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ואלה המשפטים NOW THESE ARE THE JUDGMENTS — Wherever אלה, “these are”, is used it cuts off (פוסל) the preceding section from that which it introduces; where, however, ואלה “and these” is used it adds something to the former subject (i. e. forms a continuation of it). So also here: “And these are the judgments (i. e. these, also)”: What is the case with the former commandments (the עשרת הדברות)? They were given at Sinai! So these, too, were given at Sinai! (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:1:1; Shemot Rabbah 30:3; cf. also Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 3) If this be so, why is this section dealing with the “civil laws” placed immediately after that commanding the making of the altar? To tell you that you should seat (i. e. provide quarters for) the Sanhedrin in the vicinity of the Temple.

AND THESE ARE THE ORDINANCES WHICH THOU SHALT SET BEFORE THEM. The reason [why this whole section dealing with mishpatim — civil laws — is placed here, rather than being placed after the chukim — statutes — as is the order in the commandments given at Marah],¹Above, 15:25: There He made for them ‘chock’ (a statute) ‘umishpat’ (and an ordinance). The “statutes” are the precepts for which the reasons are generally unknown. See Vol. I, p. 331. is that G-d wanted to explain to them first the civil laws. Thus we find that the first of the Ten Commandments dealt with the obligation of knowing of the existence of G-d, and the second one with the prohibition against idolatry, after which [following the giving of the Ten Commandments] He again instructed Moses, saying, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel: Ye yourselves have seen that I have talked with you from heaven,²Above, 20:19. meaning that you, [Moses] should warn them again to take to heart that which they have seen, so that they will be careful to keep these precepts which I have commanded them. For Ye yourselves have seen corresponds to the commandment, I am the Eternal thy G-d;³Ibid., Verse 2. Ye shall not make with Me — gods of silver etc.⁴Ibid., Verse 20. — corresponds with Thou shalt have no other gods,⁵Ibid., Verse 3. thereby completing the subject of idolatry; likewise, And these are the ordinances corresponds to Thou shalt not covet,⁶Ibid., Verse 14. for if a man does not know the laws of house and field or other possessions, he might think that they belong to him and thus covet them and take them for himself. This is why He said, thou shalt set before them just ordinances, which they should establish amongst themselves, so that they will not covet that which does not legally belong to them. And thus did the Rabbis say in Midrash Rabbah:⁷Shemoth Rabbah 30:15. “The whole Torah depends on justice; that is why the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the civil laws directly after the Ten Commandments.” Similarly G-d explains in this section of These are the ordinances additional laws about idolatry,⁸Further, 22:19. the honor of parents,⁹Further, Verses 15 and 17. murder,¹⁰Ibid., Verses 12-14. and adultery¹¹Ibid., 22:15-16. — which are all mentioned in the Ten Commandments.
The Rabbis have explained:¹²Tanchuma Mishpatim, 6. “Before them, but not before the Canaanites.” This interpretation is based on the observation that it should have said, “which tasim lahem” (“thou shalt set for them”) just as He said, There ‘sam lo’ (He set for them) a statute and an ordinance;¹³Above, 15:25. thus since He said, which thou shalt set ‘liphneihem’ (before them), we interpret this to mean that they should be the judges, for it is with reference to a judge that this term [liphnei (before)] appears in Scripture: And both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Eternal, ‘liphnei’ (before) the priests and the judges;¹⁴Deuteronomy 19:17. Until he stand ‘liphnei’ (before) the congregation for judgment;¹⁵Numbers 35:12. ‘liphnei’ (before) all who know law and judgment.¹⁶Esther 1:13. The Rabbis further explained: “Before them, but not before laymen.” They interpreted [the verse in this way] because with reference to the ordinances it is written: Then his master shall bring him unto ‘ha’elohim;’¹⁷Further, Verse 6. the cause of both parties shall come before ‘ha’elohim;’¹⁸Ibid., 22:8. and it is also written, and he shall give ‘biphlilim’ (as the judges determine)¹⁹Further, Verse 22. — these terms referring to judges who are experts in the law, and who had received ordination²⁰The process of investiture with judicial rights and functions. Ordination was conferred by three Sages, only one of whom himself had to be duly ordained. Ordination was valid only if both the ordainers and the ordained were in the Land of Israel. Once received in the Land of Israel, however, the authority of ordination became effective outside the Land as well. [in an unbroken chain from the time of those who had been duly ordained] by Moses our Teacher. This is why He said here that these ordinances are to be set before them, meaning before the elohim [expert, ordained judges] that He will mention further on, but not before Canaanites, and not before one who is not a judge by the standard of the Torah, such as a layman in this respect. It is forbidden to appear before such a person to act as a judge, just as it is forbidden to bring it before the Canaanites, even if he knows that this layman knows the correct law and will render him a proper decision. Even so it is forbidden for the litigant to set him up as a judge and complain before him so that he orders the other party to come to court before him, and the layman himself is also forbidden to act as their judge. Now even though the Sages have mentioned these two groups [the layman and the Canaanite] together, there is a difference between them, in that if the two litigants are willing to come before an Israelite who is a layman, and accept him upon themselves, it is permissible for them to do so, and they must abide by his decision, but to come before the Canaanites to act as judges between them, is forbidden under all circumstances, even if the Canaanite laws are in that particular case the same as our laws.

ואלה המשפטים, in the previous paragraph the Torah spoke about the prohibition of coveting property belonging to someone else (20,13). This did not involve action; by contrast ואלה המשפטים, now the Torah speaks about laws governing the concrete nature of “אשר לרעך,” tangible matters belonging to your fellow man.

ואלה המשפטים, "And these are the ordinances, etc." The word ואלה needs analysis. We find a disagreement in the Mechilta between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva on this subject. The former holds that the reason for the linkage between the Ten Commandments and the ordinances is to tell us that just as the former are of Sinaitic i.e. Divine origin, so are the latter. Rabbi Akiva said the reason for the conjunctive letter ו is that we could have thought that Moses was to teach the ordinances to the Israelites and if they did not understand them all, he, Moses, did not have to repeat them; therefore the Torah speaks of תשים לפניהם "place them in front of them," as one lays a meal before people which is ready to be eaten. According to Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the ordinances are of Sinaitic origin it is obvious that the Torah speaks about the details of these various laws being of Divine origin seeing we already know that the outlines are of Divine origin. Rabbi Yishmael has said himself in Zevachim 115 that all the general rules of the commandments of the Torah were handed down from Sinai, whereas Moses was told the details when G'd used to speak to him in the Tabernacle. If so, the commandments referred to here were the general outline only and there would be no reason for adding the letter ו in front of אלה. According to Rabbi Akiva who claimed that both general outlines and details were revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai, the expression ואלה המשפטים is also unnecessary. We need to look a little closer at what Rashi has to say on our verse. In our verse he explains the expression in line with Rabbi Yishmael, whereas at the beginning of Leviticus 25,1 where the Torah speaks about what G'd said to Moses at Mount Sinai, Rashi explains the verse in terms of Rabbi Akiva's statement in the Mechilta we quoted earlier. Rabbi Akiva said that just as both the outline and the details of the Shmittah regulations originated at Sinai, so all the laws in the Torah originated at Sinai.

Everyone endowed with intelligence should know that it is not my purpose to explain halachic rulings as part of my commentary, something I have mentioned already in my commentary at the beginning of Parshat Vayeshev. I explained there that many such rulings are hinted at by variant spellings in the text, missing words or extraneous words. Many of these have been covered in the commentary on the Torah by my grandfather Rashi of blessed memory. I have set myself the task of only explaining the plain meaning of the text as it is before us. When I explain legislation I do so within the context of its contribution to civilised behaviour, דרך ארץ. My explanations notwithstanding, when they conflict with the halachic rulings, the latter are supreme.

ואלה המשפטים, “and these are the ordinances, etc.” The introductory letter ו at the beginning of the word ואלה means that what follows must be understood as a continuation of what preceded it, i.e. the Decalogue. Alternately, what follows are new ordinances, continuing the laws which had been revealed already at Marah, where the Torah spoke of two types of laws that were taught to the people, i.e. חוק ומשפט. The reason why the Torah chose to follow this pattern is because at the beginning of the Decalogue G’d had first introduced Himself with the words: “I am the Lord your G’d, etc,” so here too Moses introduces all these laws by reminding the people that they had just recently experienced the revelation, In other words, all that follows originates with the same G’d as did the Decalogue. Moses’ words: אתם ראיתם וגו', corresponds to the first two commandments (i.e. the ones heard and understood by the people spoken to them by Hashem directly.) What follows under the heading of ואלה המשפטים corresponds to such commandments as לא תחמוד, indicative of the final and perhaps ethically most demanding commandment (as it tries to control our feelings and desires that are unspoken) If man does not know the legal aspects of private property, how can he be sure that he does not violate G’d’s will in this respect? This is why G‘d used the term תשים לפניהם, meaning that the laws following must be clearly set out for the people, must be elaborated on. No one must remain in doubt so that he cannot claim that what he coveted was not something belonging to someone else.

..."Why was the section of the laws made adjacent to the [section about the] altar": And is it not the case that Rashi only cited those that expounded about the adjacency of sections when they are not written in [chronological] order - when they [expounded in a manner] that was close to the simple meaning of Scripture? But not those sections that are not understood as being out of order - as there is no need to give a reason for their adjacency...

It disqualifies that which preceded it. If you say: [This rule seems not true because] in Parshas Bechukosai (Vayikra 27:34) it is written, “ אלה (These) are the commandments.” And in Parshas Masei (Bamidbar 36:13) it says, “ אלה (These) are the commandments and the laws.” And in Parshas Matos (ibid 30:17) it says, “ אלה (These) are the statutes.” And in Parshas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:69) it is written, “ אלה (These) are the words of the covenant.” And in all theses cases we do not interpret it as disqualifying that which preceded. The answer is: We only interpret it this way for “ אלה (These) are the histories of the heaven and the earth” (Bereishis 2:4; see Shemos Rabba 30:3), where the histories were already mentioned above, so a difficulty arose: why are they repeated and detailed? Similarly for “ אלה (These) are the descendants of Noach” (Bereishis 6:9), where the descendants were mentioned above in Parshas Bereishis, so a difficulty arose: why were they mentioned again? Thus we say they were mentioned again in order to disqualify the preceding. [The meaning of “disqualify” is discussed in the next entry.] But with “ אלה (These) are the commandments” and all the above verses, nothing was mentioned [preceding them that was similar to them], so אלה cannot mean to disqualify the preceding. Similarly in Parshas Devarim, where it says “ אלה (These) are the words” (Devarim 1:1), we cannot interpret אלה as disqualifying the preceding, since Chumash Devarim is Mishneh Torah [i.e., its primary purpose is a repetition of the Torah].

Kap. 21. V. 1. ואלה: Unmittelbar zuvor war in der Konstruktion des Altars der symbolische Ausdruck dem Grundprinzipe gegeben: dass unsere ganze Beziehung zu Gott als eine solche zu begreifen sei, dass damit dem Rechte und der Menschlichkeit für den Bau der Gesellschaft und der keuschen Sittlichkeit für die Arbeit jedes Einzelnen an sich selber die feste unerschütterliche Basis gewonnen werde. Daran schließt das Waw kopulativum die Mischpatim, die Rechtsordnungen, mit welchen nun zuerst der Aufbau der jüdischen Gesellschaft auf dem Prinzipe des Rechts und der Menschlichkeit geordnet wird. חרב, das "Schwert", Gewalt und Härte, sollen damit aus der jüdischen Staatsgesellschaft gebannt sein, erst dann wird sie würdig, dass sie in ihrer Mitte Gott einen Altar errichte. Darum gehen diese Mischpatim dem Bau der Stiftshütte voran. Die Gesetze, die dann der Verbannung der גלוי ערוה im weiteren Sinne, der Zurückdrängung des, "den Aufgang zur Altarhöhe" hemmenden Tierischen im Menschen, somit der Vollendung des Einzelnen auf dem Prinzipe der keuschen Sittlichkeit geweiht sind, folgen sodann im dritten Buche.

ואלה המשפטים, “and these are the ordinances, etc.;” Rashi has pointed out that whenever a paragraph in the Torah commences with the word אלה, this signifies that it is not a continuation of something that had been written previously. However, when the paragraph begins with the word: ואלה, “and these, etc., it signals some kind of continuation. From Rashi’s words it would appear that the laws promulgated from here on in did not originate at Sinai as when the Torah wrote in Exodus 19,20 that Hashem descended to Mount Sinai, the whole point was that He did so in order to give the people the whole Torah.In order to solve this apparent contradiction, we need to view the word: פסל used by Rashi to signify a break with what preceded it, is to be understood as in Exodus 34,1 where G–d told Moses to hew himself two Tablets to replace the ones he had shattered after coming down from the Mountain for the first time. The act of “hewing” means to separate what you carve out from a greater quantity of the same base material, i.e. rock. In other words, what we are going to read from here on in are laws that, though of the same origin as the Ten Commandments, had been separated somewhat in time from when and how they were presented to the people. What Rashi meant to tell us was that if this paragraph had commenced with the word אלה, I would have thought that what followed was not of Sinaitic origin at all. In order not to mislead the reader, the Torah added the prefix ו to make clear that what follows was also of Sinaitic origin, i.e. G–d taught Moses all the Torah while he was on the mountain for forty days and forty nights. The letter ו here has the same meaning as the word את in Exodus 9,29, where Moses said: כצאתי את העיר, “when I go out from the city.” We find a similar construction in Deuteronomy 28,69: אלה דברי הברית, “these are the words of the covenant, ”where the admonitions have been separated from the blessings. The blessings in that paragraph had been preceded by curses. We find something similar in Deuteronomy 1,1: אלה הדברים אשר דבר משה, “these are the words which Moses had spoken, etc.” where we cannot understand this as something unconnected to what preceded it, but the letter ו is omitted as we are dealing with a different Book of the Torah, one that had not been dictated to Moses, but which G–d had approved after the event as deserving to be part of the written Torah. In Genesis 2,4 the words אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, “these are the generations of heaven and earth are separated from the prehistoric period when the Torah had described the tohu vavohu which had preceded the creation of light.

ואלה המשפטים, “and these are the ordinances, etc.” according to Rashi whenever the word אלה appears, it signals a break with what preceded, whereas when the word ואלה appears it signals a continuation or addition of the subject that had been discussed previously. In other words, the correct translation of the word: אלה is: “these opposed to what preceded it,” whereas ואלה should be translated as “and these as well as the preceding verses.” The author warns the reader not to challenge Rashi by quoting the word אלה in Leviticus 27,34, or the same word in Numbers 36,13, and Numbers 30,17 nor the same word in Deuteronomy 28,69, as in those instances as well as in others like it, the previously mentioned subject is being concluded. ואלה המשפטים, Rabbi Avahu, quoting Rabbi Yossi ben Zimra said that the word אלה represents a break with what was written previously, whereas when the word appears with the prefix letter ו it signals some type of continuation. He quotes Exodus 15,25, as an example, where the Torah had written: שם שם לו חוק ומשפט ושם נסהו, “there He made for them a fixed rule and gave them social laws, there He put them to a test.” המשפטים, prior this paragraph the Torah spoke about aspects of being G-d fearing, whereas from now on it concentrates on rules that enable living in the land of Israel as a civilised nation. An alternate interpretation: previously the Torah spelled out prohibitions as warnings, as for instance: “do not commit murder; do not commit adultery;” from here on in the Torah repeats the prohibitions but adds the type of penalty that applies to violating these prohibitions deliberately. As to the commentary by Rashi here, who poses the question why we read here about the details of an altar, something entirely different from the subjects the Torah deals with here, he bases himself on the Mechilta, which suggests that this is a hint that the High Court should have its office near the Temple and that all these laws had been told to Moses while he was on the Mountain. The altar was after all also close to the Temple, immediately in front of its eastern entrance. Logic dictates that the whole paragraph commencing with 21,2 “when you purchase a Jewish slave, etc., until chapter 23,10, ושש שנים תזרע, “and during six consecutive years you may plant seeds,” are all laws that G-d taught Moses while he was on the Mountain before the people had heard the Ten Commandments. Concerning all these laws, Rashi has written: these laws are a continuation of the earlier laws.” He is referring to the laws listed in Parshat B’har in the Book of Leviticus.

אשר תשים לפניהם WHICH THOU SHALT PUT BEFORE THEM — God said to Moses: It should not enter your mind to say, “I shall teach them a section of the Torah or a single Halacha twice or three times until it will become current in their mouths exactly according to its wording (i. e. until they know the text verbatim), but I shall not take the trouble to make them understand the reason of each thing and its significance”; therefore Scripture says, אשר תשים לפניהם, “which thou shalt set before them” (cf. Genesis 34:23) — like a table fully laid before a person with everything ready for eating (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:1:1).

אשר תשים לפניהם. These are not positive commandments and negative commandments which apply to every Jew, but are applicable only if the occasion arises. The matters under discussion need to be adjudicated only if and when such situations occur in someone’s life.

אשר תשים לפניהם, ”which you are to set out before them.” Our sages (Mechilta) draw attention to the word לפניהם, meaning “before the Israelites,” but not before the gentiles or the common, uneducated people. Had the Torah wanted that Moses explain the details of the following legislation to unlearned people, it would have written a different formulation, such as אשר תלמדם, which you are to teach them, or אשר תשים להם, a formula used when Moses taught the people some of the laws at Marah. (Exodus 15,25) The expression לשום לפני וגו' is a standard phrase when the Torah means for something to be taught to the judges, the elders of the people. All litigants always have to appear before a quorum of judges, compare Deut. The judges are described as יודעי דת ודין, possessing knowledge in matters or ritual law and interpersonal relations requiring legal decisions. The reason the Mechilta understands the word לפניהם as excluding gentiles, is to warn Israelites not to have their disputes judged by a court composed of gentiles even if the laws of the gentile host country are similar to ours in that matter. Even if both litigants are agreeable to submit their dispute to a gentile court for a ruling, the Torah does not permit this. If, however these same Israelites agree to submit their dispute to three gentile laymen, (or more or fewer) this is acceptable as G‘d’s jurisprudence has not been slighted thereby. Rabbi Joseph Kimchi draws attention to the Torah not having said תשפטם, “you are to render judgment,” but תשים לפניהם, “submit before them,” as the Torah speaks of a situation when the basic halachic rulings were known to the parties. However, this is insufficient, as it allows the owner of a Hebrew servant to claim that had he known that this man’s services would be limited to 6 years, he never would have bought his services in the first place, and that therefore the entire transaction had been based on a misunderstanding. Or, for instance in the case of an ox goring a gentile servant with fatal results, for which the Torah fixes that the owner of the ox which gored has to pay 30 shekel, (a small and fixed amount) even if in the market place such a slave while alive could have fetched several times that amount. Pleading ignorance of the legislation is no reason to revoke transactions that had involved ignorance of the finer points of the law of compensation.

Then why was the section of judgments placed near the section dealing with the Altar? Many difficulties arise. First, Rashi should have asked this [first, as his first comment] on the verse, “And these are the laws. . .” Second, perhaps [the Torah is just following] the order that these Torah sections were told by Hashem to Moshe. Third, Rashi explained straightforwardly at the beginning of Parshas Behar that the entire Torah was said by Hashem at Sinai. [So why does our verse connect only the judgments to Sinai?] Fourth, Rashi [earlier] should have said that the ו of ואלה “is a continuation of that which preceded it.” [I.e., why does Rashi need the whole word of ואלה to teach this?[ Fifth, Rashi should have explained this rule on the verse “ אלה (These) are the products of the heaven and the earth” (Bereishis 2:4), or “ אלה (These) are the descendants of Noach” (ibid 6:9). The answer is: The rule that אלה disqualifies ( פסל ) that which preceded it, means [that it minimizes that which preceded it. I.e.,] these things now to be mentioned are better and more important than those preceding things which are less significant. That is the meaning of פסל . So did Bereishis Rabba explain “ אלה (These) are the products of the heaven and the earth,” and “ אלה (These) are the descendants of Noach.” Here too, if the Torah had written אלה , I would think it is disqualifying [i.e., minimizing] the judgments, [since it cannot be minimizing the preceding — the Ten Commandments — which were on the highest level]. But now that the Torah wrote ואלה , it means “a continuation of that which preceded it,” saying that the judgements, too, were given in the assembly of all B’nei Yisrael, with thunder and lightning, like the Ten Commandments that preceded them. Whereas the other mitzvos were given to Moshe alone, during his forty days on the mountain. Therefore Rashi asks: “Why was the section of judgments placed near the section dealing with the Altar?” Since the section of judgments is a continuation of the Ten Commandments, why does the section dealing with the Altar interrupt them? So explained the Re’m at length.

Why does Rashi give two separate interpretations instead of mentioning that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree in their understanding of our verse? Rashi could have more easily stated that the letter ו is to tell Moses how to teach the laws to the Jewish people, i.e. to set it before them like a table which is all laid out for the guests. He could have said that this rule applies both to the commandments regulating our relations with G'd as well as to those regulating our relations with each other.

Es heißt aber: אשר תשים לפניהם, nicht: אשר תצוה אותם ,אשר תדבר אליהם oder sonst. שום לפני־ kommt außer bei Mitteilung der göttlichen Gebote durch Mosche an Israel nur noch in einer einzigen Bedeutung vor, und zwar als spezieller Ausdruck für das Auftragen zubereiteter Speisen vor einen Gast. So: ויושם לפניו לאכול (Bereschit 24, 33), וישם לפני שאול. (1. Sam., 9, 24). Ebenso: (1. Sam., 28, 22) Auf Mitteilung von Gesetzen übertragen, heißt es daher nichts anderes, als eine dergestalt ausführliche und deutliche Mitteilung, dass sie für die Erkenntnis und Ausführung vollständig und klar vorliegen. Die der מכילתא entnommene Erklärung: כשולחן ערוך ומוכן לאכול לפני האדם ,"wie ein zum Essen vor dem Menschen angerichteter und bereiter Tisch", ist daher der wortgetreue Sinn des Ausdrucks. Es ist damit in der Überschrift dieser Gesetze das Faktum konstatiert, dass die hier folgenden schriftlichen Aufzeichnungen nur kurze, nackte Sätze enthalten, deren genauere Präzision Und vollständige Ausführung der mündlichen Überlieferung vorbehalten blieb, wir somit in diesen Sätzen der תורה שבכתב nicht schon das Gesetz in seiner Totalität vor uns sehen, wir vielmehr die Vollständigkeit des Gesetzes nur der תורה שבעל פה zu entnehmen haben.

לפניהם, “before them.” Rashi sees in this word an exclusion of gentiles, to whom all these ordinances will not apply, even if they would adopt our system of civil law. [Presumably, he felt that otherwise that word is superfluous, as it is obvious that the laws would be addressed to the |sraelites. Ed.] Jews are not allowed to submit their litigation to a gentile court even if the rules of that court are like those of ours. Our author uses a parable to illustrate the point. Imagine that two sick persons go to a physician to have themselves examined. The physician tells one of them to eat, heartily and healthily, whereas he tells the second one to abstain from some of the very foods he had encouraged the first person to eat from heartily. The reason is that not every food is good for everyone. What is good for one patient may be very dangerous for the next patient. When the physician advised the first patient to eat heartily, the reason was that that patient was diagnosed as fatally ill, so that he might as well enjoy the time left for him on earth. The same advice to the second patient would prove very dangerous for him. The same reasoning applies to Jews and gentiles. We read in Ezekiel 20,25 concerning the gentiles that G–d had given them laws and statutes that they could not live by, whereas the laws He gave to the Israelites were designed to be for their benefit. [This verse is extremely difficult, and the reader is advised to read the commentary by Rabbi M.Eisemann in the Art Scroll edition of the Book of Ezekiel. Ed.] Rashi assumes that when the Israelites fail to observe G–d’s laws, they will eventually attribute their hardships to G–d’s laws having been harmful. We are taught in the Torah that the opposite is true. Compare Leviticus 18.5. This is also the reason why we are forbidden to eat all kinds of creeping creatures, as they are injurious to one’s health. These same creatures, if eaten by gentiles, are not harmful to them. This is also the meaning of Psalms 147,19: מגיד דבריו ליעקב, חוקיו ,” ,משפטיו לישראל. לא עשה כן לכל גוי, “He issus His commands to Yaakov, His statutes and rules to Israel; He did not do so for any other nation;” The following is a true story involving the convert Onkelos, a nephew of the Roman Emperor Hadrianus, who when wishing to convert was afraid of the wrath of his uncle the Emperor. He told his uncle that he wished to engage in business, whereupon his uncle asked him if he was short of capital, in which case he was willing to help him out. He told his uncle that he wished to travel and find out which merchandise was both in demand and easy to obtain. His uncle told him to seek out a field which was presently in a recession so that he could invest at low prices and profit when market conditions would improve. As a result, he went to the land of Israel, at that time in a deep depression commercially, and studied Torah from the scholars prior to undergoing circumcision for becoming a convert. He was told that the words of Torah would only reside within him permanently if he circumcised himself first. He followed this advice, circumcised himself and studied a great deal of Torah. When Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua saw him, they noticed that his facial features had undergone a great change. They concluded that this was not Onkelos who had studied the Torah. When he began to ask the scholars questions, they told him that this was the result. When he returned to his uncle the Emperor, the latter asked him what had brought about the change in his facial features. He told him that he had studied the Torah and had himself circumcised. Upon being asked who had advised him to do this, he said: “you have.” He explained that his uncle had told him to acquire merchandise which was in a depression and patiently wait until this merchandise would appreciate in value. He had visited many nations and not found a single one which was in such a state of depression as the Jewish nation, so that he became convinced that their fortunes would improve drastically. He quoted the prophet Isaiah 49,7 who had predicted this already more than five hundred years earlier. The Emperor slapped his face and asked him once more what had prompted him to convert to Judaism. He told him that actually, he had gone to study the Torah, but had been told that the condition for being taught Torah was that he had to be circumcised, just as Yaakov. He quoted Psalms 147,20 where it has been spelled out by the use of the word בל, that only the people of Israel had been endowed with Torah knowledge that could be retained. (Tanchuma, Mishpatim section 5)

לפניהם “before them;” on this word Rashi comments: “before the Israelites and not before the gentiles,” even if you know that the gentile judges are experts in the section of law concerned in the litigation. When someone submits his legal problems to gentile judges he thereby desecrates the name of G-d, and simultaneously honours the reputation of the deity whom these judges worship. If the Jewish judges have given a ruling on the case and his Jewish opponent has not submitted to that judgment, the party deemed in the right may then appeal to gentile judges who have more power to enforce their ruling. [If both Jewish parties concerned are living in the Diaspora. Ed.]

לפניהם BEFORE THEM — but not before the heathens. Even if you know that in the case of a particular matter of law they will decide it in the same way as Jewish law would, do not bring it before their courts; for he who brings Israel’s law-cases before the heathens defames the Name of the Lord and pays honour to the name of the idol (in the name of which the heathen court administers justice), thereby giving it undue importance, as it is said, (Deuteronomy 32:31) “For their rock is not as our Rock that our enemies should be judges over us”, which implies: when our enemies are judges over us (i. e. if we make them judges over us) it is a testimony to the superiority of that which they reverence (their idol) (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 3).

Do not allow it to enter your mind to say, I will teach them. . . [Rashi knows this] because for most mitzvos the Torah says, “Speak to the B’nei Yisrael and say to them,” [or similar expressions]. Thus [the repetition of] “speak” and “say” implies teaching them at least twice. If so, why did Hashem now use the [unusual] expression of “set before them”? We must say it means “to make them understand the reasons for each thing.” (Re’m)

I have seen that Rabbi Eliyah Mizrachi explains the statement of Rabbi Yishmael to mean that even the ordinances were also communicated to the Israelites amidst thunder and lightning, and that G'd spoke more than just the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai. Even if Rabbi Yishmael had said so expressly, he would have had to substantiate this, all the more so since Rabbi Mizrachi only credits him with having meant this. According to the Mechilta all Rabbi Yishmael is quoted as saying is "just as the earlier statements were revealed at Sinai so the (later) ordinances were also revealed at Sinai." He did not say that "just as the earlier commandments were issued amidst thunder and lightning so were the ordinances revealed amidst thunder and lightning." There is no hint in this statement of the ordinances having been revealed amidst thunder and lightning. Furthermore, we have already answered the question we raised about Rabbi Yishmael's statement referring to the details of these ordinances not being revealed here because he has stated that when the Torah introduces the Shmittah legislation in Leviticus. It is posssible that Rabbi Yishmael thought that the example of the שמטה legislation was not enough to use it as a role model for all the commandments seeing that there are three other occasions in the Torah when a commandment is specifically mentioned as related to Mount Sinai. The principal reason, however, is the one we already mentioned. It might be best to leave the question against Rashi as a matter unresolved pending further study than to follow the path of Rabbi Mizrachi who put words into Rabbi Yishmael's mouth that he has not been able to support with evidence.

And not before the gentiles. [Rashi knows this] because “before them” refers to the seventy elders mentioned above in Parshas Yisro, who ascended the mountain with Moshe before the giving of the Torah. This is Rashi’s approach, as stated in the first chapter of Maseches Gittin. Tosafos explained that “before them” refers to the judges mentioned in a future verse: “The claims of both parties must be brought to the judges” (22:8). But according to both views, it refers to expert judges and not laymen judges. Thus you might ask that “before them” could be teaching us: “and not before laymen judges,” and certainly not before the gentiles. The answer is: Rashi himself answered this question when he explained, “And even if you know of a particular law that they render the same as Jewish law, do not bring the matter to their courts.” Rashi is saying that the Torah excluded gentile judges absolutely, even if they rule the same as Jews. But [this exclusion could not apply to laymen judges,] since one is indeed allowed to have them judge if they know a particular law as well as the experts do.

If Rabbi Mizrachi's intention was to say that whereas the Ten Commandments were handed down amidst both thunder and lightning, whereas the ordinances were handed down only amidst thunder, not exactly like the Ten Commandments, this would also not be acceptable as it would create a third category of commandments and the manner in which they were communicated to the Jewish people. The first category would be the way the Ten Commandments were communicated; the second category would be the way G'd communicated all the commandments to Moses during the forty days Moses spent on the Mountain; the third category would be the ordinances. Who would be prepared to even listen to such an explanation?! There is nothing anywhere in the Torah which could serve as a comparison for such an approach!

Another reason why the Torah wrote ואלה may well have to do with Sanhedrin 86, which stipulates that the judges of the Sanhedrin had to officiate near the Tabernacle or Temple. The expression ואלה then hints that just as there are other locations which are sacred, namely the altar and subsequently the Tabernacle, so the site where the judges pronounced G'd's law also had to be a site which was close by and had been sanctified.

אשר תשים לפניהם. "which you shall place before them." Whereas our sages have provided us with numerous homiletical explanations for this expression (Sanhedrin 7), we also need to know the plain meaning of these words. [I presume the author feels that one does not place words before a person. Ed.] Perhaps this is connected to the fact that some of the Torah's commandments are duties that a person's body has to perform, i.e. חובת גברא. In order to perform these commandments one needs to know what is involved. Unless a person performed such duties with his body he would not be considered part of the Holy Covenant between G'd and His people. For example, if a person did not know that it is forbidden to eat an animal which died from injuries he would consume both it and the blood and the fat parts which are forbidden. Similarly, when performing the positive commandment of the Passover he has to eat the lamb, the bitter herbs, the unleavened bread, keep the days holy, etc. In order to fulfil these commandments he has to be familiar with them. There are other categories of commandments of a more abstract nature, such as sanctifying the new moon, litigations, laws pertaining to which animal sacrifices are applicable and under what conditions, etc. The truth is that every Israelite ought to be familiar with all aspects of the Torah. However, as long as there are Torah scholars who are familiar with all the commandments and who can be consulted when the need arises all is under control. When G'd said תשים לפניהם, this means that everyone ought to be familiar with the laws listed here. How would a person making a purchase know if the purchase was legally valid unless he had first familiarised himself with the laws pertaining to acquisitions? The person who had been sold would not know of his rights to freedom after a certain number of years unless he had studied the relevant portion of the Torah. The reason the Torah continues in verse two with direct speech, i.e. "when you purchase a slave" instead of "when someone purchases a slave, etc." may underline the importance the Torah places on the purchaser being familiar with this legislation.

אשר תשים לפניהם; The word תשים is related (at least aurally) to the word סם, which can be a poisonous or therapeutic herb. If the משפטים would be observed they would act as the elixir of life, if not, as the reverse.

The words תשים לפניהם also contain a plea for the purchaser to accept the legislation wholeheartedly. While it is natural for someone who purchases a slave to consider such an acquisition permanent, the law which directs him not only to release such a slave after six years but to provide him with a stake so that he can re-establish himself economically may arouse some misgivings in the owner. The Torah wishes everyone to evaluate this legislation also from the standpoint of the slave. Since the reason the slave had to sell himself is that he was financially unlucky and/or had been found stealing, this is something which could happen to anyone, seeing money has a habit of "rolling" from one person or family to another. The owner is meant to reflect on the matter that if he himself were ever to find himself in the situation that his slave found himself in, the Torah's legislation holds out hope for such a person to achieve financial rehabilitation.

כי תקנה עבד עברי IF THOU BUYEST AN עבד עברי — This means a servant who is a Hebrew. Or perhaps this is not so, but it means a servant of a Hebrew (one who had been the servant of a Hebrew), i. e. a Canaanitish servant whom thou hast bought from an Israelite, and it is with regard to him that Scripture states “six years he shall serve”! — And if you ask, how I will then explain the commandment, (Leviticus 25:46) “and you shall leave them (the Canaanitish servants) as an inheritance for your children [and they shall serve you forever]”? then I reply, that this refers to the case of a Canaanitish servant who has been bought from a heathen; but if such a servant has been bought from an Israelite he shall go free at the end of six years! — This explanation that our text refers to a Canaanite servant will not hold, for Scripture states, (Deuteronomy 15:12) “and if thy brother an Hebrew man be sold unto thee [and serve thee six years, then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]” — the Torah says, as it were, by using the two terms העברי and אחיך: I tell you this (that the servant shall go free in the seventh year) only with regard to thy brother! Consequently Leviticus 25:46 has to be applied to any Canaanite servant, whether bought from a Hebrew or from a heathen and עבד עברי in our text can only denote עבד שהוא עברי. (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:2:2)

IF THOU BUY A HEBREW SERVANT. G-d began the first ordinance with the subject of a Hebrew servant, because the liberation of the servant in the seventh year contains a rememberance of the departure from Egypt which is mentioned in the first commandment, just as He said on it, And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt, and the Eternal thy G-d redeemed thee; therefore I command thee this thing today.²¹Deuteronomy 15:15. It also contains a remembrance of the creation, just as the Sabbath does, for the seventh year signals to a servant a complete rest from the work of his master, just as the seventh day of the week does. There is in addition a ‘seventh’ amongst the years, which is the jubilee, for seven is the chosen of the days [to be the Sabbath], and of the years [to be the Sabbatical year], and of the [seven] Sabbaticals [to be the jubilee]; and they all point to one subject, namely, the secret of the days of the world — from bereshith (in the beginning) till vayechulu (and they were finished).²²Genesis 2:1. See Ramban Vol. I, pp. 61-64. Therefore this commandment deserved to be mentioned first, because of its extreme importance, alluding as it does to great things in the process of creation.²³Ramban’s reticent and challenging language is illuminated in an essay by I. Weinstock (B’maglei Haniglah V’hanistar, pp. 151-241) where he traces the development of this Cabalistic doctrine: The universe is subject to cycles of seven thousand years; after each six thousand years of growth and activity the seventh thousand is one of “rest” — destruction. This process repeats itself seven times — representing a total of forty-nine thousand years, the fiftieth thousand being the jubilee when all existence returns to its beginnings. This phenomenon applies to the planet on which we live as well as to the worlds above us. One can thus get a glimpse into the meaning of Ramban’s words before us, that this commandment “alludes to great things in the process of creation.” This is why the prophet Jeremiah was very stringent about it and said, Thus saith the Eternal, the G-d of Israel: I made a covenant with your fathers;²⁴Jeremiah 34:13. At the end of the seven years ye shall let go every one his manservant, and every one his maidservant.²⁵Ibid., Verses 14 and 10 (Ramban combined here parts of these verses). And on account of its violation, G-d decreed the exile,²⁶Ibid., Verses 17-22. just as the Torah decreed exile for the Sabbatical rest of the land which was not observed,²⁷Leviticus 26:34-35. as I will yet write,²⁸Ibid., 25:2. with the help of the Rock.
When He finished stating the ordinance of this [first] commandment as it applies to Hebrew servants, He began the ordinance of the commandment, Thou shalt not murder,²⁹Above, 20:13. since it is the worst [sin] and then [He stated the ordinances of the commandments] to honor one’s parents, and of Thou shalt not steal,²⁹Above, 20:13. and then He went back to the ordinance of one who smites his fellow-man but did not kill him,³⁰Further, Verses 18-19. and then to the murder of a bondman, which is worse than the killing of an offspring,³¹See further Verse 22 — that for killing an unborn child a fine is paid, while in the case of the bondman, if he did not survive for twenty-four hours after he was struck by the master, the master is liable to death (Verses 20-21). and after that to [injury to] the limbs of Israelites and bondmen,³²Ibid., Verses 24-27. and then to cases of death inflicted by cattle which cause injury.³³Ibid., Verses 28-32. All the sections are thus arranged in logical sequence and in proper order.

כי תקנה עבד עברי, "When you purchase a Jewish slave, etc." Perhaps the meaning is: "when you are about to buy a slave, buy a Jewish slave (rather than a Gentile)." You should not buy a Gentile because you know you can keep him indefinitely.

כי תקנה עבד עברי, the Torah speaks about a Jewish thief who did not have enough money to make restitution (compare Exodus 22,2, “if he is unable to make restitution he will be sold in settlement of what he stole.”) שש שנים יעבוד, this applies to the thief who was sold by the court. The case of someone who had to sell himself (his labour) is discussed by the Torah in Leviticus 25,39 under the heading of כי ימוך אחיך ומכר לך, “when your brother has fallen on economically hard times so that he had to sell himself to cover his debts, etc.” Concerning that situation the Torah adds that he goes free in the Jubilee year (verse 40 there) In our situation, the term he is sold for is 6 years. Some of our sages (Kidushin 14) hold that both situations are halachically similar based on a gezeyrah shavah, identical wording being used by the Torah in both examples, i.e. the word in question being the unnecessary word יעבוד in Leviticus 25,40.

כי תקנה עבד עברי, ”When you acquire the services of a Jewish labourer,” Nachmanides writes that the reason why the Torah commences the legislation following with this example of the details of setting such a labourer free from his obligations vis a vis you in the seventh year, is that this law contains reminiscences of the Jewish experience in Egypt. This is why the Torah (in Deut. 15,15) writes: “you shall remember that you were a serf in the land of Egypt and the Lord your G’d set you free; this is why I command you this thing this day.” In addition to the reminder of the bondage experience of the Jewish people in the legislation containing the treatment of Jews performing forced labour, there is also a reminder of the 6 days of Creation followed by the Sabbath, the same cycle (in terms of years) applies to the period that a man who has sold himself, or been sold by the Court, has to serve out his term with the same master. The element of the sanctity of the seventh time seven years surfaces once more if said servant voluntarily extends his term of service for the same master. The entire legislation reflects symbolisms, seeing that the number seven surfaces as something intrinsically holy, or as something to be sanctified in terms of years or multiples of shemittah cycles. This is also why the prophet Jeremiah 34,13 warns the Jews that they will be punished with exile (becoming slaves again) for collectively violating the law which required them to release their servants not later than after 49 years, i e in the Jubilee year, as well as the law governing the abstention from working one’s land or orchard every seventh year. The Torah continues with laws governing murder or killing through negligence, which is the most serious of crimes committed against one’s fellow man, followed by the laws about not treating parents with the respect due them, even bodily harming them, followed by the laws about stealing property, etc., one after another in logical sequence.

כי תקנה עבד עברי “if you will purchase a Hebrew slave, etc.” The reason the Torah commences with legislation involving rules about how to treat a Hebrew slave is because the Israelites had only recently emerged from all being slaves, albeit to masters of another nationality. This legislation is also a reminder of the Exodus from Egypt. The essence of the liberation of the Jews from Egypt was to exchange their masters. Whereas prior to the Exodus they were enslaved to a mortal master, a cruel one at that, ever since the Exodus they became the charge of an eternal Master, the most kind-hearted imaginable. By liberating the Jewish people from a cruel fate G’d had established a claim to their loyalty, much as He had established an especial claim to the loyalty of the Jewish firstborn who had been exempted from the slaying of the firstborn.
Just as G’d had mentioned the fact that He had taken the Jewish people out of Egypt as the reason for claiming obeisance as their sole owner, (Leviticus 25,55) “for the Children of Israel are My servants,” so mention of this fact in the first of the Ten Commandments provides the justification for legislation regulating treatment of Jewish servants. This legislation is also a reminder of the fact that the Lord created the universe, as the Sabbath is the foremost reminder of that fact in the Decalogue. Just as free men are to rest every seventh day as an acknowledgment of their Creator who created the world in seven days, so the Jewish servant is no less obligated to devote the Sabbath to His master in heaven rather than to devote it to his master’s deputy, his employer on earth. The number seven permeates Judaism in more ways than one. Not only the seventh day, but the seventh month as well as the seventh year all have special significance. This special meaning of cycles of seven years culminates in the Yovel legislation which concludes a cycle called עולם, “forever,” in the words of the Torah (Leviticus 25,20). The term Sabbath is not reserved exclusively for the seventh day, but is also applied to the seventh year, the year when agricultural work is suspended.

“If you buy. . .” A slave who is a Hebrew. Whereas if the verse was indeed referring to a gentile slave, it would have said: “When you buy a gentile slave from a Jew who sold him to you,” and it is not referring to a slave who was sold by a court for his theft. This is why Rashi first explains the meaning of עבד עברי before the words of כי תקנה that appear earlier, so that in this way, כי תקנה will prove that the verse is speaking of a [Hebrew] slave sold by the court.

V. 2. כי תקנה עבד עברי. Nichts dürfte dem vorurteilslosen Denker die Wahrheit der mündlichen Gesetztradition also in die Augen springend dokumentieren, wie sofort die ersten beiden Paragraphen, VV. 2 — 6 und VV. 7 —11, mit welchen diese, "mosaische Gesetzgebung" beginnt. Es soll das Zivil- und Kriminalrecht einem Volke gegeben werden, es sollen die Grundsätze und Bestimmungen des Rechts und der Menschlichkeit ausgesprochen werden, die das Verhalten des Menschen zum Menschen in einem Staate zu regeln bestimmt sein sollen, der erste Gesetzestitel ist, wie natürlich, dem Personenrechte gewidmet, und dieser Titel beginnt mit den Sätzen: Wenn ein Mensch den andern, und wenn ein Vater seine Tochter verkauft!!! Welch eine völlig undenkbare Ungeheuerlichkeit, wenn in der Tat diese "Schrift" das "Gesetzbuch" des jüdischen Volkes, sie und nur sie die primäre und einzige Quelle des "jüdischen Rechts" sein sollte! Was muss nicht alles bereits gesagt und bestimmt, besprochen, festgesetzt und erläutert sein, ehe das Gesetz zu diesen, doch jedenfalls nur Ausnahmefällen, kommen, ja von ihnen nur sprechen kann. Und mit diesen, das heiligste persönliche Recht, das Recht persönlicher Freiheit beschränkend negierenden Sätzen, beginnt das Gesetz!

כי תקנה עבד עברי, “if you acquire a Hebrew servant;” according to Rashi, the scenario described here is that a thief who did not have the means to compensate his victim for what he had stolen, has been “sold” (i.e. the value of his labour for six years) by the court which had convicted him. [A Jew’s body cannot be sold by any court. Ed.] The procedure has been described in Exodus 22,2. Alternately, the person described in the Torah here has fallen on hard times and has sold his labour for six years to a “master” in order to pay off his creditors. If he had been “sold” by the court he does not automatically leave his master’s employment at the conclusion of six years service. Thus far Rashi on above verse. The problem is what prompted Rashi to write that someone sold by the court does not automatically conclude his service at the end of six years? We have a verse in Deuteronomy 15,12, according to which if someone who is a Jew or Jewess, has been “sold” to you, his contract is valid for six years be he a male or a female. He is to be released at the end of that period, and his master is to provide him with a minimal stake to enable him to establish himself economically from that point. (verses 13-14 there) Clearly, that verse and its provisions do not apply to someone who had “sold” himself but had been “sold” by the court. Rashi there also comments that the person in question had been sold by someone other than himself. We must assume therefore that Rashi was explaining the commentary of the Mechilta, according to which the words: כי תקנה apply to the son or daughter of the original master, who had died during these years. The question is whether the contract can be inherited by the master’s children, or in the event that the master did not leave behind any children, whether whosoever inherits the master’s estate this includes the unexpired period of such a servant’s contract. In the event that such a servant had been “sold” by the court would the contract expire automatically with the death of the original purchaser? The wording in Deuteronomy, כי ימכר לך, “if he has been sold to you,” as is distinct from the wording in our verse where the master is described as actively acquiring the servant, i.e. כי תקנה, suggest that the two situations described are not identical. In Deuteronomy the period of service is spelled out as being six years, adding that in the seventh year such a servant has to be released unconditionally, whereas in Exodus, in our verse the Torah adds the same clause. In Deuteronomy the word (unnecessary) ועבדך, “he shall serve you” is added. This reference to “you” is absent in our verse here. In Leviticus 25,39, where the subject of an impoverished Israelite selling himself is first raised, the Torah does not speak of a term of 6 years but a period concluding with the Jubilee year, a year when all such forced sales of land or labour are automatically reversed. If such servants are not released until the Jubilee year, it stands to reason that they continue serving the son or daughter of their master if he passed away before the onset of the Jubilee year (once in 50 years). This means that the verse we are dealing with, commencing with the words: “when you acquire, etc.,” must apply to someone who had been sold by the court. If the Torah, in dealing with the acquisition of a Jewish servant, had only written the one verse on the subject in our portion, I might have thought that such a “servant” would have to continue serving upon the death of his master either his son or even his brother. To prevent us from misunderstanding this, the Torah had to write when speaking of a servant who had been sold by the court: כי ימכר לך אחיך, “when your brother has been sold to you,” and it had to add: ועבדך שש שנים, “and he has to serve you, (the purchaser) for six years.” This excludes any service to an heir of the purchaser. We therefore find that on the one hand the text implies something additional, and on the other hand it implies something less. The Rabbis therefore interpreted the addition as being the heir if he is a son or a daughter, but excluding the brother in the event the master did not leave behind a son or daughter in the event that the servant had been sold by the court. We find in the Talmud, tractate Kiddushin, folio 17 that the Talmud asks what forces us to include as heir the son, while at the same time excluding the heir when he is a brother, i.e. not a direct descendant. The answer given is that a son takes the place of his father when it comes to inheriting landed property or a maidservant whom the father may assign to his son to inherit as maidservant, (wife) when of age. (Compare Leviticus 27,20 and Talmud tractate Erchin folio 25.) [At this point our author refers to Rashi saying that the whole concept of the servant leaving his master’s forced employment is a chidush, something not derived from standard methods of interpreting the Torah’s laws, and he proceeds to suggest that it could be a g’zeyrah shaveh, an accepted method of interpretation. As I have not found in my editions of Rashi, any reference to his saying that there is a chidush, I’ll skip this. Ed.]

כי תקנה עבד עברי, “If you acquire a Jewish slave, etc.;” the reason why the Torah commences its list of social laws with this particular law is that the Israelites had recently been redeemed from slavery themselves, so that they had good reason to understand how important it is not to treat one of their own as they had been treated in Egypt. Even if an Israelite had committed a crime for which he had been sold, the maximum length of time he was allowed to have his freedom to choose his employer restricted was six years. Even during these six years, his master, who did not own him bodily even then, was not allowed to force him to perform menial tasks. כי תקנה, “when you purchased etc.” Rashi explains that the “slave” the Torah speaks about was not purchased at a public auction, but was acquired as a servant from a duly elected Jewish Court whose task it also is to ensure that a thief’s victim is compensated by his victim. If he cannot do so from his own means he is “sold,” i.e. his labour is sold for a maximum of six years, his victim being paid the wages that this servant would earn during the next six years if he had not been “sold,” and is given by the court to his victim. [This editor has rounded out the picture based on the Talmud, for the benefit of readers totally unfamiliar with this subject.] There was some discussion in the Mechilta if our verse deals with an Israelite who had fallen on hard times and accumulated debts that he could not repay and who “sold himself,” (based on Leviticus 25,39). According to that view an Israelite “sold” by the court would not automatically be able to terminate his employment after 6 years maximum. This view is in apparent contrast with what the Torah wrote in Deuteronomy. According to Leviticus 25,46, gentile slaves who are owned bodily by Jews may be inherited by their children. The words ונמכר לך, “and he has been sold to you,” refer to an Israelite “sold” by the court. The Torah continues by decreeing that such a “slave” must not be required to perform menial tasks for his “master.” Clearly, this rule does not apply to gentile slaves whose bodies are owned by their Israelite masters. Deuteronomy 15,12 makes it quite clear that the law of releasing a slave after 6 years applies only to Jews who have been sold by the court. The passive form of yimacher, is absolutely clear. The Mechilta does not disagree, but derives the rule from a different type of exegesis. The author there (Rabbi Yishmael) uses a method known as gezeyrah shaveh. [I have slightly abbreviated our author’s presentation of this subject. Ed.] שש שנים יעבוד, “he is to serve for six years.” The number “6” in this verse is viewed also as an allegorical reference to six empires that at one time or another will enslave the Jewish people. They are: “Egypt, Ashur, Babylon, the Medes, the Greeks, and the Romans, (descendants of Edom). According to this interpretation, after the collapse of the Roman Empire the Jewish people, [as a whole, Ed.] will not again experience enslavement. This is based on the end of the verse: “and in the seventh year he will be released unconditionally.”

‎כי תקנה IF THOU BUYEST [AN HEBREW SERVANT] — This means an Hebrew servant whom thou hast bought from the hand of the court which sold him for a theft which he had committed, as it is said, (Exodus 22:2) “if he (the thief) have nothing, then shall he be sold for his theft”. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture is referring to the case of one who sells himself as a servant on account of his destitution, whilst he who has been sold by the court for his theft shall not go free at the end of six years! This assumption it erroneous, for when Scripture states, (Leviticus 25:39, 40) “and if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and he sells himself unto thee … [he shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee]”, it is plain that in this passage there is mentioned the case of one who sells himself on account of his destitution. How then must I explain כי תקנה in this verse? Obviously as referring to him who was sold by the court (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:2:1).

ובשביעית, the seventh year after he was sold, not the seventh year of the Shmittah cycle.

But if bought from a Jew he shall go free after six years. And accordingly, piercing the slave’s ear [so he will serve until the yovel] would be a decree of the Torah rather than because of [what Rashi explained in v. 6]: “The ear, which heard upon Mount Sinai, ‘You shall not steal!’. . .” and “‘For to Me are the B’nei Yisrael servants’. . .”

The reason the Torah refers to the slave as עבדי instead of ישראלי, may be that the Torah is sensitive about combining the words עבד and ישראל. The Torah also wants us to know that the term עבד when used as applicable to a Jew denotes a temporary status only, seeing that all Jews are permanently G'd's servants. This is one of the reasons such a Jewish servant must leave his master in the seventh year. The Torah also hints that unless a Jew had violated the Torah's commandments he would not find himself in the position of being a slave. Kiddushin 14 in particular states that the Torah speaks of a thief who was unable to make restitution and who has been "sold" by the court in order that the proceeds of the sale be used to compensate his victim. Even in a situation discussed by the Torah in Deut. 15,12 when the subject has sold himself, he did not find himself in such a desperate situation had he not previously violated Torah law. Rabbi Ami tells us in Shabbat 55 that afflictions have always been preceded by sins committed by the individual afflicted.

Ein ganz anderes ist es, wenn nicht dieses "Buch"; wenn das lebendig gebliebene Wort der Gesetzesüberlieferung, welcher dieses "Buch" nur die Stütze des Gedächtnisses und das Korrektiv des Zweifels bewahren soll, die Quelle des jüdischen Rechts bildet, wenn, wie es ja in dem Buche selbst konstatiert ist, das Gesetz bereits vierzig Jahre lang in seiner Vollständigkeit dem lebendigen Bewusstsein des Volkes übergeben und eingeprägt und zu eigen gemacht war, als vor seinem Scheiden ihm Mosche dieses Buch einzuhändigen hatte. Dann begreift es sich, wie eben Ausnahmsfälle zunächst zur Verzeichnung kommen, um eben an ihnen die Prinzipien des Normalen um so schlagender gegenwärtig zu halten, wie überhaupt nicht Rechtsprinzipien, כללים, sondern vorzugsweise einzelne konkrete Fälle, und zwar so lehrreich im "Buche" verzeichnet worden, dass sich von ihnen mit Leichtigkeit die dem lebendigen Bewußtsein anvertrauten Prinzipien abstrahieren lassen, und wie überhaupt die Sprache in diesem "Buche" eine so kunstvoll gewählte ist, dass oft mit einem auffallenden Ausdrucke, einer veränderten Konstruktion, einer Wortstellung, einem Buchstaben etc. eine ganze Reihe von Rechtsbegriffen angedeutet ist. Sollte doch aus diesem Buche nicht das Recht geschöpft werden. Sollte es doch dem bereits des Rechtes Kundigen nur als Mittel der Erhaltung und Immerwiederneubelebung seiner dem Gedächtnis anvertrauten Kunde, sowie dem Rechtslehrer zum Lehr-Mittel in die Hand gegeben sein, daran die zu tradierende Rechtskunde also befestigend zu knüpfen, dass es dem aufhorchenden Rechtsjünger leicht werde, an der Hand der ihm schriftlich vorliegenden Sätze die mündlich empfangene Kunde sich immer aufs neue im Geiste zu reproduzieren.

יעבוד, “he will serve.” The word refers here to ordinary household chores etc., not to backbreaking labour.

לחפשי means INTO FREEDOM (i. e. חפשי is a noun like חֹפֶשׁ but having a redundant י at the end).

יצא לחפשי, the word lachofshi, a participle of a verb, means “without having to pay compensation;” had the word described the state of liberty of the “servant” now released, the word should have been vocalised lechofshi with the semi vowel sheva under the letter ל.

If your brother, the Hebrew, is sold to you. In other words, through a gezeirah shavah we learn the meaning of עברי in this verse, from עברי (in Devarim 15:12), “Your brother, the Hebrew ( העברי ) . . .” For the word העברי there is superfluous — since it says “your brother”, [we know it is speaking of a Hebrew. So] why say also “the Hebrew”? Thus, עברי there is for a gezeirah shavah, teaching that עברי here is “your brother”, [i.e., a Hebrew]. So explained the Re’m.

Another nuance in the words עבד עברי instead of עברי עבד, "a Jew as a slave," is a reminder to the purchaser that the individual in question was an עבד already before the present master had purchased him. The idea is that he was already guilty vis-a-vis Heaven. The court would not sell him until he had been convicted. As a result we need not have any misgivings about the term עבד עברי being used by the Torah in this instance as opposed to Deut. 15,12 where the Torah characterises the "slave" as אחיך העברי, "your brother the Jew."

Es verhält sich die תורה שבכתב zur תורה שבעל פה, wie die kurzen Diktate nach einer vollständig mündlich vorgetragenen Disziplin einer Wissenschaft sich zu dem mündlich Vorgetragenen verhalten. Für die Jünger der Wissenschaft, die die mündlichen Vorträge gehört, sind kurze Diktate vollkommen hinreichend, um zu jeder Zeit, an der Hand dieser Diktate, sich die ganze Wissenschaft vollständig gegenwärtig zu halten und immer aufs neue wieder zu vergegenwärtigen. Für sie genügt oft ein Wort, ein beigefügtes Fragezeichen, Ausrufungszeichen, ein Gedankenstrich, ein Punkt, ein Strich unter einem Worte etc., um eine ganze Gedankenreihe, eine Bemerkung, Beschränkung usw. wieder ins Leben zu rufen. Für diejenigen, die die mündlichen Vorträge des Meisters nicht gehört, werden solche Diktate völlig unbrauchbar sein. Wollen sie sich lediglich aus ihnen die Wissenschaft konstruieren, so werden sie vielfach irre gehen müssen; Worte, Zeichen usw., die den durch die mündlichen Vorträge eingeweihten Jüngern als die belehrendsten Leitsterne zur Festhaltung der gelehrten und gelernten Wahrheiten dienen, starren den Uneingeweihten als nichtssagende Sphinxe entgegen, und die Wahrheiten, welche die eingeweihten Jünger nur an ihnen reproduzieren, nicht aber aus ihnen produzieren, werden die Uneingeweihten nur als bodenlose Spiele des Witzes und leere Träumereien belächeln. —

ובשביעית, “and in the seventh year;” at the beginning of his seventh year of service. The reference is to the beginning of the seventh year after this servant had been “sold.” When a Jewish servant has not been sold by the court, he is released only with the onset of the Jubilee year.

חנם, “by himself.” If the servant took sick during the period of his (forced) employment the employer cannot demand to be reimbursed for working hours lost, nor can he demand to be reimbursed for medical treatment for which the employer laid out the money. In short, the word חנם means that no money will change hands at the time this servant leaves the employ of his master (Mechilta). This rule applies provided that the servant was not sick for more than three years out of the six. If he was sick for three years or more, he has to make up time lost by working it off. This is based on Isaiah 16,14: “in three years, fixed like the years of a hired hand.” Seeing that this servant has been compared to a “hired hand” in Leviticus 25,40 it follows that the minimum amount of service he must render is three years (compare also Tosafot Kidushin 17A.).

The term עבד had to be used by the Torah to justify why he has to serve his master for six years and cannot leave his employer like ordinary employees.

Indem uns das göttliche Wort die Prinzipien des Rechts und der Humanität vergegenwärtigen will, die es für die Rechtsachtung der Person sanktioniert, greift es zunächst den Verbrecher hervor, und zwar den in allen andern Staaten mit empfindlichsten Leibes- und Freiheitsstrafen bedrohten Verbrecher am Eigentum, und zeigt: welche Behandlung sein Recht in seinem Staate dem Verbrecher diktiert. Lesen wir dies Gesetz:

יצא לחפשי, “he will exit to freedom.” G-d, so to speaks is quoted as saying: “I have redeemed the Israelites from Egypt from the house of slavery (Exodus 20,2). My intention was that they will henceforth be free men. They are therefore not “free” to sell themselves into servitude.” This is the meaning of Leviticus 25,10: “for the Children of Israel are My servants.” My document proving that they are Mine has preceded anyone’s subsequent document, which is thereby rendered legally invalid.

שש שנים יעבוד, he shall serve for six years, etc. The Torah means that even if the slave escaped during these six years he has to complete the term remaining from the original six years. The reason the Torah does not write: "he has to serve you," (i.e. the purchaser) is to allow for the slave to complete the six years if the original master has died and he has now become the property of the son.

כי תקנה עבד עברי. Es lehrt uns die mündliche Überlieferung, daß hier von dem Kap. 22, 2 bezeichneten Falle die Rede ist, dass ein Dieb, der den Diebstahl zu ersehen nicht das Vermögen hat, zum Behufe dieses Ersatzes verkauft wird, אם אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו. Ein solcher Verkauf findet nur zum Ersatz des gestohlenen Wertes, nicht aber zur Aufbringung der dort V. 3 als Pön statuierten doppelten Zahlung, und nur bei einem Diebe, nicht aber bei einer Diebin statt. Daher heißt es dort nicht allgemein: אם אין לו ונמכר, sondern: בגנבתו, für das Gestohlene, und nicht: בגנבה, sondern: בגנבתו, freiwillig/i verkaufe, ist (Wajikra 25, 39) vorgesehen, וכי ימוך ונמכר לך. Darum heißt es auch nur hier: כי תקנה עבד עברי, er ist schon, ehe du ihn kaufst, עבד durch das Gesetz, und du kaufst ihn aus der Hand des Gerichtes. Gleichwohl soll er, wie die מכילתא bemerkt, dir עברי, der nationale Genosse bleiben, es kann nur das Gesetz nicht umhin, ihn עבד zu nennen, יכול תקראנו עבד לשום בזיון ת׳׳ל כי תקנה עבד עברי- התורה קראתו עבד בעל כרחה.

לחפשי, some commentators claim that the letter ל at the beginning of this word, meaning “to” is superfluous, just as that letter is superfluous in Chronicles I 3,2: והשלישי לאבשלום, which means nothing other than והשלישי אבשלום, “the third: Absalom.” Here too the Torah had to write only: יצא חפשי, “will go free.” The letter י in the word חפשי, is a preposition just as in the word: הקדמוני in Ezekiel 10,19, which converts that word to mean: “which is at the eastern gate.” It is similar to the words: שלישי, רביעי, “third, fourth, etc. Other commentators understand the prefix letter ל in לחפשי as converting its meaning to a noun: “לחופש, to freedom.” They compare it to expressions such as “to דרור.” If so, then the letter י at the end of the word: לחפשי would be superfluous, just as the letter י in the words: ,היושבי, המגביהי המשפילי in Psalms 23,1, 113,5 and 113,6 are superfluous. [seeing that there we deal with poetic form of expressions, it is not fair to declare these words as superfluous. Ed.] Other conditions terminating the period of Jewish slaves’ servitude are: sickness, though followed by his complete recovery. The word: חנם, “without compensation to the master,” is the Torah‘s way of informing us of this condition. חנם, without bureaucratic delays such as a document proving that the “slave” had been released by his master. Neither did he have to compensate the master for any hours of work not actually served during any part of those six years.

ובשביעית יצא לחפשי חנם, and in the seventh year he leaves to become free without payment. The Torah means that there are occasions when said slave has to serve also in the seventh year such as when he has been sold in the middle of a calendar year. The six years are counted as commencing the day he is sold. The Torah also indicates by this verse that if the "seventh year," i.e. the שמטה occurs during the six years the slave has to serve, his term of service remains unaffected by that fact. I have found this in the commentary of Maimonides on Kiddushin chapter 1, Mishnah 2.

שש שנים יעבד, es heißt nicht ועבדך שש שנים, es geht somit seine Dienstpflicht über deine Persönlichkeit hinaus, geht also nach dem Tode des Herrn auf seinen Sohn über. Indem aber andererseits es (Dewarim 15, 12) in der Tat ועבדך שש שנים heißt, so bleibt diese Erweiterung auf den nächsten Repräsentanten beschränkt und erstreckt sich nicht auf einen sonstigen Erben (Kiduschin 17 b.).

שש שנים יעבד ובשביעית יצא, hieße es: שש שנים יעבד ואחרי כן יצא so wäre die Wiedererlangung seiner Freiheit absolut von der Leistung einer sechsjährigen Arbeit bedingt, und Ausfälle durch Krankheit müssten nachgeholt werden: hieße es: שש שנים יהיה עמך ובשביעית יצא, so würde das siebte Jahr ihm unbedingt die Freiheit bringen; in der Fassung, wie der Satz vor uns steht, ist der Arbeit und dem siebten Jahre ein sich gegenseitig beschränkender Einfluss eingeräumt, den die Halacha dahin ausspricht: er geht im siebten Jahre aus, sobald er nicht den größten Teil seiner Dienstzeit völlig arbeitsunfähig gewesen (das. 17a).

Der Begriff der Arbeitsleistung ist (Wajikra 25, 40) durch die Bestimmung כשכיר כתושב יהיה עמך dahin bestimmt, dass von ihm keine andere Arbeit gefordert werden dürfe, als die bis jetzt zu seinem Berufe gehört (א׳ אתה רשאי לשנותו מאומנותו) und dürfen nach dem fernern Satz: לא תעבוד בו עבודת עבד (daselbst 30) von ihm nicht einmal solche persönliche Dienstleistungen gefordert werden, die ein Sohn oder ein Schüler freiwillig und gerne einem Vater und einem Lehrer gewähren (מכילתא)

חפש ,לחפשי (verwandt mit חפץ und חפשׂ) der natürliche Zustand des Wollens: Freiheit.

:חנם ohne irgend welchen Ersatz, selbst wenn sein Herr Bedeutendes, z. B. für seine Heilung, verausgabt hat.

אם בגפו יבא IF HE CAME IN BY HIMSELF — This means that he was unmarried — as the Targum renders it אם בלחודוהי, if he came in “alone”. The term בגפו is the same as גף) בכנפו being synonymous with כנף wing, skirt) i. e. he came in only just as he was, alone, merely wrapped in his garment: so that בגפו, “in his skirt”, means “in the skirt of his garment”.

THEN HIS WIFE SHALL GO OUT WITH HIM. Rashi commented: “But who brought her in, that Scripture need say that she shall go out with him? But [by saying this], Scripture tells us that he who acquires a Hebrew servant is obliged to provide for the food of his wife and children.” This is a Midrash of the Sages.³⁴Mechilta on the Verse here. Now [even though the children are not mentioned in this verse, but only his wife,] the Rabbis have included the children together with the wife in this duty of the master, on the basis of what is written further on, Then he shall go out from thee, he and his children with him.³⁵Leviticus 25:41.
I am not clear on this law as to whether the earnings of the woman and children belong to the master during the time he is supporting them. It appears to me that the master takes the place of the husband [in this respect]. For the Torah had compassion on the wife and children, whose lives are hanging in suspense,³⁶See Deuteronomy 28:66. and who expect [to be supported from] the husband’s earnings, since now that he is sold as a servant, they are in danger of being lost in their misery. Therefore the Torah commanded the master who is now entitled to the servant’s labor, to act towards them as he [the servant] would. If so, the master only has to assume the responsibilities of the husband, [and no more]; thus he is entitled to their labor as is the husband, and in return he must feed and support them. This is the meaning of the expression, then his wife shall go out with him, since the servant’s wife was together with him as a handmaid to his master, for the labor of both of them belongs to him, in return for which he is obliged to give them food. Thus the only difference between husband and wife is that the wife has a right to go away as she pleases, [and is not bound to work for her husband’s master if she does not want to be supported by him, whilst the husband, who is the servant, is bound to the master]. Similarly, the master’s obligation to support the children is limited to the time that the father is responsible for them, namely when they are minors, or as long as is customary to feed them, as Rashi explained in Tractate Kiddushin.³⁷Kiddushin 22a. See my Hebrew commentary p. 413. All this is out of G-d’s compassion for them [the wife and children], and for the servant as well so that he should not die in his anguish, in the knowledge that whilst he is toiling in a strange house, his children and wife are neglected. Now even though he is not obliged by law of the Torah to support them, as has been explained in the Talmud, Tractate Kethuboth,³⁸Kethuboth 49 a-b. but since it is the normal way of life for a man to support his wife and small children, G-d in His mercies commanded the buyer [of the servant] to act to them as a merciful father. The meaning of the Sages in speaking of banav [literally: “his sons”] is both sons and daughters.
I have seen written in the Mechilta:³⁴Mechilta on the Verse here. “I might think that the master is obliged to support the betrothed [of the servant] and the childless widow of his brother who is waiting for him to marry or reject her? Scripture therefore says, his wife, thus excluding the brother’s childless widow who is waiting for him, since she is not yet his wife. With him, this excludes the betrothed who, [even though she is his wife], is not yet with him.” This Mechilta is a proof to the law which I have stated, for since it is not customary for the betrothed and the childless brother’s widow to be supported by the man [in this case the servant], therefore the Torah did not impose their support upon the master either. And even if the brother-in-law or the bridegroom became liable by law at a certain time known in the Talmud³⁹According to a first [i.e., an older] Mishnah, if after such time as the law allows for the preparation of the wedding, the bridegroom postponed it, he is liable to support her, and she may eat from his goods, so that if she is an Israelite’s daughter and betrothed to a priest, she may eat terumah (the heave-offering) as if she was already his wife. A later Mishnah though, ruled that a woman may not eat heave-offering until she has entered the bride-chamber (Kethuboth 57 b). to support them, that obligation was in the nature of other debts they may have, and therefore the master did not become liable to support them.
Again I have found in another Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon:⁴⁰In Hoffman’s edition, p. 120. — See Vol. I, p. 603, Note 245, for explanation of the term “another.” “If he be married then his wife shall go out with him. Just as the master is obliged to feed the servant, so he is obliged to feed his wife and children. Still I might say: if the servant had a wife and children before he was bought, then his master is obliged to feed them, because he bought him on that condition, but if he had a wife and children only after he was bought I might think that his master is not obliged to feed them. Scripture therefore says, if he be married⁴¹Literally: “if he be the husband of a wife, then his wife shall go out with him.” The word “wife” is thus mentioned twice, once to indicate etc. (see text). etc. There are thus two wives mentioned here, one referring to a wife that he had before his master bought him, and the other referring to a wife he had after he was bought. I might think that even if he had just a betrothed wife, or a childless brother’s widow who is waiting for him, whom the servant himself is not obliged to feed, that nonetheless his master is obliged to support them, and proof for that argument I might find in the fact that the husband himself is not obliged [by law of the Torah, as explained above] to feed his own wife and children, and yet, the master of the servant is obliged to feed the wife and children of his servant; Scripture therefore says, then his wife shall go out with him — that wife who is with him, the master is obliged to feed, but he is not bound to feed a wife who is not with him. I might think that even if the servant’s wife was one with whom it is not correct for him to continue living — such as a widow married to a High Priest, or a divorcee or profaned woman married to a common priest⁴²See Leviticus 21:7;14. — [that the master is bound to feed her]; Scripture therefore says, then his wife shall go out with him — one that is fit to live with him, but not this one etc. I might think that even if he married without the master’s knowledge [the master is obliged to feed her]; Scripture therefore says, if ‘he’ be married — just as ‘he’ was acquired with the master’s knowledge, so his wife [whom the master must support] means one taken with the master’s knowledge. I might think that the earnings of his sons and daughters belong to the master, and it is logical that it be so: for if we see in the case of a Canaanite bondman, whose master is not bound to feed him, that nonetheless the earnings of his sons and daughters belong to the master, then surely it is logical that in the case of a Hebrew servant, whose master is obliged to feed him, that the earnings of his sons and daughters should belong to his master! Scripture therefore says: he (if ‘he’ be married) — it is he whose earnings belong to his master, but not those of his sons and daughters. Then his wife shall go out with him — do not separate him from his wife; do not separate him from his children.” Thus far the language of this Beraitha.⁴³See Seder Bo, Note 209.
Yet I continue to say⁴⁴In spite of the fact that this Beraitha apparently contradicts what Ramban said above — namely, that during the time of the Hebrew servant’s servitude the earnings of his wife and minor children belong to his master, since he is obliged to feed them, whereas here the Beraitha seems to be saying the opposite — “Yet I continue to say” writes Ramban, “as I have written above etc.” as I have written above, that if the servant’s wife and children want to be supported by the master, that he may take their earnings, and this Beraitha quoted above intends only to tell us that they are not his by absolute right, as is the law of the Canaanite bondman, or as is the law of the Hebrew servant himself, [who must of necessity work for their master], but they [the wife and children of the Hebrew servant] can say to him: “We will not be fed by you, and we will not work for you.” What is new in this Beraitha is that if the servant married without the consent of his master, he is not bound to feed the wife or her children, for since it is within the power of his master to give him a Canaanite bondmaid, he is not obliged to feed this Israelite woman. The Rabbis further interpreted the word imo (with him) to teach us that you are not to separate him from his wife and children, which means to say that the master cannot tell him: “Be together with the handmaid I gave you and sleep with her at night, and not with the Israelite wife,” but the servant has the right to choose for himself.

אם בגפו יבא, If he enters the service as a single man, etc. Our sages in Kidushin 20 conclude from this wording that if the Jewish slave enters his period of slavery while unattached, his master is not allowed to asssign a Gentile slave-woman to cohabit with him. The legislation permitting this applies only if said slave is already married. I believe the reason they came to this conclusion is that the sages were bothered by an anomaly in the text. The Torah appears to repeat itself when it says that if the slave entered service married he shall leave in that state. Seeing the Torah had already said that if he entered service unmarried he will leave unmarried, this implies that if he had been married previously he could leave with his wife. Why did the Torah have to spell this out? You will find that the sages scrutinised the verse and said that the words "and his wife will leave" are quite inappropriate. His wife, after all, had never become a slave! Why does she need the Torah's permission to leave? The sages therefore interpreted these words to mean that while the slave was in the service of his master the master had to provide also for the needs of the slave's wife. Once the slave leaves, this obligation is at an end. If the Torah had meant that the slave-woman the master had assigned to the slave could leave with him, this would contradict the clear statement in verse four that any wife and children born by such a woman during these years will most certainly not be released with their husband/father. What then did the Torah mean when it said that the slave's wife may leave together with him? The sages therefore arrived at the conclusion that only a married slave may be assigned a slave-woman to cohabit with. Clearly the statement was intended to provide an additional halachah. The word בגפו means "if he has no Jewish wife." We know this because when the Torah speaks of a man married to a Jewish wife the man is called בעל אשה. The words בגפו יצא mean he is to leave unmarried, as single as he entered the service of his master. One may also understand this as a comparison to when he entered, i.e. "just as he entered service without wife and children, neither the kind that could depart with him nor the kind that had to remain behind with his master, he leaves as he came." If he had a wife but no children at the time he entered the service of his master, the latter cannot assign a Gentile slave-woman to him either as we would consider him as having entered service בגפו, alone. The same applies even more so if the slave had been the father of children at the time he entered the service of the master although he had not had a wife at that time.

אם בגפו יבא בגפו יצא. The Torah first mentions the subject in general terms, then proceeding to details. For instance, if the servant was unmarried at the time the court sold him, or even if his master has given him a wife while he was in his employ, he leaves without his wife seeing that the woman given to him as a wife remains in the house of the master, her employer. Having said this, the Torah continues to explain how this works אם בעל אשה הוא, if he was already married, his wife (who will also be a charge on his master) will leave with him when he is released from this involuntary contract after 6 years. However, if his master had provided him with a wife during the period of his forced employ, the wife in question remains with her master. The “wife” the master had assigned to his Jewish servant was a gentile servant maid whose body belongs to her master.

אם בגפו יבא, “if he enters service as a single individual,” a reference to his body גוף being unattached. Marriage can be perceived as the reuniting of two bodies separated at the time the first woman was separated from the body of the first man, Adam. Alternately, it means that this person did not own anything but his body, hence he was sold into service for his debts.

If he came by himself. The term בגפו is the same as בכנפו . [Rashi knows this] because the Targum translates the word כנף as גפא .

V. 3.גף von גפף, der Körper (verwandt mit גב, von גבב, der Rücken). Wenn er nur mit seiner Person und in keiner Beziehung zu einer Frau eingetreten, so kann ihm auch während der Dienstzeit keine solche Beziehung, wie sie V. 4 statuiert, von dem Herrn gegeben werden. Indem es aber heißt: "wenn er mit seiner Person allein eintritt", so ist damit schon der Fall angedeutet, dass er, wenn verheiratet, mit der Frau eintrete. Noch mehr liegt dies in dem: ויצאה אשתו עמו, es muss also, wenn er verheiratet ist, die Frau mit ihm eingetreten sein. Nun kann aber das Verhältnis durchaus kein Dienstverhältnis sein, in welches die Frau mit ihm zum Herrn eingetreten wäre. Selbst, wie bereits bemerkt, für den eigenen Diebstahl wird kein Frauenzimmer verkauft, geschweige dass die Frau in keiner Weise für das Vergehen des Mannes irgendwie zu büßen hätte. Vielmehr, lehrt die Halacha, wird die Frau nicht vom Manne getrennt und hat während der Dienstzeit, wo der Mann nicht für Frau und Kinder sorgen kann, der Herr die Frau und Kinder mit zu ernähren, und nur in so fern ist der Eintritt und Austritt der Frau zu verstehen (רמב׳׳ם .(מכילתא und רמב׳׳ן differieren über die Frage, ob der Herr während der ihm obliegenden Alimentationspflicht nicht dagegen, wie sonst der Mann, ein Anrecht an den Erwerb der Frau habe. רמב׳׳ם verneint dies. Nach רמב׳׳ן tritt er aber mit Übernahme der Pflicht in dieser Beziehung auch in die Rechte des Mannes. — Auch der ledig Eingetretene kann sich, mit Erlaubnis des Herrn, während der Dienstzeit verheiraten und liegt dann ebenfalls dem Herrn die Ernährung der Frau ob.

ויצאה אשתו עמו, “his wife will leave that master’s employment with him (at the same time). Rashi asks correctly, granted that we have been told that his wife leaves with him, but where did we hear that this applies to his children? As an answer he cites the Talmud, tractate Kiddushin folio 22, that we learn from this verse that the master of the servant of which the Torah speaks here is obligated to look after the servant’s wife’s and family’s needs, if he had such when he was sold to him. Whereas it is clear that the master has to look after such a servants’ wife, it does not appear clear from the text that he is also obligated to look after the children of such a servant. We need to find a nuance in the text that would support this contention. Our author therefore suggests that this can be found in Leviticus 25,41, where the subject is someone who was forced to sell his labour as he had fallen on hard times, debts, etc; the Torah there states that the “master” must release both him and his family in the Jubilee year, showing that there is an unnecessary word. The word שכיר appears both in Leviticus and that same word appears again in Deut. 15,18. The scholars that do not accept this g’zeyrah shaveh as something that is traditional, but simply consider (Talmud Kiddushin there) the phrasing of the verse as sufficient.

אם בגפו יבא, בגפו ילך, according to the plain meaning of the text the meaning is: “he will leave in the same condition as when he had begun his term of service.” The Torah proceeds to illustrate this by quoting examples of how his personal status might have changed during these six years. Even though his master might have given him a gentile slave to live with and to have children with, the “wife” and children remain the property of his master.

בגפו יצא HE SHALL GO OUT BY HIMSELF — This intimates that if he was unmarried originally (when he came in), his master is not allowed to give him against his will a Canaanitish handmaid with the object of raising slaves (Kiddushin 20a).

אם בעל אשה הוא, “if he was married at that time, etc.” if he was already married to a Jewish woman, his master may assign a non Jewish woman to be his mate. If, however, he had not been married yet, his master must not assign a non Jewish woman for him as a mate. The psychology underlying this legislation is that a normal person does not feel at ease with his fate unless he shares his life with the first woman who became his mate. If the first woman who became his mate is a gentile, he will most likely be so attached to her that even after his term of service he will not want to part from her although she is bound to her master for life. If the same servant had been married before his labour was sold for six years to the same employer, he is likely to yearn for his wife, and will not choose to remain with his master until the Jubilee year.

Wrapped in his garment, in the skirt of his garment. Since Rashi explained that בגפו means “the skirt of his garment,” which does not [directly] imply that he came single, thus Rashi explains that the verse indicates that he came with nothing but his garment, [which is an expression used to describe someone who is single].

I have seen that Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi feels that the reason for the legislation just mentioned is that otherwise the Torah should have written merely כן יצא instead of בגפו יצא. I do not agree with this. On the contrary, had the Torah written what Rabbi Mizrachi suggested as an alternative this would have reinforced the impression that the master could not give him a slave-woman and that he had to remain as single as when he entered the service. The truth is that the reason the Torah did not write כן יצא is because of other implications such an expression implies.

בגפו יצא, “he will leave alone.” According to Rashi, the line means that if this “slave” entered service while single, he will also leave while single. If he had been married before, his master can give him a gentile slave for the duration of his service. The reason is that if his master were to “give” him a gentile slave of his as a “wife,” and he would have children with her, he might grow so fond of her and her children, that at the end of the six years he would choose to remain with his master rather than to rejoin his Jewish wife. The chances of this happening to married man, is more remote. He presumably longs for his former family life, and he will leave as soon as is legally possible. His plea of preferring his gentile “family” under such circumstances is not acceptable by the Torah.

אם בעל אשה הוא IF HE BE MARRIED to an Israelite woman (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:2),

ויצאה אשתו עמו, “his wife will leave together with him.” From this verse we deduce that the servant’s master had obligated himself to look after the needs of the servant’s wife and children. (not voluntarily, but this was part of the contract the Torah has in mind).

This teaches that if he was unmarried. . . [Rashi knows that this refers to a gentile handmaid] because otherwise, [if בגפו referred to his Jewish wife as in the beginning of the verse,] it should have said simply: בגפו יבא כן יצא (If he came by himself, so shall he go out.) Perforce, the second בגפו refers to a gentile handmaid, not to a Jewess. [And the first בגפו cannot refer to a gentile handmaid because it is written about a gentile handmaid (v. 4), “the woman and her children belong to her master,” whereas here it says, “his wife shall go out with him”]. Rashi uses the term מגיד (this teaches) because the law is only interpreted from the verse, and is not the verse’s simple meaning.

You may ask whence the sages derived the ruling in Kiddushin 20 that the master can assign to the slave a gentile slave-woman only if he entered his service while not only being married but also having children? It is, of course, true that the rulings are part of the oral Torah and not dependent on being spelled out in the written Torah. Nonetheless we may search for clues in the written Torah. Where are children mentioned in the Torah? The answer is that when a person is married without children he is to leave בגפו, in the same state as he entered the service seeing that if the master assigned a Gentile slave-woman to him and he had children by her the slave could no longer qualify under the heading as leaving בגפו, i.e. in the same state as he had entered his master's service. He entered the service without children whereas now he has children. Similarly, if at the time he entered the service he had children but no wife the master cannot assign a slave-woman to him as he would not then leave his service in the state he had entered it. He entered it being single and he would leave it being married, a state that cannot be described as "just as he was unmarried when he entered the service, so he has to be in the same state when he leaves." If the slave had a wife when he entered the service of his master but he did not have any children whereas by the time he leaves his master's service he has children by his Jewish wife, he may take these with him although one may describe his status as having changed seeing that when he entered service he was allowed to live with his wife. The Torah made everything dependent on his having a wife at the time he entered service as a slave, even if the children were born only later. From this it would follow that if the slave had entered his master's service while married to a Jewish woman and his wife had died, the master may then assign a slave- woman to him as the Torah was concerned only with the slave's status at the time he entered the master's service, i.e. בגפו יבא. If I did not have the words of the Talmud before me I would have derived that ruling from the words: "if he is the husband of a wife;" this wording suggests to me that in order for the master to have the right to assign a slave-woman to the husband he must have been married at that time.

ואם בעל אשה, “but if he was married, to a Jewish wife“ at the time the court had ‘sold’ him,” his wife will leave with him; the wording means that he had consummated the marriage before being sold, not that he was only engaged, or that he was betrothed to the widow of a brother who had died without ever having had children. On this verse Rashi explains that the purchaser of a Jewish “slave,” is legally obligated to assume responsibility for said “slave’s” wife and children if any. Although nothing of that kind is written here, seeing that the Torah only writes that “he will leave with his wife,” Rashi deduced it from a verse in Leviticus 25,41: ויצא מעמך הוא ובניו עמו, “he together with his children will leave.” In that verse no mention is made of his wife. We combine both verses in order to get the true meaning of the Torah.

ויצאה אשתו עמו then HIS WIFE SHALL GO OUT WITH HIM — But who brought her in (into the state of service) that the text has to state she shall go out? But by saying this Scripture intimates that he who acquires a Hebrew servant is bound to provide his wife and children also with food (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:3; Kiddushin 22a).

To a Jewish woman. [Rashi knows this] because it says afterwards, “His wife shall go out with him.” But if it is a gentile handmaiden, it says (v. 4), “The woman and her children belong to her master.” Re’m based his explanation on the Mechilta, that “If he [was] married” relates back to בגפו יבא , i.e., his Jewish wife, rather than to the adjacent בגפו יצא , i.e., the gentile handmaiden.

אם בעל אשה הוא, If the slave is a married man, etc. We have to accept the Mechilta Acharite de Rabbi Shimon who says that the wording implies that the master has to supply the needs of the wife only if she is an appropriate wife for the slave. Should the slave be married to a woman forbidden to him under Jewish law even if the marriage was legal under Jewish law, his master has no obligation towards her. This raises the question why the master is allowed to assign a woman who is forbidden to this slave as stated specifically both in the Talmud and in chapter 3 section 4 of Maimonides' Hilchot Avadim. Maimonides distinguishes between the right to live with such a woman and the master's obligation to provide for such a woman when she is not his slave. The words אם בעל אשה הוא therefore have to be interpreted as applicable only to the law mentioned in this verse, i.e. provision of a Gentile slave-woman as partner for such a slave.

He. . . becomes obligated to support his (the slave’s) wife and children. Although here the verse teaches only about supporting the wife, a later verse (Vayikra 25:41) says, “And he shall go out from you, he and his sons.” But here Rashi mentions the support of children only in connection with the support of the wife (Re’m), and it is speaking of children who are minors. In Maseches Kiddushin 22a it is explained why the Torah needs to mention that he is obligated to support both his wife and his children.

The Mechilta raises another aspect here in these words: "I might have thought the master will be obligated to provide for the needs of a woman merely betrothed to the slave, or to a woman who is the widow of his brother who died without children and who awaits the levirate union; the Torah speaks of אשתו to teach us that the betrothed, etc., is not included in the category of wife for whom the master has to care. On the other hand, if the slave was betrothed to a woman he is no longer characterised as בגפו, single, and the master is entitled to assign a slave-woman to him while he is in his service. According to the discussion in Kiddushin 20 the same applies if the slave had children from a wife who had died and in the meantime he had betrothed himself to another woman. He is then considered as fitting the definition of having both a wife and children so that the master can assign a slave-woman to him as marital partner.

ויצאה אשתו עמו, his wife leaves together with him. The letter ו in front of the word יצאה is appropriate seeing the master had also been responsible for the wife's maintenance.

אם אדניו יתן לו אשה IF HIS LORD HAS GIVEN HIM A WIFE — From this we learn that if he has already an Israelite wife the master has the right to give him a Canaanitish handmaid with the object of raising slaves. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture by אשה is speaking about an Israelite woman?! Scripture, however, states: “the wife and her children shall be the master’s”, consequently the text can only be speaking of a Canaanitish woman, for a Hebrew maidservant goes free at the end of six years just as a Hebrew man-servant does — yea, even before the termination of six years she goes free if she shows symptoms of incipient puberty (cf. Rashi v. 7) — for it is said, (Deuteronomy 15:12) “[and if] thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, [be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years, then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]”, which statement teaches you that a Hebrew woman also goes free after six years’ service (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:1; Kiddushin 14b).

IF HIS MASTER GIVE HIM A WIFE. “Scripture is speaking of a Canaanite woman. Or perhaps this is not so; but Scripture here speaks only of an Israelite woman?! Scripture therefore says, the wife and her children shall be her master’s. Consequently, it must be speaking of a Canaanite woman.” This is the language of the Beraitha⁴³See Seder Bo, Note 209. taught in the Mechilta.³⁴Mechilta on the Verse here. Now Rashi wrote [in explanation of this Mechilta]: “For a Hebrew maidservant also goes free at the end of six years [just as a Hebrew manservant does], or even before the end of six years if she shows signs of puberty, for it is said, If thy brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, he shall serve thee six years.”⁴⁵Deuteronomy 15:12. “This teaches you that a Hebrew maidservant also goes free after six years’ service” (Rashi). Consequently the verse here which states the wife [and her children] shall be her master’s can only be speaking of a Canaanite woman.
But this is not quite correct. For if we say [as the Beraitha above attempted to,] that the verse here speaks of an Israelite woman, it could no longer refer to the case of a father selling his minor daughter, about whom the law is given that when she shows signs of puberty she goes free, for how could the master give her as a wife to his Hebrew servant, since he has no power to hand her over to any other man [except to designate her to be his own wife, or that of his son — as is explained further in Verses 8-9]!⁴⁶Accordingly, the Beraitha above that attempted to argue that Scripture here speaks of an Israelite woman [given by the master to his Hebrew servant], must refer only to a Hebrew woman of age who sold herself as a maidservant. So how then could Rashi support his argument [that if she were an Israelite woman, she would go free “if she shows signs of puberty],” when the Beraitha must of necessity be referring not to a minor but to a woman of age? (Mizrachi). Similarly, the proof that Rashi mentioned, namely that she also goes free at the end of six years, is only so in accordance with his own words which he wrote⁴⁷Above, Verse 2, Rashi. that a person who sells himself [on account of his destitution] is sold for a maximum of six years; but in the Talmud⁴⁸Kiddushin 14b. these are the words of a single Sage [Rabbi Eliezer], but the accepted opinion is that one who sells himself can be sold for six years or more. Now if so, the case of a woman who goes free at the end of six years can only be when her father sold her [as a minor, but in that case the master has no right to give her as a wife to his Hebrew servant, but only to designate her as his own wife or that of his son]!⁴⁹So both proofs of Rashi as to why Scripture cannot be speaking here of an Israelite woman, [1. that a Hebrew maidservant also goes free at the end of six years; 2. that even before the end of six years, she goes free if she shows signs of puberty], have no application here for reasons explained above.
But that which the Rabbis have said [in the Beraitha above, on the basis of the verse, the wife and her children shall be the master’s]: “Consequently, Scripture must be speaking of a Canaanite woman” — the meaning thereof is as follows: Since He stated, the wife and her children shall be the master’s [it must be speaking only of a Canaanite woman], for the children of a Canaanite bondmaid are the master’s since her child has the same status as she does, but in the case of an Israelite woman — even if she were of age [in which case her master could give her to his Hebrew servant as a wife], and even if we were to say that a woman may sell herself as a maidservant⁵⁰A woman really cannot sell herself; as the Mechilta puts it: “And if a man sell (Verse 7) — a man can sell himself, but a woman cannot sell herself.” But Ramban is writing only on the assumption that the Beraitha introduced this as a hypothesis finally to be disproved. See my Hebrew commentary pp. 515-516. — her children are the father’s [not the master’s].

אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, If his master gave him a wife, etc. Why did the Torah switch to indirect speech when it had commenced the paragraph with direct speech i.e. "when you buy a Jewish slave, etc.?" The balance of the whole paragraph is in the third person. At the very least the Torah should have concluded the paragraph in the manner it began, by addressing the people concerned directly. Perhaps the reason is that we have a tradition that marriages are made in Heaven, i.e. that G'd personally involves Himself to match the right man to the woman appropriate for him (compare Bereshit Rabbah 68). At first glance one is tempted to interpret the words אם אדוניו as a reference to his true Master, i.e. G'd. The Torah would then tell us that if G'd to whom we are all servants assigns a wife to this man then both she and her children belong to her Master, i.e. G'd. This interpretation is untenable, however; this is why the Torah adds that the wife and her children belong to her master (terrestrial master) whereas the husband (the slave) leaves without them. We also need to know why the Torah repeats the words אמור יאמר העבד in verse five.

From here. . . his master has the right. . . You might ask: Perhaps “his master should give him a wife” means giving him an adult Jewess who sold herself as a slave. [The verse stating that the Hebrew handmaid shall go free after six years refers only to a minor who was sold by her father. Thus it is possible to have an adult Jewess as a slave]? And a gentile handmaid would then be forbidden to a Hebrew slave, [as she is to other Jewish men,] for it is written: “There shall not be a male prostitute from the B’nei Yisrael” (Devarim 23:18). The answer is: Rashi holds that a woman may not sell herself as a slave, because it is written (Vayikra 25:39), “If your brother becomes impoverished and sells himself to you,” implying: your brother and not your sister.

V.4. Indem der Herr אדניה "ihr Herr" genannt wird, so kann, wie auch die Halacha lehrt, hier nur von einer kanaanitischen Leibeigenen, שפחה כנענית, die Rede sein. Für eine Hebräerin gab es kein solches Dienstverhältnis. In dem einzigen, sogleich VV. 7 u. f. besprochenen Fall einer אמה עבריה konnte sie nur mit dem Herrn oder dessen Sohn verheiratet werden. — Mit einer שפחה כנענית ist sonst keine Ehe erlaubt. Hier ist sie ausnahmsweise gestattet; und zwar auch nur, wenn der Knecht bereits verheiratet ist. Der Ausdruck: יתן לו אשה fordert übrigens, dass dies während der Dauer der Dienstzeit ein förmliches eheliches Verhältnis sein müsse: לו אשה המיוחדת לו שלא תהא כשפחת הפקר (מכילתא).

אם אדוניו, “if his master etc.” here the Torah authorises the master of this Hebrew (unmarried) servant to give him one of his Canaanite slave-women as a “wife” to have children with, provided he had previously been married to a Jewish wife. If this “servant” had previously not been married, he cannot force him to enter into such a relationship with a Canaanite woman. This ruling is based on the words in verse 3: אם בגפו יבא בגפו יצא, ”if he came as a bachelor, he will leave as a bachelor.” The reason underlying this legislation is that if he had previously been married to a Jewish woman he will not feel attracted to a Canaanite slave woman.

אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, “If his ‘master’ will give him a wife;” according to Rashi, the “wife” is a gentile slave of his master, and this verse is the halachic source that this is not only permitted, but that he may insist on his servant having a woman with whom he, and only he, performs marital union. (Mechilta, chapter 2, on this verse) The logic according to our author appears to be that seeing that the master is at any rate obligated to provide for the wife and children of such a “slave,” [and the children having a gentile mother are not Jewish, Ed.] he may recover some of the expense he had by keeping the children of such a union. Targum Onkelos adds to his translation that the master is not permitted to “give” such a “slave” a Jewish wife, as no Jewish woman may be forced to marry someone. If the “slave” had married a Jewish slave of his master during his stay there she will leave with him without the master receiving any compensation. Rashi points out here that proof that the master has no control over the body of a Jewish slave is that the Torah legislates that if such a Hebrew slave sold by her father reaches earlier than usual puberty, she immediately can leave her master. He quotes 21,7 as well as Deuteronomy 15,12 as his proof.

Or perhaps it is only a Jewish wife (that he may give him). You might ask: [Why think that the master may give his slave a Hebrew handmaid?] The master may designate a Hebrew handmaid only to himself or his son, and not to his slave [see verses 8 and 9]. The answer is: We might think that he may indeed give her to his slave, but not in marriage, only out of wedlock. And when it says (v. 8), “He has no power (right) to sell her. . .” we would say that this refers only to her father and not to her master.

The true meaning of these verses is that G'd commands something which at first glance sounds irrational, i.e. that if the slave entered the employ of his master while single, he must remain so during the years of his service. His master cannot assign a female slave to him under circumstances other than those listed in Kiddushin 20. The average reader will question the meaning of this legislation asking what difference does it make if the slave had been married or not, seeeing the Torah permits his living together with a Gentile slave anyway? The Torah answers this question by writing: "if his master will give him a wife" (clearly a Gentile woman as one can see from the context) both she and her children will remain with the master, whereas the slave himself will leave as single as he entered the service of this master. This section of the verse speaks about a master who would (illegally) provide a single slave with a Gentile slave-woman as his partner. When such a situation arises it is natural that the slave will not want to leave the employ of his master ever, (after the six years have expired) for one of two reasons: 1) He loves his wife and children; 2) he will once again find himself unattached when leaving the employ of his master. In other words, leaving his master's employ will result in the slave suffering two blows of fate. In view of such considerations, nearly every slave will want to remain in the service of his master forever. The Torah wanted to head off such a situation. This is why the Torah forbade the master to assign a slave-woman to a slave who had entered his service as a single man. If the slave already had a Jewish wife, a free woman, he will find it much easier to abandon the woman assigned to him by his master while he was in such forced service. The conditional אם in verse four is merely a prelude to the word ואם in verse five in which the Torah describes the natural consequence of what would happen after the situation introduced by the first אם had become a reality.

האשה וילדיה תהי׳ לאדניה, überall, wo nur eine physische Eheverbindung stattfinden kann, folgt das Kind der Mutter, כל מי שאין לה לא עליו ולא על אחרים קידושין הולד כמותה (Kiduschin 66 b). ל

האשה וילדיה, “the woman and her children;” children are always mentioned after their mother; Compare Psalms 116,16: אני עבדך בן עמתך, “I, Your servant, son of Your servant maid.”

[If] your Hebrew brother or sister. . . This refers back to what Rashi said before, “a Hebrew handmaid too goes free after six years.”

The reason for the repeated אמר יאמר is that if the slave adds another dimension of service to his service over and above the fact that G'd has made him His servant and he expresses his wish to also remain a slave to his terrestrial master, etc. then the Torah commands that such a person needs to have his ear pierced, etc. There is another dimension to this whole paragraph, a moral/ethical one. The Torah commands man to constantly have before his mental eye the implications of this wole legislation (even if he never contemplates buying a slave, etc.). The words כי תקנה עבד עברי introduce a reminder that a human being is composed of two major components, his soul i.e. his spiritual self, and his body. The spiritual part is his major component, the body having been provided only so that the spiritual part can fulfil the commandments that he is obligated to fulfil as a servant of his Master (G'd). G'd calls the body עבד, whereas He calls man's soul אדם. Baba Metzia 114, quoting Ezekiel 34,31, explains that only the Jewish people are called אדם, as only they have this kind of soul. This is why the Torah commands us that כי תקנה עבד עברי, meaning if you acquire עברי עובר, someone whose stay on earth is temporary seeing every human being is bound to die (Psalms 144,4), he shall be with you שש שנים. The Talmud Moed Katan 28 basing itself on Job 5,26, considers that man is entitled to expect to live 60 years. It says in Job: תבא בכלח אלי קבר, "you will come to the grave in a ripe old age." The numerical value of the word "in a ripe old age," בכלח =60. While it is true that the Torah here speaks about six years, not sixty, this may be understood as correponding to what is known as מספר קטן, i.e. ignoring the digit zero. The six years are in reality sixty years then. The same applies to when the Torah speaks about said עברי עובר going free in the seventh year. The seventh decade is considered the period during which man exits this life. The word חפשי is an allusion to death, man becoming truly free only in death as we know from Psalms 88,6, במתים חפשי, "freedom is found amongst the dead." The word חנם suggests that this freedom is actually attained via the the angel of death, through Samael. The Zohar second volume page 128 phrases it thus: "during life on earth the forces of Samael feed man with worthless things." [חנם, "for free," in the sense of "without value" Ed.] Leaving this earth then is an escape from false values. The only thing that Samael has no control over are the commandments a Jew performs at great expense to himself. This is not something חנם, without value. The message is that anything which comes for free is intrinsically something impure, rooted in the סטרא אחרא. The opposite is true of דבר שבקדושה; it possesses real value.

When the Torah continues with אם בגפו יבא, we must examine this expression more closely. Why did the Torah choose this expression instead of the word לבדו normally used to describe someone as being alone, such as when the Torah describes Jacob as remaining alone (Genesis 32,25)?

We have to remember that if a person was successful in acquiring merits for himself through having performed G'd's commandments and having performed deeds of loving kindness while on earth, such a person has acquired the strength to rise from his grave when the day of resurrection arrives. Psalms 72,16 describes such a period as "men sprouting up in towns like country grass." Ketuvot 111 understands Solomon (the author of this Psalm) as speaking of the time of resurrection. When the Torah speaks of the slave leaving בגפו, the meaning of the word גף is similar to Proverbs 9,3 where the word describes "on the wings of high places." Man's good deeds lift him up to the spiritually high places. Shabbat 49 compares Israel to the dove, i.e. it is like a winged bird thanks to its good deeds. When the Torah writes יבא, the meaning is the same as Onkelos's translation of Genesis 28,11, that "the sun had set." The words בגפו יצא on the other hand, refer to the wing in question being able to rise once again from earth at the time of the resurrection. The reverse will be true of people who have not made the effort to accumulate the required merits during their time on earth. Ketuvot 111 spells this out in connection with Proverbs 3,18 "that Torah is the tree of life for those who uphold and grasp her." The non-observant will not take part in the resurrection of the bodies.

The Torah goes on to write אם בעל אשה הוא ויצאה אשתו עמו. The Torah alludes to a profound mystical element here. There are people who acquire their soul by dint of their good deeds so that such a person (personality) is transformed into the "owner" of its holy soul. In order to understand this concept one has to refer to the Zohar volume three page 91 on Leviticus 22,27 where the Torah discusses that when an ox or sheep is born it is to remain with its mother for seven days before it could be offered on the altar as a sacrifice. According to the Zohar animals acquire their intelligence at the moment of birth. [This is why the Torah refers to the ox as "ox" already at birth not as calf, for instance. The animal does not develop its personality, though it may develop its body. Ed.] Animals are different from human beings in this respect. Human beings acquire their souls only in ratio to the good deeds they have performed. The greater the number of good deeds performed by man the higher quality is his soul (or after having been alive at least for one Sabbath). The soul which such a מצוה -observant Jew acquires is called אשה in our context. Kabbalists such as the author of Tikkunyey Hazohar chapter 50 describe the soul as אשה. The Torah tells us here that if a person has acquired his "wife" i.e. soul, by reason of the performance of good deeds, his wife will remain with him also after death. Shabbat 152 tells an interesting story in this regard. There were certain grave-diggers who dug up the earth belonging to Rabbi Nachman. In the process they happened to disturb the grave of Rabbi Achai bar Yoshia. The latter protested that the diggers were disturbing his rest. The grave-diggers told Rabbi Nachman that they had been rebuked by a man. Rabbi Nachman went to investigate and asked the person in question who he was. He identified himself as Achai bar Yoshia. Thereupon Rabbi Nachman asked Rabbi Achai: "did not Rabbi Mori say that the truly righteous will turn to dust" [as opposed to decaying and becoming worm ridden Ed.], (so how come your body is intact)? Achai retorted: "Who is this Mori whom I have never heard of (that I should be concerned with his pronouncements)?" Thereupon Rabbi Nachman quoted a verse from Kohelet (inaccurately quoted and applied) according to which a body will return to the earth in the condition it had come from it. Rabbi Achai responded that whereas Rabbi Nachman appeared to be familiar with the verse composed by Solomon in Kohelet, he was apparently unfamiliar with a verse by the same Solomon in Proverbs 14,30 according to which "envy is like rottenness of the bones." The meaning of that verse is that people who harboured envy or jealousy in their hearts will experience that their bones decay and rot; those who did not harbour such feelings during their lives on earth will be spared this experience. Thereupon Rabbi Nachman touched Rabbi Achai and found that his body was indeed real. He suggested that Rabbi Achai get out of his grave and go home. Thereupon Rabbi Achai told Rabbi Nachman that he had just revealed that he had not even studied the Book of Prophets properly. We read in Ezekiel 37,13: "you will know that I am the Lord when I open your graves and cause you to come up out of your graves, O My people." Rabbi Nachman countered that it is written in Genesis 3,19: "dust you are and to dust you will return!" Upon hearing this Rabbi Achai explained that the verse in Genesis was meant to apply only one hour before the arrival of the final resurrection. At that time all the dead would return to dust. The gist of the story is that the righteous are called alive even when they are in their graves (Berachot 18).

Another lesson to be derived from the words אם בעל אשה הוא is that the only person who qualifies for the title בעל אשה is the one who makes sure that while on earth all his activities are performed for the spiritual advancement of his soul. Solomon alluded to this in Proverbs 13,25 where he described the eating of a צדיק as "the righteous man eats in order to satisfy his soul;" a person who strives to elevate his spiritual nature in such a way may truly be called a בעל אשה. After all, it is the duty of a husband to look after all the needs of his wife. If the soul is man's wife, it behooves the husband to look after its needs. When he has done so in the best manner he is capable of he can rest assured that the "wife" does not even abandon him in death.

The Torah goes on in verse four: אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, this means that if the בעל אשה mentioned previously did not acquire his pure soul by means of performing good deeds but was fortunate to have been born with such a soul as a gift from G'd Himself, and such a wife had born children for him then both the wife and the children belong to his Master, i.e. to G'd. The Torah revealed here that some people are indeed fortunate to be born with a a righteous soul; this may be due to the fact that the father of such an individual lived a righteous life and "bequeathed" such an inheritance to his offspring. When the Torah speaks of the "children" of such people this is a reference to Bereshit Rabbah 30 which describes the principal offspring of the righteous as their meritorious deeds. Since we have a tradition that each good deed performed creates a good angel known as an advocate (Avot 4,13), such a good deed is a descendant of the צדיק. The Torah describes these "children" as being born "for him," i.e. the husband. The reason that the Torah distinguishes between בנים או בנות, sons or daughters is that the good deeds which required a great deal of effort are described as בנים, whereas good deeds which did not require a battle with the evil urge before one performed them are described as בנות, daughters.

The Torah says that the good deeds performed by such a person who had been endowed with all the advantages by G'd already at the time of birth, does not retain the "wife and her children." Rather, האשה וילדיה תהיה לאדוניה, the "wife and her children will belong to her Master (G'd) as distinct from the good deeds of the person who was not bequeathed a pure soul by his father, the צדיק. This son of the righteous father did not refine his body by means of his good deeds so that his soul will not depart from him after his death. As a result, his soul returns to G'd when his body dies. והוא יצא נגפו, whereas he leaves (dies) alone. Although such a person had been separated from "his wife and children" while in the grave, when the time comes for him to be resurrected, i.e. to leave his grave, he will find that those merits he had acquired during his lifetime on earth will once again stand him in good stead, i.e. he will recapture the status he enjoyed while he lived on earth. He will not forfeit resurrection because he had not been born without a pure soul.

ואם אמור יאמר העד, But if the slave keeps on saying, etc. The Torah here describes the eagerness of the Jew (slave) to serve his Master (G'd) even after his physical powers have diminished (after he has turned 60 as we mentioned earlier). This is why the Torah describes him as saying: "I love my Master, my wife and my children." The latter are his soul and the good deeds the "slave" has performed in this world. He does not wish to leave this world as it enables him to accumulate further merits. Seeing that death makes him חפשי, free, i.e. unable to accumulate more merits, he shuns death. The Torah promises this type of individual that he will indeed be called עבד השם, a true servant of the Lord. G'd will eventually fulfil his desire but not at this stage. ועבדו לעולם, he will be allowed to serve G'd in the Hereafter. When G'd will make a selection amongst the angels who will minister to Him, such individuals will be high on His list of priorities. We find that Moses was an example of such a person since he did not want to die prior to living in the Holy Land and performing there commandments which one cannot perform outside ארץ ישראל (compare Deut. 34,5 and Sotah 14). When the Torah speaks about this slave having his ear pierced with an awl, you will find that the word מרצע, awl, has a numerical value of 400. This is symbolic of the 400 worlds of aspirations mentioned in the Zohar volume 1 page 123. The words ועבדו לעולם may be perceived as the Torah considering such a slave as if he had served G'd for all the years the universe exists, as if he had been alive during all this time. The word לעולם has additional mystical connotations familiar to students of the Kabbalah.

את אשתי MY WIFE — the Canaanitish handmaid mentioned above.

ואם אמר יאמר העבד, “if the servant shall say.” In Kidushin 22 the sages use the repetition of the word אמר as proof that unless the servant expresses this wish twice the employer is not entitled to pierce his ear to extend his period of service in his employ. The word העבד [which does not appear necessary in our context as the subject did not change. Ed.] means that he must express this desire before his period of service expired, i.e. while he was still an עבד (ibid.)

The handmaid. [Rashi knows that] אשתי must be referring to the gentile handmaid, since she remains with the master. In this way, the slave’s love of his master, wife and children is equal, in that he does not want to part with them. But this would not apply to a Jewish wife, [as she would go out with the slave].

V. 5. אם אמר יאמר. Der Entschluss, der auf so lange Zeit hinaus sein Geschick bestimmen soll, muss von ihm wiederholt geäußert werden, und zwar: ואם וגו׳ העבד וגו׳ לא אצא, es muss dieser Entschluss כשהוא עבד und בשעת יציאה in einem Momente geäußert werden, wo er noch Knecht ist und ihm bereits die Freiheit winkt, also unterm lebendigen Eindruck beider Verhältnisse, zwischen denen er sich zu entscheiden hat, בתחלת פרוטה אחרונה ובסוף פרוטה אחרונה, somit im Momente der letzten Knechtesdienstpflicht. אהבתי את אדני וגו׳ und ebenso (Dewarim 15, 16) כי אהבך ואת ביתך כי טוב לו עמך, alle die in diesen Äußerungen vorausgesetzten Verhältnisse müssen vorhanden sein, wenn seinem Entschlusse zu bleiben Folge gegeben werden soll. Er sowohl wie der Herr müssen beide Frau und Kinder haben (ואת ביתך — את אשתי וגו׳) beide müssen gesund (טוב לו עמך) und die Anhänglichkeit eine gegenseitige sein (טוב לו עמך — אהבך) Kiduschin) 22 a). Denken wir uns eines dieser Verhältnisse einseitig weg, so kann der Entschluss leicht ein übereilter sein. Ist der Herr jetzt ledig und es kommt später eine Frau und Familie ins Haus, oder der Knecht jetzt ledig und er bekommt später Frau und Kinder, so kann das Verhältnis leicht unerträglich werden. Ist einer von beiden kränklich, so kann der Entschluss aus einem augenblicklichen Gefühl der Schwäche oder aus einer sich aufopfernden Stimmung hervorgehen und leicht in anderer Stimmung bereut werden. Ist die freundliche Gesinnung nur einseitig, so ist der Entschluss überhaupt ein unnatürlicher und zeugt von einer erregten Stimmung, der keine so weitreichende Folge gegeben werden soll. Ob, wenn beide kränklich, dem Entschluss Folge zu geben sei, ist (daselbst) unentschieden. Dieses טוב לו עמך enthält aber noch die bedeutsamste Norm für die Behandlung des Knechtes im Hause des Herrn und fordert die völlige Gleichheit des Knechtes mit der Herrschaft in Kost, Kleidung und Schlafstätte, also, dass es zum Sprichwort wurde: wer sich einen ibrischen Knecht kauft, kauft sich fast einen Herrn. Die Anforderung ist beiderseits eine sittlich große: אתה נוהג בו באחוה והוא נוהג בעצמו בעבדות, "der Herr hat ihn als Bruder zu behandeln und er sich als Knecht zu benehmen" (Kiduschin 22 a ת׳׳כ בהר).

ואם אמר יאמר העבד, “and in the event that the ‘slave’ will say insistently, etc.;” from this verse we learn that he must express this wish already during those six years, and repeat it at the end of his term of service.

אהבתי את אדוני, “I love my master.” Unless the relationship is one of mutual love the law of extending the servant’s service by piercing his ear is not applicable. This is based ion the words כי טוב לו עמך, “for it is good for him with you,” (Deut. 15,15) (Kidushin 22). If the master is sick while the servant is in good health, this law is also not applicable seeing that the word עמך presupposes some parallel condition between servant and master. If the servant were to be sick while the master is in good health the law would also not apply as the Torah writes כי טוב לו, “for it is good for him,” and a sick servant is not good for his master.

העבד, the Torah means that such a person deserves to remain a “slave,” as his actions reflect the kind of actions that the Canaanites are known for. If someone prefers the status of servitude, abandoning his choices in life, he acts like Canaanite slaves.

את אשתי ואת בני, “my wife and my children.” If said servant does not have both wife and children he may not have his ear pierced and continue in service (Kidushin 22). If he requested to serve additional time with this master already at the beginning of his term of service he may not subsequently have his ear pierced and stay on. He must formulate his request near the end of his six year term of service (ibid.).

אל האלהים means to the court. He (the slave) should take counsel with his vendors (the court) because it was they who sold him to him (the master) (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:6:1).

THEN HIS MASTER SHALL BRING HIM UNTO ‘HA’ELOHIM’ — “to the court. The servant must take counsel with those who sold him.”⁵¹This section speaks here of one who was sold by the court for a theft which he had committed and was not able to pay for (further, 22:2). On refusing to go free at the end of his six years of service, the servant is to take counsel with his vendors [the court] “and they will advise him to go free, for when he is free he can serve G-d in more ways than he could as a servant etc.” (Zeh Yenachmeinu — commentary on the Mechilta). [Thus is the language of Rashi.] And Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra wrote that the judges are called elohim because they uphold the laws of G-d on earth.
In my opinion Scripture uses these expressions: Then his master shall bring him unto ‘ha’elohim;’ the cause of both parties shall come before ‘ha’elohim,’⁵²Further, 22:8. in order to indicate that G-d will be with the judges in giving their judgment. It is He Who declares who is just, and it is He Who declares who is wicked. It is with reference to this that Scripture says, he whom ‘Elokim’ (G-d) shall condemn.⁵²Further, 22:8. And so did Moses say, for the judgment is G-d’s;⁵³Deuteronomy 1:17. so also did Jehoshaphat say, for ye judge not for man, but for the Eternal, and He is with you in giving judgment.⁵⁴II Chronicles, 19:6. Similarly Scripture says, G-d standeth in the congregation of G-d; in the midst of ‘elohim’ (the judges) He judgeth,⁵⁵Psalms 82:1. that is to say, in the midst of a congregation of judges He judges, for it is G-d Who is the Judge. And so also it says, Then both men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Eternal.⁵⁶Deuteronomy 19:17. And this is the purport of the verse, For I will not justify the wicked,⁵⁷Further, 23:7. according to the correct interpretation. In Eileh Shemoth Rabbah I have seen it said:⁵⁸Shemoth Rabbah 30:20. “But when the judge sits and renders judgment in truth, the Holy One, blessed be He, leaves, as it were, the supreme heavens and causes His Presence to dwell next to him, for it is said, When the Eternal raised them up judges, then the Eternal was with the judge.⁵⁹Judges 2:18.

אל האלוהים, before a judge or judges

והגישו אדוניו אל האלו-הים, “his master is to bring him to the Court.” The word אלו-הים here refers to a Court. Ibn Ezra writes that the reason why the judges in the Torah are often referred to not as שופטים but as “elohim” is because they are G’d’s agents on earth, carrying out His will. Nachmanides understands our verse to mean that the master is to bring the servant in question before a judge, a legally constituted tribunal, a site which enjoys the presence of the Shechinah and which inspires the judges to ensure that their verdict will be in line with G’d’s wishes. These judges are authorized by G’d to either exonerate or to condemn as evil, as guilty. (compare 22,8) Moses also stated: כי המשפט לאלו-הים הוא, “Justice belongs to G’d,” when he referred to the function of tribunals on terrestrial earth. (Deut.1.17) We also have an explicit verse illustrating this concept in Psalms 82,1, i.e. אלו-הים נצב בעדת א-ל, “G’d stands in the divine assembly.”

והגישו אל הדלת, “and he shall bring him to the door.” Had the Torah not added the words או אל המזוזה, “or to the doorpost,” I would have concluded that it did not matter whether the door be in an upright position at the time the awl was applied or not. The words או אל המזוזה provide conceptual linkage between door and doorpost. Just as the doorpost is upright, so the door must be in an upright position at the time of the piercing of the servant’s ear (Pessikta Zutrata).

אל האלהים means to court. The view holding that even the ear of a self-sold slave may be pierced would still agree that this verse of “bring him next to the door. . .” speaks of a slave sold by the court for his theft — since all agree that the verse “If you buy a Hebrew slave” speaks of a slave sold by the court for theft. Piercing a self-sold slave’s ear is learned from a gezeirah shavah between the word שכיר , “hireling” (Devarim 15:18), and שכיר (Vayikra 25:50). The reason a self-sold slave’s ear is pierced is because [his ear heard Hashem say,] “For to Me are the B’nei Yisrael servants.” (Re’m)

V .6. über die Bedeutung האלהים als Richter siehe Bereschit 1, 1. Wir haben dort die Verwandtschaft des Wortes mit dem Grundbegriff אלה als Pron. Demonstr. plur. nachgewiesen, demzufolge das Recht als das eine Vielheit unter die Einheit eines alle gemeinsam beherrschenden Prinzips bringende Moment und das Gericht als dessen Handhaber und Vertreter begriffen wird. Die durch אלהים bezeichneten Richter müssen מומחין und סמוכין sein, d. h. ihre Rechtskunde muss erprobt und anerkannt und ihnen die Befugnis zur Vertretung des Rechts durch Vertreter des Rechts erteilt worden sein. Diese Befugniserteilung (סמיכה) muss in Übertragung bis zum ersten Vertreter des jüdischen Rechtes, bis zu Mosche, hinaufreichen, und kann nur im jüdischen Lande auf dem Boden des jüdischen Gesetzes, wo eben "die Vielheit aller sichtbaren Verhältnisse der Herrschaft des einen Gottesrechtes unterstellt und zu unterstellen sind", geschehen (siehe רמב׳׳ם IV סנהדרין הל׳).

ורצע אדוניו את אזנו במרצע, “his master must pierce his ear with an awl;” why did the Torah choose the awl as the tool with which to pierce this servant’s ear? The numerical value of the letters in the word מרצע equals 400. It is to remind that servant that seeing that G–d had redeemed the Jewish people from 400 years of slavery, it is unbelievable that he should choose being enslaved to a human master voluntarily. G–d had stated categorically in Leviticus 25,55 כי לי בני ישראל עבדים, “for the Children of Israel are meant to be bound by a master- servant relationship only with their G–d,” not with any human being. If this man chooses to become indentured to a human master he deserves to be punished physically. (Talmud, tractate Kiddushin, folio 22, and Tossaphot on that folio.

אל הדלת או אל המזוזה, “against the door or doorpost of the courthouse; we find an example of this in Deuteronomy 17,5: והוצאת את האיש ההוא אל שעריך, “you are to take out that man to your gates, (court);” This procedure is designed to give publicity to the irrational behaviour of this Jewish “slave;” let all the people passing the courthouse know who it is that has preferred life as a slave with a gentile slave to life as a free Israelite. He will have no chance to escape this status before the next Jubilee year.

אל הדלת או אל המזוזה TO THE DOOR OR TO THE DOORPOST — From this statement you might think that the doorpost is also a proper thing upon which the servant’s ear may be pierced! Scripture, however, states, (Deuteronomy 15:17) “[Then thou shalt take an awl], and thrust it through his ear and into the door” — into the door but not into the doorpost. If this be so, what is the purpose of Scripture stating here “[to the door] or to the doorpost”? By this juxtaposition it only compares the door with the doorpost. What is the characteristic of the doorpost? It is something perpendicular! So, too, the door must during the act of performation be in a perpendicular position (on its hinges), not detached as, for instance, lying on the ground (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:6:2; Kiddushin 22b).

AND HE SHALL SERVE HIM ‘L’OLAM’ (FOREVER). Our Rabbis interpreted⁶⁰Mechilta here on the Verse. this to mean until the jubilee year. And Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra wrote that “the meaning of olam in the Sacred Language is ‘time.’ It hath been already, ‘l’olamim’ which were before us means ‘the times’ [or ‘the ages’] which were before us.⁶¹Ecclesiastes 1:10. And there he may abide ‘ad olam’⁶²I Samuel 1:22. [cannot mean ‘forever,’ for Samuel did not stay all his life in Shiloh; it must therefore mean ‘until a certain time,’ i.e., until he comes of age]. This is why the Rabbis have said, and he shall serve him l’olam means up to the time of the jubilee year, for of all appointed seasons in Israel the jubilee year is the most remote, and the going out to freedom is as if the world was made anew for him. The sense of the verse is then, that he should return to his status in his first time, when he was free.” The student learned [in the mystic lore of the Cabala] will understand that l’olam is to be taken in its usual sense [i.e., forever], for he who works until the jubilee year has worked all the days of old.⁶³Isaiah 63:9. See also above Note 23. In the words of the Mechilta:⁶⁰Mechilta here on the Verse. “Rabbi⁶⁴The epithet for Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, the redactor of the Mishnah, or as he is often known Rabbeinu Hakadosh, “Our holy teacher,” or simply “Rabbi.” says: Come and see that olam cannot mean more than fifty years, for it is said and he shall serve him ‘l’olam,’ which means until the jubilee year.” Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra forgot that which he wrote with understanding in another place.⁶⁵In his commentary to Leviticus 25:40-41, Ibn Ezra wrote on the verses, He shall serve with thee unto the year of jubilee. Then shall he go out from thee…: “This is what the Rabbis have received by tradition concerning the verse, and he shall serve him ‘l’olam,” meaning that he is to serve him until the jubilee year.” Thus Ibn Ezra did understand the verses there and found in them Scriptural proof that olam means fifty years, whilst here he wrote that it means “time.” Apparently, “he forgot” — as Ramban puts it — “what he wrote with understanding elsewhere.”

אל הדלת או אל המזוזה, in public view, as a sign of servitude. The door and doorpost described are made of wood even if the house in question is of stone so that the procedure of piercing the ear against such a background poses no problem.

והגישו אל הדלת, “he shall bring him to the door.” According to the plain meaning, seeing that the court holds its session publicly as we know from Ruth 4,1 where the judges sat near the city’s gate, the servant’s ear would be pierced on the door of the city’s gate. This would ensure maximum publicity of the person’s new status. Some commentators say that the point of the procedure is to indicate by the hole in the servant’s ear that this individual is charged with guarding the “door, entrance” to the home of his master Other commentators claim that the procedure itself as well as where it took place, will ensure that this servant could never claim that the hole in his ear was self-inflicted, as his master by bringing him to the door where the procedure had been performed can demonstrate that the height of the mark left on the door by the chisel that pierced his ear matches exactly the height from the floor to the servant’s ear.

ורצע אדוניו, “and his master will perform the piercing.” only the master himself, not his son or his agent or even an agent of the court (Mechilta).
את אזנו, “his ear;” not her ear; this excludes piercing the ear of a female (Kidushin 15).
במרצע, “with the awl.” the Torah does not say be-martzea, with any awl, but the vowel patach under the letter ב means that there is a special awl for this procedure (kept by the court?).

Till the Jubilee. . . Because in the verse it is written לעולם , instead of simply עולם , [Rashi knew that] it means until the yovel. For Rashi already proved that עולם means yovel, thus] לעולם means until the yovel. Whereas עולם would mean an entire 50 years.

Indem das והגישו wiederholt wird, so ist es klar, dass das Hinführen des Knechtes zu dem Gerichte noch eine besondere Absicht haben müsse. In der מכילתא heißt es: שימלך במוכריו, "damit er sich mit seinen Verkäufern berate". Es ist zweifelhaft, ob hier der Knecht oder der Herr als Subjekt zu verstehen sei, der Knecht, damit ihm womöglich das Gericht abrate, oder der Herr, damit er die fernere Behaltung des Knechtes und dessen רציעה nur auf Ermächtigung des Gerichtes übe. Raschi fügt die Worte: שמכרוהו — .לו hinzu, und scheint damit die letztere Auffassung zu bezeichnen.

ועבדו לעולם, “and he shall serve him “forever.” The word עולם here means: for the same length of time as the Levites perform their duties in the Temple. The word is used in this connection for the prophet Samuel whose mother had “given him” to G–d, i.e. to the Temple and the High Priest when he was 2 years old. Samuel died at the age of 52. (Samuel I 1,22) It follows that the length of time someone must serve a master when the Torah calls it לעולם, is no longer than 50 years.

או אל המזוזה, “or against the doorpost;” Rashi comments on this that the Torah draws a parallel between “door” and “doorpost;” both are upright. What Rashi means is that the doorpost is compared to the door only in respect of their both being upright. The definitive aspect of this procedure is found in Deuteronomy 15,17, where the Torah stipulates that the ear of the person who is going to have it pierced is to be adjacent to the door at that time. This is proved by the Jerusalem Targum which translates the word או in our verse as meaning אשר, “which is;” there are similar constructions to this, as in 21,36 או נודע כי שור נגח הוא, where the word או also means אשר, i.e. “an ox which is known to be aggressive.” The author quotes more examples. In our verse here, Rashi prefers an allegorical explanation based on the Mechilta, i.e. the ear which had heard G-d say at Mount Sinai: ”do not steal,” and which had heard G-d say: “the Children of Israel are My slaves,” needs to be reminded of this by being pierced after having opted to ignore both of these statements by G-d. Our author corrects the reference to “do not steal” from the Ten Commandments, as that commandment speaks of stealing persons, i.e. kidnapping. Therefore the version found in Leviticus 19,11 is preferred as there the Torah speaks of the theft of objects. Also, the prohibition in the Ten Commandments carries a death penalty as opposed to the version of theft discussed in Leviticus. In that version the ordinary penalty is to make restitution of twice the value of the stolen objects; if the thief is unable to come up with the money, then he [his labour, Ed.] is sold by the court to someone willing to buy him and to abide by the Torah’s rules concerning how to treat him. The reason why Rashi chose the prohibition of stealing when he had so many others to choose from, is because the thief displayed greater fear of the Lord than many other kinds of sinners, as he committed his sin in secret when insulting G-d by being more afraid of the police seeing him than of G-d seeing what he did. Moreover, the Jewish servant choosing to continue serving his master in spite of living with a non Jewish mate and raising non Jewish children, has demonstrated that he does not care what G-d had said nor what G-d’s servant, his master, has said. Hence his deliberately “faulty” hearing is being punished.

ורצע אדניו את אזנו במרצע AND HIS LORD SHALL BORE HIS EAR THROUGH WITH THE AWL — “His ear” means his right ear. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture means his left ear? Scripture however uses the term אזן here and it uses אזן in another passage, thereby suggesting an analogy based upon verbal similarity; viz., here it is said “and his lord shall bore his ear (אזנו) through”, and of the leper it is said, (Leviticus 14:25) “and the priest shall put it upon the tip of the right ear (אזנו הימית) of him that is to be cleansed”. — How is it in that latter passage? It is the right ear! So here, too, it is the right ear. — What is the reason that the ear had to be pierced rather than any other limb of the servant’s body? Rabban Jochanan ben Zaccai said: That ear which heard on Mount Sinai, (Exodus 20:13) “Thou shalt not steal” and yet its owner went and stole and was therefore sold as a slave — let it be pierced! Or, in the case of him who sold himself from destitution, having committed no theft, the reason is: That ear which heard on Mount Sinai what I said, (Leviticus 25:55) “For unto Me the children Israel are servants” and yet its owner went and procured for himself another master — let it be pierced! (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:6:3; Kiddushin 22b). Rabbi Simeon interpreted this verse like a jewel (i. e. giving it an ethical signification): In what respect are door and doorpost different from all other objects in the house that they should be singled out for this purpose? God, in effect, said: door and doorpost that were eye-witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the two doorposts, freeing Israel from slavery, and when I said, (Leviticus 25:55) “For unto Me the children of Israel are servants” — servants to Me but not servants of servants (of human beings), and yet this man went and procured another master for himself — let him be pieced in their presence (i. e. let them be eye-witnesses now when this man voluntarily prolongs his state of slavery)! (Kiddushin 22b.)

לעולם. According to the plain meaning of the text, “for the rest of his life.” This is also the meaning of the word לעולם in Samuel I 1,22 when Chanah announced her intention of handing over her son Samuel to the High Priest Eli.

ועבדו לעולם, “he will continue in service to his master until the Jubilee year.” Seeing that the word לעולם in our verse cannot possibly mean: “forever,” the alternate meaning of this word in Scripture is: “until the Jubilee year,” and is applied here. Ibn Ezra explains that the word לעולם in the Holy Tongue describes a certain period of time as we know from Kohelet 1,10 כבר היה לעולמים, “it has already existed in antiquity.” In this verse it refers to a well-known point in time, one that recurs every 49 years. In terms of time cycles in the Jewish calendar, or history, it is the longest such cycle, and therefore the word לעולם, commonly translated as “forever, without end,” is most appropriate. At the end of this cycle a new עולם, “world,” opens up before this servant.

Aus Dewarim 15, 17 ונתת באזנו ובדלת wissen wir, dass das Durchbohren nur an der Türe und nicht an dem Pfosten zu geschehen habe, aus ורצע אדניו את אזנו, dass nur das Ohr bis an die Türe zu durchbohren sei. (מכילתא, Kiduschin 22 b.)

ורצע אדוניו, “and his master will proceed to pierce his ear;” the practical use of this procedure is that if he were to escape from his master during the years to come, the mark left on his ear will serve as evidence that he is an escaped slave. He will also not be confused with a Canaanite, as Jewish law forbids mutilating any part of a gentile’s body. Besides, when it comes to proving this when the escaped slave is positioned against the door where his ear had been pierced, the height of the hole in the door will match the hole in the slave’s ear when he is positioned there.

ועבדו לעלם AND HE SHALL SERVE HIM FOR EVER — This means until the Jubilee. Or, perhaps this is not so, but לעולם means for ever as is its usual meaning? Scripture however, states, (Leviticus 25:10) “[And ye shall sanctify the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof] and ye shall return every man unto his family”. A comparison of these two passages tells us that a period of fifty years is termed עולם. This does not, however, imply that he has to serve him a whole period of fifty years, but that he has to serve him until the year of the Jubilee (the fiftieth year) whether this be close at hand or far ahead (Kiddushin 15a; Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:6:6).

ועבדו, hier heißt es nicht, wie V. 2 ועבד, sondern ועבדו. Der עבד נרצע hat nur dem Herrn und nicht auch nach dessen Tode dem Sohne zu dienen. Das ועבדו לעולם kann übrigens nur den Sinn haben: so weit an ihm liegt, muss er immer in seinem Dienste bleiben. Er hat die Fähigkeit verloren, seine Entlassung zu bewirken. Bis dahin war seine Dienstpflicht eine begrenzte, sie ging nicht über das sechste Jahr hinaus, und auch innerhalb dieser Frist konnte er sich jederzeit durch Rückzahlung des Kaufgeldes nach Abzug des bereits Abgedienten frei machen. Das in dem folgenden Gesetz der אמה עבריה eingeräumte גירעון כסף) והפדה) kam auch ihm zugute (Kiduschin 14 b). Allein fortan hat er aus sich keine Rechtsbefugnis mehr, sich frei zu machen. "Er hat ihm auf immer zu dienen", und erlangt seine Freiheit nur mit dem Tode des Herrn oder mit dem "Heimbringejahr", dem "יובל", das "jeden wieder zu seinem Erbe und jeden zu seinem Herde heimführt", ושבתם איש אל אחזתו ואיש אל משפחתו תשובו (Wajikra 25, 10).

את אזנו, “his ear;” the reason why this part of the body has been chosen by the Torah for this procedure is that if the slave were to protest that he had inflicted this hole upon himself, he would not be believed, as it is impossible for him to have done so.

Betrachten wir dies Gesetz, das das göttliche Wort an die Spitze seiner Rechtsordnungen gestellt, so gibt es wohl kein zweites, das wie dies so ganz geeignet wäre, uns einen Einblick in die Tendenz und in den ihrem ganzen innersten Wesen nach von allen andern Gesetzgebungen grundverschiedenen Charakter der göttlichen Rechtsinstitutionen zu gewähren. Es ist dies durchaus der einzige Fall, in welchem das göttliche Gesetz eine Freiheitsstrafe diktiert — (wir werden sehen, dass auch dieser nicht als "Strafe" zu begreifen ist) — und wie diktiert es sie? Es statuiert die Unterbringung des Verbrechers in eine Familie, wie wir einen zu bessernden Knaben unterbringen würden, und mit welchen Kautelen umgibt es diese Unterbringung, damit das moralische Selbstbewusstsein des Verbrechers nicht zerknickt werde, damit er sich, trotz seiner Erniedrigung, noch immer als Bruder geachtet und behandelt fühle, Liebe erwerben und Liebe geben könne, wie lässt es ihn in Verbindung mit seiner Familie, und wie sorgt es, dass nicht seine Familie durch sein Verbrechen und dessen Folgen dem Elend preisgegeben sei! Indem es ihn der Freiheit und damit der Möglichkeit beraubt, für die Seinen zu sorgen, legt es diese Sorge denen auf, denen für die Zeit seiner Unfreiheit seine Kräfte zu gute kommen.

את אזנו, it was customary to mark someone who had not conducted himself as he should, by piercing his ear. From this custom evolved the practice to do this to thieves.

Freiheitsstrafen, mit aller der Verzweiflung und sittlichen Verschlechterung, die hinter den Kerkermauern wohnen, mit all dem Jammer und Elend, die sie über Weib und Kind des Gefangenen bringen, kennt das göttliche Gesetz nicht. In dem Umkreis seines Reiches sind die traurigen Zwingerwohnungen des Verbrechens fremd. Es kennt nur eine Untersuchungshaft, und auch die konnte nach der ganzen vorgeschriebenen Gerichtsprozedur, und namentlich bei der völligen Zurückweisung eines jeden Indizienbeweises, nur von kürzer Dauer sein.

במרצע, “with an awl;” I have heard the following allegorical explanation of why this tool was chosen by the Torah for this procedure; (Compare Torah shleymah by Rabbi Menachem Kasher on the source item # 137) The cost of an awl used to be 400 coins of a certain denomination. G-d had decreed 400 years for Abraham’s descendants to be strangers and slaves, but He had subsequently decreased the length of their serfdom. This slave who could have gotten his freedom, instead volunteered to lengthen his period of serfdom.

Allein auch dieser einzige Fall, in welchem es einen Verlust der Freiheit infolge eines Verbrechens statuiert, kann nicht als "Strafe" begriffen werden. Indem es den Dieb nur für den Ersatz des gestohlenen Wertes, nicht aber auch für die Aufbringung der auf Diebstahl stehenden Geldstrafe (כפל, Zahlung des doppelten Wertes), zu sechsjährigem Knechtesdienst verurteilt, kann das Motiv dieser Bestimmung unmöglich Strafe sein. Sie ist nichts als einfache Konsequenz aus der Ersatzpflicht. Ersatzpflicht ist aber nicht Strafe, ist vielmehr nur Wiederaufhebung des Verbrechens, das so lange fortdauert, als die verbrecherisch oder rechtswidrig geübte Eigentumsbeschädigung nicht wieder gut gemacht ist. Wer sich an jemandes Eigentum vergreift, der ist in demselben Augenblick, und wenn ihn auch kein Gericht dazu verurteilt, durch seine Tat, mit seinem Vermögen, oder, wo dies nicht vorhanden, mit der Quelle des Vermögens: mit seiner Arbeitskraft, der Verpflichtung verfallen, den von ihm gebrachten Schaden zu restituieren. Also, dass es vielmehr der Erklärung bedarf, warum das Gesetz nur in diesem einen und nicht bei jedem Falle des Unvermögens zur Ersatzpflicht das Gericht, wie das Vermögen, so auch die Arbeitskraft des Beschädigers verwerten lässt, eine Beschränkung, die in der Erwägung ihr Motiv finden dürfte, dass eben Diebstahl die direkteste Höhnung des Eigentumsbegriffes und zwar gerade in dem Momente ist, in welchem der Eigentümer sein Eigentum der Rechtsachtung eines jeden Menschen anvertraut (siehe zu V. 37). Mit dem Begriff des Eigentums beginnt die Weltstellung des Menschen und in seiner Achtung dokumentiert sich die Persönlichkeit des Menschen als Mensch. Wir begreifen, wie eben nur beim Diebstahl die ganze Persönlichkeit des Diebes der Ersatzpflicht dienstbar gemacht wird.

ועבדו, ”and he is to serve him (his master)” only for his original master, not his son or daughter, if he dies prematurely. This verse is the source of the statement in the Mechilta :“A Jewish “slave” serves his master (during the first six years) or his master’s son, but not his master’s daughter. If he had his ear pierced, or if it was a female Jewish “slave,” neither will serve after the master has died.

ועבדו לעולם, “and he will serve him forever.” Mechilta Nezikin section 2 accepted that the meaning of the word “forever” in this context is “until the advent of the next Jubilee year.” This would be the fiftieth year of the cycle during which the servant had his ear pierced. A period of fifty years has been called עולם already in ancient times and we find a reference to it as having this meaning in Samuel I 1,11 where Samuel’s mother Chanah vows that after she had weaned her young son she would bring him to the Temple to reside there עד עולם, “forever.” Clearly, seeing no one lives forever, she did not mean that the word לעולם is to be understood as literally “forever.” She referred to the active life span of a Levite who is forced to retire at the age of 50 as we know from Numbers 8,24. Samuel was a Levite, of course. Samuel only lived for a total of 52 years, the last 50 of them after his mother had dedicated him to be a servant of G’d as she had vowed before becoming pregnant with him (Jerusalem Talmud Berachot 4,1). The Torah’s direction that the Hebrew servant be freed at the advent of the Jubilee year is effective regardless of how many or how few years before that year the servant in question was acquired.
Another way of interpreting the word לעולם is: “as long as the world exists.” In that event the connection with the שנת היובל would be the יובל הגדול, a concept mentioned in Psalms 105,8 דבר צוה לאלף דור, “He gave a command which is in effect for 1000 generations.” A “generation” in that case would be considered a period of 50 years. When Solomon (Kohelet 1,4) spoke of והארץ לעולם עומדת, that “the earth will endure for a period called עולם,” he referred to these 1000 generations mentioned in Psalms. The word עולם in our verse then would refer to the “world of the great Jubilee.” I shall discuss this in greater detail in my commentary on Leviticus 25,8.

Es resultiert aber diese Verurteilung zum Knechtsdienste so sehr nur aus der Ersatzpflicht, es ist das Gesetz so weit davon entfernt, damit eine Bestrafung diktieren zu wollen, und so sehr ist ihm die persönliche Freiheit ein heiliges Gut, dass nur, wenn der zu ersetzende Wert dem Werte einer sechsjährigen Arbeit des Diebes adäquat ist oder darüber hinausgeht, das Gericht dessen Verkauf vollziehen darf; denn nur in diesem Falle ist im Momente der Tat durch dieselbe die ganze Persönlichkeit des Täters diesen Folgen seiner Tat verfallen. Geht der Wert seiner Arbeitskraft über den zu ersetzenden Wert hinaus, so vergriffe sich gleichsam das Gericht an einem aliquoten, nicht der Unfreiheit verfallenen Teil der Persönlichkeit (Kiduschin 18 a). Übrigens kann nach der מכילתא der Bestohlene überhaupt auf den Verkauf des Täters verzichten und sich mit einem Schuldbriefe bis zum bessern Vermögensstande desselben begnügen.

לעולם, according to Rashi, this word does not mean: “forever, i.e. the rest of his life,” but until the onset of the next Jubilee year. To the question that possibly the Torah did indeed mean that the “slave” in question would now have to remain a “slave” for the remainder of his life, the question is that in that event what was the point of the Torah having to write in Leviticus 25,46: והתנחלתם אותם, “you may leave them as an inheritance to your children,” (Canaanite slaves)? If even a Jewish “slave” could be inherited by your children, surely the Torah did not have to tell us that the same was true for bodily owned Canaanite slaves? Clearly therefore the Torah meant that such a Jewish slave would continue to the end of his natural life, usually no longer than seventy years in the status he had acquired as a result of having had his ear pierced. The Torah’s example here assumes that the thief had been about 20 years of age at the time he committed his crime, so that he had a life expectancy of another 50 years. It follows that the term לעולם, is another way of saying “for up to 50 years.” If the Torah had written: לעולם ועד, it would have meant: “until he dies.” This could have been supported by Samuel I 1,22, where the mother of Samuel tells her husband that she will hand over her son to the High Priest Eli, and she clearly meant by that “for the rest of his life.” In the event, Samuel died at 52 years of age, 50 years after having been handed over to Eli. Rashi, on that verse, explains that she prophesied that Samuel would die at that age, without having been aware that her words had been a prophecy. He adds that 50 years are considered a euphemism for “a lifetime.”Furthermore, as stated previously, Leviticus 25,10 in which a slave is included in the possessions that must be restored to their original status, the Jubilee year, the fiftieth in a cycle, is described as such a radical turning point in his life.

Das einzige Verhältnis, in welchem dem also zum Ersatz der von ihm verübten Eigentumsschmälerung verkauften Täter seine Erniedrigung wirklich zum Bewusstsein gebracht wird, ist die Bestimmung, dass ihm für die Zeit seines Dienstes der Herr eine Leibeigene zur Frau geben darf, deren Kinder dann dem Herrn verbleiben. Da dem freien Juden eine solche Ehe verboten ist, die ja überhaupt nur einen physischen, keinen sittlichen Charakter trägt (— אין קידושין תופסין —) und die ihm also gegebene Frau nur temporär, nur für die Zeit seines Dienstes, ihm מיוחדת לו bleiben muss, so dürfte dies eben ihm wohl die Tatsache seiner sittlichen Gesunkenheit zum Bewusstsein bringen sollen, durch welche er die sittliche Würde des jüdischen Menschen eingebüßt und halb in den Kreis bloß physischen Daseins zurückgetreten ist. Ein Motiv, das wohl auch der Bestimmung gerade eines sechsjährigen Dienstes und der freimachenden Kraft des siebten Jahres zu Grunde liegen dürfte. Er ist durch sein Verbrechen zurückgetreten in den Kreis der "Sechse" der geschöpflich sinnlichen Welt, hat sich durch den Gedanken an die "Sieben", an den über allem sinnlich Sichtbaren unsichtbar gegenwärtigen "Einen" nicht zurückhalten lassen vom Vergreifen an dem sinnlich Sichtbaren, es ist ihm die "Gottesfurcht" abhanden gekommen, und er hat damit sich an dem eigenen "Gottesadel" versündigt: er hat mit dem Einsatz seines eigenen ganzen sinnlichleiblichen Daseins die Restitution seines Vergehens zu erringen, sich durch Unterordnung seiner "Sechs" wieder zu "Sieben" emporzuarbeiten, er ist sechs Jahre infolge seines Verbrechens Knecht, das siebte macht ihn frei, und sein ganzes Leben hindurch begleitet ihn die Mahnung: "Sechs" schlägt in Bande, "Sieben" macht frei, die Vergötterung des Sinnlichen macht uns zu Sklaven, die Huldigung Gottes macht uns frei und einigt unsere "Sechs" mit dem einen Einzigen zur "Sieben", hebt mit Gott im Bunde, auch unser ganzes leiblich sinnliches Wesen mit empor in den Bereich des sittlich freien, göttlichen Menschenadels!

Der Knecht, der die ihm im Stande der Unfreiheit gewährte Behaglichkeit der freien, aber sorgenvollen Arbeit eigener Familienselbständigkeit vorzieht, wird vom Herrn an die Türe oder an den Türpfosten eines Hauses geführt, und nicht an dem Pfosten, an der Türe wird vom Herrn sein Ohr mit einem Pfriemen durchbohrt. מזוזות, Pfosten, sind die Repräsentanten des selbständigen Hauses. Als solche treten sie in dem Erlösungsmomente auf, in welchem Gott die ägyptischen Sklaven zu freien Männern emporhob und ihnen das Recht, und zugleich damit die Pflicht eigener, selbständiger Häusergründung wiedergab. Die Hingebung des Blutes vom Peßachopfer, in welches alle "Seelen" hingezählt waren, an des Hauses "Pfosten", gab damit jeder jüdischen Seele die hohe Bestimmung, mit zu arbeiten an dem Bau freier Häuser für Gott. דלת aber, die Türe, der lose "Schöpfhebel" des Hauses, der die dem Hause Angehörigen ein- und auslässt, repräsentiert eben die Hörigkeit zum Hause. Der jüdische Mann, der es verschmäht "Pfosten" zu sein, selbständig die Lasten eines Hauses zu tragen und seine Freiheit für das Behagen der "Hörigkeit" verkauft und dem Gottesruf kein Ohr leiht, der ihn zur Freiheit und Selbständigkeit ruft, dessen Ohr wird im Angesicht eines "Pfostens" an einer Türe gebohrt, und ihm damit der Stempel der Hörigkeit aufgedrückt. — Ähnlich Kiduschin 22 b: מה נשתנה דלת ומזוזה מכל הכלים שבבית אמר הב׳׳ה דלת ומזוזה שהיו עדי במצרים בשעה שפסחתי על המשקוף ועל שתי המזוזות ואמרתי לי בני ישראל עבדים ולא עבדים לעבדים והוצאתים מעבדות לחירות והלך זה וקנה אדון לעצמו ירצע בפניהם.

Wie aber dem Knechte, so ist vor allem auch dem Herrn und allen Herren in Abhängigkeit zu ihnen geratener Brüder die freimachende Kraft des siebten Jahres die Mahnung: des unsichtbaren alleinen, einen, einzigen wirklichen Herrn eingedenk zu bleiben, Ihn, den einen Einzigen über Herren und Knechten, zu schauen, und ihre auf Geld und Ansehen sich gründende höhere Machtstellung nicht zu missbrauchen, um ihre in Abhängigkeit geratenen Brüder in ungesetzlicher Knechtschaft zu halten. Noch im allerletzten Stadium des jüdischen Staates hatte Jeremias (34, 13f.) die Nichtachtung des in der freimachenden Kraft des siebten Jahres sich aussprechenden Prinzips als letzten Grund des Untergangs des Staates zu verkünden, und war nach Jeruschalmi Rosch Hasch. III b פרשת שילוח עבדים das allererste Gesetz, das Mosche und Aaron (oben Kap. 6, 13 ויצום אל בני ישראל), als Grundbedingung ihrer Erlösung zu bringen hatten. Wir sagten, Jeremias weise auf das in dem Gesetze sich aussprechende Prinzip, nicht auf die Anwendung des Gesetzes hin. Nach der Kiduschin 14 b rezipierten Halacha ist nämlich der Dienst des aus Not sich Verkaufenden nicht auf sechs Jahre beschränkt, hat vielmehr die kontraktlich festgesetzte Zeit zu dauern, die nur durch den Tod des Herrn oder seines Sohnes, oder den Eintritt des Jobel abgekürzt werden kann. Demgemäß kann Jeremias Vorwurf nur so gefasst werden: selbst den eines Diebstahls wegen gerichtlich Verkauften soll das siebte Jahr seines Dienstes frei machen, geschweige denn, dass ihr die sich freiwillig aus Not euch verkaufenden Brüder mit Ablauf ihrer Zeit oder im Jobel zu entlassen habet! Nach Auffassung des ריטב׳א versteht Raschi jedoch den Satz der המוכר עצמו נמכר לשש ויתר על שש :ברייתא dahin, dass stillschweigend auch der aus Not sich Verkaufende nur sechs Jahre zu dienen habe und mit dem siebten frei werde, und nur kontraktlich ein längerer Dienst festgestellt werden könne. Demgemäß spräche die Stelle in Jeremias von Anwendung des Gesetzes in den normalen Fällen, und spräche eben der Wortlaut dieser Stelle für Raschis Erklärung. ערכין 33 a scheint übrigens das: מקץ שבע שנים תשלחו von dem nach Ablauf von je sieben Schmitajahren eintretenden Jobel verstanden zu werden.

וכי ימכר איש את בתו לאמה AND IF A MAN SELL HIS DAUGHTER TO BE A MAIDSERVANT — The text speaks of a minor daughter (under 12 years of age). You might think that he may sell her also although she may have shown signs of incipient puberty and is no longer a minor! You must admit, however, that the à fortiori argument applies: How is it in the case of a woman who was sold at an earlier age (as a minor)? She goes free on showing signs of incipient puberty, as it is said, (v. 11) “then shall she go out free without money”, which law we explain to refer to a woman who has showed such signs during the period of slavery! Is it not the conclusion that she who is of such an age and has not yet been sold shall not be sold at all?! (Arakhin 29b, cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:7:1).

SHE SHALL NOT GO OUT AS THE MENSERVANTS DO. This means that the Hebrew maidservant does not go out free “in consequence of the loss of a tooth or an eye, as Canaanite slaves do.”⁶⁶See further, Verses 26-27. Thus is Rashi’s language, and our Rabbis interpreted it likewise.⁶⁰Mechilta here on the Verse. Indeed it is so, for a Hebrew servant is not called eved⁶⁷The Hebrew servant may be called eved ivri [as in Verse 2 here: if thou buy an ‘eved ivri’ — a Hebrew servant] but never just eved, which term by itself signifies a Canaanite bondman. Here in Verse 7 where it just says ha’avadim (menservants) it must therefore refer to the Canaanite bondmen. For a similar statement of Ramban see also further Verse 20. without any further qualification.
But I wonder: why does Scripture find it necessary altogether to tell us this [that a Hebrew maidservant does not go out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye, as Canaanite bondmen do]?⁶⁸For what reason might I have thought that she does go out free, so that Scripture should find it necessary to tell us that such is not the case? Perhaps it is to tell us that we should not argue by applying the method of kal vachomer⁶⁹See in Seder Bo Note 208. — The kal vachomer in this case would be as follows: A Canaanite bondwoman who does not go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee year, does go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs. It is therefore only logical that a Hebrew maidservant, who does go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee, should surely go out free because of the loss of any chief external organs. from a Canaanite women, that a Hebrew maidservant goes out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye. This law is stated expressly in the case of a Hebrew woman, but such is also the law for a Hebrew man, who has been compared to her [thus he too does not go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs]. The author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth,’⁷⁰Rabbi Shimon Kairo, who flourished in the second half of the eighth century — when the Gaonic period was at its height. Considered a most authoritative work on Rabbinic law, the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’ was a pioneer in the field of Taryag (613) Commandments, for in a preface to this work the author was the first scholar who attempted to define each separate commandment (see my foreword to “The Commandments,” Vol. I pp. viii — ix). wrote, however, that [the verse is not needed to exclude this kal vachomer,⁶⁹See in Seder Bo Note 208. — The kal vachomer in this case would be as follows: A Canaanite bondwoman who does not go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee year, does go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs. It is therefore only logical that a Hebrew maidservant, who does go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee, should surely go out free because of the loss of any chief external organs. for even if Scripture had not excluded it, we could not have argued that a Hebrew woman should go out free in consequence of the loss of a tooth or eye], because the going forth to freedom by slaves on account of the loss of a tooth or eye is a penalty [to the master], and you cannot derive a law by logical argument from penalties. The author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’ thus considered this verse a negative commandment⁷¹As opposed to a mere “negation,” where the verse just negates a certain law from being applicable, without constituting a prohibition. In his Book of the Commandments, Maimonides dedicated the eighth principle to the clarification of this distinction between a negation and a prohibition, and without mentioning the name of the author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth,’ differs with him on the interpretation of this verse, which in his opinion merely states that there is no obligation on the part of the master to let her go free where he causes her the loss of one of her organs. [See in my translation, “The Commandments,” Vol. II pp. 390-393.] In his notes to Maimonides’ Book of Commandments, Ramban came to the defense of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth.’ wherein G-d warns the master that if he wants to send her out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye, that he transgresses a prohibition; but instead he is to pay her monetary compensation for the tooth or eye, and she shall stay with him up to the time [of six years, or before if she produces signs of puberty], to be designated as the master’s wife [or his son’s]. For it would be a great injustice if, after causing her the loss of a tooth in his anger and blemishing her thereby, he would then send her out of his house, when she had hoped to become his wife. Moreover, many times the monetary compensation for the damage done to the chief external organs, is more than the earnings for her labor if her days as a handmaid have nearly terminated. Therefore Scripture was strict upon the master and made a clear prohibition, so that he should not rob her of the monetary compensation due to her for the loss of any of her chief organs, even if he should want to let her go free on account of them. It may be that sending her to freedom is itself forbidden before the fixed time, for Scripture has obliged the master to support her and that she stay with him, in case she finds favor in his eyes and becomes his wife; just as He warned him with a prohibition that [after he marries her and takes another wife] her food, her raiment, and her conjugal rights shall he not diminish.⁷²Verse 10. In accordance with this opinion [the author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’] counted the verse, She shall not go out as the menservants do among the three hundred and sixty-five negative commandments.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים. It is not appropriate for an upstanding member of society to buy a Jewish girl as a servant against her will. Such a “sale” is acceptable only if the girl in question will become the wife of the buyer or his son when reaching puberty. The purchase price will be given to her father as our sages have stipulated in Ketuvot 46.

וכי ימכר איש את בתה, When a man sells his daughter, etc. In this instance as opposed to verse 2, the Torah emphasises the seller instead of the buyer. The reason is that one does not purchase a Jewish maidservant from anyone other than her father. The girl does not sell herself, as does an impoverished male. The law of selling a thief in payment of what he has stolen from his victim also does not apply to female thieves (compare Mechilta). The additional letter ו in the word וכי, means that the father of the girl does not only have the right to marry her off, but also to sell her as a maidservant.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, after the expiry of six years. Her employer is supposed to marry her, as will be explained later.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “she will not be free in the manner male servants are freed.” Loss by the servant of an eye or a tooth, through violent action by the master, leads to the servant’s immediate freedom. The same rule applies to the male Jewish servant. We need a special verse for this lack of symmetry governing treatment of gentile slaves when abused, and that of Jewish servants similarly abused, as without it we would have deduced from an a fortiori, that if a gentile slave is freed immediately due to his master having rendered a tooth or an eye useless, a Jewish servant would be entitled to at least the same privilege. If this logic were to be applied, the Jewish servant would forfeit his entitlement to compensatory damages, something he does not in fact forfeit. The basic difference in the legislation is that in the case of the gentile slave the freeing of the slave (whose body was owned by his master) is in the nature of a penalty to his master for having abused him. Whenever the Torah legislates a penal measure it cannot serve as a model for other situations. Our verse must be understood as a negative commandment not to release a female or male Jewish servant for loss of eye or tooth, and that doing so, far from being a charitable act, is in fact the violation of a negative commandment. The Torah is stringent with the master, closing a loophole that would have enabled him to escape his financial obligations to the victim of his cruelty or carelessness. The Hebrew servant or female servant is compensated according to the rules prevailing for any other Jewish male or female, and in the event that the compensation exceeds the value of the servant’s labour still to be rendered under his contract, the master (employer) does not have the option of freeing such a servant forthwith. Such a temptation for the master is especially likely when the incident occurred near the end of the forced employment term of said servant. Alternatively, the plain meaning of the phrase is that maidservants, unlike men servants, are not supposed to be sent outside, into the fields, for instance, to perform their labours, but are to do this in the house of the master or in his yard.

וכי ימכור איש את בתו לאמה, “when a man sells his daughter as a maid-servant, etc.” This verse is the father’s authority to “sell” his daughter for her own benefit as long as she is less than 12 years old (Mechilta Nezikin section 3).
לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “the terms of her release will not parallel the conditions of freedom for her male counterpart.” She will not leave the service of her master like a Gentile male slave, i.e. through loss of an organ such as an eye, a tooth, etc. (ibid). Whenever the word עבד or אמה is found in the Torah without additional data such as “Jewish” or ”Egyptian,” Canaanite slaves are meant. When the Torah speaks of a Hebrew servant the fact that he is Jewish is spelled out (compare 21,2). The warning in our verse is addressed to the employer of such a Jewish maidservant that if he would release (kick out) his maidservant due to loss of, say an eye, he would be guilty of violating this negative commandment. Instead of releasing her from his service he has to compensate her for the loss including pain, embarrassment, etc., (based on the author of Halachot Gedolot). She continues in her position for the agreed upon period.

Comparing the Hebrew woman to the Hebrew man. . . attaining their freedom. This teaches that she goes out even at the yovel, because going out after six years is written expressly in the verse of “If there should be sold to you your Hebrew brother or your Hebrew sister. . .”

V. 7. Aus V. 8 wissen wir, dass mit diesem Verkauf ייעוד, d. h. die Bedingung verbunden sein musste, das Mädchen eventuell zu heiraten, in welchem Falle das dem Vater gegebene Geld den Charakter der Traugabe erhielt מעות ראשנות לקידושין נתנו (siehe Kiduschin 18 b). Beide eventuelle Wirkungen dieses Verkaufs lassen schon schließen, dass er nur in einem Alter geschehen konnte, in welchem sowohl die Arbeitskräfte des Kindes juridisch Eigentum des Vaters sind, und ebenso juridisch dem Vater die Befugnis zusteht, über die Hand seines Kindes zu disponieren, d. h. eine Ehe für dasselbe einzugehen und an seiner Statt die Traugabe zu empfangen; also nur in dem Alter unmündiger Minderjährigkeit. Für beide Beziehungen reicht dieselbe sonst bis zur vollendeten Pubertätsreife, d. h. bis zu sechs Monaten nach eingetretener Pubertät, in der Regel bis zu zwölfundeinhalb Jahr, wo dann das Mädchen בכר ,בקר ,פקר ,בגר) בוגרת) "selbständig" heißt (Ketubot 46 b). Die Ermächtigung zu diesem Verkauf dauert jedoch nur während der Zeit völliger Unmündigkeit קטנות bis zum Eintritt der Pubertät, mit welcher das Mädchen נערה wird, in der Regel bis zum zurückgelegten zwölften Jahre. Diese Beschränkung dürfte schon darauf hinweisen, dass bei diesem ganzen Verhältnis die beabsichtigte Eventualität der Heirat in dem Vordergrunde steht. Das Mädchen bleibt nur so lange Magd, als es noch nicht heiratsfähig ist. Mit Eintritt der Heiratsfähigkeit muss der Herr sie entweder heiraten oder unentgeltlich frei lassen (siehe V. 11).

וכי ימכור איש, “If someone “sells” his daughter, etc.;” according to Rashi, he can only do so while she is less than 12 years of age. If someone were to claim that the father can still do so when that daughter has demonstrated signs of puberty, and that person would argue that the work performed by a daughter belongs to her father even while she is between 12 years and 12 and a half years old, the Torah has added the word לאמה, “to become a maid-servant.” She cannot be “sold” as such when older than 12 years and a day.Some scholars are of the opinion that when a minor male had been “sold” by his father, that minor would be free to leave the employment of his masters when he displayed signs of puberty. This is totally erroneous, as nowhere did we read that a father may “sell” a son, and to draw a comparison from the text in Deuteronomy 15,12, where a male Israelite is described as “selling” himself is quite absurd. If that verse would speak about a minor boy, say an orphan, selling himself. This would be legally completely invalid as minors cannot do such a thing in Jewish law. The reason is that a Jewish court has no authority to penalise a minor. (Compare the addition to Rashi’s commentary on that verse)

וכי ימכור איש את בתו, “in the event that a father ‘sells’ his daughter, etc.;” the reason why the father here has been described as איש, “a man,” is to make clear that a mother is not allowed to “sell” her daughter.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים SHE SHALL NOT GO OUT AS THE MENSERVANTS DO — i. e. not under the circumstances that the Canaanitish menservants’ departure takes place, for these go free in consequence of the loss of their tooth or eye inflicted by their master; this woman, however, shall not go free because of such loss of her tooth or eye, but shall serve either six years or until the Jubilee, or until she shows signs of incipient puberty. Whichsoever of these periods comes first brings her freedom first. — He (the master), however, has to pay her the value of her eye or the value of her tooth. — Or perhaps this is not so, but, “she shall not go out as the men-servants do,” means she shall not go free as the Hebrew menservants do, viz., at the end of six years or at the Jubilee? Scripture, however, states, (Deuteronomy 15:12) And if thy brother, an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman be sold unto thee”, comparing the Hebrew woman with the Hebrew man in regard to all reasons for departure (i. e. also with regard to her going free in the Jubilee, for that she goes free in the seventh year is stated in the text just quoted). How is it in the case of a Hebrew man? He goes free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee! So, too, does the Hebrew woman go free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee. What then do these words mean: “she shall not go out as the menservants do”? They mean: she shall not go free in consequence of the loss of one of “the tips of her limbs” (i. e. the ends of limbs that project from the body) (cf. Mishnah Negaim 6:7) inflicted by the master, as the Canaanitish servants do when they that lose “the tips of their limbs” (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:1; Kiddushin 20a). Incidentally I may add that you might think that the Hebrew manservant shall go free in consequence of loss of one of the tips of his limbs and that only the Hebrew maidservant differs in this respect from the Canaanitish servant, since Scripture expressly specified her in the words: she shall not go out free etc. Scripture, however, states “an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman” thereby comparing the Hebrew man with the Hebrew woman. What is the case with the Hebrew woman? She does not go free in consequence of loss of one of “the tips of her limbs”! So, too, the Hebrew man does not go free as compensation for the injury inflicted on one of “the tips of his limbs” (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:1).

Thereby comparing the Hebrew man to the Hebrew woman: You might ask: Since the Hebrew man is compared to the Hebrew woman, should he not too, go free upon showing signs of puberty? The answer is: There is no case of a male Hebrew slave showing signs of puberty, [since he is always an adult before he is sold]. For a minor cannot sell himself, as a minor’s transactions have no validity. And the court cannot sell a minor for his theft, since a minor is not subject to punishment. And a father cannot sell his son, because it is written in our verse, “If a man sells his daughter to be a maidservant,” thus excluding the sale of his son. All this is explained by the Re’m.

איש את בתו, a man his daughter, etc. We learned in Sotah 23 that the word איש, is used to exclude the right of a woman to sell her daughter. The word את is to tell us that whereas a man may sell himself, a woman may not (Mechilta). You have to read the verse thusly: "And a man may sell his daughter." If the Torah had not commenced the verse with the conjunctive letter ו, but had merely written: "A man may sell his daughter," I would have known only that he may sell his daughter but not that she could not sell herself.

Alles ferner, was wir aus unserm nationalen Schrifttum über die hohe Stellung des jüdischen Weibes (siehe Jeschurun, Jahrgang X und Xl), über das Verhältnis der Eltern zu ihren Kindern, sowie über die von Eltern bei Verheiratung ihrer Kinder zu beachtenden Rücksichten wissen, lässt uns ohne weiteres voraussetzen, dass: "כי ימכור איש את בתו לאמה" "wenn auf diese Weise ein jüdischer Mann sein kleines unmündiges Kind zur Magd, eventuell zur Ehegattin verkauft" ihn nur die äußerste, bitterste Not dazu gebracht haben kann. Er muss erst Haus und Hof und sein letztes Hemd verkauft haben, bevor er sich zu diesem Schritt entschließen darf (Kiduschin 20 a, Ramb. Hilch. Abadim IV 2).

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, the terms under which she leaves the employ of her “master” are not the same as apply to male “servants.” Ibn Ezra explains specifically that his master cannot force such a servant to perform labour outside the master’s home. [not found in the Ibn Ezra editions of Mossad harav Kook. Ed.]

את בתו, “his daughter,” but not his son.

לאמה, as a maidservant, etc. We have to interpret this expression by following the Talmud in Kidushin 4 that even if the daughter has displayed the marks of barrenness the father may still sell her. The emphasis of the Torah on לאמה, [something that is self-evident, for as what else would the father sell her? Ed.] teaches that although this girl is not marriage-material this does not diminish the father's right to sell her into service. We could also approach this expression from the point of view expressed in the Tossephta Bikkurim chapter 4, according to which the word is needed to exclude the father's right to sell her if there are doubts about her sex. If there are indications that she is a hermaphrodite or a Tumtum (having hidden genitals preventing determination of what sex she is), the father or the court could not exercise the right to sell her/him into service. The word לאמה is not superfluous then.

Soll doch auch sonst der Vater nicht einmal von der einen Befugnis, seine minderjährige Tochter zu verheiraten, Gebrauch machen. Geradezu אסור heißt es: אסור לאדם שיקדש את בתו כשהיא קטנה עד שתגדל ותאמר בפלוני אני רוצה "Verboten ist es, seine Tochter als Kind zu verheiraten bis sie großjährig geworden und sage: Den möchte ich gerne zum Manne!" und ist damit nicht nur jeder Zwang, sondern selbst das gar nicht seltene Überreden einer Tochter zu einer Heirat als sündhaft erklärt (Kiduschin 41 a). Ein Bündnis, das die innigste Vereinigung bedingt, kann nur aus völligster Freiwilligkeit wahrhaft gedeihen. Die juridische Befugnis erteilt das Gesetz dem Vater, es weiß, ein jüdischer Vater wird nur in dringenden Lagen davon Gebrauch machen, in denen eine solche Disposition über die Zukunft des Kindes dessen Rettung und Wohlfahrt begründet. Für solche Fälle ist das Vorhandensein der gesetzlichen Zulässigkeit solcher und ähnlicher Verfahrungsweisen kein geringes Glück, und haben sie sich in dem wechselvollen Geschick des jüdischen Volkes als solche erwiesen (siehe daselbst הוספו׳). Kühn durfte das Gesetz in Statuierung solcher Bestimmungen dem abstrakten Rechtsbegriffe die praktische Folge einräumen. Es wusste sich durch alle seine übrigen Institutionen solche Gemüter zu schaffen und zu pflegen, denen man ruhig solche Möglichkeiten in Händen geben konnte, ohne Missbrauch befürchten zu müssen. Nennt doch das Gesetz selbst, V. 8, das Verfahren des Vaters vom Standpunkte des Kindes aus: בגידה, einen Treubruch, einen Gegensatz zu dem, was sonst ein Kind von seinem Vater zu erwarten hat, und zeigt damit deutlich genug, dass es den Fall nur als Ausnahme betrachtet wissen will.

לא תצא כצאת בעבדים, “she will not leave her “master’s” employ according to the same rules as does a male “slave.” Rashi explains the word עבדים in this verse as referring to Canaanite slaves. If someone had thought that it referred to Jewish slaves, consider the fact that the Torah had separately legislated what the terms are when Jewish slave leaves his “master” in Deuteronomy 15,12. The conditions for releasing Jewish “slaves” had stipulated there that no difference is made between males and females. If you were to ask why the same rule does not apply regarding releasing a Jewish boy “servant” when he displays signs of puberty, seeing that we have a principle that the exegetical tool known as heckesh, a comparison spelled out in the Torah, must not be applied in an arbitrary manner, the reason is that there cannot be a situation in which such a comparison could be legally valid, as there is no situation when the Torah provides for a male’s puberty resulting in such a change of his status. If he had sold himself as a minor, the sale would not have been recognised as legally valid. We have already learned that his father was also not legally empowered to sell him. Rashi explains further that the comparison that the Torah made between a female Jewish “slave” and a male one, applies to the fact that neither of them obtain their release by having lost one or more of their organs, including even the loss of a tooth. This law applies only to gentile slaves. If you were to argue that we did not need to have this spelled out for us as we could have arrived at this conclusion by using simple logic, i.e. if a female Jewish ”slave,” who is released after displaying signs of puberty, is not released when losing an organ, it is clear that a male Jewish slave who is not released from service when displaying signs of puberty, is most certainly not released either when he loses an organ. We must therefore conclude that this socalled logic is faulty, as an opposite conclusion could be arrived at by using the “same” logic in reverse. What is the disadvantage a female Jewish “slave” labours under? She does not get her release as a result of losing an organ. Seeing that she had not been sold as a result of having committed theft, her male counterpart would certainly not be released under similar circumstances as he had been sold as a penalty for having committed theft. In order not to arrive at the wrong conclusion by using “our” logic, the Torah therefore wrote: “the male Jew or the female Jew” in Deuteronomy 15,12. לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “the rules for her release are not the same as that for her male counterparts.” According to the plain meaning of this verse the Torah here is inserting a rule of civilised behaviour, derech eretz. Men are sent on errands all over the earth, by day and night, and encounter all kinds of temptation while doing so. If women had to doo this, this would be considered a great disgrace for them. The Torah therefore states that female Jewish servants are to be used by their masters only for tasks that do not require tem to leave their immediate environment, the master’s home. In Psalms 45,14 this is summed up under the heading of: כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, “the entire glory of the King’s daughter is within her,” (not on public display) Furthermore, the female Jewish “slaves” under discussion here are all minors. An alternate approach: Whereas the male “slaves” leave the master’s employ unaccompanied by children they had sired while in his employ, (as discussed earlier) the female Jewish “slave,” if her master wants to have children by her, must first marry her, in which case she ceases to be a “slave” anyways. If the marriage does not work out, she will be divorced and take her children with her, like any normal woman who is divorced from her husband and gets a financial settlement.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, she will not leave the service according to the conditions applying to male slaves. Our sages in Kidushin 16 understand this as a comparison with a Gentile slave who obtains his freedom if the master (or his agent) caused any of 24 specified injuries. The justification for this interpretation is the Torah's use of the word עבדים without specifying the addition עבריים, "Jewish ones." When the Torah applies the term עבד to a Jew it is always accompanied by the adjective עברי. A Jew is not just a "slave." I believe that the plain meaning of the verse is that whereas male Jewish slaves do not leave the employ of the master before their six years of service have expired, even if the master to whom they have been sold has died before the completion of the six years, this rule does not apply to a female Jewish maidservant. As soon as her master dies she is free to leave.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים: abgesehen davon, daß עבדים עברים nicht wohl unter העבדים ohne nähere Beifügung verstanden werden, kann schon darum hier nur an עבדים כנעניים gedacht werden, weil durch כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה וגו׳ ואף לאמתך תעשה כן (Dewarim 15, 12, 17) dem ibrischen Knecht die ibrische Magd in allen freimachenden Momenten, dem siebten Dienstjahre, dem Jobel und dem Tode des Herrn (— sie ist darin dem נרצע gleich und hat nicht einmal dem Sohne zu dienen —) gleich gestellt ist. Es kann daher hier, wie auch die Halacha lehrt, nur an עבדים כנעניים gedacht sein, die nach V. 20 ihre Freiheit durch Körperverletzung erhalten, יוצאים בראשי איברים. Das ibrische Mädchen, und so auch, durch die vorhin zitierte Gleichstellung, der ibrische Knecht, geht nicht infolge solcher Verletzung aus. Sie sind ja nicht Leibeigene und der Nachlass ihrer wenigen Dienstjahre ist kein Äquivalent für die Verletzung ihres Körpers. Wie jedem andern ist ihnen der körperliche Verlust zu ersetzen, ihr Dienstverhältnis dauert fort, und das ibrische Mädchen hat ungeachtet der erlittenen Verstümmlung, oder vielmehr eben in Folge derselben noch zuverlässiger zu erwarten, dass der Herr, seiner eingegangenen eventuellen Zusage gemäß, es heiraten werde.

The words: "she does not leave like the male slaves," refer to the seventh year. If the master marries the maidservant her status is changed automatically, i.e. she will never leave her master unless he dies or divorces her. This is why the Torah discusses what happens if her master fails to marry her (verse 8). The sequence of the wording there is difficult; we could not have understood the first half of the verse, "if she does not please her master," unless we had been informed that it refers to her master displaying his displeasure by not marrying her.. Why did the Torah not write: "if the master does not marry her for she was displeasing in his eyes?" According to our approach the wording in the verse is fully justified, however, seeing the words לא תצא refer to a possible marriage, i.e. a permanent relationship. Concerning such a relationship the Torah adds that if for some reason the master finds this relationship no longer acceptable because she displeases him, אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, then the restrictions to granting freedom that apply to a male slave do not apply to a maidservant. The wording also precludes the possible errors we referred to earlier of the male slave not leaving because of the Shmittah year or even the Jubilee year unless his six years service have been completed. The moment the Torah wrote: "if she displeases her master, etc.," it becomes clear that the nature of the displeasure concerns only the master's willingness to marry this maidservant. In Deut. 15,12 the Torah commences by comparing the law of the male Jewish servant to that of the maidservant. This comparison extends only to certain entitlements the Torah legislated for the male Jewish slave. Nowhere in that whole paragraph is there a word which would contradict the interpretation of our sages regarding the distinctions between the laws applying to a maidservant.

We are free to interpret the wording of the various verses as long as our interpretation does not conflict with the halachah, seeing these rulings are all of Sinaitic origin. It is clear from the wording in our verse that the ruling about a slave being freed because of certain injuries his master caused him, such as the loss of a tooth or an eye, applies only to Gentile slaves. The reason seems to be that a Jewish slave has the option to get financial compensation from his master for such injuries. The combined value of the various compensation payments may amount to more than the price he puts on obtaining his freedom early, depending on whether such an injury was suffered near the beginning of his term of service or near the end of the six years. A Gentile slave is not entitled to such compensation seeing his very body is owned by his master. The only way his master can compensate him for the injury caused is by foregoing his services henceforth.

אם רעה בעיני אדניה IF SHE BE EVIL IN THE EYES OF HER LORD — i. e. that she did not find favour in his eyes so that he might be induced to marry her (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:8:1).

L’AM NOCHRI’ HE SHALL HAVE NO POWER TO SELL HER. “Neither her master nor her father has the right to sell her to another [Hebrew man].⁷³Rashi thus interprets l’am nochri [literally: “unto a foreign people”] as signifying “unto a strange man,” i.e., to another Israelite. Thus the verse is stating that neither the father nor the master has a right to resell her. Ramban will question this interpretation. Seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her — if he [i.e. the master] intends to act deceitfully towards her and not to fulfill the commandment of designating her as his wife [or his son’s]. So also did her father act deceitfully towards her, by selling her to this master.” Thus far Rashi’s language. And if so, l’am nochri would be like l’ish nochri (to a strange man), but we find in all Scripture no parallel to such a usage [that am (people) should be understood in the sense of “man”]. Perhaps the letter lamed in the word l’am draws along with it a similar letter in the next word, thus making it: ‘l’am l’nochri’ he shall have no power to sell her, and the explanation thereof would be similar to the verse, Thou gavest him to be food ‘l’am l’tziyim’ (to the folk inhabiting the wilderness)⁷⁴Psalms 74:14. where the second word l’tziyim explains: who is the folk? — the men who inhabit the wilderness; so here too He says, he shall have no power to sell her ‘l’am’, and He explains: who is l’am? — l’nochri, that is to say, to any stranger from the whole people [i.e., to another Israelite]. The term nochri here will then be similar in usage to the expressions: and thy labors in the house of a ‘nochri’ (stranger),⁷⁵Proverbs 5:10. which means in the house of another man; even from the ‘nochriyah’ (the strange woman) that maketh smooth her words,⁷⁶Ibid., 2:16. meaning the woman who is not his wife. All this I have written in order to uphold the words of the Sages⁷⁷Rabbi Eleazar and Rabbi Shimon — in Kiddushin 18a. who say that a man is not permitted to sell his daughter twice into the status of a handmaid, thus holding to the explanation: since he has once dealt deceitfully with her [by selling her to such a status of a handmaid], he has no more the right to sell her.
But I have seen in the Mechilta:⁶⁰Mechilta here on the Verse. “‘L’am nochri’ he shall have no power to sell her, — this is a warning to the court that he [i.e., the father] should not sell her to an alien [i.e., a non-Israelite].” It would thus appear from their language that this verse is not meant as an admonition against the father reselling her to this Israelite master or to another one, but is a prohibition against her being sold altogether [even the first time] to a non-Israelite, so that a man may not sell his minor daughter to an idolator as a handmaid. [It was necessary for this to be stated] because in the case of a Hebrew servant He said, and he sell himself unto the stranger who is a settler with thee, or to the offshoot of a stranger’s family,⁷⁸Leviticus 25:47. therefore it had to say that this should not be done to a woman. The reason for it is obvious.⁷⁹“That she not be exposed to the dangers of immorality.” (Bachya). This surely is the plain meaning of Scripture, that after the father — the vendor — redeemed her from her first master, he cannot sell her to an idolator, and the same law applies to the original sale. Scripture, however, [had to state this prohibition in the case of a re-sale], because sometimes a man may very much want to redeem his daughter from a master who did not take her as his wife, and will want to sell her to an idolator for a year or two with the intention of then taking her out from him; therefore Scripture warned him against doing this. Or it may be that this expression [i.e., ‘l’am nochri’ he shall have no power to sell her] refers back to the beginning of this subject: And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant⁸⁰Verse 7. — he shall have no power to sell her to a foreign man. If so, then the Rabbis’ interpretation in the Talmud⁷⁷Rabbi Eleazar and Rabbi Shimon — in Kiddushin 18a. that a man may not resell his daughter into the status of a handmaid, [even to an Israelite], is derived [not from ‘l’am nochri’ he shall have no power to sell her, but] from the [apparently] superfluous expression: seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. For to a non-Israelite he never has power to sell her; so why did G-d say: seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her, [since he cannot sell her even once to a foreign man], and the meaning of that expression is that since he acted once deceitfully with her by selling her into a status of a handmaid, he cannot do so another time? Therefore the Rabbis interpreted the verse thus: “to a foreign people he shall have no power to sell her [altogether], and when he hath dealt deceitfully with her [he also has no power to sell her];” that is to say, he shall have no power to sell her if he dealt deceitfully with her, for after he sold her once [to an Israelite], he cannot sell her again. There are many instances where the Rabbis interpreted the verses in such a manner. [Thus we find: Unto the stranger that is within thy gates thou shalt give it that he may eat it, or thou mayest sell it unto a foreigner⁸¹Deuteronomy 14:21. — which Rabbi Meir interpreted]:⁸²Pesachim 21b. “Read the verse thus: unto the stranger that is within thy gates thou shalt give it that he may eat it, or thou mayest sell it; thou shalt give it that he may eat it or thou mayest sell it unto a foreigner.” Similarly they interpreted here⁸³Kiddushin 4a. then shall she go out for nothing, without money,⁸⁴Verse 11. which, on account of the redundant language, [“for nothing,” “without money”] they made the basis for two additional ways of the Hebrew maidservant regaining her freedom: “she shall go out for nothing, and she shall go out without money;” thus establishing that she goes out to freedom when she produces signs of puberty, or signs of fuller development if she had no signs of puberty — this being that maturity of the barren woman, [who is incapable of conception], as is stated in the beginning of Tractate Kiddushin.⁸³Kiddushin 4a.
The plain meaning of Scripture in this section is as follows: If a man sell his minor daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as these menservants, [i.e., the Hebrew menservants] mentioned [above in Verses 2-6,] who go out to freedom in the seventh year and in the jubilee year: for the master⁸⁵In the Tur who quotes Ramban: “the father.” That is to say, if the maiden pleased the master and he wishes to marry her, the father cannot take her out from his house. can never send her away from his house if the maiden pleases him and she obtains kindness of him,⁸⁶See Esther 2:9. but he is to take her for a wife as is his will. But if she pleaseth not her master, who has not espoused her to be his wife — for he who buys an Israelite’s daughter does so with the intention of taking her as his wife, thus she is under ordinary conditions designated for him; but now if her master does not desire her, then shall the father mentioned redeem her, for as soon as the master says: “I do not want to marry her,” it is forbidden for the father to leave her any longer under his authority, nor may he sell her to a foreign people in case he comes to deal deceitfully with her, for it is deceit for a man to sell his daughter except to someone who can marry her. Or the meaning thereof may be that anyone who sells his daughter [even to an Israelite], deals deceitfully with her.

אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, even though the normal procedure is what we outlined in verse seven, her “master” does not have to marry her if he finds her incompatible, as otherwise he would eventually come to hate her. However, in such a situation the father and the master have to cooperate in releasing her from her obligation as servant.

אשר לא (ו) יעדה והפדה, who has espoused her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed. The reason the word lo is written with the letter א while it is read as if it were spelled with the letter ו, is explained in Kidushin 19 to mean that her espousal must meet with her approval. The master cannot marry her against her wishes. The Talmud derives it from the word יעדה. The Torah therefore begins the verse with "if she is displeasing in the eyes of her master" as describing a hindrance to the marriage which originates with the master. Concerning a hindrance due to the girl, the Torah writes אשר לא יעדה, to indicate that she was the party who did not agree. As a result, i.e. if either party declines to marry the other, והפדה, the legislation of facilitating her release by deducting time not served becomes applicable. If the parties agree to marry, there is no cause for the girl's prior release.

אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, and as a result he does not want to keep the implied agreement to marry her, she will not leave his employ in the manner her male counterparts would leave, but, seeing that he committed a breach of trust by not finalising the deal and marrying her (violating what the prophet Maleachi 2,14 called “the Lord is a witness between you and the wife of your youth with whom you have broken faith, although she is your partner and covenanted spouse,”) והפדה, the master has to assist her by releasing her prematurely, by allowing her to compensate the employer for unexpired years of service.

לעם נכרי לא ימשל למכרה, “he must not sell it to a member of a different family.” Our sages deduced from this wording that a father must not sell his daughter into service again after she has been released from her first master. Similarly, her first master, instead of releasing her, is also prohibited to sell her services to someone else, seeing he has not kept the promise that was implied when he first acquired her services contractually from her father. He had betrayed her trust by not marrying her when she attained the age of puberty or shortly thereafter. It is also possible that the meaning of our verse is to inform us that the criteria which apply to someone who sells himself, occasionally even to a gentile (Leviticus 25,47) if he cannot find a Jewish employer who pays his wages years in advance, so that he can pay back money he owes, are not the criteria that apply to a young girl’s father, or her employer, although, basically, her father had the right to sell her services as had her employer to buy her services, effectively preventing her from quitting he employment prematurely. This is why the Torah warns that no father has the right to sell the services of his daughter to a gentile. The Torah adds that if the father had bought his daughter out of her original contract (when it became clear that her employer had no intention to marry her, for instance) he is not allowed to sell her services to a gentile instead. He cannot do so even for a very short period of time. Another possibility of understanding our verse is: “when a father is about to sell the services of his daughter the minor, his authority is restricted to his doing so to a Jewish employer.” At any rate, at all events we derive from this verse that a second sale of the same girl by either the father or her former employer is absolutely prohibited. The extra wording in the verse that enables us to derive this rule is בבגדו בה, “seeing he has betrayed her.” The prohibition not to sell her to a gentile would have been clear from the words לעם נכרי לא ימשול למכרה, “he has no authority to sell her to a gentile.” Nachmanides writes that the plain meaning of the verse is as follows: when a man sells his daughter’s services the rules of her release from service are not identical to those applying to males mentioned earlier, such as her being wed by her employer, for instance. If this is the case, the father cannot redeem her by some means to prevent her becoming married to said employer. [the girl herself can, of course, decline such offer of marriage. Ed.] If she does not find favour in the eyes of her employer so that he wants to marry her, the father cannot sell her services instead to anyone else, seeing that he had betrayed her originally by selling her services to someone who had no intention of making her his wife.

אם רעה בעיני אדוניה אשר לא יעדה, “if she is displeasing in the eyes of her master who had designated her for himself (as a wife).” Nachmanides writes that anyone who “buys” a Jewish daughter does so with a view to marrying her. She is automatically considered as designated for her master as a wife. If, after getting to know her while she worked for him, he changed his mind, her father has to assist in her redemption (the word והפדה refers to the first subject in the verse, i.e. the word איש). It is forbidden for the girl’s father to allow her to continue in the service of a man who does not plan to wed her after the master expressly says: “I do not want her.” He has no authority to sell her to a Gentile master. Even though the Torah permitted the master of a Hebrew servant to sell him to a Gentile (compare Leviticus 25 47) where sale to a גר תושב, a resident stranger is expressly permitted, this permission does not apply to girls. This is in order to ensure that Gentiles do not treat Jewish girls or women as inferior. This is the plain meaning of these verses. Thus far Nachmanides.

Here the Torah implies that it is a mitzvah for him to marry her. [Rashi knows this] because it says, “If she is displeasing to her master,” providing the reason why he did not marry her. Thus we infer that if she is not displeasing, he should marry her. Since the Torah calls her marriage יעוד (designation), rather than saying: “had not married her,” we learn that she requires no other marriage ritual.

V. 8. יעד .אשר לו יעדה, verwandt mit יחד, bezeichnet vorwiegend die Bestimmung einer persönlichen Vereinigung, הִוָעֵד: sich gegenseitig zu einer Vereinigung, einer Zusammenkunft zu bestimmen, מועֵד: Zeit oder Ort zu einer solchen Zusammenkunft. Hier: die Bestimmung einer ehelichen Vereinigung. Dem Grundbegriffe des Wortes יעד gemäß wird Kiduschin 19 a, obgleich sonst dem Vater bei minderjährigen Töchtern das Recht zusteht, ohne deren Einwilligung für sie die Traugabe entgegenzunehmen und sie dadurch dem Manne ehelich zu verbinden, hier in diesem Falle die Einwilligung des Mädchens gefordert, אין יעוד אלא מדעת דידה, in dem Begriffe selbst liegt der beiderseitige Entschluss. So fasst dies auch Ramb. Hilch. Abadim IV 8 auf. תוספו׳ jedoch (das. 5a) fasst dies in einer Weise auf, dass auch hier die Einwilligung des Mädchens nicht gefordert werde. — יעדה ist Präteritum, bezieht sich daher auf den Akt des Kaufes zurück und kann ja auch nach dem לו :קרי gar nicht anders verstanden werden, da er sie ja jetzt nicht zur Ehe will. Er hat vielmehr, wie bereits zu V.7 bemerkt, gleich von vornherein mit Aushändigung des Geldes an den Vater "sie für sich zur Ehe bestimmt." Diese Bestimmung war aber nicht eine absolute, sie war noch seiner spätern Erklärung vorbehalten, sie war eine bedingungsweise. Daher das לא :כתיב er hatte sie sich bestimmt und nicht bestimmt. Da aber das לו :קרי und das לא :כתיב, und nicht umgekehrt lautet, in allen קרי und כתיב aber das קרי das vorherrschende ist und das כתיב nur eine Modifikation hinzufügt, so ist auch hier damit gesagt, dass מצות יעוד קודמת, dass in erster Linie ihm die Pflicht der Ehelichung obliegt und von ihm erwartet wird.

והפדה, “he must help her to obtain her freedom;” the unusual phrasing means that he must do more than the law requires to give her freedom, i.e. enable her to avoid having to become someone else’s “slave” due to her being penniless. Rashi explains our verse as follows: if the servant girl had been sold for six years service, for say 600 dollars, and she had only worked for two years, her master must give her 400 dollars upon her going free. If you were to ask what did it cost her master to give her the 400 dollars, seeing that he had received the correct percentage of the work performed? The answer is that the girl’s services becoming worth more every year she grew closer to adulthood, the master had paid her for work performed while she was too young to be worth what he had paid for. In other words, the master did sustain a financial loss by her early release.

אבל אם רעה, “but if she is ugly, etc.” the term רעה while often used to describe moral ugliness, is also used to describe physical ugliness, i.e. being “sourfaced,” as we know from when Joseph asked the baker and cupbearer who had dreamt dreams which had upset them. Compare Genesis 40,7: ?מדוע פניכם רעים היום, “why do you look so crestfallen today?” בעיני אדוניה, “in her master’s eyes;” so that he does not wish her to remain in his house as a prospective bride until she will have completed her years of service;

אשר לו יעדה means: [IF SHE BE EVIL IN THE EYES OF HER LORD] WHO OUGHT TO HAVE DESIGNATED HER to be his wife and ought to have married her, her purchase-money serving as the money necessary to contract a marriage (כסף קידושין). Scripture hereby implicitly tells you that it is his duty to designate her for himself, and since it makes no mention of the manner in which the marriage is to be contracted it implicitly tells you at the same time that she requires no other rite of marriage than the passing of the purchase-money from the master to her father (cf. Kiddushin 19a, Bekhorot 13a).

IN HIS BREAKING FAITH WITH HER - Since he is breaking faith with her in that he does not designate her, as it is written in Malachi (2:14) regarding the wife of one's youth, "you have broken faith with her, though she is your partner and covenanted spouse."

לעם נכרי לא ימשול למכרה בבגדו בה, the father of the girl in question who had already betrayed her by “selling” her initially. We know that even Lavan’s daughters were angry at what they considered their father having done when he “sold” them into marriage. (compare Genesis 31,15) The Torah describes here the negative impression it makes on any of his peers when he observes a Jewish father selling his daughter’s services for something other than marriage. Once an employer/prospective husband, has done this no other Jewish father is allowed to sell his daughter to such a man. [the word נכרי does not refer to a non Jew, but to a Jew who acted contrary to Jewish mores. Ed.]

For he, too, must aid in her redemption. Since it does not say ונפדת (she shall be redeemed), rather והפדה (lit. he shall make her redeemed), we learn that the master must aid in her redemption by calculating for her [the years she already served].

לעם נכרי, to another party, etc. The Torah has to legislate this in order to inform us that though the father has a right to sell his daughter, he does not have the right to sell her לעם נכרי. The words לא ימשול למכרה "he has no auhority to sell her," indicate that if the father sold her without a view to eventual marriage by her master or his son, such a sale is invalid because he has betrayed the girl's trust. The moment the father or the master has betrayed his trust he has forfeited every right to buy or sell this girl.

והפדה da von dem folgenden לא ימשל, wie wir zeigen werden, nur der Vater das Subjekt sein kann, so ist auch von והפרה wohl der Vater das Subjekt: wenn der Herr hintendrein erklärt, sie nicht heiraten zu wollen, so hat der Vater ihre Auslösung zu bewirken; ist er zu Vermögen gekommen, so wird er zur Auslösung gezwungen, oder, wenn er noch unvermögend ist, so ist die Familie dazu anzuhalten (Kiduschin 18 a). Es hat aber auch der Herr dazu mitzuwirken, indem er ihr das verhältnismäßig bereits Abgediente von dem zurück zu erstattenden Gelde abzulassen hat: שמגרע פדיונה ויצאה (das. 16 a)

יעדה, based on the word מועד, “appointed time;” it is used here as in Samuel II 20,5: מן המועד אשר יעדו, “from the appointed time that he (David) had set for him.” The spelling and reading of this word are יעדה and יעדו respectively.

והפדה means he shall afford her the opportunity to obtain her release from service — that he himself must cooperate in respect to the amount of her ransom. And what is this opportunity he has to give her? That he allows her a deduction from her ransom corresponding to the number of years she has served in his house, as though she were only hired by him. How can this be done? Supposing he had bought her for a maneh (one hundred shekels) and she had served him two years. We say to him: “You knew that she was to go free at the end of six years; it follows then that you bought the labour of each year for one sixth of a maneh. Now she has served you two years, that is the equivalent of one-third of the maneh: accept therefore two-thirds of a maneh as a ransom and let her go free out of your house (Kiddushin 14b).

HE SHALL LET HER BE REDEEMED. He reduces her redemption price and she goes out through redemption, according to the number of remaining years.

Neither the master nor the father. Since it says that the master should designate her to himself, or to his son, why would we think he could sell her? Therefore, we must say that “He has no power to sell her” means that even the father may not sell her.

Another aspect discussed in Kidushin 19 is the right of the father to sell his daughter to a master who is forbidden to marry her by Jewish law, such as a widow to a High Priest or a divorcee to an ordinary priest. By precluding the father's right to sell his daughter to עם נכרי, a member of an alien people, the Torah implies that a sale to the above-mentioned categories is legally valid seeing the buyer is a Jew.

לעם נכרי לא ימשל וגו׳ kann sich unmöglich auf den Herrn beziehen, er hat ja überhaupt nicht das Recht, sie weiter zu verkaufen, auch nicht an einen, der nicht unter עם נכרי zu begreifen wäre. Es ist vielmehr auch hier der Vater Subjekt. עם נכרי: wir haben schon wiederholt zu bemerken die Gelegenheit gehabt, wie עם durchaus nicht bloß den Gesamtkreis eines Volkes bedeutet, wie vielmehr das jüdische Volk als aus einer Mehrheit von Kreisen bestehend begriffen wird, deren jeder ein עם ist; daher ja der gewöhnliche Ausdruck: הכרת מעמיה ,רכיל בעמיך ,בעל בעמיו ,עמיך ,עמיו usw. Ein jeder Familienkreis ist עם, und עם נכרי ist: ein ihr fremd bleibender Familienkreis. Vergl. נכריות נחשבנו לו (Bereschit 31, 15) נכר׳ לבנ׳ אמ׳ (Ps. 69, 9). Er, der Vater, hat nicht das Recht, sie in einen Kreis hinein zu verkaufen, der ihr fremd bleiben muss oder fremd bleiben soll. Er darf sie nur einem Manne verkaufen, dessen Kreis sie durch seine oder (V.9) seines Sohnes Heirat angehörig werden kann und eventuell soll. אין מוכרה לקרובים Kiduschin 18 b). Er darf sie nicht an solche Blutsverwandte verkaufen, mit denen) die Eingehung einer Ehe unmöglich ist, darf sie auch nicht verkaufen על מנת שלא ליעדה mit der ausgesprochenen Bestimmung, dass die Ehe nicht erfolgen soll, und hat daher auch ihre Loskaufung zu bewirken, sobald der Herr erklärt, sie nicht heiraten zu wollen.

והפדה, “in order to release her.” Seeing that neither her master nor his son are prepared to marry her, and he does not want her to release herself, but prefers for her to continue to work for him on a socially demeaning level, he has to release her and pay her some compensation. [We must remember that her master had paid her father in advance for up to six years service. Ed.]

לעם נכרי לא ימשל למכרה means that neither the master nor the father has a right to sell her to another Jewish man (Kiddushin 18a),

בגד ב־ בבגדו בה: sich jemandem nur als Kleid erweisen. Mit dem Kleide, das wir anziehen, erteilen wir einem jeden den Anspruch an uns, in uns einen Menschen zu finden und nur Menschenwürdiges von uns erwarten zu dürfen. Rechtfertigen wir das in uns gesetzte Vertrauen nicht, so "sind wir ein Kleid", dem der innere Mensch fehlt. Ähnlich מעל und מעיל, das Priestergewand. מעילה ist die Täuschung in einer heiligen Angelegenheit. Man hat uns priesterliches Vertrauen geschenkt und wir haben uns als "Priesterrock" bewiesen. Der Vater hat sich unväterlich gegen sein Kind benommen, anders als ein Kind von einem Vater zu erwarten berechtigt ist.

והפדה, according to Rash,i he must contribute to the cost of cancelling her contract, i.e. that she must repay for the years of the contract she had not fulfilled her part of. The master must forfeit part of what he could have claimed, as his contribution. You might well ask what the difference is between גרעון and סיוע? (verse 10) Since she has repaid the master for the years she has not worked, what loss did the master experience? Her value as a maid increased with every she grew closer to puberty. We might therefore have assumed that the value of her work is not based on the same amount each year. By not getting back more per year for the last three years this girl did not work, than for the each of the first three years when she was quite young, the master actually did experience a loss, גרע, by releasing her from her contract early.

בבגדו בה SEEING THAT HE HATH DEALT DECEITFULLY WITH HER — If “he” means the master then these words signify: if he intends to deal faithlessly with her, i. e. if he does not intend to fulfil the commandment of “Jiud” (of designating her to himself). So also the father — he has no right to sell her to another man since he has dealt faithlessly with her as a father having sold her to this man (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:8:4; Kiddushin 18b).

לעם נכרי, “to an unrelated person;” (compare Ibn Ezra) to anyone other than her master he must not “sell her” to have dominion over her.

לא ימשול למכרה, “he must not abuse his position of mastery even to marry her off (with her consent) to someone other than himself or to his son.” למכרה, “to hand her over.” We find this term used in this sense also in Judges 4,9: כי ביד אשה ימכור ה' את סיסרא, “for the Lord will hand over Siserah into the hand of a woman.”

בבגדה בה “seeing he had betrayed her trust.” By not going through with his promise to marry her when she was old enough, he had betrayed her trust. The expression “betrayal” occurs often in relationships between husband and wife. It describes usually the break up, severance of married life with a partner. Our author quotes verses from Maleachi 2,14, and Jeremiah 3,20, where the prophet in each case refers to Israel having betrayed its relationship with Hashem. Some commentators understand the words: לעם נכרי as referring to a Canaanite, seeing that Canaanites are referred to as נכרי in Judges 19,12: אל עיר נכרי אשר לא מבני ישראל המה, “to a foreign city that does not belong to the Children of Israel.” Also in Kings I 8,41: ובא הנכרי אשר לא מעמך הוא, “or if a foreigner who is not a member of your people comes, etc;” there too the reference is to the Canaanite. Some commentators explain the words as follows: the subject of the word והפדה, is not the girl’s master but her father; he will have the right to cancel the contract and get his daughter released from its terms seeing that he has reneged on his promise to marry her.

לעם נכרי, “to any other nation;” i.e. the father does not have the right to sell his daughter to anyone but a Jewish master. He might have been under the impression that since the Torah permitted him to sell his daughter while she is a minor, it does not matter to whom he sells her. After all, seeing that the Torah did not forbid him to sell himself to a gentile if his fellow Jews did not help him to stay financially afloat, so why could he not do the same with his daughter? Therefore the Torah had to expressly forbid him to do this.

בבגדו בה, “for having betrayed her,” as this was forbidden.”

ואם לבנו יעדנה AND IF HE HATH BETROTHED HER TO HIS SON — “He” means the master (not like “he” in the previous verse where it refers both to the master and to the father). The verse teaches you that the son also may succeed to his father’s rights to betroth her to himself, if his father consents to it. Then it is not necessary for him either (just as is not obligatory for his father; cf. v. 8) to perform another act of betrothal, but he merely says to her: “You are designated for me as my wife by means of the money which your father has received from my father as your price” (Kiddushin 19a).

AND IF ‘YI’ODENAH’ (HE ESPOUSE HER) UNTO HIS SON, HE SHALL DEAL WITH HER AFTER THE MANNER OF DAUGHTERS. In line with the plain meaning of Scripture, it is possible that G-d is saying that if the buyer yi’odenah for his son, which means that he espoused her to him — for the term yi’ud is an expression of appointing, such as: he tarried longer than the set time which ‘y’ado’ (he had appointed him)⁸⁷II Samuel 20:5. — then he shall do unto her after the manner that a man does for his own daughters — he is to give her of his own according to the dowry of virgins.⁸⁸Further, 22:6. He thus commanded this as He did in the law of outfitting the emancipated servant,⁸⁹Deuteronomy 15:13-14. and it is all an expression of His goodness, magnified be He! And in accordance with the interpretation of our Rabbis, which is the truth, the meaning of the verse is: after the manner of daughters whom parents marry off, so shall the son [of the master] deal with her. And then He explains [what is “the manner of daughters”] that if he take him another wife, her food, her raiment, and her conjugal rights — that is, of this one [the former maidservant] — he shall not diminish.⁹⁰Verse 10. It is obvious that if he did not marry another woman he must not diminish her rights, but Scripture speaks of that which is usual.⁹¹I.e., if he does marry another woman he is more likely to diminish the rights of this one; hence Scripture speaks of the case ‘if’ he take him another wife. But this is by no means to be understood that it was “the usual” thing to take another wife.
Now Rashi explained: “sh’eirah⁹⁰Verse 10. means food; k’suthah is, as the literal sense of the word, raiment; onatha is the marital duty.” And so did Onkelos render sh’eirah: zivanah (food). But in the Gemara⁹²Kethuboth 47b. — For the meaning of the term Gemara see in Seder Bo, Note 204. the Rabbis said with reference to the Sage who held this opinion [that sh’eirah means food]: “And this Tanna⁹³See in Seder Yithro, Note 451. holds that the alimentation of one’s wife is a law of the Torah. For we have been taught: sh’eirah — this means her food, and so it says, He caused ‘sh’eir’ (flesh) to rain upon them as the dust⁹⁴Psalms 78:27. etc.” And from the subject under discussion in that Gemara it is understood that this is the opinion of a single Sage, whilst the accepted law is that the alimentation of one’s wife is a Rabbinical enactment. And even according to the plain meaning of Scripture, why should it mention food under the term sh’eir which means “flesh;” it should rather have mentioned lachmah (her bread), for man lives by bread⁹⁵See Deuteronomy 8:3. and his obligation towards her is [mainly] in that sustenance. Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra thought to correct this, and so he explained sh’eirah as meaning food which builds up her sh’eir, namely her flesh. But there is no sense in Scripture saying that the “husband diminish not her flesh!”
Therefore I say that the meaning of sh’eir everywhere is flesh close and near to one’s own, the root thereof being derived from the expression sh’eir b’saro,⁹⁶Leviticus 18:6. Generally translated: “that is near of kin to him.” According to Ramban the literal meaning would be: “the flesh close and near to his flesh.” that is his close flesh outside that of the flesh of his own body. Thus relatives are called sh’eir: to any sh’eir b’saro’ (that is near of kin to him);⁹⁶Leviticus 18:6. Generally translated: “that is near of kin to him.” According to Ramban the literal meaning would be: “the flesh close and near to his flesh.” they are ‘sha’arah’ (near kinswomen),⁹⁷Ibid., Verse 17. this being associated with the expressions: surely thou art my bone and my flesh;⁹⁸Genesis 29:14. of whom the flesh is half consumed.⁹⁹Numbers 12:12. “The flesh” here refers to Miriam — Aaron’s and Moses’ sister. Similarly, And I will cut off from Babylon a name, ‘ush’ar’ offshoot and offspring,¹⁰⁰Isaiah 14:22. means a child related to him. Likewise, when thy flesh ‘ush’eirecha’ are consumed,¹⁰¹Proverbs 5:11. which means “yourself and your children” who are the flesh closest to you. Thus meat is called sh’eir — He caused ‘sh’eir’ to rain upon them as the dust⁹⁴Psalms 78:27. — because meat when eaten is absorbed by the eater and becomes part of his flesh. It is possible that this is the meaning of the expression, when thy flesh ‘ush’eirecha’ are consumed,¹⁰¹Proverbs 5:11. meaning: when the original flesh of your body, and the nutriment of flesh which came from the food, will be consumed and will no longer be part of your flesh. Thus a woman in relation to her husband is called sh’eir — just as the Rabbis interpreted:¹⁰²Yebamoth 22b. “except for ‘lish’eiro,’¹⁰³Leviticus 21:2. sh’eir means his wife;” — the usage of the term being derived from the idea that G-d stated, and he shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh.¹⁰⁴Genesis 2:24. Thus sh’eira here means “the nearness of her flesh;” k’suthah is “the cover of her bed,” just as it is said, for that is his only ‘k’suthoh’ (covering)… wherein shall he sleep?¹⁰⁵Further, 22:26. and onathah is “her time,” that he come to her at times of love. And even if we say as some commentators do, that the meaning of sh’eir is like “his flesh,” and the expression, to any ‘sh’eir’ b’saro’⁹⁶Leviticus 18:6. Generally translated: “that is near of kin to him.” According to Ramban the literal meaning would be: “the flesh close and near to his flesh.” is like “to any flesh of his flesh,” just as it says, for he is our brother, our flesh¹⁰⁶Genesis 37:27. — in that case we would still explain ‘sh’eirah'… he shall not diminish as meaning that he shall not diminish from her her flesh; that is, the flesh due to her, namely, the flesh of her husband who with her is one flesh. Thus the meaning of the verse is, that G-d says that if the master takes another wife, he shall not diminish from this one the nearness of her flesh, the cover of her bed, and her time of love, for such is the manner of daughters. And the intention is that the other woman should not be sitting upon a stately bed,¹⁰⁷Ezekiel 23:41. and there they shall be one flesh,¹⁰⁴Genesis 2:24. whilst this one is to him merely like a concubine, with whom he lives only by chance, and upon the ground, just like one comes to a harlot. It is for this reason that Scripture has forbidden him to act in this way. And so did the Sages say:¹⁰⁸Kethuboth 48a. “sh’eirah means the nearness of flesh, that he should not behave to her as is the custom among the Persians, who perform their marital rights in their clothes.” This is a correct interpretation, for such is the style of Scripture always to mention sexual intercourse in clean and brief language. Therefore it mentions these duties by means of allusion: sh’eirah k’sutha v’onatha, referring to the three things which are usual when a man comes together with his wife. Thus the verse is properly explained in accordance with the accepted law, whilst alimentation of one’s wife and provision of her raiment are duties put upon the husband by ordinance of the Rabbis.

כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, his son. [the employer’s son if he will marry her. Ed.] He will have to provide these three items to his bride even though he did not formally betroth her or purchase her. [something his father had done. Ed.]

ואם לבנו ייעדנה, And if he espouse her to his son, etc. This means that the master never espoused her to himself, but intended her as a wife for his son when he bought her. The Torah informs us that this is perfectly in order, i.e. the money the father had paid to the girl's father for her is acceptable as the money for the betrothal to his son.

ואם לבנו ייעדנה, “if he had intended her as a wife for his son;” the expression ייעדנה is equivalent to the Torah writing “הזמינה,” “invited her.” The expression occurs in this context in the Scriptures in Samuel II 20,5 מן המועד אשר יעד, “than the time planned for him.”

[“He” refers to] the master. [Rashi knows this] because [after selling her,] the father may not give her to another, [thus the verse must refer to the master]. And Rashi had to state “the master” expressly, so we would not mistakenly say the following: just as neither the master nor the father may sell her [see Rashi on the previous verse], so too, neither of them may designate her to the master’s son. Therefore Rashi expressly states that the master may do so. His proof is from v. 11 which says, “If he does none of these three things to her, she goes out free.” And two of these three things (deducting from her price and designation to the master) [see Rashi on v. 11], are done by the master. [Thus the third — designating to a son — is also done by the master.] (Re’m)

V. 9. כמשפט הבנות וגו׳, nach Rambam: hat er, der Herr, sie auszustatten, als wäre sie seine Tochter; ähnlich der הענקה, der Ausstattung, die (Dewarim 15, 14) dem Herrn beim Austritt eines ibrischen Knechtes oder einer ibrischen Magd aus seinem Diensteigentum zur Pflicht gemacht ist. Allein diese spezielle Brautausstattungspflicht, wenn er sie mit seinem Sohne verheiratet, finden wir in der Halacha nirgends erwähnt. Daher ist das משפט הבנות wohl mit Raschi (und ebenso in der מכילהא) von dem Rechte zu verstehen, welches während der Ehe die Frauen von ihren Männern zu beanspruchen haben und welches in dem folgenden Verse näher bezeichnet wird. Es heißt dann: er, der Sohn, hat sie ganz zu behandeln, wie andere Ehefrauen, die nicht als Mägde, sondern als "Haustöchter" dem Manne zugeführt werden, zu fordern berechtigt sind. Dass aber dies erst beim Sohne und nicht schon beim Vater ausgesprochen ist, dürfte dadurch motiviert sein, dass vom Sohne leicht noch eine größere Geringschätzung in der Ehe als vom Vater zu befürchten sein könnte, und es ist die konzise, und darum prägnante Weise des Gesetzes, seine Bestimmungen gerne bei solchen Fällen auszusprechen, bei denen wir sie weniger erwartet hätten. Der Vater hat sie noch als Freie empfangen, der Sohn heiratet sie als Magd und nachdem sie bereits vom Vater verschmäht worden. Und es steigert das Gesetz in dem folgenden Verse noch erst die Möglichkeit der Geringschätzung durch die Annahme, es heirate der Sohn noch neben ihr eine Freie.

כמשפט הבנות, “according to the norms applying to daughters.” Normally, men betroth attractive girls to themselves and marry them, and celebrate the wedding with joy and decor, not like when one takes a lowly maid as a wife.

כמשפט הבנות [HE SHALL DO UNTO HER] AFTER THE MANNER OF DAUGHTERS — who may claim food, clothing and marital duty (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:9:2).

כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, “according to the rights of young women he shall treat her.” A reference to the master’s son. The entitlements of the young women are spelled out as שארה, כסותה, ועונתה, her food, clothing, and marital rights.” She is not to be derived of all or any of her statutory rights. He must, in the event that he does not personally marry her, provide her with the equipment given to Jewish daughters when they are about to marry. These endowments are known as מוהר בתולות. These rights are parallel to the economic stake a master has to give a male servant upon his release from service after the requisite number of years, (usually after 6 years.) All of the above legislation is a demonstration of G’d’s loving concern for the economically underprivileged, whose experience in service was, after all, a result of such under privilege. Nachmanides writes, that according to the plain meaning of the text one may understand the legislation as the employer of the girl who intended her as a bride for his son having to give her a dowry out of his own pocket.

And he will not require another marriage ritual. Meaning that [the son is] just like his father, who does not need another marriage ritual since her purchase money effects the marriage. For if this were not so, the verse should have said: If he has married or taken her for his son, [rather than: “he has designated her”].

The words כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters, apply to both the father (master) and to his son. The verse following will spell out exactly what these obligations are that the master/son assumes when purchasing such a maidservant.

Food, clothing, and marital relations. Meaning that she has the same marital rights as all other bnos Yisrael, in regard to food, clothing and marital relations. Although a husband’s general obligation in these matters is not stated anywhere in the Torah, [as the following verse mentions them only in connection to the Hebrew maidservant], our verse teaches [that these obligations apply to the Jewish maidservant], and consequently [we] learn [that these marital rights apply to all bnos Yisrael as well]. Mechilta

אם אחרת יקח לו IF HE TAKE HIM ANOTHER WIFE — besides her,

לא יגרע, one does not have the right to marry more than one woman unless able to provide for them not at the expense of reducing the first wife’s allowance. (Yevamot 65)

שארה, her provisions (food) as in Micah 3,3ואשר אכלו שאר עמי, “the ones who devoured the flesh of my people.”

שארה, according to Rashi this is a reference to her entitlement to food. According to Nachmanides [who considers the opinion expressed about this as that of a single scholar, not binding, and not halachically accepted as being of such axiomatic nature. Ed.], this line according to the plain meaning refers to conjugal marital rights, the word שאר normally meaning גוף, body, especially when referring to family relations. Nachmanides views the meaning of the word as an expanded version of one’s own personal flesh, i.e. genetically related relations, “blood relations.” We know from Lavan that he said to his nephew Yaakov “אך עצמי ובשרי אתה,” “after all you are my bone and my flesh.” (Genesis 29,14). Flesh that is consumed, eaten, is also called שאר as we know from Psalms 78,27: וימטר עליהם כעפר שאר, “He rained meat on them like dust.” [a quantity of meat as generous as the dust on earth. A reference to the Israelites in the desert, compare Numbers chapter 11. Ed.] The reason why it is called this is that meat has a tendency to attach itself to other food. Blood relations also have a tendency to cling to one another. The description by the Torah of conjugal rights of intimacy by the wife as something anchored in law is therefore quite understandable. Naturally, this right is mutual, the husband being reciprocally entitled to intimacy with his wife’s body.

Whom he had already designated as his wife. Rashi is saying that “not diminish” implies not taking away from what she already had, as it is written in v. 9, “He must grant her exactly the same rights as daughters,” which is speaking before he took a second wife. (Re’m)

V. 10. Es ist dies die einzige Stelle, in welcher das schriftliche Gesetz sich über die Verpflichtung des Mannes gegen die Frau ausspricht. Indem es משפט הבנות, die Eherechte der Töchter seines Volkes grundzüglich andeuten will, greift es das Weib auf der tiefsten sozialen Stufe, das Kind eines Bettlers heraus, das Kind eines Mannes, der bereits sein letztes Hemd veräußert, und, um sich und sein Kind vom Hungertode zu retten, es als Magd verkauft, das als vom Herrn verschmähte, vielleicht bereits misshandelte Magd, Frau des Haussohnes wird, stellt sie neben die aus freiem, begüterten Stande verheiratete Frau, und spricht das große Wort aus: nicht um ein Haarbreit geringer darf jene als diese behandelt werden! מכילתא) הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד)! Das normale משפט הבנות wird hier an einem speziellen, so lehrreich gewählten Falle veranschaulicht. Dadurch ward jenes große, die Rechtsachtung unserer Frauen aussprechende Prinzip Norm in Israel: עולה עמו ואינו יורדת עמו, "die Frau steigt, aber fällt nicht mit dem Manne!" Gleichgültig, ob sie ihm Hunderttausende eingebracht, oder als nacktes Bettlerkind in sein Haus gekommen, hat er sie nach seinem Stande zu behandeln. Wo aber die Lebensgewöhnungen ihres väterlichen Hauses einem höhern sozialen Stande, als der seine, angehören, da hat sie, wenn nicht von vornherein darauf verzichtet, die Fortsetzung ihrer Lebensgewöhnungen zu beanspruchen. "Sie steigt mit ihm, aber sie fällt nicht mit ihm!"

ועונתה, some commentators believe that the root of this word here is עון as in Isaiah 13,22: וענה איים באלמנותיו “ and the wild beasts of the islands shall cry in their desolate palaces.” The letter מ in the word מעון having been replaced similar to the way it has been in the words: מלון, מזון and מדון our verse then would prescribe that the departing female “slave,” be provided by her former master with food, clothing and an abode wherein to set up house.

שארה כסותה וענתה לא יגרע HER FOOD, HER RAIMENT AND THE MARITAL DUTY SHALL HE NOT WITHHOLD — from the maidservant whom he has already designated as his wife.

כסותה, her clothing

כסותה, “her covering,” i.e. bed covers.

Es gibt eine Auffassung der Halacha (ר׳׳ן ,הרב המגיד ,רמב׳׳ן u. a.), nach welcher hier unter שאר nicht die Pflicht der Alimentierung verstanden wird, und מזונות, die Alimentierung der Frau als Rechtspflicht, nur תקנת חכמים ist. Wäre dies der Fall, so hätten wir damit noch ein bedeutsameres Dokument, wie hoch die Frauen in der Achtung unseres Volkes standen. Es hätte dann das Gesetz ebenso wenig für notwendig gefunden, die Verpflichtung des Mannes gegen die Frau in eine Rechtsschuld zu verwandeln, wie es in der Tat die Verpflichtung des Vaters gegen seine Kinder nicht als Rechtspflicht ausgesprochen hat. Die Alimentierung der Kinder als Rechtsschuld ist auch nur תקנת חכמים! Und wie das Gesetz mit aller Beruhigung dem natürlichen Gefühle jüdischer Vaterherzen das Geschick ihrer Kinder anvertraute, so hat es dann auch mit aller Beruhigung der Liebe und Hochachtung jüdischer Männer das Geschick ihrer Frauen anvertraut.

שארה means FOOD;

ועונתה, her accommodation, housing, the word is a derivative of מעון, a residence. The letter מ in the word מעון is similar to the letter מ in the word מקום, “place, site,” or in the word מלון, “inn.” It is not an integral part of the noun. In other words, the rejected bride must be provided food, living quarters and adequate clothing. [all of the above would have been hers automatically if her master had honoured his original undertaking. Ed.]

עונתה, “her entitlement to conjugal relations.” At least after her having ritually immersed herself.

כסותה means what the literal sense of the word is:RAIMENT;

לא יגרע, “he must not diminish.” He must not marry another woman in addition, and thereby reduce this former servant’s status to that of a concubine both in appearance and by her reduced conjugal rights The second wife is not to sit on the bed of the first wife, thereby causing her mental anguish. Any marriage to an additional wife must not be at the expense of the first wife.

ענתה means THE MARITAL DUTY (Ketuvot 47b).

ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה means IF HE DO NOT one of THESE THREE UNTO HER. What are these three? He should designate her to himself as his wife, or to his son, or allow her a deduction from the ransom so that she may go free (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:11:1). This man, however, has neither betrothed her to himself, nor to his son, and she herself does not possess the entire sum paid for her originally that she might buy herself out, therefore shall she go out free without money.

ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, If he fails to do these three things for her, etc. The three are 1) marrying her, שארה; 2) providing her with a clothing allowance, etc., כסותה; 3) maintaining marital relations with her at designated intervals, עונתה; the Torah stresses the word אלה, these, so as to exclude previous conditions such as the need to betrothe her. ויצאה חנם אין כסף, she may leave for nothing without money. Both master and son have lost their authority over this girl; they cannot force her to serve the balance of the six years her father contracted for, or until she displays signs of puberty. Rather the master has to give the girl a document releasing her if he does not decide to consummate the betrothal. The words "without money," mean that there is no need for money to change hands whereas there is a need for a divorce document releasing her as the Torah considered the girl as betrothed to her master ever since her father had sold her. Our sages in the Mechilta add that the words אין כסף also mean that whereas the maidservant does not have to compensate her master financially if he failed to meet the conditions mentioned, she can also gain her freedom by merely attaining the age/or signs of puberty. All of these rulings are of Sinaitic origin, independent of any allusions in the text.

ואם שלש אלה, that he neither wants to marry her himself, nor have her marry his son, nor allow her to buy herself out of her contract,

שלש אלה, “these three,” the three options the Torah provided to the master-employer, 1) to marry her herself; 2) to make her his son’s bride; 3) to release her before her contractual 6 years of service have expired if she showed premature signs of puberty. No compensation for time not served is due her master/employer in such or similar circumstances.

ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, “and if he does not perform these three for her, etc.” If he does not marry her himself, nor give her to his son as a wife or allow her father to release her, as per the word והפדה, then she leaves the employ of her master without having to compensate him for breach of contract and her father cannot prevent her from leaving. If even her father who had the right to sell her has lost his authority over her, her master whose authority over this girl never equaled that of her father most certainly cannot detain her. All of this is contained in the words ויצאה חנם, “she goes out free.” If you were to argue that her master can demand part of his purchase price back from her father, the Torah wrote the word חנם, “without compensation,” to make it clear that the father also does not have to compensate a master who had not honoured his undertaking. If you were to say that her master has to compensate her financially for having disappointed her, the Torah adds the words אין כסף, meaning she has no financial claim on him because he did not marry her. These are the words from which our sages learned in Kidushin 4 that a maidservant acquires her freedom merely by displaying signs of puberty.

If he does none of these three things. . . [Rashi knows this] because if the verse meant doing all three, why does it say, “She goes out free with no repayment of money?” If he designated her as a wife to himself or his son, she needs a divorce document [rather than going out freely]. And if he deducted from her redemption price, she must pay the rest [rather than going out without money]. Alternatively, [Rashi knows this] because doing all three is impossible: it would entail designating her to both himself and his son. (Re’m)

AND IF THESE THREE — designating her to himself as his wife, or to his son, or allowing her to be redeemed — HE DO NOT UNTO HER, then SHALL SHE GO OUT FOR NOTHING, WITHOUT MONEY, as do the menservants mentioned.¹⁰⁹I.e., at the end of six years, or the jubilee year. It is thus in contrast to Verse 7 above: And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as the menservants do. But if the master do not these three things to her [as explained], then she shall go out as the menservants do. See Ramban above at the end of Verse 8 [“The plain meaning of Scripture in this section etc.”]. To this he now adds that if the master fails to do any of the three ways to ameliorate her condition, then she shall go out free for nothing, as menservants do.

V. 11. ואם שלש אלה kann sich unmöglich auf die unmittelbar zuvor genannten drei Ehepflichten des Mannes beziehen, dagegen spricht entschieden der Nachsatz ויצאה חגם וגו׳. Ist sie einmal seine Frau, so kann sie nur durch Scheidebrief von ihm ausgehen, und hätte ja dann auch das חנם אין כסף keinen Sinn, da sie dann ja gar nicht mehr in Dienstpflicht zu ihm gestanden, die etwa erst durch Geld abgelöst werden müsste. Vielmehr bezieht es sich auf die bisher angegebenen drei Eventualitäten, die ihren Dienststand beendigen können: dass der Herr sie heiratet, der Sohn sie heiratet, oder ihre Auslösung bewirkt wird. Geschieht keines von diesen dreien, so geht sie mit Beendigung ihrer Dienstzeit ohne weiteres aus. Sie konnte, wie bereits zu V.7 bemerkt, nur als Minderjährige, קטנה, verkauft werden, und würde auch stillschweigend ihre Dienstpflicht nur haben bis zur vollendeten Volljährigkeit, בוגרות, dauern können, da nur so lange das Dispositionsrecht des Vaters sowohl über die Arbeitskraft als über die Eheeingehung seiner Tochter juridisch dauert, er aber dem Herrn kein größeres und länger dauerndes Anrecht übertragen kann, als ihm selbst zusteht. Mit ויצאה חנם wäre daher die Beendigung ihrer Dienstpflicht bereits selbstverständlich mit Beendigung ihrer juridischen väterlichen Hörigkeit, somit mit ימי בוגרות ausgesprochen. Auf weiter hinaus konnte der Vater in keinem Falle ein Herrenrecht erteilen, da er selbst auf weiter hinaus keins besaß. Nun steht aber noch der Beisatz: אין כסף, es muss daher die Dienstpflicht bei dem Herrn in einem Momente enden, über welchen hinaus sein Recht noch hätte dauern können, in welchem somit eine Entschädigung noch hätte denkbar und dem Gesetze Veranlassung sein können, ausdrücklich zu bemerken, dass gleichwohl die Entschädigung nicht stattfinden solle. Offenbar muss daher ihr Dienst beim Herrn früher als ihr Verhältnis zum Vater, somit in einem Momente zu Ende gehen, über den hinaus der Vater wohl noch Rechte über die Tochter hat, die stillschweigend dem Herrn hätten übertragen werden und für deren Erlass eine Entschädigung denkbar gewesen wäre. Dieser Moment ist aber kein anderer, als der Eintritt der Pubertät, ימי נערות, daher der Satz (Kiduschin 4 a): ויצאה חנם אלו ימי בוגרות אין כסף נערות. Sie geht mit Eintritt der ימי נערות aus dem Dienst, und obgleich dann der Vater noch bis zu ימי בוגרות Rechte über die Tochter hat, die in den Verkauf an den Herrn hätten mit einbegriffen sein können, und daher eine Entschädigung an diesen gerechtfertigt sein dürfte, so negiert doch das Gesetz diesen Anspruch mit: אין כסף, sie geht als נערה aus, und dem Herrn ist doch keine Entschädigung zu zahlen. — Gleichzeitig ist damit noch auf ein zwiefaches hingewiesen. Indem das Gesetz einen Austritt als בוגרת erwähnt, muss derselbe in Praxi möglich sein und findet sich derselbe da, wo der körperlichen Unreife willen, die mit אילונית bezeichnet wird, נערות gar nicht, und die Volljährigkeit, בוגרות, in Folge des Alters eintritt, das Mädchen somit ohne Zwischenstadium von קטנות zu בוגרות übergeht. Und ebenso liegt darin der Satz angebahnt, dass אין כסף לאדון זה ויש כסף לאדון אחר, dass, wenn sie vor בוגרת als נערה aus dem Verhältnis zum Vater durch Eingehung einer Ehe tritt, die Traugabe dem Vater zufällt (siehe Kiduschin 3 b und 4a u. b).

ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, “and if her master had not performed any of the three options offered him by the Torah, etc.” Rashi spells out what these three options were; a) he marries her; b) his son marries her; c) seeing that she cannot release herself, he must give her an unconditional release. The interpretation of the three options do not refer to her enduring upon being married to her former master that her husband marries someone else in addition, less frequent opportunities to marital relations with her husband. Her entitlements to clothing, marital relations are unimpaired. When she leaves her master’s employ (which resulted upon her puberty in his marrying her) she must receive a definite document of divorce to ensure that she can marry without problems.

ואם שלש אלה, “if he fails to provide any of these three items, she will leave his house without paying the master any compensation for leaving his employ before her contract had been completed.” (Ibn Ezra)

ויצאה חנם THEN SHALL SHE GO OUT FOR NOTHING (i. e. without making any payment) — Scripture adds in her case one more way of acquiring freedom than it provides for menservants. What is this additional way of acquiring freedom? This verse teaches you that she goes free also on account of having shown signs of incipient puberty: but she must stay with him until she reaches this stage of incipient puberty. For that she goes free if the termination of the six years happened to come before the signs of incipient puberty we have already learned, since it is said, (Deuteronomy 15:12) ,‘[and if thy brother], an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman [be sold unto thee], and serve thee six years [then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]” (cf. Rashi v. 7). What then must be the meaning of what is stated here, “she shall go out for nothing”? That when the signs of incipient puberty appear before the six years are at end she shall go out on account of them. Or perhaps Scripture states here that she shall go free only when she has reached the intermediate stage of womenhood (בגרות, fuller development after twelve years and a half), if this stage happened to be reached before the termination of the six years! To teach this Scripture states “without money” — which would be superfluous since it has already said “she shall go out חנם” — in order to add as another date of her acquiring freedom the time of her reaching this stage of womanhood. And though it necessarily follows that she goes free an reaching the state of בגרות since her freedom is brought about even by the earlier stage of נערות yet if Scripture had not used both terms (both חנם and אין כסף), I might have said that ויצאה חנם refers to the stage of womanhood; therefore both expressions are used in order to give a disputant no opportunity to offer a different explanation (i. e. Scripture wishes to be quite clear on the point in order to preclude all possibility of misunderstanding) (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:11:3; Kiddushin 4a).

ויצאה חנם אין כסף, the court will declare her free from her contract without her owing the master-employer any compensation for unexpired years of service. Our sages, (Kidushin 4) understood the verse halachically as meaning that she is entitled to leave that employ upon the signs of puberty without reference to the Jubilee year or the expiry of the six years for which her father had contracted her to the employer.

What are the three things. . . [Rashi knows this] because if the three were sustenance, clothing and conjugal rights, she would not go out freely. She would need a divorce document, since he designated her as a wife.

Seeing that the rulings are not dependent on allusions in the text, we are free to see in the text allusions to moral/ethical values, i.e. רמזים. We are basing ourselves on Sotah 42 that when the word איש appears by itself, i.e. without a name, the subject is G'd Himself, such as in Exodus 15,3. Our sages in Shir Hashirim Rabbah chapter 3 have said further that G'd insisted on expressing His fondness of the community of Israel by referring to it as His daughter. We also find that Scripture defines exile of the Jewish people as G'd having sold the Jewish people (compare Kings I 12,9). Inasmuch as the Torah legislated that if one acquires a male Jew as a slave he has to serve six years and no more, the Torah i.e. the Jewish people, is portrayed here as complaining to G'd why if the male Jewish slave should have to serve only six years, a Jewish girl, אמה, may have to serve longer; the Torah says that such a maid-servant will not automatically leave her master's employ after six years as does her male counterpart. In other words: "why has the Jewish people (the daughter) been sold into this long and bitter exile? Why are they not entitled to be treated in accordance with the male Jewish servant described in our chapter?"

Verbrechen und Armut, das sind die beiden Potenzen, die in gewöhnlichen sozialen Kreisen die Achtung der persönlichen Menschenwürde bis auf Null herabzubringen geeignet sind. Einen Verbrecher und ein Kind des Elends hat das Gesetz an den Eingang zu seinem Personenrechte gestellt und hat an ihnen gezeigt, was es unter Achtung der Menschenpersonen verstehe und wie es diese Achtung bis hinab zu den tiefsten Stufen der Gesellschaft gewahrt wissen wolle.

ויצאה חנם, “she will leave for nothing without money” (to her master). This verse speaks of her leaving after having attained the status of נערה, the period between twelve years and a day, and twelve and a half years.

Until she demonstrates signs (of puberty). [Rashi is explaining that] she does not go out immediately upon his failure to do one of these three things.

The Torah (Israel) repeats the argument by saying: "assuming that the girl is רעה, still guilty of the sins that caused her to be exiled in the first place (compare Isaiah 50,1: 'you have been sold on account of your iniquities') in the eyes of her master to whom she has been betrothed," after all she was also G'd's betrothed," as has been spelled out in Song of Songs 4,8? To this question the Torah (G'd) replies that the word לו in אשר לו יעדה, has also been spelled with the letter א, i.e. meaning that there are times when Israel does not qualify as G'd's betrothed. Israel is portrayed as countering that as long as it is in exile under the dominance of alien masters והפדה, she is deserving of release, seeing that her shortcomings are not even recognisable while she languishes under alien masters, בעיני אדוניה. Israel argues that her inadeqacies could come to light only if she would be redeemed and still fail to demonstrate her true repentance. As long as her erstwhile master has not redeemed her she could not do proper repentance. G'd replies that Israel was sold because it did not remain true to her master (G'd) while it lived in peace and unmolested, at a time when no alien ruler dominated her.

Es folgen nun Sätze aus dem Personenrechte VV. 12 —32; und zwar VV. 12 bis 17 Verbrechen gegen das Leben und dem Leben gleichgeachtete Beziehungen, VV. 18. bis 26 Verbrechen gegen die Körperintegrität, Verletzungen und Gesundheitsschädigungen, VV. 27. — 32 Körperverletzungen und Tötung durch Tiere.

The additional words: אין כסף, “without money changing hands,” apply to a situation in which she has attained the status of בגרות, biological maturity, i.e. over twelve and a half years of age. (Talmud, tractate Kiddushin folio 4) The reason this had to be added is that if the Torah had not written this, we would have assumed that already the words ויצאה חנם apply to her having this status, which would have been a simple assumption to make. In the event that you the reader would raise the question that seeing that this girl is legally entitled to leave the employ of her master already when having attained the status of נערה, why would the Torah have to add anything further, the answer to this question given by the Talmud we quoted, is that if she had displayed symptoms of being unable to bear children, i.e. she never displayed the symptoms attesting to the fact that she had matured biologically, in which case the Torah rules that when she attains the age of twelve and a half she must be given her freedom regardless of any other considerations.

ויצאה חנם, “she will leave, with the consent of the court;” the Torah here does not specify a particular point in time, but does so at a later time in Deuteronomy 15,12, where we read: כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים, “when your brother the Hebrew is forced to sell himself to you or your sister a female Hebrew, he/she is to serve (work for) you for six years.” אין כסף, “if she falls sick at the end of her six years and is unable to leave, and her master supplies her with food, she need not compensate him for this. (Based on Torah shleymah by Rabbi Menachem Kasher Mishpatim, quoting Jerusalem Talmud, item 230 on our verse.) According to the simple meaning of the text, the words: אין כסף which are superfluous after the word חנם, “without compensation,” are a way of underlining the statement, just as the statement מת את ולא תחיה, “you are dead and will not live.”

Israel tries again by saying that if G'd did not want her as His bride, at least He ought to treat her as His son, seeing that there are numerous occasions in the Bible when the Jewish people are described as G'd's sons when compared to the other nations. Those nations are fully aware that the Jewish people enjoy a special relationship with G'd, even their very name reflecting this. If Israel still enjoyed a special relationship with G'd, at least it should not be treated worse than any other nation, something that unfortunately is evident to everyone following the history of the fate of the Jews. It should be enough punishment that the Jewish people are no longer superior to the other nations. G'd replies to this argument by saying Israel will be treated according to משפט הבנות, the laws applying to daughters. They are called daughters even if they do not qualify as being called G'd's daughter. To this Israel replies אם אחרת יקח לו, "if He takes another in her place," the daughter in question must still not be denied her statutory rights, i.e. שארה, כסותה, עונתה. The Zohar volume 2 page 152 writes that when the destruction of the Temple occurred all the sources which normally supplied Israel with G'd's bounty were turned in a different direction so that this bounty was directed at the other nations. Whereas previously the sacred sites were recipients of this bounty, now the situation was reversed and all this Divine bounty was poured out in unholy places. Israel is depicted as requesting that G'd at least not direct all His bounty to other nations. Even if G'd were to grant most of His bounty to the other nations because He still considers Israel's sins as unexpiated, at least He should not deny her her statutory rights such as שארה, etc. In this instance the meaning of שארה would be her sustenance as per the opinion of Rabbi Aushiyah in the Mechilta. כסותה would refer to her clothing requirements, and עונתה in this instance would refer to G'd answering Israel's prayers when it is in difficulties. [from the word עונה answer, Ed.]

Israel asks how could it possibly continue to exist without these necessities? Israel adds, ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, "If G'd were unwilling to grant her even those three necessities," at least He should let her go free, ויצאה חנם, without having to make a payment for such freedom, i.e. it should be released from the undertaking to perform G'd's commandments. The words אין כסף mean that Israel claims that her payment in terms of afflictions is adequate already.

Since we are already indulging moral allusions contained in this passage, here is another possible approach. When the Torah speaks of "a man selling his daughter," the subject is G'd; He is selling His holy nation, Israel, to be a maidservant; seeing that various exiles the Jewish people have found themselves in, such as the exile in Egypt and the exile in Babylon, have not produced the desired rehabilitation of the people, the reason may have been due to Israel having been enslaved to a single nation in each instance. As long as we were a single unit, even while in exile, we never became reduced to the status of אמה, a lowly maidservant. In this present exile when we are scattered amongst all the nations wherever Jews are to be found they are looked down upn, are in disgrace, so much so that even if the redemption would occur tomorrow we have already acquired the title אמה, maidservant. This is why G'd has given us the assurance that the redemption of this nation will not be similar to what it has been in the past, i.e. the word העבדים is a reference to Exodus 20,2 where the Torah spoke about Egypt being בית העבדים, a house of bondage. The difference between the redemption then and the redemption to come is that at that time G'd only had to orchestrate the redemption of a people from one single country as distinct from what will happen in the future. The miracles which will be performed at that future redemption will eclipse the ones performed when the Israelites left Egypt. When the final redemption will occur the rulers of all the nations will prostrate themselves before Israel as predicted in Isaiah 49,23.

The Torah goes on to say אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, which we have to understand in light of a statement in the Zohar that if the redemption would occur as a result of Israel's good deeds as compared to the redemption which will occur because G'd's timetable has run out. If the redemption ocurs because of the former situation, an angel of G'd whose feet are planted on earth and whose head is in Heaven will become visible. If, however, the redemption will occur only because G'd cannot defer it any longer, the redeemer will arrive as a poor man riding on the lowly ass as described in Zachariah 9,9. G'd assures Israel that even if it is still unworthy when the time comes for redemption, רעה בעיני אדויה, in the eyes of her Master, ולא יעדה, and not deserving of redemption (לא spelled with an א), He will release her, והפדה. He will not continue to let her languish amidst עם נכרי, an alien people, although the nature of that redemption would not match the type of redemption which would occur if the people were worthy of it. At any rate, the "sale" of Israel is not something permanent and irreversible. Job 28,3 expresses this redemption as "He has set an end to darkness."

The Torah continues and describes a redemption as the result of Israel's having returned to G'd as a penitent sinner; אם לבנו ייעדנה, if they are deserving to be called בנים, "sons," a state attained when they observe G'd's commandments (compare Baba Batra 22), then כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, G'd will deal with them according to the laws of the daughters. Their holy souls, also known as בנות ירושלים, will be the recipients of all the promises we find spelled out concerning that period throughout the Books of the Prophets. Those Jews still alive at that time will experience the brilliant light with which G'd will then illuminate the universe. They will all be able to point to G'd by saying זה אלי ואנוהו, "This is my G'd, let me glorify Him."

The words אם אחרת יקח לו in verse 10 describe G'd's promise that regardless of whether Israel is evil so that G'd has sold it in favour of someone else receiving His bounty, or whether it is good so that it qualifies for the status of "son," it will not forfeit the three basics, שאר כסות ועונה. Should it not receive these either, i.e. that the afflictions during exile will be too great, then ויצאה חנם אין כסף. G'd will consider these afflictions as payment for the redemption and Israel will experience the coming of the Messiah even before the final date G'd has set aside in His timetable for that event.

מכה איש ומת WHOSOEVER SMITETH A MAN SO THAT HE DIE [SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH] — Many apparently redundant verses have been written in various sections of the Torah dealing with murderers and I shall explain to the best of my ability why all these statements have been made.

מכה איש ומת, He who strikes a man and he dies as result, etc. This means that death need not occur immediately, such as when one slaughters or chokes someone to death. The striker is culpable even if death is delayed but occurs directly as a result of his blow. The only exception to this rule is if the stricken person had recovered sufficiently to be able to stand on his feet and leave his home unassisted (verse 19). The new element in this legislation is that if the striker had struck the victim unintentionally he is not obliged to flee to a city of refuge unless death occurred as an immediate result of the blow (compare Gittin 70). The Talmud states there specifically that if the victim had vital parts such as most of the windpipe and the gullet severed the killer is not consigned to the city of refuge as we consider the possibility that his victim did not die immediately, or contributed to his accelerated death by making a wrong move. Tossaphot comment that this rule applies only in the case of an involuntary killing. They derive this from Numbers 35,23: ויפל עליו וימות, "he cast it upon him whereupon he died." This means that death did not follow immediately. Although a person who has done this intentionally will be considered guilty of murder even if the victim did not die immediately, we distinguish between the laws of confinement to a city of refuge and the laws dealing with murder. This corresponds precisely to what we wrote that our verse deals with someone who attacked someone else intentionally. If the Torah wanted to include unintentional killing it would have had to write הורג איש instead of מכה איש. As it is, even if the attacker set out to kill now but death occurred only several days later, the death penalty applies. Concerning unintentional killing, the Torah speaks of והאלוקים אנה לידו, "and G'd caused it to happen by his hand;" this means that death occurred by means of the hand of the killer himself, not a delayed effect. You will find this confirmed by Maimonides' ruling in chapter five of his Hilchot Rotzeach. Rabbi Shlomo Aderet, who frequently disagrees with Maimonides, disagrees in this instance also. I find his reasoning quite unacceptable. This is not the place to evaluate the finer points of their dispute, however.

מכה איש ומת, “if one strikes a man with fatal results, etc.” According to our sages the conceptual linkage between these apparently unrelated subjects is that when a capital punishment is imposed on someone for a crime normally involving compensatory financial damages, the sinner does not also have to pay financial compensation to his victim. The repetition of the words מות יומת implies that with his judicial death he has paid for all his crimes.

מכה איש ומת מות יומת, “if someone strikes a man and he dies as a result the striker shall be executed.” Having concluded the legislation concerning Jewish servants, a subject conceptually linked to the first commandment on the first Tablet, the Torah returns to the first commandment on the second of the Tablets, the law about murder. Seeing that in the Ten Commandments the prohibition was spelled out without the penalty for transgressing it, the Torah now announces the penalty for murder. The verse speaks of an intentional, at least potentially lethal attack.

Which does not cause death. The Re’m asks: How could [Rashi suggest that] he might be put to death for a blow which does not cause death? [On the contrary,] it is written (v. 19) that if the victim does not die, the law is: “the one who struck him be acquitted, still he must pay for his loss of work, and must pay for his complete cure.” The Re’m left this unanswered. An answer is: We would think it is like striking one’s father or mother, for which one is put to death for striking them, even without killing them. And the difference would be that for parents, one is liable even without making a wound, but for others, only with a wound. Although it is written (v. 25): “a wound for a wound,” [teaching that for making a wound, one pays damages but is not put to death], and Rashi explains there: “A wound that draws blood,” [thus we see that for making even a significant wound, one is not liable for death]. But [we could explain that] that verse applies only if one struck unintentionally. Whereas if intentionally, one would be liable for the death penalty. And when it is written (v. 13): “But Hashem brought it to his hand,” teaching that for striking unintentionally, he is liable for exile [but not for paying damages], this applies when he had intent to strike one person but in fact struck another. Whereas without any intent to strike, he is not liable for exile [and must pay damages]. And when it says (v. 18—19) that if the victim “does not die”, [thus one pays damages], we could say that this applies to striking in a way that cannot kill, i.e., there was no wound at all. (Kitzur Mizrachi) Another answer is: We would think that if he does not agree to pay damages [for striking without killing], then he is put to death — as it is said in Maseches Sanhedrin (15b) concerning kofer [the atonement fine for when one’s ox kills a man]. And this answers all Re’m’s questions.

V. 12. Leben, als alle übrigen mit dem hieniedigen Dasein verbundene Güter involvierende Bedingung, steht obenan. Der Satz מכה איש ומת wird durch einen andern Satz: איש כי יכה כל נפש אדם: (Wajikra 24, 17) ergänzt; durch beide zusammen wird erst der gesetzliche Begriff des Täters, der Tat und des Objektes genauer präzisiert. Das in מכה ganz allgemein gelassene Subjekt erhält durch איש die Bedingung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit zum Ausschluss der קטנים, und das in איש zu beschränkt gefasste Merkmal des Geschlechtes wird durch מכה beseitigt und damit auch das weibliche Geschlecht inbegriffen. Der durch איש beschränkte Begriff des Objekts wird durch נפש אדם auch auf Frauen und Kinder ausgedehnt, und bleibt durch איש nur auf die Bedingung der Lebensfähigkeit mit Ausschluss von נפל etc. beschränkt. Endlich wird der durch כי יכה zu weite Begriff der Tat durch unsere Beifügung ומת auf einen absolut tödlichen Schlag beschränkt. Es heißt aber nicht הורג איש, sondern es wird der Schlag und dessen Folge getrennt aufgeführt, weil es nicht notwendig ist, dass der Tod unmittelbar darauf gefolgt, wohl aber, dass er als absolut notwendige Folge des Schlages zu beurteilen sein müsse, wenn die Todesstrafe darauf erfolgen soll.

מכה איש, “if someone strikes an adult male, etc;” Rashi compares this verse with a similar verse in Leviticus 24,17, reading איש כי יכה, “when an adult male strikes someone,” explaining that both verses are necessary. Verse 14 here, commencing with “if someone deliberately strikes some with intent to kill, but tries to make it look as if it was unintentional,” is also needed as explained by Rashi on that verse, i.e. that unless it had been written, I would have thought that penalties are in place only when the aggression was deliberate with intent to harm or kill. Without our verse one could have thought that killing a woman or injuring her, or doing so to a hermaphrodite would not be punishable, or would be punishable less severely. Rashi explains all this on verse 16 in our chapter.

מכה איש ומת, “if someone strikes a man and he dies as a result;” Rashi explains this as being based on Leviticus 24,17: ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות ימות, “if a man strikes a lethal blow on another human being it is a capital offence and the attacker will be subject to execution.” If you were to ask: “where did we ever hear that if a person strikes another and he does not die as a result, that he is still subject to execution? After all, even if he did cause his victim to lose a limb, he is only liable for monetary compensation? Some commentators have provided what is a very forced answer by saying that if the injury to the victim of the blow is such that he will die within 12 months that the attacker will be subject to the death penalty. Alternately, the verse could have meant that death resulted from a blow with an instrument not meant to cause death. Since we could have thought that he would still be guilty of the death penalty as it is the result that counts, the Torah had to write that unless the weapon used was of a kind that is used as a lethal weapon the killer is not liable to the death penalty.

מכה איש ומת WHOSOEVER SMITETH A MAN SO THAT HE DIE — Why is this said (how does the particular form of words used here tell us some point of law which is not contained in another text bearing upon the same subject)? Since it is said, (Leviticus 24:17) “And the man that smiteth (יכה) any person (more lit., the soul of any human being) [shall surely be put to death]”, I might have inferred that mere smiting without resultant death is subject to the death penalty. Scripture therefore states here, “Whosoever smiteth a man so that he die [shall surely be put to death]”, thus telling you that he is not punishable with death unless the stroke proves fatal. On the other hand if it had stated here, “Whosoever smiteth a man…” and it had not said there “If a man smiteth [any person]”, I might have inferred that the murderer is not guilty except if he killed “a man”; whence, however, could I know that he is subject to the death penalty if he killed a woman or a minor? Therefore Scripture states “And if [a man] smiteth any person”, thus including even a minor and a woman. Then again: if it had stated only, “Whosoever smiteth a man” I might have inferred that even a minor who smote and killed a person is punishable with death. Scripture therefore states “and if a man smiteth” — a man but not a minor. Then on the other hand, so far as concerns the statement “And if [a man] smiteth the soul of any man” it might be held that even premature births at a term of eight months are included in the term כל נפש אדם “soul of any man”, Scripture therefore states “Whosoever smiteth a man” to intimate that one is not subject to the death penalty unless he kills a viable child — one which is fitted to become a man (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:12:2).

I might have inferred that mere smiting without resultant death [is subject to the death penalty]: It is a wonder how it could come to one's mind that he would be killed for hitting without [killing] - and behold, it is written (verses 18-19), "and he struck his neighbor with a stone... and he did not die, and the one who struck is cleared, yet he must give his rest, etc." And Rashi himself wrote there, s.v. "And the one who struck is cleared," "And would it come to one's mind that this one who did not kill would be killed?"

Even were a minor to strike a blow and kill he would be liable. The Re’m asks: [Why does Rashi say that a minor might be liable?] Where do we ever find the Torah punishing a minor? The Gemara (Sanhedrin 68b) raises a similar question concerning the ben sorer umoreh, and answers: “Did you think that a ben sorer umoreh is killed for his sin? He is killed only because of what he will do in the end!” There, the Gemara says that even a minor might be liable. But here, how could we say such a thing? The Nachalas Yaakov answers: Since it is written, “If one strikes a man,” [implying any striker at all,] we might think it includes that even a minor is subject to the death penalty, although generally a minor is exempt from all mitzvos. Therefore we need “And if a man strikes,” to exclude a minor. This question and its answer are relevant to all the cases following as well.

מות יומת, he shall surely be put to death. The reason the Torah repeats this word as well as in such instances as someone either cursing or killing his father or mother, and someone guilty of kidnapping, needs to be analysed. Remember that it is the prerogative of G'd, the judge of the whole universe, to kill perpetrators of evil. However, instead of doing so personally, G'd has assigned judges of flesh and blood to judge part of the crimes for which people deserve to be killed. These judges are to hand down death sentences for crimes/sins listed in the Torah as carrying the death penalty. In some instances G'd has revealed why certain crimes carry the death penalty, i.e. one to be administered here on earth, while in other instances He has reserved the right to execute the guilty party Himself in His own good time. In all instances where the Torah speaks about the penalty being כרת, such as a husband who has marital relations with his wife while the latter is menstruating, G'd himself is the executioner. Ketuvot 30 informs us that the fact that nowadays we do not have a court authorised to impose and carry out the death penalty, does not mean that the party guilty of a sin for which the Torah legislates the death penalty will go unpunished. In the case of an ox which has gored a human being (the owner having been negligent), the Torah states that the owner should be executed in addition to his ox although such a law is not enforced by a human tribunal (Mechilta) but only by Heaven. Our sages in Baba Metzia 31 elaborated further on this subject.

The reason why this paragraph follows closely after the paragraph dealing with how to treat a slave, is because most masters are in the habit of hitting slaves when they do not perform their duties diligently. The expression: מות יומת “he must certainly be executed,”by decree of the court, is meant to exclude the legislation applicable to a gentile slave

Even a baby that cannot live would be included. The Re’m says that this interpretation [saying that one is liable for killing a viable child] was received by Chazal as an oral tradition. Otherwise, we could say that “If one strikes a man” exempts killing a minor, and “any human being” makes one liable for killing an [adult who is a] woman, one whose gender is indistinguishable, or a hermaphrodite. The same applies to Chazal’s interpretation that the verse “If a man should strike” (Vayikra 24:17) makes one liable only for a blow that kills. Otherwise we could expound the opposite: since it says in our verse, “If one strikes a man and he dies,” this means only for a blow that kills. Therefore the verse in Vayikra says, “If a man should strike,” teaching that even for a blow that does not cause death, [still he would be liable]. The Re’m explained at length. However, it is difficult [how can Rashi suggest that one might be liable for the death penalty for killing even a baby that cannot live]. If so, when would one be liable merely to pay damages for killing a fetus [see v. 22]? An answer is: damages would apply when one had no intent to injure the fetus. This is similar to what Rebbi said (Sanhedrin 79a), that “A life for a life” (v. 23) means merely to pay money [when the striker intended to kill a certain person but actually killed another). Another answer is: One would be subject to the death penalty for killing an unviable baby that was already born, whereas before its birth, one would not be liable [to the death penalty, only to pay damages]. (Tosafos, Sanhedrin 84b)

ואשר לא צדה AND IF A MAN LIE NOT IN WAIT — i. e. if he did not lie in ambush for him (the person whom he killed), nor did he premeditate the blow (Makkot 7b).

והאלוקים אנה לידו, this was not a death caused intentionally by the killer, but we know that there operates a principle in this world known as מגלגלין חובה על ידי חייב, “G’d arranges matters so that the guilty party being punished will be punished by someone himself guilty of something else.” This is what Solomon referred to in Proverbs 16,4 וגם רשע ליום רעה, “even the wicked for the day of evil.” [to the question if everything has a purpose in this world, what is the function of the wicked? Solomon answers that the wicked is used by G’d to administer punishment to those who deserve it. Ed.]

ואשר לא צדה והאלוקים אנה לידו, If a man did not lie in wait but G'd caused it to happen to him, etc. Why did the Torah say the same thing in different words, i.e. "he did not plan it," and: "G'd caused it to happen?" Besides, why would G'd deliberately cause a person to become an involuntary murderer? Makkot 10 as well as the Mechilta dealing with the laws of the city of refuge and who has to go there, explain that the Torah speaks about wicked people who will become the instrument of performing evil deeds (compare Samuel I 24,14). They illustrate their meaning by the following example. Two people, one an intentional murderer, the other an unintentional killer, meet. There had not been any witnesses to either killing. The unintentional killer was in the process of descending from a ladder; he fell and hit the murderer who sat under the ladder with fatal consequences. The person descending the ladder has to go to a city of refuge. (If the same accident occurred while the unintentional killer was ascending the ladder, he would not have to go to the city of refuge). The intentional sinner was killed by the unintentional sinner. Thus far the Mechilta. This does not seem very satisfactory. True, the intentional murderer winds up getting his just deserts, the unintentional killer, however, has by now committed two killings and has to atone for only one killing while he is in the city of refuge. If we were to argue that he is altogether innocent concerning the instance when G'd made him fall off the ladder, then we must assume that the falling off the ladder was not an act of G'd and as a result the death of the person under the ladder was not the punishment due him as he was not guilty. Had he really been guilty then the fall off the ladder would have to be considered under the heading of "a deliberate act of G'd." This seems a very forced explanation as the Torah describes the example of an unintentional killing as unrelated to Divine interference (Numbers 35,15). The Torah did not distinguish between different categories of such unintentional killings as did the Mechilta.

ואשר לא צדה, the word צדה is used here in the same sense as in Numbers 35,20 בצדיה, or in Samuel I 24,12 ואתה צודה את נפשי, “yet you are bent on taking my life.” The word describes lying in ambush in order to kill one’s victim, not necessarily running after him.

Like its Targum, “And he did not ambush him.” Since the Targum translates וארב לו (Devarim 19:11) as: וכמן ליה , and the Targum translated the same on our verse, which says צדה , this proves that our verse, too, means: “He did not ambush him.”

V. 13. צדה: seine Richtung auf etwas nehmen, irgendwohin zielen, ואתה צדֶה את נפשי לקחתה (Sam. I. 24, 12), du zielst auf mein Leben. Daher passiv: נצדו עריהם מבלי איש (Zeph. 3, 6): die Städte sind jedem auf sie Zielenden preisgegeben, sie sind offen, leer, es kann sie jeder nehmen. Sehr wahrscheinlich ist damit auch שָׂדֶה, verwandt, als das natürlich (ש) Offene, Freie, jedem Zugängliche. Wohl auch davon שׁדה wovon: שׁד, die Mutterbrust, als das sich zuvorkommend Darbietende. Es heißt nun hier אשר לא צדה: er hat nicht in die Richtung des Getroffenen werfen wollen; פרט לנתכוין לזרוק שתים וזרק ארבע wird es Baba Kama 26 b erläutert. Hier, so wie durch die Bamidbar 35 u. Dewarim 19 gegebenen näheren Bestimmungen, insbesondere durch das an letzterer Stelle V. 5 gegebene spezielle Beispiel, wird nämlich die Fluchtauswanderung für den unvorsätzlichen Totschlag genau nach beiden Seiten dahin präzisiert, dass die Tat ebenso weit von leichtsinniger Unvorsichtigkeit als von unvorherzusehender Zufälligkeit ferne sein müsse, sie darf nicht קרוב למזיד und nicht קרוב לאונס sein; in dem ersten Falle ist die Schuld zu groß, als dass sie mit der Verbannung in eine Zufluchtsstätte gesühnt werden könnte, in dem zweiten Falle zu klein, als dass sie einer solchen Sühne bedürfte. Würfe z. B. jemand einen Stein in die Richtung eines vier Ellen entfernt stehenden Menschen mit der Absicht, ihn nur zwei Ellen weit zu werfen, der Stein aber fliegt weiter und trifft den Menschen, so ist dies eine leichtsinnige Unvorsichtigkeit, die nicht durch גלות gesühnt werden kann, es ist קרוב למזיד; ein solcher Fall wird hier durch die Bestimmung אשר לא צדה ausgeschlossen. Wollte er aber in entgegengesetzter Richtung werfen und durch einen nicht vorherzusehenden Umstand fliegt der Stein in die Richtung des Menschen und trifft ihn, מתכוין לצד זה והלכה לה לצד אחר so ist er wiederum nicht חייב גלות, es ist קרוב לאונם, die Schuld ist zu klein, als dass sie dieser Sühne bedürfte, und ist dieser Fall durch die Bestimmung בלא צדיה (Bamidbar. 35, 22) ausgeschlossen (Makkoth 7 b). Es darf nur die Absicht gefehlt haben, allein es muss eine gewissenhafte Überlegung die Möglichkeit, wenn auch nicht die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Gefährdung haben voraussetzen können. Z. B. der spezialisierte Fall des Abfliegens des Beils beim Holzfällen. Demgemäß scheint denn auch hier der Ausdruck והאלקי׳ אנה לידו die Begrenzung des Begriffs nach der andern Seite zu enthalten. Es heißt nicht והאלקי׳ אנה אותו, Gott hat es gefügt, dies würde eine völlige Schuldlosigkeit אונם und קרוב לאונם involvieren. Vielmehr אנה לידו, seine יד, seine Tätigkeit bildet einen Hauptfaktor in der Urheberschaft des Ereignisses, allein sie war nicht der alleinige Faktor, es lag in ihr die Möglichkeit der Gefährdung und göttliche Fügung hat sie zur Wirklichkeit werden lassen. אשר לא צדה schlösse somit האלקי׳ אנה לידו ,קרוב למזיד auch קרוב לאונס aus.

והאלוקים אנה לידו, “and it was a result of divine will;” in other words, the person becomes guilty of death at the hands of heaven. Rashi on this verse understands it as referring to an inadvertent killing, which was the result of inadequate precautions being taken by the person who caused it. He interprets it as a demonstration of the verse: מרשעים יצא רשע, “wicked people will cause wicked acts.” What is meant is that if someone has committed a serious sin unobserved and intentionally, so that he could not be brought to trial, providence sees to it that he will have to atone for this by committing unintentional death of an apparently innocent person. The example quoted is that the “sinner” was ascending a ladder, a rung of which broke and caused him to hit someone standing nearby in his fall. On our verse, Rashi comments: “this refers to unintentional killing.” He interprets the verse from Samuel I 24,13, by providing an illustration. The person sitting under the ladder had once killed intentionally, whereas the person falling from the ladder had once killed unintentionally when there were no witnesses who would have forced him to take refuge in the city set aside for such situation. Now, through divine intervention, both had received their penalties, each appropriate to his sin. Alternately, the scenario should be as follows: the party who had previously committed deliberate murder, fell onto someone holding a knife in his hand at the time. If we would not explain the verse in this manner, the person who had been guilty of execution by the sword would not have died by the proper type of execution, i.e. the sword. The example quoted also teaches that a person cannot become guilty having to go to the city of refuge twice. The reason is that once you have killed someone if in the process you have killed someone also unintentionally, you are penalised only for the more serious crime.

צדה is a term denoting “lying in wait”; similarly it says, (I Samuel 24:12) “yet thou liest in wait (צדה) for my soul to take it”. It is, however, not correct to say that צדה is of the same derivation as, (Genesis 27:34) הצד ציד “he that hath hunted (הצד) venison”, for a ה has no place in the verbal forms of the term denoting “hunting beasts”. Then again, the noun form of the latter is צַיִד and that of the former צְדִיָה, whilst the participle of the verb “lying in wait” is צוֹדֶה and that of the other is צָד. I therefore say that its meaning is as the Targum gives it: “and if he did not lie in ambush for him”. Menachem ben Seruk placed it in the same section as הצד ציד (i. e. he held that the root is צד and that it has the meaning of “hunting”), but I do not agree with him. If it is to be placed in one of the sections of צד we had better place it in the same section as, (Isaiah 66:12) על צד תנשאו “ye shall be borne upon her side (צד)” and (I Samuel 20:20) “and I will shoot [three arrows] on the side thereof (צדה)”, and (Daniel 7:25) “and he shall speak towards the side of (against) the Most High”. Thus, here, the words אשד לא צדה could be taken to mean, “he did not turn aside (צִדֵּד)” to seek some side (occasion) for killing him. But there are objections even to this explanation. At any rate, even if it be connected with צד in this sense, it would still have the meaning “lying in wait”.

ושמתי לך מקום אשר ינוס, to atone for his guilt by being exiled from his home.

אנה לידו, the Torah describes someone who had already been guilty of death but who could not be legally executed, now being killed inadvertently by someone else whom he did not even know. This is what we call מיתה בידי שמים, “death at the instigation of heaven.”

And falls upon the one. . . This means he already went up, and is falling upon the one below as he is going down the ladder — and not as he is going up, since in such a case he would not be exiled (Makkos 7b). Rashi here mentioned going up the ladder only because he could not fall while going down unless he first went up. (Re’m)

The correct explanation is that the person who was originally killed by the unintentional killer had been a deliberate murderer also. G'd could have caused some weight to fall upon such a murderer without involving the unintentional killer at all. He used the unintentional killer as His tool in order to "kill two birds with one stone." The unintentional killer who has now become G'd's tool i.e. ואנה לידו, is guilty of exile in the city of refuge only for the first time he killed unintentionally. Even if he had killed ten people as a result of his fall from the ladder, he would only be liable for exile for the original killing. The penalty of exile is related to the cause, not to the number of killings committed by the person. G'd will not arrange for this unintentional killer to become involved in a second killing in order to be exiled again. As a result of this consideration you will observe that not all unintentional killers are measured by the same yardstick. [This is nothing new since all the killers in the city of refuge go free at the same time, at the time the High Priest dies, regardless of when the people exiled there committed the killing. Ed.] We now understand the Talmud who attributed the fall off the ladder to a previous undetected and unintentional killing by the person suffering the fall. The sages simply selected an example in which both parties were equally guilt-ridden. The true scholar will understand the mystical aspect behind all this.

Die Ähnlichkeit der Strafe des unvorsichtigen Totschlägers mit der über den ersten Totschläger verhängten Strafe des נע ונד haben wir schon zu Bereschit 4, 12 berührt.

ושמתי לך מקום, “I set aside for you a special place;” this commandment would not become effective until the people took up residence in their homeland. It is a hint of the cities of refuge to be legislated and introduced still during Moses’ lifetime.

והאלהים אנה לידו means, BUT GOD GOT IT READY FOR HIS HAND. It has the same meaning as this root has in, (Psalms 91:10) “No evil shall be got ready (תאנה) for thee”; (Proverbs 12:21) “There shall no evil be got ready (תאנה) for the just”; (2 Kings 5:7) “he gets himself ready (מתאנה) for me”, i. e. he gets himself ready to discover some occasion against me.

ושמתי לך מקום, once you will have cities wherein to dwell. The reason the Torah spoke about this already at this time is because it had already legislated the prohibition of murder in the Ten Commandments as well as the need to honour one’s parents. This is why also penalties for violation of these commandments have to be legislated in this portion. The penalty for kidnapping is also spelled out here, seeing the Torah had prohibited stealing as part of the Ten Commandments. Our sages said that the “do not steal” in the Ten Commandments refers to kidnapping and is punishable by legal execution (Sanhedrin 86). We note that at this juncture the Torah discusses a number of crimes or sins punishable by death.

ושמתי לך מקום, “I shall provide a place for you.” This means that even in the desert a special place will be set aside for such unintentional killers to find refuge from a potential avenger who is a blood relation of the victim. The “place” in question was the area in which the Levites had their tents (Makkot 12). I believe that the reason the Torah wrote the word לך, “for you,” something quite unusual, is to hint that Moses, a Levite, had himself been guilty of killing someone.

The one who killed accidentally is exiled. You might ask: But he still is not being punished for his first accidental killing? The answer is: he killed someone who was already considered “dead,” [as the person he fell upon was liable for death]. And it is known before Hashem that he need not be exiled for this [second accidental killing], only we do not know this. [Thus, the court rules that he must be exiled — ostensibly for the second killing, but Hashem knows that it is for the first.]

It is also possible that the Torah felt that the person who was guilty of involuntary manslaughter and should have volunteered for exile in the city of refuge but had neglected to do so is now being punished for this by becoming the cause of another death. As a result he ought to spend two periods of exile in such a city of refuge. In order to enable him to expiate his guilt the Torah legislated that his stay in the city of refuge is limited; once the High Priest dies, his first exile has been completed. G'd reserves the right to determine when the High Priest should die and thereby to determine how many years such a person guilty of two unintentional killings must spend in exile altogether. While this explanation covers the words: "if G'd made it happen, etc," it still does not explain the conjunctive letter ו before the word אלוקים.

והאלהים אנה לידו BUT GOD GOT IT READY FOR HIS HAND — But why should this go forth from Him (be brought about by God)? This is just what David tells us: (I Samuel 24:13) “As says the proverb of the ancient (הקדמני) “Wickedness proceededeth from the wicked”. — “The proverb of the קדמני” is the Torah, the maxim of God, Who it the “Ancient” (Whose existence preceded that) of the world. But where indeed does the Torah say, “Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked”? It says it implicitly in the verse: “But God got it ready for his hand”. For what is Scripture here speaking about? About two men, one of whom killed a person with premeditation and the other killed inadvertently, and in neither case were there witnesses to the deed who could testify about it. Consequently, the former was not put to death and the latter was not forced into banishment to a city of refuge (cf. Numbers 35:11). Now God brings them together at the same inn. He who killed with premeditation happens to sit beneath a ladder, and the other who killed inadvertently ascends the ladder and falls, when descending it, upon the man who killed with premeditation and kills him. Witnesses now being present they testify against him, so compelling him to be banished to one of the cities of refuge. The result is that he who killed inadvertently is actually banished and he who killed with premeditation actually suffers death (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:13:1 and Makkot 10b).

And the one who killed with premeditation is killed. We must say that he had a sword in his hand when he fell and killed him. Otherwise, the premeditated murderer would not be killed by the sword, which is the type of death for which he is liable as he is liable for. For if the person simply fell on him, it is like [death by] stoning.

I believe the Torah was being very specific in legislating the rules pertaining to exile in the city of refuge as related by Maimonides chapter 6 of Hilchot Rotzeach. He states that the only person who has to go to the city of refuge is one who has committed involuntary manslaughter which resulted from lack of precautions plus public knowledge that the killer did not harbour malevolent thoughts against the victim. If, however, a fatal accident could not have been foreseen and the killer had no reason to hate the victim, it is an accident and the killer does not have to go to the city of refuge. These two aspects are covered by 1) והאלוקים אנה לידו, "it was an act of G'd," or 2) אשר לא צדה, "he did not ambush the victim," (but also took no precautions to preclude an accident). If the killer had either entertained hateful thoughts against the victim or had taken precautions against any accidents there is no case for exile. In the latter case the killer is totally exonerated, in the former case there is an assumption of evil intent and taking refuge in a city of refuge is not the answer.

ושמתי לך מקום AND I WILL APPOINT THEE A PLACE — in the wilderness also — WHITHER HE SHALL FLEE — Which was the place that offered him an asylum? The camp of the Levites (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:13:2; Makkot 12b).

It was the camp of the Levites. Since [Hashem speaks to Moshe in this verse and says:] “I will designate for you a place,” it means that the place will be in your camp. And Moshe was a Levite. Thus, the place designated is in the wilderness, and in the Levite camp. For in the wilderness, Moshe’s camp gave refuge.

וכי יזד AND IF A MAN ACT INTENTIONALLY — Why is this stated at all (since v. 13 expressly provides a place for the murderer only if he does not lie in wait)? Since it is said, (v. 12) “Whosoever smiteth a man [so that he die shall be put to death]”, I might infer that this is so even if the victim is a heathen, and that there it included even a physician who kills a person as a result of his treatment, and a court-officer who kills a man when inflicting on him the forty lashes, and a father who beats and thereby kills his son, and a teacher who chastises his pupil and thereby kills him, and one who kills in error (שוגג, i. e. one who intended to kill a certain person but missed the mark and killed another instead — נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה)! Scripture therefore states here: “if a man acts intentionally (יזיד)” — but not in error (שוגג); “against his fellowman (רעהו)” — but not against a heathen; “to slay with guile (בערמה)” — thus excluding the court-officer, the physician, and one who chastises his son or his pupil for all these though acting intentionally do not do so with guile (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:14:1).

מעם מזבחי, even though at that time when no cities of refuge existed yet the entire camp of the Levites, and not only the immediate area of the altar served as such a place of refuge.

וכי יזיד איש.. להרגו בערמה, If someone plans devious murder, etc. Mechilta concentrates on the word למות at the end of the verse and understands it as excluding "bringing him to trial, inflicting corporal punishment, or exile." This is the reason that Yoav (David's general) who had taken refuge in the Temple holding on to the altar was dragged away and executed. While it is true that Yoav was executed, this was because he was rebellious and not because he had murdered Avner or Amassa (compare Sanhedrin 49). He had fled before he could be brought to trial. The Talmud in Makkot 12 claims that Yoav's error in thinking that the altar could save his life was that at that time the altar was still a temporary structure, Solomon's Temple not having been built yet.

וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו, “and if a man shall act intentionally against his fellow to kill him,” the meaning of the word להרגו, is והרגו, i.e. “he has carried out his intention and killed the person he intended to kill.” The Torah had to add the words בערמה, “with guile,” in connection with the legislation involving murder and its penalty as nearly every murderer makes an elaborate attempt to conceal the fact that he killed intentionally. In other words, a murder almost by definition, engages in ערמה, guile, deceit. Not only that, his sin is one that was inspired by the original serpent who wanted to make man guilty of death. The Torah had described the principal characteristic of that serpent as being that it was the “most ערום,” the most crafty of all the living beasts (Genesis 3,1). Murder then is a sin directly attributable to the influence of the serpent. According to ancient sources, the serpent had mated with Chavah and its seed had produced Kayin, the first murderer. (see author’s commentary on Genesis 5,2; Ed.) This is also why the sages (Sotah 21) call anyone who engages in sin after having misrepresented his intentions a רשע רע, “an evil sinner,” (as if a sinner were not evil by definition already). The attribute רע which the sages appended to the description רשע is based on Isaiah 3,11 אוי לרשע רע, “woe to the wicked sinner.” Such a sinner derives his strength from the celestial sphere Mars, which itself is described as רע, evil, as wars and murder usually take place under its aegis. (I have explained this in detail on Exodus 10,10). The prophet Jeremiah 1,14, when saying that “disaster shall break loose from the north upon all the inhabitants of earth,” also refers to the planet Mars. This planet was also referred to as רעה, by Pharaoh in Exodus 10,10.

The Torah therefore says: “If he plots.” You might ask: Since liability for the death penalty requires testimony and prior warning, how could killing accidentally ever be liable for the death penalty? And perforce, an accident was not prewarned. For if it was, it would not be accidental! The answer is: We are dealing with [a killer who is] a learned person and needs no warning [since he surely knows the punishment — were he to act intentionally]. You might ask: Why do we need our verse to exclude an unintentional killer [from the death penalty]? It is written (v. 13) that when “he did not lie in wait,” the punishment is exile, not death. (Re’m) The answer is: We are dealing with an unintentional killing that was close to being intentional. For example, he intended to kill one person and killed another. In such a case, exile does not atone for him, since he acted negligently, [therefore we need this verse to exclude this case from the death penalty].

V. 14. וכי יוד איש וגו׳ ist das vollendete מזיד (siehe unten V. 18). Zwischen ihm und dem im vorhergehenden Vers mit גלות belegten שוגג liegt das קרוב למזיד, die strafbare Unvorsichtigkeit, bei welcher nur die ערמה, die Absicht fehlt, und die daher weder die gerichtliche Todesstrafe zu erleiden hat, noch mit גלות gesühnt werden kann.

מעם מזבחי, even when the murderer has taken refuge near My altar; all the more so when he escaped to one of these cities.

מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות THOU SHALT TAKE HIM FROM MY ALTAR, THAT HE MAY DIE — even if he is a priest and stands at the altar intending to officiate thou shalt take him away that he die (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:14:4; Yoma 85a).

תקחנו למות, as in Jeremiah 7,11 “do you consider My house to be a den of thieves?

I have noted that Maimonides writes in chapter 5,12-14 of his Hilchot Rotzeach that the altar serves as a refuge for unintentional killers as far as protection against an avenger who is a member of the victim's family is concerned. It does not act as an alternative to such a killer having to go into exile. Clearly, Maimonides had not seen the Baraitha which we quoted above according to which the word למות excludes exile, etc. The Baraitha's whole point is that if someone tries to save himself in the Holy Temple by holding on to the altar he can be dragged out only in order to be executed and not in order to be confined in a city of refuge. While it is true that one could offer a forced explanation that the words in the Baraitha ולא לגלות mean that that if someone is guilty of confinement in the city of refuge the family's avenger has no right to kill such a person, this is extremely forced seeing it contains no new element. We know this already. Besides, the words in the Baraitha which appear immediately before this comment about לא לגלות contradict such an explanation. The Baraitha had said: "not to have corporal punishment administered to him nor to be brought to trial." I have an even greater difficulty with the words of the author of Mishneh Lamelech who wonders why Maimonides makes a distinction between intentional and unintentional killers seeking refuge at the altar, whereas he makes no such difference at all. The latter statement is incomprehensible even if we did not have a Baraitha at all. We have no authority to rule that the altar fails to act as refuge except in a situation specifically excluded by the Torah.

מעם מזבחי וגו׳ Der jüdische Altar gewährt dem Verbrecher keinen Schutz. Es. sind nicht etwa zwei sich gegenseitig kontrollierende, mildernde und beschränkende Prinzipien, wie etwa Kirche und Staat, Gnade und Recht etc. etc.; unmittelbar neben dem "schwertfeindlichen" Altar war die oberste Stätte des "Rechts". Es ist ein und dasselbe Prinzip, das am Altare gepflegt und vor dem Sanhedrin zur Verwirklichung kam. Der ganze Begriff des Begnadigungsrechts fehlt im jüdischen Staatskodex. Nicht des Menschen, Gottes ist das Recht und das Gericht. Wenn das genau präzisierende, der Menschenwillkür keinen Spielraum lassende Gottesrecht den Tod über den Verbrecher verhängt, dann ist die Vollziehung dieses Urteils nicht eine etwa durch Rücksichten zu mildernde Härte, sie ist selbst rücksichtsvolle Sühne, Sühne der Gesamtheit, Sühne des Bodens, Sühne des Verbrechers, ganz so Sühne wie das Opfer, das auf dem Altar vermittelt wird. Und stände der Priester an dem Altare und wäre der einzige Priester, das Opfer zu vollbringen, und es trifft ihn die Anklage des Mordes: von dem Altare weg hast du ihn vor Gericht zu bringen, dem Recht zu genügen.

ומכה אביו ואמו AND HE THAT SMITETH HIS FATHER OR HIS MOTHER [SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH] — Because Scripture has taught us that he who inflicts a wound upon his fellow-man is liable for damages (cf. Rashi on Exodus 21:24) but is not subject to death, it was compelled to state that he who inflicts a wound on his father or his mother is subject to the death penalty (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:15:3). He is, however, not punishable with death except for a blow which causes a wound (Sanhedrin 85b).

AND HE THAT SMITETH HIS FATHER, OR HIS MOTHER, SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH. Our Sages have already taught¹¹⁰Sanhedrin 84b. that his death is by strangulation. This is why He placed next to it, And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him,¹¹¹Verse 16. for he too is punished by the same death. He separated it from the later verse, And he that curseth his father or his mother,¹¹²Verse 17. because his death is by stoning, as it is said concerning him, he hath cursed his father or his mother; his blood shall be upon him,¹¹³Leviticus 20:9. and whenever such an expression [his blood be upon him] is used about someone, his death is by stoning, this being derived from that which is written, They shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them.¹¹⁴Ibid., Verse 27. The reason why He was more severe as to the manner of death of the one who curses his mother or father than as to the manner of death of one who smites them,¹¹⁵In the order of severity stoning is considered the most stringent of the four deaths that the court had power to inflict, and strangulation the least severe. Ramban’s question is thus pertinent: why the most severe punishment for the curser, and the least severe one for one who smites? is because the sin of cursing is more common, for when the fool gets angry he frets himself and curses by his king¹¹⁶Isaiah 8:21. and father and mother the whole day, and a crime that is frequently committed needs a greater punishment [than one rarely committed]. Or it may be that cursing involves a greater sin, because he uses the Name of G-d,¹¹⁷Shebuoth 36a. Also in the Mechilta here: “One who curses his father or his mother is not liable to the death penalty unless he curses them by using the Divine Name.” Needless to say cursing is strongly forbidden by itself, even without using the Divine Name. and therefore he has to be punished for his sin against his father and mother, and also for taking G-d’s Name in transgression and sin. Now the Gaon Rav Saadia¹¹⁸Mentioned here in Ibn Ezra, Verse 16. — On Rav Saadia, see in Seder Va’eira, Note 229. said, that the reason why He placed the matter of stealing a human being between that of smiting one’s parents and cursing them, is because most people are kidnapped when they are young, and they grow up in a strange place unaware of who their parents are, and thus they may come to smite them or to curse them [not knowing that they are their parents]; therefore it is fitting that the thief too be punished by death as they are, since he is responsible for the punishment that is visited upon the child [who smites or curses either of his parents, and for that reason the verse dealing with the thief’s punishment is mentioned between those dealing with smiting one’s parents and cursing them].

ומכה אביו, our sages say that the penalty prescribed applies only if an injury results from hitting one’s parents (Sanhedrin 84).

ומכה אביו ואמו מות יומת, “If someone strikes his father or his mother he shall be executed.” The blow must be such that it causes an injury involving bleeding or a bruise (Mechilta Nezikin section 5). The situation described here is similar to Kings I 20,37: “he struck him and wounded him.” When the Torah writes אביו ואמו, the meaning is not that in order to become guilty of the penalty prescribed the son or daughter has to strike both father and mother. The letter ו here as well as in many other instance means או, “or.” A striking example of the letter ו meaning “or” instead of “and,” is Deut. 17,3 ויעבוד אלוהים אחרים וישתחו להם ולשמש או לירח או לכל צבא השמים, “and he will go and serve gods of others and prostitute himself to them, or to the sun or the moon or to any of the host of heaven;” clearly the letter ו in the word וישתחו cannot mean that he must perform all of these acts of idol worship in order to become culpable. The Torah lists a number of alternatives any of which result in his becoming guilty of death by stoning. In our verse the death penalty for someone striking either parent is death by strangulation.

Which causes a wound. [Rashi knows this] because it says (Vayikra 24:21): “Whoever smites an animal shall pay for it, and whoever smites a man shall be put to death.” [This implies a comparison between the two:] just as smiting an animal [is liable only] when there is a wound [as otherwise there is no damage to the animal], so too with smiting a man, [one is liable only] when he inflicts a wound.

V. 15. Indem הכאה zur Bezeichnung des Totschlags durch die Beifügung ומת vervollständigt werden muss, ist הכאה ohne diese Beifügung nicht Tötung. Die Halacha lehrt, dass gleichwohl eine Verwundung stattgehabt haben muss, wenn Todesstrafe erfolgen soll. Im Zusammenhange spricht sich demnach das Gesetz also aus: מכה איש ומת וגו׳ ומכה אביו וגו׳ wer sonst einen Menschen schlägt, daß er stirbt, ist todesschuldig, wer aber Vater oder Mutter schlägt, ist todesschuldig, wenn auch der Schlag nicht tödlich ist.

ומכה אביו ואמו, “and if someone strikes his father or his mother;” the Torah here spells out the penalty, i.e. legal execution, without even having informed us that this is forbidden, an unusual construction. This question is raised by the Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin, folio 54. We have a rule that no court can convict a sinner except where the Torah has warned us of the sin in question being a sin. Granted that in the case of someone cursing a crowned head or even a deaf person who cannot even hear the curse, is forbidden, i.e. both a low-ranking person and a high ranking person must not be cursed, it is obvious that the same rule applies to social strata in between, and therefore each strata does not need to be written separately; compare (Exodus 22,7 and Leviticus 19,7) but where did the Torah spell out the prohibition to strike a human being without the penalty being spelled out simultaneously? We must fall back on Deuteronomy 25,3, where the Torah warns the court’s clerk not to apply more than the permitted number of lashes to a person convicted of these. If in the case where the physical punishment is mandatory even a minutely excessive force is specifically forbidden, it is clear that striking someone without the consent or even instruction by the court is forbidden, how much more so is striking someone without such legal cover forbidden! In fact, concerning the subject of physical punishment, the halachah is according to the view of Rabbi Meir, who said that if someone is guilty of two penalties, both physical punishment and a financial penalty, (and we do not apply both for the same sin) the physical punishment is not administered. (Talmud, tractate Ketuvot, folio 32) The only exception is if the financial penalty amounts to less that the lowest coin in circulation at the time in the country. In this respect, the halachah does not treat sins committed against father or mother differently from offences committed against someone else. If you were to ask that seeing the verse deals with the prohibition of striking one’s father, a sin which carries the death penalty, how could anyone have even imagined that the penalty would be 39 lashes, seeing that we have a rule that physical lashes are never an option for committing such a sin, (compare Talmud tractate Makkot folio 13), the answer is that we have two different expressions in the verse dealing with that subject in Deuteronomy 25,3. It says both: ארבעים יכנו לא יוסיף,, as well as פן יוסיף להכותו על אלה מכה רבה, “forty lashes he may give him, he must nor exceed this,” and “lest he should exceed above by inflicting a severe wound, etc.;” you may also argue that seeing the subject in our chapter deals with inflicting wounds, how could the penalty be one of execution by a court? How would I know that if the blow administered did not result in a visible wound that it would be punishable altogether? Furthermore, when the Torah speaks about cursing father and mother (Leviticus 20,9) execution is the penalty, how could it occur to anyone to think that the penalty would be 39 lashes? We would have to look at Leviticus 24,21 where the Torah decrees the death penalty for striking a human being, any human being, i.e. ומכה אדם יומת, “if he strikes a human being she shall be executed!” On that verse Rashi felt compelled to explain that the human being meant in that verse is one’s father, and that the reason is to contrast and to compare the penalty for striking animals and striking one’s father, where the former is punishable only by financial compensation to the owner of that animal. We could conclude that just as when said animal did not die from its wounds only a financial penalty is imposed, the same would be true for striking human being who does not die a result. The Torah therefore wrote the word יומת, “he shall be executed,” to show that the verse speaks of a human being who is the father of the man who struck him.(Compare Rashi on that verse.) It is not possible to say that the Torah there speaks of someone who had struck one’s father after he was dead, but the verse speaks of living animals and a living father being the victim. What is the difference between יומת and מות יומת, the usual term for legal execution? The former refers to a financial penalty, just as in Exodus 21,29, where the owner is not executed, but the Torah uses this word to show that he deserves to be executed. We know this as previously the Torah had written: כן ינתן בו, “thus it shall be rendered to him.” (verse 20) This was a clear reference to a financial penalty. In light of the above, we must understand the word יומת in Leviticus 20,9 as having been meant literally and applying to someone who struck his father or mother.

ומכה אביו ואמו, “and if someone strikes either his father or his mother;” why did this verse have to be written? [If killing someone not related to him by blood results in execution, is it not natural that he will not face a lesser penalty for killing his father or his mother? Seeing that theTorah had written: עין תחת עין, “an eye for an eye,” the Torah had to let us know that this law does not apply when the eye of one’s father had been gouged out by his son, but that he faces a more severe penalty in that instance. The Talmud employs an exegetical tool called heckesh, i.e. [according to some scholars, the 19th of these tools enumerated in the 32 such tools listed by Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yossi hag’lili. Ed.] In order to have halachic validity, this instrument being used in a particular instance must have been a well known tradition, called in the language of our sages: halachah miMoshe mi Sinai, a ruling as binding as if it had been given to Moses at Mount Sinai. Ed.] In our case it would work as follows: just as someone if he has struck his neighbour’s animal is not culpable for such a deed unless the animal sustained a visible wound, so if one strikes one’s father or mother he becomes guilty of the death penalty only if he had actually wounded his father or mother by such a physical blow. The reason it appears in our context in the Torah is that the penalty is parallel to that for murder, something discussed in our paragraph.

אביו ואמו means either his father or his mother (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:15:2).

Either one or the other. It is written ואמו , and a vav usually means to add to what preceded [and thus would be translated as “and”]. Nevertheless, Rashi explains that a vav can also denote one of the two, [and thus would be translated as “or”], unless the verse specifically states that the two are to be considered “together” ( יחדו ). So it is with the verse, “You may not plow with an ox and a donkey ( ובחמור ) together” (Devarim 22:10). There, the verse needed to state “together” [in order for the vav to mean “and”].

ומכה אביו ואמו מות יומת, “and someone striking his father or mother must be put to death.” The peculiarity here is that the Torah informed us of the penalty for violating the commandment before having spelled out the commandment not to strike anyone. Actually, the commandment that the penalty for striking someone and his being subject to 39 lashes has been established, and the Torah had added that this number of lashes, (Deuteronomy 25,3) must not be exceeded by the person carrying it out as agent of the court. Actually, we could have derived that from logic also, i.e. “if the agent of the court who carries out striking an individual is commanded not to exceed his authority, how much more so does such a rule apply to someone who had no authority to strike anyone!” (Mechilta, Mishpatim chapter 5)

מות יומת SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH — by strangulation (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:15:4).

וגנב איש ומכרו AND HE THAT STEALETH A MAN, AND SELLETH HIM, [AND HE BE PREVIOUSLY FOUND IN HIS HAND, HE SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH] — Why is this statement made (how does the particular form of words used here tell us some point of law which is not contained in another text bearing upon the same subject)? Since it is said, (Deuteronomy 24:7) “If a man be found stealing any of his brethren … [then that thief shall die]”, I might say that I have here only the law that a man who stole a person is punishable with death. Whence, however, do I know that this is also the case if a woman or a person whose sex is not distinguishable or a hermaphrodite (טומטום ואנדרונינוס) has stolen a person? Scripture therefore states here: “Whosoever stealeth a man and selleth him”. — And again, since Scripture states here: “He that stealeth a man [shall be put to death]”, I might say that I have here only the law that if one steals a man he is punishable with death. Whence do I know that this is also the case if he has stolen a woman? Therefore Scripture states, (Deuteronomy 24:7) “[If a man be found] stealing any person [he shall be put to death]”. Consequently both verses are necessary: what the one omits the other tells us (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:16:2; Sanhedrin 85b).

AND HE THAT STEALETH A MAN, AND SELLETH HIM, AND HE BE FOUND IN HIS HAND — “previously, before the sale.” This is Rashi’s language. But I have not understood it.¹¹⁹Ramban argues that since Rashi made his comment upon the phrase: and he be found in his hand, it would appear that the fact that the witnesses saw him in his possession constitutes their proof that the holder stole him. On this, Ramban asked: could you possibly think that the thief be subject to death without the witnesses having seen the actual theft and the sale? Their having seen him in the thief’s possession is in fact no proof at all that he had stolen him (Nimukei Shmuel). If Rashi means that witnesses must have seen him [the stolen person] in the thief’s possession before he had sold him — could it even enter your mind that the thief be subject to the death penalty without witnesses having seen him stealing and also seeing him selling! It would therefore have been sufficient if Scripture were to say: “and he that stealeth a man and selleth him”. Further, his being found in the thief’s possession is no real proof that he stole him! Rather, this verse is the source for that which we have been taught in a Mishnah:¹²⁰Sanhedrin 85b. “He that steals a person is not liable to the punishment unless he brings him into his own possession,” and in a Beraitha the Rabbis have said:¹²⁰Sanhedrin 85b. “If he stole him but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he is still in his [the thief’s], possession, he is free [from the death penalty].” The meaning of this is to teach us that the law applying to the thief of a human being is [in one respect] similar to that of thieves of other, i.e., monetary, matters; namely, that if a thief killed or sold [an ox or a sheep] within the domain of the owner, he is free [from paying five oxen for an ox and four sheeps for a sheep],¹²¹Further, Verse 37. but if he lifted them up [thereby acquiring possession of them], or removed them from the domain of the owner, he is liable to pay. Similarly, this thief of a human being must first have brought the stolen person into his own domain [in order to be liable to death]. Likewise if he lifted the lad upon his shoulder, and sold him to another person, he is liable to the death penalty, because this too is called if he be found in his hand, since it is not logical that a man’s ground should have a greater power of taking possession of a thing for the owner, than his own hand has. In a similar way, that which the Rabbis said [in the Beraitha mentioned above]: “or if he sold him but he is still in his [the thief’s] possession etc.,” means that the buyer did not remove him at all from the thief’s domain, even though he paid him the money, and since he did not remove him from there, the thief is free [from the death penalty]. Now I do not know whether this is to say that [in order to make the thief of a human being liable to the death penalty] the buyer must perform a formal act of acquisition, as is the law in other transactions, that the buyer does not take ownership of the article until he draws it from the domain of the seller into a simta, [an alley adjoining an open place] or until he lifts it [even within the domain of the seller] — or it may be that it is a special Scriptural decree in the case of the sale of a stolen human being, that even if the sale has been finalized between them, and the buyer has taken ownership from the seller by lifting him or by drawing him along in ground which belongs to both of them, [in which case usually the act of drawing the purchased article is a valid act of acquisition even if not done in a simta], that the thief is nonetheless free from the death penalty until the stolen person goes out from his domain into the domain of the buyer. And so indeed it would appear to be [as the latter exposition].
Now Rashi in his commentaries there in the Gemara¹²⁰Sanhedrin 85b. explained [the phrase of the Beraitha]: “if he sold him but he is still in his possession” as meaning “if he is still in the stolen person’s domain,¹²²Not as we have explained it heretofore, according to Ramban, that the reference is to the thief’s domain. in which case the thief is free from punishment because there has been no real theft at all.” But if so, nothing new has been established here which is unlike the ordinary law of theft in monetary matters!¹²³But according to Ramban, as explained above, there is a new law established here: even if the thief brought the stolen person to his domain, and the buyer came there and the sale was completely finalized, [by the buyer lifting him, or drawing him into ground which belongs to both], the thief is nevertheless free from the death penalty as long as the buyer did not remove him from the seller’s domain. In the case of theft of an ox or sheep under such circumstances, the thief would be liable to pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep.
However, it may be, the words of the verse [to be interpreted properly, must be transposed as follows]: “and he that stealeth a man, and he be found in his hand, and he selleth him, he shall surely be put to death.” But it is still possible that the verse may be explained properly in the order it is written in. Thus: And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, and he be found in the hand of the buyer [he — the thief — shall surely be put to death]; for if he stole a human being and brought him to his house, and then he brought the buyer there and sold him without the buyer taking him out from there, the thief is not liable, because the sale has not been completed between them, or even if the sale has been completed, he is still free of the death penalty, as I have written above.

וגונב איש ומכרו, “and he who kidnaps a person and sells him, etc.” The Torah inserts this verse (subject) between the verse dealing with murder, and the one dealing with physically assaulting one’s parents, or cursing them. Some commentators feel that the point of the sequence is to list two crimes both of which are punishable by strangulation of the sinner together. Cursing parents, on the other hand, is punishable by the guilty party being stoned to death, a more painful and demeaning manner of execution. This commentary does not seem very convincing to me, as if that were the reason the Torah adopted this sequence, the verse dealing with kidnapping should have preceded that of describing parents being assaulted. In that way the verses dealing with improper behaviour against parents could have remained part of the same sequence, and the two crimes for which the punishment is strangulation could also have been written sequentially. Rabbeinu Saadyah gaon explains that seeing most victims of kidnapping are small children, who as a result of being sold, will be raised far from their parents’ homes, not even able to recognize their parents, the chances that at sometime during their lives they will curse or physically assault a parent, not even being aware that the person they cursed was a parent, the kidnapper deserves the penalty which otherwise would be applicable to the victim of the kidnapping had he done what he did deliberately. This is why the Torah chose this apparently obscure sequence. The penalty for a son who curses his father without laying a hand on him is more severe than the penalty for physically assaulting one’s parent, because this offense is more commonplace than the one of actually raising a hand against a parent. In order to act as a deterrent, the Torah imposed a harsher penalty. It is also possible that the reason why the penalty for cursing one’s parents is harsher than for striking them, is that cursing involves using the holy name of the Lord for such a nefarious crime. [Halachically, “cursing” means to curse someone in the name of G’d, to try and call down G’d’s anger against the person one curses. Ed.] He who curses parents has committed two major sins simultaneously.

Who stole another person. The Re’m was puzzled by Rashi’s comment. For when it said (v. 12): “If one strikes a man,” Rashi did not expound the verse along the same lines as he did here. He should have said there: “Since it is said: ‘If a man strikes’ (Vayikra 24:17), I would know only [that this applies to] a man who struck. But a woman, or one whose gender is indistinguishable, or a hermaphrodite [who struck], how would we know [that this law applies]? Therefore the Torah says: ‘If one strikes a man.’” The Re’m on v. 12 explained Rashi’s exegesis there by saying that perhaps the interpretation was received by Chazal as an oral tradition. Another answer, which the Re’m offers, is that perhaps the Tanna there was not trying to explain all the laws that those verses teach us. He intended only to explain the seemingly extra verses. Thus he merely stated some of the laws, thereby showing the need for both verses: what this verse lacks, the other verse teaches.

V. 16. Wie im vorangehenden Vers die Persönlichkeit des Vaters oder der Mutter die partielle Tötung, d. i. Verwundung, in die Kategorie einer totalen Tötung erhebt und zu einem todeswürdigem Verbrechen macht, so lehrt hier das Gesetz, dass die Freiheit ein Gut ist, dessen Raub als sozialer Mord gegen jedermann ebenfalls mit dem Tode zu bestrafen ist. Der Menschenräuber ist aber nur dann dem gerichtlichen Tode verfallen, wenn נמצא בידו, und, wie Deuteron. 24, 7 hinzugefügt ist, והתעמר בו und dann ומכרו, d. h. wenn er dem Menschen alle Sachbehandlungen hat angedeihen lassen, ihn ganz als Sache behandelt hat. Dazu gehört: נמצא בידו, d. h. dass es durch Zeugen konstatiert ist שהכניסו ברשותו: dass er ihn in seinen Eigentumsraum gebracht, התעמר בו: d. h. השתמש בו, dass er sich seiner irgendwie selbst als Sklave bedient und dann ומכרו ihn verkauft hat (Sanhedrin 85 b).

וגונב איש, but if someone kidnaps a person, etc.” the reason why this scenario is written between the verses where striking a father a or cursing him is written, is because the penalty for striking a father or kidnapping a person is death by strangulation, while the penalty for cursing one’s father is by stoning (more severe). In Leviticus 20,9, the penalty for cursing is described both as מות יומת, “he is sure to be executed,” plus the additional words: דמיו בו, “his blood(guilt) is upon him.” Although we might have thought that cursing one’s parent should carry a lighter sentence than physically assaulting him, seeing it does not involve an act, whereas striking includes an act of violence, the Torah decreed a more severe penalty for the cursing of one’s parent, i.e. death by stoning. According to the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin, folio 49, the reason why a severe type of death penalty is applied for cursing one’s parents, is that the Torah compares the parents as deserving a similar degree of honour as that shown to G–d, seeing that the parents brought you into this world. Cursing G–d is punishable by stoning as we know from the blasphemer in Leviticus 24,14. Seeing that it impossible to strike G–d, any comparison with striking a parent is inappropriate. Hence the death penalty for that sin is chenek, strangulation. Furthermore, when someone was guilty of cursing his parents after they had died he is still guilty of the same sin, whereas if the same person had struck his father after he had died the death penalty does not apply, as it was part of the penalties listed for causing injury (Compare Mechilta Mishpatim, section 5.). It is impossible to inflict an injury upon someone who is already dead. Our author asks that if one cannot inflict injury after death and therefore the death penalty by stoning is not applied, why is the same not true of someone who cursed G–d, seeing it is impossible to harm Him in any way? Perhaps the fact that the subject of cursing G–d, and the penalty for this appears next to the subject of the blasphemer in Leviticus chapter 24, makes my question irrelevant.

וגונב איש, “If one kidnaps another person, etc.” Why was this verse necessary? (it has been repeated in detail in Deuteronomy 24,7) If we had only had the verse in Deuteronomy, we would have thought that the penalty would apply only if we had witnesses to the kidnapping. We would not have known that witnesses to both the kidnapping and the subsequent selling of the victim were required in order for the death penalty to apply. Another thing these two laws have in common is that the death penalty is to be carried out by strangulation.

ונמצא בידו implies that witnesses have seen him stealing and also saw him selling the person, and that he has been found in his possession before he had sold him (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:16:3).

ומכרו ונמצא בידו, “and he sold him but the kidnapper is apprehended while still having the kidnapped person under his control.” According to Rashi the victim is found in the kidnapper’s possession before the sale. Nachmanides writes that if this were so the Torah would not have needed to bother to write the line ונמצא בידו, “the victim was still in the kidnapper’s control.” Seeing that we obviously have witnesses to the crime, the kidnapper had both kidnapped and sold the person concerned, he clearly was under his control. He therefore understands the meaning of the words ונמצא בידו to mean that the kidnapper has brought the kidnapped person into his private domain to mean that until the kidnapper had brought his victim into his private domain he is not liable to the penalty the Torah decrees. The rule is parallel to someone who has stolen and then slaughtered or sold the animal in question. His penalty of making 4 or 5 fold restitution is also applicable only if the stolen animal had first been transferred to the private domain of the thief.

And he was already in his (the thief’s) possession before he sold him. Rashi is excluding the case where the thief first sold him and only then stole him [i.e., took him out of his home]. Thus, the law of kidnapping resembles the law of other property theft — where the thief is exempt [from the law of paying four or five times the stolen animal’s value] if he slaughtered or sold the animal before removing it from the owner’s premises. And this is how the Ramban understands Rashi’s words on the Gemara (Sanhedrin 95b). (Nachalas Yaakov)

ונמצא בידו, “and he has been found in his possession;” another way of saying that the crime had been carried out in the presence of witnesses, or that there was so much circumstantial evidence as if it had been witnessed by living witnesses. [One cannot help thinking of coloured photographic evidence even showing the parties in motion. Ed.]

מות יומת HE SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH — by strangulation. Wherever the death-penalty is mentioned in Scripture without being precisely defined strangulation is intended (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:16:4; Sanhedrin 84b). [It should be noted that Scripture interrupted the context by writing “Whosoever stealeth etc.” between the passages, “He that smiteth his father etc.” and “He that curseth his father etc.”, which passages ought on account of their contents to follow one after the other. I think that this gave rise to the difference of opinion found in Sanhedrin 85a where one Rabbi holds that we must put “smiting” on an equality with “cursing”, in spite of the text being interrupted by the verse וגונב, which, however, is placed between them only to teach that in some respects “smiting” and “cursing” have not the same law, — that after the death of the parents “cursing” them is punishable whilst “smiting” them is not; whilst another bolds that since the two verses have been disconnected “smiting” can by no means be put on an equality with, and have the same legal consequenses as, “cursing” (cf. Sanhedrin 85b)].

Wherever the Torah mentions an unspecified death. . . But above (v. 15), Rashi did not need to explain this. This is because the verse of “Whoever steals a man and sells him” interrupts between the verse of striking one’s father (v. 15) and that of cursing him (v. 17). And had it not interrupted, we would say that [the punishment for] striking is learned from [the punishment for] cursing. As Rashi explains, one who curses his father is stoned. Thus, one who strikes him would also be stoned. Therefore the Torah interrupts with “Whoever steals a man” [in order to teach us:] just as one who kidnaps is strangled, so too, is one who strikes his father strangled. And if you would ask: How do we know that one who kidnaps is strangled? The answer is as Rashi explains here: “Wherever the Torah mentions an unspecified death. . .” I found this [written].

מות יומת, “the kidnapper is to be executed.” The reason is that having sold his victim it is almost certain that the victim will be so abused that he will die prematurely. As to the question where was the law written before the penalty was recorded in the Torah, the reader is directed to the eight of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20,13: לא תגנוב, “Do not steal!”

ונמצא בידו, “while he was in his power.” The word נמצא must be contrasted with מצוי. The former is a person over whom the kidnapper had no legal authority; the latter is someone such as a teacher who does have a certain legal authority over the victim. Such a kidnapper is not subject to the death penalty (Sanhedrin 86).

ומקלל אביו ואמו WHOSOEVER CURSETH HIS FATHER OR HIS MOTHER [SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH] — Why is this stated in this particular form? Since Scripture says, (Leviticus 20:9) “For every man who execrateth his father [or his mother shall surely be put to death]” I might say that I have here only the law that a man who curseth his father or his mother is punishable with death. Whence do I know that this is also the case if a woman curseth her father or her mother? Scripture therefore states here, “Whosoever curseth father or mother” — whosoever generally — intimating that it applies to both man and woman (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:1). But if this be so why is it said, (Leviticus 20:9). “For every man who execrateth etc.”? To exclude a minor.

V. 17. Menschenraub ist die konkrete Vernichtung der Menschenwürde; Vater und Mutter gegenüber zieht schon die bloß angewünschte Vernichtung, קללה, den gerichtlichen Tod nach sich, und zwar selbst das Fluchen verstorbener Eltern.

ומקלל אביו, “and if someone curses his father;” from what is written here we only know that it is forbidden to curse one’s father while he is alive; how do we know that the same law applies to people cursing their fathers posthumously? The word: ומקלל formulated in the present tense, in the widest possible formulation includes cursing him anywhere anytime. Where is the commandment not to curse one’s father stated explicitly independent of the punishment in store for those who violate it? The reader is directed to Exodus 22,27: אלוהים לא תקלל ונשיא בעמך לא תאור, “Do not curse a judge and do not curse an elected political leader within your people.” לא תקלל חרש, “do not curse a deaf person!” The common denominator in these three prohibitions is that they are part of your people, and that your father and mother are similarly not only your relatives and have begotten you, but they are part of your nation, a holy nation. The reason why the Torah interrupts this sequence with verse 16, which deals with kidnapping, is that most people who are kidnapped are minors, who were unable to defend their abductor. As a result of having been kidnapped and sold to a foreign nation they will grow up in a country where they do not even know their parents, and when they get involved in an argument they will likely curse their fate and the father who had not protected them. Therefore this insertion is not a deviation from the theme the Torah deals with here. Verses 16 17 18 have a common denominator, as the Torah hints that in practice the occurrence of these sins are interrelated through the negative experiences in life by the parties who become guilty of them. [We must never lose sight of the fact that the Torah does not address itself to wicked people, as this would be a waste of time. What wicked person would take any notice of it? Ed.] What the Torah did here was listing sins which originate in quarrels between people some of which result in violent action, others in violent language. The honour due to father and mother is based on the honour due to the Creator himself, seeing that father and mother represent two thirds of begetting each one of us, G-d being the remaining third, who had helped father and mother to produce progeny. Therefore, cursing parents or cursing G-d are part of the same phenomenon, the result of frustration of the guilty party. Moreover, in the case of G-d releasing one’s anger by striking out physically is obviously impossible. Therefore all three are treated in a similar manner when it comes to how such release of one’s anger is treated by the Torah. Some commentators approach our whole paragraph as reflecting what our sages call it “not only this but also this.” For example: not only a person who has been so angry that in striking his fellow he has actually killed him, deserves to lose his life as a result of such lack of restraint, but even people who killed without intention actually deserve the same fate seeing that they had been criminally negligent, but the Torah stops short of this by protecting their lives if they succeeded to reach a city of refuge before an angry relative had a chance to avenge his relative’s needless death. This approach is supported by the Torah stating that if such a killer had acted intentionally, and had sought immunity next to the altar, [a symbol for a location where violence is absolutely forbidden, Ed] by taking refuge in the precincts of the Temple, this will not protect him against being brought to court by force and tried. Having stated this, the Torah extends this to people who in their anger only struck a parent also deserve the death penalty. If their act leaves a mark, injury, on the body of either parent they will be treated as having committed a capital offense. Finally, even if the son or daughter did not raise their hands against either parent and cursed them instead, they are also dealt with as having hurt them bodily.

מות יומת SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH — by stoning. And the rule is that wherever the term “his blood is upon him “is used in connection with the death penalty, “execution by stoning” is meant. The following in the passage from which this is evident (בנין אב): (Leviticus 20:27) “they shall overwhelm them with stones: their blood is upon them” — and as regards one who curses father or mother (Leviticus 20:9), Scripture indeed uses the words דמיו בו (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:3; Sanhedrin 66a).

Obgleich die gerichtliche Todesstrafe bei diesen vier Verbrechen allgemein durch מות יומת ausgedrückt ist, so lehrt die Halacha, und ist dies auch an andern Stellen in der Schrift angedeutet, dass ihre Todesstrafe nicht gleich ist. Der Mörder wird durchs Schwert, סייף, hingerichtet, Verwundung der Eltern und Menschendiebstahl wird mit חנק, Erdrosselung, Fluchen der Eltern mit סקילה, Steinigung, bestraft. Die verschiedenen Arten der Todesstrafe stehen tief in engstem Zusammenhange mit der Art der Verbrechens. Sie können jedoch nur in gesamtem Überblick betrachtet werden, und behalten wir uns diese Betrachtung s.G.w. zu פרשת עריות (Wajikra 20) vor.

וכי יריבן אנשים AND IF MEN QUARREL — Why is this (vv. 18, 19) stated in this particular form? Since Scripture states, (v. 24) “Eye for eye”, we learn from this only that compensation for the loss of limbs has to be paid, but we cannot infer from it that indemnity for loss of time (during which the injured has been disabled from work) and cost of medical treatment have also to be paid; consequently this section (vv. 18 and 19) is said (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:18:1).

WITH A STONE OR ‘B’EGROF’ (WITH HIS FIST). Judging from certain expressions of the Rabbis, egrof is the hand closed tightly, with the fingers gathered into the palm for the purpose of striking someone with it. Thus they speak of ba’alei egrofin [literally: “men of fists,” or men of power];¹²⁴Kiddushin 76b. “egrofo (the fist) of Ben Abtiach.”¹²⁵Keilim 17:12. A giant who lived in the time of the Second Sanctuary. Similarly ‘b’egrof’ of wickedness¹²⁶Isaiah 58:4. means the hand of wickedness that strikes. Scripture thus mentioned two kinds of hitting — the hard one, with a stone, and the lighter one, with the fist, which in most cases does not cause death — in order to declare that in both cases an estimate [of the power of the stone or the fist with which he struck him] is needed, and the assailant is meanwhile imprisoned. If the assailed person dies, such as where he struck him a mortal blow, he is a murderer; he shall surely be put to death,¹²⁷Numbers 35:16. but if he does not die, the assailant has to pay him for the loss of his labor and for the cost of the healing.
In the Mechilta [we find the following text]:¹²⁸Mechilta here on the Verse. “Rabbi Nathan says: He has likened the stone to the fist and the fist to the stone. Just as the stone can cause death, so also the blow of the fist must be such that it is capable of causing death. And just as the fist is something that can be identified [and measured for the power of its blow], so also the stone must be such as can be identified. But if the stone with which he struck him became mixed up with other stones, the assailant is free.” This means if the stone became mixed up with other stones, they [e.i., the judges] estimate the lightest one and if it is incapable of causing death, they free the assailant.
Other scholars¹²⁹Ibn Ezra and R’dak (in Sefer Hashorashim, root goraf). have said that the word egrof means “a clod of earth,” the term being derived from the expression: the grains shrivel under ‘megr’fotheihem’ (their clods of earth),¹³⁰Joel 1:17. and the letter alef [in the word egrof is redundant], as is the alef in the word ezro’a [“arm,” where the word is really zro’a]. And this is the opinion of Onkelos who translated b’egrof — b’churmeiza (a piece of white stone or glazed tile). He mentioned these things also in order to tell us that the assailant who hits him with a clod of earth is also liable to be put to death, if he struck him on a sensitive spot where it is capable of causing death. This is to distinguish the law of the sword from the stone and egrof, for no estimate [of a sword or weapon] needs to be taken [since even a minute piece of metal — such as a needle — can also cause death], as the Sages have mentioned.¹³¹Sanhedrin 76b.

וכי יריבון אנשים, And if men quarrel (fight physically), etc. Why did the Torah have to add the words: "and he does not die?" Surely any reader would have concluded that the situation described is one where the victim did not die!

או באגרוף, according to the plain meaning, as Onkelos translates, i.e. with a stone or brick. This is also the opinion of Torat Kohanim in its commentary on Leviticus 14,40. The departure from understanding the word אגרוף as “fist,” is justified with the question: “is someone to be executed for hitting merely with a fist, not a lethal tool?” Isaiah 58,4 להכות באגרוף רשע, “to strike wickedness with a fist” would hardly be a deterrent. It is therefore understood to refer to a large stone. Moreover, when the Torah reports that the victim did not die, surely one does not normally die by being struck with a fist; it stands to reason that the Torah refers to a lethal weapon which failed to kill, i.e. a brick or something similar held in one’s fist causing serious injury.

או באגרוף, “or with a fist.” According to our sages the word אגרוף refers to a fist, i.e. a palm balled into a fist. It describes the injury being caused as like a punch by a boxer. The reason the Torah mentions either a stone or a fist as being the cause of the non-fatal injury, is that both a stone and a fist when used in a fight are proof of a degree of premeditation. Even though, generally speaking, a stone inflicts a more serious injury, both of these weapons do not as a rule cause fatal injuries, although, admittedly, being hit by a stone appears to be more serious. Some commentators understand the word אגרוף as referring to dust, the word occurring in this context in Joel 1,17 עבשו פרודות תחת מגרפותיהם, “the seeds have shriveled under their clods of earth.”

But the loss of work and medical costs. Rashi mentions [only] loss of work and medical costs, because [compensation for] pain and embarrassment are learned from other Torah sections. (Re’m)

V. 18. וכי יריבֻן. Es heißt nicht einfach: וכי יכה איש את ראהו וגו׳, sondern: וכי יריבון וגו׳, wohl um zu sagen, daß die hier statuierte Zahlungspflicht unabhängig von der Veranlassung und Absicht ist. Nicht nur, wenn einer darauf ausgeht, den andern zu schlagen, sondern auch, wenn der Schlag infolge eines Wortwechsels etc. geschehen; denn ריב heißt zunächst ein Streit mit Worten, im Gegensatz zu dem וכי ינצו וגו׳ V. 22, welches zunächst ein tatsächliches Streiten, eine Schlägerei bedeutet (נצה: Anfang von נצח). Nur bei Leibesstrafen kommt die böswillige, ja verbrecherische Absicht in Betracht, es muss nicht nur (V. 14) במזיד, sondern auch בערמה, mit vollem Bewusstsein des verbrecherischen Charakters der Handlung, somit בהתראה (— vergl. לתת לפתאים ערמה und sonst ערמה in משלי, so auch בערמה ,להוציא חרש שוטה וקטן שאינן מערימין :מכילתא. Siehe Sanhedrin 41 a, wo jedoch התראה in der Futurform des יזיד gefunden wird — ערמה wäre vielleicht Nacktheit, Unverhülltheit, ein Anschauen der Dinge, wie sie wirklich sind, es fehlt nichts an der Totalität des Bewusstseins —) die Tat geschehen sein. Allein alle die im Gesetze vorkommenden Verurteilungen zu Zahlungsleistungen ( — mit Ausnahme der wenigen, die den Charakter קנס tragen —) sind keineswegs Geldstrafen. Es sind Ersatzverbindlichkeiten (תשלומין), die als reine Rechtskonsequenz aus dem angerichteten Schaden fließen und ganz unabhängig sind von dem größern oder geringern Grad des Verbrechencharakters der verübten Tat. Der Beschädiger trägt die Ersatzpflicht, selbst wenn ihn kein Gericht dazu verurteilt oder auch aus Mangel an Zeugen gar nicht verurteilen kann. Nur hinsichtlich des Umfangs des zum Ersatz kommenden Schadens, ob nämlich nur die unmittelbar verübte Beschädigung (נזק), oder auch deren Folgen (צער ,רפוי ,שבת ,בשת) zum Ersatz obliegen, ist ein Unterschied in dem Grade des Bewusstseins, mit welchem die Tat geübt worden. Hinsichtlich des direkten Schadens heißt es: אדם מועד לעולם בין שוגג בין מזיד בין ער בין ישן סימא את עין חבירו ושיבר את הכלים משלם נזק שלם ( B. K. 26 a) "der Mensch ist immer verantwortlich, ohne Absicht oder mit Absicht, wachend oder schlafend (wenn der beschädigte Gegenstand bereits vor seinem Einschlafen ihm entsprechend nahe gewesen): hat er den Nächsten geblendet oder Geräte zerbrochen, leistet er vollen Ersatz." Die entferntern Folgen der Beschädigung: Schmerz, Heilung, Versäumnis fordern einen gewissen Grad des Bewusstseins der Gefährlichkeit seiner Handlung; Beschimpfung, בשת, sogar Absicht, weil Unabsichtlichkeit den Begriff der Beschimpfung aufhebt (siehe B. K. das. b u. 27 a). Es heißt daher hier: וכי יריבון, und zwar noch mit hervorhebenden 'ן, sie sind nur im Wortstreit begriffen, hatten von vornherein gar nicht die Absicht, einander zu beschädigen. Das Schlagen mag im Affekt geschehen sein. Es mildert das nicht die Ersatzpflicht, die ja nicht Strafe, sondern möglichste Wiedergutmachung des angerichteten Schadens bezweckt. Daher auch, da Geldersatz nicht Bestrafung des verübten Unrechts, sondern Ersatz des verübten Schadens ist, bei Leibesbeschädigungen dieser Ersatz nie erschöpfend sein kann, und zumal das Schmerzgefühl gehabter Kränkung nie aufhebt: darum dauert, selbst nach geleistetem Ersatz, die Schuldigkeit des Beschädigers vor Gott fort und kann nur durch Verzeihung des Beschädigten gesühnt werden. (B. K. 92 a, Ramb. חובל ומזיק V.9. der den Satz der Mischna allgemein fasst. So auch Ch. M. 422, 1. Andere beziehen dies bloß auf בשת.)

וכי יריבון אנשים, “if two men engage in an argument that has become physical;” from this wording I might think that the legislation which follows applies only to males, how do we know that it applies equally to females? Rabbi Eliezer says that seeing that when the Torah discusses the subject of compensations for damages caused is written in general terms not mentioning men or women separately and mentions genders only a single time (in verse 29, i.e. that the victim is either man or woman) it is clear that the entire subject applies equally to both sexes.

ונפל למשכב BUT KEEPETH HIS BED — The meaning is as the Targum gives it: ויפל לבוטלן “and he falls into inactivity”, i. e. he falls into an illness that prevents him from working.

The intent of the Torah is to inform us that payments of compensation such as loss of income, medical expenses, etc., are all applicable only if the victim does not die as a result of this fight. This is the reason the Torah only mentions compensation for loss of income after it had described the victim as having recovered sufficiently so that he could get about without help.

גרף .באבן או באגרף: zusammenscharren, zusammenfassen, daher: אגרף, die zusammengefasste Hand, die geballte Faust. Indem aber das Gesetz das Mittel der Beschädigung nennt und sich nicht begnügt zu sagen: והכה איש את רעהו ולא ימות וגו׳, so ist damit gesagt, dass nicht nur der Erfolg, sondern auch das Mittel der Beschädigung zur Beurteilung kommt, und zwar nennt es: אבן, als ein Objekt, mit welchem Beschädigung und Tötung bewirkt werden kann, und אגרף, die Faust des Beschädigers, die ידוע, d. h. die der gerichtlichen Veurteilung nicht entzogen werden kann, מסור לעדה ולעדים (B. K. 91 a). Es ist nämlich der Beschädiger nur für solche Verletzung verantwortlich, die durch den von ihm mit dem von ihm gebrauchten Mittel geführten Schlag in der Regel bewirkt werden konnte. Folgen, die in der Regel von einem solchen Schlage mit einem solchen Mittel nicht bewirkt werden, müssen von andern Umständen herrühren, für welche der Täter nicht verantwortlich gemacht wird. Es hat also das Gericht sachkundig das Mittel und den Schlag im Verhältnis zu den davon zu erwartenden Folgen zu schätzen יש אומד לנזקין (B. K. das.).

או באגרוף, “or with a certain type of stone,” (according to the Targum) The same expression is used by Torat Kohanim when explaining Leviticus 14,40 where the treatment of an eruptive like plague on the walls of a house is discussed. The usual translation of אגרוף, is: ”fist,” possibly not acceptable to the sages, as it is not a lethal tool, and the death of the victim within 24 hours, which according to Torah law would be equivalent to murder, seems unduly harsh.

I am not sure that if the victim had been expected to die but recovered instead whether this is to be considered an act of G'd (miracle) or not. We have learned in Chulin 42 that an animal which suffers from certain categories of injuries dies within 12 months. In the event it did not die within this period we consider this as something supernatural, and we do not allow such occurrences to change the status of the animal. Similarly in our case. Do we say that the victim's recovery was miraculous and he therefore does not qualify for the various compensations listed in the Torah just as he would not have qualified for such payments if he had died? Or do we consider the fact that he has recovered as the only criterion in determining the compensation due him? According to Maimonides Hilchot Rotzeach chapter 4,3 anyone who did not die is entitled to compensation even if his recovery was a miracle, medically speaking.

Subsequently I found the following statement in the Mechilta. "If he does not die but becomes bed-ridden; if, however, the aggressor inflicted the kind of injury which normally results in death, the attacker is free of the obligation to pay compensation." It appears that the author of the Mechilta makes the payment of compensation dependent exclusively on what the attacker had done and how he had done it.

It appears that the author of this Mechilta holds that the attacker is to be freed from the need to pay for loss of income only if the victim died because the injury he received was lethal. If the victim had succumbed to a non-lethal blow, a situation in which the attacker would not be guilty of the death penalty, he would have to pay the various payments an injured person would have been entitled to. If the attacker did not pay the victim before he died, he would have to make these payments to the estate of the victim.

על משענתו (lit., with that on which he relies) — i. e. his former healthy state and vigour (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:19:1; cf. Onkelos).

IF HE RISE AGAIN, AND WALKS ABROAD ‘AL MISH’ANTO’ — “in his former healthy state and vigor.” This is Rashi’s language. And Rabbi ibn Ezra said that the reason why this word [which means literally: “support”] is used, is to tell us that he must not be dependant upon others for the ability to walk, like an invalid, but must walk by himself;¹³²Thus according to Rashi mish’anto is “his physical strength;” according to Ibn Ezra, it is “his leaning” or “support.” Ramban will proceed to explain it in its literal sense — “on his staff.” Almost all translations follow Ramban’s interpretation. only then shall he that smote him be quit from prison.
In my opinion, mish’anto is to be understood in its literal sense, [a staff], just as in the verses: every man with ‘mish’anto’ (his staff) in his hand for old age;¹³³Zechariah 8:4. ‘mish’eneth’ (the staff) of this bruised reed.¹³⁴II Kings 18:21. Scripture is thus stating that if the injured person’s health improves sufficiently to enable him to go out walking as he wishes in the streets and in the broad ways¹³⁵Song of Songs 3:2. with his staff, like those healed from some prolonged disabling injury, then shall he that smote him be quit; and it further teaches us that even if the injured man is careless later about his health and dies after that in his weakness, the assailant is free from the death penalty. Scripture says and he walketh abroad because it speaks of the customary way of life, for injured men who were laid up in bed do not go out walking again until their wounds have healed and they are out of danger, this being the sense of the phrase, and he walketh abroad, because if he just gets up and walks in his house on his staff, and then dies, the assailant is not free [from the death penalty].
In the words of the Mechilta:¹³⁶Mechilta here on the Verse. “If he rise again and walketh. I might think this means within the house; Scripture therefore says, abroad. But from the word abroad I might think that even if he was wasting away [the assailant is still free from punishment]; Scripture therefore says, if he rise again.” This explanation too is very correct, that Scripture should be saying that if the injured man gets up completely from his bed and goes steadily outside — without having to go back to his bed when returning from outside, as is the way of those who continue to waste away — even though he is weak and has to lean upon a staff, the assailant shall be let off. In general all this is to be interpreted as being figurative, language expressing people’s practical conduct, and the basic rule is that he must have been assessed as being capable of recovery. This is why Onkelos translated al mish’anto: al boryeih (in his healthy state).

רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא, he shall only pay for loss of income and cause him to be cured completely. This means that even if the victim has regained the ability to get around unassisted but he cannot yet pursue his occupation, the attacker has to continue payments for loss of income. The same applies to continued medical supervision of the victim if the latter deems same as necessary.

'אם יקום והתהלך וגו, if he dies, even after a lengthy interval, the attacker will be executed. If the victim was one’s servant the owner is guilty of the death penalty only if the victim died immediately as the result of the blow, not if he survived for a day or two.

על משענתו, “on his cane.” According to Rashi the Torah means that the injured person can manage to walk without any external assists, as distinct from sick and weak people who require canes or “walkers.” Nachmanides writes: “it appears to me that the Torah means that if this injured person is able to walk even only with the help of a cane, or “walker,” that the person who has hit him is exonerated from the charge of manslaughter (if eventually, more than 24 hours later the victim dies) The Torah’s example is based on the most likely result of injuries sustained by being struck by a stone or a fist. The immediate result may be a short sojourn in bed followed by a rapid recovery. The fact that the victim has ventured outside before he died, is an indication that any danger he had been in had already passed before that stage. If he had only been able to hobble around indoors, the attacker is not exonerated from causing the death of his victim.

ורפא ירפא, “and he shall provide for healing.” Whenever the Bible mentions the word רפואה when applied to a human being the letter פ always appears with the dagesh. For instance Jeremiah 51,9 רפאנו את בבל ולא נרפתה, “we tried to cure Babylon but she was incurable;” when we find the word used as something being performed by G’d then there is no dagesh in the letter פ. Example: Jeremiah 17,14 רפאני ה' וארפא, “Heal me O Lord and I shall be healed.” Another example is found in Psalms 147,3: הרופא לשבורי לב, “He heals the broken-hearted, etc.” There are many more examples. The reason for this distinction in the spelling of the description of the applied cure is that when man, i.e. a physician, administers a cure it is apt to be accompanied by pain and suffering, whereas a cure administered by the Lord is a painless procedure. This is part of the meaning of Proverbs 10,22: “the blessing of the Lord enriches, He does not add sorrow to it.”
When the sages in Baba Kama 85 stated that the words ורפא ירפא in our verse constitute permission for a physician to practice his art they said so only in connection with externally visible injuries or symptoms of diseases; internal diseases, especially mental diseases are not subject to treatment by physicians of flesh and blood. They are the sole domain of the One who provides the soul to all living creatures. [This interpretation seems to be based on Ibn Ezra, but is disputed by other authorities. Ed.].

On his health and his strength. [Rashi knows this] because if the meaning of משענתו was literal, “his staff,” the person [walking on his staff] could still be ill and might still die. If so, why does it say, “The one who struck him shall be acquitted”?

V. 19. על משענתו kann unmöglich an einem Stabe, oder einer Krücke heißen. War der Beschädigte früher in seinem Gehen ungehindert und bleibt jetzt in Folge des erlittenen Schlages lahm, so kann unmöglich dies durch bloßen Ersatz des Versäumnisses und der Heilungskosten vergütet sein. Ebenso wenig kann es die noch andauernde Schwäche des Rekonvaleszenten bezeichnen sollen; denn, so lange die Folgen der Verwundung noch andauern, wird das ונקה המכה nicht ausgesprochen werden können. Es würde ja auch sonst על משענת heißen, wenn es eine Stütze bezeichnen sollte, deren er sich erst jetzt in Folge seiner Erkrankung bedienen müsste. משענתו heißt aber seine gewohnte Stütze und bezeichnet es vielmehr: על בוריו, seine völlige Wiederherstellung. Er geht wieder, wie er vor der Beschädigung gegangen.

אם יקום והתהלך בחוץ, “if he (the person who had been knocked to the ground) gets up and walks outside the house unaided;” if that person takes to his bed and does not even partially recover, so that he dies before having been able to walk, the party that knocked him down will be tried for murder (and executed if he had been duly warned by witnessing observing the fight).

ונקה המכה [WHEN HE RISES AGAIN…] HE THAT SMOTE HIM SHALL BE FREED — But could it enter your mind that this person who has not killed anyone at all should be subject to the death penalty? Why, then, is it necessary to state this? But it is intended to teach you that he is kept in prison until we discover whether the other is completely healed or not, and what the verse implies is this: when this man rises again (אם יקום) and walks in the street in his former vigour, then he who smote him shall be freed from prison, but so long as the other has not risen from the sick-bed etc. the man who smote him is not freed (Ketubot 33b; Sanhedrin 78b).

Scripture states, only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed, but it does not say, “he shall pay for the loss of his time and his medical care.” in order to tell us that he must pay the money for the doctors to heal him, and the injured person cannot demand that he should give him the compensation and he will do other things with it. Instead, the assailant must heal him under all circumstances.

שבתו, loss of income from the victim’s normal occupation by being bedridden.

רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא, “he only has to pay compensation to the victim for time lost from work, and for his medical expenses.” The Torah refers only to the fee of the attending physician, not to the cost of medications, which, if prescribed by the physician will also be supplied by him. The victim is not entitled to forego the medications and retain the cost of them. Unless he uses them, the attacker is not liable for their cost. Our sages derive from the wording ורפא ירפא that the physician is permitted to practice his art, and that we do not adopt the attitude that if G’d wants him to recover he will recover and if not he will die, i.e. that it is not up to us to interfere. (Baba Kama105). The comment in the Talmud is strange as we have a law (Leviticus 19,16) that one must not stand idly by when a fellow Jew is in mortal danger and could be saved when one takes the appropriate action. The answer given is that the verse ורפא ירפא is needed to make clear that if through lack of skill or misdiagnosis the patient dies after receiving treatment, we do not hold his physician responsible for the death. Another interpretation of the line is that the physician is entitled to charge for his services. If not for this verse we would have assumed that it is one’s moral and ethical duty to heal for free, just as judges do not get paid, and just as Torah is taught for free. [the latter, no longer common, is excused by Abravanel on the grounds that if the teacher of Torah is economically underprivileged, lives in dire circumstances, his students will not want to “buy his wares,” i.e. his Torah, believing that Torah scholars are slated for a life of poverty. Ed.]

He must pay the doctor’s fee. [He must pay in all cases because] even if he is a doctor, the victim may claim: “I do not want you to heal me, because to me, you are like a devouring lion!” And if the striker says, “I know a doctor who will heal you for free,” the victim may claim, “A doctor who heals for nothing is worth nothing.”

We may understand the word רק as referring to something mentioned by Maimonides in Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. We estimate the cost of medical care as well as the loss of income as soon as the fight is over and the attacker makes these payments immediately. If the estimate proves wrong and the victim takes longer to recover, the attacker is not assessed additional damages. This ruling applies only if the attacker is willing to pay the whole amount of damages immediately. If the attacker preferred to compensate the victim on a day to day basis this limitation on the amount of total damages assessed by the judges does not apply. Maimonides appears to have derived this rule from the word רק in our verse.

ונקה המכה kann nicht sagen wollen: frei von Todesstrafe; es wäre dies überflüssig, da der Beschädigte lebt. Es heißt vielmehr: frei von der Untersuchungshaft, und setzt den Fall voraus, אמדוהו למיתה, das Gericht habe den Schlag für tödlich erkannt, und musste der Täter bis zum Ausweis des Erfolges in Verhaft bleiben; es ist daher hier der Satz: אמדוהו למיתה וחי פטור ממיתה וחייב בה׳ דברים (Sanhedrin 78 b). Dem gegenüber findet die Halacha in dem vorangehenden Verse, in welchem sonst das ולא ימות völlig überflüssig wäre, den entgegengesetzten Fall angedeutet: dass der Schlag ein solcher gewesen, ולא ימות, dass nach dem Urteil des Gerichts er nicht daran sterben würde; in einem solchen Falle ist er ebenfalls frei von Todes- oder Galutstrafe, selbst wenn der Beschädigte gleichwohl gestorben, אמדוהו לחיים ומת פטור ממיתה והייב בה׳ דברים (ebendaselbst). Dagegen: אמדוהו למיתה והיקל ממה שהיה ולאחר מכאן הכביד ומת חייב (daselbst).

על משענתו, “supporting himself on his walking cane;” the word משענת is used in the Bible in this sense in Kings II 4,29: וקח משענתי בידך, ”and take my walking cane in your hand;” [Elisha speaking to his servant Geychazi)

רק שבתו ONLY [HE SHALL PAY FOR] THE LOSS OF HIS TIME — i. e. for the interruption of his labour due to this illness. If, for instance, he cut off his hand or his foot, we regard the interruption of labour caused by this illness as though his occupation were that of a watchman in a cucumber field (which work can be done even by a man lacking a hand or a foot), for even after he has recovered from the illness he will not be able to do work which requires hands or feet, and indeed the value of his hand or his foot that was cut off the other has already paid to him as “damages” (נזק), as it is said, (v. 24) “hand for hand, foot for foot”. (Having compensated him already for loss of capacity as a wage-earner whole in body, it would not be right if this man has again to pay him for loss of time as though he were of full-earning capacity) (Bava Kamma 85b).

ורפא ירפא. and he will provide full medical services. This too can best be explained by what Maimonides wrote in the above-mentioned chapter of Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. "If the victim said to the attacker: 'pay me cash and I will look for my own doctor, etc.,' one does not take any notice of this." The ruling is derived from the wording in our verse which strongly suggests that the onus of providing medical care is on the attacker personally. This is in contrast to the payment for loss of income where the Torah spoke of the attacker "giving" the payment directly to the victim. There are many other interesting rules which have been derived from the repetition of the words ורפא ירפא.

רק שבתו יתן וגו׳. Es sind hier nur die durch das Krankenlager (ונפל למשכב) entspringenden Kosten genannt und zugleich, wie die מכילתא bemerkt, damit gesagt, dass bei tödlichem Schlage mit tödlichem Ausgange nicht auch noch Versäumnis und Heilungskosten zu Ersatz kommen (siehe V. 23). Die sofort durch die Beschädigung sich ergebenden Ersatzpflichten נזק צער בשת folgen V. 24. — רק שבתו וגו׳. Dieses רק beschränkt die Ersatzpflicht auf die durch die Verletzung als solche hervorgerufene Versäumnis und notwendig gewordene Heilung, schließt jedoch den Fall aus, wenn er durch Übertretung der ärztlichen Vorschrift die Krankheit verlängert hätte, עבר על דברי רופא (B. K. 85 a.).

שבתו, “compensation for income lost through being bedridden;” Compare use of this expression in Ruth 2,7: זה שבתה הבית מעט, “she has rested but a little.”

ורפא ירפא — Translate it as the Targum does: he shall pay the physician’s fee.

ורפא ירפא. Durch die Prägnanz dieser Wiederholung ist zugleich der irrigen Meinung begegnet, als sei der Gebrauch ärztlicher Hilfe dem von Gott geforderten Vertrauen entgegen, מכאן שנתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות (B. K. 85 a); das Gesetz setzt die Anwendung ärztlicher Hilfe voraus und fordert sie hier, und wie תוספו׳ (das.) bemerkt, nicht nur wie hier bei Verwundungen, sondern auch bei sonstigen Erkrankungen.

יתן, he (the one who inflicted the wound) has to “give,” even if the wounded person recovered without having sustained permanent damage.

וכי יכה איש את עבדו או את אמתו AND IF A MAN SMITE HIS SERVANT OR HIS MAIDSERVANT — Scripture speaks of a Canaanitish servant. Or perhaps this is not so, but it speaks of a Hebrew servant? Scripture however states, (Exodus 21:21) “for he is his money”. How is it in the case of his money? It is something that is his forever (i. e. it is something the possession of which is not limited to a definite time)! So also the servant referred to here is such a one as is his forever (and only a Canaanitish servant serves his master for ever, cf. Leviticus 25:46, whilst the Hebrew servant goes free after six years). But surely he (one that smites his servant) is included in the general statement, (Exodus 21:12) ”Whosoever smiteth a man [so that he die shall surely be put to death]”; why, then, is this case mentioned at all? But Scripture singles it out from the general statement that he (who smiteth his servant etc.) may be subject to the particular regulation of “a day or two” (Exodus 21:21) — that if he (the servant) does not die beneath his hand and continue to live twenty-four hours his master should be freed from the death-penalty (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21.20.1).

IF A MAN SMITE HIS BONDMAN. Our Sages have already perforce derived from the expression, for he is his money,¹³⁷Verse 21. that this verse speaks of a Canaanite bondman, and the plain meaning of Scripture is indeed as they say, for his countryman, a Hebrew man or woman, is not called plain eved or amah without any further qualifications.¹³⁸See also Ramban above Verse 7, and Note 67. Scripture states ‘basheivet’ [with a patach under the beth, which indicates the definite article, thus meaning] “with the rod”: [And if a man smite his bondman, or his bondwoman, with the rod], because it is the custom of a ruler or master to keep in his hand a rod, and G-d therefore warned him that even if it be a rod of correction¹³⁹Proverbs 22:15. and not a wooden cane, he should be careful with it and should not use it to hit even a Ganaanite bondman with a persecution that none restrained.¹⁴⁰Isaiah 14:6. This is the purport of the expression, and he die under his hand, meaning that he kept striking him until he died. It was not necessary for Scripture to state the punishment which he is liable to, but it just stated that he is not to go free merely because the bondman is his money, but he shall surely be punished, as is the punishment of anyone who strikes another person so that he dies, where Scripture has said, he shall surely be put to death.¹⁴¹Above, Verse 12.
In line with the plain meaning of Scripture the intention of: Notwithstanding, if a day or two ‘ya’amod’,¹³⁷Verse 21. [generally translated “he continues”], is that the bondman literally gets up “and stands” on his feet. This is why it was necessary for Scripture to say a day or two, the meaning thereof being that if on that day or on the following day the bondman will stand up on his feet, he [i.e., the master] shall not be punished. And the verse is to be understood as if it said: “notwithstanding, [if he stands up] ‘bayom’ or ‘bayomayim’ (in a day or in two) or ‘l’yom’ or ‘l’yomayim’ (to a day or to two).¹⁴²The verse has it: yom o yomayim [literally: “a day or two”]. This fits in with the translation of ya’amod as “he continues,” thus: if he continues [living] a day or two. Ramban who interprets ya’amod in its literal sense — “he stands up” — therefore concludes that the sense of the verse is: “notwithstanding, if he stands up in a day or in two etc.” The opinion of the Rabbis mentioned further on will explain sufficiently why the Torah did write here yom o yomayim. There are many such cases [where the prefix beth or lamed is missing as it is assumed in the meaning of the word]. Thus, at first He had said, and he die under his hand, which might be taken to have meant that the bondman died immediately at the time he struck him; therefore He referred back and explained that if on the day he struck him he stood up on his feet, or even if he could not stand at all on that day, but did so on the next day, the master is free from punishment. But if he did not stand up at all, the master is liable to punishment, even though the bondman only died on the second day, for that too is considered as if he died under his hand. It did not mention a case where he stood up on the third day, for if the bondman lived three days, the master is free from the death penalty, since this is no longer considered a case of he die under his hand.
In the opinion of our Rabbis¹³⁶Mechilta here on the Verse. Scripture mentioned yom o yomayim [“a day or two,” and not bayom o bayomayim, “in a day or in two”], in order to teach us that [for the master to go free] the bondman must have survived twenty-four hours, and the meaning of the expression used is: “a complete day [consisting, as it does, of twenty-four hours]; or two days, neither of which consists of a complete day, [but instead the period of twenty-four hours is made up of the parts of two separate days].” Had it said just “a day,” the bondman would have had to continue living for a night first and then the following day, as is the “day” of the Torah mentioned at the creation¹⁴³And there was evening and there was morning, one day (Genesis 1:5). and in connection with the Sabbaths and festivals; [but now that it said, a day or two it means any period of twenty-four hours, as explained above]. The word ya’amod [in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis] then means that “he continues to live.” Similarly, that they may ‘ya’amdu’ many days,¹⁴⁴Jeremiah 32:14. means “continue to exist.” And this is the correct and true interpretation of the verse.

נקום ינקם, the blood of the slave. The master is certainly not permitted to administer such a cruel blow even though he owns this human being. He is allowed to administer physical punishments as we know from Proverbs 29,19 בדברים לא יוסר עבד, “a slave does not respond to mere oral chastisement.”

בשבט, with a rod, etc. Maimonides writes in chapter 2,14 of Hilchot Rotzeach: "I believe that the word "rod" is to be taken literally. If the master hit the slave with a knife, a sword, a stone or a fist, or something similar, and the court judged that the slave would die from the result of such an attack even after a full year, the master is subject to execution." I do not understand why the master should be executed if he used an instrument which is normally not lethal if the victim did not survive for 24 hours. In such a situation the assailant is not guilty of the death penalty even if he struck a person who is not his slave, i.e. not his personal property. I believe that the reason the Torah writes בשבט with a rod, is that if the master's actions prove that all he wanted to do was to discipline his slave, something normally done with a rod, G'd allowed him a 24 hour period before he would be considered guilty of murder seeing that the slave is his personal property and one does not destroy one's personal property on purpose. If the instrument used to inflict fatal injuries on the slave was one that is not normally employed when one wants to discipline someone but a weapon used when one is about to kill a person, such as stabbing the slave in his belly with a sword, the Torah does not grant the master a reprieve of 24 hours during which survival of his slave may save him from a murder charge. He will be guilty of murder even if death occurs a year after the stabbing, for instance.

בשבט, an example of an instrument used to administer physical punishment to one’s slave in order to discipline him. If the slave had been struck with a sword, for instance, even if he had not died within the first twenty four hours, the master would be guilty of manslaughter as the tool used to inflict the injury points at criminal rather than disciplinary intention. The subject of our verse is a gentile slave. A Jewish servant, by contrast, not being the personal property of his master, is treated legally in all respects as if he were a hired hand, with the exception of his master (employer’s ) right to give him a gentile slave as his wife.

With a rod. Killing him with a rod is crueler than killing him with a sword, therefore heaven will take special revenge against the master.

וכי יכה איש את עבדו, “if someone strikes his (gentile) slave, etc.” The subject of this verse is only a gentile slave, whose body is owned by his master. The Torah teaches that although the stick had been used as a disciplinary rod, and the stick was not a walking cane (whose use as a disciplinary means might inflict far more pain and injury,) the owner must take care not to inflict the kind of injury that might prove lethal. Otherwise, the death is to be avenged.

Included in: “Whoever strikes a man who dies. . . [Rashi asks this] because even a gentile is included [in the term איש (man), in the verse: “Whoever strikes a man who dies shall be put to death.”] And certainly a gentile slave, who is obligated to keep mitzvos, [is included]. For a gentile is only excluded when the Torah writes רעהו (his friend).

נקם ינקם, the reason the Torah employed the term “revenge” in this context [instead of speaking of judicial execution, Ed.] is that it is clear that the master had intended to kill the slave when hitting him. He had arranged to do it in such a sly way that it would be considered as a blow out of a feeling of revenge but not one intended to be lethal. The Torah characterises the master’s execution as an act of “avenging the servant” so that everyone will be aware that he had intended to kill deliberately and the execution is the avenging of an uncalled for murder. If the killing of the master was not judicial execution, he himself will also be avenged.

V. 20. Dass hier von einem עבד כנעני die Rede ist, beweist das כי כספו הוא (V. 21). בשבט, ein Mittel der Züchtigung. Nur wenn er mit einem zur Züchtigung erlaubten Mittel und zur Züchtigung ihn geschlagen, tritt die V. 21 ausgesprochene Milderung ein. (Ramb. Hilch. Rozeach. 2, 14). Onkelos übersetzt daher auch בשולטן, in Ausübung seines Herrenrechtes.

וכי יכה איש, “and if a man strikes, etc.;” how do we know that the verse also addresses women? Rabbi Yishmael says what we already attributed to Rabbi Eliezer as an answer to this question on verse 18.

בשבט WITH A ROD — Scripture speaks of a rod that is capable of inflicting death. Or perhaps it speaks even of one that is not capable of inflicting death (but some-how or other the servant died beneath his hand)? Scripture however states, (Numbers 35:17) in reference to an Israellite (cf. Numbers 35:15) “And if he smote him with a stone in the hand, wherewith he may die, [and he die, he is a murderer]”. Now is not the following statement a logical conclusion à fortiori? How is it if one has killed an Israelite whose case is more stringent (inasmuch as the leniency mentioned in v. 21 is not applied to it)? He is not subject to the death penalty unless he smote him with an instrument capable of inflicting death and unless it be a limb through the striking of which by such an instrument he is likely to die! Then in the case of a servant where (as can be seen from v. 21) the conditions are less stringent, does it not follow all the more that he is not subject to the death penalty? (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21.20.4).

By the rule of “a day or two.” You might ask: Why did Rashi not ask his question on the verse [immediately, rather than first proving that it speaks of a gentile slave]? The answer is, so we will not say: Since the Torah taught the special law of “a day or two” concerning a gentile slave, it will apply also to a Jewish slave, in accordance with the rule of davar shehaya bichlal. . . [which allows this special law to apply to everything in the category of slaves]. Therefore Rashi first proves that the verse is talking only about a gentile slave. And Rashi is saying, so to speak: “Now [the rule of ‘a day or two’] will come out clear, [since we have established that the verse is not speaking of a Hebrew slave].”

נקום ינקם bezeichnet die Hinrichtung durch das Schwert, wie והבאתי עליכם חרב נוקמת .(Wajikra 26, 24) (Sanhedrin 52 b). Es ist dies die auf Mord gesetzte Strafe Dass diese Strafe hier bei dem an einen Sklaven begangenen Mord durch נקמה ausgedrückt ist, dürfte tief bezeichnend sein. Wie aus Bereschit 9, 1—6 erscheint, ist der Mord als eine höhnende Verleugnung des צלם אלהים-Charakters des Menschen zu begreifen. In dem Morde eines Menschen ist somit der göttliche Charakter der ganzen Menschengesellschaft, und innerhalb derselben zunächst derjenige des nächsten Kreises des Ermordeten angegriffen. Bei dem Freien tritt daher der nächste Verwandte als גואל הדם als "Annehmer des vergossenen Blutes" auf. Der Leibeigene, der keinen גואל in der Verwandtschaft hat, findet in der Gesamtheit diesen גואל. Sie hat als Rächerin des in ihm gehöhnten göttlichen Menschencharakters aufzutreten.

בשבט, “with a rod;” the Torah chooses as an illustration instruments with which the average master disciplines his slaves. This is why the first letter ב in this word is “open,” as if the Torah had written: בהשבט. If the master had struck that slave with a sword or other instrument used to inflict death, he will be treated as an intentional murderer even if his victim survived for a day or two, seeing that this was not the way one disciplines a person.

נקם ינקם HE SHALL SURELY BE AVENGED — This means execution by the sword. For thus does Scripture state, (Leviticus 26:25) “a sword avenging the vengeance of my covenant” (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21.20.6; Sanhedrin 52b).

And upon a limb which is capable of causing death. . . [Rashi knows this] because [regarding a Yisraelite victim] it says (Devarim 19:11): “And he will ambush him, arising against him.” This means that he has intent to kill him. But if the rock [or the stricken limb] was not capable of causing death, perforce he had no intent to kill him. You might ask: [If this law can be learned from a Yisraelite victim,] why does the Torah need to write in this verse, “With a rod”? The answer is: a fortiori reasoning [“it follows even more so. . .”] is not a valid basis for applying a punishment.

ומת מחת ידו, “and he dies as a result of this beating;” seeing that he had used permissible means of disciplining, the death of the victim is attributed to something like an accident, the master not having intended to deprive himself of the services of this slave. An alternate interpretation of the expression: תחת ידו; “while still being beaten;” this is no longer “disciplining,” but killing with one’s own hands.

אך אם יום או יומים יעמד לא יקם NOTWITHSTANDING IF HE CONTINUE A DAY OR TWO, HE SHALL NOT BE AVENGED — If the master is free of the death penally in case of the servant remaining alive one day, is it not logical that he is free if he lives two days (what need is there for Scripture to add יומים)? But it adds it to show that the term יום is to be defined by יומים — “a day that is like two days”. And what kind of day is thereby meant? A period of twenty-four hours (a day which comprises a part of two separate days) (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:21:1).

כי כספו הוא, and it is up to him to discipline him. Sometimes a slave’s insubordination continues until the master is forced to administer a strong blow. We have read of such in Proverbs 17,11 ומלאך אכזרי ישלח בואך מרי יבקש רע, “an evil man seeks to rebel; therefore a cruel messenger will be dispatched against him.”

לא יקם כי בספו הוא, he will not be avenged for it was his own money. If he killed the slave unintentionally (in the accepted sense of the word), the master will have to be confined in a city of refuge on account of this. In this ruling there is no difference between putting to death of one's slave or some other human being. Exile is applicable only if one killed directly, in accordance with the definitions we outlined in verse 12. The Torah only needed to write in which respect the law of a master killing a slave is different from someone who kills a person who is not his slave.

כי כספו הוא, and it is in order to administer a bodily blow in order to discipline him.

אך אם יום או יומים יעמוד, “but if he will survive one or two days, etc.” seeing that if a survival of a single day suffices not to treat this death as manslaughter, why does the Torah add the words “or two days?” Our sages answer that what the Torah refers to is a day that is comparable to two days, i.e. the minimum period of survival is 24 hours, even on two successive calendar dates. (Mechilta)

Even were he to linger for 24 hours. . . Rashi is answering the question: Why did the verse not simply say, “His slave, who is his property”? Why does it instead say, “For he is his property”? Thus Rashi explains that this phrase is providing a reason for the above law, saying: only the master is subject to the law of “a day or two,” [since the slave is his property], but another person does not.

V. 21. יום או יומים, nach der Halacha: Ausdruck für vierundzwanzig Stunden. Es kann ja auch nur eine ganz bestimmte Zeit präzisieren wollen, und wenn schon nach einem Tage die Milderung eintritt, so bedarfs des zweiten nicht. Da im Tempel der Tag mit dem Morgen, im bürgerlichen Leben mit der Nacht beginnt, so sind innerhalb vierundzwanzig Stunden immer je nach der einen oder andern Beziehung ein oder zwei Tage enthalten, מכילתא) יום שהוא כיומים ויומים שהוא כיום).

אך אם יום או יומים, “but if he survives for a day or two, etc.” Rashi commenting on verse 20, explains that the subject in that verse was either a Canaanite slave or slave-woman, and that our verse was necessary to describe under what circumstances the scenario described here has been exempted from the general rule applying to someone who struck his Canaanite slave, fatally, with an object that could be assumed to cause death. If death was delayed by at least 24 hours, the master is not treated as a murderer, but as someone who had disciplined someone whom he owned physically. [At this point the author engages in a discussion of the applicability of two closely related principles of Torah exegesis, known as the thirteen principles of Rabbi Yishmael, something extremely complicated for anyone not familiar with these principles. This editor does not think that he is qualified to explain this adequately to his readers, and has decided that rather than to confuse the reader he will omit this. He points to what Rashi himself has written in his commentary on verse 12, that he will endeavour to explain this legislation and why it appears so many times in the Torah, each time in a slightly different format. If even Rashi felt this way, this editor may be forgiven for preferring to skip part of this. Ed.]

יום או יומים, “a day or two days.” The reference is to one day that is equivalent to two days. The verse could not be referring to actual days, as if even one day’s survival is sufficient to absolve the killer from the charge of murder, survival for two days would not need to be mentioned. According to the plain meaning of the text, in consonance with the practice of the Torah, we can simply translate this as “he does not even have to survive two days for the master not to be accused of murder, even a survival of 24 hours is sufficient.” We find a parallel construction in Deuteronomy 17,6: על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים, “on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses.”

לא יקם כי כספו הוא HE SHALL NOT BE AVENGED: FOR HE IS HIS MONEY — However, any other person who smote him (the servant) is subject to the death penalty although he lived 24 hours before dying.

כי כספו הוא: das Motiv zu dieser Milderung kann nicht in einem etwa tiefer stehenden Menschencharakter des Leibeigenen liegen, da sie nur bei Tötung desselben durch den Herrn eintritt, für jeden andern jedoch ganz das Gesetz der Tötung eines Freien gilt. Vielmehr kann das Motiv nur, in dem Verhältnis des Herrn zu seinem Leibeigenen liegen und ist dies Verhältnis durch die Motivierung כי כספו הוא so scharf bedingt, dass die Milderung nur dann eintritt, wenn der Getötete כספו המיוחד לו ganz nur ausschließlich sein Eigentum war, also dass, wenn er z. B. das Eigentum zweier gewesen, für keinen seiner Herren diese Milderung gilt (B. K. 90 a). Der Begriff dieses Motivs ist schwer zu finden. Der später erfolgte Tod dürfte denselben nicht unbedingt als Folge des Schlages erscheinen lassen, und dieser Umstand, verbunden mit dem Züchtigungsrecht des Herrn, nach welchem in dem Schlagen an sich kein Verbrechen liegt, dürfte vielleicht hier ebenso die Milderung motivieren, wie bei der unabsichtlichen Tötung auch die Galutstrafe nur dann eintritt, wenn der Tod so unmittelbar erfolgt, dass kein Luftzug oder keine heftige Bewegung den schnellen Eintritt des Todes befördert haben kann (Gittin 71 a).

כי כספו הוא, “for he is as if his own money.” He has full control of the servant including beating him, but only in order to discipline him. (Rash’bam)

The mystical significance of שאר, כסות and עונה, is incorporated in the concept of שכינה. In the book Tomer Devorah, chapter six, this is described in the following words. "Just as G–d is pure and holy, so man has to perform these duties towards his wife in a similar spirit. After a person has achieved a certain degree of purity, he should perform on the Jewish servant maid, אמה עבריה, the commandment of שאר, כסות ועונה, i.e. the three duties a husband needs to discharge towards his wife, his companion for life." 1) He has to provide her physical needs, sustenance, generously; this means he has to be instrumental in channelling this blessing on to her from Heaven. 2) He has to protect her against the influence of negative spiritual forces; he should see to it that in their pairings there is no desire for purely physical gratification. This means he has to "cover" the opening that exists there more than anywhere for the evil urge, which is commonly known as ערוה. The meaning of kessut then is "a covering for nakedness, shame." A major tool helping one to attain this aim is to ensure that all one's actions are purely motivated to be service to G–d. Another formidable tool that helps to ward of the evil urge is the טלית ותפילין, the prayer shawl and the phylacteries. In the language of the Kabbalists the ספירה גבורה is another name for the domain of the evil urge, whereas the ספירה חסד is another name for the domain of the "good urge." Whereas the latter was created for the needs of אדם himself, the former was created to provide the needs of his wife. A third effective tool against the machinations of the evil urge is the immersion in Torah study. When man allocates different times, i.e. עונה, for all these personality building activities, he may consider himself as "dating" the שכינה, G–d's Presence.

וכי ינצו אנשים IF MEN STRIVE with each other and one intended to strike the other and inadvertently struck the woman (Sanhedrin 79b).

AND IF MEN STRIVE TOGETHER, AND HURT A WOMAN WITH CHILD, SO THAT HER FRUIT DEPART, AND YET NO HARM FOLLOW, HE SHALL BE SURELY FINED, ‘KA’ASHER’ THE WOMAN’S HUSBAND SHALL LAY UPON HIM. “This means: ‘when’¹⁴⁵Rashi is thus explaining the letter kaf in the word ka’asher not in the sense of “as,” indicating degree or extent (“according as”), but in the sense of “when” — when the woman’s husband takes him to court. the husband will summon him before the court in order that they put a fine on him for it.” Thus far Rashi’s language. And it is correct [to interpret here the letter kaf in the word ka’asher as meaning “when”, and not “as”]. A similar case is the expression, ‘ka’asher’ (when) it shall be well with thee,¹⁴⁶Genesis 40:14. and there are many other such cases. And the intention of the verse is that the assailant has to pay compensation for the miscarriage when the husband takes him to court, not when the woman does so, as the compensation is not hers. Onkelos, however, translated: “according to the amount [that the woman’s husband] shall lay upon him.”
Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explained the verse as follows: according as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him, or¹⁴⁷The Hebrew word v’nathan, which is generally translated “and he shall pay” — as the judges determine, Ibn Ezra interprets to mean “or he shall pay,” and the purport thereof is as explained in the text. he shall pay as the judges determine, as if to say that the assailant should come to agreement with the husband on a fixed sum, or he should pay compensation as the court will assess him. This is not correct, for what reason is there to mention this?¹⁴⁸For surely if the parties voluntarily agree on a sum there is no necessity for them to go to court, and if they fail to agree on a sum it is self-understood that the court will have to assess the fine.
In my opinion, since the damage done is one that is not discernible in the unborn children themselves — for who could know their fortune — therefore Scripture said, that although he cannot be made to pay a precise monetary compensation, he should nonetheless be fined as a sort of penalty in the form of a sum of money¹⁴⁹See my Hebrew commentary p. 424 for further elucidation of this phrase of Ramban “a sort of penalty.” which others [i.e., the judges] shall impose upon him. A similar usage [of the term onesh — punishment] is also found in these verses: and he put the land to ‘onesh’ (a fine);¹⁵⁰II Kings 23:33. they drink the wine of them that have been ‘anushim’ (fined).¹⁵¹Amos 2:8. Scripture is thus stating that the punishment be entirely as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him, because he desires his children and they are important to him, but he [i.e., the husband] should fix the sum through the judges, in order that he should not impose upon him an exorbitant sum. In the words of the Mechilta:¹³⁶Mechilta here on the Verse., “According as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him. I might think this to mean, whatever he pleases; Scripture therefore says, and he shall pay as the ‘pelilim’ determine, and pelilim always means judges.”

וכי ינצו אנשים, And if men strive together, etc. In this case each one is presumed to have murderous intent. It happpened that instead of killing his adversary the potential killer struck the woman (either fatally or otherwise).

ולא יהיה אסון, and no harm will befall her.

כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, “according to the assessment levied upon him by the husband of the pregnant woman whose fetus died.” The Torah emphasizes that the injured party herself, i.e. the woman, is not allowed to determine the scale of compensation as she has no ownership rights concerning her children. [she is not allowed to “sell” her daughter, for instance, whereas the father is. However, she is compensated for pain, etc. Ed. Ibn Ezra explains that our verse allows for a mutually agreed settlement between the husband of the woman and the one causing the injury, failing which the court, i.e. בפלילים will assess the amount of damages payable. Nachmanides explains that the new aspect of this legislation is the fact that although the damage is not definite as no one knows if the woman would have successfully carried out this fetus, and normally when the value of the damage cannot be assessed with precision, no financial damages are payable, the nature of this payment is under the heading of “punitive damages.” The Torah gives the husband leeway to determine the amount of punitive damages due to him. The reason is that he is presumed to have a greater stake in the loss of this fetus. The reason that the Torah also involves the court, בפלילים is to ensure that the husband does not make unreasonable demands, above the value of such a fetus if it had been born already, for instance.

ונגפו אשה הרה, “and they collide with a pregnant woman,” the collision described was unintentional; ולא יהיה אסון “no ascertainable damage occurred,” to the woman although she miscarried.
כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, “as the husband of the woman shall assess against him.” It is not the woman who had miscarried who will assess the amount of loss she has sustained. The reason for this is that the mother has no financial standing in her offspring. Although the Torah speaks of ילדיה, “her children,” giving the impression as if she had a proprietary interest in them, this is not so. The legal position of a woman and her children is similar to the legal position of a man to whom an object or animal has been entrusted for safe-keeping. [The male who impregnated her gave her his seed as a treasure to guard. In due course he would reclaim it, compare Kidushin 59]. The Talmud phrases it as “wherever the seed may be it remains the property of the donor-husband.” This is the reason that when the matter of compensation comes up the father determines the amount of compensation he feels he is entitled to. In the event that the father makes a claim which is perceived as excessive, the matter is adjudicated before judges, i.e. ונתן בפלילים. The way this verse is interpreted in Mechilta (Nezikin 8) is that if the Torah had only written the words כאשר ישית עליו, I would have concluded that the father of the prematurely born baby can demand any amount of compensation he likes. To make sure that he will not demand an excessive amount the Torah adds the words “he will give it (the man who caused the mishap) according to the decision of judges.”

If men will fight — with one another. As opposed to both of them fighting with the woman. For if that was the case, even one man [would be sufficient]. Furthermore, it would say [at the end of our verse], “They shall pay. . .”

(Exodus 21:22) "And if men fight, etc." What is the intent of this section? From (Ibid. 14) "And if a man be bent against his neighbor to kill him," we hear only that one who intends to smite his foe and does so is to be put to death; but we do not hear the same for one who intends to smite his foe and smites his friend. It is, therefore, written (to this effect) "And if men fight … and if there be death (in his friend) then you shall give a life for a life."

V. 22 u. 23. Wir haben schon bemerkt, dass נצה in Gegensatz zu ריב, zunächst einen Streit mit Tätlichkeiten, einen Kampf bedeutet. So wird Dewarim 35, 11 auch mit כי ינצו אנשים וגו׳ להציל וגו׳ מיד מכה offenbar eine Schlägerei bezeichnet. Auch hier spricht der Fall von einer solchen, und wenn V. 23 bei erfolgter Tötung auf Todesstrafe erkannt wird, so muss das וכי ינצו sogar einen Totschlag beabsichtigenden Kampf bezeichnen, במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר (Sanhedrin 74 a); und sind daher in diesem kombinierten Problem sehr wichtige Rechtsgrundsätze niedergelegt.

וכי ינצו אנשים, “if men fight,” why was there a need for this verse? Seeing that from verse 14 where we were told only that deliberate killing of one’s enemy is punishable by death, we would not have known that when one kills one’s friend instead of one’s enemy in a fight, he would not be considered as a murderer, we are told now that when the objective of an altercation was to kill one’s adversary, it does not matter that one had killed the wrong target by mistake. There are some commentators who do not understand this verse as prescribing the death penalty for the killer, but that he is only liable for monetary compensation to be assessed by the court. (Rabbi Yitzchok in Mechilta Mishpatim chapter 8) He interprets our verse along the following lines: as long as we had only heard Leviticus 24,17: if someone deliberately smites a human being (so that he dies) the killer must be executed, even if that human being had been born after a pregnancy of only eight months, (which according to the Talmud is not considered a baby with a regular life expectancy). The Torah here describes the premature birth of such a baby as a result of the mother having been struck as having given birth to a נפש אדם a human being in the full sense of the word. The wording in our verse makes it clear that only if the mother had been struck in the region of her body to which her fetus is sensitive, does the attacker deserve the penalty prescribed, not when she was hit on the head or other parts of her body not related to her pregnancy. An alternate explanation: even if only one of her fetuses was killed. [The wording in the verse speaks about fetuses, plural. Ed.]

ונגפו AND HURT [A WOMAN WITH CHILD] — The root נגף always signifies “dashing against” and “striking”. Examples are: (Psalms 91:15) “lest thou dash (תגוף) thy foot against a stone”; (Jeremiah 13:16) “and before your feet dash (יתנגפו)”; (Isaiah 8:14) “but for a stone of dashing (נגף).

To the woman. It could not refer to the fetus, because the next verse says: “However if there is a fatal injury, you shall give a life for a life.” And if it referred to the fetus, [this law would not apply], because it says [in v. 12 that one is liable only] “if one strikes a man,” as opposed to striking a fetus that cannot live.

ונגפו אשה הרה, and they hurt a pregnant woman; the reason that the Torah uses the plural, i.e. "they hurt," is to inform us that if they both fell upon the woman thus causing her to lose the fetus they divide the compensation the woman has to be paid between them (compare Maimonides Hilchot Chovel Umazzik).

בפלילים, in accordance with the assessment by the judges trying the case.

Wir haben zuerst den Fall נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה, er will den Gegner treffen und trifft die Frau, einen Fall, über welchen die Halacha nicht ganz entschieden ist; nach den חכמים tritt gerichtliche Todesstrafe ein, nach ר׳ שמעון nicht (Sanhedrin 79 a), und rezipiert Ramb. (Hilch. Rozeach IV, 2) die letztere Ansicht, siehe jedoch כ׳׳מ daselbst. Nach der ersten Auffassung spräche der V. 23 angenommene Fall von Tötung der Frau, nach der zweiten Auffassung jedoch — da die Halacha ferner die Ansicht des תנא רבי חזקי׳ feststellt, dass in keinem Falle bei Menschentötung Geldstrafe eintritt, und daher das נפש תחת נפש nicht mit רבי (das.) wie das sogleich folgende עין תחת עין als ממון begriffen werden kann, — müsste der Fall V. 23 von beabsichtigter Tötung der Frau oder des Gegners verstanden werden (siehe תוספו׳ Kethub. 35.2 ד׳ה ומי איכא).— Wir haben ferner, dass Tötung der ולדות Geldstrafe an den Vater verwirkt. —

אשה הרה, “a pregnant woman; we would have known this as soon as we read the balance of the verse in which we are told that she lost her fetuses when the Torah speaks about her losing her fetuses prematurely; how could she have done so unless she had been pregnant?The reason that the Torah had to first inform us that she had been pregnant was to teach us that the attacker’s penalty is related to the fact that she had been pregnant and he should therefore have been especially careful, as well as to tell us that if the loss of her fetus could be attributed to the fact that she had been hit in the region of her womb, the penalty of which the Torah writes does not apply.

ולא יהיה אסון AND YET THERE BE NO MISCHIEF — no further mischief with the woman (Sanhedrin 79b).

They shall impose monetary compensation on him. Since it says afterwards, “He shall pay as determined by the judges,” implying that he did not paid yet, Rashi therefore says: “they shall impose,” rather than “he pays.”

אשה הרה, a pregnant woman, etc., the scenario is one where the woman had been present and both parties were aware of this. If the woman's presence was unknown to the parties involved in the fight, they are not guilty of any compensation. This is based on the Talmud Yerushalmi and stated explicitly in Maimonides chapter 1 of Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. Here is his wording: "If one of the parties was asleep and the other party lies down beside him, the sleeping party is free of any guilt [if his motions cause the death of the second person, Ed.] seeing that whatever harm he caused was totally accidental."

Der Satz: אם לא יהי׳ אסון ענוש יענש, der sofort auch den Gegensatz enthält: הא אם יהי׳ אסון לא יענש, und zwar nicht nur דין אסון, Todesstraffälligkeit, sondern אסון ממש, überhaupt Todesfall der Getroffenen, gibt den großen Rechtssatz: חייבי מיתה שוגגין פטורין מתשלומין, ,auch nicht straffällige Verübung todesstrafwürdiger Verbrechen" enthebt der Geldstrafe", ein Satz, der durch den Ausspruch des ׳תנא דבי חזקי noch vollständiger also präzisiert wird: מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה לא חלקת בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון אלא לחייבו ממון אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין בשוגוג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין (בין דרך ירידה לדרך עליה לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון (כתובות לה׳ א׳), .d. h: Wajikra 24, 21 fasst das Gesetz die Geldersatzpflicht für Tötung eines Tieres und die Todesstrafe für Tötung eines Menschen in einen Satz zusammen und gibt damit zugleich die Norm, dasss, wie bei Tötung eines Tieres, ohne Rücksicht auf die größere oder geringere Vollkommenheit des Bewusstseins und der Absicht oder den Grad der Fahrlässigkeit, in jedem Falle Geldersatz eintritt, bei Tötung eines Menschen ebenso in jedem Falle Geldersatz nicht eintrete. Es dürfte aber eben in dieser gegensätzlichen Zusammenstellung des Tieres und des Menschen zugleich das Motiv dieser Rechtsnorm sich kundgeben, und diese tief in der in jedem Falle zu wahrenden höhern Dignität des Menschenwesens wurzeln. Für ein Tierleben gibt es Geldersatz, für ein Menschenleben nie, לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח. Und in dem Augenblick, wo ein Mensch mit seinem Leben der strafenden Gottesgerechtigkeit verfallen wird, — und das bleibt er selbst dann, wenn wohl das Verbrechen an sich, aber nicht die Umstände, unter denen es verübt worden, das menschliche Gericht zur Ahndung bestellt sein lassen, — in dem Augenblick kann er keiner Geldespflicht schuldig werden. Die Schwere des Verbrechens und die parallellose Dignität des mit ihm eingesetzten und verfallenen hohen Gutes dulden es nicht, dass neben ihnen noch von Geld die Rede sein dürfte. Man denke: wenn man von einem Mörder auch noch, oder von einem aus Milderungsgründen freigesprochenen Mörder wenigstens den Ersatz des durchbohrten Kleides fordern wollte! Das Gesetz ist aber in Aufrechthaltung dieses Prinzipes so empfindlich, dass es dessen Anwendung selbst auf ממון אחר d. h. selbst auf eine nicht aus dem Objekt des todesschuldigen Verbrechens gleichzeitig resultierende Geldschuld fordert, und zum Beispiel dem Mörder oder Totschläger nicht den Geldersatz des Gutes eines andern auferlegt, das er mit dem auf den Getöteten geführten Pfeil gleichzeitig zerstört. Haben wir doch, nach ר׳׳ת, in dem Problem unseres Textes selbst ein solches Beispiel von ממון אחר vor Augen. Die Geldstrafe ist dem Manne zu zahlen, die Todesstrafe um der Frau willen zu leiden, מיתה לזה ותשלומין לזה, und doch ist die Geldstrafe nur zu zahlen, wenn die Frau nicht getötet worden (siehe תוספו׳ Kethub. 31 a. ד׳ה רב אשי). Ja, selbst wenn die Tötung gar nicht vollzogen, sondern nur erstrebt worden, der Verbrecher nur ein רודף, ein "Verfolger" geblieben, und er hätte in seiner "Jagd auf Mord" irgend das Eigentum irgend eines Menschen zerstört, so würde er zum Ersatz des beschädigten Eigentums nicht herbeigezogen werden: רודף שהיה רודף אחר חברו ושיבר את הכלים בין של נרדף ובין של כל אדם פטור (Sanhedrin 74 a). Auf dem Wege zum Morde war sein Leben jedem verfallen, der, wenn nicht anders möglich, durch seine Tötung die Ausführung des Verbrechens hätte verhindern können und müssen. Und wird konsequenter Weise (daselbst) ebenfalls aus unserm Problem nachgewiesen, dass, wer einen von Mord Bedrohten durch Tötung des Mörders gerettet, wo er bloß durch Verstümmlung des Mörders die Rettung hätte bewirken können, selbst des Todes schuldig wäre. יכול הצילו באחד מאיבריו ולא הציל (אלא בנפשו) נהרג (להרמב׳׳ם חייב מיתה לשמים אבל אין ב׳׳ד ממיתין אותו). Wäre dies nicht, wäre jeder in Mord Begriffene in jedem Falle durch Tötung vom Morde zurückzuhalten, so wäre unser רודף, selbst אם לא יהי׳ אסון, nicht zur Zahlung zu verhalten, da er in dem Momente der Schädigung der ולדות jedem mit seinem Leben verfallen gewesen. — Dieser Grundsatz, dass חייבי מיתות אפי׳ שוגגין פטורין מתשלומין, findet seine Anwendung auf alle Verbrechen, die, wenn במזיד ובהתראה geübt, gerichtlichen Tod nach sich ziehen würden, und wird gewöhnlich mit der Formel bezeichnet: קים ליה בדרבא מניה ."er unterliegt dem Höhern" ר׳ נחוני׳ בן הקנה dehnt den Begriff auch auf nichtgerichtliche Todesschuld, כרת ומיתה בידי שמים aus, seine Überlieferung ist jedoch nicht als Halacha rezipiert.

ענוש יענש, “he will be severely punished.” Rashi explains here that the financial penalty is the value of the lost fetuses to the husband if these babies when healthy had been offered for sale in the slave market. If you were to ask why the attacker is not subject to the death penalty for murder, the answer is that there is no certainty that they would have been born after nine months as healthy babies. If this is a relevant consideration why is it not applied to fully grown human beings who might have been terminally ill had they lived to die naturally? The answer is that we base ourselves on the majority of such cases where the victim would prove not to have been terminally ill. To the question why we do not apply the same logic to the fetuses? If we were to do this the attacker would also have to be guilty for hitting the woman who is the mother of these fetuses. We have to derive from the wording of the various verses dealing with violent encounters between people that as long as the fetus has not seen the light of day, it has no market value, as decided in the Talmud tractate Erchin folio 7, where it is stated that unborn fetuses have no claim to the estate of their fathers.

ענוש יענש HE SHALL SURELY BE AMERCED to pay the value of the offspring to the husband. We estimate her value according to what she is worth if she were sold as a slave in the market giving her a higher value on account of her being with child (Bava Kamma 49a).

When the husband summons him to the court. [Rashi knows this] because if it meant he pays the amount that the husband demands, what is the meaning of “He shall pay as determined by the judges”?

כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, in accordance with what the woman's husband will impose upon him. The reason for this ruling is that the husband has the prerogative to receive compensation for the monetary value of his wife's children (such as when he sells his daughter). As a result, he is considered the litigant against the guilty party and not the mother of the unborn child.

ונתתה נפש תחת נפש. Zuvor heißt es: ונתן בפלילים, er, der Beschädiger, hat den Ersatz zu geben. Hier, bei der Todesstrafe, heißt es bezeichnend: ונתתה, und zwar mit dem die Person noch hervorhebenden ה, so hast du, die jüdische Gesamtheit, zu geben Leben für Leben. Die Geldstrafe hat der Schuldige zu geben, sie liegt ihm, so weit sie Ersatz ist, sogar ob, selbst wenn kein Gericht ihn dazu verurteilt. Das Gericht sagt ihm nur, wie viel er zu leisten schuldig sei, die Leistung ist aber seine Aufgabe. Nicht so der Todesschuldige. Er hat nicht sein Leben hinzugeben. Es steht ihm ja gar nicht die Disposition über sein Leben zu. Sein Tod von seiner Hand wäre ja nur ein zweites Verbrechen. Ja, nicht einmal die Herbeiführung seiner Verurteilung wird von ihm erwartet, ja, das Gesetz hat sie ihm unmöglich gemacht. Kein Verbrecher kann nach jüdischem Gesetze sich selbst angeben. Sein Geständnis ist für seine Verurteilung völlig irrelevant. Nur vor Vollziehung eines Todesurteils wird der Verbrecher um der eigenen Sühne willen zum Geständnis ermahnt. (Dürfte doch, in Parenthese, für Gesetzgebungen, die auf Selbstgeständnis des Verbrechers den meisten Nachdruck legen, und darauf hin ein Todesurteil fällen und vollziehen, die Frage nicht leicht zu beantworten sein, warum denn die Selbsttötung eines Mörders Selbstmord wäre?) Nur Gott, und in besonderen Fällen der für diese Fälle von ihm delegierten Gesamtheit, steht die Disposition über sein Leben zu. Indem es aber ונתתה und nicht ולקחת heißt, indem die Vollziehung der Todesstrafe als ein "Hingeben" des Lebens, nicht als ein "Nehmen" desselben bezeichnet wird, so ist damit allen Versuchen, die diese Strafe als ein Rachenehmen an dem Verbrecher, als Abschreckungsmittel, ja auch nur als Vergeltung auffassen möchten, begegnet. In allen solchen Fällen müsste es zweifelsohne: ולקחת heißen, dass dem Mörder das verwirkte Leben genommen werde. ונתתה lässt die Strafe geradezu als "Restitution" begreifen, sei es nun der Gerechtigkeit, des Gesetzes, der im Ermordeten verletzten Menschenwürde, oder aller dieser ohnehin in einander fallenden Momente zusammen. Die Gesamtheit hat den durch das Verbrechen verletzten Momenten das Leben des Verbrechers hinzugeben. In diesem Ausdruck liegt zugleich, dass das Leben des Einzelnen Gott und der Gesamtheit angehöre, und dass mit jedem Tode, auch mit dem des Mörders, die Gesamtheit einen Verlust erleide, der aber von der Pflicht der Restitution überwogen wird.

כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, In accordance with the conditions imposed upon him by the husband of the woman; in the event that the men who were fighting had decided to settle their dispute out of court. If they cannot agree on the amount of compensation, ונתן בפלילים, he will have to abide by the court’s decision about damages. We find a similar construction in Leviticus 7,10: בלולה בשמן וחרבה, “mixed with oil, or dry.”

ענוש יענש (lit., he shall surely be punished) — It means that they shall exact money from him. ענוש is used here in the same sense as in, (Deuteronomy 22:19) “And they shall amerce (וענשו) him an hundred shekel of silver”.

The one who struck. . . the value of the offspring. [Rashi is explaining:] as opposed to paying the value of the stricken woman. And this is a “short” verse [because it says “he shall pay” without saying what he pays].

ונתן THEN HE SHALL GIVE — i. e. the man that struck the woman shall give the value of the offspring.

כאשר ישית עליו וגו׳ means, when the husband will summons him before the Court that they should place upon him a fine for this (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:23:7),

בפללים ACCORDING TO THE DECISION OF THE JUDGES (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:23:9).

ואם אסון יהיה AND IF THERE BE ANY FURTHER MISCHIEF — in the case of the woman,

ונתתה נפש תחת נפש, "you shall give life for life." The meaning of these words is disputed. The Mechilta quotes opinions according to which the Torah speaks of an actual death penalty even though the killer had intended to kill another party, whereas other sages hold that the Torah speaks of monetary compensation for such a life (unborn child). According to the latter opinion the words ונתתה, "you shall give," are most appropriate seeing that monetary compensation is something that is given from one hand to another. According to the opinion that the Torah speaks of an actual death penalty, we must understand the word ונתתה as contrast to the situation described in verse 22 when no fatality occurred; instead of monetary compensation for the injury described in verse 22, something involving several types of payments such as for pain, shame, etc; in this instance there is only one exchange, i.e. the life of the guilty party for the harm done. We have learned previously that whenever a party is guilty of the death penalty no additional fines are imposed. The exception is a situation we have described in verse 18 when death did not occur promptly.

ונתתה נפש תחת נפש. There will not be additional financial damages payable.

אם אסון יהיה, “if an unexpected complication resulted, such as the premature stillborn death of the fetus, etc.” according to the scholar in the Talmud who holds that if a person intended to kill A and killed B instead by mistake, he is still considered guilty of murder, seeing that he had violated the commandment of “a life for a life,” as having to be understood literally, there is no problem here. According to the scholar who holds that these words here are not to be taken literally, but that what is meant is a financial penalty/compensation, to be paid by the perpetrator. The third opinion in the Talmud, Tanna de bey Chiskiyah, holds that the perpetrator does not even have to pay a financial penalty to the heirs of the victim. This opinion is expressed in the tractate Baba Kamma, folio 35, and is based on the following interpretation of our verse: The words: אם אסון יהיה, “if a mishap will occur,” are referring to the woman pregnant with child, not to her fetus; then the rule נפש תחת נפש, “a life for a life is applied,” seeing she, a living human being had been killed. The author adds that it appears to him that what went wrong here was that the killer had intended to kill the man he was fighting with, but had erroneously killed this woman. If we had not had this verse we might have thought that no death penalty would apply seeing that what he had intended to do had not been carried out; the Torah therefore repeats this expression “a life for a life,” to remind us that regardless of who had been killed by him he deserves death for having intended to kill a human being, something he had intended to do, and something which carries the death penalty.

ונתת נפש תחת נפש THEN THOU SHALT GIVE SOUL FOR SOUL. Our Rabbis differ as to the explanation of the word נפש the first time it occurs here. There are some who say that it actually signifies “life” (i. e. life for life), others say that it means monetary compensation but not literally life, and they say that this must be so because he who intends to kill a certain person and inadvertently kills another instead, (as is the case here), is exempt from the death penalty, and has only to pay to his heirs his value estimating this as though he were sold as a slave in the market (Sanhedrin 79a).

עין תחת עין EYE FOR EYE — If one blinded the eye of his fellow-man he has to pay him the value of his eye, i. e. he pays him how much his value would be diminished if he were to be sold as a slave in the market. In the same way all other cases are to be dealt with, but it does not mean the actual cutting off of the offender’s limb — just as our Rabbis have explained in the chapter beginning with the word החובל (Bava Kamma 84a).

EYE ‘TACHATH’ (FOR) EYE. It is known in the tradition of our Rabbis¹³⁶Mechilta here on the Verse. that this means monetary compensation. Such usage [of the term tachath to indicate] monetary compensation is found in the verse: And he that smiteth a beast mortally shall pay for it; life ‘tachath’ life,¹⁵²Leviticus 24:18. [in which case tachath surely indicates monetary compensation]. Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra commented that Scripture uses such a term to indicate that he really is deserving of such a punishment, [that his eye be taken from him], if he does not give his ransom. For Scripture has forbidden us to take ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death,¹⁵³Numbers 35:31. but we may take ransom from a wicked person who cut off any of the limbs of another person. Therefore we are never to cut off that limb from him, but rather he is to pay monetary compensation, and if he has no money to pay, it lies as a debt on him until he acquires the means to pay, and then he is redeemed.
Proof for what the Sages have said [that eye ‘tachath’ eye means he pays him the value of his eye], is in what He has said above [with reference to one who injures another person], only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.¹⁵⁴Above, Verse 19. But if we were to do to the assailant exactly as he has done to the injured man, why does he have to pay after that? He himself is in need of amends for the loss of his own time and costs of his own healing! And it would not be valid to argue that the assailant is to give the injured man [the difference in cost between a slow recovery and] a fast recovery,¹⁵⁵Thus, if the assailant had a fast recovery and the injured man a slower recovery, the assailant is to pay him the difference of expenses incurred in the loss of time and costs of healing. In that case, one could still argue that eye ‘tachath’ eye really means that the eye of the assailant be removed, and Verse 19 that deals with his obligation to pay for the loss of time and cost of healing of the injured, applies to that difference as explained above. — This argument is actually mentioned in the Talmud (Baba Kamma 84a.). But, argues Ramban, it is not the plain meaning of Scripture, for the simple meaning of Verse 19 is that it speaks of the assailant having to pay for the whole loss of time and costs of healing. Therefore it constitutes a proof that eye ‘tachath’ eye means monetary compensation, as explained above. since this is not the plain meaning of Scripture. Rather, Scripture speaks of all people, and even if his recovery [i.e., the assailant’s] were to be fast, we would have long taken our punishment of him, in doing to him exactly as he did!¹⁵⁶And why should he be burdened with the additional cost representing the difference in the recoveries [as explained above], after we have already taken our punishment of him by doing to him as he had done to others? Thus it is obvious that Verse 19 speaks of all men alike, and eye ‘tachath’ eye cannot be meant literally, but means the monetary value of the eye.
If we explain the verses according to the literal interpretation of Scripture, there is no escape from this question,¹⁵⁷I.e., an apparent difficulty in the verses [if we interpret them in their plain meaning]: that in one verse it says eye for an eye, and in the other it speaks of the assailant’s duty to pay for the loss of his time and costs of healing, and the question appears why he should pay this additional payment when we have already punished him. There is no escape from this question except by saying that etc. [see text]. Ramban will finally allude to why he mentions all this: it is to show what sophistry we have to display if we seek to follow only the plain meaning of Scripture! We thus have no recourse but to Tradition. unless they¹⁵⁸I.e., “those who pursue the plain meaning of Scripture” (the rodfei ha’pshat). See Vol. I, p. 154. will say that if someone maims his neighbor so that he deprives him permanently of some bodily member, such as an eye, hand, or foot, or causes a burn which leaves a permanent mark, then we are to do likewise to the assailant’s body, this being the case of the verse which says, As he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him,¹⁵⁹Leviticus 24:20. and in that case there is no monetary compensation paid for loss of time and cost of healing. But if he hits him with a stone or with his fist on his clothes, and he is laid up in bed but then is completely healed without any crippling effect remaining upon his body, in that case He said, only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.¹⁵⁴Above, Verse 19. All the injuries specified in the verse, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe,¹⁶⁰Verse 25. are included, according to the plain meaning of Scripture, in this preceding general principle, for a wound and stripe may be completely healed. And as for that which Scripture states there, And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor, as he hath done so shall it be done to him,¹⁶¹Leviticus 24:19. it too was meant to include all injuries, but He did not mention there at length the cases of wounding, striping, and burning [as He did here]. He used the term mum (blemish), for every wound causes at least a temporary blemish. Thus even if it is of the kind which heals, it is still called “a blemish,” just as we say: “a passing blemish,”¹⁶²Bechoroth 37b. and the Torah calls scabbed, or scurvy, or hath his stones crushed¹⁶³Leviticus 21:20. “a blemish” although they are temporary and can be healed,¹⁶⁴See my Hebrew commentary, p. 425. and it is further written, youths in whom there was no blemish.¹⁶⁵Daniel 1:3. The intention there is obviously that these youths who were to serve in the king’s palace were free even of any passing blemish. The general principle everywhere is that the Tradition is always true.¹⁶⁶See above, Note 157.

עין תחת עין; this is what ought to be the judgment against the offender, if we were to apply the principle of the punishment fitting the crime in all its severity. However, according to tradition only financial compensation is exacted as we cannot accurately measure how to apply the principle of “an eye for an eye” literally.

עין תחת עין, the monetary value of the eye destroyed. Our sages (Baba Kamma 84) have explained why the Torah needed to write so many examples for what appears to be the same legislation. Our verse discusses loss of an entire limb or organ.

עין תחת עין, there is a tradition by our sages (Baba Kamma 84) concerning this that the meaning is: “the value of an eye for the value of an eye.” The Torah does not speak of the person inflicting the loss of someone’s eye paying with his losing an eye of his own. The proof that this could not have been what the Torah meant is verse 19 in our chapter רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא, “he must only pay for his loss of income and his medical expenses.”
If we were to do to a person who has caused the loss of another’s limb exactly as he had done, why would he have to pay something in addition to that? After all, he himself loses pay due to absence from work and he also incurs medical expenses for treatment of his severed limb!?
Furthermore, even assuming that the Torah’s words here were to be interpreted literally, not all situations are alike so that the literal application would resemble any kind of “tit for tat.” If the eye which a healthy person gouged out belonged to a person who had only one good eye, how would the loss of one of two good eyes by the person who caused the injury even come close to “fair retribution?” Not only that. Some people’s constitution would not be able to survive the loss of an organ whereas others would. If a person had had a kidney ruined beyond repair by someone who only had a single kidney left, taking that person’s kidney would be equivalent to a death sentence!
Furthermore, in Leviticus 24,19-20 we read כאשר עשה כן יעשה בו, “just as he has done (to another), so shall be done to him.” This verse cannot be applied in any other way than the way our sages have seen fit to understand it. The thrust of the verses is to indemnify the injured party in a manner commensurate to the injury he has sustained, not by depriving him of a limb of his own. It would be physically impossible to cause a person an exact duplicate of the injury he himself has suffered. If he were to cause either a lesser or a greater injury than the one he had sustained, he would be in violation of what the Torah wrote as he would not have complied with the Torah’s demand “as he had done so should be done to him.” In the case of monetary compensation, experts can evaluate the precise amount of the value of the loss sustained.
It is possible to understand the line כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו, as meaning: “just as he has caused harm, harm shall be caused to him.” Proof of this being the meaning of the words can be found in Judges 15,11 where Shimshon said: “as they have done to me so I have done to them.” The dispute had begun when the Philistines had taken Shimshon’s wife and in retaliation he burned their crops. Seeing that the retaliation by Shimshon did not match the harm done to him by the Philistines, it is clear that the meaning of the line is merely that harm done will be requited. Any retaliation therefore would be considered as “as he has done so shall be done to him.”
We also find that the prophet Ovadiah 15-16 prophesies concerning the future of Esau “as you did so shall be done to you. Your conduct shall be requited.” He goes on to spell out what precisely this involves: “the same cup that you drank from on My Holy Mount shall all nations drink evermore; drink till their speech grows thick and they become as though they had never been.” I have provided you with proof based both on logic and on verses from Scripture that it is impossible to translate the line עין תחת עין, as meaning “an eye for an eye.”

"an eye for an eye" money. You say "money," but perhaps an eye (literally) is intended? R. Elazar was wont to say (Leviticus 24:21) "One who strikes a beast shall pay for it, and one who strikes a man shall be put to death." Scripture likens the injuries of a man to the injuries of a beast, and the injuries of a beast to the injuries of a man. And just as the injuries of a beast are subject to monetary payment, so, the injuries of a man. R. Eliezer says: It is written (Exodus 21:30) "When kofer ('atonement payment') is imposed upon him, he shall give the redemption of his soul." Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If where Scripture makes him liable for death, he only pays money, then here (re an eye), where Scripture does not make him liable for death, how much more so does he pay only money! R. Yitzchak says: "an eye for an eye": I understand this to mean that whether or not he intends (to blind him), he pays only money. And, indeed, Scripture limits one who intends to cause a blemish to monetary payment, as it is written (Leviticus 24:19) "And a man if he maims his neighbor" — general; "an eye for an eye" — particular. general-particular. (The rule is:) The general subsumes only what exists in the particular. Then, in (20) "as he maims a man," there is a reversion to the general. Perhaps the first general is generalized (i.e., all maimings are to be included.) Would you say that? We have here an instance of general-particular-general, where (the rule is that) you judge in accordance with the particular, viz.: Just as the particular specifies permanent maimings, external organ prominences, and intended (injuries) as paying only money (and not being punishable by death) (so, all such maimings are included.) Thus, "as he maims a man" — when he intends to maim him.

V. 24. Die in diesem Verse genannten Fälle sind Verstümmelungen, Beraubungen eines Organes, und zwar sind die Repräsentanten der verschiedensten Tätigkeiten genannt: das Auge: Organ der Sinnestätigkeit, Zahn: der Körpererhaltung (Verdauung), auch des Sprechens, Hand: der produktiven Tätigkeit, Fuß: der Bewegung, und zwar hebt der Verlust eines Auges und eines Zahnes nicht die entsprechende Tätigkeit ganz auf, sondern schwächt sie nur, während der Verlust einer Hand und eines Fußes in der Regel eine bis dahin möglich gewesene Tätigkeit völlig aufhebt. Der durch solche Verstümmelung dem Beschädigten gebrachte bleibende Verlust wird unter den gesetzlichen Begriff: נזק, Schaden, gefasst. —

כויה תחת כויה BURNING FOR BURNING — כויה is a burn produced by fire. Up to here (i .e. v. 24) Scripture has spoken of a bodily injury that is attended by a decrease of the market-value of the person injured; here, however, it speaks of a case in which there is no decrease of value but pain alone: if, for instance, a man burns another on his nails with a hot spit, we estimate how much a person like him (the injured) would be willing to accept for undergoing a pain like this, and such an amount the other has to pay as indemnity (Bava Kamma 84b).

כויה תחת כויה; even though the examples mentioned here do not involve loss of an entire organ or limb, the principles applying to compensating the victim are based on the same considerations

(Exodus 21:25) "A burn for a burn": If you say (the meaning is that he burned him and spilled his blood, this is already subsumed in "a wound for a wound." If you say that he made a welt, this is already subsumed in "a welt for a welt." How, then, is "a burn for a burn" to be understood? As his burning him on his nail or on the sole of his foot without leaving an impression, lading him with stones and causing him suffering thereby, placing snow on his head and making him cold — in which instances he compensates him for his suffering. But if he were frail, indulged, and pampered, how much more so is his "suffering" allotment to be doubled. This is the (type of) suffering intended in "a burn for a burn."

V. 25. Die in diesem Verse besprochenen Beschädigungen sind: Verwundungen ohne bleibende Verstümmelung. כויה, Brand, wird (B. K. 84 b) als Repräsentant des einfachen Schmerzes, צער, gefasst. Es ist dafür "Brennen" gewählt, weil sich damit, z. B. durch Führen eines glühenden Eisens über den Fingernagel, die Bewirkung eines Schmerzes ohne jede Verletzung darstellen lässt. פצע (verwandt mit פצח ,פצה, öffnen) ist die klaffende Wunde. חבורה, (von חבר, verbunden sein) weist auf die geschlossene Wunde hin. Es kommt jedoch in Verbindung mit פצע vor: חברות פצע תמרוק ברע (Prov. 20. 30), und danach scheint es die weiterreichenden Folgen einer Wunde, somit Entzündung, dem Worte nach: Geschwulst zu bedeuten. (מרק, verwandt mit מרג, Dreschgerät, heißt: tief eindringen, daher ומרק ושטף מריקה בחמין שטיפה בצונן Sebachim 97 a. תמרוקי נשים: eindringliche Hautpflege.) Es heißt dort: "Nicht die offene Wunde, die dadurch hervorgerufenen Entzündungsgeschwülste sind das mit Gefahr Eindringende." Demgemäß hätten wir hier die Verwundung in ihren drei aufeinander folgenden Fortschritten: der Schmerz, der Schnitt, die Entzündung.

פצע is an injury which draws blood — the accused having crushed the other’s flesh; navrure in old French In such a case it all depends upon what happens: if any decrease in his market-value is caused the other pays him an indemnity (נזק); if he is confined to his bed, he has to pay for loss of time, for medical treatment, for the shame he feels at being somewhat disfigured and for the pain he has been made to suffer. This passage, (פצע תחת פצע), is apparently redundant, but our Rabbis explained in the chapter beginning with the word החובל (Bava Kamma 85b) that Scripture intends by this statement to make one liable to pay for pain inflicted even in a case when one has already paid damages (נזק) for decrease in one’s value — that although he has paid him the value of his hand, we do not exempt him from paying also for pain inflicted, arguing thus: Since he has, so to say, purchased his hand by paying its value, he was entitled to cut if off by whatever means he pleases; but we say that he ought to have removed it by means of a poisonous drug when he would not have suffered so much pain. He, however, cut if off by means of an iron instrument and caused him great pain; therefore he is bound to pay for pain inflicted also.

פצע, an injury caused by a lethal weapon such as a sword.

עין תחת עין וגו׳ וגו׳. Die Konsequenzen, welche die buchstäbliche Auffassung dieses Rechtskanons in dem Sinne, dass dem Beschädiger eines Auges das Auge usw. geschädigt werde, zu einer moralischen Unmöglichkeit machen würden, wie z. B. wenn ein Einäugiger einem Zweiäugigen ein Auge ausgeschlagen, wie der Bestrafte an einer Verwundung sterben könne, die dem Beschädigten nur den Verlust eines Gliedes gebracht, sind schon B. K. 83 b f. hervorgehoben. Es ist ebenso bereits bemerkt worden, wie schon die oben V. 18 u. 19 gegebene Bestimmung, dass bei Verletzungen, die bettlägerig machen und ärztliche Behandlung erfordern, Versäumnis und Heilung ersetzt werden sollen, die Auffassung des עין תחת עין וגו׳ פצע תחת פצע וגו׳ als jus talionis zurückweisen müsse, da ja die gleiche Wiederverletzung des Beschädigers diesen ebenfalls bettlägerig und ärztlicher Behandlung bedürftig machen würde. Wenn nun aber diese sachlichen Erwägungen schon die von der Halacha überlieferte Bestimmung, dass hier überall nur von Geldersatz der verursachten Verletzung die Rede sei, als eine dem Geiste des Textes allein adäquate erscheinen lassen, so dürfte eine nähere Erwägung des Wortes תחת, auf welchem eigentlich der Begriff des Ganzen ruht, die Erklärung der Halacha zugleich als die wortgetreueste des Textes ergeben.

חבורה is a wound in which the blood is congealed but does not come out, only that the flesh on that spot becomes red. The word חבורה means tache in old French Similar is, (Jeremiah 13:23) “[Can an Ethiopian change his skin] or the leopard his spots (חברברתיו)”. The Targum renders it (חבורה) by משקופי, an expression denoting “beating”, batture in old French Similarly it translates (Genesis 41:6) שדופות קדים, “blasted with the east”, by שקיפן קדום, “beaten by the east wind”. So, too, the lintel it termed “משקוף” (from the root שקף “to beat upon”), as, e. g., in the expression על המשקוף, because the door beats against it.

וחבורה, a minor injury, such as damage to one of his fingernails.

Die Grundbedeutung von תחת ist: unten und unter. Den Begriff "für" kann es daher nur in der Bedeutung: "statt" ausdrücken und ist daher ganz eigentlich der Ausdruck des Ersatzes. Es bezeichnet zunächst die Stelle, die etwas einnimmt, daher (Habakuk 3, 16) ותחתי ארגז: ich bin auf meiner Stelle gelähmt, wage mich nicht von der Stelle, und zittere. Wird etwas von seiner Stelle genommen, so bleibt eine leere Stelle, eine Lücke; wird ein anderes "an die Stelle gesetzt", so ist dies buchstäblich: "Ersatz." So (Bereschit 2, 21) ויקח אחת מצלעתיו ויסגר בשר תחתנה. (Ist ja auch שכר Lohn, nichts anderes, als סכר ,סגר: Lückefüllen). Daher auch: תחת הנחשת אביא זהב usw. (Jes. 60, 17) und die vielen Stellen, in welchen das Eintreten des einen "an die Stelle des andern" ausgedrückt wird. Daher auch der ganz gewöhnliche Ausdruck für Schadenersatz, d. h. für diejenige Leistung, mit der jemand die dem andern verursachte Lücke wieder auszufüllen hat. Gleich im nächsten Vers: לחפשי ישלחנו תחת עינו. Ebenso V. 16: שלם ישלם שור תחת שור V.37. חמשר בקר ישלם תחת שור Dewarim 22, 29: תחת אשר ענה. :Daher auch Bamidbar 25, 13 תחת אשר קנא לאלקיו zum Ersatz, zum Lohne für seine Aufopferung. Jes. 53, 12: תחת אשר הערה נפשו למות, zum Ersatz, zum Lohne für seine Hingebung. Schwerlich dürfte je תחת in dem Sinne von Strafe, Züchtigung für etwas, wie כי ,יען usw. vorkommen. תחת אשר לא עבדת וגו׳ (Dewarim 28, 48) schildert den völligen Gegensatz des Zustandes, der an die Stelle des frühern getreten. Nicht: dafür, dass, in dem Sinne von: deshalb, weil, sondern: anstatt, dass du früher in Freuden und Überfluss nicht einmal Gott hast dienen wollen, musst du jetzt in Leid und Mangel Menschen dienen. — התחת זאת לא יומת שמעי (Sam. I. 19, 22) scheint auf den ersten Blick eine Widerlegung dieser Ansicht zu bieten und ist in Wahrheit eine Bestätigung derselben. Schimi war David zu Füßen gefallen, hatte sein Unrecht bekannt, hatte darauf hingewiesen, wie er nun auch der erste seines Stammes sei, der David die Huldigung gebracht. Darauf fragt Abischai: התחת זאת, und zum Lohne für diese freiwillige, aber von der Not abgerungene Selbstdemütigung soll Schimi Straflosigkeit für das frühere Verbrechen erhalten?

Jedenfalls weist תחת in weit überwiegender Weise mehr auf Ersatz als auf Strafe hin, und עין תחת עין. usw. heißt nichts anderes als: er hat Auge zu ersetzen für Auge usw. er hat demjenigen, dem er ein Auge etc. ausgeschlagen, ein anderes Auge etc. wieder zu geben. Dadurch aber, dass ihm, dem Täter, ein Auge ausgeschlagen würde, käme der Beschädigte in keiner Weise wieder zu seinem Auge. Da aber kein Mensch dem andern ein Auge in natura wieder schaffen kann, so kann das Gesetz nichts anderes als:"vollen Geldersatz für das Auge" meinen.

So weist auch, B. K. 84 a, nachdem eine ganze Reihe von Erläuterungen der betreffenden Halacha aus dem Texte gegeben waren, R. Aschi einfach darauf hin: אתיא תחת תחת משור כתיב הכא עין תחת עין וכתיב התם שלם ישלם שור תחת שור מה להלן ממון אף כאן ממון, oder vielmehr, um ein Beispiel von אדם מאדם ונזיקין מנזיקין zu geben: תחת תחת מתחת אשר ענה וגו׳. —

Nur beim Gemordeten, נפש תחת נפש, wo das Verbrechen eben die konkrete Persönlichkeit vernichtet hat, welcher ein Ersatz zunächst zu leisten gewesen wäre, wird die Strafe an der Person des Mörders vollzogen, und auch diese Strafe ist, wie wir gesehen, durch den Ausdruck ונתתה וגו׳ ganz entschieden als Restitution ausgesprochen, nur dass dort an die Stelle der sonst in aller erster Linie zur Restitutionsforderung berechtigten wirklichen Persönlichkeit, um deren Vernichtung es sich ja aber eben handelt, die ideelle Person des Gesetzes, des Rechtes, der Menschenwürde tritt. Bei Verstümmelungen und Verletzungen aber, wo unmittelbar nach begangenem Verbrechen die verletzte, zur Restitutionsforderung berechtigte Persönlichkeit in concreto da ist, diese zunächst und direkt Beteiligte leer ausgehen lassen und statt ihrer durch Wiederverstümmelung des Täters nur der Idee des Rechtes eine Restitution zukommen lassen zu wollen, wäre barer Unsinn. Vielmehr: in dem Ersatze des Auges wird der Person und der Idee zugleich Restitution geleistet.

Auch das ב־, womit dieser Rechtssatz Dewarim 19, 21 bei עדים זוממים ausgedrückt ist: עין בעין שן בשן וגו׳ bezeichnet Ersatz. So: Bereschit 29 18 אעברך וגו׳ das. 30,16 ;הלא ברחל עברתי das. 25 ;ויעבד יעקב ברחל das. 20 ;ברחל בתך הקטנה usw. עברתי אתך בהן das. 26 ;שכרתיך בדוראי בני

Wir haben in unserm Kommentare zu Bereschit 9, 6 dieses Rechtskanons erwähnt und ihn in dem Sinne verstanden, dass damit der Grundsatz ausgesprochen wäre, jeder habe nur so lange ein Recht, als er dasselbe Recht in dem andern achte, verliere somit das Recht auf sein Auge etc. mit dem verletzten Auge etc. des Nächsten. Der Ersatz des verletzten Auges wäre dann ein Sühnemittel für die Erhaltung des eigenen. Eine Auffassung, die sich dadurch empföhle, weil in der Tat nach ר׳ אליעזר B. K. 84 a sogar nicht der Wert des verletzten, sondern der Wert des Auges des Beschädigers zu bezahlen käme. Allein es war uns damals nicht die entschiedene Bedeutung des תחת gegenwärtig, nach welcher der Wortlaut geradezu nur Entschädigung ausspricht, und dürfte selbst nach R. Eliesers, von der Halacha nicht rezipierten Ansicht, der Text nur dahin hätte verstanden werden müssen: der Wert des eigenen Auges sei zum Ersatz des verletzten zu zahlen. An der Hand des Wortlauts des Textes spricht jedoch die Halacha nur die einfache Verpflichtung zum möglichst vollständigen Ersatz der zugefügten körperlichen Beschädigung aus. Und zwar wird der körperliche Schaden in allen seinen direkten und indirekten Folgen ermessen. V. 24 spricht Ersatz der Verstümmelung aus, Ersatz der durch den Verlust eines Organes herbeigeführten bleibenden Unfähigkeit, נזק, absolute Einbuße, auch שֶבֶת גדול genannt, absolute Arbeitsunfähigkeit. V. 25 spricht in כויה und צער :חבורה, den Ersatz des Schmerzes aus, und zwar in כויה sowohl des mechanisch durch das Verwundungsinstrument gebrachten, als auch in חבורה des pathologischen, in den zerstörten oder gestörten organischen Teilen sich erzeugenden Schmerzes (siehe B. K. 84 b).

Wenn unsere Auffassung richtig ist, dass durch חבורה ,פצע ,כויה der Verwundungsvorgang in seinen drei aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten, Schmerz, Schnitt, Entzündung gezeichnet ist, so ist es klar, dass, nachdem durch עין תחת עין usw. der bleibende Schaden, durch כויה וחבורה der transitorische Schmerz, נזק וצער, zum Ersatz bestimmt ist, es kein direktes Ersatzobjekt weiter gibt, das noch durch das Mittelglied פצע תחת פצע bezeichnet sein könnte. Es wird auch (B. K. 85 a u. 26 b) in פצע תחת פצע keine reale Erweiterung, wohl aber eine formale Erweiterung des Begriffes der Ersatzpflicht, und zwar nach zwei Seiten hin, erblickt, einmal: ליתן צער במקום נזק und ferner: לרבות שוגג פצע .כמזיר ואונס כרצון ist ja die mechanische Zerstörung, deren etwaige bleibende Folge nach Abzug des durch כויה und חבורה bezeichneten Momentes bereits durch עין תחת עין gegeben ist. Es heißt daher einmal: פצע תחת פצע, "die Verwundung in ihrer Totalität komme zum Ersatz für eine Verwundung", also כויה וחבורה, d.i. צער (und so auch die bereits oben bestimmten indirekten Folgen שבת ורפוי) auch da, wo schon der durch פצע repräsentierte bleibende Schaden נזק zum Ersatz kommt. Und ferner: פצע תחת פצע, ,die Verwundung an sich", d. h. der dadurch bewirkt bleibende Schaden" נזק, kommt für jede Verwundung zum Ersatz ohne Rücksicht auf die größere oder geringere Absichtlichkeit der Tat. Bei פצע absolut kommt immer nur die objektive Wirkung ohne Rücksicht auf den subjektiven Charakter der Tat in Betracht, während die andern direkten und indirekten Folgen nur bei einem gewissen Grade des Bewusstseins und der Absichtlichkeit, מזיד und קרוב למזיד, zum Ersatz obliegen.

Der Satz פצע תחת פצע ist also einmal absolut zu begreifen: פצע für jede פצע, und zweitens im Zusammenhange: כויה und חבורה sind auch zu ersetzen, selbst wenn פצע für פצע zum Ersatz kommt. Daher steht auch פצע תחת פצע in der Mitte. Bei einer formal und real vollständigen Verletzung kommt פצע ,כויה und חבורה zum Ersatz.

Außer den oben V. 19 genannten indirekten Folgen, שבת: der relativen, transitorischen, durch die Bettlägerigkeit hervorgerufenen Arbeitsunfähigkeit, (שבת קטן, zum Unterschiede des שבת גדול, der absoluten, bleibenden Unfähigkeit, die unter נזק begriffen ist); רפוי: den Heilungskosten, und den hier genannten direkten Folgen: נזק und צער, kennt das Gesetz noch eine direkte, zum Ersatz kommende Folge der Verletzung: בשת, die durch das Schlagen an sich angetane, oder durch die verursachte körperliche Entstellung erfolgende Beschämung. Sie findet sich in dem schriftlichen Gesetze in dem Dewarim 25, 11 besprochenen Probleme. Es liegt die Annahme nicht ferne, dass auch diese zum Ersatz kommende Folge in חבורה unseres Textes angedeutet liegt, da Geschwulst, Entzündung etc. eben in der Regel Ursachen körperlicher Entstellung sind, ähnlich dem: הכהו על ראשו וצבה, der im Jeruschalmi B. K. VII., 1 allegierten תוספתא.

את עין עבדו [AND IF A MAN SMITE] THE EYE OF HIS SERVANT — of a Canaanitish servant; but the Hebrew servant does not got free on account of his tooth or his eye having been knocked out by his master, as we have stated in our comment on the passage לא תצא כצאת העבדים (v. 7).

וכי יכה איש את עין עבדו, If a man smite the eye of his slave, etc. In Kidushin 24 Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the other rabbis disagree on the meaning of this verse. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the legislation contained in this verse applies only when the master has destroyed the eye of his slave deliberately; the other rabbis hold that even if he had not done so deliberately but had merely aimed his blow at the eye, the slave goes free. According to the rabbis, why did the Torah not begin the verse by writing: "whenever a master destroys the eye of his slave," instead of writing "when he strikes the eye of his slave and he destroys it?" Perhaps the Torah did not use this expression as I would have interpreted it as applying to the eye regardless of the intent which has to accompany such a destruction of the eye.

תחת עינו, if the victim was a gentile slave.

וכי יכה איש את עין עבדו, “if an owner strikes the eye of his slave, etc.’ The Torah speaks of a gentile slave. The legislation pertaining to the destruction of such a servant’s eye formulated here applies equally to 23 other parts of the body enumerated in the Talmud. The reason the Torah chose the eye as the example of the organ whose loss results in the slave’s being freed forthwith, is that when Cham, Noach’s younger son, saw his father in a state of nudity due to his being drunk, instead of covering him he told his brothers i.e. he employed his teeth in doing so. This is why even the loss of a tooth is considered so important by the Torah, (verse 27), as it too is an organ capable of causing serious harm.

וכי יכה איש את עין עבדו, “And if a man will injure the eye of his slave, etc.” It is a Biblical law that a Canaanite slave is set free if he lost a tooth or eye through maltreatment by his master. The reason is that they became slaves only due to “tooth and eye.” It is written in connection with Cham the father of Canaan (Genesis 9,22) “Cham the father of Canaan saw the nakedness of his father and he told his two brothers outside.” He was first guilty with his eyes by looking and then with his teeth by telling what he had seen.” This is why he was cursed: “cursed be Canaan, the lowest of slaves shall he be to his brothers” (Genesis 9,25). Once the offending organs had been smitten the rest of the body has been released from that curse.
Our sages (Kidushin 25) say that the word ושחתה, “and destroys it,” in our verse means that there must have been an intent to destroy that eye or tooth. If the master struck the eye in the process of trying to cure it and the treatment failed and resulted in loss of that eye, the slave does not go free. The sequence of these paragraphs commences with verse 20 which speaks of killing one’s slave intentionally, a very severe sin, progressing to the description of two men fighting in the course of which the Torah discloses the legal status of an unborn baby, a death which is due to a lesser sin than that described in verse 20. This is followed by injury inflicted on Jewish people, i.e. the meaning of “an eye for an eye.” There the Torah speaks about injury rather than death. This is followed in turn by injury caused to a Canaanite slave, the least serious misdemeanor of the list commencing in verse 20. After having dealt with injuries and death caused by human beings, the Torah turns its attention to injuries or death caused by beasts or inert objects. The Torah proceeds in a very orderly and logical manner.

She shall not go free as do the (gentile) male-slaves. [Also a male Hebrew slave does not go free in this manner, since male and female Hebrew slaves] are compared to one another by the Torah, as it says, “If your Hebrew brother or sister is sold to you. . .” (Devarim 15:12).

V. 26 u. 27. Mit עבד und אמה ohne nähere Beifügung ist am Gesetze immer עבד כנעני, der kanaanitische Leibeigene bezeichnet. שן ועין sind nur exemplifikatorisch, und zwar durch die Wiederholung des לחפשי ישלחנו in möglichst weitem Umfange als רבוי zu verstehen (siehe zu Kap. 22, 6). Es sind nur alle jene Verstümmelungen ausgeschlossen, die nicht wie "Auge" unreproduzierbar, oder nicht wie beide augenfällig sind. Es sind darunter begriffen: כל מומין שבגלוי ואינן חוזרין. Neben Auge war noch Zahn zu nennen, weil dieser ein Organ ist, das nicht mit der Geburt gegeben wird, und daher minder wesentlich erscheinen könnte (Kiduschin 24 b). Indem das Gesetz das ושחתה, das Verderben des Auges etc. nur als Folge des כי יכה, eines Schlages, eintreten lässt, setzt es offenbar nicht die Absicht der Verletzung voraus. In der Tat wird die Freilassung statuiert, selbst beim geringsten Grad der Fahrlässigkeit: היתה לו אבן מונחת לו בחיקו ולא הכיר בה ועמד ונפלה לעין עבד, in welcher נזק allgemein zum Ersatz kommt, und selbst bei in bester Absicht verübter Ungeschicklichkeit z. B. שהיה רבו רופא ואמר לו לחתור שנו והפילו u. dergl. (B. K. 26 b. Kiduschin 24 b. תוספו׳ das., im Gegensatz zu Maimon. עבדים V. 11). Indem aber das Gesetz in der Freilassung eine Entschädigung bestimmt, die in der Regel weit den Wert des zugefügten Schadens übersteigt, indem es ferner diese Entschädigung ohne Rücksicht auf den verschiedenen Wert des verletzten Gliedes, in allen Fällen, z. B. beim Zahn wie beim Auge, gleich eintreten lässt, דבר קצוב, so ist es klar, dass die als "Ersatz" ausgedrückte Freilassungspflicht doch nicht als eine תשלומין, als Ersatzschuld, sondern als: קנס, als Präventivpön (siehe zu V. 37) zu begreifen ist, um durch dieselbe Gelassenheit, Milde und eine noch größere Vorsicht in Behandlung der Leibeigenen als selbst hinsichtlich Freier bei der Herrschaft hervorzurufen.

לחפשי ישלחנו, “he must set him free;” even if he had only knocked out one of his Canaanite slaves’ teeth. According to a Midrash, (asking the rhetorical question) will such a slave really be given his freedom just because he lost as tooth? The answer given is as follows: Cham, the son of Noach was cursed by G–d, [actually his son, seeing that he had previously been blessed by G–d and that blessing could not be nullified Ed.] for having seen his father naked, and having told his brothers instead of covering him. In our verse, the subject, the master of the slave, had actually deprived his slave of a tooth or an eye, no wonder that the Torah applies a financial penalty to the master by decreeing that he release the slave (whose market value is basically 30 shekel).

לחפשי ישלחנו, “he has to discharge him to freedom.” The Torah’s point here is that the slave does not have the option of accepting a financial settlement for the loss of his limb by his owner. The reason is that such a settlement would be useless to him, seeing that as long as he remains a slave all that he owns belongs to his master. Even a person who has sold himself into slavery with the express condition that his master cannot control his possessions, the master remains in a position that enables him by harassing his slave force him to hand over his belongings to him. The only way this can be avoided is by setting his slave free.

תחת עינו [HE SHALL LET HIM GO FREE] FOR HIS EYE’S SAKE — and similarly if he cuts off one of the twenty-four “tips of limbs” viz., the fingers, the toes, the two ears, the nose and the ראש הגויה, the membrum (cf. Mishnah Negaim 6:7). But why, since the precept is not applicable to eye and tooth alone but to twenty-four limbs, are both the eye and the tooth, mentioned? One would have stufficed! Because if only the eye were mentioned and not the tooth also, I might have said: What it the characteristic of the eye? It came into the world together with him! So, too, this law is applicable only to such limbs as came into the world together with him, but not to the tooth, for the tooth did not come into the world together with him. If, on the other hand, only the tooth had been mentioned and not the eye also, I might have said: the law applies even to a case when the master knocked out a child-slave’s tooth which grows again (more lit., which has a substitute) after a time. Therefore the eye is also mentioned to intimate that the law can be applied only when the master knocks out the tooth of his adult slave which, like the eye, does not grow again. (Kiddushin 24b).

Twenty-four tips of limbs. This is derived from the law of tooth and eye, which serves as a binyan av (prototype). The common denominator [of tooth and eye] is that they are: permanent defects, tips of limbs, visible, and the result of an intentional blow. Thus, all [the other 24 tips of limbs, which have these qualities, have the same law]. This excludes the case of the master cutting flesh from his slave, since it grows back. (Mechilta)

The Torah may also have intended to convey that though the eye was not destroyed immediately and totally at the time the master struck the slave but only some time later, the legislation that the slave goes free still applies. This situation is different from the one described earlier when death as a result of an unintentional killing had to occur immediately in order for the killer to be guilty of murder. The opinion of the rabbis is supported by the Torah using the word ושחתה, "he has destroyed it," i.e. even if he had not intended to.

ואם שן עבדו….יפיל, And if he smite a tooth of his slave…. so that it falls out, etc. Kidushin 24 explains why the laws concerning destroying a slave's eye or tooth are not lumped together by the Torah in one verse but have been divided into two separate laws. Rabbi Sheshet says if the eye of a slave was already blind but the master gouged it out, the slave has to be freed. Accordingly, we have two separate laws concerning how to free a slave. One applies when the eyesight of the slave has been impaired as a result of the master hitting him, the other if even a blind eye has been scratched out by his master. Had the Torah lumped these two kinds of injuries together in a single verse, we would have concluded that the same yardstick is applied in either kind of injury. Just as the tooth becomes useless only when it is knocked out, so we would have thought that an eye becomes useless only when it is gouged out. We would not have assumed that destroying merely the sense of sight in an eye was sufficient reason to let the slave go free seeing the slave did not lose a limb.

ישלחנו, he will release him. The expression שילוח, is similar to the when we read in Deuteronomy 24,3: ושלחה מביתו, “he sends her away from his house;” the reason that the word: חנם, “without any compensation is absent here is the reason why the word: חנם “without compensation,” is absent here in our chapter, [as opposed to verse 11 in our chapter, where automatic release of slaves after 6 years service is discussed Ed.], is to teach us that the release must be accompanied by a document just as the document of divorce to a wife.

תחת שינו, “on account of his tooth.” The Torah teaches us that even though the master owns the slave bodily, this does not mean that each body part of that slave is his to do with as he likes. G-d did not consent to slaves being owned in order for their masters to be able to mutilate them when they are angry at them. The Torah singling out the word: his “tooth” (sing), teaches that even if the slave lost only one tooth through his being beaten this suffices to his master having to free him unconditionally. In the event that the master had caused the slave to lose an eye, and before releasing him he caused him to also lose a tooth, he will have to compensate him financially for the loss of the tooth, as by that time, halachically, he did not own that slave’s body anymore, even though he was still under his physical control. According to our author, the rule that a gentile slave receives his freedom in return for losing a limb, is arrived at by simple logic. If he gains his freedom at the hands of heaven when he becomes unable through disease to perform his duties, how much more does he qualify for his freedom when he has been abused by a human being owning him. [Rabbi Chavell in his glossaries, cites a statement from the Talmud B’rachot 5 according to which the logic is precisely the reverse, i.e. “if a gentile slave receives his freedom in return for having lost a limb as a result of punishment by his master, how much more so must G-d forgive sinners whose entire bodies have been punished by Him with painful sickness and disease!” This is whatDavid asked for when he said in Psalms 118,18: 'יסור יסרני קה ולמות לא נתנני, “the Lord punished me severely but did not hand me over to the angel of death.” Surely, if someone had to endure man’s inhumanity to man, he would be entitled to his release in exchange.]

וכי יגח שור AND IF AN OX THRUST — This law applies to an ox as well to any other cattle, wild beast or fowl, but Scripture mentions the ox, because it speaks of what usually occurs (Bava Kamma 54b).

וכי יגח שור את איש, If an ox gore a man, etc. The apparently superfluous word את is explained in Sanhedrin 79. If Shimon intended to kill Reuven but killed Levi instead he is guilty of murder since he intended to murder someone. The words את איש mean any man, even one other than the target. This applies only if the original target had been a human being; if one intended to kill an animal and killed a human being instead, the killer is not culpable for murder (compare Sanhedrin 78).

סקול יסקל השור, according to the plain meaning the offending ox will be stoned to death.

וכי יגח שור את איש, “If an ox shall gore a man or a woman, etc.” the Torah employs the term נגח when speaking of an injury or death caused by an ox attacking a human being, whereas when describing two beasts fighting each other the word used is נגף, “pushed with the body” (compare verse 38). The Talmud Baba Kama 2 explains that seeing the fate of a human being is influenced by horoscopic influences as well as through supervision by celestial forces of his individual fate, the Torah uses an expression indicating intent, whereas when beasts fight each other, seeing that their individual fates are not subject to such celestial influences the Torah is content to describe what happened as a result as a mere unintentional push.

And a beast or bird. This is learned from a gezeirah shavah between the word שור (ox) in our verse, and the word שור in the section of Shabbos (Shemos 23:12) — as Rashi explains [below] on the verse of “an ox or a donkey” (v. 33).

V. 28. Es heißt hier nicht: שור איש, wie V. 35, denn das Gericht ergeht über das Tier selbst und begreift ebenso alle Tiere in sich, wie שורך וחמורך des Dekalogs (Dewarim 5, 14) nur exemplifikatorisch genannt und durch וכל בהמתך als solches erläutert ist. (מכילתא und B. K. 54 b). Indem aber die Hinrichtung des Tieres, selbst wenn es herrenlos ist, geboten ist, so kann diese Bestimmung nicht als ein Verfahren gegen den Eigentümer begriffen werden, sondern erscheint ebenso als ein vom göttlichen Gerichte dem menschlichen delegierter Auftrag zur Ausführung des מיד כל חיה אדרשנו (Bereschit 9, 5), wie das an einem Mörder durch Menschen zu vollziehende Todesurteil ebenfalls als eine solche partielle Delegation zur Ausführung des ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרש את נפש האדם (das.) zu betrachten ist. Beiden liegt wohl, nach eben dieser Stelle, das gemeinschaftliche Motiv der im Bewusstsein der Menschen aufrecht zu haltenden göttlichen Dignität des leiblichen Daseins des Menschen zu Grunde.

סקול יסקל השור, “the (offending) ox must be stoned to death.” Rashi claims that from the words above we would not know that its flesh would be prohibited as food. This sounds very strange, seeing that it has not been killed by ritual slaughter, it is what is known as neveilah, and all animals that died other than by ritual slaughter are automatically forbidden to us as food. What did Rashi think that the words: “its meat must not be eaten” was needed for? It could be needed for a situation in which the ox in question had been ritually slaughtered after being convicted to die by stoning, before the decree could be carried out. In that event our verse insures that it will not allow the guilty party to circumvent the court’s decision, seeing that ritual slaughter could not be carried out on a dead animal. If you were to say that the prohibition here refers to the fetus found inside an animal that had been ritually slaughtered and was either close to be born, and comes out alive, or it had been carried for the full term of pregnancy and was dead, and the Torah decreed that ritual slaughter of the mother was not sufficient to permit this ben pekuah to be eaten, as is, it is considered as having died from natural causes and therefore cannot be eaten, the words לא יאכל, teach that it must not only not be eaten, but no other use may be made of it either.

וכי יגח שור את איש, “when an ox gores a man, etc. up until this point the Torah had listed a number of situations when a human being had inflicted pain or loss of life; now it turns to damages caused by animals under the control of human beings, or property owned by human beings and not secured against causing damage to his peers.

ולא יאכל את בשרו AND ITS FLESH SHALL NOT BE EATEN — From what is implied in the words “the ox shall surely be stoned” do I not know that it becomes carrion, and carrion of course is prohibited to be eaten? Why then is it stated, “and its flesh shall not be eaten”? It is to intimate that even if he slaughtered the animal according to regulation after sentence of stoning has been pronounced but before it had been carried out it is forbidden to be eaten. Whence may it be proved that under such circumstances it is prohibited to derive any other benefit from it? Scripture therefore states: “and the owner of the ox is נקי” — it is a phrase such as a man uses to his fellow: that man there has gone away “empty” (נקי) of all his property (he has nothing whatever left), and he has not the slightest benefit of it. This is how the Halachic Midrash explains it (Bava Kamma 41a). However, the real sense of ובעל השור נקי, is what it literally means: the owner of the ox shall be guiltless. Because Scripture says with reference to the מועד (an ox which inflicted injury three times in succession, and about which its owner must therefore be regarded as forewarned), (v. 29) “and his owner also shall be put to death”, it was forced to state with regard to the תם (a hitherto innocuous animal, having inflicted an injury for the first time) “the owner of the ox shall be guiltless”.

ולא יאכל את בשרו; not only may its meat not be eaten by a Jew, but not even by a gentile or a dog; it is completely forbidden to be enjoyed by anyone. This is in spite of the fact that normally, when the animal of a Jew has died of natural causes or has been found ritually unfit for consumption, the Torah permitted the meat of the carcass to be either sold to a gentile or given to him as a gift or to be fed to one’s dogs (Deuteronomy 14,21 and Exodus 22,30), such animals are permitted even after they had died through stoning. [seeing that had not killed a human being. Ed.] Our sages derive from this verse that after judgment had been handed down that the animal in question is to be stoned to death, slaughtering it ritually will not make it fit for consumption or other beneficial use to the owner. (Baba Kamma 61).

ומת, and he dies, this includes delayed death. As long as the death is attributable to the goring, the ox, i.e. his master, is liable. It is worthwhile to compare Rashi in Baba Kama 41 where the Talmud discusses the law of an ox goring and endangering the lives of three people none of whom died from the goring.

סקול יסקל השור ולא יאכל את בשרו, sobald die Tötung des Menschen durch den Ochsen vermittelst Zeugen erwiesen ist, ist er zum Steinigungstode zu verurteilen und darf statt dessen nicht zum Genusse getötet werden; hätte man dies selbst durch gehörige שחיטה getan, so dass er nun als בשר, als sonst zum Genusse erlaubtes "Fleisch" da läge, so darf gleichwohl sein Fleisch nicht genossen werden, שחטו אחר שנגמר דינו אסור. Ja, seine Tötung steht überhaupt im Dienste eines höhern, sittlichen Zweckes, diesem ist er verfallen und somit jeder Benutzung entzogen, er ist mit gefälltem Urteil אסור בהנאה (nach ר׳׳ת erst mit der Tötung, wenn auch durch שחיטה (siehe תוספו׳ B. K. 24 a und Sebachim 71 a). Ist ja, nach der rezipierten Ansicht des ר׳ אבהו אמר ר׳ אלעזר, überhaupt in den durch לא יאכל לא תאכל לא תאכל :אכילה ausgedrückten Verboten auch הנאה die Benutzung mit als verboten inbegriffen, so lange nicht anderweitig das Gesetz selbst, wie z. B. bei נכלה den Verkauf, oder wie bei טרפה, die Fütterung (Dewarim 14, 21 u. Schmot 22, 30], somit die Benutzung überhaupt ausdrücklich gestattet. Hier wird durch das beigefügte את, da es nicht ובשרו לא יאכל oder לא יאכל בשרו, sondern את בשרו heißt (siehe Bereschit 1, 1) das בשר in weitester Ausdehnung begriffen, und selbst עורו, die Haut ist zur Benutzung untersagt (B. K. 41 a u. b).

וכי יגח שור את איש, the expression: נגיחה is used when an ox gores a human being, whereas the expression: נגיפה is used when said ox gores another animal. The reason is that the fate of a human being is influenced by his mazzal, the astrological constellation of the stars when he has been born, and as a rule animals fear human beings (Genesis 9,2) so that even when they gore they take care not to inflict death. Animals do not enjoy this advantage and therefore being gored is generally fatal for them. (Compare Rashi on Talmud Baba Kamma folio 2)

ובעל השור נקי, as long as the offending animal had not been classified as a dangerous animal, putting an additional onus to guard it properly on its owner.

ולא יאכל את בשרו, and its meat may not be consumed. If the owner ate the meat he will receive 39 lashes. He is, however, not punished for enjoying the remains of the animal in other ways, such as the skin, etc., although any use of the remains of the animal is forbidden. This is the reason the Torah has not lumped all these various examples of injuries and fatal injuries together under a single heading.

נקי. Da Menschenverletzung nicht zur normalen Natur des Ochsen gehört, dieser Fall aber von einem solchen normalen Tiere (תם) spricht, bei welchem ein solches Stoßen eines Menschen als Abnormität nicht zu erwarten war, so ist auch der Eigentümer eines solchen Tieres in keiner Weise etwa wegen vernachlässigter Hut für schuldig zu halten. Gleichwohl ist die Bemerkung des Gesetzes nicht überflüssig, weil V. 35 für Vermögensbeschädigung durch abnormen Stoß eines normalen Tieres eine Präventiv-pön (קנס) im Betrage des halben Schadens (חצי נזק) statuiert ist, somit die Voraussetzung nahe lag, dass auch hier vielleicht חצי כופר, die Hälfte des V. 30 statuierten Sühnegeldes, aufzuerlegen wäre. Es war also auszusprechen, dass er in diesem Falle durchaus נקי, von keinerlei Zahlung zu betreffen sei. Es dürfte aber die Notwendigkeit dieser Bemerkung auch schon dadurch gegeben sein, weil doch in der Tat der Eigentümer durch den völligen und gänzlichen Verlust seines Tieres in Mitleidenschaft gezogen ist und daher auszusprechen war, dass außer diesem Verluste er nichts zu zahlen habe. Vielleicht liegt diese Betrachtung der Auffassung des שמעון בן זומא (B. K. 41 a) zu Grunde, nach welcher eben aus diesem Zusatz, ובעל השור נקי, der gänzliche Verlust des Tieres für den Eigentümer gefolgert wird: כאדם שאומר לחברו יצא איש פלוני נקי מנכסיו ואין לו בהם הנאה של כלום, welches dann in dem Sinne zu verstehen wäre, wie man von jemandem, der persönlich freigesprochen worden, jedoch das ganze Recht auf seine Güter eingebüßt, sagt: er ist frei aus seinen Gütern herausgegangen, und brauchte man somit nicht gerade anzunehmen, es habe בן זומא das נקי hier in dem Sinne wie: ונקתה לארץ תשב (Jes. 3, 26) נתתי לכם נקיון שנים (Amos 4,6) "der Eigentümer des Ochsen geht leer aus", verstehen müssen. —

סקול יסקל השור, “the offending ox is to be stoned to death. If you were to ask that if even an ox that did not have a history of goring people is subject to stoning, why did the Torah have to tell us that an ox with a history of goring has to be stoned? (verse 29) Answer: this is faulty logic; the reason why a hitherto tame ox is stoned is because no penalty of compensating the victim is imposed on the owner;I could think that seeing that the owner of an aggressive ox that has killed a human being would not have to be stoned. To make sure that we do not think so, the Torah added that the guilty ox has to be stoned in all such situations. You might also ask that how can it happen that an ox will gore people twice or even three times, i.e. become labeled: “an aggressive ox” מועד, if he had been stoned to death already after the first time he killed a human being? Answer: either such an ox had escaped after it gored the first time, or, that whereas we know the ox but did not know who its owner was so that we could have accused him of deliberate negligence.

ולא יאכל את בשרו, “and its flesh may not be eaten.” Is it not clear from the fact that this animal had to die through stoning that its flesh would be forbidden, seeing that only animals that have been killed by ritual slaughter may be eaten? The expression יאכל in the passive mode, always means that it is not only forbidden to be eaten by Jews but may neither be fed to dogs or sold to gentiles.

ובעל השור נקי, and the owner of that ox remained free of guilt as long as his ox had not displayed signs of being aggressive. (Rash’bam)

מתמל שלשם [BUT IF THE OX HAS BEEN WONT TO THRUST] YESTERDAY AND BEFORE YESTERDAY — Here you have including the present occasion the three times an ox must gore before it can be declared a מועד (Bava Kamma 23b).‎

AND ITS OWNER SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH. Our Rabbis have received by Tradition¹⁶⁷Mechilta here on the Verse. that this death means by the hand of Heaven. Similar cases are these verses: and the common man that draweth nigh shall be put to death;¹⁶⁸Numbers 18:7. Punishment for a non-priest who performs the Divine service in the Sanctuary is death by the hand of Heaven (Sanhedrin 83 a). and they die therein, if they profane it.¹⁶⁹Leviticus 22:9. This is with reference to an unclean priest who ate clean heave-offering [which is forbidden to him as long as he remains in his state of uncleanness], and the punishment is death by the hand of Heaven (Sanhedrin 83 a).
I have noticed that where the Torah speaks of those liable to be put to death by the court, it does not mention just yumoth (he shall be put to death), but always says, moth yumoth (he shall surely be put to death). Do not object to this rule from the verse, and he that killeth a man ‘yumoth’ (shall be put to death),¹⁷⁰Leviticus 24:21. In this case his punishment is death by the court, and yet it says only yumoth! or from the verse about the Sabbath,¹⁷¹Of the Sabbath it is said, Whosoever doeth any work therein ‘yumoth’ (shall be put to death) (further 35:2), and his punishment is death by the court! or a prophet who misleads,¹⁷²And that prophet… ‘yumoth’ (shall be put to death) (Deuteronomy 13:6), and there too his punishment is by the court (Sanhedrin 84 a). for in each of these cases He has already clearly explained elsewhere about them [that they are liable to death by the court, by using the phrase: moth yumoth].¹⁷³In the case of smiting a man — see above Verse 12; for the Sabbath, see further, 31:14. For a prophet who misleads, see Deuteronomy 13:10: ki harog tahargenu (for thou shall surely kill him).
Now I do not know the reason for Onkelos’ rendering yumoth as yithk’teil [“he shall be killed”, which indicates that his death is to be by the court, instead of by the hand of Heaven]. Perhaps his intention is to state that the owner, [who had been previously warned that his ox had gored three times, but still did not guard it, so that it went out and killed a man or woman], deserves to be put to death, but is instead made liable to the payment of a ransom. Or perhaps Onkelos means to explain that that which Scripture states, and its owner also shall be put to death means that the owner will perish in a similar manner to that by which the gored person was killed, for his day shall come to die, or he shall go down into battle, and be swept away;¹⁷⁴I Samuel 26:10. the Eternal will not hold him guiltless.¹⁷⁵Above, 20:7. Thus Onkelos wanted to teach us that the owner of the ox is liable, according to the view of Heaven, to die by the hand of a killer, and not by a natural death, something like it is said, and I will kill you with the sword.¹⁷⁶Further, 22:23. In the verse, and the common man that draweth nigh shall be put to death,¹⁶⁸Numbers 18:7. Punishment for a non-priest who performs the Divine service in the Sanctuary is death by the hand of Heaven (Sanhedrin 83 a). Onkelos also translated yumoth as yithk’teil [“he shall be killed,” indicating that his death is to be by the court], because he agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiba who said that a non-priest who performed the Divine service in the Sanctuary is put to death by strangulation.¹⁷⁷Sanhedrin 84a. The Sages, however, are of the opinion that his death is by the hand of Heaven.

וגם בעליו יומת. A reference to judgment by heaven which will be exacted from the guilty party if we cannot convict him due to lack of witnesses.

וגם בעליו יומת, by heavenly forces as opposed to by human tribunal. If the owner did make restitution of monetary kind he is not guilty vis a vis heaven either.

וגם בעליו יומת, “also its owners shall be executed.” This execution would be at the hands of heaven, not by human tribunal. [clearly, the owner could not have been warned of what his ox was going to do and that he would be executed if he did not prevent it so that legal proceedings against him would result in a death sentence. Ed] Nachmanides writes that he cannot follow the translation of Onkelos who takes the text decreeing execution of the ox’s owner literally. He speculates that possibly Onkelos meant that the owner deserves to be executed. Instead, the Torah, in this instance, provided monetary compensation to be paid by the owner. Alternately, what Onkelos meant to say was that this owner, when the day would come when he was meant to die, would die a violent death instead of dying from natural causes. In other words, by his negligent conduct with this aggressive ox he made himself liable to G’d’s direct intervention in causing his death.

והמית איש או אשה, “and it kills a man or a woman, etc. “ According to Pessikta Zutrata on our verse, these words are redundant in connection with the immediate subject at hand. They are therefore available to serve as a basic premise that just as there is no difference in the treatment of man and woman if either has been gored by an ox, neither does Jewish law make a distinction between men and women in other instances of woman sustaining death or injury. Although nowadays (since the Jews were exiled to Babylon) we do not have the authority to impose financial penalties, if someone who was wronged (injured) compensated himself by seizing property belonging to the guilty party our local courts do not reverse what the injured party has done.
Our sages in Baba Kama 30 relate a list of anecdotes describing how careful various Talmudic scholars were to ensure that their property (inert) could not accidentally become the cause of injuring people. They buried plowshares 3 feet underground, were very careful that discarded shards should not pose a hazard to anyone, etc. Deut. 22,8 (in connection with the fence on one’s roof) states “in order that you do not place blood in your house,” as the basic warning not to become guilty of damage or injury through inadvertence. A certain individual was observed throwing stones which he did not want anymore from his house into the public domain, the street. An old man accosted this individual challenging him why he threw refuse from a place which was his own to a place which was not. The offender replied sarcastically: After some time had passed the offending individual found himself in financial straits and had to sell his house. He tripped over the stones which he had thrown out sometime earlier. He then remembered the words of the old man who had scolded him at the time and now he acknowledged that the reproof had been in place. The story is an illustration of what Solomon said in Kohelet 12,1: “remember your Creator in your youth.”

Making. . . three gorings. [They are:] the goring of yesterday, of the day before, and of today. (Nachalas Yaakov) This teaches that he is not liable until the fourth goring.

והועד בבעליו, and its owner(s) had been warned, etc. The reason the Torah speaks of "its owners" (pl) is that in the event the ox in question is owned jointly by several people, all are guilty of the death penalty; the situation is not comparable to one where two people combined to administer a lethal blow to another. In the latter case both are not culpable before a human tribunal (compare Baba Kama 26). The reason is that there they are only free from a human tribunal, whereas both are guilty in the eyes of Heaven. In our case there is no death penalty by a human court even if the animal belongs to a single owner. When the Torah speaks about the owner יומת, it refers to death at the hands of Heaven. All owners have to pay the required amount of compensation, however.

V. 29. נַגָח: Substantivform wie חַטָ גַנָב, die den Charakter, d. h. eine zur Natur gewordene Eigentümlichkeit bezeichnet. So auch hier: ein Ochse, dem das Stoßen zur Natur geworden. Diese abnorme Eigentümlichkeit wird als "fest" gewordene Natur (חזקה) durch dreimalige Wiederholung an drei Tagen konstatiert. Wenn רבא (B. K. 23 b) im Prinzipe nicht der rezipierten Halacha entgegensteht, daß der נַגָח-Charakter mit dreimaliger Tötung erlangt wird und erst der vierte Stoß dem Eigentümer zur Last fällt, er vielmehr das Prinzip selbst an der Hand unseres Textes also darstellt: תמול מתמול חד שלשום תרי ולא ישמרנו האידנא חייב, sich aber dabei die Schwierigkeit erhebt, den vierten Stoß in unserm Texte nachzuweisen: so dürfte רבא vielleicht das ואם שור נגח הוא des 29. V. in Verbindung mit dem in V. 28 besprochenen Falle, und zwar also gefasst haben: wenn aber der Ochse, der eben gestoßen, damit sich als ein שור נגח erwiesen, indem er bereits auch gestern und vorgestern, also schon zweimal vor dem jetzigen Stoß, gestoßen hatte, und von nun an der Eigentümer ihn nicht hütet, so ist er beim nächsten Stoß zahlungspflichtig. In diesem Sinne haben wir auch übersetzt. Und ebenso wäre V. 36 im Sinne רבא's zu verstehen. Die Möglichkeit aber, dass ein Ochse, der ja bereits nach der ersten Tötung eines Menschen hingerichtet werden muss, zum dritten und vierten Stoße gelangen kann, ist (B. K. 41 a) verschiedentlich nachgewiesen, z. B. wenn er die ersten Male wiederholt entlaufen war usw.

ואם שור נגח הוא, “but if that ox had had a history of goring people, (and its owner had not taken proper precautions);“ The Talmud, tractate Baba Kamma folio 23, relates a dispute between two scholars, Abbaye and Rava whether the term נגח applies to an ox that already gored twice or whether even after having gored once, that animal belongs to the category of being potential a killer, and its owner being guilty of not having protected potential victims properly. The subject of their dispute is the meaning of the word תמול, usually understood to mean “yesterday.” According to the former scholar, even a single incident of goring suffices for the ox to be categorised as dangerous, and the prefix מ i.e. מתמול, would refer to the second offense by that ox, so that the words ולא ישמרנו, “and its owner did not watch it adequately,” would make him liable to stoning only the fourth time whereas according to the second scholar, basing himself on the word שלשום, “day before yesterday,” that ox’s status did not change from harmless to dangerous until after it had gored three times. According to Rava, the words ולא ישמרנו, would then mean that only after a third such occurrence did this ox change its category, and its owner became guilty on an additional count According to the Talmud in tractate Baba batra, folio 28, such an ox is subject to stoning only after it has gored the fourth time. seems therefore that Abaye found four sources in the Torah’s text supporting his view whereas Rava found only three. If you were to ask what difference this makes, [after all we do not decide questions of halachah on the written text of the Torah, but use it only as broad hints, Ed.] Rabbi Ezra hanavi claims that there is a difference. The difference would be if the fourth goring had occurred on the same day as the third goring. According to Abbaye, if the last goring would have occurred on the same day as the previous one, the owner as well as his ox would not be held liable for the additional negligence, as the owner on a day when his ox was bad-tempered had not yet had time to place him under secure restraint.

וגם בעליו יומת, “and also its owner is guilty of the death penalty by execution.” According to the plain meaning of the text he should be executed in practice, seeing that he was aware of allowing a dangerous animal to be on the loose, and he took no precautions.

והועד בבעליו AND IT HATH BEEN TESTIFIED TO HIS OWNER — הועד (from the root עוד) is an expression for warning through witnesses (Bava Kamma 24a), as in, (Genesis 43:3) “the man hath solemnly forewarned (הָעֵד הַעִד) us”.

וגם בעליו יומת, “and also its owner shall die.” The word יומת here does not refer to execution of the owner by a human tribunal. Our sages, (Sanhedrin 15) in interpreting the word conclude that a man is executed for murder of a human being not for the killing committed by his ox. The penalty referred to in our verse is known as מיתה בידי שמים, “death at the hand of heaven,” i.e. premature death of the owner in question. The expression used for the death penalty of the guilty owner is the same as in Numbers 18,7 “and the stranger (non-priest) who enters holy precincts will die.” Sanhedrin 83 makes clear that what is meant is death at the hands of G’d.

Kill him with biting. . . [Rashi knows this] because “and it kills” is a superfluous phrase. For it already said (v. 28), “If an ox gores a man. . . and he dies,” and immediately afterwards the verse states, “But if the ox had gored. . .” Thus, the superfluous “and it kills” comes to include any method of killing that is similar to [goring with] the horn. (Kitzur Mizrachi) The reason why Rashi did not mention the method of crouching [on the victim, although the Gemara mentions it] is because Rashi included it in “shoving.”

הועד בבעליו. Die Bedeutung העיד, von עוד, Dauer: als zeugen und warnen haben wir bereits (Bereschit 8, 22) erläutert. Hier fallen beide Bedeutungen zusammen. Indem dem Eigentümer die dreimal wiederholten Stöße seines Tieres und damit der nunmehrige Charakter desselben bezeugt worden, ward er zugleich gewarnt, d.h. es ward ihm die Pflicht gegenwärtig gemacht, denselben entsprechend zu hüten. Es bleibt (B. K. 24 a) zweifelhaft, ob שלשה ימים דקתני לייעודי תורא או לייעודי גברא, d. h. ob es genügt, dass dem Eigentümer die drei Stöße und damit der gefährliche Charakter seines Tieres auf einmal bezeugt worden, oder der Eigentümer dreimal gewarnt sein muss. Wir haben in ersterm Sinne übersetzt: und es ist dies nun seinem Eigentümer bezeugt worden. Nach der zweiten Annahme hieße es: und es ist dies seinem Eigentümer (jedesmal) bezeugt worden. —

והמית איש וגו׳ BUT HE HATH PUT TO DEATH A MAN [OR WOMAN] — Since it states, (v. 28) “If an ox gore (יגח) [a man or a woman, that he die]” I might say that I have only the law dealing with the case that it kills by pushing him with the horn (the root נגח being mainly used of thrusting with the horn, cf. e .g., Deuteronomy 33:17) but whence can the law be derived that it applies also to the case where it kills by biting, thrusting, or kicking? Scripture therefore states “he hath put to death [a man or a woman]” thus intimating that so long as death is caused by the animal it is liable to stoning.

השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת, beide zusammen haben sie eigentlich den Tod des Menschen bewirkt, der Eigentümer, als die Intelligenz, die also die Kraftäußerung des ihr unterstehenden, lebendigen und leblosen Besitzes zu überwachen und zu vertreten hat wie die Kraftäußerungen ihres eigenen Leibes. Daher: כמיתת הבעלים כך מיתת השור: es gelten für die Verurteilung und Hinrichtung des Tieres ganz die Bestimmungen und die Prozedur, wie bei der eventuellen Hinrichtung des Herrn; das Tier ist nur zu verurteilen, wenn die Tötung unter Umständen geschehen, die, wenn sie durch einen Menschen verübt, dessen Todesschuld herbeigeführt hätten (B. K. 44 b). Ebenso geschieht die Verurteilung nur wie beim Menschen durch einen Gerichtshof von dreiundzwanzig (Sanhedrin 2 a). Dieses letztere findet jedoch auch statt, wenn das Tier herrenlos, und dürfte dem vielmehr das Motiv zu Grunde liegen: der Hinrichtung des Tieres die oben angedeutete sittliche Idee zu erhalten und sie nicht als etwa polizeiliche Maßregel zur Verhütung fernern Schadens erscheinen zu lassen.

וגם בעליו יומת AND HIS OWNER ALSO SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH by a visitation of God. You might perhaps think he shall be punished by human agency (the judges)! Scripture, however, states, (Numbers 35:21) “he that smote him (a human being) shall surely be put to death; for he is a murderer” — the force of these last words is to intimate that for a murder committed by himself you shall put him to death (i. e. he suffers death by human agency as is the law regarding a murderer), but you shall not put him to death on account of a murder committed by his ox; this must be left to God (Sanhedrin 15b; cf. also Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:29:8).

יומת: er hat vor Gott das Leben verwirkt; allein das menschliche Gericht hat ihm nur, wie im folgenden Verse ausgesprochen, ein Sühnegeld aufzulegen.

אם כפר יושת עליו WHEN THERE BE SET ON HIM A RANSOM — This אם is not conditional (i. e. it does not mean “if” the heirs feel inclined to set on him a ransom) but it has the same meaning as in (Exodus 22:24) “When (אם) thou lendest money” where it has the meaning of אשר, “when” (for it is a duty to lend money to the poor and it is not optional). It is the law regarding him that the court should set on him a ransom.

IF THERE BE LAID ON HIM A RANSOM, THEN HE SHALL GIVE FOR THE REDEMPTION OF HIS LIFE WHATSOEVER IS LAID UPON HIM. Since the redemption is a form of atonement¹⁷⁸“An atonement for the owner whose ox killed a man” (Rashi Makkoth 2 b). as are the offerings, and if the owner does not desire it we cannot force him to come before the court to impose the ransom on him, and even if the court ordered him to pay it, we cannot seize his goods as security, therefore He said: “if.”

אם כופר יושת עליו, if witnesses testify in a manner that enables the court to apply the laws of compensation as a means of atonement.

פדיון נפשו. His soul's ransom. There is a dispute in Baba Kama 40 as to what determines the amount of compensation. Some hold that we evaluate the worth of the victim that has died, others that the basis of the compensation is the value of the offending animal. According to the opinion that we determine the amount of compensation based on the value of the ox which gored, it would appear that where the ox in question was owned by more than one individual each one has to pay the full amount of compensation seeing there is no death sentence by a human tribunal which would override the laws of financial compensation. According to the opinion that the basis of the compensation is the value of the victim, the offenders would only have to share the monetary value of the victim between them. In view of this, the question Rabbi Nachman asked Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov whether both owners have to pay compensation seems out of place, seeing this is a much older Tannaitic argument. Clearly, we cannot assume that the question mentioned in the Talmud is based on the assumption that the value of the offending ox is the basis of the compensation [which everyone agrees serves as atonement not as restitution, Ed.]. In the following scenario an ox worth 200 shekel has gored a human being whose market value as a slave would have been 50 shekel. If the ox was owned by more than one party, and the basis of compensation is the value (maximum) of the offending ox, each owner pays 50 shekels. No allowance is made for the fact that there are two owners who could have shared the damage of 50 shekels that had been inflicted. The problem Rabbi Nachman submitted to Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov was based on the assumption of the Chachamim that the value of the victim serves as the basis of the compensation. It appears that Maimonides also understood the problem in this way for he ruled in chapter 11 of his Hilchot Nizkey Mamon that monetary compensation is based on estimating the value of the slain person (or animal); if two people owned the offending animal, each partner has to pay compensation equivalent to the total value of the victim. The reason Maimonides takes the stricter view is because we have a doubt as to whose opinion is correct, and when matters of compensation for a life taken is involved we always accept the stricter view when in doubt.

אם כופר יושת עליו, “If monetary atonement be assessed against him, etc.” The introductory word “if” presents a problem; what is “iffy” about this? The matter is similar to the atonement for sins obtained through the offering of a sin offering for instance. When such an offering has been legislated by the Torah, the court does not send enforcers to see to it that the party obligated to offer it does so. If he does not, he will not attain atonement. Similarly, in the case of the owner of the ox. If he fails to pay the assessment he remains out of grace with his Creator, but the court does not check if he has in fact made the payment decreed by the court. This is why the Torah prefaces the legislation with the word אם.

אם כופר יושת עליו, “if a ransom payment has been imposed upon him,” the word אם in this instance is not a conditional word, i.e. “may be yes maybe no,” but describes the duty of the court to assess such financial damages. The word אם therefore means either “when,” or as “soon as.” The wordכופר means atonement wherever it appears. Payment of the fine constitutes atonement for the owner. The atonement is similar to that achieved by presenting a sin-offering where the owner paid for the animal in question. The principal atonement is a matter for heaven; the owner is not forced to appear before a court in order to be assessed damages, nor, after damages have ben assessed and he has failed to pay them is his property seized to enforce the court’s judgment (compare Ritva on Makkot 2).

The word אם here. . . You might ask: At the end of Parshas Yisro, Rashi cited R. Yishmael’s statement that there are three cases of אם in the Torah that are not conditional. This was on the verse, “ אם (When) you build a stone Altar for Me.” And this verse, “ אם (When) an atonement fine. . .” is not included among them. The answer is: Although this verse, too, is not conditional in the sense that it is indeed obligatory, [like the three cases of R. Yishmael], nevertheless, it is conditional in the sense that it depends on an external factor — if an ox gores someone and kills him, only then is one liable for an atonement fine. But if not, one is not liable. Therefore it was omitted. (Re’m)

(Exodus 21:30) "When kofer is imposed upon him, he shall give the redemption of his soul": the value of the victim. These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: the value of the killer (i.e., the owner of the ox). And thus do we find that redemption is not given for those who are put to death. In all places, those who are liable to death at the hands of man are not redeemed, as it is written (Leviticus 27:24) "Any cherem that is devoted from a man (going out to be executed) shall not be redeemed, (for) he is going to be put to death" (and has no valuation). But here "he shall give the redemption of his soul." R. Yishmael says: Come and see the mercies of the One who spoke and brought the world into being, for flesh and blood. For a man acquires himself with money from the hands of Heaven, as it is written (Numbers 30:12) "When you take the sum of the children of Israel according to their number, then each man shall give the ransom of his soul to the L rd, etc.", and (II Kings 12:5) "each man, the money for the valuation of his soul," and (Mishlei 13:8) "A man's wealth may redeem his soul," and (Daniel 4:24) "But, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to you. Redeem your soul through charity," and (Job 33:23-24) "If there will be for him but a single defending angel from a thousand to declare a man's uprightness for him, then He will be gracious to him and He will say: Redeem him from descending to the grave I have found kofer for Him!" We find that certain consecrated objects can be redeemed and others cannot be redeemed; certain things that may not be eaten may be redeemed; things from which benefit may not be derived may not be redeemed. The nations of the world cannot be redeemed, as it is written (Psalms 49:8) "A man cannot redeem his brother; he cannot give his kofer to G d. Too costly is their soul's redemption and unattainable forever." Beloved is Israel for whose souls the Holy One Blessed be He has given the nations as kofer, as it is written (Isaiah 43:3) "I gave Egypt as kofer for you." Why? (Ibid. 4) "Because you were honored in My eyes, you were honored and I loved you, and I placed a man in your place and nations in place of your souls."

V. 30. אם כפר.Stände der Satz apodiktisch, so gelte die Pflicht zum Sühnegeld nur für den im vorangehenden Verse besprochenen Fall, in welchem das Tier hingerichtet wird: es soll ihm jedoch ein Sühnegeld aufgelegt werden etc. etc. Indem es aber konditional ausgedrückt ist, so geht die Pflicht über diesen Fall hinaus und tritt in allen jenen Fällen ein, "wann" das Gericht ein solches Sühnegeld aufzulegen hat, auch in Fällen, wo das Tier nicht hingerichtet wird, z. B. es habe ein Tier treffen wollen und den Menschen getroffen: אם כופר לרבות כופר שלא בכוונה (B. B. 43 b).

אם כופר יושת עליו, in the event that the heirs of the person who had been gored to death are willing to accept a financial settlement for their father having been killed;

ונתן פדיון נפשו HE SHALL GIVE THE RANSOM OF HIS SOUL — the value of the injured person; this is the view of R. Ishmael, R. Akiba, however, says that it means the value of the person who caused the injury (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:30).

ונתן פדיון נפשו ככל אשר יושת עליו, “and he is to pay a redemption for his life in accordance with what has been assessed against him.” This teaches that if the owner of the goring ox has paid the judgment he is no longer subject to death at the hands of G’d. We base this also on Job 33,24: “redeem him from descending to the Pit, for I have obtained his ransom.” This is the law whenever someone is guilty of death at the hands of G’d such as this individual who has not committed murder or even manslaughter, but has merely been the indirect cause of death of a human being through his negligence. When a person has killed with his own hands, (directly) there is no provision for his guilt being wiped out through a ransom payment. This is what the Torah meant in Leviticus 27,29 אך כל חרם אשר יחרם מן האדם לא יפדה מות יומת, “but any condemned person who has been banned from mankind shall not be redeemed, he shall be put to death.”

Should the avenger of the victim have succeeded in killing the owner of the offending animal before the latter had a chance to make the compensatory payment, I believe the avenger is guilty of murder. The Torah law covering the avenger is applicable only if the killer had killed by his own hand, not when his property was the instrument causing the death.

ככל אשר יושת עליו, “the owner must pay whatever is imposed upon him.” The reason that the Torah does not apply the principle that we do not accept financial compensation for killing human beings, is that that this rule applies only if the human being in question has personally committed such an act. [The reason that this verse begins with the word: “if”, is that most people would spurn such an offer by the party who was responsible for their father’s death.”

The word אם, “if” here, does not belong to the list that the author had made when this word is not an option. (Compare Exodus 20,22)

או בן ינח WHETHER HE HAVE THRUST A SON — a son who is a minor;

O’ (OR) HE HAVE GORED A SON, OR HAVE GORED A DAUGHTER ACCORDING TO THIS JUDGMENT SHALL IT BE DONE UNTO HIM. Scripture uses the word o (‘or’ he have gored a son), because it adds to a phrase mentioned above, the meaning of the whole phrase thus being: “and he hath put to death a man or a woman,¹⁷⁹Above, Verse 29. or he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, one ordinance shall be for them.” Some scholars¹⁸⁰Rashi in Leviticus 4:23, and R’dak in Sefer Hashorashim, root o. say that the word o comes in the place of im (if). Similarly: ‘o’ (if) it be the carcass of an unclean beast;¹⁸¹Leviticus 5:2. ‘o’ (if) I had dealt falsely against mine own life;¹⁸²II Samuel 18:13. ‘o’ (if) it be known that the ox was wont to gore.¹⁸³Further, Verse 36. There are many such cases, in the opinion of these scholars.¹⁸⁰Rashi in Leviticus 4:23, and R’dak in Sefer Hashorashim, root o. But all these proofs are false witnesses; you will understand them all in their context.
According to our Rabbis,¹⁸⁴Baba Kamma 44a. Scripture had to detail the ordinance [in the case of an ox goring] minors, because it found it necessary to say above, And if an ox gore a man or a woman,¹⁸⁵Verse 28. — in order to teach us that in all laws of the Torah concerning damages G-d has treated woman equally to man — thus I might have thought that one is only liable in the case of a grown man or woman; therefore Scripture says, or he have gored a son, to make him liable for the death of minors as for that of adults. The same method was followed by Scripture in the verse, And he that smiteth any man mortally shall surely be put to death,¹⁸⁶Leviticus 24:17. as Rashi explained there.¹⁸⁷“Because it is said, He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death (above Verse 12), I know only about a man. How do I know that the same applies to a woman and to a minor? Scripture therefore says, kol nefesh adam (and he that smiteth ‘any man’) — [literally: ‘the soul of any human being’]” (Rashi, Leviticus 24:17).
In line with the plain meaning of Scripture, [the ordinance concerning an ox goring minors is stated] because an ox that kills a grown-up person is extremely vicious, as a bear robbed of her cubs¹⁸⁸II Samuel 17:8. in the wilderness, thus if warning hath been given to its owner, and he hath not kept it in,¹⁷⁹Above, Verse 29. he has committed a grave transgression, and deserves to be liable to death or to pay a ransom [for the redemption of his life]; but an ox that kills minors is not so vicious, for most oxen are not afraid of them, and one might therefore think that their owners are not liable [to the same punishment], therefore Scripture states that according to this judgment shall it be done unto him.

או בן יגח או בת יגח, “whether it gores a boy or it gores a girl, etc.” The Torah considers the death through an owner’s negligence of a minor as just as serious as the death of an adult. The reason why we needed a specific verse for this legislation to be spelled out is that when an ox kills a man it is as if a bear enraged through the loss of one of its young goes on a rampage, i.e. disregarding danger to itself. On the other hand, I might have thought that when an ox gores a minor this was not such a serious departure from its normally tame behaviour that the owner forthwith has to guard it with all the means at his disposal. The Torah therefore informs us that any animal which kills any human being, even a minor, has changed its status to becoming a שור מועד, an aggressive ox, with all that this implies for the precautions its owner has to take to neutralize it as a source of danger.

או בן יגח או בת יגח, “whether it gores a boy or a girl, etc.” Seeing that in verse 28 the paragraph commenced with the words “if an ox gore a man or a woman,” the Torah adds that even if the victim of such a goring was a minor the same law applies.

He is liable for a minor. You might ask: If this is so, why did it need to say (v. 28): “a man or a woman”? [Since he is liable for a minor, surely he is liable for an adult!] An answer is: Had it not said “a man or a woman,” I might think that the “son or daughter” of our verse means an adult son or daughter. Alternatively, [I might have applied the rule that] a fortiori reasoning is not a valid basis for a punishment, [thus we cannot learn from a law pertaining to minors and apply it to adults].

אם בן יגח או בת, “if it gores a son or a daughter;” it is most unusual for the Torah to spell out separately that the victims are either man or woman, or son or daughter; (Compare verse 28). Why did it do so here? The reason is that the owner of the ox could have argued that if the father of the child who had been killed had taken care of hjs son or daughter these would not have been where the animal could have attacked them with impunity. The Torah had to inform us that such an excuse by the owner of the ox which had killed is absolutely irrelevant. A different explanation: when the Torah speaks of free people, the status of minors and adults is exactly the same. (Talmud Baba kamma folio 43) when the victim of this ox was either a child of a slave who was still a minor, the owner of the ox is not liable.

או בת יגח OR HAVE THRUST A DAUGHTER, who is a minor. Since it states, (v. 29) “and hath put to death a man or a woman”, one might think that the owner is liable only for the death of adult persons, Scripture therefore states, “whether he have thrust a son etc.” to make him liable for the death of minors equally as for that of adults (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:31:1).

אם עבד או אמה IF [AN OX SHALL THRUST] A MANSERVANT OR A MAIDSERVANT — Canaanitish servants (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:32:1).

כסף שלושים שקלים, equivalent to the monetary value set by the Torah on a woman in her prime (between 20-60) The comparison reflects the part of Torah legislation that must be observed both by Jewish women and gentile male slaves.

אם עבד, a gentile slave יגח השור, the one whose owner had been warned concerning the danger this animal represented (מועד). If the ox did not have any strikes against it but was a תם, its owner is not liable for damages.

אם עבד יגח השור או אמה, “if the ox gores a male or a female slave, etc.,” this again refers to Canaanite slaves;
כסף שלושים שקלים, “thirty silver shekels.” This is a fixed amount irrespective of the market-value of the slave in question, even if he is a pearl-stringer, or even one who is inflicted with a skin disease.

Gentile [slaves]. [Rashi knows this] because it is written, “He must give thirty silver shekalim” — whereas if it was speaking of a Hebrew slave, he would have to pay the atonement fine [see v. 30].

V. 32. Dass bei der Tötung eines Leibeigenen das Sühnegeld fixiert, während es bei Tötung eines Freien durch dessen größern oder geringern Wert bedingt ist, dürfte in tieferm Grunde liegen. Die Höhe des Sühnegeldes für einen durch ein Tier getöteten Freien wird nach dem Werte gefunden, den derselbe als Leibeigener haben würde. Es gibt keinen andern Weg, den Wert einer Menschenpersönlichkeit in einer pekuniären Größe zu fixieren, und dies ist ja auch derselbe Weg, um bei Verstümmelungen die Höhe des Schadenersatzes zu finden. Es liegt darin für den Freien keine Erniedrigung, weil es eben ein Freier ist, und dadurch die Anwendung dieses Maßstabes ihre konkrete Bedeutung verliert. Allein bei einem Leibeigenen würde die Schätzung nach dem Werte sich auf dem Boden konkretester Wirklichkeit bewegen und dürfte somit in geradem Gegensatz zu einer Bestimmung stehen, vermittelst welcher eben die Göttlichkeit der Menschenwürde aufrecht gehalten werden soll. Dafür statuiert das Gesetz lieber ein fixes Sühnegeld und zwar in der Größe der höchsten Summe der Weiheschätzung (ערך) einer weiblichen Persönlichkeit (Wajikra 27, 4), deren Stellung dem jüdischen Gesetzesheiligtume gegenüber, als zu temporären Pflichten, מצות עשה שהזמן גרמה nicht verbunden, ja auch — עבד ואמה teilen.

שלשים שקלים, “thirty shekel.” This is an arbitrary amount determined by the Torah, as clearly the value in terms of ability to perform work varies from person to person. We already have a hint of this on the first occasion when the Torah ever mentions a “slave,” in Genesis 9,25, where the Torah writes, concerning Canaan, son of Cham that he is to be a slave to slaves, and the extra word יהיה, “he will be,” is added there. The numerical value of that word is 30, as if to tell us that this is a fixed amount regardless of the physical strength of that servant.

אם עבד יגח השור, “if the ox had gored a slave, either a male of a female slave, (which had already been legally labeled as an aggressive ox) this latter point is clear without having to be spelled out, otherwise killing a slave would be rated as a more serious offense than killing a free man.

שלשים שקלים יתן HE SHALL GIVE THIRTY SHEKELS — This is the enactment of Scripture (and no reason is given) — the indemnity shall be thirty shekels whether the slave was worth a thousand zuz or was worth no more than one denar. A shekel weighs four gold coins, making half an ounce according to the correct weight of Cologne.

This is a decree of the Torah. . . It seems that Rashi is answering [a question that could arise] about what he said earlier, that “male or female slave” refers to a gentile slave. [For one could ask:] perhaps in truth it is referring to a Hebrew slave? And even though their law is the atonement fine, this verse is [not contradicting this law, but] adding a stringency onto the owner of the goring ox: if the atonement fine is greater than the 30 shekalim, he must pay the atonement fine. And if it is less, he must pay the 30 shekalim. Therefore Rashi explains that the 30 shekalim is a decree of the Torah [and applies absolutely] — so we cannot make the above distinctions regarding the 30 shekalim, [calculating which way the payment is higher], and apply these distinctions to the Hebrew slave.

כסף שלשים שקלים, the compensation payable by the ox’s owner to the owner of the slave is to be 30 shekels. This corresponds to the value of a free woman between the ages of 2060 years of age as stated in Leviticus 27,4.

והשור יסקל, “and the offending ox is to be stoned to death.” This is the only way we can be sure that it will not at some time in the future also gore a free man. Seeing that it is customary for the slaves to be looking after the master’s livestock, feed them, etc., it is not a rarity that sometimes an animal turns on its keeper. This will lead to arguments between the owner of ox and the family of the slave as to how much the dead slave was worth. In order to forestall such arguments, the Torah spelled out a fixed amount for all such situations. Seeing that the chances that a free man becomes the victim of such an ox are statistically quite insignificant, the Torah uses a different yardstick in evaluating the damage.

וכי יפתח איש בור AND IF A MAN SHALL OPEN A PIT which was covered over, and he now uncovered it.

וכי יפתח איש בור, If a man shall open a pit, etc. This means that even if an ox or donkey fell upon the person digging the pit, not only being killed itself but also killing the owner (digger) of the pit, the owner of the pit (or in this case his estate), must pay compensation to the owner of the animal which tripped and was killed although it caused the death of the owner of the pit (compare Erchin 7).

וכי יפתח איש בור, one which was already deep enough to cause fatal harm to animals when not covered; when the owner deepened it further, his sin being that he did not cover it to render it harmless. כי יכרה איש בור, or even if the man in question only digs a hole and fails to cover it at the end of the day, seeing he did not complete it until the following day, and he considered it too much bother to put a temporary cover on it pending his completing his excavation, he is held responsible for any damage thus caused.

או כי יכרה איש בר וגו', “or if he digs a pit.” The word for “pit” here is spelled without the customary letter ו, the only instance in the Torah when it is spelled in this manner. The reason is that the Torah implies that even if the digger of this pit dug far less that the minimum depth required for the pit to become a lethal hazard, (10 tefachim, 40 cm) it is the last such tefach which makes him liable for the consequences, even if he had only deepened an existing pit by a single tefach. The sages rule that in such an event it is also the last digger who is responsible for the damages caused. (Baba Kama 51)

One who digs. . . after another has dug. . . is liable. Rashi means that if the first man dug nine tefachim and the second man completed it to ten tefachim, the second is [fully] liable whether the ox died or was damaged. For by completing the pit to ten tefachim, it can now both kill and damage [whereas before it could only damage]. And the first man is fully exempt, even if the ox is damaged. For no verse is needed to exempt him if the ox died, since he did not make it deep enough to kill, and clearly he is exempt — [perforce, the verse comes to exempt him even if the ox is only damaged].

V. 33. Indem das Gesetz von beiden Tätigkeiten spricht, פתיחה und כריה, und sich nicht begnügt, zu sagen: wenn jemand eine Grube hat, und sie öffnet und nicht wieder zudeckt, so ist hier zunächst nicht von dem Eigentümer einer Grube die Rede, nicht von בור שיש לו בעלים bei einem solchen könnte nach פתיחה nicht auch noch von die Rede sein. Sobald der Rechtsgrund der Verantwortlichkeit einfach aus dem כריה Begriff des Eigentums resultiert, so ist es völlig gleichgültig, in welcher Weise der Gefahr bringende Gegenstand Eigentum geworden, ob z. B. der Eigentümer der Grube sie auf seinem Grund und Boden selbst gegraben, oder sie als fertige Grube mit dem Grund und Boden in sein Eigentum übergegangen. Es ist dann auch gar kein Grund vorhanden, dass etwa das Gesetz noch ausdrücklich "Graben" erwähnen müsste, um etwa zu sagen, dass damit die Verantwortlichkeit nicht wachse, (wie das z. B. רב יוסף zur Erläuterung einer Ansicht des ר׳ עקיבא B. K. 50 a hatte sagen wollen), oder dass etwa die bloße Vertiefung der Grube dem völligen Graben gleichstehe (wie dies Motiv das. 51a in Wahrheit ausgesprochen wird), da ja durch diese Umstände das Eigentumsrecht, auf welchem die Hutpflicht beruht, in keiner Weise alteriert wird. Vielmehr ist eben durch die Erwähnung beider Arten die Beziehung des Angeklagten zur Grube evident, nämlich dass er nicht als Eigentümer, sondern als Urheber der Grube zur Verantwortung gezogen wird, wie רבה (das. 49 b) nachweist: אמר קרא כי יפתח וכי יכרה אם על פתיחה חייב על כרייה לא כל שכן אלא שעל עסקי פתיחה ועל עסקי כרייה באה לו. Es spricht daher der Fall zunächst von בור ברה׳׳ר von dem Aufdecken oder Graben einer Grube in einem öffentlichen Raume, somit: von der Verantwortung für Gefahr bringende Veranstaltungen, und heißt auch der Veranstalter V. 24 בעל הבור als der Urheber der Gefährlichkeit, בעל התקלה. Gleichzeitig ist damit aber auch die Verantwortlichkeit für Gefahr bringendes Eigentum, בור ברה׳׳י, statuiert, wenn jemand den Umraum, somit den Zutritt zu einer auf seinem Grund und Boden befindlichen Grube dem Allgemeinen preisgegeben, הפקיר רשותו ולא הפקיר בורו, wo ihm sodann als konkretem בעל הבור, als Eigentümer der Grube, die Verantwortung obliegt. Für den ersten Fall, die Urheberschaft der Gefährlichkeit, war allerdings כריה neben פתיחה und פתיחה neben כריה zu nennen, um entweder zu sagen, dass selbst für פתיחה die Pflicht des Zudeckens da sei, und selbst für כריה ein gehöriges Zudecken schon der Verantwortung enthebe, und diese nicht etwa erst mit dem Wiederzuwerfen der widerrechtlich gemachten Grube aufhöre; oder daran zugleich den Rechtssatz zu lehren (das. 51 a): להביא כורה אחר כורה שסילק מעשה ראשון dass, wenn jemand durch Vertiefung einer schon vorhandenen Grube die Gefährlichkeit gesteigert, er mit dem ersten Urheber die Verantwortung nach Verhältnis zu tragen hat, wenn aber durch seine Vertiefung die Gefährlichkeit der Grube einen ganz andern Charakter bekommen — sie war z. B. nur בור לנזקין hatte nur eine Verletzung drohende Tiefe und ist nun בור למיתה, eine lebensgefährliche geworden, — dass dann סילק מעשה ראשון, die ganze Verantwortung, sowohl für Verletzung als Tötung, ausschließlich auf dem letzten ruht.

ונפל שמה שור, “and an ox falls into that pit;” (because it was not covered); Rashi explains that the Torah chose the ox as an example which applies to all other domestic animals also. Wherever the word שור occurs in the Torah, it serves as an example applicable to other domestic animals. When both שור and חמור, “ox and donkey” are mentioned, what is meant is “an ox as opposed to a human being,” and the word חמור, donkey, is meant to be contrasted with “inert vessels.” If you were to argue that the word שור at least once, is needed in order to establish its connection to the Sabbath laws where the Torah wrote in Exodus 23,12 that “your ox must rest on the Sabbath,” the answer is that unless we were to deduce from the repeated use of these types of animals and no others that they were meant to exclude human beings and inert vessels from the respective legislation under discussion, the Torah did not have to use either example, and simply write that something will fall into the pit, without listing any example. If this is so, i.e. that the word ונפל, “it falls,” includes both ox, donkey, etc.; just as these words do in connection with the Sabbath rest to be observed by the possessions of a Jew on the Sabbath, the words “ox” and “donkey” are available for teaching us additional rules. Nonetheless, it is still difficult to understand why the Torah chose as its examples animals and not human beings that would fall into the pit of which our verse speaks. This can be deduced from the words: והמת יהיה לו, “and the carcass will be his;" i.e. he who owned this animal while alive is permitted to make use of its carcass other than consuming it. This makes clear that the owner of the offending animal is not permitted to make any use of the animal or vessel his ox had killed or destroyed. This has been pointed out already in the Jerusalem Talmud in connection with a different problem, namely if an owner of a Canaanite slave who has not yet been circumcised and undergone immersion in a ritual bath, is permitted to start working for his owner. The reason why the dead animal is forbidden to be made any use of is derived from Deuteronomy 21,1 where the subject of the heifer that is killed as symbolic atonement for the people in whose vicinity an anonymous person had been murdered, their declaring that he had not been denied food or shelter in their town. In that verse the Torah uses the apparently unnecessary word שם, “there,” as it does in connection with the death of Miriam in Numbers 20,1. The rabbis conclude from these two unnecessary words, that just as a human carcass is forbidden to be made any use of, so it is forbidden to make any use of the carcass of the heifer discussed in Deuteronomy 21,4. [This editor does not understand why the author ever assumed that a human being could have served as the example in our verse, as when a human being falls into a pit the person who had failed to cover it is not responsible, as human beings have been given eyes to see with and a brain to use to watch where they are going.] (Compare Rashi, who contrasts שור with אדם, i.e. no compensation is payable for human beings who fall into the pit.] The Talmud in tractate Avodah zarah folio 29, quotes the school of Yannai as saying that the reason why such making use of the dead is prohibited, is that death is associated with atonement, i.e. כפר לעמך ישראל, “grant atonement for Your people of Israel,” [so that they will regain their status as being holy, Ed.] and just as something holy must not be used for a secular use, so also the dead who have achieved forgiveness through having died, and have recaptured their former status as innocent holy beings.

וכי יפתח איש בור, If a man opens the lid over a pit (which had been placed there to protect pedestrians); the Torah refers to a pit which had remain fully covered for a long time, or even if that person had a dug pit which had never been in that place, and he had not bothered to cover it because he intended to dig deeper on the following day;

או כי יכרה OR IF A MAN SHALL DIG [A PIT] — Why is this stated? If he becomes liable for opening one that already exists how much the more is he liable for digging a new one! However, it does not mean that he digs a pit from beginning to end but it is intended to include in this law a person who digs after another has dug (i. e. who deepens to a height of ten handbreaths a pit which another has already excavated to a depth less than this. Before he did this an animal which fell into the pit was unlikely to kill itself; now, however, such a fall may prove fatal) — that such a one alone becomes liable (cf. Bava Kamma 51a).

But if he covers it, he is not liable. Rashi means: Do not think that covering it is insufficient and he needs to fill it up with earth, so the verse tells us [this is not so].

Wie nämlich כי יפתח von einer schon vorhandenen Grube spricht, so spricht auch כי יכרה von einer schon vorhandenen Grube und ist daher wohl auch der Ausdruck כרה und nicht חפר gewählt. Während חפר nur: graben heißt, bedeutet כרה nicht nur: graben, sondern überhaupt: bereiten, veranstalten, und war daher der ganz geeignete Ausdruck für Veränderung des Charakters einer bereits vorhandenen Grube. Indem dabei איש wiederholt wird, ist eben das סילק מעשה ראשון ausgedrückt, dass, obgleich der Urheber der Grube mehrere sind, bei verändertem Charakter derselben die Verantwortung ausschließlich dem letzten Einen obliegt, der diese Veränderung geschaffen. Demgemäß könnte כי יפתח איש בור von בור לנזקין sprechen, und כי יכרה איש בור von בור למיתה. Beides spricht nämlich von einer und derselben Grube, von einer בור ט׳ nur neun טפח tiefen Grube, die noch nicht lebensgefährlich ist. Öffnet die einer und deckt sie nicht zu, so ist er für jede Tierverletzung verantwortlich. Gräbt einer sie weiter und macht sie dadurch zu einer lebensgefährlichen, so trägt er für Verletzung und Tötung die alleinige Verantwortung (siehe B. K. 10 a).

ולא יכסנו, “and he fails to cover it.” If he had covered it, he is free from further responsibility, provided that he covered it securely. The term “securely” is applied to a cover strong enough to prevent a wagon loaded with stones from collapsing the cover. (Jerusalem Talmud Baba Kamma 5,7) One is not permitted to dig a hole underneath the public streets unless wagons loaded with stones can cross above it without concern.

ולא יכסנו AND SHALL NOT COVER IT — if, however, he did cover it, though he did not fill it in with earth” he is not liable (Bava Kamma 50a). Scripture speaks of one who excavates a pit in a public thoroughfare (cf. Bava Kamma 49b).

Of digging in the public domain. Because if he dug in the [damager’s] private domain, the damager could tell the damaged party, “What was your ox doing in my domain?” The law [of this verse] applies as well to any place where the damager cannot say, “What is your ox doing in my domain?” Rashi is only excluding digging a pit in the [damager’s] private domain (Bava Kama 49b).

וכי יפתח איש בור ולא שור בור: für die Grube, die ein Tier in dem Besitzraum eines andern gemacht, ist der Eigentümer des Tieres nicht verantwortlich. Er hat dem Eigentümer des Besitzraumes den an diesem durch sein Tier verübten Schaden zu ersetzen, damit fällt aber die Grube unter Obhut des Eigentümers des Bodens, in welchem sich die Grube befindet.

ונפל שמה שור, “and an ox falls into it.” Human beings, seeing that they have been given a brain by G-d, are expected to look where they are going, and if they come to harm due to not looking out for themselves, the person causing the obstacle is not held responsible. [How different from our time when people try to sue the city for potholes on the sidewalk! Ed.] The Torah adds here the word: או חמור, “or a donkey,” to tell us that if people‘s belongings fall into that hole, the person who dug it is also not responsible as these belongings must have been carried by a human being who did not look where he was going. (Talmud Baba Kamma, folio 53) An alternate explanation: Oxen and donkeys are mentioned here as they are the most likely animals to fall into such a hole. What applies to them applies to all other animals also.

שור או חמור AN OX OR AN ASS — This is the law also with respect to all cattle and beasts, because wherever the Torah prescribes something with regard to “ox or ass”, we derive it (the fact that it applies to all cattle and beasts) on the grounds of the verbal similarity of שור in the text in question with שור which occurs in the law prescribing the Sabbath rest, for — with regard to the latter — it is stated, (Exodus 23:12) “that thine ox and thine ass may rest”. Now how is it in the latter case? We know that all cattle and beasts are to be treated in this respect as the “ox”, because in another passage referring to Sabbath (Deuteronomy 5:14) it is expressly said “[thy ox and thy ass] and all thy cattle”! So here, too, all cattle and beasts are to be treated as the ox. The only reason why ox and ass are alone mentioned is to imply: “an ox” — but not a man, “an ass” — but not vessels (Bava Kamma 53b).

We derive it “ שור , שור ” regarding Shabbos. The Re’m was puzzled [why we need the gezeirah shavah], The Gemara (Bava Kama 54b) mentions the verse, “He must compensate its owner with money” (v. 34), and applies it to a damaging pit, teaching that [payment must be made for] anything with an owner, [not just for animals and beasts. If so, what does the gezeirah shavah of this verse teach us?] The Re’m answers: we need “compensate its owner with money,” [and we need this verse as well]. Because without “compensate its owner with money,” we would interpret this verse as follows: ונפל שמה is a klal (general rule), and שור או חמור is a prat (specific case). Consequently, the klal includes only what is in the prat — an ox and donkey, and nothing else. And the gezeirah shavah is not strong enough to nullify the klal and prat. Therefore, “compensate its owner with money” comes to teach us [that payment must be made for] anything with an owner — and this nullifies the klal and prat. But if so, why do we need the gezeirah shavah of “ שור , שור ” regarding Shabbos, [i.e., the original question arises again]? The verse could have simply said, ונפל שמה הנופל (And something fell into it). Why does it say שור או חמור , [from which the gezeirah shavah is derived]? The answer is: [In truth, the gezeirah shavah is not needed. And that is why Rashi goes on to say that from שור או חמור we infer,] “An ‘ox,’ but not a man. A ‘donkey,’ but not vessels.”

ולא יכסנו: das bloße, bei gewöhnlich vorauszusetzenden Umständen gehörigen Schutz gewährende Zudecken genügt, um der Verantwortung zu entheben. Diese normale Vorsicht heißt: שמירה פחותה, gemeine Hut. Eine selbst für ungewöhnliche Umstände ausreichende Hut heißt: שמירה מעולה, außerordentliche Hut. Eine normale Hut, שמירה פחותה reicht überall aus, um der Verantwortung für Schaden bringendes Eigentum zu entheben, außer bei שור תם (V. 35), wo durch Präventivpön (שמירה מעולה (קנס erzielt wird.

“An ox,” but not a man. This is a decree of the Torah [and thus applies absolutely.] It makes no difference whether or not the man was intelligent or not, and [it applies] even at night and even if he was blind. [I.e., the exemption from payment applies even in cases where the man who fell in could not be faulted.]

ונפל שמה nicht בו, das ebenso "dadurch" wie "hinein" heißen könnte, sondern: שמה, "hinein" Wenn die Grube nur Veranlassung zum Falle geworden, das Tier wäre über sie hinüber gestolpert, נפל לאחורי בור חוץ לבור(B. K. 53 a), so wäre der Eigentümer oder Urheber der Grube nicht zum Ersatz zu verhalten. Er hat nur den Schaden zu ersetzen, den sein Eigentum oder seine Veranstaltung bewirkt, nicht aber, den sie nur veranlassen. Hier aber hat sich das Tier nur an קרקע עולם beschädigt. Das Objekt, welches das Tier verletzt oder getötet, hat diese gefährdende Beschaffenheit nicht von ihm erhalten. Sein Eigentum, oder seine Veranstaltung war nur Veranlassung, dass ein anderes, von ihm unberührt gebliebenes Objekt das Tier beschädigt. Der Boden der Grube aber, obgleich an sich ebenfalls ursprünglich קרקע עולם, hat jedoch erst durch ihn die Gefahr bringende Beschaffenheit erhalten, und ist diese daher seine Veranstaltung. Ganz ebenso ist der Hinabsturz von einer unberechtigt im öffentlichen Wege gemachten Anhöhe, תל ברה׳׳ר, als Wirkung seiner Veranstaltung und nicht als קרקע עולם zu betrachten; denn auch da hat durch die von ihm geschaffene Fallhöhe der Boden die gefährdende Beschaffenheit erhalten. Dagegen ist die Beschädigung, die jemand durch Stolpern über einen Stein von dem Fall auf dem Boden erhalten, nur veranlasst, nicht Wirkung der Veranstaltung dessen, der den Stein unberechtigt in den Weg gelegt. Ein anderes aber ist es, wenn jemand einen Stein an eine ohnehin gefährliche Stelle, z. B. in die Nähe der Mündung einer Grube, legt. Er erhöht dann die vorhandene Gefährlichkeit der Grube und hat in Gemeinschaft mit dem Eigentümer oder Urheber der Grube die Verantwortung zu tragen, wenn durch seinen Stein ein Tier in die Grube fällt. (In dieser Weise dürften die Sätze B. K. 50 b u. 53 a ihre sich nicht widersprechende Motivierung finden. Siehe דרישה zu ח׳׳מ תי׳׳א.)

A “donkey,” but not vessels. Meaning: [The case is not that a man pushed the vessels into the pit, rather] that a donkey with vessels fell into the pit, and the [donkey was injured and the] vessels were damaged. And [the verse teaches that] the digger is liable for the animal but exempt for the vessels.

Wir haben hier den weitreichenden Begriff der גרמא, der "Veranlassungen" im jüdischen Schadenrecht, die sich in גרמא בנזקין, in entferntere, und in דיני דגרמי, in nähere Veranlassungen, teilt. Die Unterscheidung hat jedoch nur gerichtlichen Wert. Auch wo das Gericht nicht auf Ersatz zu erkennen hat, bleibt jede גרמא בנזקין, jede Veranlassung, dass ein anderer durch uns zu Schaden komme, ein schweres, vor Gott zu verantwortendes Vergehen (B. K. 56 a).

Es kommt übrigens bei der Grube nicht nur der durch die Fallhöhe bewirkte Stoß des Bodens in Betracht. Auch wo dieser weich wäre, kann die in einer Grube gesperrte Luft (הבלא) durch Betäubung den vornüber Hineinfallenden schädigen, und ירבs (nicht rezipierte) Ansicht beschränkt sogar, wo der Boden der Grube nicht Eigentum des Urhebers ist, den Anteil desselben an der Verantwortung zunächst auf diese Betäubung — בור שחייבה עליו תורה להבלו ולא לחבטו — B. K. 50 b. Nach dieser Ansicht dürfte dann die durch Betäubung und Stoß erfolgte Schädigung des in die Grube gefallenen Tieres als eine in "Gemeinschaft" vom Urheber der Grube und dem Boden als קרקע עולם — bewirkte Schädigung zu beurteilen sein, der Ersatz aber dem Urheber der Grube voll und allein obliegen, nach dem Grundsatz des כל היכי :ר׳ נתן דלא אפשר לאשתלומי מהאי משתלם מהאי, d.h. insofern einer in Gemeinschaft mit einer andern, nicht verantwortlichen Potenz einen Schaden anrichtet, hat er die Verantwortung allein zu tragen (B. K. 53 a). (שטה מקובצת zu B. K. 50 b gibt eine andere Motivierung dieses Schadenersatzes nach רב).

שור וחמור. Die Halacha (B. K. 53 b) lehrt: שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים, dass die hier zu statuierende Ersatzpflicht nur bei getötetem Tiere, nicht aber bei getötetem Menschen eintritt, hinsichtlich dessen ja auf כופר Sühnegeld (V. 30 u. 31), und nicht auf Ersatz zu erkennen gewesen wäre, welches aber hier durch Beschränkung des Problems auf Tiere, שור, negiert wird. Und ferner: dass die Ersatzpflicht nur für חמור, für das beschädigte Lasttier, nicht aber für die beschädigte Last, כלים, obliegt. Fassen wir nach dieser Halacha das Gesetz ins Auge, so spricht sich darin der auch in dem folgenden (Kap. 22, 4) sich bestätigende Rechtssatz aus: der Eigentümer oder Urheber eines Gefahr bringenden Objektes hat nur Verantwortung für die Schädigung solcher Güter zu tragen, die unmittelbar durch die gefährdende Natur seines Eigentums oder seiner Veranstaltung bedroht sind. Durch ein "lebloses Objekt in Ruhe" als dessen Repräsentant בור dasteht, sind zunächst nur lebende Wesen, Tiere und Menschen, bedroht, nicht aber leblose Güter, כלים. Es handelt sich ferner nur um ersetzbare Güter. שור וחמור repräsentieren daher alle lebenden ersetzbaren Güter, dazu gehören Tiere und in erster Linie der gesunde Körper des Menschen selbst. בור gibt daher Verantwortung für Tötung und Verletzung von Tieren und für Verletzung von Menschen. Menschenleben gehört nicht zu den ersetzbaren Gütern. Ein durch nicht geschütztes Eigentum vernichtetes Menschenleben wirft eine höhere Schuld auf den Veranlasser. Und wenn bei Tötung eines Menschen durch בור nicht wie bei שור ein Sühnegeld, כופר, statuiert ist, so ist das nicht notwendig als Erleichterung zu begreifen. Es kann auch das Gegenteil sein. Bei lebendigem Eigentum, שור, dessen Wirkungen doch immerhin spontan sind, und daher nicht in dem Maße auf die Persönlichkeit des Eigentümers zurückfallen, wie bei einem Gefahr bringenden leblosen Objekte, das, תחלת עשיתו לנזק, sofort mit seiner Existenz allem Lebenden Schädigung androht, hat das Gesetz כופר als פדיון נפשו statuiert; bei בור bleibt aber die Schuld auf dem Eigentümer oder Urheber vor Gott beruhen. Unterliegt dies ja jenem allgemeinen Warnruf: ולא תשים דמים בביתך, "gib keiner Blutschuld Raum in deinem Hause!" (Dewarim 22, 8), mit welchem wir vor Gott für jede Lebensgefährdung verantwortlich gemacht werden, die wir in unserm Kreise durch Fahrlässigkeit verschuldet. B. K. 9 b wird allerdings כופר בשור als הומרא behandelt, und dürfte auf diesem Standpunkte die כופר-Befreiung für בור in der Erwägung sich erklären, dass anderseitig doch eben bei Verunglückung durch בור der Getötete immer selbsttätig mitwirkend gewesen, während er bei שור völlig passiv sich verhält, und die Aggression ganz auf Rechnung des tötenden Mediums, des Tieres, kommt, das zu vertreten der Eigentümer schuldig ist.

בעל הבור THE OWNER OF THE PIT [SHALL PAY FOR IT] — This means the one who occasioned the damage. Although the pit was not his, — for he dug it in the public thoroughfare, — Scripture regards him as its “owner” (בעל הבור) in so far that he becomes responsible for the damage caused by it.

AND THE DEAD BEAST SHALL BELONG TO HIM — “to the one who suffered the damage. We make an estimation of the value of the carcass and he takes it in part payment and the one who caused the damage, [the owner of the pit], pays him in addition as much as makes up the value of his damage.” This is Rashi’s language. But he did not explain the law sufficiently. For there is no need for Scripture to tell us concerning this carcass that the one who suffered the damage must take it in part payment, when he brings it before the court to collect his damage; for even if the one who caused the damage had other carcasses that were carrion, or flesh that was treifah¹⁸⁹Any animal suffering from a serious organic disease, whose meat is forbidden even if ritually slaughtered. in his possession, he can give it to him in part payment, it being already established¹⁹⁰Baba Kamma 7a. that restitution for damages need not be in money, but may “include anything of value, even bran.” Rather, the meaning of the verse is to state that the carcass belongs to the one who suffered the damage and is considered his property; therefore if its value decreased after the damage was caused, or it was stolen, the one who caused the damage, [the owner of the pit], pays only the loss in value caused by the death of the animal. Thus if the ox that was killed was worth when alive one hundred zuzim, and upon its death became worth fifty, the one who caused the damage is liable to pay only fifty zuzim, and the other attends to his carcass [removing it from the pit], and keeps it for himself.¹⁹¹He may use its hide for leather, and its flesh to feed the animals, or he may sell it for such uses. This law applies to all damages, and it is what the Sages call: “the loss in the carcass’ value,” and is explained in the Gemara.¹⁹²Ibid., 34a. [See in my translation of Hameniach, Shulsinger Bros., New York, 5729, p. 65.]

בעל הבור, either the one opening a pit which had been covered, or the one having excavated a pit and not completed it is considered by the Torah as בעל, its owner, in a negative sense, i.e. responsible as if he were the owner for any damage he caused.

The injured party’s. [Rashi knows this] because if [ לו refers] to the owner of the pit, the Torah should simply write, “The owner of the pit must pay” — and then the Torah does not have to say, “And the dead [animal] remains his.” [For we would know that he receives the carcass, since he is paying for the full value of the animal.] Perforce, [ לו refers] to the injured party.

V. 34. בעל הבור, der Eigentümer oder Urheber, בעל התקלה, von dem das Gefahrdrohende herrührt. So Prov. 18, 9: גם מתרפה במלאכתו אח הוא לבעל משחית, der Nachlässige ist dem Urheber eines Verderbens gleichzustellen.

בעל הבור, “the one responsible for that hole;” this cannot refer literally to the owner of the land on which the hole has been dug, but must refer to the one who created the hazard on it. The owner of the land, if not the same, is completely free from responsibility.

כסף ישיב לבעליו [THE OWNER OF THE PIT SHALL PAY FOR IT] AND RESTORE MONEY UNTO THE OWNER OF THEM — The word ישיב is apparently redundant; it would have sufficed to state ישלם כסף לבעליו but it is added to include as legal tender in this case even bran (i. e. the restitution need not be money so long as he actually restores something of money-value). (Bava Kamma 7a).

והמת יהיה לו, but the carcass of the animal for which he pays compensation is his, seeing he had fully compensated its owner. However, our sages interpret the verse to mean that the carcass of the animal remains the property of its owner. (Baba Kamma 10)

כסף ישיב לבעליו. Nachdem bereits durch ישלם, die Ersatzpflicht ausgesprochen ist, kann durch diesen Beisatz nur noch die Art der Ersetzung näher bestimmt sein. Sollte das Gesetz nun hier ausdrücklich nur Ersatz in Geld vorschreiben, so würde es: ישלם כסף לבעליו haben lauten müssen. כסף ישיב לבעליו heißt aber: "das Geld (das durch das vorhergehende ישלם schon vorauszusetzen ist) hat er dem Eigentümer wieder zu bringen", d. h. er braucht ihm nicht direkt Geld, sondern Mittel zu geben, zu dem Gelde zu gelangen, wofür er sich den geschädigten Gegenstand wieder herstellen kann. Daher ישיב לרבות שוה כסף.(B. K. 10 b). Nicht nur im Gelde, sondern auch in Geldeswert kann der Ersatz stattfinden. Das liegt durchaus schon in dem Ausdruck: ישיב und nicht: יתן. Es ist ihm ja nicht "Geld", sondern "Geldeswert" geschädigt worden, man kann also nicht sagen: er soll ihm Geld wieder geben, wohl aber Geldeswert. Unter Geldeswert wird aber jedes mobile Objekt (מטלטלין), selbst "Kleie", wie der Ausdruck lautet, ואפי׳ סובין, verstanden. Nur wenn ein Ersatz in קרקע, in unbeweglichem Gute stattfindet, ist ein Unterschied in der Qualität und wird bei Schadenersatz, עירית ,מיטב :נזקין, das relativ Beste gefordert, das er hat, nach der Bestimmung מיטב שדהו וגו׳ ישלם (Kap. 22, 4), מיטב שדהו של מזיק (B. K. 7 a). Unbewegliche Güter müssen, um leicht versilbert zu werden, durch ihre Güte den Käufer anziehen. Bewegliche Güter in jeglicher Qualität können den Käufer aufsuchen, der ihrer gerade in dieser Qualität bedarf, daher heißt es von ihnen: כל מילי מיטב. (B. K. 7 b). Gleichwohl hat ein Darlehnsschuldner zunächst seine Schuld in barem Gelde zu entrichten und kann nur, wenn er kein bares Geld hat, den Gläubiger auch mit Geldeswert abfinden. Tage- und Arbeitslohn muss aber nur in barem Gelde entrichtet werden, der Arbeitgeber hat den Geldeswert zu versilbern (B. K. 9 a תוספ׳ ד׳׳ה ר׳ הונא).

והמת יהיה לו, “and the carcass will belong to the person who caused the damage,” as seeing he has paid full damages this is only fair. (This is the plain meaning of the verse, not necessarily the Talmud’s, there being a debate about who is the subject of the word: לו, “his”)

והמת יהיה לו AND THE DEAD BEAST SHALL BELONG TO HIM — to him who has suffered the loss. We assess the value of the carcass and he (the claimant) takes it at this value in part payment, and the man who caused the damage pays him in addition to this as much as will make up the whole loss he has suffered (Bava Kamma 10b).

לבעליו. Indem es nicht heißt: לבעל השור והחמור, ist damit שור וחמור als exemplifikatorisch bezeichnet: כל דאית ליה בעלים mit Ausschluss von כלים (das. 54 a).

והמת יהי׳ לו indem der zum Ersatz verpflichtende Vorgang V. 33 allgemein: ונפל שמה וגו׳ ohne nähere Angabe der Wirkung des Falles bezeichnet war, so beschränkt sich derselbe keineswegs lediglich auf Tötung des Tieres, sondern statuiert den Ersatz auch bei bloßer Verletzung, und ist hier nur die eine der beiden Eventualitäten, בור שיש בו מיתה hervorgehoben.

Das "לו" kann sich nicht auf den Ersatzpflichtigen, מזיק, den Beschädiger, beziehen; denn לא כך היה, das wäre selbstverständlich: hat der Beschädiger den Wert des ganzen getöteten Tieres zu zahlen, so gehört eo ipso das Getötete ihm. Es bezieht sich daher entschieden auf den ניזק, den Eigentümer des getöteten Tieres. Allein auch so kann damit das Gesetz nicht lediglich sagen wollen, der Beschädiger habe ihm den noch vorhandenen Wert des getöteten Tieres anzurechnen und ihm nur den Wertverlust zu ergänzen. Auch das verstünde sich von selbst, nachdem unmittelbar zuvor durch כסף ישיב der Ersatz in jeglichem mobilem Geldeswerte für zulässig erklärt worden. Der Beschädiger könnte ihm ja den ganzen Ersatz in gefallenen Tieren leisten, kann ihm daher selbstverständlich das vorliegende gefallene Tier in Zahlung anrechnen. Es spricht vielmehr das Gesetz damit den Grundsatz aus: שהבעלים מטפלין בנבלה ופחת נבלה דניזק (B. K. 10 b u. 11 a), dass das getötete Tier für Risiko des Beschädigten liegt. Der Beschädiger hat es nur aus der Grube herauszuschaffen, dann aber hat der Beschädigte für dessen Fortschaffung und Verwertung zu sorgen; vernachlässigt er dies, so hat ihm der Beschädiger dasselbe für den Wert anzurechnen, den es in dem Momente des Herausschaffens aus der Grube hatte. Dieser Grundsatz ist auch bei dem durch einen stößigen Ochsen getöteten Tiere (V. 36) ausgesprochen, und steht hier, um gleichzeitig die Bestimmung anzudeuten, dass die Verantwortung bei בור nur hinsichtlich solcher Tiere gilt, die völliges profanes Eigentum sind, die zuletzt noch als לו :מת sind, zu jeglichem Gebrauche stehen, nicht aber שור של פסולי מוקדשין, die selbst nach dem פריון nur לאכילה, aber lebend nicht לגיזה ועבודה וחלב, und gestorben nicht לאכילת כלבים gestattet sind (B. K. 53 b). Es dürfte der Ausschluss des שור פסולי מוקדשין von בור tief mit jenem großen Prinzipe zusammenhängen, das das Heiligtum in weitestem Sinne von jeglichem Schadenersatzanspruch ausschließt — נזקין להדיוט ואין נזקין להקדש — und das wir zu V. 35 näher zu betrachten haben. פסולי מוקדשין, untauglich gewordene Heiligtümer verlieren, wie bemerkt, selbst nach ihrer Auslösung nicht ganz ihren frühern Zusammenhang mit dem Heiligtume. Obgleich profanes Eigentum geworden, ist doch der profane Gebrauch sehr wesentlich beschränkt. Es ist der Begriff des הקדש in ihnen nicht ganz verwischt, Sie erscheinen vielmehr als Güter gemischter Hörigkeit: הדיוט והקדש. Ein Verhältnis, das auch noch anderweit sehr auffallend zu Tage tritt (siehe Makkoth 22 a המנהיג בשור פ׳ה׳מ). Alle anderen in Bewegung schadenbringenden Güter, wie שור und אש, unterscheiden sich von בור darin, dass דרכן לילך ולהזיק, dass sie das zu schädigende Gut aufsuchen. Dieses und dessen Eigentümer sind völlig passiv bei der eintretenden Beschädigung; diese fällt vielmehr völlig dem מזיק zur Last. Bei ihnen überwiegt daher die Rücksicht auf den vor Beschädigung zu schützenden הדיוט-Eigentümer den in dem beschädigten Gute noch vorhandenen הקדש-Charakter bei פסולי מוקדשין und legt auch für deren Beschädigung Ersatzpflicht auf. Bei בור hingegen, שאין דרכו לילך ולהזיק, kann die Beschädigung ohne Zutun des Beschädigten gar nicht eintreten. Der Beschädigte muss zur בור kommen und sie außer acht lassen; weshalb ja auch leblose Objekte, כלים, als gar nicht direkt durch בור bedroht, gar nicht ersetzt werden. Gleichwohl weil בור תחלת עשיתו לנזק weil בור sofort Gefahr für alles Lebendige in sich trägt, legt das Gesetz für alle lebenden Güter solcher Persönlichkeiten, die durch das Gesetz vor Beschädigung zu schützen sind, auch bei בור die Ersatzpflicht auf den Eigentümer oder Urheber der Grube. Bei Gütern jedoch, wo zu dem Anteil, den der Beschädigte im Grunde an dem erlittenen Schaden hat, noch der Umstand hinzutritt, dass in dem Gute zu einem großen Teile noch eine andere, moralische Persönlichkeit, הקדש, gegenwärtig ist, die das Gesetz gegen Beschädigung nicht durch Ersatzpflicht schützen will, da überwiegen beide Momente zusammen den partiellen Anspruch und der Grundsatz: אין נזקין להקדש wird hier selbst auf פסולי מוקדשין ausgedehnt. Danach begreifen wir, wie (B. K. 53 b) die Frage: מה הזית וכו׳ nach Motivierung der Auffassung des והמת יהיה לו bei בור als Ausschluss der פסולי מוקדשין und desselben Satzes bei שור als Niederlegung des Rechtssatzes בעלים מטפלין בנבלה und nicht umgekehrt, durch das Motiv beantwortet wird: מסתברא פטור גבי בור הואיל ופטר בו את הכלים. Dasselbe Motiv, das dem פטור bei כלים zu Grunde liegt, ist auch in dem פטור bei פסולי מוקדשין wirksam.

בור ist das Musterbeispiel (אב) für alles in Ruhe schadende leblose Eigentum oder dergleichen Veranstaltung. Eine auf die Straße geworfene Scherbe etc. etc., an welcher sich ein Tier oder Mensch schädigen kann, ist תולדה דבור, gehört zur Kategorie בור und so alles Ähnliche. Es braucht der schadenbringende Gegenstand aber nicht einmal direkt in den öffentlichen Weg geworfen zu werden, wenn er auch nur in einer solchen Stellung gelassen worden, dass er durch vorauszusetzende Naturkraft in den öffentlichen Weg geworfen werden kann, und nachdem dies eingetroffen, schadet er dort in Ruhe, z. B.: אבנו סכינו ומשאו שהניחן בראש הגג ונפלו ברוח מצויה והזיקו בתר דנייח (B. K. 3 b) Steine, Messer, Lasten, die jemand auf das Dach gelegt und die durch gewöhnlichen, vorauszusetzenden Wind auf die Gasse geworfen werden und dort, nachdem sie zur Ruhe gekommen, geschadet haben. Schaden sie im Hinunterfallen, so gehören sie zur Kategorie אש (Kap. 22, 5). Die Ersatzpflicht tritt bei בור übrigens nur für solche lebende Wesen ein, die unmittelbar dadurch bedroht sind, also nur für solche, שאין דרכן להתבונן בדרכים, bei denen Achtsamkeit im Gehen nicht vorauszusetzen ist, z. B. Menschen, junge Tiere, oder ältere im Dunkel.

Wesentlich gehört es zur jüdischen "Frömmigkeit", zu den Charakterzügen eines Chassid, zerbrochene Nadeln, oder was nur immer schaden kann, nur dorthin zu werfen, wo sie unmöglich Schaden verursachen können: האי מאן דבעי למהוי הסידא לקיים מילי דנזיקין (B. K. 30 a).

וכי יגף AND IF [AN OX] HURT [AN OX OF HIS FELLOW-MAN] — יגף means to thrust; whether it injures by horns or the whole body, or whether it kicks with its foot or bites it with its teeth, all are included in the term נגף, for נגף means nothing else than מכה — the impact of one thing upon another (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:35:1).

שור איש את שור רעהו, one man's ox that of another, etc. The reason the Torah writes the word את is because the scenario we deal with assumes A) that there were no witnesses, B) that both oxen are of equal value while alive; if, however, the attacking ox was clearly more valuable than its counterpart, the owner of the victimised ox is entitled to only half the value of the damage he has sustained; this is the ruling given in Baba Kama 34. The Talmud writes as follows: "If the value of the offending ox is less than that of the victim, we do not allow the owner of the victim to receive more than half the value of the offending animal. If we were to allow that, then the Torah should not have made the compensation depend on the sale of the surviving ox and its proceeds, but the Torah should have written: 'he shall pay him half the damage he has sustained.' The wording of the Torah proves that the owner of the dead ox does not receive more than half the value of the surviving ox even if this amounts to less than half the amount of damage he has sustained." The Talmud did not bother to mention that the owner of the victimised ox will certainly not receive more than half the value he has sustained. If we were to assume that the Torah assigns half of the value of the surviving animal to the owner of the victimised animal, it could happen that if the surviving animal is worth more than twice the value of the animal killed, the owner of the dead ox would receive more than the total value of the dead animal (while it was alive) as compensation. Such a situation is obviously not intended by the Torah.

וחצו את כספו, our sages (Baba Kamma 34) understand the entire verse as applying only to situations in which the owner of the offending animal is only liable for partial compensation, the offending animal having had a track record of being tame. The entire loss is to be borne in equal measure by both owner of the surviving animal and owner of the carcass.

The ox of a man. This is the meaning as opposed to [saying that וכי יגף שור איש ] means, “If an ox gores a man.” [It cannot mean that,] because afterwards it is written, “his neighbor’s ox.”

V. 35. נגף ,וכי יגף (verwandt mit נקב: löchern, נגב: das Stechen der senkrechten Strahlen, נקף: Abbrechen), bezeichnet den Stoß nach seiner verletzenden und tötenden Wirkung, daher מַגֵפָה, das plötzliche Sterben. נגח aber, das verstärkte נגע, bezeichnet nur die Tätigkeit des Stoßes, und zwar beim Tiere zunächst den Stoß mit den Hörnern. Aus V. 36 או נודע כי שור נגח הוא ist ersichtlich, dass hier auch נגיחה, der Hornstoß, gemeint ist, der hier jedoch sofort nach seiner tödlichen Wirkung, נגיפה bezeichnet ist. Beim Angriff auf einen Menschen (V. 28) wird der Stoß nur נגיחה genannt, denn, wie (B. K. 2 b) bemerkt wird, אדם אית ליה מזלא, der Mensch steht unter besonderer Obhut, mit der tödlichen Beschaffenheit des Stoßes ist noch nicht notwendig der wirkliche Erfolg des Todes gegeben. Daraus fließt dann der Satz: מועד לבהמה לא הוי מועד לאדם, wohl aber umgekehrt. Ein Ochse, der dreimal Tiere getötet hat, trägt darum noch nicht den Charakter eines stößigen Ochsen hinsichtlich des Menschen, bis er drei Menschen getötet. Hornstoß ist übrigens nur exemplifikatorisch und gehört jede mit schadender Absicht von einem sonst zahmen Tiere verübte Beschädigung als תולדה דקרן zu der Kategorie קרן.

ומכרו את השור החי, “and they sell the surviving ox.” What the Torah writes here applies only when the damage was caused through the ox being used on land that was not owned (or leased) by the owner of the ox. If it had been on property owned or leased by the ox’s owner, the party causing the damage is free from responsibility as the party that caused the damage can say to the owner: “what business did your ox have on my property?”

שור איש means שור של איש THE OX OF A MAN (i. e. שור is in construct state to the word איש).‎

שור איש, im Gegensatz zu V. 28 וכי יגח שור, ist hier nur von einem in Eigentum eines verantwortlichen Herrn stehenden Ochsen die Rede (B. K. 39 a).

וחצו את כספו וגם את המת, “they will share equally the price they realized for the surviving ox as well as that they salvaged for the carcass of the animal that was killed.” Seeing that the animal that gored did not have a history of being aggressive, its owner had no reason to take special precautions by tying it up. Fate played an equal role for both in causing them to suffer a financial loss.

ומכרו את השור וגו׳ THEN THEY SHALL SELL THE LIVE ONE — Scripture is speaking of a case when both animals are of the same value: an ox of the value of 200 zuz that killed another also valued at 200 zuz. Then whether the carcass is worth much or whether it is worth little, as soon as one takes one-half of the living animal and one-half of the dead, and the other takes one-half of the living animal and one-half of the dead, it follows that each of them suffers the loss of half the damage which the death of the animal has caused. Scripture teaches us that the תם (which is the animal spoken of here — one that inflicted injury for the first time) always pays half damages. For from what it states about animals of the same value you may gather the rule for such as are of different values — that the law regarding the תם is for its owner to pay half damages, neither more nor less. Or perhaps you might say that also of animals which were of unequal value when living Scripture states that both of them must be halved! But if you say this, you will find that sometimes the man who occasions the damage may benefit considerably — namely, when the carcass is worth when sold unto heathens much more than the value of the ox which inflicted the injury. And you must admit that it is impossible that Scripture should say that the man who occasioned the damage should benefit by it. Or it may sometimes happen that the claimant will receive much more than the value of the whole damage — namely, when one-half of the value of the defendant’s ox is worth more than the whole value of the claimant’s ox. Consequently if you still maintain this (that the animals are to be halved even when they are of different value), the result may well be that the case of the תם is more severely dealt with than that of the מועד (when the claimant gets full damages — but not more). You must therefore needs admit that Scripture speaks here only of animals that are of equal value, and that it teaches you that the owner of a תם has to pay half damages; and from what is said in respect to animals of equal value you may derive the law in respect of such as are of different values — that in any case when a person is paid half the damages caused to him we value the carcass for him (the claimant); and as regards the depreciation in value caused by its death — he must accept a sum equal to half of that depreciation together with the carcass and has to be satisfied (Hebrew: and goes his way). But why does Scripture use this mode of expression and does not simply say: he (the owner of the תם) shall pay the half? To teach you by the way that the תם pays only to the extent of its own value (Hebrew: from what can be obtained for its body). So in case it gores another and itself dies, the claimant gets at most the carcass of the ox that caused the damage, and if that does not amount to one-half of the damage, he has to suffer the loss. Or take another case: an ox of the value of one maneh (200 zuz) that gored an ox of the value of 500 zuz (so that the loss is more than the whole value of the ox that caused it). The claimant still does not get more than the living ox; and the defendant is not bound to make up the deficiency from his own money, for the תם is not responsible to such an extent as to make its owner liable to pay from his own property) (Bava Kamma 16b).

ומכרו. Die tradierte Halacha lehrt, dass תם משלם חצי נזק מגופו, jede von einem sonst zahmen, der Obhut eines verantwortlichen Eigentümers unterstehenden Tiere anormal in schadender Absicht verübte Beschädigung (קרן) nur zur Hälfte, und zwar nur von dem Werte des schadenden Tieres selbst zum Ersatz kommt. Es hat sich der Eigentümer des beschädigten oder getöteten Tieres nur an das Tier selbst zu halten, das den Stoß verübt hat. Das sonstige Vermögen des Beschädigers haftet nicht dafür, אינו משלם מן העליה, während für alle andern Beschädigungen der Beschädiger mit seinen besten Gütern haftet, נזקין שמין מן העידית במעולה שבנכסיו (B. K. 15 b). Sofort nach verübtem Stoß ist das Tier bis zur Hälfte des dadurch angerichteten Schadens dem Beschädigten verfallen, הוחלט השור, und übersteigt dessen Wert diese Ersatzhäfte, so sind sie beide als gemeinschaftliche Eigentümer derselben zu betrachten שותפי נינהו (B. K. 33 a). Es ist ferner dieser halbe Schadenersatz nach der rezipierten Halacha nicht Ersatzpflicht (ממונא), sondern Präventivpön פלגא נזקא קנסא כי היכי דלנטרי לתוריה, damit der Eigentümer seinen Ochsen überwache (B. K. 15 a u. b). Endlich lehrt die rezipierte Halacha, dass das Problem unseres Textes zunächst von einem Vorgange auf völlig neutralem Boden, d. h. in einer solchen Örtlichkeit handle, in welcher beiden, dem Beschädiger wie dem Beschädigten, ganz gleiches Recht, ihre Tiere hinzubringen, zusteht, z. B. die öffentliche Straße, das freie Feld, ein gemeinschaftlicher Hof etc. dass aber gleichwohl auch ברשות הניזק, in dem einseitigen Besitzraum des Beschädigten, wohin schon der bloße Eintritt des Tieres des Beschädigers etwas Unbefugtes war, die Ersatzpflicht nicht über die Hälfte des Schadens hinausgeht (B. K. 14 a, 24 b).

Alle diese Sätze sind durch die Art des Problems in prägnanter Kürze in dem Texte enthalten, und dürfte damit zugleich das diesen Gesetzbestimmungen zu Grunde liegende Motiv angedeutet sein.

Der Text spricht nirgends eine persönliche Ersatzpflicht, wie oben V. 36, aus, sagt nicht: חצי השור ישלם תחת השור, sondern statuiert nur, was mit dem lebenden und dem getöteten Tiere zu geschehen habe. Ein Beweis, dass der Beschädigte keinerlei Anspruch an den Beschädiger, sondern sich nur an das Tier zu halten habe, מגופו משתלם. Er statuiert, dass sie sich den lebenden und getöteten Ochsen zu teilen haben. Es kann dies selbstredend nur von dem Falle sprechen, dass beide Tiere in gleichem Werte waren, sonst könnte der Beschädiger noch Vorteil haben. So aber tritt sein lebender Ochse für den getöteten ein und, indem sie sich beide teilen, büßt jeder die Hälfte des Schadens ein. War jeder der Ochsen zweihundert wert und der Getötete hat noch einen Wert von fünfzig und beläuft sich somit der Schaden auf einhundertfünfzig, so erhält jeder einhundertfünfundzwanzig und verliert fünfundsiebenzig. Damit ist aber die allgemeine Norm gegeben: von dem Ochsen des Beschädigers macht sich der Beschädigte bis zur Hälfte seines Schadens bezahlt. Indem nun der Text nicht ומכר, sondern ומכרו, die Verwertung des Tiers nicht dem Beschädiger allein, sondern beiden zusammen auflegt, so hat er sie damit eben als gemeinschaftliche Eigentümer, שותפין, eingesetzt. Sofort mit dem Stoße gehört der Ochse bis zur Hälfte des Schadens dem Beschädigten. Es hat dies z. B. eine rechtliche Folge, wenn der Beschädigte einseitig über seinen Anteil disponiert hätte, הקדישו ניזק. Nach einer andern, nicht rezipierten Ansicht hat der Beschädigte nur ein Pfandrecht an dem Ochsen, יושם השור בב׳׳ר ,בעל חוב הוא (B. K. 33 a). — Es lässt endlich der Text die Örtlichkeit des Vorganges völlig unbestimmt, während er bei Beschädigung durch den Zahn des Tieres (שן) Kap. 22, 4 den Vorgang auf שדה אחר auf den Besitzraum des Beschädigten beschränkt. Es ergibt sich hieraus, dass für קרן, Hornstoß, die Verantwortung auch im neutralen Gebiete, רשות הרבים, stattfindet, und indem durch das Nun paragogicum in יחצון die Person noch besonders hervorgehoben wird, ist damit der ganze Rechtssatz nur von den Personen des Beschädigers und des Beschädigten abhängig und, völlig von der Örtlichkeit unabhängig. also hingestellt, dass selbst ברשות הניזק, im Besitzraum des Beschädigten, der Anspruch des letzteren nicht die Hälfte des erlittenen Schadens übersteigt, bis zur Hälfte aber selbst in רשות הרבים ihm zusteht: אמר קרא יחצון אין חצי נזק חלוק לא ברשות הרבים ולא ברשות היחיד (B. K. 26 a). Nur wenn der Vorgang כרשות המזיק, in dem Besitzraum des Beschädigers stattgefunden, wohin dem Beschädigten kein Zutritt seines Tieres rechtlich zugestanden, fällt der Ersatz weg (B. K. 14 a).

Nach dem Kanon, dass, wo die Zahlungspflicht nicht dem angerichteten Schaden adäquat ist, sondern mehr oder weniger beträgt, keine Ersatzschuld, sondern eine Präventivpön, — (siehe zu Kap. 22,4 ,חצי נזק צרורות vorliegt — (mit alleiniger Ausnahme von .קנס haben wir auch dieses חצי נזק beim Hornstoß als קנס zu begreifen (B. K. 15 a u. b). Mit dem Eintritt eines lebenden oder leblosen Gutes in die Botmäßigkeit eines Menschen wird dieser für die Kraftäußerungen seines Eigentums verantwortlich. Das Eigentum des Menschen ist im Grunde nur sein erweiterter Körper, und wie die Menschenintelligenz für die Kraftäußerungen des Leibes einzustehen hat, so wird sie mit der Aneignung eines vernunftlosen Gutes auch sofort dessen Vormund und ist für dessen Kraftäußerungen verantwortlich, wie wir dies hinsichtlich lebloser Güter bereits V. 33 u. 34 unter dem Titel בור erfahren. Allein sie ist nur für solche Kraftäußerungen ihres Eigentums verantwortlich, die aus der bekannten Natur desselben vorauszusetzen sind, und ihr daher zu verhüten obliegen. "Hornstoß", d. h. absichtliche Beschädigung aus Schadenlust, liegt nicht in der normalen Natur des Ochsen. Er ist in dieser Beziehung תם, oder wie der Ausdruck B. K. 15 a lautet: סתם שורים בחזקת שימור קיימי, sie bedürfen in dieser Beziehung keiner Hut. Aus einer dennoch geschehenen Beschädigung erwächst daher keine Rechtsschuld zum Ersatz. Gleichwohl hat das Gesetz im Interesse des zu sichernden öffentlichen Verkehrs den Eigentümer eines Tieres für einen solchen Fall mit einer Geldbuße bedroht, כי היכי דלנטריה, damit er in öffentlichen Verkehrsräumen sein Tier selbst hinsichtlich in der Regel nicht vorauszusetzender Kraftäußerungen überwache. Hätte nun das Gesetz den vollen Ersatz statuiert, so wäre damit der öffentliche Verkehr nur noch um so mehr gefährdet, es wäre damit auf der andern Seite ein Sporn gegeben, sein Vieh völlig sorglos durch Verkehrswege zu treiben, ja dessen Beschädigung zu suchen, da sein voller Ersatz gesichert wäre. Indem aber das Gesetz in einem solchen Falle beide, den Beschädigten wie den Beschädiger, büßen lässt, nötigt es beide zu derjenigen Vorsicht, die allein einen gesicherten öffentlichen Verkehr ermöglicht. Es stellt damit zwei sich einander begegnende Tiere gleichsam unter gemeinschaftliche Obhut beider Eigentümer und knüpft eine momentane Interessengemeinschaft, die überhaupt die Basis des öffentlichen Verkehrsrechts bildet. Darum treten sie auch im Texte als gemeinschaftliche Eigentümer, שותפין, beider Tiere in gemeinschaftlicher Verbüßung eines gemeinschaftlich verschuldeten Schadens auf. Und darum geht auch der Anspruch des Beschädigten nicht über das Objekt des Tieres des Beschädigers hinaus. Der Begriff der Präventivmaßregel ist eben nichts anderes, als die Gemeinschaft der Tiere für den eventuellen, von beiden abzuwendenden Unfall. Es dürfte aber auch im רשות הניזק die Präventivpön deshalb nicht über die Schadenhälfte hinausgehen, weil zunächst diese Vorbeugungspön nur durch die Rücksicht auf den öffentlichen Verkehr nötig erschienen; für den seltenen Ausnahmefall des unerlaubten Betretens eines fremdes Gebietes hätte das Gesetz nur das einfache Recht walten lassen, hätte dafür keine Sicherheitsbestimmung getroffen, wie ja auch die ähnlichen גזרות דרבנן ein מלתא דלא שכיחא nicht berücksichtigen. Indem aber für den öffentlichen Verkehr eine solche Pön zu statuieren war, sprach das Gesetz diese Pön allgemein, auch für jenen seltenen Fall, und zwar nur in der Höhe des allgemeinen Ansatzes aus. Die Erhöhung zum vollen Ersatz ברשות הניזק wird (B. K. 25 a) nach dem Interpretationsgrundsatze: דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון, dass eine übertragene Gesetzbestimmung nur auf das Maß der Urbestimmung zu beschränken sei, zurückgewiesen.

או נודע means, OR it was not a תם but IT IS KNOWN THAT THE OX WAS WONT TO THRUST to-day yesterday and the day before yesterday — thus you have the three acts of goring required to make it a שלם ישלם שור (Bava Kamma 23b)

OR IF IT BE KNOWN THAT THE OX WAS WONT TO GORE IN TIME PAST, AND ITS OWNER HATH NOT KEPT IT IN, HE SHALL SURELY PAY AN OX FOR AN OX. It is known that if a Tam¹⁹³A Tam is an animal which has not injured, or killed [an animal] more than three times and whose owner has not been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damages a Tam does, its owner pays only half the loss. The Tam is distinguished from a Muad, an animal which has killed or injured at least four times, and whose owner has been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damage it does, the owner must pay in full. too is properly guarded by its owner, but through an accident it so happened that it went out and caused damage, the owner is certainly not liable.¹⁹⁴But if so, the question arises why the Torah mentions the guarding of the animal only in the case of the Muad, (see Note above) since the same law applies to a Tam as well. Ramban proceeds to remove this difficulty. Thus the reason why He states only with reference to a Muad,¹⁹³A Tam is an animal which has not injured, or killed [an animal] more than three times and whose owner has not been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damages a Tam does, its owner pays only half the loss. The Tam is distinguished from a Muad, an animal which has killed or injured at least four times, and whose owner has been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damage it does, the owner must pay in full. and its owner hath not kept it in, [when the same principle would apply to a Tam as well] is, according to that Sage in the Talmud¹⁹⁵Baba Kamma 45b. See in my Hebrew commentary p. 426, that the reference is to Rabbi Meir. who says that a Muad needs better guarding than a Tam, as follows: Scripture states that if the ox was wont to gore and warning had been given to its owner, and he hath not kept it in and guarded it better in view of its dangerous nature, so that it went out and caused damage, the owner must pay the full damage. According to the opinion of that Sage¹⁹⁶This is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (ibid.). who holds that the degree of guarding necessary for both Tam and Muad¹⁹³A Tam is an animal which has not injured, or killed [an animal] more than three times and whose owner has not been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damages a Tam does, its owner pays only half the loss. The Tam is distinguished from a Muad, an animal which has killed or injured at least four times, and whose owner has been warned that it is dangerous and must be guarded. For whatever damage it does, the owner must pay in full. is alike, the meaning of the verse is as follows: If it be known to the owner that the ox was wont to gore and now too [i.e., at the fourth time] he hath not kept it in, he is liable to pay the full damage on account of his grave negligence.

ולא ישמרנו, and he did not supervise it adequately, etc. The correct interpretation of this verse follows what we learned in Baba Kama 46. Rabbi Eliezer is on record that the only adequate supervision of an aggressive ox such as the one mentioned in our verse is the knife, i.e. it has to be slaughtered. Rabbah elaborated: "why does the Torah speak of 'if he will not guard it,' because there is no longer any point in guarding it." If the ox had to be slaughtered what is the point of speaking of supervision?" Abbaye answered Rabbah that if one were to accept Rabbah's argument what is the meaning of "he did not cover it" in verse 33? [clearly if the pit had been covered nobody would have fallen into it. Ed.] So far the Talmud. I believe that Rabbah's point is well taken. There is obviously a difference between the situation involving the pit and that of the ox which had gored repeatedly. In the case of the pit, the Torah uses the future tense, it speaks of an event which has not happened as yet; Also the description of the victims is worded in the future. In the case of the ox which had gored repeatedly the Torah commences by telling us of the past history of that ox. The Torah suddenly switches to the future tense by saying ולא ישמרנו. Actually, the Torah should have written ולא שמרו, "and he did not guard it." Rabbah did not bother to answer Abbaye in the Talmud. According to the view of Rabbi Yehudah that even relatively minor supervision of such an ox is adequate in order to exonerate the owner if the ox gored again, the Torah must be understood thus: ולא ישמרנו, "if he did not guard it at all." It is worthwile to study the Talmud at the end of the chapter on folio 46.

Or it was not a תם . Rashi does not explain או (or) as meaning אם (if), because then it would be written with an adjunctive vav, as ואם (and if). This resolves the Re’m’s question: why does Rashi not explain the verse as “if”, as Rashi did on the verse, “If ( או ) his sin becomes known to him” (Vayikra 3:23)? [The Re’m claimed] that “if” would have explained the verse very well, and Rashi would not have had to insert the word “ אלא ,” [in order to give meaning to the verse]. The Re’m left the matter unresolved. The Re’m also objects: Rashi himself, on the verse of “If ( או ) his sin becomes known to him,” explains that או is like אם , as in: “If ( או ) it was known that it was a goring ox.” This contradicts what Rashi says here! This matter is unresolved.

V. 36. Siehe zu V. 29. – ולא ישמרנו בעליו, beim שור תם, V. 35, steht diese Bedingung nicht. Die Präventivpön ist dort somit unbedingt auferlegt, ihr wird mit שמירה פחותה, mit gewöhnlicher Hut nicht entgangen, sie ist eben auferlegt, um שמירה מעולה, um eine auch ungewöhnlichen Umständen, שאינם מצוים, begegnende Hut zu veranlassen. Die Verantwortung für שור המועד, welchem das Stoßen zur Natur, somit zur bekannten und vorauszusetzenden Kraftäußerung geworden, fließt aus dem Rechtsbegriff. Sie ist bedingt durch vernachlässigte ולא ישמרנו בעליו :שמירה. Sollte dies auch wie bei תם mehr als gewöhnliche Hut, שמירה מעולה, bedeuten, es hätte der Text davon schweigen dürfen, und stillschweigend wäre sodann die Ersatzpflicht für מועד ebenso unbedingt wie für תם ausgesprochen. Die ausdrückliche Bestimmung: ולא ישמרנו kann daher מועד nur auf den einfachen Rechtsboden versetzen wollen, der nur eine gewöhnlich vorauszusetzenden Umständen genügende Vorsicht, שמירה פחותה, fordert und nur bei Abgang dieser gewöhnlichen Hut zum Ersatz verpflichtet. Es wird dies B. K. 45 b nach dem Interpretationskanon: אין רבוי אחר רבוי אלא למעט "die sonst unnötige Wiederholung einer Begriffserweiterung beabsichtigt nur dessen Beschränkung", erläutert. Das: ולא ישמרנו, supponiert den gänzlichen Mangel an שמירה. Ein normal gehüteter Ochse fällt somit nicht unter die Bestimmung, שמור הוא זה, es fehlt bei ihm die Voraussetzung, dass לא ישמרנו בעליו (das.) — Es wird (das.) die Frage behandelt, ob צד תמות במקומה עומדת, .d. h. ob der Stoß eines normal gehüteten מועד, bei welchem also die Ersatzschuld wegfällt, nicht gleichwohl der schon für תם statuierten Pön der Schadenhälfte unterliegt. תוספו׳ und ראש adoptieren die Ansicht ר׳ אדא בר אהבה's, dass diese Ersatzpflicht zur Hälfte auch beim מועד bei שמירה פחותה wie beim תם bleibe. רמב׳׳ם jedoch adoptiert die Ansicht רב's, dass mit שמירה פחותה ein מועד völlig von Ersatzpflicht frei werde. Das Auffallende, dass nach dieser letzteren Ansicht sodann מועד leichter als תם vom Gesetze behandelt erscheint, dürfte durch die Erwägung schwinden, dass der Ersatz der Schadenhälfte nur Präventivpön, קנס, ist und als solche nur מלתא דשכיחא, nur normale Vorgänge im Auge hat, der מועד-Zustand aber an sich ein seltener Ausnahmefall ist, dass aber ferner מועד, dessen Ersatzpflicht auf dem Rechtsboden steht, gar keiner Präventivpön bedarf. Die rechtliche Folge, zum Ersatz des ganzen Schadens und zwar als Rechtsschuld verpflichtet zu werden, die gar keiner auf Zeugen basierter richterlichen Kognition bedarf, ist ein hinlänglicher und viel mächtigerer Sporn für den Eigentümer, sein stößiges Tier hinlänglich zu hüten, als eine Präventivpön des halben Schadens, zu deren Leistung der Beschädiger nur auf Grund von Zeugen provozierten gerichtlichen Erkenntnisses verpflichtet ist, ihr aber durch einfaches Selbstangeben entgeht (siehe zu Kap. 22, 8 אשר ירשעון אלהי׳).

., “and he had not secured it;” actually we could have learned this by simple logic. If an owner of an ox that had gored must bear half the cost of the loss of its victim if the offending animal had had a reputation for aggressiveness and its master had not secured it, he surely must be liable for the whole damage! Why do we need the words: “and he had not secured it?” Therefore we learn that this word speaks another type of guarding that ox; he has to also muzzle such an ox so that it cannot become guilty of causing damage with its mouth, by either biting, or grazing in other people’s fields. An alternate explanation why the words: ולא ישמרנו are needed; logic does not suffice to impose penalties. Perhaps someone could come up with another aspect nullifying our logic. Therefore penalties have to be spelled out. Still another interpretation: the penalty applies even if the offending ox had been looked after on behalf of its owner by someone who did not charge the owner a fee for this.

.מועד HE SHALL SURELY PAY AN OX [FOR THE OX] — i. e. the full damage.

AND THE DEAD BEAST SHALL BELONG TO HIM — “to the one who suffered the damage, and the one who caused the damage adds to it until he completes the amount, so that the one who was damaged will have been paid for his entire loss.” This is Rashi’s language, and is in accordance with the teaching of our Rabbis.¹⁹⁷Ibid., 10b. And if so, it is proper that we explain the verse as follows: he shall surely pay ox for ox “with” the dead beast which shall, belong to him. Similarly, and Joseph was in Egypt,¹⁹⁸Above, 1:5. means: “with” Joseph who was in Egypt [they were seventy souls]. Likewise, I cannot endure iniquity ‘va’atzarah’¹⁹⁹Isaiah 1:13. [literally: “and the solemn assembly”] means with the solemn assembly, similar to that which He said, I hate robbery ‘b’olah’ — “with” a burnt-offering.²⁰⁰Ibid., 61:8.
According to the simple meaning of Scripture it is possible to explain the expression, and the dead shall belong to him — to the one who caused the damage, the verse thus stating: he shall surely pay ox for ox, but he may keep the carcass, so that in making monetary compensation he can turn it over to the one who suffered the damage as part payment. Thus according to both interpretations the law is alike — the owner of the dead animal attends to the carcass, and its value is determined as at the time of its death,²⁰¹If its value decreases after the time of its death, he must bear that loss alone (Baba Kamma 34 b). to be taken by him as part payment, according to the words of our Rabbis.²⁰¹If its value decreases after the time of its death, he must bear that loss alone (Baba Kamma 34 b).

To the damaged party. You might object: Rashi already explained this above (v. 34). An answer is: This verse is the primary source for the law that the owner has to look after the carcass, [thus Rashi mentioned it again here]. An alternative answer is: Since [this law is stricter than that of the תם , and] the damager pays in full, we might mistakenly think that he must also look after the carcass. Therefore Rashi explained that the carcass belongs to the damaged party.

ישלם שור, he shall pay an ox. Although the Talmud in Baba Kama 4 states that an ox which is a מועד, whose owner has been put on notice that his ox is agressive, will have to make restitution by paying the victim from the best quality of the fields the owner posesses, this rule is limited to situations when the owner of the aggressive ox owned property of a quality superior to that of the owner of the victim. If not,-using our verse as a guide,- he may be allowed to use the ox itself as payment. The statement in the Talmud may only mean that the owner of the aggressive ox must not use earth which is inferior to that owned by the victim's owner as a means of payment.

An dem Ausdruck des Tertes: וכי יגף שור איש את שור רעהו lehrt die Tradition den großen Satz: שור רעהו ולא שור של הקדש. (B. K. 6 b) und entwickelt תוספו׳ das., dass nicht nur für Beschädigung von Heiligtümern durch vernachlässigte Hut von Tieren und sonst schadenbringendem Eigentum, sondern selbst für die direkte Beschädigung von Heiligtümern durch den Menschen selbst alle und jede Ersatzpflicht wegfällt, נזקין להדיוט ואין נזקין לגבוה, Beschädigung profanen Eigentums ist zu ersetzen/i, nicht aber Gott heiliger Güter. Sei es nun, dass damit dem Beschädiger gesagt werde, nicht Gott, sondern dir hast du zerstört, was du zerstört; sei es, dass Gott keine irdische Hand gehoben haben will zur Vertretung Seines Gutes; sei es, dass materiell ersetzende Wiederherstellung das eigentliche Wesen des Verhrechens, die Vergreifung an der Idee, die das gestörte Objekt als Träger vergegenwärtigt, verwischen würde: immer steht das Faktum fest, dass unter dem Regime dieses Gesetzes jemand die heilige Bundeslade zertrümmert, den heiligen Vorhang zerrissen, die Tempelgeräte zerstört, den ganzen Tempelschatz vernichtet haben konnte, ohne auf Erden einen Richter zu finden, der ihn auch nur zum Ersatz eines Pfennigs zu verhalten befugt gewesen wäre. Dieses Faktum steht aber gewiss als völliges Unikum im Kreise der Gesetzgebungen auf Erden, und können wir die Bemerkung nicht unterdrücken, wie denn doch schon dieses eine, so völlig einzige Faktum die sprechendste Signatur an dieser Gesetzgebung ist, dass wir an ihr kein menschlich Werk, geschweige denn ein Produkt hierarchischer Priesterbestrebungen, wohin man so gerne das jüdische Gesetz zu verweisen geneigt wäre, vor Augen haben. Priester, Hierarchen, hätten gewiss einem solchen Sakrilegium den Kainsstempel des schreiendsten Verbrechens aufgedrückt und den weltlichen Arm in allererster Linie zum Wächter und Rächer ihrer Schätze bestellt. Nur bei profanierender Verwendung von Heiligtümern, und zwar in erhöhtem Maße bei irrtümlicher, מעילה, tritt eine Ersatzpflicht ein, die wir zu dem betreffenden Gesetze (Wajikra 5, 16) zu betrachten haben werden. — Beschädigung des Altars und des Tempelgebäudes — נותץ אבן אחד מן ההיכל ומן המזבת ומן העזרות — ist durch einfaches, mit מלקות belegtes Verbot untersagt (ספרי פ׳ ראה). Unvorsätzliche, ja mutwillige, aber der gesetzlichen Verwarnung entbehrende Beschädigung auch dieser ist somit ebenso straflos als ersatzfrei, während selbst unvorsätzliche Beschädigung eines Privatgebäudes unbedingt zu vollem Ersatze verpflichtet. Auch in anderen zivilrechtlichen Bestimmungen stehen Heiligtümer im Nachteil, so in Beziehung auf אונאה, Übervorteilung, ,שומריך Hutverantwortlichkeit, und תשלומי כפל וד׳ וה׳, (B.M. 56a).

והמת יהיה לו AND THE DEAD SHALL BELONG TO HIM — to the claimant (Bava Kamma 23b) as part of this full payment. In addition to it the defendant has to complete the amount until the claimant has been paid for his entire loss.

חמשה בקר וגו׳ [HE SHALL PAY] FIVE OF THE HERD etc. — Rabban Jochanan ben Zaccai said, “The Omnipresent has much consideration for the honour of His creatures: when an ox — an animal that can walk by itself — has been stolen and sold or slaughtered, in which case the thief had not to degrade himself by carrying it on his shoulder, he has to pay fivefold restitution. In the case of a lamb, however, which he had to carry on his shoulder, he has to pay only the fourfold, because he was forced to degrade himself by carrying it”. Rabbi Meir said, “Come and see how great is the virtue of labour: In the case of the theft of an ox which he (the thief) withdrew from its labour, thereby causing a loss to its owner, he has to repay five oxen, in the case of a lamb which he has not withdrawn from its labour — only four (Bava Kamma 79b).

וטבחו, or he has slaughtered it, etc. This refers to either the ox or a sheep. Should the stolen animal be a lamb or a kid and the thief had to raise it in his home so that it turned into a different category animal, i.e. a fully grown one, he is not liable for this five or four-fold payment, seeing he had become its owner by the twin method of shinnuy reshut u-mekomo a change of both domain and place (home). This is the thrust of the comments by the Talmud in Baba Kama 65.

חמשה בקר, our sages (Baba Kamma 79) rule that when the stolen ox had been doing work for the owner prior to its being stolen, compensation is set at 5 times the value of the labour the owner has now been deprived of.

The Torah repeats them. Meaning: if the Torah did not repeat them, we would make a gezeirah shavah between שור here and שור in the section of Shabbos (Shemos 23:12), and learn that the law of paying “four or five” applies even to stealing any beast or bird. When Rashi says, “The Torah repeats them,” it means as follows: The Gemara (Bava Kama 67b) explains that the verse could have said, “If a man steals an ox and then slaughters or sells it, he must pay five oxen for it, and four sheep for each sheep.” Why repeat “ox” at the beginning and “sheep” at the end? [See Gemara for full explanation.] It is to tell us: [for stealing] an ox or sheep, yes, [he pays four or five]. But for other things, he does not.

V. 37. Aus Kap. 22, 3 u. 6 wissen wir, dass für jedes gestohlene bewegliche Gut (mit Ausnahme von Heiligtümern, wie schon zum vorigen Vers bemerkt, und Schuldbriefen, die nicht selbst als Güter betrachtet werden), כפל, das Doppelte zu zahlen ist. Wir hören hier, dass für gestohlene Ochsen und Schafe, wenn sie geschlachtet oder verkauft worden, dass Fünf- und Vierfache gezahlt werden muss, und zwar ist durch die ausdrückliche Wiederholung des שור und תחת השה ,תחת השור :שה, diese erhöhte Doppelzahlung nur auf Ochsen und Schafe beschränkt (B. K. 62 b u. 67 b). Wir wissen aus dem bereits zu V. 35 erwähnten Kanon, dass diese Doppelzahlung, als über den Wert des zu Ersetzenden hinausgehend, nicht als Ersatzschuld, sondern als Pön zu betrachten sei. Wir wissen endlich, daß diese Pön nur bei Diebstahl, גנבה, nicht aber bei Raub, גזלה, eintritt. Geraubtes ist nur einfach zu ersetzen, זהשיב את הגזלה אשר גזל (Wajikra 5, 23). Vergegenwärtigen wir uns die Begriffe Diebstahl und .3 Raub und sodann die Eigentümlichkeit von Ochsen und Schafen in Beziehung zu diesem Begriffe, so dürfte uns das Motiv dieser Sätze klar werden. Raub ist gewalttätiges Entreissen eines Eigentums, ויגזל את החנית מיד המצרי. (II. Sam. 23, 21, B. K. 79 b). Diebstahl: heimliches Nehmen. Der Räuber vergreift sich an einem unter dem persönlichen Machtschutz des Eigentümers stehenden Gegenstand. Der Dieb findet den Gegenstand unter den Schutz der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung gestellt. Raub ist daher ein einfaches Verbrechen gegen das individuelle, geschädigte Eigentumsrecht. Diebstahl ein doppeltes Verbrechen: gegen das individuelle Recht des Eigentümers und gegen die allgemeine Rechtsachtung, unter deren Schutz der Eigentümer sein Gut gestellt, als er sich von ihm entfernte, und die die erste Basis bildet, auf welcher überhaupt die Staatsgesellschaft als Rechtsverein beruht. Ohne diese vorauszusetzende allgemeine Rechtsachtung könnte kein Mensch irgend eines seiner beweglichen Güter einen Augenblick außer Acht lassen. Der Dieb zahlt daher als Ersatzschuld den Wert des Gestohlenen dem Eigentümer und noch einmal dieselbe Summe für die Höhnung des Prinzips der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung, gegen das er sich vergangen. Als selbst ein Glied der Gesamtheit war gleichsam das Gut auch unter seinen Schutz gestellt, und statt es zu vertreten, hat er es entwendet. Daher kann eine solche Pön auch nur durch die Vertretung der Gesamtheit, die Gerichte, auferlegt werden — der Bestohlene an sich, und aus dem an ihm begangenen Verbrechen heraus, hat keinen Anspruch darauf — und sie wird durch eine, die Macht dieses öffentlichen Rechts in der Achtung wiederherstellende Selbstanklage überflüssig.

כי יגנוב איש, “if a man steals etc,” the legislation applying to the stolen goods having either been slaughtered and consumed or disposed of commercially, and the thief has been found, i.e. אם ימצא הגנב, applies also to the slaughterer and the seller (if they are not the thief himself). They are all penalised with 4 or five times the value of the objects they were trying to dispose of before they could be found. (Rash’bam)

תחת השור … תחת השה FOR THE OX … FOR THE LAMB — The text repeats the words שור and שה unnecessarily (for it would have sufficed to state כי יגנוב איש שור וטבחו או מכרו חמשה בקר ישלם תחתיו וארבע הצאן תחת השה “And if a man shall steal an ox … then he shall pay five of the herd for it, or four sheep in place of the lamb”) to tell you that the rule providing for four-fold and five-fold restitution applies solely to the ox and the lamb (and not to any other cattle) (Bava Kamma 67b).

השור. the ox. In the Mishnah Baba Kama 62 it is stated that only the two categories of animals mentioned here ever qualify for the four or five-fold compensation payable to the owner. The reason cited there is that if other animals were included in that legislation the Torah should have written the words "and he either slaughtered it or sold it," immediately after the word שור instead of waiting until both שור and שה had been mentioned. As it is we deduce that either one of these two categories is meant exclusively. The present wording excludes both other categories of animals as well as the same category of animal if it had matured in the hands of the thief.

Mehr aber als alle anderen Güter wird dasjenige lebendige Eigentum dem öffentlichen Schutze, der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung unterstellt, das, wie Rinder und Schafe, unter den Begriff: Herden fällt. Der Eigentümer lässt sie in freier Öffentlichkeit unbewacht weiden und vertraut der Macht der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung, und zwar tritt diese Eigentümlichkeit bei Rindern in noch höherm Grade als bei Schafen hervor. Während das Rind völlig frei weidet, werden Schafen noch gehürdet. Schafe werden in Hürden — גדרות צאן — geborgen. Diese Eigentümlichkeit dürfte sich auch in deren Benennung, בקר und צאן, ausprägen. (verwandt mit בכר ,בגר ,פגר ,פקר ): völlig frei. צאן, von שאן (Wurzel von שאנן, verwandt mit שען), ungestört, ruhig, mit dem die Überwindung von Schwierigkeiten, das Künstliche ausdrückenden צ-Laute: künstlich geborgen. Diese in noch erhöhtem Grade bei Ochsen und Schafen hervortretende Unterstellung unter den öffentlichen Schutz der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung dürfte das Motiv der noch erhöhten Pön für deren Höhnung sein, und zwar, der Eigentümlichkeit gemäß, für Rinder in noch mehr erhöhtem Ansatz als für Schafe. Vielleicht sagt auch darum der Text nicht: חמשה ישלם תחת השור וארבעה תחת השה sondern: חמשה בקר וגו׳ וארבע צאן וגו׳, weil in diesen Benennungen zugleich das Motiv der Bestimmung liegt.

וטבחו או מכרו, and the thief had either slaughtered it or sold it; here we could also say that logic would have told us this. If the slaughterer is guilty of this penalty, surely the one who had sold it is also guilty of it? Had the Torah not written this example we would have reasoned that this is proof that penalties can be imposed by the court by the judges simply using their logic.

Dieselbe Begriffsverschiedenheit von Raub und Diebstahl, sowie die Verschiedenheit von שור und שה von allen andern Gütern und unter einander ergibt gleichzeitig auch, dass zum Diebstahl viel mehr Gelegenheit als zum Raube, zum Diebstahl von Rindern und Schafen mehr als zum Diebstahl anderer Güter, und endlich zum Diebstahl von Ochsen mehr als zum Diebstahl von Schafen gegeben ist. גנבה ist mehr שכיח als גזל, גניבת שור ושה mehr als anderer Güter, גניבת שור mehr als גניבת שה. Wie bereits bemerkt, glauben wir, dass, wie bei גזרות דרבנן so auch bei קנסות דאוריתא vorzüglich das שכיח, das Häufigere und unter gewöhnlichen Umständen zu Erwartende, nicht aber das Seltene, Exzeptionelle ins Auge gefasst ist. Dem Diebstahl war mehr durch Präventivpön vorzubeugen als dem Raube, der daher auf dem einfachen Rechtsboden verblieb, dem Diebstahl von Ochsen und Schafen mehr als dem von anderen Gegenständen, dem Ochsendiebstahl mehr als demjenigen von Schafen. — Wir begreifen nach dieser Motivierung auch die sonst auffällige Reihefolge der Gesetztitel im Texte, die mit diesem Gesetz über Diebstahl die Reihefolge der אבות נזיקין unterbricht. Der innere Zusammenhang ist der Begriff קנס. Es ist im Grunde derselbe Begriff, der bei שור תם בר׳ה׳ר den ניזק und מזיק als שותפין hinsichtlich der zu verhütenden Fährlichkeit hinstellt — beide Tiere sind hinsichtlich des gesicherten Verkehrs unter beider Schutz gestellt — der den Dieb mit כפל und den Ochsen- und Schafdiebstahl mit noch erhöhtem כפל bedroht.

וטבחו או מכרו, why did the Torah choose these two examples of how a thief wishes to eliminate suspicion from himself? Just as slaughtering and subsequently eating the ox is an irreversible act, so selling him and transferring ownership is a similarly irreversible act.

Es tritt aber ארבעה וחמשה nur nach טביהה או מכירה ein, und wird (B. K. 68 a) das Motiv dieser Bestimmung verschiedentlich aufgefasst, entweder: weil נשתרש בחטא, d. h. אהני מעשיו, durch Verkauf oder Schlachten erst sein Verbrechen objektiv bleibende Folge gewonnen, oder מפני ששנה בחטא weil er subjektiv das Verbrechen wiederholt hat. So lange nämlich der Gegenstand unverändert im Besitz des Diebes sich befindet, hat der Eigentümer, selbst wenn er in Folge des ihm zum Bewusstsein gekommenen Diebstahls den Gegenstand aufgegeben hat, יאוש, ( — und סתם גניבה יאוש בעלים, bei jedem zum Bewusstsein des Eigentümers gekommenen Diebstahl ist die Präsumtion, dass der Eigentümer den Gegenstand als unwiderbringlich verloren betrachtet —) dennoch nicht das Anrecht an den Gegenstand selbst eingebüßt. Der Dieb ist verpflichtet, den Gegenstand in natura zurückzugeben. Hat aber der Gegenstand im Besitze des Diebes eine bleibende Veränderung erlitten, שנוי שאינו חוזר לבריותו, ist somit ein anderer geworden, (wie durch טביהה, oder ein gestohlenes Schaf ist zum Widder, ein Kalb zum Ochsen herangewachsen), oder er ist nach יאוש in den Besitz eines andern übergegangen, יאוש ושנוי רשות so hat der Eigentümer das Recht an den Gegenstand seines frühern Eigentums eingebüßt und hat nur noch den Anspruch auf den Ersatz des Wertes. Nach der ersten Auffassung, אהני מעשיו ,נשתרש בחטא, tritt die erhöhte Pön nur dann ein, wenn mit der מכירה ebenso wie mit טביחה das Verbrechen objektiv erst seine volle Vollendung gewonnen, d. h. damit der Gegenstand dem Eigentümer für immer entzogen wird, also nur dann, wenn der Verkauf nach יאוש geschehen, und da יאוש in der Regel bei jedem Diebstahl präsumiert wird, so spricht eben von diesem falle das Problem des Textes. Es hat dann der Dieb durch den Diebstahl den Gegenstand dem Besitze, durch Schlachten oder Verkauf aber dem Eigentume des Eigentümers verloren gemacht. Die zweite Auffassung jedoch, שנה בחטא, die auch als Halacha rezipiert ist, sieht von der objektiven Wirkung der zweiten Handlung ab, es genügt ihr: שנה בחטא, dass subjektiv das Verbrechen wiederholt worden; wir glauben dies dahin verstehen zu dürfen, dass, so weit an ihm, dem Verbrecher, liegt, von ihm eine zweite Handlung begangen ist, die möglicherweise den Anspruch auf den Gegenstand verloren gehen macht, wenn z. B. was er gar nicht wissen kann, יאוש vorangegangen, oder nach einer Ansicht auch noch nach שנוי רשות eintreten würde (353,3 ח׳׳מ siehe jedoch ש׳׳ך daselbst). — Diese negierende Wirkung von יאוש und שנוי auf das gegenständliche Eigentumsrecht ist wohl als eine Konsequenz aus den beiden Grundelementen zu betrachten, aus welchen sich der Begriff des Eigentums konstituiert, dem ideellen des Willensaktes und dem konkreten des Machtbesitzes, wie diese beiden Elemente auch bei jedem קנין, jeder Eigentumsentstehung beweglicher Güter hervortritt (siehe zu Wajikra 25, 14).

חמשה בקר וגו' וארבע צאן, “five times the value of cattle, etc. or four times its value if he stole a sheep or goat.” The reason why the thief faces a relatively smaller penalty if the object he stole was a sheep or goat, is that he had to demean himself by carrying the animal from where he stole it. He did not use such tactics when stealing a large animal such as an ox. Also the loss of an ox to its owner is more serious as it deprives him of an animal that works for him while in his possession. This is not the case with sheep or goats. A different explanation for the penalties imposed for hiding evidence. Stealing a large animal such as an ox is evidence that the thief had experience in how to steal successfully. Stealing a lamb successfully is no evidence that the thief had become a professional thief.

An dieses Problem von טביחה ומכירה knüpft sich noch die Lehre eines bedeutsamen Grundsatzes. טביחה ומכירה nämlich bildet nebst שליחות יד und מעילה eine Ausnahme des großen Satzes: אין שליח לדבר עברה "es gibt keinen Auftrag zu einem Verbrechen", d. h. ein in Auftrag verübtes Verbrechen hat gerichtlich nicht der Auftraggeber, sondern der Erfüller des Auftrages zu verantworten. (Vor Gott, לצאת ירי שמים, trägt jedenfalls auch der Auftraggeber Verantwortung, bis das Verbrechen gesühnt (siehe 32,2 ח׳׳מ zu ש׳׳ן,).

תחת השור.... תחת השה, “in exchange for the ox, in exchange for the lamb. The reason that the Torah repeats this legislation for each animal separately, is that by doing so it teaches that this particular legislation applies only in the event that either of these categories had been stolen and sold, etc. It does not apply if the stolen animal had been a camel or donkey, for instance.

Wir haben schon oben zu Kap. 12, 3 f. bemerkt, wie sofort bei Konstituierung des jüdischen nationalen Körpers im קרבן פסח der aus der Einheit und Gleichheit vor Gott resultierende Grundsatz der Vertretung des einen durch den andern zur Vollziehung gottesdienstlicher und zivilrechtlicher Handlungen שלוחו של אדם כמותו — sanktioniert worden. Selbstverständlich gilt dieser Satz nur von objektiv zu vollziehenden Handlungen, nicht aber von subjektiv an den Persönlichkeiten selbst zu erfüllenden Momenten. Es kann wohl einer z. B. im Auftrage des andern dessen Peßachopfer opfern, und diese an dem Tiere vollzogene Handlung ist völlig als die Handlung des Auftraggebers zu betrachten, allein es kann keiner im Auftrage des andern und an seiner Statt vom Opfer essen, oder sich im Auftrag des andern für den andern Tefillin anlegen usw. Die Handlung käme allenfalls auf Rechnung des Auftraggebers, aber die Personen, an welchen die Handlung vorgeht, bleiben nur sich selbst identisch, und es wäre etwa so viel, als habe der Auftraggeber die Tefillin an Arm und Haupt des Auftragerfüllenden gebunden. Immerhin aber wäre seine Hand und sein Haupt ohne Tefillin geblieben usw. Siehe קצות חשן zu 182 ח׳׳מ.)

Diese Vertretung in Handlungen hat ihre Grenze innerhalb des Kreises des Erlaubten. Zu etwas Unerlaubtem darf und kann daher keiner ( — auch hier wie bei שבועת שוא steht die moralische Unmöglichkeit der physischen gleich —) sich einem andern zur Verfügung stellen — אין שליח לדבר עברה —; ein in Auftrag ausgeübter gesetzwidriger Akt hat zivilrechtlich keine Geltung (B. M. 106 תוספו׳ ד׳׳ה דאמר לישראל) und fällt kriminalrechtlich dem Ausüber des Auftrages zur Last, denn דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעים, "wenn des Meisters Wort im Widerspruche mit des Schülers Wort steht, wessen Wort ist zu befolgen?" d. h. keine menschliche Autorität kann für etwas Gehorsam fordern und erwarten, das Gott verboten hat (Kiduschin 52 b). Dieser allgemeine Satz wird (B. M. 10 b) nach רבינא durch die Bedingung beschränkt: היכא דשליח בר חיובא ,wenn der Auftrag dem Ausführenden selbst ein vom Gesetz" verbotener ist", nicht also wenn z. B. ein כהן sich durch einen Nicht-כהן eine Geschiedene antrauen lässt. Nach רב סמא ist er jedoch nur durch die Bedingung beschränkt: היכא דאי בעי עביר ואי בעי לא עביד, ,,wenn der Ausführende eine der freien Selbstbestimmung fähige Persönlichkeit ist". Beide Auffassungen setzen jedoch nach תוספו׳ (B. K. 79 a ד׳ה נתנו לבכורות) voraus, dass der den Auftrag Ausführende von der Gesetzwidrigkeit der Handlung Bewusstsein hat, und wäre demgemäß, wenn jemand in Auftrag eines andern ein fremdes Tier aus einem Stalle holte, in dem Glauben, es gehöre dem Auftraggeber, dieser, der Auftraggeber, ersatzschuldig. (Siehe jedoch ש׳׳ך zu 348 ח׳׳מ, ס׳׳ק ו׳, der die entgegengesetzte Ansicht des נ׳׳י adoptiert.)

Drei Ausnahmen von dieser allgemeinen Regel kennt das Gesetz: שליחות יד ,מעילה, und den Fall unseres Textes: טביחה ומכירה, dass nämlich der Dieb zum fünf- und vierfachen Ersatze auch dann verpflichtet ist, wenn er das Tier durch einen andern hat schlachten lassen, der um den Diebstahl wusste. Allein die Gründe dieser scheinbaren Ausnahmen dürften sich einsehen lassen. Dass, wenn jemand irrtümlich einen andern mit Verwendung einer dem הקדש angehörenden Sache zu profanen Zwecken beauftragt, in dem Momente, wo sein Auftrag durch den andern vollführt wird, er selbst dann der מעילה schuldig wird, wenn sein Bote des Heiligtumscharakters der zu verwendenden Sache bewusst ist — שליח שעשה שליחותו בעל הבית מעל אפי׳ נזכר השליח (Kiduschin 42 b תוספו׳ das.) — dürfte einfach darin liegen, dass der Begriff מעילה ja eben nur irrtümliche Profanierung voraussetzt. Das Bewusstsein und die Absichtlichkeit des Boten hebt ebenso bei ihm den Begriff מעילה auf, wie die Abwesenheit desselben ihn bei dem בעל הבית beruhen lässt, der ja auch, eben weil er in gutem Glauben gehandelt, die Erfüllung seines Auftrages erwarten durfte. Eben darum auch נזכר הב׳׳ב ושגג השליח השליה מעל. — Dass ferner, wenn ein שומר an einem ihm zur Hut anvertrauten Gute שליחות יד ע׳׳י אחר üben lässt, d. h. es durch einen andern auch nur zum augenblicklichen Gebrauche nehmen lässt, sofort der שומר und nicht der andere den Charakter גולך in Beziehung auf dieses Gut erhält und als solcher חייב באונסין, d. h. selbst bei unverschuldetem und unvermeidlichem Zugrundegehen des anvertrauten Gutes, z. B. natürlichem Sterben eines Tieres, zum vollen Ersatz verpflichtet ist, dürfte ebenfalls als völlig motiviert erscheinen, da diese Verpflichtung nur aus dem Charakter שומר, nicht aber einfach aus dem unbefugten Zumgebrauchnehmen eines fremdem Gutes fließt. Ein Nicht-שומר, und das ist ja der andere, wird allerdings durch den bloßen Gebrauch eines fremden Eigentums (שואל שלא מרעת) in Beziehung auf dieses גזלן. Allein wenn er es nur in der Absicht, es zu gebrauchen genommen, es aber sofort wieder an seine Stelle hingelegt, ist er von jeder fernern Verantwortung frei. Der שומר aber wird sofort durch das bloße Nehmen-zum-Gebrauch des anvertrauten Gutes, selbst wenn er diese Absicht gar nicht ausgeführt, sondern es sogleich wieder an gehörige Stelle gelegt, in Beziehung darauf bleibender גזלן und für alles, was auch ferner dem anvertrauten Gute geschehen möge, dem Eigentümer zu vollem Ersatz verpflichtet. Mag er nun das Gut selbst genommen oder einen andern es zu nehmen veranlasst haben, er hat in beiden Fällen in ganz gleicher Weise gegen seine שומר-Pflicht gesündigt und hat die Folgen zu tragen. Er hat ja als שומר ganz eigentlich die Pflicht übernommen, es zu hüten, dass kein anderer sich daran vergreife (siehe zu Kap. 22, 7). — Ganz ebenso ist die Bestimmung, dass, wenn ein Dieb einen gestohlenen Ochsen oder ein gestohlenes Schaf durch einen andern schlachten lässt, dann nicht dieser, sondern der Dieb zum fünf- und vierfachen Ersatz zu verhalten ist, völlig motiviert. Diese Pön resultiert nur aus der Fortsetzung oder Vollendung des Diebstahls (נשתרש בחטא ,שנה בחטא), kann also nur dem auferlegt werden, der den Diebstahl begangen hat.

Diese traditionelle Bestimmung der טביחה ע׳׳י אחר wird (B. K. 71 a) zunächst an der Zusammenstellung des וטבחו und מכרו des Textes gelehrt: מה מכירה ע"י אחר ,sowie Verkauf notwendig durch Mitwirkung eines andern geschieht, אף טביחה ע׳׳י אחר so habe auch das Schlachten die im Texte ausgesprochene Folge, selbst wenn es durch einen andern geschieht". Es wird ferner dort auf das "או", hingewiesen, או לרבות את השליח, וטבחו או מכרו — von andern auf das wiederholte "תחת לרבות את ,"תחת ל תחת השור, תחת השה, השליח. Der Begriff der disjunktiven Partikel או, wo sie nicht eben zur Bezeichnung der Disjunktion notwendig ist, או לחלק, wird häufig als רבוי, als eine Erweiterung des Begriffes gefasst. Wie das Wort או an sich, von אוה, wählen, schon eine "Auswahl", somit eine extensive Erweiterung bezeichnet, so ist ja auch an sich eine jede Disjunktion "oder" ein erweitertes Raumgeben. A "oder" B lässt die auszusprechende Bestimmung nicht auf A allein beschränkt sein, sondern gibt Raum auch dem davon jedenfalls verschiedenen, vielleicht auch ganz gegensätzlichen B. Hier gibt es einem ganzen, formalen und realen Gegensatze Raum, erweitert somit die Anwendung der Bestimmung ישלם über den nackten Begriff וטבחו hinaus auf den ganzen durch מכרו gegebenen Gegensatz. וטבחו an sich ist formal und real in Vergleich zu מכרו beschränkt. Die Handlung geschieht durch den Dieb selbst allein, und der gestohlene Gegenstand selbst wird zum Verbrauch zugerichtet. מכירה ist in beiden Beziehungen ein Gegensatz. Der Gegenstand wird gegen einen andern vertauscht und die Handlung geschieht unter Mitwirkung eines andern. Es bleibt also in beiden Beziehungen die Bestimmung nicht auf das real und formal durch טבחו allein Gegebene beschränkt, und die formale Erweiterung des או, auf וטבחו übertragen, ist buchstäblich: לרבות את השליה. — Ebenso die Wiederholung des "תחת": Indem damit die vervielfachte Zahlung wiederholt als auf das gestohlene, geschlachtete oder verkaufte Objekt bezogen wird, so wird damit die subjektive Art des an ihm Geschehenen in den Hintergrund gestellt. Es genügt, dass es, nachdem es gestohlen, auch noch geschlachtet oder verkauft worden. Wie diese beiden letzteren Handlungen, aus welchen die erhöhte Pön resultiert, geschehen, ob unmittelbar oder mittelbar, ist gleichgültig, und: תחת לרבות את השליה. (Vergl. oben: . (לרבות שוגג כמזיד וכו׳ :פצע תחת פצע

Unter טביחה wird immer שחיטה, eine die gesetzliche Genusserlaubnis bedingende Tötungsart verstanden (siehe B. K. 78 b).

And that is that He commanded us to redeem the firstborn man, that we should give the money to the priest. And that is His saying, "you shall give me your firstborn sons" (Exodus 22:28). And He explained to us how this giving should be: And it is that we redeem him from the priest; and it is as if [the priest] already acquired him, and we purchase him from him for five sela - and that is His saying, "but surely redeem the firstborn man" (Numbers 18:15). And this commandment is the commandment of redeeming the son. And women are not obligated in it - indeed it is one of the commandments of the son that is upon the father, as it is explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 29a). And all of the laws of this commandment have already been explained in Bekhorot. However Levites are not obligated in it. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Firstlings.)