Tosefta su Levitico 5:78

All of those who are unclean according to the Torah, whether they are made unclean by a minor source of impurity or a major one, are liable for impurity [they impart to] the Temple and its sacrificial foods, as it says, “[When a person touches] any impure thing” (Lev 5:2), to include all the ones who are unclean according to the Torah. “Or anyone” (Lev 5:2)—why is this said? Since there are three mitzvot stated in the verse, two explicitly and two implicitly, learn the implicit from the explicit. Just as the one mad explicit [requires] an oath, so too the unexplained [require] an oath. Even if he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that I have not been made unclean,” and they said to him, “[By an] oath, [we swear] that we do not know any testimony on your behalf,” can they be liable? Scripture says, “or anyone,” to separate them from the rules of impurity and bring it into the rules of oaths. “Or anyone”—to include all people, even the prince and the anointed [priest]. Rabbi Yirmiya says, it is a matter one learns from its context. As it says, “But if one’s means to not suffice for a sheep” (Lev 5:7) and it says, “And if one’s means do not suffice for two [turtledoves or pigeons]” (Lev 5:11). Scripture speaks of one who has become poor, excluding the prince and the anointed [priest], who are not in the category of those who are poor, because their sanctification lasts forever. “Any impure thing” (Lev 5:2)—why does the Scripture say “thing”? Rabbi Aqiva says, to include the nega upon whom impurity does not settle. Rather in a matter that Rabbi Aqiva did not derive from a klal u’frat, he would derive via “inclusions and exclusions.” Thus did he learn from Nahum of Gam Zu. Rabbi Natan says, to include utensils upon which impurity does not settle, except by the intention [of the maker]. He said to him, Why are utensils seen [as impure] because of intention? For Rabbi Shimon would not derive from “inclusion and exclusion,” but he would derive from klal u’frat u’klal. “Or anyone touches any unclean thing”—a generalization (klal). “Or touches the corpse of an unclean beast”—a specification (prat). “Or when one touches human impurity” (Lev 5:3)—a generalization (klal). Klal u’frat u’klal, you do not decide except by the matter of the specification [which limits the rule]. When it says, “of whatever kind by which a person becomes impure” (Lev 5:3), it goes back and generalizes. If [one proposes] that [it is all included in] the first generalization, we say no. Rather it is a klal u'frat u'klal. You do not decide except by the matter of the specification. It says to you, as the specification is explicit about explicit kinds of impurity that are in Torah—excluding a herd of camels or a herd of sheep or a pack of wild animals or a resting bird, so impurity that is not explicit in the Torah [must be excluded]. Rabbi Natan says, impurity of glens and not impufity of consecrated things, excluding the one who burns the cow and the bulls and the one who sends out the goat, which are forms of impurity of consecrated things. I know only [that the rule applies to] clean domesticated species, wild animals, and birds. Unclean domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds, from where do I know this? Scripture says, “or the corpse of an unclean sheretz” (Lev 5:2). Rabbi Yoshiya said, Is there an unclean sheretz and a clean sheretz? Rather, just as it [does not] distinguish between an unclean sheretz and a clean one, thus between a domesticated animal and a wild animal, one should not distinguish between unclean and clean. I know only that [when I have] all of it [the animal]. [That it applies when I have only] an olive’s-bulk, from where do we learn it? Scripture says, “the corpse of an unclean wild animal” (Lev 5:2). Just as Scripture says impurity, it includes an olive’s bulk. Rabbi Shimon says, what was the reason they said that the domestic animal and the wild animal is impure [in the amount of] an olive’s-bulk, but of a sheretz [only] the bulk of a lentil? Rather, just as the domestic animal and the wild animal at the beginning of their creation are an olive’s-bulk, the sheretz is at the time of its creation a lentil’s bulk.

All of those who are unclean according to the Torah, whether they are made unclean by a minor source of impurity or a major one, are liable for impurity [they impart to] the Temple and its sacrificial foods, as it says, “[When a person touches] any impure thing” (Lev 5:2), to include all the ones who are unclean according to the Torah. “Or anyone” (Lev 5:2)—why is this said? Since there are three mitzvot stated in the verse, two explicitly and two implicitly, learn the implicit from the explicit. Just as the one mad explicit [requires] an oath, so too the unexplained [require] an oath. Even if he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that I have not been made unclean,” and they said to him, “[By an] oath, [we swear] that we do not know any testimony on your behalf,” can they be liable? Scripture says, “or anyone,” to separate them from the rules of impurity and bring it into the rules of oaths. “Or anyone”—to include all people, even the prince and the anointed [priest]. Rabbi Yirmiya says, it is a matter one learns from its context. As it says, “But if one’s means to not suffice for a sheep” (Lev 5:7) and it says, “And if one’s means do not suffice for two [turtledoves or pigeons]” (Lev 5:11). Scripture speaks of one who has become poor, excluding the prince and the anointed [priest], who are not in the category of those who are poor, because their sanctification lasts forever. “Any impure thing” (Lev 5:2)—why does the Scripture say “thing”? Rabbi Aqiva says, to include the nega upon whom impurity does not settle. Rather in a matter that Rabbi Aqiva did not derive from a klal u’frat, he would derive via “inclusions and exclusions.” Thus did he learn from Nahum of Gam Zu. Rabbi Natan says, to include utensils upon which impurity does not settle, except by the intention [of the maker]. He said to him, Why are utensils seen [as impure] because of intention? For Rabbi Shimon would not derive from “inclusion and exclusion,” but he would derive from klal u’frat u’klal. “Or anyone touches any unclean thing”—a generalization (klal). “Or touches the corpse of an unclean beast”—a specification (prat). “Or when one touches human impurity” (Lev 5:3)—a generalization (klal). Klal u’frat u’klal, you do not decide except by the matter of the specification [which limits the rule]. When it says, “of whatever kind by which a person becomes impure” (Lev 5:3), it goes back and generalizes. If [one proposes] that [it is all included in] the first generalization, we say no. Rather it is a klal u'frat u'klal. You do not decide except by the matter of the specification. It says to you, as the specification is explicit about explicit kinds of impurity that are in Torah—excluding a herd of camels or a herd of sheep or a pack of wild animals or a resting bird, so impurity that is not explicit in the Torah [must be excluded]. Rabbi Natan says, impurity of glens and not impufity of consecrated things, excluding the one who burns the cow and the bulls and the one who sends out the goat, which are forms of impurity of consecrated things. I know only [that the rule applies to] clean domesticated species, wild animals, and birds. Unclean domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds, from where do I know this? Scripture says, “or the corpse of an unclean sheretz” (Lev 5:2). Rabbi Yoshiya said, Is there an unclean sheretz and a clean sheretz? Rather, just as it [does not] distinguish between an unclean sheretz and a clean one, thus between a domesticated animal and a wild animal, one should not distinguish between unclean and clean. I know only that [when I have] all of it [the animal]. [That it applies when I have only] an olive’s-bulk, from where do we learn it? Scripture says, “the corpse of an unclean wild animal” (Lev 5:2). Just as Scripture says impurity, it includes an olive’s bulk. Rabbi Shimon says, what was the reason they said that the domestic animal and the wild animal is impure [in the amount of] an olive’s-bulk, but of a sheretz [only] the bulk of a lentil? Rather, just as the domestic animal and the wild animal at the beginning of their creation are an olive’s-bulk, the sheretz is at the time of its creation a lentil’s bulk.

All of those who are unclean according to the Torah, whether they are made unclean by a minor source of impurity or a major one, are liable for impurity [they impart to] the Temple and its sacrificial foods, as it says, “[When a person touches] any impure thing” (Lev 5:2), to include all the ones who are unclean according to the Torah. “Or anyone” (Lev 5:2)—why is this said? Since there are three mitzvot stated in the verse, two explicitly and two implicitly, learn the implicit from the explicit. Just as the one mad explicit [requires] an oath, so too the unexplained [require] an oath. Even if he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that I have not been made unclean,” and they said to him, “[By an] oath, [we swear] that we do not know any testimony on your behalf,” can they be liable? Scripture says, “or anyone,” to separate them from the rules of impurity and bring it into the rules of oaths. “Or anyone”—to include all people, even the prince and the anointed [priest]. Rabbi Yirmiya says, it is a matter one learns from its context. As it says, “But if one’s means to not suffice for a sheep” (Lev 5:7) and it says, “And if one’s means do not suffice for two [turtledoves or pigeons]” (Lev 5:11). Scripture speaks of one who has become poor, excluding the prince and the anointed [priest], who are not in the category of those who are poor, because their sanctification lasts forever. “Any impure thing” (Lev 5:2)—why does the Scripture say “thing”? Rabbi Aqiva says, to include the nega upon whom impurity does not settle. Rather in a matter that Rabbi Aqiva did not derive from a klal u’frat, he would derive via “inclusions and exclusions.” Thus did he learn from Nahum of Gam Zu. Rabbi Natan says, to include utensils upon which impurity does not settle, except by the intention [of the maker]. He said to him, Why are utensils seen [as impure] because of intention? For Rabbi Shimon would not derive from “inclusion and exclusion,” but he would derive from klal u’frat u’klal. “Or anyone touches any unclean thing”—a generalization (klal). “Or touches the corpse of an unclean beast”—a specification (prat). “Or when one touches human impurity” (Lev 5:3)—a generalization (klal). Klal u’frat u’klal, you do not decide except by the matter of the specification [which limits the rule]. When it says, “of whatever kind by which a person becomes impure” (Lev 5:3), it goes back and generalizes. If [one proposes] that [it is all included in] the first generalization, we say no. Rather it is a klal u'frat u'klal. You do not decide except by the matter of the specification. It says to you, as the specification is explicit about explicit kinds of impurity that are in Torah—excluding a herd of camels or a herd of sheep or a pack of wild animals or a resting bird, so impurity that is not explicit in the Torah [must be excluded]. Rabbi Natan says, impurity of glens and not impufity of consecrated things, excluding the one who burns the cow and the bulls and the one who sends out the goat, which are forms of impurity of consecrated things. I know only [that the rule applies to] clean domesticated species, wild animals, and birds. Unclean domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds, from where do I know this? Scripture says, “or the corpse of an unclean sheretz” (Lev 5:2). Rabbi Yoshiya said, Is there an unclean sheretz and a clean sheretz? Rather, just as it [does not] distinguish between an unclean sheretz and a clean one, thus between a domesticated animal and a wild animal, one should not distinguish between unclean and clean. I know only that [when I have] all of it [the animal]. [That it applies when I have only] an olive’s-bulk, from where do we learn it? Scripture says, “the corpse of an unclean wild animal” (Lev 5:2). Just as Scripture says impurity, it includes an olive’s bulk. Rabbi Shimon says, what was the reason they said that the domestic animal and the wild animal is impure [in the amount of] an olive’s-bulk, but of a sheretz [only] the bulk of a lentil? Rather, just as the domestic animal and the wild animal at the beginning of their creation are an olive’s-bulk, the sheretz is at the time of its creation a lentil’s bulk.

All of those who are unclean according to the Torah, whether they are made unclean by a minor source of impurity or a major one, are liable for impurity [they impart to] the Temple and its sacrificial foods, as it says, “[When a person touches] any impure thing” (Lev 5:2), to include all the ones who are unclean according to the Torah. “Or anyone” (Lev 5:2)—why is this said? Since there are three mitzvot stated in the verse, two explicitly and two implicitly, learn the implicit from the explicit. Just as the one mad explicit [requires] an oath, so too the unexplained [require] an oath. Even if he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that I have not been made unclean,” and they said to him, “[By an] oath, [we swear] that we do not know any testimony on your behalf,” can they be liable? Scripture says, “or anyone,” to separate them from the rules of impurity and bring it into the rules of oaths. “Or anyone”—to include all people, even the prince and the anointed [priest]. Rabbi Yirmiya says, it is a matter one learns from its context. As it says, “But if one’s means to not suffice for a sheep” (Lev 5:7) and it says, “And if one’s means do not suffice for two [turtledoves or pigeons]” (Lev 5:11). Scripture speaks of one who has become poor, excluding the prince and the anointed [priest], who are not in the category of those who are poor, because their sanctification lasts forever. “Any impure thing” (Lev 5:2)—why does the Scripture say “thing”? Rabbi Aqiva says, to include the nega upon whom impurity does not settle. Rather in a matter that Rabbi Aqiva did not derive from a klal u’frat, he would derive via “inclusions and exclusions.” Thus did he learn from Nahum of Gam Zu. Rabbi Natan says, to include utensils upon which impurity does not settle, except by the intention [of the maker]. He said to him, Why are utensils seen [as impure] because of intention? For Rabbi Shimon would not derive from “inclusion and exclusion,” but he would derive from klal u’frat u’klal. “Or anyone touches any unclean thing”—a generalization (klal). “Or touches the corpse of an unclean beast”—a specification (prat). “Or when one touches human impurity” (Lev 5:3)—a generalization (klal). Klal u’frat u’klal, you do not decide except by the matter of the specification [which limits the rule]. When it says, “of whatever kind by which a person becomes impure” (Lev 5:3), it goes back and generalizes. If [one proposes] that [it is all included in] the first generalization, we say no. Rather it is a klal u'frat u'klal. You do not decide except by the matter of the specification. It says to you, as the specification is explicit about explicit kinds of impurity that are in Torah—excluding a herd of camels or a herd of sheep or a pack of wild animals or a resting bird, so impurity that is not explicit in the Torah [must be excluded]. Rabbi Natan says, impurity of glens and not impufity of consecrated things, excluding the one who burns the cow and the bulls and the one who sends out the goat, which are forms of impurity of consecrated things. I know only [that the rule applies to] clean domesticated species, wild animals, and birds. Unclean domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds, from where do I know this? Scripture says, “or the corpse of an unclean sheretz” (Lev 5:2). Rabbi Yoshiya said, Is there an unclean sheretz and a clean sheretz? Rather, just as it [does not] distinguish between an unclean sheretz and a clean one, thus between a domesticated animal and a wild animal, one should not distinguish between unclean and clean. I know only that [when I have] all of it [the animal]. [That it applies when I have only] an olive’s-bulk, from where do we learn it? Scripture says, “the corpse of an unclean wild animal” (Lev 5:2). Just as Scripture says impurity, it includes an olive’s bulk. Rabbi Shimon says, what was the reason they said that the domestic animal and the wild animal is impure [in the amount of] an olive’s-bulk, but of a sheretz [only] the bulk of a lentil? Rather, just as the domestic animal and the wild animal at the beginning of their creation are an olive’s-bulk, the sheretz is at the time of its creation a lentil’s bulk.

If he was unclean and the uncleanness left him but he remembered the Temple, or he forgot this one and that one, and he prostrated himself or stayed there for [enough time] to prostrate himself or he stayed with his fellow for [enough time] to prostrate himself or he entered the addition to the courtyard and stayed [long enough] to prostrate himself—he is liable for each and every one, according to Rabbi Yishmael . For Rabbi Yishmal says, “it was hidden from him” (Lev 5:2) and “it was hidden from him” (Lev 5:3), two times, to obligate him for forgetting the matter of impurity and for forgetting the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Aqiva say, he is only liable for forgetting the impurity.

If he was unclean and the uncleanness left him but he remembered the Temple, or he forgot this one and that one, and he prostrated himself or stayed there for [enough time] to prostrate himself or he stayed with his fellow for [enough time] to prostrate himself or he entered the addition to the courtyard and stayed [long enough] to prostrate himself—he is liable for each and every one, according to Rabbi Yishmael . For Rabbi Yishmal says, “it was hidden from him” (Lev 5:2) and “it was hidden from him” (Lev 5:3), two times, to obligate him for forgetting the matter of impurity and for forgetting the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Aqiva say, he is only liable for forgetting the impurity.

The one who imposes an oath on an idolator, or on women, or on minors, or on relatives, or on those invalid [to testify], they are exempt, as it says, “Though he was a witness” (Lev 5:1). [It speaks] of a witness that is suitable to extract money [from a defendant]. Rabbi Eliezer says, the one who imposes an oath on a single witness is exempt, as he is not suitable to extract money. Testimony about money is established on what one has seen but not known or what one has known but not seen. What [is a case] where one has seen but does not have knowledge? “Give me two hundred zuz which are in your hand!” “You have no money in my hand.” “Didn’t I count for you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so?” “They should say, and I will give you!” This is seeing without having knowledge. And what is having knowledge without seeing? “Give me two hundred zuz that are in your hand!” “You don’t have two hundred zuz in my hand.” “Didn’t ou admit to me in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so?” “Let them say, and I will pay you.” This is knowledge without seeing.

They are liable for deliberate testimony with a deliberate oath, and for a deliberate testimony with an inadvertent oath, and for inadvertent testimony he is exempt. And what is deliberate testimony with a deliberate oath for which he is liable? If he knew testimony for someone and he knew that whoever makes a [false] oath brings a sacrifice, this is deliberate testimony with a deliberate oath for which he is liable. And what is deliberate testimony with an inadvertent oath for which he is liable? If he knew testimony for him but did not know that one who makes a [false] oath brings a sacrifice, this is deliberate testimony with an inadvertent oath for which he is liable. And which is inadvertent testimony for which he is exempt? He did not know any testimony for him or he knew and forgot it at the moment he took the oath, he is exempt, as it says, “And he took an oath falsely” (Lev 5:1).

They are liable for deliberately [denying] a deposit and deliberately taking an oath, and for deliberately [denying] a deposit with an inadvertent oath, but for inadvertently [denying] a deposit, he is exempt. Which is the case of deliberately [denying] a deposit with a deliberate oath for which he is liable? If he knew that he had a deposit in his possession and he knew that anyone who makes a [false] oath [in this situation] brings a sacrifice, this is a deliberate [denying] a deposit and deliberately [taking a false] oath, for which he is liable. Which is deliberately [denying] a deposit and inadvertently [taking a false] oath, for which he is liable? If he knew that he had a deposit in his possession but he did not know that one who takes a [false] oath [in this situation] brings a sacrifice, this is deliberately [denying] a deposit and inadvertently [taking a false] oath, for which he is liable. Which is inadvertently [denying] a deposit, for which he is exempt? If he didn’t know that he had a deposit in his possession or if he knew but then forgot in the moment that he took the oath, he is exempt, as it says, “And he took an oath falsely” (Lev 5:1). If he went after witnesses and they said, “Why are you coming after us? By oath, we know no testimony for you,” they are exempt until he makes a claim against them. But [in the case of] a bailment, it is not like that. “Why are you coming after me? By oath, I have nothing of yours in my possession,” he is exempt [liable?]. The rule of an oath relating to a bailment is stricter than the rule of an oath about testimony. If he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that I have in so-and-so’s possession 200 zuz, the wage of a hired man or money for my wife and daughters.” “By oath, we will not testify for you,” these are exempt until they say, “By oath, we do not know any testimony on your behalf.” And thus regarding bailment: If he said to him, “Give me two hundred zuz that I have in your possession from the business of a hired man’s wages or the money for my wife and daughters.” “By oath, I will not give to you,” he is exempt until he says to him, “By oath, I have nothing of yours in my possession.” If he said to the witnesses, “Come and testify for me that so-and-so said to give to me two hundred zuz and he didn’t give it to me” [or] “a garment that he said he would clothe me [with] and he did not clothe me.” “By oath, we do not know any testimony for you,” these are exempt as he might say to him, “He told me to give to you but it is not possible to give to you.” Or, “he said he would clothe you but it is not possible to clothe you.” And thus for a bailment: If he said, “He said [he would] give two hundred zuz but he did not give it to me,” [or] “a garment that he said he would [use] to clothe me, and he did not clothe me.” “By oath, I have nothing of yours in my possession,” he is exempt, for he could say to him, “I said I would give to you but it is not possible to give to you.” Or “I said I would clothe you but it is not possible to clothe you.”

[A person] who is cutting gavels [of grain, with intention] to bundle them into sheaves later [and not right away], and also [a person who is piling up] heaps of garlic [with intention to make from the heaps] bundles of garlic, or [spread out] onions, [later and not right away, if any of these gavels of grain or heaps of garlic, or spread out onions, have been forgotten in the field, the law of] Shikcha (forgotten sheaves) does not apply to them, [and therefore they still belong to the owner, who can go back and retrieve them.] [A person] who is binding sheaves, because of [an approaching] fire or because of an irrigation canal [that broke through and is about to flood the field, if any of these sheaves have been forgotten in the field the law of] Shikcha does not apply to them, [and therefore they still belong to the owner, who can go back and retrieve them,] because he (i.e. the farmer) will check [the field for any forgotten sheaves, since he is not harvesting them, but rather moving them out of the way of the fire or flooding water.] It happened with a certain pious person that he forgot a sheaf in his field [during harvest,] and he said to his son, “Go [to the Temple in Jerusalem] and sacrifice in my name a bull for Korban Olah (burnt-offering) and a bull for Korban Shlamim (peace-offering).” He (i.e. his son) said [back] to him (i.e. the father), “Father! What have you seen in this commandment [of Shikcha that caused you] to rejoice [about it] more than all [other] commandments that are mentioned in the Torah?” He (i.e. the father) said [back] to him (i.e. the son), “All [other] commandments [that are mentioned] in the Torah have been given to us by God [to be executed] consciously (i.e. on purpose with intent). [But] this [commandment of Shikcha was given to us by God to be executed] unconsciously (i.e. accidentally due to forgetfulness), because if we would have done it willingly (i.e. left the sheaf in the field on purpose for the poor to take) in front of God, this commandment would not be counted for us [as a fulfilled commandment of Shikcha, but rather as a random act of kindness.]” He (i.e. the son) said [back] to him (i.e. the father), “It says [in the Torah], ‘When you will harvest your harvest in your field and you will forget a sheaf in the field, do not go back to take it. It shall be [left there] for the Non-Jewish resident, for the orphan, and for the widow, in order that Hashem, your God, will bless you with all the deeds of your hand.’ (Devarim 24:19) The verse has granted him (i.e. the farmer who left the sheaf in the field) a blessing. [But why did the verse need to say explicitly that the farmer will get a blessing?] Is not it a Kal Vechomer (derivation from minor to major) [which can be concluded by us logically without the need of an explicit verse]? Just like someone who did not intend to do something good, but he [ended up] doing something good [anyway], the verse considers him as if he has done something good, so for sure someone who intended to do something good, and [ended up] doing something good [that he meant to do] how much more so [should get a blessing]?” Similarly, [it says in the Torah:] “If a soul from the common people sins by accident by doing one of the negative commandments of Hashem, and becomes guilty of it. When his sin which he sinned will become known to him … (the verses go on to describe the sacrifice that the sinner should bring) … and the priest will atone for him, and he will be forgiven.” (Vayikra 4:27-31) And it is a Kal Vechomer [which can be concluded by us logically]! Just like someone who did not intend to sin, but sinned [anyway], we consider him as if he sinned. So someone who intended to sin and [then] sinned, how much more so [should be considered as if he sinned. And therefore will for sure get punished.]