⁹Lev. 7:20.. How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]⁹⁰This is prohibited in Lev. 7:19.? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi says, he ate⁹¹Lev. 7:21., his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Ḥiyya says, sancta are mentioned in the plural⁹²A well-being offering is always mentioned in the plural, שְׁלָמִים. It is argued that therefore a singular cannot refer to the sacrifice. The argument is unconvincing since the sacrifice is not called שְׁלָמִים in the plural but זֶבַח שְׁלָמִים in the singular. It also is unnecessary since in 7:20 עָלָיו “on him” refers to the subject וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ “but the person”. but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I uphold his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Meїr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates⁹³A person always can remove his impurity, for simple impurity by immersion in a miqweh, for severe impurities by one of the prescribed rituals. Impure sacral meat must be burned (Lev. 7:19; it also loses its impurity by rotting but as long as it is meat it remains impure.. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”

MISHNAH: Also he⁴⁵The person who made a vow that the other shall have no profit from him. Heave and tithes diminish the farmer’s wealth; they do not increase it. can separate his heave and tithes with the other’s knowledge, and can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges²³“Nest” is the technical term for a couple of birds from the pigeon family, prescribed sacrifice for the person healed from genital discharge before he could enter the Temple. For a male, Lev. 15:14. For a female, Lev. 15:29., nests for childbirth²⁴Due before the mother could enter the Temple, Lev. 12:8, for the wife of a man who could not afford a sheep, Lev. 12:6., purification and reparation offerings²⁵Lev. 4:27–5:26. These sacrifices are in part burned on the altar, in part eaten by the priests; nothing is given to the offerer and his family, in contrast to well-being offerings. and teach him interpretations⁴⁶Rabbinic interpretations of biblical verses, of the kind preserved in the Mekhiltot, Sifra, and Sifry., religious rules, and sermons⁴⁷As the Halakhah explains, in imitation of Moses who taught the Children of Israel without taking money, one may not take money for teaching the Oral Law. (In rabbinic practice, one may take money for teaching during regular business hours to make up for the loss incurred by not being in business at that time.); but he may not teach him Bible; he may teach Bible to his sons and daughters⁴⁸Since Moses wrote the Torah only at the end of his life, he never taught it. Therefore, one may take money to teach to read, sing, and understand the biblical text. This anonymous Mishnah proves that practice should not follow R. Eliezer in Mishnah Soṭah 3:4, Note 85.. Also, he can feed his wife and children⁴⁹If they are needy, since charity is a universal obligation. even though the other is obligated for their upkeep. But he cannot feed his animals⁵⁰Since this would increase the animal’s worth; i. e., the other man’s property., whether pure or impure; Rebbi Eliezer says, he may feed his impure⁵¹Those which cannot be eaten. animals but not the pure ones. They asked him, what is the difference between pure and impure animals? He said to them, the pure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his⁵²As food., but the impure’s soul and body is Heaven’s. They said to him, also the impure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his, since he could sell it to Gentiles⁵³Who may eat any kind of animal; Gen. 9:3. or feed it to the dogs.

Another explanation: He shall pay the whole worth and add its fifths to it⁹⁰Lev. 5:24. The plural “fifths” implies that for repeated false oaths about the same subject additional fifths are due (Sifra Ḥovah, Wayyiqra II, Parašah13:12; Babli Bava qamma103b, Bava meṣi`a54b). This disproves R. Jacob’s statement.. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would be sanctified, it is sanctified here. He claimed a claim of thief, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would not be sanctified⁹¹A reparation offering is obligatory; it cannot be voluntary. Since the rabbis hold that double restitution excludes oath and confession, no sacrifice is possible even in the case where the verse demands double restitution in any case, as for the paid keeper who falsely claimed that a thief had stolen the item (Note 74)., it is not sanctified here, but following Rebbi Jacob it would be sanctified.”

Rebbi Yose asked, if somebody benefited from Temple property less than the value of a perutah¹⁶⁸Which therefore cannot be claimed in court and there is no coin with which to pay., is he liable for reimbursement? (He said to him.)¹⁶⁹Addition by the corrector; to be deleted. Let us hear from the following: What he appropriated from sancta he has to repay¹⁷⁰Lev. 5:16. This seems to exclude amounts smaller than the smallest coin in circulation since such an amount cannot be paid., except what is less than the value of a perutah. There are Tannaim who state, to add. (He who said except, for) [he who said “except what is less than the value of a perutah” for reimbursement¹⁷¹Sifra Ḥovah (Wayyiqra II) Parashah11(7). The argument there is based on the expression from sancta, even a minute part. and] sacrifice. He who said “to add”, for reimbursement¹⁷²While is cannot be paid for in coin, it can be restituted in kind. Everybody agrees that no sacrifice as prescribed in 5:15 is due in this case. (The scribe’s text, in parentheses, is preferable.). As you are saying there^172*Appropriating less than the value of a perutah from sancta does not trigger the obligation to pay an additional fifth since no amount less that a perutah can be invoiced., intentionally less than the value of a perutah, even though he does not pay the fifth and a reparation sacrifice he has to pay to the tribe, one says the same here. The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, is that not a Mishnah? “Somebody who eats leavened heave on Passover, if in error pays its value and a fifth¹⁴⁶A Non-Cohen who eats sanctified heave (which either was dedicated leavened before Passover or was dedicated unleavened but became leavened by itself on Passover) has to pay restitution to the priests together with a biblically ordained surcharge; Mishnah Terumot 6:1 Note 1., if intentionally he is not liable for restitution even as value of wood¹⁴⁷Intentional desecration of heave (e. g., used as food by a Non-Cohen) is too great a sin to be forgiven for just a monetary fine (Mishnah Terumot 7:1 Note 2). Also, while the restitution money and the fine for inadvertent consumption are sancta, the restitution for intentionally consumed heave is profane (loc. cit.) and therefore has to follow the rules of civil debts. Since leavened matter on Passover is forbidden for usufruct, it has no monetary value, not even as fuel to be burned.”? He told them, there it is impossible to complete¹⁷³Since leavened matter on Passover is worthless, rules about it cannot be invoked in discussions about money’s worth., but here it is possible to complete.

²⁹⁸Ševuot 15b, the entire paragraph. How did the processions go? The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. One said, one opposite the other; the other said, one after the other; both are explaining the same verse: The second thanksgiving sacrifice went לְמוּל and I after it²⁹⁹Neh. 12:38, in MT למואל. According to Gesenius, one has to read מוּאל as contraction of מֵאֲוַל “not first, not with it”. This justifies both meanings quoted here, “opposite” and “after”.. He who said, one opposite the other, and he dwells opposite me³⁰⁰Num. 22:5.. But he who said, one after the other, he should break off its head behind its neck³⁰¹Lev. 5:8.. For him who said, one opposite the other, it turns out that every place was purified by one thanksgiving sacrifice³⁰²In principle, one sacrifice would suffice if the procession went around the entire wall.; for him who said, one after the other, it turns out that every place was purified by two thanksgiving sacrifices³⁰³Since we do not expect two sacrifices for the same purpose, one has to find differences of purpose for the two.. For him who said, one after the other, this is correct following what he had stated: “the inner one is being eaten, the outer one is being burned.³⁰⁴Tosephta 3:4, Megillat Taˋanit 6. The Babli, loc. cit. ²⁹⁹ suggests that the first makes sacrifices possible; therefore, it has to be burned outside the Temple. The second one then is a legitimate thanksgiving sacrifice, most of which has to be eaten by the priests as public well-being sacrifice (Mishnah Zevahim 5:5).” For him who said, one opposite the other, what is the inner one? The one closer to the Temple. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It was eaten on the instruction of a prophet³⁰⁵Who defined the meaning of “inner” and “outer”?. Rebbi Zeˋira said, they state there: Since a prophet is there, for what do I need Urim and Tummim³⁰⁶The nature of the Urim and Tummim oracle already was no longer known when the Second Temple was built; Nehemiah (7:65) uses the expression “the coming of a Cohen with Urim and Tummim” assynonym with “the coming of the Messiah.” The requirement of Urim and Tummim disqualifies all parts of Jerusalem not forming part of Solomon’s city.? It was found stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, Urim and Tummim are needed³⁰⁷In the Babli, Ševuot 16a, it is a dispute among Babylonian Amoraïm whether Nehemiah’s ceremony, without king and oracle, was a valid dedication of the rebuilt city of Jerusalem or whether it was a token ceremony to re-establish the intrinsic sanctity of Jerusalem created by Solomon’s Temple. The quote here, from an otherwise unknown baraita, qualifies the second opinion as minority opinion of a Tanna..

There⁸⁴Mishnah Ševuʻot 6:1. The subject is the biblical oath imposed on a person who denies an obligation (Ex. 22:8). The rabbinic interpretation of the expression אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר כִּי הוּא זֶה is “if he [the defendant] agrees that there is a case.” If the defendant in a civil suit, in which there are no witnesses and no documents, denies the entire claim, he does not have to swear a biblical oath (he may have to swear a rabbinical oath). But if he agrees to part of the claim, he has to swear a biblical oath to free himself from the remainder. Only if the claim is advanced as tentative, then any admission by the defendant is a gift to the claimant and by rabbinic rule no oath of any kind is due., we have stated: “You⁸⁵The speaker is the claimant. have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you⁸⁶The speaker is the defendant. have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find⁸⁷The heir is not conversant with all the details of his father’s business dealings. Since he cannot swear that the father had not received payment, he has no case if the defendant denies the entire claim. The partial admission of the claim is the equivalent of a gift by the defendant to the claimant..” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated⁵⁰All other Mishnah sources have an additional clause, either as original text or addition: “The finder shall not be made to swear, for the public good.” Since the statement is quoted in the Halakhah (Note 88), it should be read here also.: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good⁸⁸If the owner claims to have lost more than the finder returns, the finder cannot be made to swear that he did not retain anything for himself, since otherwise nobody would return any find..” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen⁸⁹As explained later, one ox was found but the owner claims to have lost two. Returning one ox is not accepting part of a claim of two.. But if he⁹⁰The finder. said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other⁹¹The original owner. said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule⁹²He has to swear since both parties claim to be sure of their case.. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute⁹³This is a case of returning a find and the finder is protected.. But in the first case⁸⁹As explained later, one ox was found but the owner claims to have lost two. Returning one ox is not accepting part of a claim of two., it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen⁹⁴This cannot be more than a conjecture; the claimant cannot make a defendant swear about a hypothetical case., but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse⁹⁵Lev. 5:22, speaking of the sacrifice required of the person who swears falsely in the situation described in Ex. 22:8. says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me⁹⁶The claimant asserts as a certainty that he saw his two oxen in the finder’s possession., and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it⁹⁷This is an assertion of a certain claim which falls under the rule of Ex. 22:8.,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

MISHNAH: Thirteen horns¹The “horns” were chests for the money given to the Temple for various reasons, as detailed in Mishnah 7. A person putting money into one of the chests could not put his hand into it, he had to let the coins drop in from the top. were in the Temple, and it was written on them: New sheqalim, and old sheqalim, nests¹³⁴Obligatory purification or reparation offerings, as prescribed in Lev. In all cases, two birds are required, one as purification and one as elevation offering, following different rules., young birds for elevation sacrifices¹³⁵Voluntary offerings which may be for a single bird., wood¹³⁶A person vowing firewood for the Temple does not bring wood but the money for it., and incense, gold for the cover¹³⁷To cover the Holiest of Holies in the absence of the Ark; Mishnah 4:4., and six for voluntary gifts¹³⁸As explained in the Halakhah and in Tosephta 3:7.. New sheqalim for the current year, and old ones, one who did not bring the past year, gives it for the next one¹³⁹New sheqalim are given for current use; sheqalim for past years are treated directly as remainders from that year (Mishnah 4:3)..
“Nests” are turtle doves and “young birds as elevation offerings” are pigeons, all for elevation offerings, the words of Rebbi Jehudah¹⁴⁷It was explained in the preceding Halakhah that R. Jehudah cannot accept the explanation of Mishnah 7 given in Note 134, but must require that a person offering two birds to be able to partake in sancta, the woman after childbirth (Lev. 12:8), the poor person healed from skin disease (Lev. 14:22), the male healed from gonorrhea (Lev. 15:14) and the female from flux (Lev. 15:29), personally deliver the birds to the Cohen who thereby is assured that the person is alive. As a consequence, for him the money deposited for “nests” is for elevation sacrifices; the distinction from “young birds for elevation offerings” only is in the amount of money required and the kind of birds bought. Mishnah 7 was explained following the Sages in Mishnah 8.. But the Sages say, of “nests” one is a purification offering and one an elevation offering; “young birds as elevation offerings” are all elevation offerings. If one says, “I am obligated for wood logs”, he may not give less than for two logs; “incense”, he may not give less than for a fistful; “gold”, he may not give less than for a gold denar¹⁴⁸25 silver denars, or their equivalent in small change.. “Six for voluntary gifts.” What did they do with this? One buys with it elevation offerings¹⁴⁹As with any money delivered to the gift account.; the flesh is for the Eternal and the skins are for the Cohanim. This explanation did Jehoyada the High Priest explain: It is a reparation offering, repairing, a reparation offering for the Eternal¹⁵⁰Lev. 5:19.; this is the principle: Elevation offerings should be bought from anything coming¹⁵¹It is obvious that money given to the Temple for purification or reparation offerings must be used for the kind of offering specified. Money “coming from” these kinds of offerings are excess monies, not used for the obligatory offerings. Since obligatory offerings cannot be brought voluntarily, nor can monies dedicated to the Temple be returned, the excess has to be deposited in the gift account and used for elevation offerings. because of sin or reparation; the flesh is for the Eternal and the skins are for the Cohanim. It turns out that both parts of the verse are fulfilled, a reparation offering for the Eternal and reparation for the Cohanim. And it says, money for reparation offerings and money for purification offerings are not to be brought to the Eternal’s House, it shall be for the Cohanim¹⁵²2K. 12:17. The money is not for the Cohanim but the Cohanim receive the skins of the animals bought with the excess monies..

MISHNAH: Thirteen horns¹The “horns” were chests for the money given to the Temple for various reasons, as detailed in Mishnah 7. A person putting money into one of the chests could not put his hand into it, he had to let the coins drop in from the top. were in the Temple, and it was written on them: New sheqalim, and old sheqalim, nests¹³⁴Obligatory purification or reparation offerings, as prescribed in Lev. In all cases, two birds are required, one as purification and one as elevation offering, following different rules., young birds for elevation sacrifices¹³⁵Voluntary offerings which may be for a single bird., wood¹³⁶A person vowing firewood for the Temple does not bring wood but the money for it., and incense, gold for the cover¹³⁷To cover the Holiest of Holies in the absence of the Ark; Mishnah 4:4., and six for voluntary gifts¹³⁸As explained in the Halakhah and in Tosephta 3:7.. New sheqalim for the current year, and old ones, one who did not bring the past year, gives it for the next one¹³⁹New sheqalim are given for current use; sheqalim for past years are treated directly as remainders from that year (Mishnah 4:3)..
“Nests” are turtle doves and “young birds as elevation offerings” are pigeons, all for elevation offerings, the words of Rebbi Jehudah¹⁴⁷It was explained in the preceding Halakhah that R. Jehudah cannot accept the explanation of Mishnah 7 given in Note 134, but must require that a person offering two birds to be able to partake in sancta, the woman after childbirth (Lev. 12:8), the poor person healed from skin disease (Lev. 14:22), the male healed from gonorrhea (Lev. 15:14) and the female from flux (Lev. 15:29), personally deliver the birds to the Cohen who thereby is assured that the person is alive. As a consequence, for him the money deposited for “nests” is for elevation sacrifices; the distinction from “young birds for elevation offerings” only is in the amount of money required and the kind of birds bought. Mishnah 7 was explained following the Sages in Mishnah 8.. But the Sages say, of “nests” one is a purification offering and one an elevation offering; “young birds as elevation offerings” are all elevation offerings. If one says, “I am obligated for wood logs”, he may not give less than for two logs; “incense”, he may not give less than for a fistful; “gold”, he may not give less than for a gold denar¹⁴⁸25 silver denars, or their equivalent in small change.. “Six for voluntary gifts.” What did they do with this? One buys with it elevation offerings¹⁴⁹As with any money delivered to the gift account.; the flesh is for the Eternal and the skins are for the Cohanim. This explanation did Jehoyada the High Priest explain: It is a reparation offering, repairing, a reparation offering for the Eternal¹⁵⁰Lev. 5:19.; this is the principle: Elevation offerings should be bought from anything coming¹⁵¹It is obvious that money given to the Temple for purification or reparation offerings must be used for the kind of offering specified. Money “coming from” these kinds of offerings are excess monies, not used for the obligatory offerings. Since obligatory offerings cannot be brought voluntarily, nor can monies dedicated to the Temple be returned, the excess has to be deposited in the gift account and used for elevation offerings. because of sin or reparation; the flesh is for the Eternal and the skins are for the Cohanim. It turns out that both parts of the verse are fulfilled, a reparation offering for the Eternal and reparation for the Cohanim. And it says, money for reparation offerings and money for purification offerings are not to be brought to the Eternal’s House, it shall be for the Cohanim¹⁵²2K. 12:17. The money is not for the Cohanim but the Cohanim receive the skins of the animals bought with the excess monies..

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. ⁵⁷Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 8(8–10). From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit⁵⁸In Lev. 5:1, “or” is used twice, in vv. 21–22 four times.. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove⁵⁹Num. 35:22–23, in the description of accidental homicide, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove⁶⁰Num. 5:14, the presumption of innocence of the deviant woman is introduced by “or”. The imprecation is not the woman’s but the Cohen’s, v. 19. since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove⁶¹Lev. 5:4, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error⁶²As explained in the preceding Chapters, blurted oaths create a liability for a sacrifice only if they were broken in a period of forgetting, i. e., unintention- ally. There is no mention of unintentional sin for liability in cases of oath about testimony or monetary damages. from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable⁶³He refers to Lev. 5:5: It shall be if he causes damage by some of these; some will require a sacrifice but not others. The decision what to include is left to the religious authorities guided by the hermeneutical principle of “equal cut”. Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1).. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims^41,All examples in Lev. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1.⁶⁴Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(2)..

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. ⁵⁷Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 8(8–10). From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit⁵⁸In Lev. 5:1, “or” is used twice, in vv. 21–22 four times.. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove⁵⁹Num. 35:22–23, in the description of accidental homicide, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove⁶⁰Num. 5:14, the presumption of innocence of the deviant woman is introduced by “or”. The imprecation is not the woman’s but the Cohen’s, v. 19. since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove⁶¹Lev. 5:4, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error⁶²As explained in the preceding Chapters, blurted oaths create a liability for a sacrifice only if they were broken in a period of forgetting, i. e., unintention- ally. There is no mention of unintentional sin for liability in cases of oath about testimony or monetary damages. from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable⁶³He refers to Lev. 5:5: It shall be if he causes damage by some of these; some will require a sacrifice but not others. The decision what to include is left to the religious authorities guided by the hermeneutical principle of “equal cut”. Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1).. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims^41,All examples in Lev. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1.⁶⁴Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(2)..

It was stated⁸⁹The main tannaїtic source is Sifra Wayyiqra דבורא דחובה פרשה ט. The argument is discussed in Babli Ševu‘ot 26b.: “With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind, the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate⁹⁰The verse reads: “Or a person who might swear to articulate with his lips for bad or good, about all a man might articulate in an oath, when he forgot and then remembered about any of these.” Since articulate is used twice in the same verse it is assumed that the second mention is not identical with the first. Since the first mentions lips, the second cannot speak about the same situation. {Biblical dictionaries tend to define בטא as “speaking hastily” on basis of Prov. 12:18. However, as Rashi points out, the context requires:
(17) “He who breathes trust will tell the truth
but a false witness trickery.
(18) There is one who articulates like sword thrusts
but the tongue of the Sages is healing.”
The chiastic arrangement of the verses shows that they form a unit. Therefore, the rabbinic use of the word as “carefully articulated” is borne out by biblical usage. Cf. also Arabic بطو “to be slow-going.”}”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obliged until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind⁹¹The verse is quoted incorrectly (it must be לבו not לב). The verse speaks of voluntary gifts for the Tabernacle; explicit pledges are never mentioned there.,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep⁹²“What comes out from your lips you have to keep as you made a vow of a voluntary gift to the Eternal your God, as you pronounced with your mouth.” A voluntary gift here is a sacrifice; the verse insists that such a vow is valid only if pronounced.,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.

“Incense”, he may not give less than for a fistful. It is said here “remembrance” and it is said there, “remembrance”¹⁶⁰“Here” means the rules of voluntary flour offerings, described in Lev. Chapter 2. “There” means either the rules of the shew bread, Lev. 24:7 or that of the obligatory flour offering of the poor sinner, Lev. 5:12. In the first case, there are two rows of bread, each one with a portion of incense which at the end has to be entirely burned on the altar. In the second case, it is stressed that the entire fistful has to be burned. In both cases it can be inferred that for voluntary flour offerings, where “entire” is not mentioned, only an entire fistful is qualified.. Since “remembrance” there means a full fistful, so “remembrance” here must mean a full fistful. Since “remembrance” there means two fistfuls¹⁶¹This can apply only to the shew bread., does “remembrance” here mean two fistfuls? Rebbi La said, they inferred fistfuls only from the shew bread¹⁶²In B: From the poor sinner’s flour offering.. Since there a deficient fistful is disqualified, also here a deficient fistful is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, the word of Rebbi Ila implies that one who volunteers a flour offering brings it according to the High Priest’s¹⁶³It seems that one refers not to a High Priest, but to a large priest, whose fistful can be enormous. Since the donor does not know which Cohen will present his offering to the altar, he must prepare for the largest possible fistful. fistful. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: even according to the owner’s fistful.

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: The extortionist, and the robber, and the thief⁴⁶⁶The owner obtained a court order of restitution for anything taken unlawfully. If the thing was broken in the meantime or if it was livestock it died (cf. Ex. 21:35), is the thief or robber obligated to pay for the entire damage or may he return the damaged object and pay only the difference between the original value and the amount recoverable from sale of the damaged object?? He answered, it is assumed that the owners do not deal with the dead animal⁴⁶⁷In the Babli, Baba qama 11a, Ulla in the name of R. Eleazar represents the opposite opinion. The opinion expressed here is accepted by the Babylonian authorities as judicial practice. The paragraph is discussed in Tosaphot Baba meṣia‘ 96b/97a, s. v. זיל.. From where that the owners do not deal with the dead animal? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double⁴⁶⁸Ex. 22:3, speaking of the thief of livestock.,” but not dead animals. That refers to theft; for robbery? Rebbi Abun said, “he shall return the robbed object which he robbed⁴⁶⁹Lev. 5:23.,” as it was.

¹⁴⁶Tosephta Ḥallah 2:7–9, Babli Baba Qama 110b, Ḥulin 132b, Sifry Qoraḥ #119 (“12 in the Temple, 12 in the countryside”), Midrash Tanḥuma Bemidbar 24, Num. rabba 5(1).24 gifts were given to Aaron and his sons, ten in the Temple, four in Jerusalem, and ten in the countryside. These are the ten in the Temple: Purification offering¹⁴⁷Lev. 6:19., reparation offering¹⁴⁸Lev. 7:7., public well-being offerings¹⁴⁹Lev. 23:19. Even though this sacrifice is labelled “well-being offering”, being a public offering it is treated as most holy and must be eaten by Cohanim in the Temple precinct., purification offering of a bird¹⁵⁰While there is no separate verse commanding that the purification offering of a bird must be eaten, since the burnt offering of a bird is consumed on the altar it follows that the purification offering must be eaten., the reparation offering for suspected guilt¹⁵¹Lev5:17–18., the log of oil of the skin-diseased¹⁵²Lev 14:10,21. The unused part of the oil becomes property of the Cohen., the two breads¹⁵³Lev. 23:17., the shew-bread¹⁵⁴Lev. 24:9., the remainders of cereal offerings¹⁵⁵Lev. 2:3, 6:9–11., and the ‘omer¹⁵⁶Lev. 23:10–11.. These are in Jerusalem: Firstlings¹⁵⁷While these are sacrifices, after the blood was sprinkled on the altar wall the animal was eaten by the Cohen and his family anywhere in the city., First Fruits¹⁵⁸Cf. Mishnah Bikkurim 3:10., what was lifted from thanksgiving sacrifices and from the nazir’s ram¹⁵⁹In fact, any part lifted for the Cohen from any well-being sacrifice is for the Cohen and his entire family, to be eaten outside the Temple precinct. Cf. Lev. 7:34, Num. 18:11., and the skins of sacrifices¹⁶⁰Only of most holy sacrifices (burnt, purification, and reparation offerings); Lev. 7:8.. These are in the countryside: Heave, Heave of the Tithe, ḥallah, foreleg, jawbone, and first stomach¹²⁷Deut. 18:3., the first shearing¹⁶¹Deut. 18:4., robbery of the proselyte¹⁶²Num. 5:8. It is assumed that the only person without legal heirs is the proselyte who had no children after his conversion., redemption of the firstborn¹⁶³Ex. 13., redemption of the firstborn donkey¹⁶³Ex. 13., ḥērem-dedications, and fields of inheritance¹⁶⁴Dedicated and not redeemed; Lev. 27:16–21..

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious⁸³Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁴The biblical text never hints at the possibility that anybody could be unaware of being in the holy precinct; therefore no penalties are spelled out for this case.. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious⁸⁵Lev. 5:3, speaking of impurities generated by the human body., two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁶This is the opinion formulated in Mishnah 1. The Mishnah is quoted Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq12(7)..

MISHNAH: How much time does one have to return it⁹⁵The defective coin which fails the standards of Mishnah 4.? In walled cities⁹⁶Greek χάραξ, χάρακος “palisade”. until one can show it to a banker, in villages until Sabbath eve. If he recognizes it, he should take it back even after twelve months, but he has only a complaint against him⁹⁷If the person who handed out the defective coin recognizes that it is the coin given out illegally, he has a moral duty to take it back even when the legal period in which he can be forced to take it back has expired. If he refuses, the injured party has the right to complain (i. e., tell about the case to other people) but has no recourse in court.. He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly⁹⁴In Temple times, Second Tithe produce was redeemed for coin which was spent on food in Jerusalem, to be eaten there in purity. Since the redemption is a transaction between a person and himself, occasionally deficient coins may be used since he knows the deficiency. But one may not collect deficient coins during the year and then use the collected coins for redemption (Ma‘aśer Šeni 2:7, Note 96).’⁹⁸After the destruction of the Temple and the disappearence of the ashes of the red cow (cf. Berakhot 1:1, Note 3) when food can no longer be eaten in purity, the coin has to be destroyed. For that purpose it even is preferable to use defective coins..
Cheating is by four oboli⁹⁹Mishnah 3., claim is about two oboli, confession is about one peruṭah¹⁰⁰The court will not impose a judicial oath unless it be a case in which the claim is at least 2 oboli and the defendant admits to owing at least 1 peruṭah:, Mishnah Šebuot 6:1.. There are five peruṭot¹⁰¹The peruṭah appears as minimal standard in five legal categories.: Confession is about one peruṭah¹⁰⁰The court will not impose a judicial oath unless it be a case in which the claim is at least 2 oboli and the defendant admits to owing at least 1 peruṭah:, Mishnah Šebuot 6:1.; a woman is preliminarily married by one peruṭah’s worth¹⁰²Mishnah Qiddušin 1:1.; one who used one peruṭah’s worth of Temple property committed larceny¹⁰³He has to pay a 25% fine and bring a sacrifice, Lev. 5:15–16.; one who finds one peruṭah’ s worth has to make it public; one who robbed another of one peruṭah’s worth and swore about it, has to return it to him even in Media¹⁰⁴Mishnah Bava qamma 9:7..
There are five fifths¹⁰⁵Five cases in which a payment of 125% of the amount is due.: He who eats heave, or heave of the tithe¹⁰⁶If he eats in error, Mishnah Terumot 6:1; Lev. 22:14, Num. 18:26., or heave of the tithe of demay¹⁰⁷This only applies to demay(produce of which it is not known whether it was tithed), but not to the heave of its tithe; Mishnah Demay 1:2, Note 67., or ḥallah¹⁰⁸Num. 15:20., or first fruits¹⁰⁹Mishnah Bikkurim 2:1., adds a fifth¹¹⁰All these cases are considered identical since each of them is called “heave” in a verse.. He who redeems his vineyard in the fourth year¹¹¹Lev.19:24, 27:31. or his Second Tithe¹¹²Mishnah Ma‘aśer Šeni 5:5; Deut.14:25., adds a fifth. He who redeems his own gifts to the Temple, adds a fifth¹¹³Lev. 27:19.. He who used one peruṭah’s worth of Temple property, adds a fifth¹⁰³He has to pay a 25% fine and bring a sacrifice, Lev. 5:15–16.. He who robbed another of one peruṭah’s worth and swore about it, adds a fifth¹¹⁴Lev. 5:24..

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious⁸³Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁴The biblical text never hints at the possibility that anybody could be unaware of being in the holy precinct; therefore no penalties are spelled out for this case.. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious⁸⁵Lev. 5:3, speaking of impurities generated by the human body., two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁶This is the opinion formulated in Mishnah 1. The Mishnah is quoted Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq12(7)..

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself⁷¹All the rules of liability for a variable value sacrifice spelled out in the preceding Mishnaiot are valid for all kinds of oaths irrespective of their content or meaning., or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good⁷²Lev. 5:4. The causative refers to the future.. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse⁷³The continuation of the quote, anything which a person will blurt out in an oath, which seems to be superfluous since the sentence starts: Or a person who would swear blurting out with his lips. The addition indicates that the verse should not be interpreted narrowly. Cf. Note 83.. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other⁷⁴Oaths stating facts about the past..

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. ⁶⁶Babli 33b, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1). It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew⁶⁷Lev. 5:1., etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. ⁶⁸Babli 33b, Tosephta 2:5. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know⁶⁹The witnesses came and testified that they saw a transaction but they have no knowledge about the kind of transaction it was. Had the debtor not said that he would pay if the witnesses came, that testimony would be worthless, but now he has to pay. The Babli assumes that the testimony is without a disclaimer.. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me⁷⁰The biblical fines for seducing a virgin (Ex. 22:16) or raping her (Deut. 22:29)..” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine⁷¹Since he is found in court to be a liar he is barred from swearing to clear himself from the claim. Therefore even a weak testimony will buttress the claim against him., but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman⁷¹Since he is found in court to be a liar he is barred from swearing to clear himself from the claim. Therefore even a weak testimony will buttress the claim against him., but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable⁷²In the Babli, e. g., Ketubot 12b, בָּרִי וְשֶׁמָּא בָּרִי עָדיף “between certain and perhaps, certain is preferred.” If a claim is asserted as certain but the defense is that possibly it is false, there is no defense.. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him⁷³Babli Bava qamma 91b.. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable⁷⁴Since the burden of proof is on the claimant..

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext⁷⁰This refers to the last sentence in Mishnah 5. Since this refers to a vow, which may be annulled by a rabbi or a court, all the restrictions described for oaths are eliminated. Even if he made his vow dependent on minute details, or refers to something in the past, or to minute quantities, or even to worthless things, the vow is valid since he only wants to find a pretext to divorce his wife.. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past⁷⁵He never could swear that X will give Y since it is not in his power to force X to give. This is all about liability for a variable sacrifice, not monetary liabilities. Since witnesses do not swear, this is not a case of perjury.. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past⁷⁶If somebody swore falsely that he put on tefillin he is liable for a sacrifice (Mishnah 9).! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good⁷²Lev. 5:4. The causative refers to the future.; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission⁷⁷The expression היתיר “permission” probably is induced by the usual opposites prohibition - permission. What really is intended here is מצוה “commandment” which is the opposite of something optional; Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah9(6), Babli 27a.. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor⁷⁸Whose words have no legal consequences.. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will⁷⁹Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah9(9), Babli 26a. This includes even a person acting by his own will on false information or false remembering.. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁰Chapter 1, Note 23.? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice⁸¹Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq12(7), Babli 14b; Mishnah 2:6.. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional⁸²Since harming anybody is forbidden, an oath to harm another person does not trigger liability for a sacrifice if it is broken. The example shows that in this case breaking the oath may be a meritorious act. Babli 27a.. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

“He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly.” ¹¹⁸Cf. Babli 53b. A parallel, different treatment is in Ma‘aśer Šeni4:3, Notes 57–63. Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simon¹¹⁹For obvious chronological reasons this must read: R. Simon (in Ma‘aśer Šeni: R. Yose ben R. Simon) in the name of R. Joḥanan.: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe which in itself is not worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe for which the fifth is not worth a peruṭah¹²⁰The Babli presents this as R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion. The Yerushalmi Ma‘aśer Šeni quotes only the second opinion.. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. As it was stated: “From its tithe,¹²¹Lev. 27:31.” except what is worth less than a peruṭah.¹²²As always in rabbinic interpretation, the prefix מ is partitive: Not for all tithe has a fifth to be given in redemption. Sifra Beḥuqqotai Pereq12(10); Babli 53b. This means, not unless itself is worth a peruṭah. Another Tanna states: “From its tithe¹²¹Lev. 27:31., its fifths¹²³Lev. 5:23. The plural “fifths” is interpreted to mean that if somebody is obligated to pay a fifth and then reneges and swears falsely that he does not owe it, the first fifth becomes principal on which another fifth is due. This may continue until the fifth becomes less that a peruṭah. Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 13(12); Babli 53b.” except if it is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Abin bar Mamal¹²⁴Everywhere else, including Ma‘aśer Šeni, he is called Abba bar Mamal. There, it is shown that quite a number of “perutot” are missing from the Mishnah. said, our Mishnah follows neither one since we have stated “there are five peruṭot”, but we did not state “not unless itself is worth a peruṭah”; we have stated “there are five fifths”, but we did not state “not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah”.

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? ⁷²Lev. 5:4. The causative refers to the future.Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail⁸³In the version of Sifra(Introduction1), in the list of the thirteen hermeneutical principles of R. Ismael one finds (5) a general statement followed by a detail, (6) a detail followed by a general statement, (7) a general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement you only argue following the pattern of the detail, (8) a general statement dependent on the detail, (9) a detail dependent on the general statement. Rules 8 and 9 mean that if the general statement can only be understood by the detail or vice versa, rules 5 and 6 do not apply. It then is explained in §7 that if a general statement is followed by a detail, only the detail is intended. §8: If a detail is followed by a general statement, the general statement adds to the detail. Examples are Lev. 1:2: From animals, from cattle, or from small cattle. This implies that sacrifices are restricted to cattle, sheep, or goats. Ex. 22:9: A donkey, an ox, a sheep, or any animal. The rules of caretakers apply to any animal. Then it becomes a problem how to treat a verse which contains general statement, detail, general statement, whether to apply rule 5 (eliminating the final general statement by rule 9), or rule 6 (eliminating the first general statement by rule 8), or rule 7. In the preceding derivation, the arguments have been suppressed that rules 8 and 9 do not apply and, therefore, only rule 7 is relevant. The standard example for an application of rule 7 is Deut. 14:26, about permitted uses of Second Tithe money at the place of the Sanctuary: You may spend the money for anything you desire(general), for cattle, or small cattle, or wine, or liquor(detail), or anything you wish(general). The common denominator of the items in the detail describes animal or vegetable food; Second Tithe money can be used for any food derived from animals (generated from semen) or plants (growing from seeds).
Since the first part of Lev. 5:4 fits Rule 7, it is clear that the rule applies not only to oaths intended to cause good or evil but to a larger set of oaths which, however, have to conform to the idea underlying “causing good or bad things”. Obviously one of the ideas is that events caused are later in time than the cause. This is R. Ismael’s interpretation of the verse. Babli 26a.. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? ⁸⁴Quote from the Mishnah.“He answered him, from the additional text of the verse^73,The continuation of the quote, anything which a person will blurt out in an oath, which seems to be superfluous since the sentence starts: Or a person who would swear blurting out with his lips. The addition indicates that the verse should not be interpreted narrowly. Cf. Note 83.⁸⁵This is not an additional argument. The additional text shows that the rule to be applied is rule 7, not rule 5. R. Aqiba follows a different system. For him the sentence structure is not general, detail, general but expansive, restrictive, expansive, which he reads as including everything except what is completely different from the detail quoted as restriction.. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other⁸⁶The text of R. Aqiba’s answer is the text of the Mishnah in the Babli. It is known that the separate Mishnah in the Yerushalmi is not from the Yerushalmi text. The Mishnah text in Maimonides’s autograph is that of the separate Yerushalmi Mishnah..” You cannot⁸⁷The Mishnah cannot be quoted as proof that R. Ismael conceded to R. Aqiba., as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael¹¹Who is R. Aqiba’s opponent. All of Mishnah 1 is R. Aqiba’s teaching. R. Ismael opposes adding backward looking oaths as blurted oaths. answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath¹²A future directed oath, where it cannot be verified instantly whether it will be kept or violated, is an actionless crime and cannot be prosecuted (cf. Note 3). The preconditions of a sacrifice for a blurted oath negate the possibility of judicial penalties.? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice¹³If R. Aqiba did accept R. Joḥanan’s argument, it would be possible for a person to be flogged for violating the prohibition of perjury (Lev. 19:12) and still be liable for a sacrifice. This would make R. Ismael’s objection irrelevant.? He said to him⁸⁸R. Aqiba to R. Ismael., do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written⁸⁹Since they are not mentioned in the verse. For לי נן read לֵי[ת אִי]נֻּן.? He told him⁹⁰R. Ismael to R. Aqiba., even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good⁹¹It is obvious from rule 7 that the obligation of a variable sacrifice for a blurted oath must hold for a larger set than “causing bad or good things”. The only problem is to define this larger set and the causative employed definitively excludes oaths regarding the past. The Tanna of the Mishnah cannot accept R. Ismael’s hermeneutical rules.? Therefore never for the past⁹²Since the oath is void, he is prevented from sacrificing if it was unintentional. If it was intentional he can be prosecuted for a vain oath, forbidden in the Ten Commandments..

MISHNAH: He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man and swore to him⁷⁶The victim had asked him to return the robbed item when he swore that he had not robbed him. When later he admits to the robbery, Lev.5:23–25 makes it clear that after a false oath there can be no atonement nor any divine forgiveness until the falsely denied debt was paid in full. The “fifth” is computed from above, a fifth of the entire payment which is a fourth of the amount of the robbery. should deliver it to him even in Media⁷⁷Meaning any far-away place which is difficult to reach.. He should deliver neither to [the victim’s] son nor to his agent⁷⁸While one can liquidate a debt through the creditor’s agent, one cannot fulfill the religious duty of restitution by proxy., but he may deliver to an agent of the court⁷⁹Duly appointed in a public act at the request of the victim (cf. Bava meṣi‘a 3:6)., and if [the victim] had died, he has to make restitution to his heirs.
If he had returned the capital⁸⁰The value of the robbed item. but not the fifth^1,The robber, who takes things openly and by force, has to make restitution with possibly a 25% fine, Lev. 5:21–24. The thief who takes things by stealth has to pay double.⁸¹The verse requires personal restitution. The additional 25% constitute a fine; it is additional money, not restitution, and can be liquidated by agent or by mail., or [the victim] had forgiven him the capital but not the fifth or had forgiven him both except for less than a peruṭa’s worth of the capital⁸²Less than a peruṭa’s worth is not money; cf. Qiddušin 1:1, Note 7., he need not follow him.
If he had returned the fifth but not the capital, or [the victim] had forgiven him the fifth but not the capital or had forgiven him both except for a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he has to follow him.
If he paid the capital but swore on the fifth, he pays a fifth for the fifth until the capital⁸³As is explained in the Halakhah, the “capital” is the object of the false oath. For the embezzlement or robbery, the “fifth” is 25% of the original amount. For a false oath about these 25%, the additional fine is 6.25% of the original amount. In the next step, 1.5625% would have to be added and so on. But once the amount in dispute becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth, the process stops since that amount no longer represents money. becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. And so “for a deposit, or a partnership, or robbery, or if he oppressed his neighbor, or found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely,⁸⁴Lev. 5:21.” has to pay the capital, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.

HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for hearing the sound of an imprecation,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of Rebbi Yose the Galilean is, if he is poor and cannot afford it⁸³Lev. 14:21. This is a wrong quote since it refers to the sacrifice of the healed sufferer from skin disease. The expression used in Lev. 5 is וְאִם־לֹ֨א תַגִּ֣יעַ יָדוֹ֮ “if it is out of his reach” for the poor person and וְאִם־לֹא֩ תַשִּׂ֨יג יָד֜וֹ “if he cannot afford” for the poorest.. Somebody who is apt to fall into poverty; this excludes the Anointed⁸⁴He is not mentioned in our Mishnah text, but Mishnah 8 states that the High Priest is exempt according to everybody; only for the king does R. Aqiba disagree; Babli 9a. According to Tosephta 1:10, the king is exempted only for disregarding a request for testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (since his diadem is a permanent atonement for imperfect sacrifices, Ex. 28:38.)
The High Priest is required (Lev.21:10) to be the richest priest; if he is not, the other priests have to make him so. R. Joseph David Sinzheim (Yad David on Horaiot) notes that the High Priest had the choice always to officiate at the burning of incense. Any other priest was given only a once in a lifetime occasion for this (Mishnah Yoma 2:4) since presenting the incense made the presenter rich (explicit in the Babli, implicit in the Yerushalmi, Yoma Halakhah 2:4, 40a 12). The king naturally has taxing powers.
Since king and High Priest are never able to bring a sacrifice according to the rules of the poor (Lev. 5:7–10) or the very poor (vv. 11–13), they are prohibited from ever bringing a sacrifice depending on the offerer’s wealth. who is not apt to fall into poverty. [⁸⁵Text of B. It seems that this text presupposes a Mishnah mentioning only the Anointed; no such Mishnah is known. They objected: There is the prince who is not apt to fall into poverty.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it shall be if he becomes guilty of any of these⁸⁶Lev. 5:5.. He who can be liable for all of them is liable for part of them; but one who cannot be liable for all of them is not liable for part of them⁸⁷Since the king is exempt from testimony and the High Priest for violations of impurity (Note 84), neither of them is qualified to bring a sacrifice for all cases enumerated in vv. 1–4; they are not under the rules of vv. 6–7.. Rebbi Isaac asked: Then he should not become impure by skin disease since he is not apt (easily and then) [to fall]⁸⁸The text in brackets, from B, is the only one making sense; the text of the ms., in parentheses, seems to be a scribal error. into poverty or the deepest of poverty⁸⁹Since the verse quoted at the start of the Halakhah refers to the poor sufferer healed from skin disease. But there is no verse requiring that the sufferer from skin disease be able to bring all possible sacrifices; the question does not deserve an answer.. Rav Hoshaia asked: Then a woman should not be liable for entering the Temple. Does the woman not bring⁹⁰Since a woman cannot be a formal witness in court, she cannot be the subject of an imprecation forcing here to testify. But the question is moot since women after childbirth are ordered in Lev. 12:6–8 to bring a sacrifice after being impure.? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Aqiba, this is the offering of Aaron and his sons⁹¹Lev. 6:13, the daily flour offering of the High Priest, identical in quantity to the variable sacrifice of the very poor. Babli 9a.. This one he brings; he does not bring another tenth of an ephah. Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Yasa⁹²This is the correct attribution, against the text of B. may he not bring a voluntary offering? He told him, yes. He does not bring an obligatory one; he may bring a voluntary one.

We have stated there¹⁸²Mishnah Menaḥot 6:1. In that Mishnah, the anonymous rabbis hold that the entire offering is burned on the altar in one piece.: “Rebbi Simeon says, a fistful is taken from the sinner’s flour offering¹⁸³The flour offering of the very poor person who either refused to testify, was unmindful of his impurity in dealing with the Temple and its appurtenances, or had forgotten an oath he had imposed on himself, Lev.5:11–13. of a Cohen. The fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is sacrificed separately.” Both of them explained the same verse: “It shall be the Cohen’s as a flour offering¹⁸⁴Lev. 5:13. Since one speaks of a flour offering, it is diffult to understand why “it should be like a flour offering”..” The rabbis say, it is like his voluntary flour offering. Since his voluntary flour offering is brought entire, that one also is brought entire¹⁸⁵Voluntary flour offerings are described in Lev. 2:1–11. It is stipulated in Lev. 6:16 that no part of a priest’s flour offering may be eaten. Sifra Ṣaw Pereq 8(5) disagrees with the Yerushalmi; it interprets Lev. 6:16 to deal mainly with the Cohen’s obligatory offerings and only in a derivative fashion with voluntary offerings.. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha¹⁸⁶The amount of flour required for the purification sacrifice, Lev. 5:11. An epha was 3 seah. of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten¹⁸⁷This shows that the offering of a Cohen cannot simply be compared to that of an Israel since the result would contradict biblical precepts.? The verse¹⁸⁸Lev. 6:16. says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” The rest, under which category is it brought, under the rules of a fistful or under the rules of remainders¹⁸⁹This question is about the opinion of R. Simeon. For the rabbis, the offering is brought to the altar in one piece and burned as a sacrifice. But for R. Simeon, since the fistful is brought to the altar as a sacrifice, it makes sense to inquire whether the rest is burned under the same rules or not. If the same rules were to apply, it is difficult to see why there should be two distinct offerings.? If you want to say, under the rules of a fistful, one cannot bring them during the night, one cannot bring them after death, and he is forbidden to think about them¹⁹⁰Sacrifices can be offered in the Temple only between the morning and evening daily sacrifices. Remainders of sacrifices for which blood and fat were offered during daytime can be brought to the altar during the night.
A sacrifice can be brought only during one’s lifetime.
In talmudic theory (Mishnah Zebaḥim 2:2), a sacrifice is either valid or invalid from the start. Therefore, the biblical prohibitions of פִּגּוּל and נוֹתָר (Lev. 19:5–7) are interpreted to mean that the sacrifice becomes permanently prohibited if any of the prescribed actions in the Temple were executed with the idea that the meat should be eaten out of its allotted time or place. This means that the Cohen, by thinking to eat from the rest of the offering the next day or outside the Temple courtyard while dealing with the fistful taken for the altar, will invalidate the offering. This danger is restricted to the fistful, whose correct treatment will permit the rest to be eaten by the Cohanim. What these think while eating the rest is irrelevant; the only actions which are invalidated by wrong thoughts are those on which something else depends, either that part of the sacrifice becomes permitted as food, or that people are purified or otherwise enabled by it.. If you want to say, under the rules of a remainder, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death. Is he forbidden to think about them? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon¹⁹¹While both mss. read here “R. Simeon ben Eleazar”, the continuation of the paragraph shows that the author must be R. Eleazar ben R. Simeon. The Babli, 23a/b, and the Tosephta, 2:6, read: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest is dispersed. says, the fistful is sacrificed separately and the rest dispersed over the ashes. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, where are we holding? If the upper ashes¹⁹²The ashes on the top of the altar are hot and spreading the offering out means burning it on the altar. If that were the meaning, R. Eleazar’s position is that of his father and does not have to be mentioned., Rebbi Simeon already said it. If it cannot refer to the upper ashes, let it refer to the lower ashes¹⁹³The ashes removed from the altar to the floor of the courtyard (Lev.6:2).. That means, one can bring them during the night, one can bring them after death, and he can think about them¹⁹⁴Anything not destined for the altar cannot permit anything else. Therefore, any wrong intention the Cohen may have while depositing the rest on the ashes is irrelevant; he may think what he wishes. Similarly, since the burning of the fistful permits the consumption (or dispersion) of the remainder by the Cohanim, if the owner of the offering dies after the burning of the fistful it cannot have any influence on the status of the rest.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is forbidden to think about them since they are not qualified as food either for humans or for the altar¹⁹⁵The argument of the previous Note is valid only for the offering of an Israel, for whom the fistful really permits the remainder to the Cohanim. But for the offering of a Cohen, the offering of the fistful according to R. Eleazar ben R. Simon does not permit anything, not even to bring the rest onto the altar. Therefore, the sacrificing of the fistful cannot lift the rules of פִּגּוּל and נוֹתָר for the Cohen’s offering.. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: Does Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follow the rules of his father or the rules of the rabbis? According to the rules of his father, it should be brought on top [of the altar]. According to the rules of the rabbis, why should he take a fistful¹⁹⁶They require that the entire offering be burned, cf. Note 182.? He follows his father’s rules. Rebbi Simeon says, the tenth of an epha of a Cohen is like the tenth of an epha of an Israel. Since a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of an Israel, so a fistful is taken from the tenth of an epha of a Cohen. Maybe, since this one is eaten, the other is also eaten? The verse says, “Any flour offering of a Cohen shall be totally burned; it shall not be eaten.” Then it should be burned totally! You bound it to “it shall not be eaten”; you did not bind it to “it has to be sacrificed in its entirety.¹⁹⁷R. Eleazar ben R. Simeon accepts the comparison of the obligatory to the voluntary offering of a Cohen, called “binding (הֶקֵּשׁ) of one verse to the other”; it is only to modify the rule of Lev. 6:16, which deals with voluntary offerings, not that of Lev.6:15, which deals with an obligatory offering of another kind.”

HALAKHAH: “For all commandments of the Torah,” etc. Halakhah 8:“For a suspended sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable,” etc. A person, to include the Prince¹⁰²Lev. 5:17, the introduction to the rules for the suspended reparation sacrifice.. Should it include the Anointed? “And sinned inadvertently.¹⁰³Lev. 5:15. There are two problems with this quote: The first that it is a misquote, it reads וְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה not בְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה. This is easily explainable since in talmudic times under the influence of Greek every ב sounded like v. The serious problem is that the quote is from the paragraph detailing the rules of the fixed reparation sacrifice for larceny committed with sancta. It seems that the quote from Lev. 5:17 refers to the full text וְאִם־נֶ֙פֶשׁ֙ in addition, if a person . . which in Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Parašah 12(1) is explained as meaning that the rules of the suspended reparation sacrifice, vv. 17–19 are an appendix to the rules of the reparation sacrifice for larceny involving sancta, vv. 14–16.” Any depending on acting inadvertently. This excludes the Anointed who is not depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁴He is liable for a sacrifice only if there is an element of ruling falsely, Mishnah 3.. But following Rebbi who said, the Anointed is depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁵Halakhah 3. Rebbi declares him liable for a bull and a goat without an element of ruling falsely in case the subject was idolatry, not in any other case. This permits to formulate the preceding argument so it remains valid even for Rebbi.? One dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. This excludes the Anointed who is not dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. A person, to include the Prince and the Anointed¹⁰⁶Lev. 5:20, the introduction to the rules for the reparation sacrifice for monetary offenses.. Here you say, to include the prince, and there you say, to include the Anointed? Like the purification sacrifices is the reparation sacrifice¹⁰⁷Lev. 7:7.. Just as the purification sacrifice atones and wipes clean, also the reparation sacrifice atones and wipes clean. This excludes the suspended reparation sacrifice which atones but leaves a residue¹⁰⁸If at the end it becomes clear that a sin had be committed which qualifies for a purification offering, the suspended offering did not take its place, and a second sacrifice is due. Therefore the rules for the suspended sacrifice are separate from those of other reparation sacrifices..

HALAKHAH: “For all commandments of the Torah,” etc. Halakhah 8:“For a suspended sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable,” etc. A person, to include the Prince¹⁰²Lev. 5:17, the introduction to the rules for the suspended reparation sacrifice.. Should it include the Anointed? “And sinned inadvertently.¹⁰³Lev. 5:15. There are two problems with this quote: The first that it is a misquote, it reads וְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה not בְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה. This is easily explainable since in talmudic times under the influence of Greek every ב sounded like v. The serious problem is that the quote is from the paragraph detailing the rules of the fixed reparation sacrifice for larceny committed with sancta. It seems that the quote from Lev. 5:17 refers to the full text וְאִם־נֶ֙פֶשׁ֙ in addition, if a person . . which in Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Parašah 12(1) is explained as meaning that the rules of the suspended reparation sacrifice, vv. 17–19 are an appendix to the rules of the reparation sacrifice for larceny involving sancta, vv. 14–16.” Any depending on acting inadvertently. This excludes the Anointed who is not depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁴He is liable for a sacrifice only if there is an element of ruling falsely, Mishnah 3.. But following Rebbi who said, the Anointed is depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁵Halakhah 3. Rebbi declares him liable for a bull and a goat without an element of ruling falsely in case the subject was idolatry, not in any other case. This permits to formulate the preceding argument so it remains valid even for Rebbi.? One dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. This excludes the Anointed who is not dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. A person, to include the Prince and the Anointed¹⁰⁶Lev. 5:20, the introduction to the rules for the reparation sacrifice for monetary offenses.. Here you say, to include the prince, and there you say, to include the Anointed? Like the purification sacrifices is the reparation sacrifice¹⁰⁷Lev. 7:7.. Just as the purification sacrifice atones and wipes clean, also the reparation sacrifice atones and wipes clean. This excludes the suspended reparation sacrifice which atones but leaves a residue¹⁰⁸If at the end it becomes clear that a sin had be committed which qualifies for a purification offering, the suspended offering did not take its place, and a second sacrifice is due. Therefore the rules for the suspended sacrifice are separate from those of other reparation sacrifices..

HALAKHAH: “For all commandments of the Torah,” etc. Halakhah 8:“For a suspended sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable,” etc. A person, to include the Prince¹⁰²Lev. 5:17, the introduction to the rules for the suspended reparation sacrifice.. Should it include the Anointed? “And sinned inadvertently.¹⁰³Lev. 5:15. There are two problems with this quote: The first that it is a misquote, it reads וְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה not בְחָֽטְאָה֙ בִּשְׁגָגָ֔ה. This is easily explainable since in talmudic times under the influence of Greek every ב sounded like v. The serious problem is that the quote is from the paragraph detailing the rules of the fixed reparation sacrifice for larceny committed with sancta. It seems that the quote from Lev. 5:17 refers to the full text וְאִם־נֶ֙פֶשׁ֙ in addition, if a person . . which in Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Parašah 12(1) is explained as meaning that the rules of the suspended reparation sacrifice, vv. 17–19 are an appendix to the rules of the reparation sacrifice for larceny involving sancta, vv. 14–16.” Any depending on acting inadvertently. This excludes the Anointed who is not depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁴He is liable for a sacrifice only if there is an element of ruling falsely, Mishnah 3.. But following Rebbi who said, the Anointed is depending on acting inadvertently¹⁰⁵Halakhah 3. Rebbi declares him liable for a bull and a goat without an element of ruling falsely in case the subject was idolatry, not in any other case. This permits to formulate the preceding argument so it remains valid even for Rebbi.? One dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. This excludes the Anointed who is not dependent on acting inadvertently in any situation. A person, to include the Prince and the Anointed¹⁰⁶Lev. 5:20, the introduction to the rules for the reparation sacrifice for monetary offenses.. Here you say, to include the prince, and there you say, to include the Anointed? Like the purification sacrifices is the reparation sacrifice¹⁰⁷Lev. 7:7.. Just as the purification sacrifice atones and wipes clean, also the reparation sacrifice atones and wipes clean. This excludes the suspended reparation sacrifice which atones but leaves a residue¹⁰⁸If at the end it becomes clear that a sin had be committed which qualifies for a purification offering, the suspended offering did not take its place, and a second sacrifice is due. Therefore the rules for the suspended sacrifice are separate from those of other reparation sacrifices..

MISHNAH: How does one instill fear in witnesses in criminal cases⁹⁵A criminal trial is one where the punishment is either death or flogging. Flogging is potentially life-threatening. A crime for which the punishment is a fine is tried as civil infraction under the rules of civil suits.? One brings them in and instills fear in them. Maybe you would testify by a guess, or by a rumor, or from the mouth of a witness, or you heard it from a trustworthy source⁹⁶This still is hearsay evidence which is inadmissible., or maybe you do not know that we shall examine you by cross-examination and interrogation¹Cross-examination is the interrogation of witnesses which changes from trial to trial. Investigation is the determination of answers to the obligatory questions enumerated in Mishnah 5:1.. You should know that criminal trials are not like civil trials. In civil trials a person⁹⁷On whose incorrect testimony another person was found owing money. pays money and is forgiven. In criminal trials, his blood and the blood of all his descendants hang in the balance, to the end of all generations. So we find when Cain slew his brother, it is said: The sounds of your brother’s bloods cry to me from the earth⁹⁸Gen. 4:10; cf. Gen. rabba 22(21).. It does not say your brother’s blood but your brother’s bloods, his blood and that of his descendants. Another explanation⁹⁹This is a possible correct interpretation of the verse, not to be used as sermon in court. Cf. Gen. rabba 22(22).: Your brother’s bloods, the blood was splashed on trees and stones.
Therefore man was created single in the world to teach that for anybody who destroys a single life it is counted as if he destroyed an entire world, and for anybody who preserves a single life it is counted as if he preserved an entire world. And because of peace among men, that nobody could say to another, my father was greater than your father. And that sectarians¹⁰⁴In general, מין denotes a Jewish Christian. If Jesus was identical in nature with God, he could not have been created or born. If Jesus was similar in nature to God, his creation would contradict the thesis of unique creation of man. If Jesus was simply referring to himself as God’s son in the meaning of Deut. 11:1, he is no power in Heaven. could not say, there are a plurality of powers in Heaven.
And to proclaim the greatness of the King over kings of kings, the Holy One, praise to Him. For a man coins many coins with one die; they are one like the other. But the King over kings of kings, the Holy One, praise to Him, stamps every man with the stamp of the first man, but no one is like any other. Therefore, everybody is required to say, the world was created for me.
Maybe you will say, why should we go to all this trouble? There already is written: If he is a witness, or saw, or knew¹¹²Lev. 5:1. As usual, the implication is from the part of the verse which is not quoted: If he do not tell, he has to bear his sin., etc. Maybe you will say, why should we be guilty of this man’s blood? There already is written: In destruction of evildoers is clamor¹¹³Prov. 11:10..

Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment¹⁹³Lev. 5:1., a sacrifice¹⁹⁴This supports Rav, that a sacrifice is due for any untruthful oath.. From where that one needs a court¹⁹⁵That a sacrifice is required only for oaths connected with judicial proceedings.? One learns “telling, telling¹⁹⁶The only legal texts in the Pentateuch which use the root נגד are Lev. 5:1 and Deut. 17:9–11. The latter text contains the rules of the Supreme Court and the punishment for disobeying its rulings.”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his”⁷⁶Since the widow’s ketubah is guaranteed by her first husband’s estate, there is no reason why the standing grain should go to the levir. If the husband had lived, it would have been his, but it could not be the levir’s before the latter actually married the widow. One has to correct the Mishnah to hers from his. This argument is R. Simeon ben Laqish’s in the Babli, 82a. but [ ]⁷⁷The word “hers” is missing in ms. and editio princeps; it is understood in the text.. In which respect? In case the heir took it⁷⁸If the levir harvested the grain without crediting it to the widow’s ketubah fund, she can go to court and have him acquire real estate for the corresponding amount., one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands⁷⁹The same statement is quoted in Halakhah 9:3; there the scribe wrote: “one does not remove from their hands”, but the first corrector crossed out “not”. In both cases, the context implies that the scribe’s original text is the correct one. Since the heir does not have a claim on the standing grain, the heir’s creditor does not have one either.? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.⁸⁰It is stated repeatedly in the Babli (Yebamot 46a,66b; Giṭṭin 40b; Ketubot 59b, Nedarim 86b; Baba Qama90a) that dedications to the Temple break contracts. This rule is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi and the latter’s position in this matter is not known. In Rashi’s interpretation, only dedications to the altar break contracts, not dedications which are purely monetary gifts to Temple or charity. Therefore, that principle does not apply here in any case.
The text is Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:2. There it is stated that if somebody dedicates his encumbered property, neither can the wife collect her ketubah nor a creditor his claim from Temple property which must first be redeemed. Then it is stated that if the creditor’s claim is at least equal to the appraised value of the property, he may lend another denar to the debtor and force him to redeem it to be able to foreclose the now secular property.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption⁸¹This is a generally accepted principle; Babli Arakhin 32b, Pesaḥim31a. The redemption is purely symbolical since the debtor did not have the right to injure the creditor’s claim by dedication; therefore, the dedication is invalid.. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny⁸²Me‘ilah is larceny with Temple property which requires restitution in the amount of 125% and a sacrifice; Lev. 5:14–16. R. Joḥanan implies that a person using the dedicated property for his personal advantage before it was redeemed is obligated for a sacrifice. On the other hand, it is sinful to offer unnecessary sacrifices which would be ”profane animals in the Temple courtyard.” If the sacrifice is valid then the dedication must be valid and could not be undone by a token amount but would require appraisal by a Cohen (Lev. 27:11–14).. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate⁸³Lev. 5:14 restricts me‘ilah to “the Eternal’s holy things”, which excludes real estate.? But we talk about standing grain⁸⁴This is not subject to me‘ilah when standing but will be subject once it is cut.. Since if the administrator⁸⁵The Temple’s chief financial officer. Since the dedication was invalid when made for the field, he should not have cut the grain. But once it was cut, it becomes legitimate Temple property and can be sold for the Temple’s upkeep. misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule⁸⁶This does not mean that the levir can take the standing grain, cut it, and keep it, but that the their’s standing vis-à-vis the creditor is like the administrator’s vis-à-vis the creditor. Since the creditor’s lien is on the real estate, it cannot cover the grain once it is cut and made movable. (Cf. the commentary RYDBZ ad loc. in the Wilna ed., and the novellae of Rashba, Giṭṭin 40b, end.). Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate⁸⁷Since the ox is movable, the dedication should be absolute.? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value⁸⁸This is a rabbinical rule to protect the holders of chattel mortgages.. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand⁸⁹This is the main question of this paragraph: Since the heir can cut the grain to the detriment of the lienholder, why can he not cut the grain to the detriment of the widow who also is a lienholder?. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive¹¹⁸This is the position of the Yerushalmi here and in 7:1 (Note 11), Eruvin 3 (21b l. 24), Qiddušin 3:4 Note 136, Nedarim1:4 Note 158. (The explanation given there that the statement of R. Yasa in the name of R. Joḥanan is a rhetorical question is incorrect; the statement is a straightforward declarative sentence.) The Babli (36a, Nedarim 11a,13b, Soṭah 17a) is totally opposed; it proposes to switch the attributions in the Mishnah between R. Meїr and the Sages.. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice¹¹⁹Lev. 5:1., to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation¹²⁰Babli 36a, Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 8(2)..