Talmud su Numeri 30:14

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons¹The language of the Mishnah implies that the wife was told (maybe by hearsay), not that she received testimony that would stand up in court. This is clear from the following Mishnaiot and the discussion at the end of Halakhah 2. came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried²Without having her husband declared dead by a competent court. That a woman may remarry even if her husband’s death is not confirmed by two independent witnesses of sterling character (Deut. 19:15) is a rabbinic institution. and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands³It is clear that she has to leave the second husband since her marriage to him was invalid by biblical standards. As pointed out by both Talmudim, this shows that the rules of the Mishnah are rabbinical., she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows⁴Num. 30:14.. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah⁵If the deceased husband had sons from different wives, before the inheritance is distributed the ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons.. If they died⁶Before the divorce documents were executed and there are no children., the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵Num. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶Num. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead²³Everybody agrees that there exist situations in which an agent acts with the full authority of a principal and others where only the person himself can act. The question is, what is the normal case and what is the exception?. “If he definitively will substitute²⁴This seems to be a quote from Lev. 27:10, but there the masoretic text is הָמֵר יָמִיר. If the word יְמִירֶנּוּ is not a slip of the scribe’s pen, the reference might be to יַחֲליפֶנּוּ (“he himself may exchange it”) in the same verse. There is no explicit baraita in rabbinic literature which would invalidate substitution by agent; the double expression is always interpreted as an addition in R. Aqiba’s system. In Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 9(6), the double expression is interpreted to include a woman for her own sacrifice and an heir for an inherited one. Since the agent is not mentioned, he is excluded. In the Babli, Temurah 2a, the statement of Sifra is characterized as R. Meïr’s., if he himself will dissolve²⁵Num. 30:14. This does not refer to an infinitive construction but to the use of the word יְפֵרֶנּוּ instead of the simple יָפֵר. In R. Aqiba’s system, suffixes always carry a special meaning. The argument is explicit in the Babli, Nazir 12b, where the Tanna R. Joshia quotes Num. 30:14 to prove that a husband cannot delegate his power over his wife’s vows to an attorney. R. Jonathan holds that an agent always can act for his principal..” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,²⁶Lev. 1:4;3:2,8,13;4:24,29,33, a necessary action to validate a sacrifice. The repetition of his hand in all these verses is taken in the Babli, Menaḥot93b, as proof that any agency is impossible for animal sacrifices.” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent²⁷This formulation is in Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 4(2).. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl²⁸Ex. 21:6, speaking of the Hebrew slave; cf. Chapter 1:2.;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent²⁹Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 253), dR.Simeon ben Ioḥai Mišpaṭim 6:6.. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority³⁰This opinion is not found in any parallel source..

It is written³⁰Num. 30:14.: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls³¹In the opinion of S. Fraenkel κολλίκιον, diminutive of Greek κόλλιξ “large round bread”.. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one³²There were two pieces of meat and she was afraid her husband would take the nicer (larger) one for himself. It is assumed that the servants cooked and brought the meal. and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification³³She might change her mind and opt for the smaller piece. The Babli, 82b, holds that the husband cannot dissolve as long as she has enough not to be hungry. It does not discuss the case of a person becoming afraid of overeating.. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification³⁴Since the verse speaks only of mortification whithout indicating to whom it refers, it is implied that the husband can dissolve his wife’s vow if it mortifies him.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me³⁵The Babli, 82a, agrees with both statements.. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there³⁶Which is declared to be R. Yose’s opinion.: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose³⁷The late Amora. said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him³⁸Since he would have to go hungry if he is temporarily out of cash and could not pay another grocer, this certainly is potential mortification for him.. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce³⁹R. Mana even considers it mortification if he had to take a lesser quality from another store..

HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it⁶³Num. 30: 14: “Her husband may confirm it or her husband may dissolve it.”
The Tosephta (7:4) has a fifth version: The husband may confirm one and dissolve the other of two vows made at the same time, i. e., it is applicable to the situation described at the end of Mishnah 6.”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally⁶⁴The husband has only the choice to accept or to reject the wife’s vow in toto., “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides⁶⁵In Halakhah 9, R. Ismael says the determining factor is the vow. A multiplicity of vows made at the same time is treated as a multiplicity; there are two separate vows in our case. R. Aqiba says that a multiplicity of prohibitions imposed at the same time are one prohibition; there is only one vow..

MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed⁵⁴In his absence. Everybody agrees that an as yet nonexistent vow cannot be confirmed., he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved.
Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition⁵⁵Vows actually made by which the wife imposes a legally enforceable prohibition on herself., should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition⁵⁶Vows not yet made.? They said to him, it says⁵⁷Num. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels. ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.

HALAKHAH: ⁶⁸This refers to Mishnaiot 8,9. Tosephta 6:5; Babli 75b.“He⁶⁹In the parallel sources: They. This is no longer part of R. Aqiba’s argument, but belongs to the anonymous Sages. answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh⁷⁰The ritual bath cleanses from most impurities. But a pure person cannot immerse himself to become immune to future impurities. prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them?⁷¹It is difficult to make sense of this text. In Tosephta and Babli one reads: מָה אִם בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ מִשֶׁנָּדַר הֲרֵי הוּא מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. מָקוֹם שֶׁמֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשֶׁנָּֽדְרָה אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיָּפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. “Since he cannot dissolve his own vows after he vowed (for only a Sage can do that), but he can dissolve his own vows before he vows (by a declaration that all his future vows are null and void), then since he can dissolve his wife’s vows after she vowed it is only logical that he should be able to dissolve his wife’s vows before she vowed.” It seems that the Yerushalmi text should follow similar lines. No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them⁷²This text contradicts the next sentence. The Tosephta reads אָֽמְרוּ לוֹ וּמָה מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. “They said to him, why is it that he can dissolve his own vows before he made them?”? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?⁷³The Tosephta reads יָפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. שֶׁכֵּן אִם רָצָה לְהָקֵם אֵינוֹ מוּקָם. “Could he dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” (As R. Eliezer agrees in the Mishnah.)” ⁷⁴Tosephta 6:6; Babli 76b.“But it says⁵⁷Num. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels., ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”