출애굽기 21:24의 주석

עין תחת עין EYE FOR EYE — If one blinded the eye of his fellow-man he has to pay him the value of his eye, i. e. he pays him how much his value would be diminished if he were to be sold as a slave in the market. In the same way all other cases are to be dealt with, but it does not mean the actual cutting off of the offender’s limb — just as our Rabbis have explained in the chapter beginning with the word החובל (Bava Kamma 84a).

EYE ‘TACHATH’ (FOR) EYE. It is known in the tradition of our Rabbis¹³⁶Mechilta here on the Verse. that this means monetary compensation. Such usage [of the term tachath to indicate] monetary compensation is found in the verse: And he that smiteth a beast mortally shall pay for it; life ‘tachath’ life,¹⁵²Leviticus 24:18. [in which case tachath surely indicates monetary compensation]. Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra commented that Scripture uses such a term to indicate that he really is deserving of such a punishment, [that his eye be taken from him], if he does not give his ransom. For Scripture has forbidden us to take ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death,¹⁵³Numbers 35:31. but we may take ransom from a wicked person who cut off any of the limbs of another person. Therefore we are never to cut off that limb from him, but rather he is to pay monetary compensation, and if he has no money to pay, it lies as a debt on him until he acquires the means to pay, and then he is redeemed.
Proof for what the Sages have said [that eye ‘tachath’ eye means he pays him the value of his eye], is in what He has said above [with reference to one who injures another person], only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.¹⁵⁴Above, Verse 19. But if we were to do to the assailant exactly as he has done to the injured man, why does he have to pay after that? He himself is in need of amends for the loss of his own time and costs of his own healing! And it would not be valid to argue that the assailant is to give the injured man [the difference in cost between a slow recovery and] a fast recovery,¹⁵⁵Thus, if the assailant had a fast recovery and the injured man a slower recovery, the assailant is to pay him the difference of expenses incurred in the loss of time and costs of healing. In that case, one could still argue that eye ‘tachath’ eye really means that the eye of the assailant be removed, and Verse 19 that deals with his obligation to pay for the loss of time and cost of healing of the injured, applies to that difference as explained above. — This argument is actually mentioned in the Talmud (Baba Kamma 84a.). But, argues Ramban, it is not the plain meaning of Scripture, for the simple meaning of Verse 19 is that it speaks of the assailant having to pay for the whole loss of time and costs of healing. Therefore it constitutes a proof that eye ‘tachath’ eye means monetary compensation, as explained above. since this is not the plain meaning of Scripture. Rather, Scripture speaks of all people, and even if his recovery [i.e., the assailant’s] were to be fast, we would have long taken our punishment of him, in doing to him exactly as he did!¹⁵⁶And why should he be burdened with the additional cost representing the difference in the recoveries [as explained above], after we have already taken our punishment of him by doing to him as he had done to others? Thus it is obvious that Verse 19 speaks of all men alike, and eye ‘tachath’ eye cannot be meant literally, but means the monetary value of the eye.
If we explain the verses according to the literal interpretation of Scripture, there is no escape from this question,¹⁵⁷I.e., an apparent difficulty in the verses [if we interpret them in their plain meaning]: that in one verse it says eye for an eye, and in the other it speaks of the assailant’s duty to pay for the loss of his time and costs of healing, and the question appears why he should pay this additional payment when we have already punished him. There is no escape from this question except by saying that etc. [see text]. Ramban will finally allude to why he mentions all this: it is to show what sophistry we have to display if we seek to follow only the plain meaning of Scripture! We thus have no recourse but to Tradition. unless they¹⁵⁸I.e., “those who pursue the plain meaning of Scripture” (the rodfei ha’pshat). See Vol. I, p. 154. will say that if someone maims his neighbor so that he deprives him permanently of some bodily member, such as an eye, hand, or foot, or causes a burn which leaves a permanent mark, then we are to do likewise to the assailant’s body, this being the case of the verse which says, As he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him,¹⁵⁹Leviticus 24:20. and in that case there is no monetary compensation paid for loss of time and cost of healing. But if he hits him with a stone or with his fist on his clothes, and he is laid up in bed but then is completely healed without any crippling effect remaining upon his body, in that case He said, only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.¹⁵⁴Above, Verse 19. All the injuries specified in the verse, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe,¹⁶⁰Verse 25. are included, according to the plain meaning of Scripture, in this preceding general principle, for a wound and stripe may be completely healed. And as for that which Scripture states there, And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor, as he hath done so shall it be done to him,¹⁶¹Leviticus 24:19. it too was meant to include all injuries, but He did not mention there at length the cases of wounding, striping, and burning [as He did here]. He used the term mum (blemish), for every wound causes at least a temporary blemish. Thus even if it is of the kind which heals, it is still called “a blemish,” just as we say: “a passing blemish,”¹⁶²Bechoroth 37b. and the Torah calls scabbed, or scurvy, or hath his stones crushed¹⁶³Leviticus 21:20. “a blemish” although they are temporary and can be healed,¹⁶⁴See my Hebrew commentary, p. 425. and it is further written, youths in whom there was no blemish.¹⁶⁵Daniel 1:3. The intention there is obviously that these youths who were to serve in the king’s palace were free even of any passing blemish. The general principle everywhere is that the Tradition is always true.¹⁶⁶See above, Note 157.

עין תחת עין; this is what ought to be the judgment against the offender, if we were to apply the principle of the punishment fitting the crime in all its severity. However, according to tradition only financial compensation is exacted as we cannot accurately measure how to apply the principle of “an eye for an eye” literally.

עין תחת עין, the monetary value of the eye destroyed. Our sages (Baba Kamma 84) have explained why the Torah needed to write so many examples for what appears to be the same legislation. Our verse discusses loss of an entire limb or organ.

עין תחת עין, there is a tradition by our sages (Baba Kamma 84) concerning this that the meaning is: “the value of an eye for the value of an eye.” The Torah does not speak of the person inflicting the loss of someone’s eye paying with his losing an eye of his own. The proof that this could not have been what the Torah meant is verse 19 in our chapter רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא, “he must only pay for his loss of income and his medical expenses.”
If we were to do to a person who has caused the loss of another’s limb exactly as he had done, why would he have to pay something in addition to that? After all, he himself loses pay due to absence from work and he also incurs medical expenses for treatment of his severed limb!?
Furthermore, even assuming that the Torah’s words here were to be interpreted literally, not all situations are alike so that the literal application would resemble any kind of “tit for tat.” If the eye which a healthy person gouged out belonged to a person who had only one good eye, how would the loss of one of two good eyes by the person who caused the injury even come close to “fair retribution?” Not only that. Some people’s constitution would not be able to survive the loss of an organ whereas others would. If a person had had a kidney ruined beyond repair by someone who only had a single kidney left, taking that person’s kidney would be equivalent to a death sentence!
Furthermore, in Leviticus 24,19-20 we read כאשר עשה כן יעשה בו, “just as he has done (to another), so shall be done to him.” This verse cannot be applied in any other way than the way our sages have seen fit to understand it. The thrust of the verses is to indemnify the injured party in a manner commensurate to the injury he has sustained, not by depriving him of a limb of his own. It would be physically impossible to cause a person an exact duplicate of the injury he himself has suffered. If he were to cause either a lesser or a greater injury than the one he had sustained, he would be in violation of what the Torah wrote as he would not have complied with the Torah’s demand “as he had done so should be done to him.” In the case of monetary compensation, experts can evaluate the precise amount of the value of the loss sustained.
It is possible to understand the line כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו, as meaning: “just as he has caused harm, harm shall be caused to him.” Proof of this being the meaning of the words can be found in Judges 15,11 where Shimshon said: “as they have done to me so I have done to them.” The dispute had begun when the Philistines had taken Shimshon’s wife and in retaliation he burned their crops. Seeing that the retaliation by Shimshon did not match the harm done to him by the Philistines, it is clear that the meaning of the line is merely that harm done will be requited. Any retaliation therefore would be considered as “as he has done so shall be done to him.”
We also find that the prophet Ovadiah 15-16 prophesies concerning the future of Esau “as you did so shall be done to you. Your conduct shall be requited.” He goes on to spell out what precisely this involves: “the same cup that you drank from on My Holy Mount shall all nations drink evermore; drink till their speech grows thick and they become as though they had never been.” I have provided you with proof based both on logic and on verses from Scripture that it is impossible to translate the line עין תחת עין, as meaning “an eye for an eye.”

"an eye for an eye" money. You say "money," but perhaps an eye (literally) is intended? R. Elazar was wont to say (Leviticus 24:21) "One who strikes a beast shall pay for it, and one who strikes a man shall be put to death." Scripture likens the injuries of a man to the injuries of a beast, and the injuries of a beast to the injuries of a man. And just as the injuries of a beast are subject to monetary payment, so, the injuries of a man. R. Eliezer says: It is written (Exodus 21:30) "When kofer ('atonement payment') is imposed upon him, he shall give the redemption of his soul." Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If where Scripture makes him liable for death, he only pays money, then here (re an eye), where Scripture does not make him liable for death, how much more so does he pay only money! R. Yitzchak says: "an eye for an eye": I understand this to mean that whether or not he intends (to blind him), he pays only money. And, indeed, Scripture limits one who intends to cause a blemish to monetary payment, as it is written (Leviticus 24:19) "And a man if he maims his neighbor" — general; "an eye for an eye" — particular. general-particular. (The rule is:) The general subsumes only what exists in the particular. Then, in (20) "as he maims a man," there is a reversion to the general. Perhaps the first general is generalized (i.e., all maimings are to be included.) Would you say that? We have here an instance of general-particular-general, where (the rule is that) you judge in accordance with the particular, viz.: Just as the particular specifies permanent maimings, external organ prominences, and intended (injuries) as paying only money (and not being punishable by death) (so, all such maimings are included.) Thus, "as he maims a man" — when he intends to maim him.

V. 24. Die in diesem Verse genannten Fälle sind Verstümmelungen, Beraubungen eines Organes, und zwar sind die Repräsentanten der verschiedensten Tätigkeiten genannt: das Auge: Organ der Sinnestätigkeit, Zahn: der Körpererhaltung (Verdauung), auch des Sprechens, Hand: der produktiven Tätigkeit, Fuß: der Bewegung, und zwar hebt der Verlust eines Auges und eines Zahnes nicht die entsprechende Tätigkeit ganz auf, sondern schwächt sie nur, während der Verlust einer Hand und eines Fußes in der Regel eine bis dahin möglich gewesene Tätigkeit völlig aufhebt. Der durch solche Verstümmelung dem Beschädigten gebrachte bleibende Verlust wird unter den gesetzlichen Begriff: נזק, Schaden, gefasst. —