민수기 30:18의 주석

ויאמר משה אל בני ישראל AND MOSES TOLD THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL — This is stated to separate this subject (of sacrifies) from the following (vows). Such is the opinion of R. Ishmael. What it means is: since up to now we have the words of the Omnipresent to Moses (Numbers 28:1—2: “And the Lord said to Moses, ‘Command the children of Israel, etc.’ ”) and the chapter about vows that follows begins with an utterance of Moses (“And Moses spake”), it is necessary first to make a break by stating that Moses in turn told this section to Israel (“And Moses told etc.”), for if this were not done it would imply that he did not tell them this section about the sacrifices, but began his address with the chapter about vows (Sifrei Bamidbar 152).

AND MOSES TOLD THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL [ACCORDING TO ALL THAT THE ETERNAL COMMANDED MOSES]. “‘This is [stated] in order to separate the subject [of the offerings from that of the following chapter, dealing with vows and oaths].’ These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. [The meaning thereof is as follows:] Since up till this point [we have] the words of G-d [to Moses],²¹⁹See above, 28:1: And the Eternal spoke unto Moses, saying … and the [following] section of vows begins with the statement of Moses,²²⁰Further, Verse 2: And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes … it was necessary to separate the subject [of the offerings] by stating that Moses repeated it and told this section to Israel; for if this were not stated, one might have thought that he did not tell them this [section dealing with the offerings], but began his words with the section of vows.” These are the words of Rashi. But I do not understand them, for [we find] similarly that it says — at the end of the section [dealing with] blemishes [in priests], And Moses spoke unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel;²²¹Leviticus 21:24. and it says at the end of the section of the festivals, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal²²²Ibid., 23:44. [and in both these cases the subsequent chapters also begin with G-d’s utterance to Moses; so why was it necessary, according to Rashi, to separate here the sections by saying that Moses declared those laws to the children of Israel]!
But according to its plain meaning, the verse here comes to say that although this section deals with the laws of the offerings, G-d did not single out Aaron and his sons in connection with it, as in the sections of [the book] “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. Instead Moses said it to all the children of Israel together, according to all that the Eternal commanded Moses, including the laws of refraining from work on the festivals,²²³Above, 28:18, 26. etc. and [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings, the Additional Offerings, the vow-offerings and the freewill offerings, for thus it was told to Moses, Command the children of Israel.²²⁴Ibid., Verse 2. And the reason [for this] is because this commandment applies after they enter the Land, and it is a commandment to all Israel to observe [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings and the Additional Offerings [of the Sabbath and festivals] in their appointed times, and to bring their vow-offerings and freewill offerings. Furthermore, the main intention of the commandment [to offer up offerings] is that these days should be remembered and kept,²²⁵Esther 9:28. and to refrain on them from all servile work [and therefore it was told to all the children of Israel]. Now this section is like the section of the festivals in “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. For it says there at the beginning, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them,²²⁶Leviticus 23:2. and at the end it says, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²²Ibid., 23:44. and here likewise at the beginning [of the section it says], Command the children of Israel, and say unto them²²⁴Ibid., Verse 2. and at the end [in the verse before us] it says, And Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the Eternal commanded. It did not mention [here in this verse that Moses told] “the appointed seasons of the Eternal,” because in this section here other matters are mentioned [as well] which do not apply to “the appointed seasons of the Eternal,” such as the Daily Whole-offerings of weekdays, and the Additional Offerings of the Sabbath and the New Moons.
The interpretation given by Rabbi Yishmael [quoted above by Rashi] is because Scripture never has to say of Moses that he told the children of Israel all that G-d commanded him, [because it is self-understood that he always did so], and it is not usual for the Torah to say so at each and every section. Therefore the Rabbis [similarly] explained²²⁷Torath Kohanim, Emor 3:12. the verse, “And Moses spoke unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel²²¹Leviticus 21:24. — [as implying that] he warned Aaron about his sons [i.e., that Aaron as High Priest should preserve the sanctity of the Sanctuary, and prevent priests with a bodily blemish from performing the Divine Service], and [he warned] the sons concerning the Israelites [that they should prevent the Israelites from entering those parts of the Sanctuary which are forbidden to them], and [he warned] the Israelites about each other” [that they should each prevent the other from violating the sanctity of the Sanctuary]. And in the section of the festivals they explained [the verse, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal]²²²Ibid., 23:44. in many ways. [Thus they said]:²²⁸Ibid., 17:12-13. “This teaches us that Moses used to tell Israel the laws of the Passover on Passover, the laws of Shavuoth [the Festival of Weeks] on Shavuoth, and the laws of Tabernacles on Tabernacles. [It further teaches us that] in the very language that he heard it [from G-d], he told it to Israel. And all the sections [mentioned here] are subject to the same law.²²⁹This means, as explained further, that just as fixing the days of the festivals [through the sanctification of the New Moon] can only be performed by a qualified court (see Vol. II, p. 116) so the adjudication of vows [mentioned in the following section] requires a court of qualified experts. Hence the statement: “All sections [mentioned here — namely the preceding one dealing with the festivals, and the following one treating of vows], are subject to the same law.” Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: It states [and Moses declared unto the children of Israel] the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²²Ibid., 23:44. but the Sabbath of Creation [i.e., the weekly Sabbath] was not said together with them.’²³⁰This means that the Sabbath, unlike the festivals, does not require “sanctification” by the court, since its sanctity is permanent and endures forever, being based on its original sanctification by G-d at the creation of the world (Genesis 2:3). Ben Azai says: It is said, [And Moses declared unto the children of Israel] the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²²Ibid., 23:44. but the section of vows was not said together with them [as will be explained further on]. Rabbi²³¹This is Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, the redactor of the Mishnah. Because of his great status, he is known simply as “Rabbi.” See also Vol. II, p. 349, Note 64. says: What does this verse — And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal²²²Ibid., 23:44. — come to tell us? Since [hitherto] we have only learnt that the Paschal-lamb and the Daily Whole-offering override the Sabbath [i.e., are brought on the Sabbath although they entail doing work which is normally forbidden], because it says about them in its appointed season²³²Above, 9:2 (Paschal-lamb). Ibid., 28:2 (Daily Whole-offering). [which includes even the Sabbath]; but we have not [yet] been taught that [the same applies to] the other public offerings. Therefore Scripture says: These ye shall offer unto the Eternal ‘in your appointed seasons’²³³Above, 29:39. thus indicating that all public offerings mentioned in this section of the Additional Offerings of the festivals, override the Sabbath. [But we still do not know that the sheaf [of new barley brought on the second day of Passover], and the offerings brought with it,²³⁴Leviticus 23:12-13. and the two loaves [brought on the Festival of Shavuoth] and the offerings that come with them²³⁵Ibid., Verses 17-18. [override the Sabbath, since they are not mentioned in this section of the offerings, and hence are not included in the phrase in your appointed seasons.²³³Above, 29:39. But when Scripture says [there], And Moses declared unto the children of Israel ‘the appointed seasons of the Eternal,’²²²Ibid., 23:44. it established ‘an appointed season’ for all [public offerings, so that they all override the Sabbath].” Thus far is the text of the Torath Kohanim.²²⁸Ibid., 17:12-13.
Now it is possible to say that the interpretation of Rabbi Yishmael who said that [the verse before us: And Moses told the children of Israel … is said] in order to separate the subject [of the offerings from that of the vows, as Rashi mentioned], is identical with that of Ben Azai, who said: “It says the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²²Ibid., 23:44. but the section of vows was not said together with them,” meaning that the law of the festivals is not like the law of the section of vows, which was told to the heads of the tribes²³⁶Further, 30:2. in order to say that a single person who is expert [in the laws] can release a vow, and so can three ordinary people, for the festivals require the sanctification [of the New Moon] by a court of [at least] three experts, as is explained in [Tractate] Baba Bathra.²³⁷Baba Bathra 121a. Ben Azai thus derived this distinction between them [the festivals and vows] from the limiting phrase: [And Moses declared] the appointed seasons of the Eternal, and Rabbi Yishmael derived this [same] principle from the [apparent] redundancy of this verse [before us], and [hence he explained] that it only comes to separate the subject of the festivals from that of the vows. Thus both of them [Ben Azai and Rabbi Yishmael] are saying the same thing, differing only as to the text from which this law is derived.
The correct interpretation [of the words of Rabbi Yishmael who said that our verse comes only to separate the subjects] appears to me to be that he only intended to say [as follows]: Had He finished the section [here] of the festivals with [the verse]: These ye shall offer unto the Eternal in your appointed seasons,²³³Above, 29:39. and begun [immediately with the verse] And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel, saying: This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded,²³⁶Further, 30:2. it would have been possible [to explain] that the verse refers to the previous [subject], meaning that Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes: “This is the thing which G-d commanded concerning the Daily Whole-offerings and the Additional Offerings” mentioned [previously], and the phrase unto the heads of the tribes would not be interpreted as referring to the following section of the vows. Therefore He divided [the subjects] and finished the section of the festivals [with the verse before us], And Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the Eternal commanded Moses, and then began the section of vows [with the statement] that Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes, This is the thing that the Eternal hath commanded.²³⁶Further, 30:2. This is the truth, for such is the explanation of [the expression] “to separate the subject” in many places in the Sifra and Sifre. And Rashi himself has already mentioned²³⁸Further, 31:17. what the Rabbis have said in the Sifre:²³⁹Sifre, Matoth 157. “[Now therefore kill every male among the little ones,] ‘and kill’ [every woman that hath known man by lying with him].²³⁸Further, 31:17. Why is [the expression]and kill used [since it has already been said once at the beginning of the verse]? It is to separate the subject. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. For if I were to read [the verse without the repetition of the expression ‘and kill,’ namely]: ‘Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and every woman that hath known man by lying with him. And all the women-children … [keep alive], I would not know what the verse is saying [about the women who have known man by lying with him — whether they are to be killed together with every male mentioned in the beginning of the verse, or to be kept alive together with all the women-children mentioned in the following verse]. Therefore it says [again], and kill, in order to separate the subject [from the following verse].’ These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael.” Similarly we find [such a usage of the expression “to separate the subject”] in other places in the Torath Kohanim [i.e., the Sifra].
Matoth

ככל אשר צוה ה׳ את משה in accordance with all that G'd commanded Moses. The Torah did not content itself with writing אותו, "him," but wrote instead את משה, although the word "him" would have been quite unmistakable. The reason is that we deal with an independent statement by the Torah, i.e. a testimony by the Torah that what Moses conveyed to the people was exactly what G'd had commanded him to convey. It was not merely what Moses thought that G'd had commanded him to convey.

ויאמר משה אל בני ישראל, “Moses said to the Children of Israel, etc.” Rashi, basing himself on Rabbi Yishmael in the Sifri, justifies this verse by stating that whereas up until now the Torah had reported the words of G’d to Israel, the legislation introduced about vows could prove confusing as the pronoun endings in the words לבד מנדריכם, “except for your vows, etc.” in verse 29,39 could have been misunderstood in that Moses did not teach the legislation about the offerings on the festivals until each festival was about to occur. By making an interval before the legislation about vows in chapter thirty, it becomes clear that what was written before had already been revealed to the people by Moses. Nachmanides comments that he does not understand what Rashi had in mind. He quotes Leviticus 21,24 where at the conclusion of the chapter dealing with physical blemishes which disqualify a priest from offering sacrifices in the Temple, there is a similar verse to that we find here although one could not possibly justify that verse by the type of the reader’s confusion cited by Rabbi Yishmael in the Sifri, the subject at the beginning of chapter 22 being one that is totally different from that just concluded. Moreover, at the end of Leviticus, when Moses had concluded the legislation about the festivals, [excluding the sacrificial service on those days, Ed.] the Torah also inserts a verse signaling this conclusion when writing וידבר משה את מועדי ה' אל בני ישראל, “Moses informed the Children of Israel of the festivals of Hashem” (Leviticus 23,44). The subject matter commencing with chapter 24 there also does not allow for any confusion with what preceded it, and yet the Torah saw fit to insert an apparently superfluous verse. According to the plain meaning of the text, we have to understand that although in the most recently concluded chapter the role of Aaron and his sons, [the role of the priests, generally, Ed,] had not been spelled out, as opposed to the legislation about the festivals in the requisite chapters in Leviticus, and the words of Moses are reported as addressed “only” to “the Children of Israel,” this must not be misunderstood. Once the Children of Israel would take up residence in the Holy Land, some of them hundreds of kilometers from Jerusalem, they might think that the whole subject of sacrificial service on the festivals is one reserved for the priests. By stressing that Moses addressed the Children of Israel, ignoring the priests as people who are different, the Torah reminded the people at large that all of them had a vital role to play in making these festivals meaningful, the duty for the males to make a pilgrimage being only one part of this. Not only this, Moses did not even repeat the term מועדי ה'', “Hashem’s festivals,” which had been used so prominently in the relevant chapters in Leviticus. All of this was designed to impress the people that the legislation was relevant in the highest degree to the entire nation, to all its members. As to the Sifri, i.e. the Midrash of Rabbi Yishmael quoted by Rashi, the meaning of the word להפסיק, to establish a break in continuity, is that contrary to the principle of establishing conceptual linkages, based on two subjects in the Torah being written one adjoining the other, here we are not to apply the principle of דורשים סמוכים, of trying to make halachic parallels between such subjects. Personally, (Nachmanides speaking) what Rabbi Yishmael had in mind was that if the Torah had concluded the previous section with the line אלה תעשו לה' במועדיכם, (29,39) and had immediately commenced with וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות זה הדבר וגו', “Moses spoke to the heads of the various tribes: this is the thing that Hashem has commanded, etc.,” we would have construed the next chapter as being a continuation of the previous chapter, and would have assumed that the entire legislation about the public offerings to be presented in the Temple on the various festivals had been relayed by Moses to the heads of the tribes, for them in turn to relay it to the individual members of each tribe, instead of our knowing that the entire legislation had been communicated by Moses directly to the whole people.

Because up until this point we have the words of the Omnipresent. Rashi is answering the question: It is obvious that he said [over] all that Hashem had commanded him! Furthermore, in the entire Torah it mentions the command alone, so why here does it mention the command and also Moshe’s words to Yisroel? He answers that “because…”

Kap. 30. V. 1. ויאמר משה. Die Anordnung der Festopfer ist das letzte Kapitel des eigentlichen Gesetzes. Ihm folgt nur noch פרשת נדרים, das Kapitel über Gelübde, dessen Inhalt ja die freiwillige Gesetzgebung, d. i. die Sanktion und die Begrenzung solcher unsere Willenstätigkeit normierenden Bestimmungen bildet, die nicht Gott, sondern die wir uns selbst festgestellt, ein Kapitel, dessen Prinzipien ja die Basis auch jener statutarischen Bestimmungen und Gewohnheitsrechte, תקנות und מנהגים bilden, die, aus den Vereinbarungen und dem praktischen Gesamtleben der Gemeinde hervorgegangen, die Verwirklichung der göttlichen Gesetze nach Eigentümlichkeit lokaler Verhältnisse regeln und sicher stellen. Wir glauben daher, in dem ויאמר משה אל בני ישראל ככל אשר צוה ד׳ את משה einen auf die ganze Gesetzgebung zurückblickenden Schlusssatz zu erkennen. Es kommt, wenn wir nicht irren, ein Bericht darüber, dass Mosche ein gewordenes spezielles Gesetz dem Volke mitgeteilt, in dieser Fassung: ויאמר וגו׳ ככל וגו׳ nicht weiter vor. Charakteristisch ist ויאמר, das ja in der Regel Erläuterung eines bereits Bekannten bezeichnet, namentlich aber der Ausdruck: ככל, wodurch die Mitteilung über den bloßen Gesetzesausspruch hinausgeht und auch das "Wie", die Modalitäten umfasst, wie der Ausspruch verstanden und aufgefasst werden will. Ein Ausdruck, der daher sonst nur in dem Bericht über die Ausführung eines Gesetzes vorkommt, ויעשו בני ישראל ככל אשר צוה ד׳ את משה כן עשו (Kap. 1, 54 und sonst häufig), wo es eben sagen will, dass sie nicht nur das Gebotene im allgemeinen, sondern auch so, in allen Einzelheiten zur Erfüllung gebracht, wie es erfüllt sein wollte. Wörtlich heißt daher der Satz: Mosche erläuterte Israels Söhnen das "Wie" alles dessen, welches Gott Mosche geboten hatte. Es sagt dies zum Schlusse der ganzen bisherigen Gesetzgebung, dass dem Volke nicht nur die kurzgefassten Sätze mitgeteilt worden, in welchen das Gesetz hier schriftlich vorliegt, sondern, dass ihnen Mosche jedes Gesetz erläutert in der ganzen Modalität seines Inhalts zum Bewusstsein brachte. Nur noch einmal, soweit wir glauben, kommt dieser Ausdruck: בכל bei Mitteilung des Gesetzes vor (Dewarim 1, 4): ויהי וגו׳ דבר משה אל בני ישראל ככל אשר צוה ד׳ אתו אליהם und auch dort bezieht er sich offenbar auf die ganze Gesetzgebung, die Mosche vor seinem Tode nicht nur in kurzen Sätzen, sondern mit dem ganzen "Wie" des Inhalts nochmals (דבר) zum Ausspruch brachte. Es war bereits בדבור und באמירה, kurzgefasst und ausführlich erläutert, dem Volke tradiert. Beides wurde jetzt "repetiert".

ראשי המטות [AND MOSES SPAKE TO] THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL] — This does not mean that he spoke only to the princes of the children of Israel and not to the people also, but that he showed respect to the princes by teaching them first and that afterwards he taught the children of Israel. This explanation seems to assume that this was the general method of instruction, but from what Biblical verse may we infer that this was so in the case of all addresses, and that this was no exceptional case? Because it says, (Exodus 34:31—32) “[And Moses called unto them], and Aaron and all the princes of the congregation returned unto him and Moses spake unto them; and afterwards all the children of Israel came nigh, [and he gave them all the commandments which the Lord had spoken to him in Mount Sinai]”. But if this be no exceptional case, what reason is there for Scripture going out of its way to state it here? Because by specially stating that the laws about vows were taught in the first instance to the princes and afterwards to the Israelites, it intends to teach that the annulling of vows is really to be effected by one person who is expert in the Law, and that only if there be no such expert, may they be annulled by three ordinary persons. But you may perhaps say that the statement does mean that Moses spoke this section only to the princes of the children of Israel, and that Moses did not speak to them also, and that consequently nothing about the expert and laymen can be inferred! But it is stated here, “This is the word”, and it is stated in the passage dealing with “animals slaughtered outside the sanctuary” (Leviticus 17:2) “This is the word”. What is the case there? It was addressed to Aaron and to his sons and to all the children of Israel, as it is said there, “Speak unto Aaron [and unto his sons and unto all the children of Israel]”! So, too, this was addressed to all of them (and the reason why it is stated here is to tell us that the annulling of vows etc., as above) (cf. Sifrei Bamidbar 153:1; Nedarim 78a).

AND MOSES SPOKE UNTO THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES. Scripture did not precede this section with [the statement]: “And the Eternal spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the heads of the tribes, and say unto them: This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded,” as He stated in the section [dealing with] slaughtering [offerings] outside the Sanctuary Court,¹Leviticus 17:2. and in other sections. Instead, He mentioned it as the end of this section, saying, These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses.²Further, Verse 17. And in the section of Vayehi Bayom Ha’shemini³Leviticus 9:1. it says: And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal commanded that ye should do,’⁴Ibid., Verse 6. See also Ramban ibid. Verse 2. but did not mention the [actual] command [given by G-d to Moses] at all. Similarly, in the section about the manna [it is said], And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded: Let an omerful of it be kept etc.’⁵Exodus 16:32. [although the Divine command about it to Moses is not expressly stated].
Now the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel are the princes of the standards, whom the tribes had appointed over their standards after Nachshon the son of Amminadab [prince of the children of Judah]⁶Above, 2:3. and his colleagues had died. It is possible that they [the heads of the tribes referred to here] were those who are mentioned in the section [dealing with] the inheritance [of the Land]: These are the names of the men that shall take possession of the Land for you;⁷Further, 34:17. or it may be that those [referred to here] were others, for there Scripture speaks about [the leaders of] the future [saying] that when they come to divide up the Land [in the time of Joshua] all those mentioned will be living, and they will represent them [in the apportionment of the Land].
And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes. The reason [why he did not address this section to the entire people] is because it was not necessary to teach all the children of Israel that the father and husband [of a woman] can declare void those vows [of their daughter or wife, respectively] which involve affliction of the soul, and perhaps it is [even] necessary to conceal these [rights] from them, so that they should not treat vows lightly. But it was to the Sages of Israel, the heads of their tribes, that he taught the ordinance [of vows]. The verse also alludes to the interpretation of our Rabbis⁸Nedarim 78a. [who said] that the heads of the tribes have a special function and power in vows over and above the rest of the people, namely, that a single person who is an expert in the laws can release a person from a vow [and therefore, this section was addressed to the heads of the tribes, i.e., the Sages].
Now the [power of] release from vows [by a Sage] is not expressly stated in the Torah, but it is a law declared to Moses on Sinai, and Scripture “hung it on a hair’s-breadth,” just as the Rabbis have said:⁹Chagigah 10a. Now although these rules concerning the release from vows by a Sage “have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based,” they are yet on an absolute par with those laws which do have support in Scripture, as “they are all the essentials of the Torah” (ibid., 11b). “[The rules concerning] the release from vows [by a Sage] hover in the air, and have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based.” But Scripture did allude to it [by saying]: ‘lo yacheil’ (he shall not profane) his word.¹⁰Verse 3. For it did not say: “he shall not transgress his word.” but commanded that he should not make “profane” his word, meaning that he should not treat the vow as a hollow [and irreverent] thing; and when he comes to the court and they find him a cause for absolution¹¹Thus, for example, if a man vows or swears that he will divorce his wife, the court may say to him: “Had you known that people would say about you: ‘Such is the nature of this person to divorce his wife,’ and that they will say about your daughters: ‘They are the daughters of a divorced woman! What did her mother do that she was divorced?’ [Had you known all this], would you then have made your vow?” If he says, “Had I known this I would not have made my vow,” they may release him from his vow (Nedarim 66a). See also Note 44 further on. and he regrets [having made the vow], and they release him thereof, he is not profaning it.⁹Chagigah 10a. Now although these rules concerning the release from vows by a Sage “have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based,” they are yet on an absolute par with those laws which do have support in Scripture, as “they are all the essentials of the Torah” (ibid., 11b). And the reason for this [law being indicated in this manner of allusion] is as I have said [above], that Scripture treated absolution from a vow or oath as if it were one of the secrets of the Torah which are only to be revealed to those who are fit to [hear] them, and therefore they are written [in the Torah] in allusion. And this section [of vows] is placed here [in the Torah] because since [in the section above] He mentioned vows to the Sanctuary, [as it is said], beside your vows, and your freewill offerings, whether they be your burnt-offerings, or your meal-offerings, or your drink-offerings, or your peace-offerings,¹²Above, 29:39. therefore He said furthermore: “Apart from these above-mentioned vows, there are also vows of a secular nature. [In the case of these vows, too], according to all that proceedeth out of a man’s mouth¹⁰Verse 3. he is obliged to fulfill, and to do all with which he bound his soul; for in [the case of] all vows [whether of a holy or secular nature] he shall not profane his word,¹⁰Verse 3. but others may absolve it for him” [by finding him a cause for absolution, as explained above].

'וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות....זה הדבר אשר צוה ה, G’d had commanded the basic legislation at Mount Sinai when He had said (Leviticus 19,12) ולא תשבעו בשמי לשקר וחללת וגו' “do not render a false oath in My name and thereby desecrate it.” The plain meaning of that verse had not been that you must not deliberately swear falsely, but that having sworn you must honour your oath in all its details. A woman who is married and therefore subject to restrictions imposed upon her by the authority of her husband, is not considered as having desecrated G’d’s name when violating her vows or oath on that account, provided her husband had declared her vow void.

אל ראשי המטות, to the leaders of the tribes, etc. What is so different about this commandment that Moses assembled the chiefs of the tribes to inform them of it and that they in turn were to tell the Israelites? Sifri claims that seeing in Numbers 10,3 in connection with the trumpets the congregation was mentioned before the leaders, and Moses was afraid that this would be misinterpreted to mean that the congregation at large took precedence over the princes, he made sure in 10,4 that the princes were referred to as the heads of the congregation. Moses did something similar here when he addressed the heads of the tribes first. In Nedarim 78 we are told that the reason the heads of the tribes are mentioned here was to hint that vows may be dissolved by a lone judge if he is an expert in the subject. All these comments are strictly allegorical. We need to understand also why the Torah writes המטות לבני ישראל. All Moses had to say was מטות בני ישראל. What is the reason for the extra letter ל? We must assume that the reason for the extra letter is to avoid a misunderstanding. Had the Torah not written לבני ישראל, we might have thought that the legislation was aimed only at the leaders of the people. By writing the extra letter ל, the Torah ensured that we would understand the legislation as applying to the leaders of the people as well as to the nation at large. The absence of the letter ו in front of לבני ישראל is not significant as the Torah has omitted that letter on frequent occasions where we would have expected it such as in Exodus 1,2 ראובן, שמעון, etc.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות, I was asked by people in some town in France, Anyon, where else we find a portion commencing with the words וידבר משה, without being told first that G’d had told Moses to deliver the message or legislation in question to the people. My answer to the question was that we had read in Numbers 29,39 אלה תעשו לה' במועדיכם לבד מנדריכם ומנדבותיכם, “These you are to present to the Lord,” i.e. sacrifices which you have to present on one of the three pilgrimage festivals, seeing that everyone who is tardy is guilty of a serious misdemeanour, as we know from Rosh Hashanah 4. It was no more than natural that after he heard this Moses went and told the heads of the tribes, the judges all the details pertaining to all kinds of vows, including those between husband and wife, etc.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות, Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes, etc.” Nachmanides writes that seeing previously the Torah had written: “excepting your various offerings in fulfillment of vows, etc.,” (29,39), and those vows had involved only vows made to G’d, not personal vows made to oneself as in the chapter commencing here, the Torah now reminds the people that any utterance made by a human being in the form of a vow or oath, (or even without such a specific formulation) he must honour. [There is no such concept as “this is between me and myself, no one else’s concern.” Ed.] Other commentators see in the fact that the following legislation was addressed in the first instance to the heads of the tribes, i.e. judicial heads, a hint that if someone refuses to honour vows he has made or oaths he has sworn, he is being punished physically until he recants his refusal and agrees to honour the vow in question. Nachmanides writes further that seeing that contrary to common practice, this chapter has not been prefaced by the introductory line “G’d spoke to Moses telling him to say to the Israelites,” or something similar, the Torah makes up for this omission at the end of the chapter (verse 17) by stating that “these are the statutes that G’d had commanded Moses, etc.”

By teaching them first. Rashi is answering the question: Why is it written, “To the tribal leaders”? One cannot say this passage was only said to the tribal leaders, and not to all of Israel. For here it states, “This is the word” in order to learn a gezeirah shavah [scriptural comparison] as Rashi explains shortly, to teach that this passage was said to all of Israel. If so, why is it written, “To the tribal leaders”? Rashi answers that it is to “bestow honor…” Accordingly the meaning of “To the tribal leaders of Bnei Yisroel” is “[To the tribal leaders] and to Bnei Yisroel.” Re’m. We cannot say that perhaps the verse means “To the tribal leaders of Bnei Yisroel” because if so, why would it have been necessary to write “of Bnei Yisroel” given that it would have been sufficient to just say “To the tribal leaders, saying…” Rather, one must say that it was informing us of the order of teaching, as Re’m explained and as Rashi will explain shortly. Alternatively, Rashi is answering another question: Why did the verse write ראשי המטות לבני ישראל [lit. "to the tribal leaders, to Bnei Yisroel"] when it should have said אל ראשי מטות בני ישראל ["to the tribal leaders of Bnei Yisroel"]? Rather, since the verse was written in this way one must say that “tribal leaders” is considered a construct, meaning that the word “tribal” is a construct with the word “leaders.” Consequently the word “Yisroel” is distinct, not a construct with the word “tribal,” rather it is an independent word. Thus one is obliged to explain as follows: Initially Moshe said this to the tribal leaders and afterwards to Bnei Yisroel, and it is as if it had written “and to Bnei Yisroel.” This was the honor bestowed upon them, that he taught them first and afterwards the Bnei Yisroel. Accordingly it is also understandable why the Torah did not write, “Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: Speak to Bnei Yisroel: If a man makes [a vow]…” Rather the verse must be coming to inform us of the order of teaching, writing “Moshe spoke” as if to say, “This was [the order] of Moshe’s speech to Yisroel.” This is the essence of Rashi’s explanation according to Toras Kohanim, however in Gemara Nedarim (78a) it is expounded differently.

V. 2. וידבר משה וגו׳. Dies war jedoch ein neuer Ausspruch. Er eröffnet das Gebiet der, wie wir es nannten, freiwilligen Gesetzgebung, und ist daher gleichsam als Anhang zur eigentlichen Gesetzgebung gegeben, deren Erfüllung und Ausführung im Grunde das Motiv zur Sanktion dieser freiwilligen Gesetzgebung bildet. Es soll damit dem einzelnen wie den Gesamtheiten und der Gesamtheit der Nation die Möglichkeit eröffnet werden, sich dauernde Normen für eine pflichtgetreue Ausführung des Gesetzes festzustellen. Nicht ohne Grund ist daher wohl dieses Gesetzkapitel ganz besonders an die נשיאים gerichtet, die bedeutsam ראשי המטות genannt werden. Wir haben bereits zu Kap. 1 erläutert, wie מטה den Stamm als "Zweig" des großen Ganzen begreift, innerhalb dessen die einheitliche Gesamtaufgabe nach seiner besonderen Eigentümlichkeit zur Verwirklichung kommen soll. Aufgabe der ראשי המטות war es, die aus den Eigentümlichkeiten eines jeden "Zweiges" hervorgehenden Sitten und Gewohnheiten, sowie die gemeinsamen Bestimmungen, Tätigkeiten und Bestrebungen, nach den eigentümlichen Besonderheiten eines jeden "Zweiges" in eine der Gesamtaufgabe förderliche Richtung zu leiten und darin zu erhalten. Das unumgängliche Mittel zu einer solchen Wirksamkeit, zu einer Gesamtheitsentwicklung, zu einem Gemeindeleben überhaupt, ist die Unverbrüchlichkeit selbstgefasster Feststellungen, die Unverbrüchlichkeit des gelobenden Wortes, das לא יחל דברו, welches den Inhalt der folgenden Bestimmungen bildet. Gleichzeitig ist das heilsame Korrektiv solcher gelobenden Feststellungen, wie dies zum folgenden Verse zur Darstellung kommt, היתר נדרים, ebenfalls den ראשי המטות, gleichsam einem Familien- und Gewissensrate aus dem Volke anvertraut, und auch mit Hinblick hierauf das Gesetz über Gelobungen an die ראשי המטות zunächst gerichtet.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות וגו'...זה הדבר אשר צוה ה,“Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of Israel....this is what the Lord has commanded.” When Rabbi Sh’muel son of Meir, a grandson of Rashi, was asked where we can find that the legislation concerning vows was commanded to Moses, he directed the questioner to what has been written in the Torah immediately prior to our portion, namely: “these are the rules concerning the festivals for the Lord, apart from your vows, etc. “(Numbers, 29 39) The reference is to free willed vows and free will offerings, etc. There is also another category of vows, which is discussed in the Torah. Our verse refers to the chapter 28 in Numbers which commences with rules concerning sacrificial offerings.

אל ראשי המטות, “to the leaders of the tribes;” It would be their task to enforce this law. An alternate interpretation by Ibn Ezra: this paragraph was revealed to the people after the punitive expedition against Midian, seeing that these verses are continuous until the end of verse three. Rashi claims that the manner in which Moses ensured that the respective legislation reached the people was the same as in this instance, and he proves it from Exodus 34,3132 where the Torah wrote: 'וישובו אליו אהרן וגו, “and all of them returned to Moses, i.e. Aaron, the princes, etc.”This particular verse was spoken by Moses when he had just descended from Mount Sinai on the Day of Atonement equipped with all the commandments. Rashi adds here that the reason this formula has been used here by the Torah especially, is in order to teach that annulling vows can only be done by a judge authorised to do so, or in the absence of such by three laymen. This law has a unique feature in that a single judge, if an expert in that legislation is empowered to do so. The reference to the leaders of the tribes shows that such individuals possess special powers, whereas the words: “and to the Children of Israel,” mean that three laymen can accomplish the same as an expert without a colleague. This is stated in the Talmud tractate Nedarim folio 78, where Rav Acha says that the words: “Aaron, his sons, and the Children of Israel,” teach that an ad hoc court of three laymen can perform this task. If so, why does the Torah stress that this legislation be revealed foremost to the heads of the tribes, suggesting that these are people of superior knowledge? This suggests the opposite, i.e. that laymen are excluded!? Rabbi Chisda states that this is to teach that when an individual is indeed an expert in the legalese required, he can act independently.

זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD — Moses prophesied with the words (introduced his message by the statement), “Thus saith the Lord, About midnight [will I go into the midst of Egypt]” (Exodus 11:4), and other prophets also prophesied with “Thus saith the Lord”, Moses, however, had an additional superiority in that he prophesied also with the expression “This is the actual word [that God hath spoken]” (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:2). Another explanation of זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD: it is a restrictive phrase serving to intimate that the Sage (the expert) makes use of the expression “invalidating” (התרה), and the husband (dealing with his wife’s vows), only of the expression “annulling” (הפרה), as is the language of Scripture here (e. g., in v. 9), and that if they (one of them) exchanges the expression, it (the vow) is not invalidated nor is it annulled as the case may be (Nedarim 78a).

The words איש כי ידור נדר, refer to a person vowing to bring a voluntary sacrifice, just as the words או השבע שבועה mean that he phrases this vow in a negative manner. When the Torah adds that such a person must not יחל his word, the meaning is that he must not be late in fulfilling his vow else he is considered as having broken his promise, i.e. delay carrying out his word, his promise. He has only until (according to one view) the next pilgrimage festival to come to Jerusalem and make good on his vow. Seeing that at that time he must come to Jerusalem at any event, this does not impose any kind of hardship on him. The expression יחל in the sense of delaying, procrastinating, occurs several times in Scripture, for instance in Judges 3,25 ויחל עד בוש, “he waited an embarrassingly long time.” Or, in Genesis 8,10 ויחל עוד שבעת ימים, we read that Noach waited another seven days before sending out the dove again. In Psalms 130,7 David speaks of יחל ישראל אל ה', meaning that Israel is to continue to wait for G’d hopefully. Anyone translating the words לא יחל דברו as “he must not profane, dishonour his word,” as the plain meaning of the verse is in error.

ראשי המטות לבני ישראל, “the heads of the tribes of Israel.” These were the ones who replaced the first generation of such princes, carriers of the various banners, who had included such illustrious figures as Nachshon ben Aminadav, who had courageously entered the sea of Reeds before it had been split. It is possible that the men referred to here were the ones mentioned in the chapter dealing with the distribution of the parcels of land in the as yet non-existent State of Israel, (Numbers 34,17-28). Alternately, we may be speaking of different men, seeing that in Numbers 34 the Torah speaks about something that would come to pass later, after Moses had left the scene. Or, the men mentioned in chapter 34 were all alive and well 14 years after Joshua took over and was in a position to make the allocation of most of these lands. The reason why the Torah here uses the unusual formulation of ראשי המטות instead of saying: ”to all the Children of Israel,” is simply that there was no need for all of the Israelites to be taught rules applying to a narrow aspect of the relationship between a wife and her husband or a father with a daughter below twelve and a half years old. The vows discussed here are only those that result in interference with the father’s, or husband’s quality of life, עינוי נפש. Perhaps there was a need at this time to withhold these laws from them so that they would not begin to become negligent concerning the whole subject of vows, knowing that their husbands were able to rescue them from a foolish vow. At any rate, the spiritual leaders of the people could be entrusted with this legislation without it being filtered through the High Priest and the seventy elders first. Mention of the individual leaders of the tribes is also an oblique hint on which the sages later on may have based themselves, when allowing an individual who possesses the necessary expertise to annul such vow, without recourse to a lay court of at least three people. It is a fact that the Torah nowhere spells out a procedure for annulling vows generally, other than the specific vows mentioned here which are subject to annulment only by the father or husband, and only within 24 hours of their becoming aware of them. The whole legislation of annulling vows and how and by whom is הלכה למשה מסיני, a law handed down orally since the time of Moses, something that cannot be arrived at by the use of our logic in interpreting the written Torah. Our sages, in referring to this, describe it as hanging by a thread as thin as a hair on our heads.” (Compare Chagigah 10) Another expression used there is that this entire legislation, its various rules are “flying in thin air.” The “hint” we mentioned, consists of the Torah writing that the party making the vow לא יחל את דברו, “he must not profane his word,” instead of the Torah having written לא יעבור על דברו, “he must not violate his verbal undertaking.” This enabled the sages to save the applicant from violating his vow if he could find an opening, פתח, primarily by establishing that when making the vow the person who made it did not foresee certain circumstances which, if he had foreseen them, he never would have made such a vow in the first place. Seeing that this is so, the Torah did not reveal this legislation to the people at large, else too many people would become irresponsible and make vows lightheartedly.

Why, then, did he see fit to say this here? Meaning that because throughout the entire Torah honor had been bestowed upon the leaders, as it is written, “They returned to him, Aharon [and all the leaders…].” Why was this taught again here?

I have come across a Baraitha in Baba Batra 120 which goes as follows: "I might have thought that Moses said this paragraph only to the princes; to prevent me from thinking this the Torah wrote זה הדבר, 'this is the thing, etc.' We have the same expression in Leviticus 17,2 where the subject is the prohibition to slaughter animals for their meat and eat them unless they had first been offered as sacrifices in the Tabernacle. This legislation applies to all the people as it is is phrased: 'any man who, etc.' We therefore use the expression זה הדבר which appears on both occasions to conclude that the legislation in our paragraph also applies to all the men of Israel." Thus far the Talmud. Granted that the exegesis of this is valid, why did the Torah then have to add the words לבני ישראל, in our verse? Clearly the Baraitha did not understand the words לבני ישראל to mean that the legislation applied to the entire people why else would it have bothered to prove this indirectly by learning the גזרה שוה (similar wording) of זה הדבר in both instances? Moreover, the Talmud in Keritut 5 told us not to treat such a גזרה שוה lightly.

זה הדבר אשר צוה ד: diese eine Verordnung einleitende Formel findet sich zunächst bei Anordnungen zu augenblicklicher Erfüllung, wie beim Manna (Schmot 16, 16 und 32), תרומת המשכן (daselbst 35, 4), מלואים (Wajikra 8, 5 u. 9, 6). Auch die Bestimmung, dass eine Erbtochter nicht außer ihrem Stamme heiraten soll (Kap. 36, 6 bis 8) wird (Baba Batra 120 a), dieser Formel gemäß, als nur für das damalige Geschlecht geltend begriffen. Nur פרשת שחוטי חוץ. (Wajikra 17, 2) ist, obgleich ausdrücklich für ewige Zeiten bestimmt, חקת עולם וגו׳ (V. 7), ebenfalls durch זה הדבר וגו׳ eingeleitet. Erwägen wir, dass eine zur augenblicklichen Erfüllung getroffene Anordnung sofort die ganze Energie der Fassungs- und Willenskraft beansprucht, so dürfte dieselbe Einleitungsformel für zeitlich unbeschränkte Verordnungen nur die Bedeutsamkeit und Wichtigkeit derselben bemerkbar machen. Auch unser Gesetz über Gelobungen, obgleich für alle Zeiten geltend, wie (Baba Batra daselbst) durch גזרה שוה-Hinweisung auf שחוטי חוץ erläutert wird, erhält durch diese Einleitungsformel die ihr nach obigem zukommende Bedeutsamkeit. Durch diese Gleichstellung unseres נדרים-Kapitels mit dem שחוטי חוץ-Gesetze wird (daselbst) die Anrede an ראשי המטות zu der Allgemeinheit von אהרן ובניו וכל ישראל wie bei שחוטי חוץ erweitert und die Handhabung des Gelobungskorrektivs jeden dreien urteilsfähigen Männern aus dem Volke, ג׳ הדיוטות, überwiesen, wenn sie auch sonst nicht zu den Gesetzeskundigen, מומחה, gehören, wie denn nach רמב׳׳ם überhaupt für התרת נדרים der Begriff "מומחה", in dem Satze, dass dafür יחיד מומחה genüge, nicht in der Schärfe סמוך wie für Handhabung des übrigen Gesetzes zu verstehen sei und nicht רב מובהק bedeute, eine Eigentümlichkeit, die ר׳׳ן zu Nedarim 87 b einfach aus dem Begriff ראשי המטות herleitet, der ja nicht richterliche Qualifikation in eminentem Sinne, אלהים, wie bei den übrigen Gesetzen involviere. Alle diese Bestimmungen harmonieren mit unserer Auffassung des נדרים-Kapitels, das, wie wir glauben, als Kapitel über die freiwillige Gesetzgebung und das Gewohnheitsrecht eine von der eigentlichen Gesetzgebung geschiedene und untergeordnete Stellung einnimmt. Es dürfte aber diese Gleichstellung der נדרים- und שחוטי חוץ-Kapitel, aus welcher (ebendaselbst) für letztere auch noch die Übertragung des Gelobungskorrektivs auch auf יש שאלה בהקדש ,נדרי הקדש resultiert, auf einem tieferen inneren Grunde beruhen. Spricht doch schon der Satz der Weisen: הנודר כאלו בנה במה והמקיימו כאלו מקריב עליו קרבן eine solche innere Verwandtschaft aus. Beide, במה und נדר streben die Sanktion eines willkürlichen subjektiven Beliebens außer und neben dem Gesetze an. Die Allgemeinheit, wie eine solche Sanktion in שחוטי חוץ und במה zum Ausdruck kommt, ist absolut verwerflich. Im נדרים-Gesetz erhält jener Subjektivismus nur einen beschränkten und bedingten Raum der Betätigung (siehe Nedarim 22 a ר׳׳ן daselbst).

'זה הדבר אשר צוה ה, “this is the matter that the Lord has commanded:” The Torah did not reveal where G-d commanded the following law to Moses. This is only one of numerous prophetic announcements by Moses where the time and location where Moses received these instructions has not been revealed. Examples quoted by our author are: Exodus 10,3, Exodus 11,4, Exodus 32,27 and his commentary there.

'וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות לבני ישראל לאמור: זה הדבר אשר צוה ה', “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel to say: ‘this is the thing that Lord has said.’” According to the plain meaning of the text the words לבני ישראל mean that the leaders of the tribes are to convey this legislation to the Children of Israel.
However, our sages in Nedarim 78 explained that the dual wording “the heads of the tribes”, followed by “the Children of Israel,” implies that either a single expert or a quorum of three ordinary men are authorized to annul vows under certain conditions. The reason this portion has been recorded immediately after the chapter dealing with the mussaf offerings on the festivals is that at the conclusion of that chapter (verse 39) the Torah had mentioned the vows that are generally brought as gifts to the Lord on most of these festivals when the owner of the animals vowed is in Jerusalem on his pilgrimage. This is also the reason why in our verse the Torah adds אשר צוה ה', “which the Lord has commanded;” the Torah reminds us that apart from vows which are made in honor of Hashem there are also others of a more profane nature; one must fulfill all one’s undertakings regardless whether this is an undertaking (vow) made to G’d or to man. Another reason for these additional words “which the Lord has commanded,” is that just as sanctifying the Holidays requires calendar expertise so dissolving a vow also requires expertise if it is performed by a single individual.

Vows may be annulled by a single expert. When the Sage comes to permit a vow, he removes it retroactively as if there had never been a vow. With this sanction, the vow is annulled as if there had never been one; therefore Rashi uses the term הפרה ["annulment"].

We also need to understand the meaning of the word לאמור? To whom were the Israelites to convey this legislation? If the Torah meant that the heads of the tribes were supposed to convey this legislation to the Israelites the Torah should have written לאמור לבני ישראל, "to tell to the children of Israel!" Furthermore, what precisely did the Torah want to exclude by using the word זה הדבר in verse 2?

By three laymen. [Rashi says this] because “Tribal leaders” implies that there was one leader who could annul the vow, namely the one expert. You might ask: Surely it is written “leaders” in the plural form? The answer is that it speaks of leaders in general, referring to all the tribal leaders. Now, since one expert was required, then three laymen would be needed. [We derive the number as follows:] It is logical that we would need more laymen than experts. However, it is not possible [that we require only] two, given that a court can never be evenly balanced. Thus, we add an additional one, totaling three. We need not ask that perhaps more than three, because if so there would be no end to the matter.

I believe that we can understand our verse after recalling a statement in Chagigah 10. The Talmud says there: "the whole legislation of cancelling vows is like something which flies in the air (i.e. has no firm basis)." If so, we must investigate why the Torah treated this legislation so differently from any other legislation. Every other legislation has been spelled out in the written Torah whereas only this legislation is "left hanging in the air?"

Only to the leaders. And accordingly, לבני ישראל ["of Bnei Yisroel"] would mean for Bnei Yisroel, meaning that he taught the leaders so that they would teach Yisroel, but Moshe did not teach everyone for that would not be necessary here. [One might have thought so] since the annulment of vows requires people appointed over Yisroel, in order to instruct them as to which vows one is unable to annul and which one is able to annul. Therefore, here it would have been sufficient to have the leaders instruct them. Thus, Rashi answers that “here it says…”

I believe the reason is simple. The Torah did not feel comfortable with the thought that it would write outright that vows and oaths undertaken by an Israelite could be cancelled by a judge or even by a team of judges. If the Torah had spelled this out people would conclude that oaths and vows are meaningless as they can be cancelled so easily. The Torah therefore resorted to a clever stratagem by leaving the matter of evaluating a vow with a view to annulling it to the greatest minds of the nation. As far as the average Jew was concerned, the doors to annulment remained closed in order to encourage them to fulfil oral undertakings they had entered into. The operative clauses for keeping one's oral undertakings are: 1) לא יחל דברו, "he must not break his word (from the root 'to profane')," and 2) "he must fulfil what he has undertaken orally." The meter of the verse is as follows: "Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes and outlined the entire legislation to them. But to the rest of the children of Israel he only conveyed the following, i.e. זה הדבר." In other words, the people were to honour vows and oaths and not to fail to observe them; the tribal heads were given information about the instances when annulment might be considered. This then is what the Talmud meant in Chagigah 10 when it characterised this legislation as "flying in the air." This explanation solves all the questions we have raised earlier.

Moshe prophesied… You might ask: “This is the word” was necessary for the gezeirah shavah [scriptural comparison] above, as Rashi explained. The answer is that here one cannot question the gezeirah shavah, therefore it does not need to be superfluous [and one can also expound the simple meaning].

Another approach to our paragraph could be this: Moses told the heads of the tribes this whole legislation. He told the Israelites at large to honour their oral undertakings and to turn to the tribal heads in the event they had some problem in fulfilling their vows. The latter would then inform them if their specific vows could be annulled or not.

With the phrase “this is the word.” This is an additional distinction, for “This is the word” implies that it is the word itself, which was clearly heard from Hashem in what is termed a “clear vision.” This was not so for the other prophets, as Hashem spoke to them only in riddles or through dreams, termed as “unclear visions.” But to Moshe He spoke “the word” itself, so that he could tell it to Bnei Yisroel. Likewise, it states (Bamidbar 12:8), “Mouth to mouth I speak to him, in vision and not in riddles.” [One might ask what was meant] when Moshe prophesied with the words “So says Hashem” as it is written in Parshas Va’eira (Shemos 8:26) and in Parshas Bo (Shemos 10:3). The answer is that before he stood on Mount Sinai he would prophesize with “So [says Hashem]” however after the Torah was given he prophesied with “This is the word [of Hashem],” once his face began to emit beams of light.

Having read all this you may wonder why our sages had to bother with exegetical methods such as a גזרה שוה, seeing the Torah did write the words: "to the children of Israel?" The answer is that the גזרה שוה really was not needed except to tell us that Moses personally said these things to Israel. As to the announcement of the legislation itself, no גזרה שוה was needed. This is what the sages meant with the statement "I could have thought that Moses personally related this legislation only to the heads of the tribes. To prevent me from erring, etc, etc." The sages were careful not to say: "I could have thought the legislation was not given except to the heads of the tribes."

Another interpretation: “This is the word” is exclusionary. According to the first explanation, there is the difficulty of why it did not say this for all of the mitzvos. Therefore Rashi explains that “this is the word…” However, one cannot say that it was only said for this [second] reason, for if so why did the Torah say, “The word that Hashem commanded…”? It should have said explicitly what is excluded. Therefore, the first reason is also necessary.

Another possible reason why the גזרה שוה was needed may be that without it I would have understood the words לבני ישראל as a continuation of the words אל ראשי המטות, as if the Torah had written: "Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel." The גזרה שוה of זה הדבר ensures that we understand the words לבני ישראל correctly. Do not ask that we ourselves have explained the word זה as restrictive, telling us that only part of the legislation was revealed directly to the Israelites. The exegesis of the גזרה שוה is not based on the common word זה, but on the common word הדבר which is not restrictive. Our exegesis is based on the word זה alone.

The Sage with the term “release” and the husband with the term “nullification.” The Sage only releases [the vow] when there is regret, therefore the term “release” is suitable. However the husband nullifies without regret and without providing any reason, thus the term “nullification” is appropriate.

A moral/ethical approach would read together the words לאמור זה הדבר; this would reflect a teaching by Bamidbar Rabbah 22,1 where we are exhorted to be very circumspect with keeping vows and oaths. King Yannai owned two thousand asses and they all perished on account of a true oath [but an unnecessary one. Ed.] The example quoted in the Midrash has someone swear to his friend that he would consume a certain amount of food and drink in a certain place. Both parties went to that place and the one who had sworn the oath consumed the requisite amount of food and drink. A short while later all his asses perished. The moral lesson to be derived from this is that if G'd is so particular about a true but needless oath which a person swears, how much more particular will He be if someone perjures himself! In our paragraph the Torah goes on record that there are certain vows and oaths that G'd commands people to swear, i.e. לאמור זה הדבר, "to utter this word." לבני ישראל לאמור. According to Sanhedrin 56 the word לאמור is a reference to גלוי עריות, unchaste behaviour, illicit sex. [based on Jeremiah 3,1: לאמור הן ישלח איש את אשתו והלכה מאתו והיתה לאיש אחר, הישוב אליה עוד? הלא חנוף תחנף הארץ ההיא. "To say: 'if a man divorces his wife and she leaves him and marries another man, can he ever go back to her? Would not such a land be defiled?'" The unusual position of the word לאמור at the beginning of this verse leads to interpreting it as a "verbal under-taking" such as in marriage Ed.] In verse three the Torah uses the word איש to hint that "a man" who is able to control his carnal urges should employ the legislation of making vows to help him resist the evil urge to sleep with people forbidden to him. In other words, the vow entered into by a Nazirite who wants to reinforce his resolution to resist sexual temptation, is acceptable to G'd. We have a number of Midrashim discussing situations when Biblical personalities needed to reinforce their resolution to resist such temptation. (Ruth 3,13, Vayikra Rabbah 23,11, Psalms 119,106 "I have sworn an oath to keep Your just rules.")

Following the Scriptural language here. For it is written (v. 3) “If a man makes a vow…to initiate a prohibition himself, he may not profane his word” which implies that he may not profane his word, however another [i.e., Sage] may "profane" it for him. Furthermore, it is written לאסור איסר ["to initiate a prohibition"] which implies that he prohibited a certain article upon himself and another person can come and release him from the prohibition. It is regarding “prohibition” the term “release” is appropriate, for איסור ["prohibition"] has the connotation of a knot, making the term מתיר [lit. "untying, releasing"] appropriate — just as one unties a knot. Hear from this that the term התרה ["release"] refers to the Sage.

נדר A VOW — This is when one says, Behold, I take upon myself an obligation which is as sacred to me as an offering, that I will not eat, or that I will not do such-and-such a thing. — One might think that if he swears that he will eat the flesh of an animal which has not been slaughtered properly according to the rite that I may apply to him the text, “He shall do according to all that goeth forth from his mouth”! It, however, says, “[If he takes an oath] to forbid something to himself”, i.e., to forbid for himself something which is permissible to him — and not to make permissible that which is forbidden to him (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4).

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre¹⁵Sifre, Matoth 153. is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond:¹⁰Verse 3. “I might think that even if ‘he swore’¹⁶The words “he swore” show clearly that the Sifre is speaking about an oath, while Rashi applied it to a vow. to eat n’veiloth and treifoth,¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows).¹⁷The language of the verse before us is as follows: If a man ‘voweth a vow’ unto the Eternal, or ‘sweareth an oath’ to bind his soul with a bond. Ramban’s intent is to point out that Rashi, who made his comment on the phrase if a man voweth a vow, and speaks of konam [a term used only in vows], is diverging from the Sifre who gives this explanation on the phrase or sweareth an oath. Since, as will be explained further on, there are important legal differences between vows and oaths, Rashi’s application of the Sifre to the case of a vow [instead of to an oath] is thus incorrect. And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this],¹⁸In my “Kuntros on Variant Readings in Rashi according to the first print, Reggio 1475,” p. 27 (printed in Berliner’s Rashi, Feldheim, Jerusalem, 5730) I have shown that on the basis of a minor emendation in the text of Rashi [as found in the Reggio edition], Ramban’s criticism of Rashi disappears. for the Rabbis have said¹⁹Nedarim 2b. that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters,²⁰Ibid., 13b. such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it.²¹In other words, there is no question as to when a person “vows” to eat n’veilah [which is forbidden] that it is invalid, but even if he “vowed” to eat a permissible thing it is also invalid, since we do not find anywhere in the Gemara vows about matters which require one “to get up and do,” but only matters which require one to abstain from certain things. On the other hand, in the case of an “oath,” as where one says “I swear to eat this loaf,” the oath would indeed be valid. Since Rashi applied it to “vows,” it is therefore incorrect, as explained above. — The reason for this distinction between oaths and vows is as follows: An oath takes effect upon the person himself. Hence if he says, “I swear to eat the loaf,” he is obliged to do so. But a vow takes effect upon the object. Hence if he says, “This bread is ‘konam’ to me,” it is a valid vow and he may not eat it. But if he were to say, “A vow be upon me that I shall eat this loaf,” it would be invalid, since it is a contradiction in terms [the statement begins with a reference to a vow, but concludes with — “I shall eat …” — which is appropriate only for an oath]. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,”²²Kinim 1:1. or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object which itself becomes forbidden], this [vow is valid] because [there is a general principle that] dedicating something [verbally] to the Sanctuary creates an obligation on one’s property exactly as if it had been handed over to an ordinary person.²³Therefore when he says, “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” it is as if he had actually separated a specific animal to be an offering. Thus his vow attaches to a definite object, and therefore it is valid. Or [it may be that] this is a stringency²⁴In other words, even if we are not to resort to the preceding explanation that a verbal promise to the Sanctuary is tantamount to actual delivery of the object, we may yet explain the reason why vows to the Sanctuary are valid, because of a stringency ordained by the Rabbis based on the fact that since ultimately he will set aside a specific animal for his offering, therefore the effect of the vow takes place immediately upon his utterance thereof, and all his property becomes mortgaged to the fulfillment of the vow. applicable [only] to vows to the Sanctuary, because they [such vows] involve an object which becomes forbidden to an ordinary person and invested [with sanctity] for the Sanctuary when [the object is actually] set aside [as an offering]; therefore right from the start [when he merely bound himself verbally to separate an animal as an offering at some future date], the obligation created by the vow takes effect upon his property. But the case of [ordinary] vows of utterance [about a secular matter] we have no such rule, because there is no [tangible] object existing at all, neither at the beginning [i.e., at the time of uttering the vow], nor at the end [i.e., at the time that the vow is to be fulfilled]. Similarly, [the expression of the Sifre mentioned by Rashi that] he can “forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but cannot allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah]” is a statement which is not correct to make in connection with vows [as Rashi did], because they do take effect on matters of [religious] commandments, just as they do on secular matters [i.e., on matters which do not come within the scope of the commandments]. Thus someone who says in the form of a vow “I will not make a Booth [for the Festival of Tabernacles]” or “I will not put on phylacteries” is indeed forbidden [to make the Booth, or to put on the phylacteries] although he thereby violates a positive commandment.²⁵The reason for this is that since a vow takes effect upon a particular object (see Note 21), he may forbid the use of the particular Booth or of the phylacteries in the fulfillment of the commandment. But he cannot prohibit their use by means of an oath, swearing not to use them, since the oath creates a prohibition on the person, and that is invalid for him to do, since “he has already sworn on Sinai” to fulfill the commandment, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath, as will be explained. Similarly a man who vowed not to have [sexual] intercourse with his wife is forbidden [to have such intercourse with her] although he thereby violates a negative commandment.²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. Similarly, vows take effect to oblige one to observe a negative commandment [although, of course, he already is bound not to transgress it], such as if he vowed not to eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. — [so that if he does it he violates two prohibitions: against eating n’veilah, and against breaking his vow, this principle being deduced] from the words of the Mishnah:²⁷Nedarim 17a. The Mishnah there establishes the distinction that a vow may take effect upon another vow, but one oath may not take effect upon another. From this Ramban deduces the teaching that if an object is prohibited to a person for some reason, such as n’veilah or treifah (see Note 14 above), or indeed any other prohibition, another vow — not to eat it — can still take effect upon that object doubly prohibiting the person from eating it, so that if he does eat it, he violates two prohibitions: one for having eaten n’veilah, and one for having violated his vow. “A vow may take effect upon a vow etc.”
Thus a vow takes effect to forbid [not only that which was previously permitted, but also to forbid] that which was [already] forbidden [such as when he vows not to eat n’veilah]¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96., and [a vow takes effect] not to do [something] which he is [commanded to do and] forbidden to transgress [such as the duty to have sexual intercourse with his wife,²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. as mentioned above], except that vows do not take effect to allow him to actively transgress a negative commandment.²⁸Thus if he vowed to eat the flesh of n’veilah which is prohibited by a negative commandment, the vow takes no effect whatever, so that if he does not eat it he is not punishable for having violated his word. But oaths are only able to render forbidden that which was [hitherto] permitted, and they do not apply at all to matters involving commandments, neither to transgress [the prohibition of] a negative commandment [even passively, such as by swearing not to have intercourse with his wife], nor to strengthen its observance [such as by swearing not to eat n’veilah],¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. nor to neglect [the performance of] a positive commandment, such as [by saying]: “I swear that I will not make a Booth,” or “[I swear] that I will not put on phylacteries.” Even to strengthen the performance of a positive commandment [an oath] cannot take effect, so that if a person swears to fulfill a commandment and does not fulfill it, he is not liable for [breaking his] oath either to [the punishment of] stripes [if he deliberately neglects it] or to [bring] an offering [if he neglects it accidentally].²⁹The punishment for breaking an oath in optional matters deliberately is the same as for transgressing any negative commandment; i.e., stripes (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), and for accidentally breaking it, there is a duty to bring an offering (Leviticus 5:4-13). But if one swears to fulfill a positive commandment [e.g. “I swear to wear phylacteries”] the oath is invalid, because “he has already sworn at Mount Sinai” [to perform all the commandments of the Torah], and an oath does not take effect upon another oath (see Note 27). Therefore if he does not fulfill the commandment, he is responsible for neglect of a positive commandment, but is not subject to stripes or an offering for failure of fulfilling the additional oath, since his oath never took effect. But it is permitted for a person to encourage himself [to fulfill a commandment by swearing to do so], for it is written, I have sworn, and have confirmed it, to observe Thy righteous ordinances.³⁰Psalms 119:106. See Nedarim 8a. Therefore it is only with reference to swearing [and not, as implied by Rashi, to vows] that one can interpret [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond¹⁰Verse 3. [as the Sifre does, that he may forbid upon himself that which was hitherto permitted to him, but may not allow himself to do that which is forbidden, by means of swearing to do it]. These are great [i.e., complex and important] laws, and the scholar will find them [explained in the Talmud] in their [proper] places.

איש כי ידור נדר, When a man vows a vow, etc. Why did the Torah repeat both the word נדר, vow, and the word שבעה, oath? Why could the Torah not simply have written איש כי ידור לה׳ או ישבע? Furthermore, why did the Torah phrase observance both in a positive and in a negative connotation, i.e. "he must not profane his word, as well as he must do in accordance with what came out of his mouth?" I believe we must look for the key to the way the Torah worded this legislation by remembering that there are two categories of vows and oaths. One category is related to a person's soul, i.e. he may undertake to study Torah, give a certain amount of charity, refrain from abominable practices, not to visit places predominantly visited by women, etc. The other category of vows and oaths pertains to the body and involves matters which are neither forbidden to us nor are we commanded to do them. Here too there are two divisions; one may vow to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or live in a certain house, etc. Or, one may undertake on oath not to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or wear certain clothes. G'd legislated here how a person should best conduct himself. The words כי ידור נדר, i.e. an ordinary vow involves an undertaking to go to a certain place or to perform a certain task. The addition of the word לה׳ means that different rules apply when the vow is not of a secular nature but relates to one's conduct vis-a-vis G'd. The addition of this word therefore means that the word נדר has not been repeated at all, but that once it applies to secular vows and once to religious vows.

(1) IMPOSING AN OBLIGATION ON HIMSELF ... HE SHALL NOT BREAK HIS PLEDGE. This refers to the votive offering. In other words, he must not delay his votive offering until after the festivals, as the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. For this is the explanation of "he shall not break [lo yahel]," as in (Jud. 3:25) "He waited [actually, "They waited"] a long time"; (Gen. 8:10) "He waited another seven days"; (Ps. 130:7) "O Israel, wait for the LORD" -- wait and anticipate Him. And one who explains [this] as an expression of desecration [hilul] according to the straightforward sense is in error.

איש כי ידור נדר לה', “If a man makes a vow to Hashem,” he vows to himself to honour Hashem. The reason we understand it in this fashion is that the Torah, otherwise, should have written בה'”, i.e. “in the name of Hashem,” or “invoking Hashem’s name.” Elsewhere, that is the prefix used in such cases as for instance in Genesis 21,23 השבעה לי באלוקים, “swear to me in the name of the Lord.”

A konam that I will not eat. Meaning that he says, “Let this article be like a konam to me, that I will not eat…” Though [a statement] prohibiting one from eating is applicable to a שבועה ["oath"] rather than a נדר ["vow"], as Ramban asks, this has already been answered by Re’m. See there.

V. 3. נדר .איש כי ידר נדר לד׳ וגו׳ (siehe Bereschit 28, 20). Wir kennen bis jetzt, außer dem besonderen Nasirgelübde, נדר nur als נדרי הקדש, als Weihung oder Gelobung eines Gegenstandes zum קדשי מזבח ,קרבן, oder zum Tempeleigentum, קדשי בדק הבית, sei es mit der Formel: נדבה ,הרי זו, oder: נדר ,הרי עלי (Wajikra 22, 21), und zwar wird in beiden Fällen, als נדבה sofort, als נדר im Momente der Erfüllung, der von der Gelobung betroffene Gegenstand allgemein zu jedem Profangebrauch oßur. Hier wird nun der Fall statuiert, dass jemand ידר נדר לד׳ לאסר אסר על נפשו, dass jemand eine Gelobung ausspricht, wodurch ein Gegenstand nicht allgemein, sondern על נפשו, ihm, dem Gelobenden so oßur werde, als ob er von einem allgemeinen נדר הקדש betroffen worden wäre; ein Gegenstand soll ihm so oßur sein, wie ein קרבן, wie der מזבח usw. Daher, wie wir glauben, der Satz (Nedarim 14 a): איש כי ידור נדר לד׳ עד שידור בדבר הנדור, es ist das hier besprochene Gelübde nur korrekt, wenn es den nach dem Gesetze einem durch Gelobung oßur werdenden Gegenstande — (z. B. קדשי מזבח oder קדשי בדק הבית) — innewohnenden Charakter einem anderen beliebigen Gegenstand zuspricht. Nicht aber בדבר האסור, wenn er z. B. gesagt hätte, es solle ihm oßur sein, wie דם, wie נבלה, da der Ißur דם und נבלה kein aus einer Gelobung hervorgegangener Ißur ist. Diese Fixierung eines Gegenstandes mit einem הקדש-artigen Charakter heißt: התפסה. Das eigentliche נדר ist daher nur ein sachliches Gelübde, indem es einem Gegenstande die Konsequenzen הקדש-Charakters zuspricht: eines או השבע שבועה — .אוסר חפצא על נפשיה, oder indem er die Gelobung als Eid ausspricht. Ein Gelobungseid ist immer persönlich, er bindet den Willen in Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand oder eine Tätigkeit. Wir haben somit hier zwei Kategorien: נדר לאסר אסר על נפש und שבועה לאסור אסור על נפשו. Sagt jemand, Wein solle ihm wie קרבן sein, so hat er sich durch נדר den Weingenuss untersagt. Sagt jemand, er schwöre, dass er keinen Wein trinken werde, so hat er sich durch שבועה den Weingenuss untersagt. Dieser begriffliche Unterschied zwischen נדר und שבועה hat einige wichtige Konsequenzen: נדר kann sich nur auf einen konkreten Gegenstand, דבר שיש בו ממש, beziehen, nicht aber auf ein Abstraktum, דבר שאין בו ממש, also nicht auf eine Tätigkeit, mag diese Tätigkeit als Substantiv oder Verbum ausgedrückt sein. Also nicht: Schlaf oder Schlafen, Gang oder Gehen, solle ihm קרבן sein. Dagegen kann man sich durch ein sachliches Gelübde indirekt die Erfüllung einer Mizwa unmöglich machen, z. B. die Sucka solle ihm קרבן sein. Denn die Pflicht ruht auf der Person und nicht auf der Sache. שבועה hingegen, wodurch zunächst die Persönlichkeit in ihrer Willensbestimmung getroffen wird, kann sich auch auf דבר שאין בו ממש beziehen, z. B. שבועה שלא יישן היום Allein eine שבועה zur Verletzung einer Pflicht, z. B. שלא ישב בסוכה ist nichtig, denn der Wille ist hinsichtlich der Pflicht bereits gebunden, in Beziehung auf eine Mizwa ist die Persönlichkeit nicht frei. Daher die Sätze: חומר בשבועות מבנדרים ובגדרים מבשבועות חומר בנדרים שהנדרים חלין על המצוה כברשות מה שאין כן בשבועות וחומר בשבועות שהשבועות חלות על דבר שיש בו ממש ושאין בו ממש מה שאין כן בנדרים (Nedarim 13 b). מדרבנן ist נדר auch תוספו׳) חל על דבר שאין בו ממש daselbst). Es haben sich ferner in der Volkssprache umlautende Ausdrücke, כנויים, für נדרים und שבועות gebildet, z. B. קונם für קרבן usw. die in ihren Folgen ganz die Kraft von נדרים und שבועות haben: כל כנויי נדרים כנדרים וכו׳, und ebenso braucht die Gelobungsformel nicht vollständig ausgesprochen zu sein, auch wenn sie nur dem Sinne nach angedeutet ist, יד, so dass das Aussprechen gleichsam eine Handhabe der Gelobung bildet, ist es ein bindendes Gelübde: ידות נדרים כנדרים (Nedarim 2 b). Ebenso ist überhaupt die Beifügung einer התפסה unwesentlich; דבר זה אסור עלי ist ein vollkommenes ר׳׳ן) נדר zu Nedarim 2 a). Endlich nur bei an sich gleichgültigen Dingen bedarf es des ausdrücklichen נדר- oder שבועה-Ausdrucks. Zu Mizwazwecken ist der einfache Vorsatzausspruch bindend (Nedarim 8a ר׳׳ן und ראש daselbst). Ist doch auch das älteste עשר אעשרנו לך ,נדר. (Bereschit 28, 20), nicht ein korrekter נדר-Ausdruck, sondern נדר בלשון שבועה (siehe auch י׳׳ד 206, 5). Ja, selbst wenn ein solcher Gelobungsvorsatz gar nicht in Worten ausgedrückt, sondern nur durch Übung betätigt worden, erhält er bindende Kraft (daselbst 214, 1).

או השבע שבועה לאסור איסר, “or swears an oath to declare something permitted to others as forbidden to himself;” what is the difference between making a “vow” and “swearing an oath,” seeing both place something out of bounds to the party making such a declaration?When making a vow the object of the vow is placed out of bounds to the party who makes such a vow, whereas when swearing an oath, the party swearing it places himself out of bounds to the object or people that are the subject of such an oath. Even though the Torah has not spelled this out specifically, we find hints that this is so in the wording used by the Torah to describe these two kinds of self imposed restrictions. (Compare Sifri) If someone says: “by the Life of Hashem and by your own life, I am not going to abandon you,” he is stating that Hashem is alive, and that the party to whom he makes such a statement is alive. Using the name of the Lord as relevant to one’s own standing, is something which makes it such a severe sin if it turns out that one does not honour such a vow or oath.

לא יחל דברו This is the same as לא יחלל דברו (the root of יחל being חלל): He shall not make his own word to bear a secular character (חולין) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4; see also Rashi on Leviticus 21:4).

YIDOR NEDER LA’SHEM (VOWETH A VOW ‘UNTO’ THE ETERNAL). The meaning of [the expression] ‘yidor neder la’shem’ is not like that of ‘asher nish ba la’shem (how he — David — swore ‘unto’ the Eternal),³¹Ibid., 132:2. for that [expression mentioned by David] is like ‘vayishava lo’ (and he swore ‘to him’)³²This is in reference either to Genesis 24:9, where Eliezer swore to Abraham to find a wife for Isaac from the country of his birthplace, or to Genesis 47:31, Joseph swearing to Jacob that he would bury him together with his fathers. In both cases the meaning of the prepositional lamed [‘lo’] is its literal meaning — “unto him,” and the intention is to say that the oath was “for his benefit.” Likewise the prepositional lamed [in the word la’shem] used by David has its literal meaning — “for ‘the benefit’ [so to say] and glory of G-d,” since the oath concerned his determination to build the House of G-d. which means that he swore to him for his [the recipient’s] benefit. But [the use of the prepositional lamed in the case of vows is equivalent to the use of the preposition beth (“by”)³³The gist of Ramban’s reasoning is as follows: The prepositional lamed in the case of oaths [in the examples cited above] has the meaning of “to” — to the benefit of the recipient, as is the case of Eliezer where the oath was for the benefit of Abraham. This principle, however, cannot be made to apply to vows, since in our verse it says if a man vows a vow ‘la’shem,’ and the verse is not speaking exclusively about vows to the benefit of the Sanctuary but refers to vows of all sorts, even of secular matters. Hence we must say that the prepositional lamed in vows has the same meaning as the beth [not the lamed] in oaths, which in both cases means “by” — by G-d. In other words, the prepositional lamed in vows and the beth in oaths are identical in meaning. Finally, Ramban will conclude that the Cabala does offer an explanation why a different preposition is used in each case. Thus it is shown that the mystic character of the Sacred Language is deeply embedded in the text of the Torah. in the case of oaths, for] in the case of oaths Scripture says: ‘u’vishmo’ (and ‘by’ His Name) shalt thou swear;³⁴Deuteronomy 6:13. v’ashbiacha ‘ba’shem’ (and I will make thee swear ‘by’ the Eternal);³⁵Genesis 24:3. as I swore ‘lecha’ (unto thee) ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ the Eternal), the G-d of Israel, saying: Assuredly Solomon thy son shall reign after me;³⁶I Kings 1:30. swear ‘li’ (unto me) here ‘bei’Elokim’ (‘by’ G-d).³⁷Genesis 21:23. But in the case of a vow Scripture does not say: “he vows ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ G-d)” but la’shem (‘to’ G-d). The Sages in the Sifre have already alluded to the reason for this matter [the different terminology], saying:³⁸Sifre, Matoth 153. See Vol. I, p. 66, where Ramban quotes this Sifre. “What is the difference between vows and oaths? Vows are like vowing³⁹This is the text in the Sifre and in Ramban here. In Genesis, however, Ramban has “swearing” (Vol. I, p. 66). The intent of the texts in both places is equivalent. ‘by the life of the King;’ oaths are like swearing ‘by the King Himself.’ Although there is no [clear] proof for this explanation [in Scripture], there is an allusion to it: By the living G-d, and by the life of your soul. I will not leave thee.”⁴⁰II Kings 4:30. See Vol. I, p. 66, Note 290 where this text is explained in detail. And the secret thereof is that the shevuah (oath) is derived from the word shivah [“seven” — alluding to the seven Emanations], for she [wisdom] hath builded her house, she hath hewn out her seven pillars,⁴¹Proverbs 9:1. whereas the vow is on [the level of] understanding, the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old.⁴²Ibid., 8:22. Thus you find that vows take precedence over the Torah, and therefore they apply to commandments just as to optional matters [as explained above]. Thus all vows are la’shem (“to” the Eternal), whereas all who swear [do so] “by” Him.

(2) HE MUST CARRY OUT ALL THAT HAS CROSSED HIS LIPS. This refers back to "taking an oath" (hishava sh'vu'ah) [i.e., not to "makes a vow" (yidor neder)] -- he must do according to what he specified in taking an oath, according to the time he specified, whether short or long. And a proof of the matter,of what these two things mean, is what Moshe said in Deuteronomy (23:22), "When you make a vow to the LORD your God, do not put off fulfilling it, ... You must fulfill what has crossed your lips and perform ...." Takes an oath, etc.

The Torah goes on או השבע שבעה, "or he swears an oath, etc." In the first instance the oath concerns something one undertakes not to do as stated here לאסור אסר על נפשו, "to deny himself something." Here too we have two categories of oaths. One may swear not to do something which is already forbidden, as Boaz did when he wanted to reinforce his resolution not to sin by swearing an oath.

אסר .לאסר אסר, sonst nur ein konkretes Binden und Fesseln, ist hier auf das Binden des Willens durch ein gelobendes oder schwörendes Wort übertragen. לא יחל יחל ,דברו Hifil von ”חלל“ wie ולא אחל את שם קדשי עוד (Ezech. 39, 7). Es dürfte zwischen Pi'el חַלֵל und Hifil הַחֵל ein Unterschied sein. חַלֵל hieße der Heiligkeit eines Gegenstandes zuwiderhandeln, der Gegenstand bleibt in seiner Heiligkeit, allein man behandelt ihn, als wäre er unheilig; so חלל ברית ,חלל את השם ,חלל שבת usw. החל , Hifil, heißt aber: etwas in dem חולין-Zustande lassen, es nicht zur Heiligkeit gelangen lassen. So ja das aus Ezechiel zitierte: ולא אחל את שם קדשי עוד. Es heißt dies ja nicht: ich will meinen heiligen Namen nicht mehr entweihen, sondern: ich will ihn ferner nicht in der Entweihung lassen, in welche er durch Israels Verirrung und sein verdientes Geschick geraten. לא יחלל דברו würde daher heißen: er soll sein Wort nicht brechen, der Heiligkeit seines Wortes nicht zuwider handeln. לא יחל דברו heißt aber: er soll sein Wort nicht folgelos, nicht חולין lassen. Es bindet ihn. Schon dieser Ausdruck deutet auf die Möglichkeit hin, dass das Wort, obgleich er es gesprochen, folgelos sein könne, und wenn nun die Halacha hinzutritt und den Pronominalbegriff betonen lehrt: הוא אינו מיחל אבל אחרים מחלין לו (so ist die Lesart Berachot 32a), er darf sein Wort nicht folgelos sein lassen, aber andere können ihm dessen Folgelosigkeit ermitteln, so ist in dem Ausdruck selbst der Begriff der hier von der Halacha gelehrten Korrektivtätigkeit des חכם in betreff der התרת נדרים präzisiert: חכם עוקר נדר מעיקרו. Es stellt die Untersuchung heraus, dass das gelobende Wort von vornherein folgelos gewesen. Das Ergebnis lässt das Wort in seiner חולין-Schwäche. So lange er aber sein gelobendes Wort einer solchen Untersuchung nicht unterworfen, oder diese nicht zu einem solchen Ergebnis geführt, לא יחל דברו, darf er sein Wort nicht חולין, nicht kraftlos lassen, vielmehr בכל היוצא מפיו יעשה.

לא יחל דברו, “he must not delay fulfillment of his words indefinitely.”Alternately, he must not profane his own solemn undertaking by not honouring it.” We find this expression used in this sense in Psalms 130,7: 'יחל ישראל אל ה, “keep faithfully waiting, o Israel for Hashem fulfilling His undertakings” where the Psalmist has G-d urging Israel to wait patiently for G-d to honour His vows. G-d can be depended on to fulfill His vows or oaths. The party failing to fulfill his vow must not profane himself by doing so. However, others, i.e. a legal court have the power to release him from the obligations he imposed himself at a time of personal stress, not realising all the implications of what he had said at that time. (Talmud tractate Chagigah, folio 10).

ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה. This refers to the words השבע שבועה, meaning that the party concerned must do as he has sworn to do and in accordance with the date he had specified whether in the immediate future or at a later date. Proof that this is the correct interpretation of our verse is what Moses himself said in Deut. 23,22 כי תדור נדר לה' לא תאחר לשלמו “when you make a vow to the Lord your G’d, do not be tardy in paying it;” this is followed immediately by מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית, “the utterance that emanates from your mouth you shall honour, and carry out the respective undertaking.”

Like לא יחלל. Thus, it is one of the doubled roots and had it not been a [a letter] ches, which does not take a dagesh [dot], it would have had a dagesh in order to complete the doubling. [Here the root is doubled, thus it should have been חלחל. However a dagesh in the ches would have substituted for the second letter ches]. [לא יחלל] means, “He should not belittle his words” as one belittles unsanctified property without concern of guarding it from impurity, as [one guards only] sanctified property from impurity.

The Torah was very astute in separating the word "vow" from the word "oath" by interposing the word "to G'd," to alert us to the fact that the reason both the word נדר and the word שבעה have been repeated is to allude to vows or oaths of a religious nature. Such religious vows or oaths are not subject to the same rules which govern vows or oaths of a secular nature. The words לא יחל דברו, "he must not profane his word," refer to vows and oaths which involve abstaining from something of a purely secular nature such as Boaz' oath; the rule which applies is: "he must not break his word; however, a collegium of judges has the power to annul the vow or oath in question (compare Nedarim 14). With respect to vows involving matters of religious significance, such as declaring something sacred for use only by the Temple treasury, etc., or oaths of a religious nature, the words which are applicable are: "everything which his mouth has uttered he shall do."

Dies Korrektiv der Gelobungen, auf welches bereits das ראשי המטות des V. 2, denen dessen Handhabung, wie bemerkt, überwiesen ist, hinblickt, ist im Texte nur durch eine leise Nuance angedeutet, um — wie רמב׳׳ן im Kommentar bemerkt, — nicht durch das jedermann zugängliche schriftliche Gesetzeswort einer missbräuchlichen Gleichgültigkeit gegen die Heiligkeit von Gelobungen Vorschub zu leisten. Es gehört zu den ganz oder doch fast ganz der Tradition vorbehaltenen Institutionen, die nach dem Ausdruck Chagiga 10a פורחין באויר ohne alle Stütze im Buchstaben der Schrift ausschließlich von mündlicher Überlieferung getragen sind, oder doch כהררים התלויים בשערה in Verhältnis zu ihrem Umfange und ihrer Bedeutung nur eine haarfeine Andeutung in der Schrift erhalten haben, שהן מקרא מועט והלכות מרובות, während anderen Gesetzinstitutionen eine ausführlichere Fixierung im schriftlichen Worte geworden ist, und gleichwohl הן הן גופי תורה, sind die einen wie die anderen gleich wesentliche Teile des Gesetzes. Das hier den ראשי המטות anvertraute Korrektiv der נדרים besteht darin, dass der Gelobende sein Gelübde in der Weise bereut, dass es ihm leid ist, überhaupt das Gelübde getan zu haben und bei richtiger Überlegung er es durchaus nicht getan hätte (חרטה מעיקרא), oder Umstände eingetreten, die unter gewöhnlichen Verhältnissen vorauszusehen waren und deren Voraussicht ihn vom Geloben zurückgehalten hätte (פתח, aber אין פותחין בנולד), dass er dann sein Gelübde einer Untersuchung Kompetenter unterwirft und sie um Entscheidung fragt (שאלה), und diese dann nach Befund die Auflösung des Gelübdes, als von vornherein aus Unbesonnenheit geschehen, aussprechen (מותר לך). Es unterliegt jedoch die Auflösbarkeit eines Gelübdes vielen gesetzlichen Bedingungen, die genau erwogen sein wollen, und ein durch Verschweigung eines wesentlichen Momentes ermittelter Lösungsausspruch wäre kraft- und folgelose Selbsttäuschung; denn nicht eine Macht zu binden und zu lösen ist in die Hand eines jüdischen חכם gelegt, sondern nur die Fähigkeit und die Pflicht untersuchender Erkenntnis.

The [letter,] yod is vocalized by a patach; and it does not state, "yechal," with a yod vocalized by a tsere, as in (Isaiah 48:11), "as how can it be desecrated (yechal)" - like many negative commandments that are stated in the passive form. For if so, its meaning would be that he could not find any way to desanctify his vow, even if it be done through annulment. Hence the verse states it in the active form, to teach that he - from himself - cannot annul it, but it is permitted that it be desanctified by others; and that is with the annulment of others. And this is [the meaning of] of what the Sages, may their memeory blessed, said  (Chagigah 10a), "He may not annul, but others can annul [it] for him."

Another reason why the Torah wrote the word לשם can be understood in light of Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim chapter 11. He writes that if a 12 year old boy has made a vow or sworn an oath, we examine him to find out if he is mature enough to have understood the significance of his undertaking, i.e. "to whom he made this undertaking." If so, he is held responsible just as an adult. The exegetical tool for this is the word איש before the legislation. The legislation applies to anyone who qualifies intellectually under the heading of איש, is mentally of age and realises his obligations vis-a vis G'd.

לא יחל דברו, “he must not desecrate his word.” The word is derived from חול, not to profane his word. Our sages explain this wording to mean that whereas the person who made the vow must not “profane,” it, others (three laymen or an expert) may do so (Chagigah 10). The annulment of a vow is possible if the person regrets what he vowed because he had not realised its full implications. He tells the court that had he known at the time he made the vow what he knows at that moment he would never have made the vow in the first place (compare Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,5). Having said this the lay judges or the expert will release him from his vow. The legal basis for this is that the vow is presumed to have been erroneous from the start and hence never valid.
A person is not permitted to cancel his own oath, his own vow, or even the vow of his wife on his own (without recourse to such a tribunal). The reason the husband cannot release his wife from her vows is that legally she is considered as part of him, i.e. אשתו כגופו. The inability of the husband to cancel his wife’s vow applies only when the husband was acting as the solitary expert. A husband is allowed to be part of a quorum of three people who listen to the wife state that had she known what her vow entailed she would never have made the vow in the first place. No one, even a “so-called” expert, may annul a vow single-handedly if there is a scholar of greater reputation available locally. Neither may a scholar take such a decision in the presence of his teacher (even if he has surpassed the teacher in knowledge), unless his teacher has specifically given him permission to do so (Maimondes Hilchot Shevuot 6,3).

בבית אביה [IF A WOMAN VOW] … BEING IN HER FATHER’S HOUSE — i.e., under her father’s control, but the law here stated applies even though she be not in his house, provided she be under his control (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4).

AND IF A WOMAN VOWETH A VOW UNTO THE ETERNAL … 5. AND HER FATHER HEARETH HER VOW. Scripture wanted to mention the [case of] prohibition first [in Verses 4-5, namely that if she makes a vow and her father is quiet about it or confirms it, then all her vows shall stand ..] in order to tell us that a young girl [in her father’s house] is also subject to the negative commandment mentioned [previously], that he shall not break his word,¹⁰Verse 3. and therefore if her father confirms her vow [expressly or tacitly] the vow shall stand, but if he disallowed her, it shall not stand.⁴³Verse 6. And Scripture states [in conclusion], and the Eternal will forgive her, because her father disallowed her,⁴³Verse 6. in order to tell us that G-d will only forgive her if she acted [in disregard of her vow] after her father had disallowed it, but not [if she broke it] at the beginning, that is, if she [first] transgressed her vow and later on her father disallowed it, just as the Rabbis have said: “[The father or husband] ‘cuts off’ [the vow from the moment that he disallows it], but [unlike a Sage] he does not uproot it retrospectively.”⁴⁴Nedarim 68a. The intention of this statement is to contrast the law, of a Sage who “releases” a vow, with that of a father or husband who “annuls” it. In order that a vow or oath should be valid, the person who makes it must at the time of the utterance thereof have been fully aware of its consequences. If at that time he did not fully understand all that his vow or oath entailed, the Sage points this out to him and affords him an opportunity to regret having made it. If he so declares that he regrets it, the Sage “releases” him from the vow or oath. This release “uproots it” from the very start, since it has now been shown that he made it under a misapprehension. The father or husband, on the other hand, is empowered by the Torah to “annul” the vow or oath, even if made under no misapprehension and the daughter or wife does not regret it. Therefore there is no power of retroactive effect; instead, the “annulment” only “cuts off” in the future. One of the differences between these two procedures is here referred to by Ramban, and that is namely, if the person who made the vow or oath violates it before the time of “release” or “annulment.” In the case of the release by the Sage, since it takes effect retrospectively, there is no sin. In the case of the father or the husband, however, there is a sin entailed.

ואשה כי תדור, “and if a woman makes a vow, etc.” A female of twelve years and over is called אשה, “a woman.” Her vows and oaths are legally valid. If she is between 11 and 12 years of age she is presumed to be a minor though she is examined if she understands the implication of a vow or an oath. If she does, she is subject to the same rules as a male between the ages of 12 and thirteen. If she is less than eleven years old she is a minor in all respects of the law. Her pronouncements have no legal standing whatever. If a female is over 12 years of age or a male over 13 years of age their vows or oaths are legally binding even if they did not know to whom [i.e. that this involves an undertaking vis-a vis G’d. Ed.] they made such commitments (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1-3).
This entire paragraph reveals many important laws concerning vows and oaths in very few words. The legal status of women concerning vows may be divided into four categories: 1) A נערה, girl between the age of 12-12 years and six months; 2) An ארוסה, a girl betrothed but not yet having moved in with her husband. 3) A married woman (after חופה); 4) A widow. When a נערה has a father she remains under his legal control and her father can invalidate her vows on the day he hears about them but not later. The logic behind this is that she would have attached a mental rider to her vow that her father would approve of it. If she finds that she was mistaken and her father objected upon hearing of it, her vow was never valid in the first place. The same logic does not apply to vows undertaken by a male of corresponding age. Just as the father is legally empowered to sell the services of his daughter to a stranger, an entitlement which does not extend to selling the services of his son, so the father is also legally entitled to countermand vows made by a daughter not yet fully of age.
When such a נערה has attained the age of 12 years and six months she is considered adult in all legal respects and no longer under her father’s legal control (Niddah 47). She is fully responsible for all her vows and oaths, the same as a widowed woman or a divorcee. The words of verse 10: כל אשר אסרה על נפשה יקום עליה, “everything she has prohibited upon herself- shall remain upon her,” apply to such a 12 and a half year old single girl. If, while under the age limit, she made a vow and her father annulled it on the day he heard of it, it is as invalid as if it had never been uttered. When the Torah adds the words וה' יסלח לה, that “the Lord will forgive her,” the sages reasoned that these words are applicable when the girl who had made the vow is in need of forgiveness, such as when she violated her vow being unaware that her father had already canceled it (Niddah 47). Obviously, if someone commits what he or she perceives to be a violation of G’d’s law they are in need of forgiveness even if technically, for reasons unknown to them they did not commit a sin.
As to the woman who has been betrothed. The Torah speaks here about a woman who prior to her betrothal made a vow or swore an oath and who enters the first stage of her marriage with such vows still valid. The Torah, by employing the words, ואם היו תהיה לאיש indicates that the girl (under 12 and a half years old) has not yet completely left her father’s domain and also has not yet come under the domain of her husband concerning his interest in the matter. Her father and husband-to-be must both annul her vows in order for such an annulment to be legally valid. This is what we learned in Nedarim 66 seeing that we presume that when she made the vow she mentally resolved that it would be with the approval of both her father and her husband-to-be. Both her father and her husband-to-be have to hear it on the same day in order for both of them together to be able to annul it. The Talmud adds, that if the fiance of the betrothed girl dies before she reaches the age of maturity and she had moved into her husband’s home (after חופה), she reverts to her father’s domain and he can cancel her vows as if she had made them before she was married. If her father died prior to her having become fully married, (חופה), her husband cannot annul her vows until after she is fully married to him (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,10).

Under her father’s jurisdiction. At the end of this passage it is written, “In her youth, while in her father’s house” (v. 17) which is apparently superfluous, given that here it is written, “In her father’s home while still in her youth.” Rather, it comes to teach you that all the profits of a youth belong to her father, and this is even if she is not in his house, since “In her father’s house” is not to be taken literally. Similarly, here, “In her father’s home” means under his jurisdiction and not literally in his house. Re’m.

V. 4. ואשה וגו׳. Der gelobende Vorsatz eines Mannes ist für ihn von vornherein bindend. Nur seiner nationalen Genossenschaft und deren Vertretern kann er — ja, wie zu Dewarim Kap. 23, 22 f. zu entwickeln kommt, soll er (Nedarim 57a) — sein Gelübde zur einsichtigen und umsichtigen Prüfung und Entscheidung vorlegen. Ist ja der Mann ein selbständiger Schöpfer seiner Lebensstellung, und wenn durch ein bindendes, der Lösung unfähiges Gelübde seine Lebensrichtung ein normal nicht gegebenes, sie zu einer Besonderheit gestaltendes Element in sich aufgenommen, so liegts ja an ihm, diese Besonderheit bei Gestaltung seiner Lebensverhältnisse massgebend sein zu lassen. Nicht so das Weib. Die sittliche Größe der weiblichen Lebensbestimmung selbst fordert ein Eingehen und Aufgehen in die von einem andern geschaffene Lebensstellung. Es schafft sich das Weib nicht selbst ein Haus. Es tritt in die von dem Manne zu schaffende Häuslichkeit ein und waltet darin als die beglückende Pflegerin alles Gegebenen im Geiste der Sittenheiligkeit und der Gott zugewandten Gesinnung. Mehr noch als der Mann hat das Weib sich vor bindenden abnormen Lebensrichtungen zu hüten, sie können sich dauernd der Erfüllung seiner Bestimmung in den Weg stellen, und dürften sich von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus die fürsorgenden Anordnungen begreifen, mit denen das Gotteswort das gelobende Weib vor den Konsequenzen des eigenen Wortes sichergestellt, und dem Vater dem Gelübde einer unter seiner Obhut stehenden jugendlichen Tochter gegenüber, dem Vater und dem Verlobten dem Gelübde einer verlobten Tochter, dem Manne dem Gelübde seiner Frau gegenüber ein beschränktes Veto erteilt.

בנעורה IN HER YOUTH — when she is a נערה i.e., in the first state of womanhood, but not when she is a קטנה, a minor, and not when she is a בוגרת (in full womanhood); for so far as a minor is concerned, her vow is in general no vow (it is null and void ab initio), and a בוגרת is not under her father’s control so that he can annul her vows. What is a קטנה, a minor, in respect to vows? We may gather this from what our Rabbis said: a woman of eleven years and one day must have her vows investigated until she reaches the age of twelve years; if she understands in Whose name it is that she has made the vow or in Whose name it is she has dedicated the thing, her vow is a vow, but a woman of twelve years and a day does not require any investigation regarding her vow (Niddah 56b).

But not a minor. Meaning that her vows are not definite vows, rather there are those whose vows must be examined, and there are those that are not vows at all, as explained.

בנעריה. Auf tiefem psychologischen Grunde dürfte die im Gebiete des göttlichen Gesetzes einzige Bestimmung beruhen, nach welcher für gelobende Vorsätze die Zeit der Reife früher beginnt, als für alle anderen Äußerungen des gesetzlichen Lebens. In jeder anderen Beziehung beginnt die gesetzliche Zurechnungsfähigkeit für das männliche Geschlecht mit zurückgelegtem dreizehnten Jahre, für das weibliche Geschlecht, welchem das heilige Wort eine frühere Verstandesreife zuerkennt, mit zurückgelegtem zwölftem Jahre, beides bei übrigens erlangter Pubertät. Allein die bindende Kraft von Gelobungen beginnt schon um ein Jahr früher, im dreizehnten Jahre für Knaben, im zwölften Jahre für Mädchen, wenn sie das volle Bewusstsein haben, dass sie mit dem Gelübde Gott einen gelobenden Vorsatz angelobt, יודעין לשם מי נדרו (Nidda 45 b). Diese bei vorhandener Erkenntnisreife um ein Jahr früher als die sonst gesetzliche Mündigkeit eintretende Gelobungsreife, עונת נדרים, wird unter die Formel מיפלא סמוך לאיש gefasst und wird in solchem Ernste als דאוריתא begriffen, dass nach einer allerdings nicht rezipierten Auffassung für einen מופלא סמוך לאיש selbst מלקות bei Übertretung seiner Gelobungen eintreten würde (daselbst 46 a). Erwägen wir, wie in den Jahren, in welchen der Knabe zum Jüngling, das Mädchen zur Jungfrau reift, oft ein stiller nur Gott bewusster Gelobungsvorsatz für das ganze Leben entscheidend wird, und der reiche Lebensinhalt eines edlen Mannes, einer edlen Frau, oft nur als Fruchtsegen eines als Knabe, als Mädchen Gott gelobten Vorsatzes reift: so begreift sich der liebende Ernst, mit welchem Gott Gelobungsvorsätze ihm zureifender Knaben und Mädchen entgegennimmt. —

Es statuiert nun das Gesetz: בבית אביה בנעריה, und ebenso am Schlusse dieses Gesetzkapitels (V. 17): בנעריה בית אביה, dass sie während ihres נעורים-Alters, also bis nach zurückgelegten sechs Monaten nach erlangter Pubertät, wo sie vom נערה- zum בוגרת-Charakter übergeht (siehe Schmot 21, 7) בית אביה der Obhut des Vaters hinsichtlich ihrer Gelobungen angehört (Ketubot 46b und 47a).

ושמע אביה את נדרה..וקמו כל נדריה, and her father hears about her vow;….all her vows shall stand." We need to understand why the verse first speaks about "her vow" in the singular and then continues to speak about "her vows" in the plural. Besides, why did the Torah add the word: "all" both times. It would have sufficed to write: "her vows and oaths will stand," without adding the word "all" each time. Furthermore, why does the Torah use a different future tense when speaking about her vows, i.e. וקמו, whereas when speaking about an oath the woman uttered, it uses the word יקום to indicate that "it will stand?" The word יקום was altogether superfluous as the word וקמו which appeared earlier in the same verse would have referred to both vow and oath.

VV. 5 u. 6. ואם הניא וגו׳ ושמע וגו׳. An dem Tage, an welchem der Vater von der Gelobung einer seiner Obhut noch unterstehenden Tochter Kunde erhält, kann er durch Einsprache, הפרה, den Fortbestand des Gelübdes aufheben. Lässt er aber den Tag schweigend vorübergehen, so ist eine spätere Einsprache unwirksam, und zwar gilt hierfür nur die Dauer des natürlichen mit Sonnenuntergang zu Ende gehenden Tages (Nedarim 76b). — הניא von נוא der Wurzel von נא (siehe Schmot 12, 9), ist die spezifische Bezeichnung für הפרה, für die Wirkung der Einsprache des Vaters und des Mannes. Es ist dies הניא eine Unterbrechung, eine Hinderung des Fortbestandes — מיגז גיין — zum Unterschiede der התרה des חכם, welche den ganzen Bestand des Gelübdes von Anfang an aufhebt, עוקר נדר מעיקרו (Nasir 21b und 22a).

ושמע אביה, “and her father has heard about it (the vow).” The Torah speaks only about when the father has heard about his daughter’s vow from her directly. What is the legal status if he heard about her vow only from others? This is why the Torah continues that “all her vows remain in force.” Even if he heard about it only indirectly, he can use his authority to annul it within 24 hours.

We may be able to explain the wording the Torah used in our verse with the help of what we learned in Nedarim 87. The Mishnah says there: "If she said 'I swear that I will not eat either these figs or grapes,' and her husband confirms the part about her not eating figs, he has confirmed the entire vow. If the husband annulled the part of her vow concerning the figs, however she is still bound by the vow not to eat the grapes until her husband invalidates that part of her vow also. If she said: 'I swear not to eat these grapes, and I swear not to eat these figs,' she has made two separate vows.'" The Talmud explains that this Mishnah must be understood according to the view of Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the words אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו, "her husband may confirm it, or her husband may annul it," refer to the example cited in our Mishnah, that as long her husband has confirmed part of her vow he is considered as having confirmed the whole of it and his wife is bound to observe both parts of her vow. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, interprets the word יקימנו, to mean that the letters מנו in the word יקימנו (30,14) are to be understood as ממנו, "part of it.' He argues that just as her husband may confirm any part of her vow, so he may also annul any part of her vow so that partial confirmation equals total confirmation, so he only needs to annul part of her vow to invalidate all of it. Rabbi Yishmael counters that the Torah, after all, did not write ממנו, "a part of it?" Rabbi Akiva makes a conceptual comparison (מקיש) between invalidating a vow and confirming it. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees claiming that this is both Rabbi Yishmael's and Rabbi Akiva's approach, but that the other sages make the conceptual comparison between 1) confirming of a vow and 2) invalidating it. Just as in the case of invalidating a vow only the part of the vow which he has invalidated is affected, so when he has confirmed it only the part which he has actually confirmed is binding on his wife. The above is the version of our Talmud. Tossaphot, Ran and Nachmanides have a different version in which the conceptual comparison is reversed as follows: "Just as a partial annulment is not valid, so a partial confirmation is not valid (i.e. at all)." According to that version Rabbi Yishmael and the other sages share the same opinion. I believe that this is the correct version as is proved by the Tossephta.

כל נדריה וגו׳. Wie zu Verse 14 und 17 bemerkt, beschränkt sich das dem Ehemanne bei Gelobungen seiner Frau eingeräumte Veto auf נדרי עינוי נפש und דברים ל שבינו לבינה, auf körperliches Wohlbefinden gefährdende oder die gegenseitigen Beziehungen, des Gattenlebens schmälernde Gelobungen. Nach der durchaus allgemeinsten Auffassung ist auch das väterliche Veto auf dieselbe Weise beschränkt, wie dies auch im ספרי ausdrücklich gelehrt wird. Nur רמב׳׳ם 12,1 הל׳ נדרים)) erkennt dem Vater ein unbeschränktes Veto zu und hat bereits selbst in einem vom מגדל עוז (daselbst) mitgeteilten Schreiben an die חכמי לינל seine Auffassung gegen die insbesondere aus dem ספרי erhobenen Einwürfe zu verteidigen sich bemüht. Seine Verteidigungsgründe basieren außer dem unbeschränkten Wortlaute unseres Textes, vorzüglich darauf, dass die נדרי עינוי נפש, insbesondere aber die דברים שבינו לבינה, die doch bei dem Verhältnis einer Tochter zum Vater ganz andere als bei dem Verhältnis der Ehegattin zum Manne sein müssten, gar nicht hinsichtlich des Vaters im Talmud besonders behandelt werden. Dürften wir jedoch unsere zu V. 4 geäußerte Meinung für richtig anerkennen, dass selbst das dem Vater eingeräumte Veto nur aus Rücksicht auf die einstige Bestimmung der Tochter für ein Eheleben fließe, so könnten vielleicht damit diese gegen die allgemeine Auffassung geltend gemachten Schwierigkeiten von selbst sich lösen. Die דברים שבינו לבינה, gegen welche der Vater Einsprache tun kann, wären dann vielleicht in der Tat nur solche, die voraussichtlich ein friedliches und inniges Eheleben stören könnten, und die דברים שבינו לבינה für das Veto des Vaters wären in der Tat identisch mit denen des Mannes. Nicht ganz unerheblich dürfte auch dafür sprechen, dass bei dem rückblickenden Schlusssatze (V. 17) das בין איש לאשתו voransteht und sich ihm בין אב לבתו nur fast wie eine Konsequenz anschließt. Ist es doch auch schließlich dieser Satz אלה החקים וגו׳ בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו, auf welchem im ספרי die Gleichstellung des Gelobungsvetos des Vaters mit dem des Mannes basiert: מקיש את האב לבעל מה הבעל אינו מפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש אף האב אינו מפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש.

As a result of what we have heard so far, we are faced with three possible approaches to the problem. 1) The view of Rabbi Yishmael quoted by Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi when he edited the Mishnah, that as long as the husband confirmed part of his wife's vow he confirmed all of it, whereas if he annulled only part of it, the only part which is annulled is the part which he spelled out. 2) The approach of Rabbi Akiva that whenever the husband either confirmed or annulled part of his wife's vow, he has in effect confirmed or annulled all of it. 3) The approach of the sages that any partial approval or partial annulment is legally invalid. The wording of our verse can be explained satisfactorily according to the view of each one of these three approaches.

Rabbi Yishmael's view as expressed in the text of the Mishnah understands the verse as follows: "and her father (or husband) hears about her vow (singular) teaches that the verse speaks about a woman who made a single vow such as when she lumps together the figs and the grapes saying only once: "I vow not to eat, etc." This excludes a situation where she used the words "I vow not to eat" more than once in relation to two or more items she vows to abstain from.

When the Torah continues about her vows (plural) remaining in force if her husband remained silent when he heard the vow, the Torah refers to the kind of vow mentioned at the end of the Mishnah when she said: "I vow not to eat these figs, and I vow not to eat these grapes," and the husband remained silent only concerning part of her vows. Concerning such a situation, the Torah continues: "if her father heard about it and remained silent, then all her vows are in force." The reason the Torah writes "all" is to tell us that even if the husband remained silent concerning only a single part of her vow(s) i.e. he did not oppose the vow not to eat figs, all her vows remain valid. What Rabbi Yishmael meant to tell us was that the word והחריש, "he remained silent," does not mean he has to remain silent concerning the entire vow in order for it to remain valid. Had the meaning of the word והחריש been total silence by the husband or father, the Torah would not have needed to tell us that all her vows remain valid. Who would have imagined that such vows would not remain valid? The Torah therefore must have wanted us to appreciate that the words והחריש לה did not mean total silence but objection to only part of her vows.

When the Torah continues וכל אסר..יקום, "and any prohibition will remain if force," this means that when the words "all her vows (pl)" were used, the Torah did not refer to the kind of vows in which each part was introduced with the preface "I will not eat, etc.," but to vows in which a number of prohibitions were all lumped together under a single heading of: "I will not eat such an such, such and such, etc." The fact that the Torah uses the term אסר in connection with the rule יקום is no problem as the laws for vows or oaths are interchangeable as we know from verse 3 where the Torah speaks of "or."

The reason the Torah writes יקום instead of merely relying on the word וקמו which preceded it in the same verse, is that in that event the word וקמו would have had to apply also to the case in our Mishnah where by uttering a single vow (formula) the woman included several matters she undertook to abstain from. I would then have misunderstood the meaning of the words והחריש לה, that "her husband remained silent." The word יקום in the singular is needed then to teach that the husband has to express his consent by silence to every part of the vow in order for it to be valid.

When the Torah continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "but if her father disallow her," the words כל נדריה, "all her vows" mean that he has to disallow all parts of her vow or vows in order to make his objection legal. If he only expressed objection to his daughter's vow not to eat the figs under discussion, his objection remains meaningless until he also objects to her abstaining from the grapes she vowed not to eat at the same time. The word לא יקום recurs at the end of verse 6 in the singular again to alert us to the fact that the Torah speaks about a single vow (with more than one part) such as at the beginning of the Mishnah from Nedarim we have quoted.

According to the view of Rabbi Akiva that objection to part of her vow invalidates the whole vow and that consent to part of her vow means consent to her entire vow, our verses have to be understood in the following manner: ושמע אביה….. והחריש, "if her father remains silent when he hears about her vows, etc," the word ושמע refers to his having heard only part of her vow and his having remained silent to what he heard. In such an event the Torah legislates וקמו כל נדריה, "all her vows are valid," i.e. even the parts of her vow which her father has never heard about. The Torah then continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "if her father disallows her," meaning that even if he disallows only part of her vow, as long as he disallows part of her vow he has exercised his authority in this respect concerning her whole vow. This is why there is no need to follow this up with the words כל נדריה, "all her vows, or her entire vow, i.e. every part of it." If the meaning had been that the father had to disallow all her vows in order to be legally effective, what need was there for the Torah to add the word אותה? Seeing that the Torah saw fit to write the word אותה, it is clear that this word belongs to what follows, i.e. to the words לא יקום, it does not remain valid (singular), to inform us that the father succeeded in annulling even the part of the vow he had not specifically objected to.

Once we follow this approach the words: "and G'd will forgive her" at the end of our verse (6) make excellent sense. Supposing her father had only heard that she vowed to abstain from figs and did not even know about her also having vowed to abstain from grapes, and the woman, unaware of her father's ignorance, had nonetheless violated her vow by eating the grapes she had vowed not to eat, then G'd's forgiveness is needed because as far as she was concerned she had sinned. The news the Torah conveys with the words: "and G'd wil forgive her" is that even in such a case G'd forgives her trespass. This has to be spelled out so that we understand that the object of G'ds forgiveness is an absence of knowledge on the woman's part which was the cause of her inadvertently eating what her husband had not allowed her to eat.

Finally, according to the view of the sages that neither partial confirmation nor partial disallowance of the woman's vow is legally effective, the verse has to be understood as follows: The Torah phrased the words: "if her father hears of her vow" in the singular to alert you to the fact that the subject is a single vow, i.e. a single declaration "I will abstain from, etc.," as oppposed to a situation when the woman made two vows as I have already explained in connection with the view of Rabbi Yishmael. The Torah continues with "and her father remains silent…her entire vow (i.e. all parts of her vow) will stand." The words כל נדריה, "all her vows" refer both to what was written immediately before and prior to that. The meter of the verse then is: "if her father remains silent, i.e. under which circumstance is his silence effective to keep her vows valid? Answer: if his silence covered all parts of her vow; however, if it covered only part of her vow his silence is legally quite ineffectual."

The Torah then continues: "if her father disallows her…all her vows will not stand." The words "all her vows" now refer to what the Torah had already spoken of, i.e. if his disallowance covers all parts of previously mentioned vows, or all parts of her previously mentioned vow; then she does not even have to honour any part of her vow. The Torah reminded us by use of these words that in the event the father's disallowance had failed to cover even a single part of her vow, the words לא יקום do not apply. Although we have also said that the words כל נדריה may be applied to what follows instead of to what had been written before, the wording still makes sense as we then interpret the words לא יקום as applying, provided that all her vows are included in the disallowance; in other words the futility of cancelling part of the vow or vows would not then apply and all her vows are cancelled. All of the above applies only when she had made only a single vow though this vow included several parts as we deduced from the words: "and her father has heard her vow (singular). If, however, she had made separate vows i.e. prefacing each clause with the words: "I swear I will abstain, etc." then cancellation of one vow has nothing to do with cancellation or confirmation of the other vow.

ואם הניא אביה אתה BUT IF HER FATHER DISALLOWED HER — The Hebrew signifies, “if he withholds her” from the vow, that is to say, that he annuls it for her. I would not know what this expression הניא, “withholding”, implies (i.e., how he withholds her) — but when it states, (v. 9) “But if on the day that he hears, he withholds her and annuls [her vows]”, one must admit that “the withholding” consists in “annulling the vow” (i.e. in exclaiming מופר לך) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:6). But still the plain meaning is that it is a term for “withholding” and “removing” (and the word והפר only shows how and by what means she is to be withheld from keeping her vow); and similar is (Numbers 32:7): “And wherefore do you remove (תניאון) [the heart of the children of Israel from the idea of passing over the land]”; and so, too, (Psalms 141:5): “Oil so choice, let not my head turn away (יניא), and similar, also, (Numbers 14:34): “And ye shall know My turning aside (תנואתי)” — i.e. ye shall know that ye have turned aside from Me.

וה' יסלח לה, for having made a vow which it was not in her power to fulfill

וה' יסלח לה כי הניא אביה אותה, “and Hashem will forgive her for her father had restrained her.” The message of this verse is that G’d will forgive her only any violation committed after her father had restrained her. If the girl in question had pre-empted her father’s objection and violated her vow already, she will not be forgiven. The reason is that the father’s authority does not extend to revoking a vow retroactively, that is a privilege the Torah gave only to judges.

I would not know what this הנאה means. You might ask: Surely without that verse Rashi would still know the meaning of הנאה, for afterwards he brings the verses למה תניאון ["why do you turn away"] and אל יניא ראשי ["not turn my head"]. [Re’m] brings many more difficulties. The answer is as follows: Initially Rashi explained “He restrained her from the vow” in accordance with his later explanation that “Its plain meaning is [to restrain…].” However, since it said, “If he restrained her” I might have said that he could annul the vow solely with words, by saying, “I do not wish this vow to stand.” Therefore Rashi explained that “In other words, he nullified it.” Meaning as the Sifri teaches, that he has to explicitly nullify the vow saying, “Let it be nullified for you.” But if he did not say so and merely restrained her, then it is not annulled. It is in relation to the Sifri that Rashi says, “I would not know what this הנאה means,” meaning that according to Sifri “If her father הנאה ["restrained"] her” is in the sense of nullification, and I would not know how הנאה implies nullification. However, since the Sifri explained that at the end of the passage it says regarding the husband, “But if on the day her husband hears about it, he restrains her and then annuls” (v. 9) we see that הנאה in the context of the husband is nullification. Thus it would be logical to say that הנאה here in the context of the father is also nullification. For if it merely meant restraint, the verses would be contradictory, for “Her father restrained her” would imply mere restraint while “restrain” in the context of the husband would imply nullification, that he said, “Let it be nullified for you,” because it is written, “If… he restrains her and nullifies.” Therefore, one must say that “nullify” is the explanation of “restrain” and we see that הנאה written in the context of the father is also nullification, only that [here] the Torah wrote הנאה in place of nullification. Nonetheless, its plain meaning is to restrain and turn aside as Rashi explains above, bringing proof from Scripture. Afterwards (s.v. ‘will forgive her’) Rashi raises a difficulty: Since “Her father restrained” implies actual nullification, why is it written, “Hashem will forgive her”? Why would she need forgiveness if she did not sin, given that her vow had been annulled? He answers that regarding the husband it also writes, “Hashem will forgive her” (v. 9) and, “To whom does Scripture refer? To a woman who made a [Nazirite] vow…” This is a woman who needs forgiveness, even though the vow was annulled. So too, regarding the father and daughter, it refers to a daughter who made a Nazirite vow where her father heard… She too needs forgiveness, since she was not aware that it was nullified, and transgressed her vow, as Rashi explains. He expands more upon this, see there. (Kitzur Mizrochi). Regarding Rashi’s comment about the youth, that if she took a Nazirite vow and he nullified it etc., Mahari raises the difficulty that there is no punishment in the heavenly court until the age of twenty. He answers that this could be where she vowed not to eat meat for twenty years, meaning her vow continued until after she had reached twenty, and became independent. If she then transgressed her vow, she would require atonement. He discusses this at length but finally he raises the difficulty with his answer that it is inconceivable that she would not hear or know about the nullification until the age of twenty. It appears to me that the matter is not dependent upon any punishment, for even an older woman would not be punished, given that her husband had annulled the vow. However, there would still be some blemish to her soul. Here too with the youth, since she knew to whom she made the vow [in the case where she was a minor], and all the more so if she was older than twelve where she would be liable to punishment in the earthly court, her soul would be somewhat blemished because her intention was to sin.

וה' יסלח לה AND THE LORD SHALL FORGIVE HER — Of what is Scripture here speaking? Of a woman who, e.g., vowed that she would become a Nazarite, and whose father heard it and annulled it for her, but she knew it not, and transgressed her vow and drank wine or made herself unclean by means of a corpse. It is such a woman who requires forgiveness even though it (her vow) has been annulled. — And if those whose vows have been annulled require forgiveness in such a case, how much more is this so for those whose vows have not been annulled and have been transgressed! (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:6; cf. Kiddushin 81b).

כי הניא אביה אותה, and at the time she made the vow she had not known that her father would object to it. It had been her intention to honour her vow.

ואם היו תהיה לאיש AND IF SHE BECOMES A MAN’S — (a phrase used for marriage). This refers to a woman who becomes betrothed (ארוסה). Or perhaps this is not so, but it refers to a married woman (one who has joined her husband; cf. Rashi on Leviticus 21:9). When, however, it says, (v. 11) “And if she vowed in her husband’s house”, it is evident that a married woman is being spoken of there, and here, therefore, the text is speaking of one who has been only betrothed. And it (the separate mention of her) is intended to make a different rule about her — that her father and her husband must annul her vow: if the father annulled and the husband did not annul, or the husband annulled and the father did not annul, then this vow is not regarded as annulled, and it is not necessary to state (and it is a matter of course) that if one of them confirmed the vow the other has no power to annul it (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:7; Nedarim 67a).

AND IF SHE WERE AT ALL [BETROTHED] TO A MAN, AND THERE ARE VOWS UPON HER. In the opinion of our Rabbis⁴⁵Nedarim 71a. Scripture [here] is saying: “and if she, this woman [mentioned above in Verses 4-6] were at all [betrothed] to a man, and bound herself by a bond, being in her father’s house, in her youth⁴⁶Verse 4. — and there are vows upon her, meaning that her father had not heard them, so that they were neither annulled nor confirmed, and her [betrothed] husband hears them as well [as her father who hears them now when she is betrothed], then he makes void her vow,⁴⁷Verse 9. signifying that he also joins [now] with the father in annulling her vows [that are upon her].”

But perhaps to a “nesuah.” Meaning that although the plain understanding of הויה [lit. "being" having the connotation of marriage] refers to kiddushin [betrothal], nonetheless, we also find הויה referring to relations as in “his virgin [sister] who is close to him, who was not היתה ["married"] to a man” (Vayikra 21:3) where [היתה] refers to relations, meaning she was a nesuah. Thus, I would have said that הויה here also refers to relations and a she was a nesuah, such that both the father and the husband would annul her vow. However “when it says…”

V. 7. ואם היה תהיה לאיש וגו׳. Erst V. 11 ואם בית אישה נדרה spricht von נשואה, von dem Verhältnis der Frau nach ihrer Verheiratung, wenn sie bereits in das Haus des Mannes übergegangen ist. ואם היה תהיה לאיש bezeichnet daher nur die persönliche Aneignung, קידושין, und handelt von dem Verhältnis einer נערה המאורסה, die sich noch בבית אביה befindet und als נערה noch der Gelobungshut des Vaters angehört. Für eine solche statuiert das Gesetz, dass אביה ובעלה מפירין נדריה, dass Vater und Verlobter nur in Gemeinschaft ihr Gelübde hindernde Einsprache tun können, und zwar steht dem ארוס das Veto zu und ist das Veto des Vaters auch an seine Einsprache gebunden, selbst נדריה עליה, selbst hinsichtlich der Gelübde, die sie schon vor den אירוסין gelobt, ohne dass vor den אירוסין der Vater sie vernommen und Einsprache getan, während dem Ehemann die Einsprache nur hinsichtlich während der Ehe getaner Gelübde zusteht, אין הבעל מפר בקודמין (Nedarim 66b u. 67a). — ואם היה תהיה selbst bei wiederholten אירוסין, wenn der erste ארוס gestorben. War sie beim Tode des ארוס noch נערה, so tritt sie wieder ganz unter die Gelobungsobhut des Vaters zurück, מת הארוס נתרוקנה רשות לאב (daselbst 70a), verlobt sie sich wieder als נערה, so teilt der Vater wieder sein Einspruchsrecht mit dem zweiten ארוס (daselbst 17a). Stirbt aber der Vater während des אירוסין-Standes, so steht dem ארוס allein keine Einsprache zu (daselbst 70b) מת האב לא נתרוקנה רשות לבעל.

או מבטא שפתיה, “or the utterance of her lips;” this does not refer to a casual few words, but is an alternate formula describing an oath, as we know from Leviticus 5,4: כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים, “or if one swears clearly with his lips etc.”

ונדריה עליה [AND IF SHE BECOMES A MAN’S] AND HER VOWS ARE UPON HER — It means that she had made the vows being in her father’s house, and her father did not hear them, and so they were neither annulled nor confirmed at the time of her betrothal (cf. Sifrei Bamidbar 153:7).

And the phrase she were at all ‘to a man’ means that she is [promised] unto him but [still] is in her father’s house, and has not yet come to his [the man’s] house, and [hence] this must refer to a betrothed girl, for Scripture calls her too, the wife of his fellow.⁴⁸Deuteronomy 22:23. Thus she is already called the wife of the man to whom she is betrothed, in the same way that here he is described as her ish (man) — literally “husband.” Now our Rabbis did not explain [that this verse refers to a fully-married wife, and teaches] that a husband himself can annul the vows of his married wife which she “brought along” from her father’s house to his house, as would seem the simple meaning of the verse, for if that were so, why would Scripture have to repeat itself and say [in Verse 11], And if a woman vowed in her husband’s house, for if he can annul [even] those vows which preceded [his marriage to her], surely [he can annul] those vows which [she makes whilst she is] in his house!⁴⁹So why, then would the Torah state the obvious (in Verse 11): And if a woman vowed in her husband’s house etc.? It must be because Verses 7-9 speak about a betrothed woman, in which case both the father and the betrothed do jointly annul her vow. “If the father revoked the vow but not the betrothed, or if the betrothed revoked it but not the father, the vow is not revoked. Still less need it be said if one of them explicitly confirmed the vow” (Nedarim 67a). — It should be noted that the term “betrothed” in this connection has reference to the actual “betrothal” of a man to a woman to be his wife [not a mere “engagement”]. In the eyes of the Jewish law she is then considered his wife, except that the consummation of the marriage takes place some time after the betrothal. And [even without resorting to this reasoning], it is the tradition [of the Rabbis] which decides [the true meaning of the verses].

So this must mean an “arusah.” For here it is written ואם היו תהיה לאיש ["if she is married to a man"] which is in the sense of הויה ["marriage"] and kiddushin.

That her father and husband annul her vow. Meaning that the Torah did not group them [the nesuah and arusah] together so that it could distinguish between them, teaching about an arusah that her father and husband annul her vow, which is not the case for a nesuah. Afterwards Rashi explains that one should not say that [between] her father and her husband one of them can annul it, for this is not so, because “if the father annulled…” as is explained in the continuation of the passage.

If one of them endorsed it. We have said that if one annulled and one was silent then it is not annulled. Even more so if one endorsed, the other would not be able to annul.

But her father did not hear them — they were neither annulled. Because if the father annulled [the vows], they would not have to be annulled any further.

Nor endorsed. Because if the father endorsed [the vows], the husband’s annulment would not help. [In the case of an arusah] if the father did not annul while the husband did, it would not help, as Rashi explained above that “[if the father] annulled but not [the husband]…” Consequently, even more so if the father endorsed the vows, they could not be annulled by the husband’s annulment.

ושמע אישה וגו׳ BUT IF HER HUSBAND HEARD etc. — Here you have the case that if the husband confirmed the vow, it is confirmed. (That the father may confirm the vows of his betrothed daughter is given in v. 5 which statement applies also to w. 6 ff. — see Note).

ושמע אישה...והחריש לה, “and her husband hears of it (her vow) and remains silent concerning it;” the word אישה in this verse means הארוס שלה, her husband-to-be, fiance who gave her קידושין.

V. 8. ושמע אישה. Nach der rezipierten Halacha (daselbst 73a) kann sowohl der Mann als der Vater, ohne selbst ein spezielles Gelübde gehört zu haben, allgemein gegen den Bestand etwa der Tochter und der Verlobten obliegender Gelübde Einsprache tun, und war es daher דרך ת׳׳ח עד שלא היתה בתו יוצאת מאצלו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת בתוך ביתי הרי הן מופרין וכן הבעל עד שלא תכנס לרשותו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת עד שלא תכנסי לרשותי הרי הן מופרין שמשתכנס לרשותו אינו יכול להפר (daselbst 72b). — וקמו וגו׳ und könnte dann der Vater einseitig nicht mit Erfolg Einsprache tun.

ושמע אישה, “and her husband hears about it;” here Rashi comments that the Torah implies that her husband had silently approved of his wife’s vow that it remains valid. [Our author appears to have had a different version of Rashi’s commentary from that which appears in our editions. Ed.]

והפר את נדרה AND HE (THE HUSBAND) ANNULS HER VOW — One might think that since confirmation by the husband does not require the assent of the father, in the case mentioned here it is annulled even if the father has not annulled it! It, however, states, (v. 17): "[These are the laws … relating to a father with his daughter] בנעריה בית אביה" which means: so long as she is בנעריה (not fully married) she is under her father’s control (Sifrei Bamidbar 155; Ketuvot 46b).

ואם ביום שמוע אישה אותה ...וה' יסלח לה, “and if on the day her husband hears about it ..he revokes it, etc.” the verse speaks about a situation when the father of the girl has already made use of his right to annul her vow. Under such circumstances her husband has the right to complete the annulment commenced in part by her father. This is why the Torah first wrote the additional words בנעוריה בית אביה, “while she was not of age and in her father’s house.” If the (wife) in question had made vows (in her father’s house while he was alive) prior to her becoming betrothed to her husband, her husband cannot revoke them. This is the meaning of Nedarim 72 that the husband cannot revoke vows made by his wife before she became betrothed to him, seeing that the principle that she automatically presumes her husband’s consent to such a vow would not have applied while she did not even know who her husband was going to be.
This assumption that vows are made on the understanding that both father and husband do not object is the only reason why a vow, i.e. an undertaking of Biblical force can be revoked by a husband invoking only rabbinical force. The example we have in mind is a twelve-year old who is fatherless but mature enough to understand the meaning of her vows who has been given in marriage to her husband by her mother.
The situation of a widowed woman we mentioned as category 4 above refers only to a woman who became a widow after having been fully married (חופה), i.e. after having lived with her husband. Her status, as well as that of a divorcee, is that she had no longer been under the authority of her father at all. Seeing that the authority of her father had ceased completely after she had received חופה, the final stage of becoming married, her father will not again have any authority over her regardless of her age. This also proves that the institution of חופה is Biblical in its legal force, and that once there had been חופה, if her husband is a priest he must defile himself at her burial, is entitled to inherit her, and is exclusively entitled to revoke her vows [inasmuch as they affect him. Ed.]

Perhaps even if the father did not annul… (Nachalas Yaakov) There is no doubt that [the title of this comment, as it appeared in the text of the Sifsei Chachamim] is a copyist’s error, for that verse (v. 13) refers back to “If she took the vow in her husband’s home” (v. 11) and the case where she was married. However, the text of Re’m is correct, for [its heading] reads, “He then annuls her vow.”

V. 9. ואם ביום וגו׳, wohl aber wird die Geltung des Gelübdes gestört, wenn zu der Einsprache des Vaters dann auch die Einsprache des ארוס hinzukommt.

All through her youth she is under her father’s jurisdiction. Rashi means to say that above when it is written (v. 7) ואם היו תהיה לאיש ["and if she is married to a man"], it should have written אם תהיה ["if she is married to a man"]. However, the [letter] vav links it to the previous subject where it is written (v. 6), “Her father restrained her…” [i.e. where the father annulled her vow]. Consequently, when we expound that "all the profits of a youth belong to her father" from the verse, “In her youth, while in her father’s home” (v. 17) this also implies that here she would require the annulment of her father. Thus, there is no difference between an arusah and an unmarried girl, for the [conjunctive letter] vav links it to the previous subject where she was also under the jurisdiction of the father, and would refer to an arusah who is under the jurisdiction of both [the husband and the father]. Re’m explains that if it had referred specifically to an unmarried girl, but that the jurisdiction of the father had been removed from an arusah, why is it necessary to say “In her youth, while in her father’s house” (v. 17) a second time? Surely it had already written “In her father’s home, in her youth” (v. 4). Both of these explanations are in the Gemara, as Re’m also mentions. Thus, the verse, “If she is married” refers to a woman who imposed a prohibition [on herself] in her father’s home during her youth, where her vow was still upon her since her father had not heard about it. Subsequently, if after she became betrothed her father heard about it, he would also be party to its nullification.

כל אשר אסרה על נפשה יקום עליה [BUT THE VOW OF A WIDOW AND OF ONE WHO IS DIVORCED] EVERYTHING WHEREWITH SHE HATH BOUND HER SOUL SHALL STAND AGAINST HER — because she is not under the control of a father or under the control of a husband. Scripture is speaking of one who is a widow after having been fully married (נשואה) (Sifrei Bamidbar 154:1), but in the case of one who becomes a widow after having only been betrothed, if her husband dies his entire authority becomes emptied (void) and returns to her father (Nedarim 70a).

A widow after nisuin. The explanation is as follows: A widow is not under the jurisdiction of the father and a divorcee is not under the jurisdiction of the husband regarding the nullification [of vows]. You might ask: Why would one think that he could annul [the vow]? The answer is that once we find that the husband can annul a vow even if it was not made under his jurisdiction, such as where she made a vow in her father’s house, [one would have said] all the more so that he could annul [this vow] for her, since she made it under his jurisdiction. Therefore, Rashi explains that she is not under the jurisdiction of the husband.

V. 10. Vers 7 hat durch die wiederholte הויה bereits den Fall besprochen, wenn sie wiederholt eine ארוסה geworden, also dass ihre ersten אירוסין durch den Tod oder גרושין gelöst worden, und war da nach Nedarim 70b מקיש קודמי הויה שניה לקודמי הויהרשונה das töchterliche Verhältnis vor der zweiten Verlobung dem töchterlichen Verhältnis vor der ersten Verlobung gleichgestellt, מה קודמי הויה ראשונה אב מיפר לחודיה אף קודמי הויה שניה אב מיפר לחודיה, auch nach aufgehobenen אירוסין steht das Einspruchsrecht vollkommen wieder dem Vater zu, wie ursprünglich vor den אירוסין. היה תהיה die beiden Verlobungen und die Übergänge zu ihnen sind gleich. Damit ist denn gegeben, dass אלמנה oder גרושה מן האירוסין, so lange sie גערה ist, wieder unter der Gelobungshut des Vaters steht und unser Vers kann nur von אלמנה וגרושה מן הנשואין reden. Sobald sie als נשואה in des Mannes Haus überging, war sie für immer aus dem Hause des Vaters ausgetreten, und selbst wenn die Ehe durch Tod oder Scheidung gelöst worden, tritt sie selbst in den נערה-Jahren nicht wieder in die alte Stellung hinsichtlich der Gelübde zum Vater zurück, und was sie in solchem oder נרושה-Stand gelobt, das יקום עליה, das kann weder der Vater in der Gegenwart, noch der Mann bei einer einstigen Wiederverheiratung durch Einsprache aufheben; denn, wie bereits zu V. 7 bemerkt, אין הבעל מפר בקודמין. Nur, wie es V. 11 heißt: אם בית אישה נדרה nur gegen die während der Ehe getanen Gelübde gilt die Einsprache des Mannes.

ואם בית אישה נדרה AND IF SHE VOWED IN HER HUSBAND’S HOUSE — Here Scripture is speaking of a woman who is fully married (Sifrei Bamidbar 154:1; Nedarim 67a).

ואם בית אשה נדרה, this is in contrast to the scenario described earlier in verse 7, where vows made before the woman became married or betrothed are discussed. Seeing that these verses are sequential it is clear that the husband has the right to countermand vows made before the woman’s marriage if they interfere with his quality of life.

Scripture refers to a nesuah. (Gur Aryeh) The reason why the Torah did not place “But if she took a vow in her husband’s home” before the verse, “The vow of a widow” (v. 10) which speaks about a case after marriage, is because the Torah was not being specific when it said, “Widow or a divorced woman.” For the same holds true for an adult who is unmarried, [since] the father does not have jurisdiction over her, her vow stands like that of a widow. Thus the verses are in order, for first it speaks of a youth who is under the jurisdiction of her father entirely, and afterwards, “And if she was married to a man” where she is under the jurisdiction of her father and her husband. Then [it refers to] a woman who is not under the jurisdiction of the father [i.e.] a widow or a divorced woman, with the same being true for an adult. Next, [it refers to] a nesuah who is entirely under the jurisdiction of her husband.

V. 11. ואם בית אישה נדרה siehe zu V. 10.

ואם הפר יפר אותם אישה, "But if her husband will surely declare her vow null and void, etc." In order to understand why the Torah repeated the word הפר and why the Torah wrote the words כל מוצא שפתיה, "everything which her lips uttered," can be understood with the help of Nedarim 82. We are told there in the name of Shemuel that "if she vowed not to eat two loaves of bread, and observing her vow concerning one of these loaves represents hardship for her, [i.e. it looks very appetizing Ed.] whereas abstaining from the other loaf does not represent any hardship for her, then, if the husband cancels the loaf which represents hardship, he automatically is also considered as having cancelled the vow not to eat the other loaf." It is such a situation which our verse envisaged when referring to two הפרות, cancellations, or breaching of the vow. Once the husband has cancelled the part of her vow which is subject to his prerogative to cancel, he has also cancelled the part which is not subject to his authority to cancel. [one must appreciate here that the husband's entire authority stems from the fact that if his wife suffers emotionally as a result of her vow, this disturbs the harmonious relationship between him and his wife. Ed.] The Torah goes on with כל מוצא שפתיה לא יקום, that none of her utterances are valid. This means that even if her husband disallowed those parts of her vow over which he has no legal authority, they become ineffective because he has already disallowed the parts over which he does have legal authority. According to the approach of Rav Assi who disagreed with this interpretation in Nedarim, claiming that the prerogative of the woman's husband extends only to the part of the vow which is burdensome for her and therefore potentially also for him, we would have to explain the words in this verse as follows: אם הפר, "if the husband disallows something which he is entitled to disallow," יפר, "his objection is legally valid;" it is not valid, however, concerning parts of his wife's vow which does not have the potential to bother him and which therefore is excluded from this whole legislation. The reason the Torah had to write both the word כל and the word נדריה was to inform us that even if the vow is made up of two parts only one of which is burdensome for the wife, the parts of the vow are lumped together for the purpose of disallowing it.

V. 13. וד׳ יסלח לה selbst, wenn sie, ohne die הפרה des Mannes erfahren zu haben, gegen ihre Gelübde gehandelt (Nasir 23 a), durch die הפרה des Mannes ist die Geltung des Gelübdes entweder für immer oder doch für die Zeit ihrer Ehe mit ihm objektiv aufgehoben (siehe zu V. 14).

Our verse becomes clearer when we consider what the Mishnah says in Nedarim 87 [The subject is a husband or father who has failed to dissolve his wife's or his daughter's vow within the prescribed period of time because he was unaware of part of the legislation and who now explains his dilemma to a collegium of judges. Ed.] When someone says: "I am aware that there are regulations regarding the keeping of vows, but I was unaware of my right to disallow some such vows;" he is allowed to disallow the vow in question at the later date when he was told the regulations. Alternatively, this petitioner says: "I am aware that there are regulations concerning disallowing certain vows, but I was not aware of the regulations which pertain to keeping the vows." In such a case Rabbi Meir holds that the petitioner is not now allowed to disallow the vow in question whereas the sages hold that he is allowed to do so. Thus far the Mishnah. The words הפר יפר in our verse may refer to the situation discussed in the Mishnah we just quoted. In other words, even if the error concerned only the disallowing of the vow, if the husband disallows it belatedly because he was unaware of the law he may do so (in accordance with the view of the sages). As to the view of Rabbi Meir, the repetition of the words הפר יפר may be understood thus: "there are occasions when even after the time has elapsed we allow the husband or father to exercise the right to disallow his wife's or his daughter's vow which the Torah has provided; however this belated disallowing is only possible if the petitioner did not know that he possessed such a right at all." According to the view of Rabbi Meir, לנדריה means: "when is her husband able to disallow her vows even after the time set aside for this by the Torah has elapsed? If her husband did not make an error once he became aware of his rights under this legislation." According to the view of the sages, the word לנדריה would simply mean: "when he became aware of the nature of her vows." The word would then teach you that even though the husband's error concerned the vow itself and not his ability to disallow it, he is permitted to disallow it once he finds out that he had been in error.

כל נדר וכל שבעת אסר וגו׳ EVERY VOW AND EVERY BINDING OATH [TO AFFLICT THE SOUL HER HUSBAND MAY CONFIRM IT OR HER HUSBAND MAY ANNUL IT] — Because it states that a husband may annul his wife’s vows, one might think that all vows are implied! It therefore states: “[every vow] …to afflict the soul” — he may annul only vows to afflict the soul, and these are set forth in Treatise Nedarim 79b.

EVERY VOW, AND EVERY BINDING OATH TO AFFLICT THE SOUL, [HER HUSBAND MAY ESTABLISH IT, AND HER HUSBAND MAY MAKE IT VOID]. “Since He had said [in the preceding verses] that a husband may annul [his wife’s vows], I might think that this includes all her vows! Scripture therefore says, to afflict the soul, meaning that he can only annul vows which afflict the soul, and they are explained in Tractate Nedarim.” These are the words of Rashi. But his language here is [too] concise, because a husband annuls vows which afflict the soul, such as [if she vows] “The fruits of the world be forbidden to me,” or even if she [only] vowed that she would not taste one of all the kinds [of fruits]; and likewise he may annul matters [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, even if they do not involve affliction of the soul, such as [if she swore] “I will not paint [my eyes]” or “I will not put powder on my face,” or “I will not have sexual intercourse,” these being matters about which He said, between a man and his wife,⁵⁰Further, Verse 17. as is explained in the last chapter of Tractate Nedarim.⁵¹Nedarim 79b. Such is also the law with respect to the father himself, as we have been taught in the Sifre:⁵²Sifre, Matoth 155. “I only know that a husband may annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and vows which afflict the soul, [to the exclusion of other vows which he may not annul]. Whence do I know that the father [is similarly limited in his rights]? You can reason [in the following manner] etc… But I have not succeeded in establishing [the father’s law] by reason. Therefore Scripture says: These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter.⁵⁰Further, Verse 17. [This teaches us that] we must of necessity compare the father to the husband, sothat just as the husband may only annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and matters which involve affliction of the soul, so also the father may only annul matters [which concern the laws] between him and her,⁵³Such as if she vows not to give him the wages for her work. and matters which involve affliction of the soul.” It is also taught in this way in the Gemara Yerushalmi of Tractate Nedarim.⁵⁴Yerushalmi Nedarim XI, 1. For “Yerushalmi” see Vol. III, p. 192, Note 44.

כל נדר וכל שבועת איסר לענות נפש, “any vow or any prohibition by oath, the purpose of which is to diminish one’s quality of life, etc.” This verse tells us that the husband has no power to rescind a vow by his wife unless it impinges on his quality of life; for instance, if his wife vowed not to partake of certain foodstuffs forever, and the change in her diet has definitively negative effect on her health, something that it is in her husband’s interest to preserve. The same applies to matters that affect the interpersonal relationship between husband and wife, such as the wife vowing not to use any cosmetics, something that will make her unattractive in the eyes of her husband. Anything that is within the province of a husband to rescind is also within the province of a father to rescind. The Torah equated father and husband by writing בין איש לאשתו ובין אב לבתו, “between a man and his wife or between a father and his daughter.”

כל נדר וכל שבועת אסר לענות נפש, “any vow or oath which results in a personal affliction, etc.” Here the Torah teaches that the fact that the Torah has granted the husband of a woman the right to interfere with her vows and to annul them is not a carte blanche applicable to any type of vow. The husband’s authority applies only when such a vow results in personal pain or discomfort also involving him in his marital status. If his wife were to vow not to wash or bathe herself, keeping such a vow would clearly interfere with their marital life; as a result of such considerations the Torah permitted her husband a veto power over such vows. It goes without saying that the husband can veto any vow of his wife which would interfere directly with their family life together. The husband’s authority extends to his wife’s vowing not to use eye-shadow or even certain products for sale in specific stores. We derive all this from the words בין איש לאשתו “between man and his wife,” in verse 17. The reason the husband has the right to interfere in vows concerning either ענוי נפש, self-affliction, and matters directly involving inter-marital relations is that his wife (any wife) is subservient to her husband in two areas; he is entitled to demand that his wife appear attractive to him and not take measures which result in her becoming physically repugnant to her husband. Our sages in Ketuvot 62 understood this concept as derived form Genesis 3,20 “for she (Chavah) is the mother of all living beings,” as meaning that the wife’s purpose in life is to enhance the quality of life of her husband not the reverse.
In matters of their sexual relations there is no need for additional proof that the wife is subservient to the needs of her husband as denial by the wife of the husband’s legitimate rights whether with a vow or without a vow means that she endangers her marriage and would forfeit her כתובה upon being divorced for cause. In matters which have no bearing on the successful relations between husband and wife the husband has no authority to interfere with his wife’s vows.

He may only annul vows which are self-denial. For example, that she may not taste anything [that I prepare] or that she may not drink any beverage.

V. 14. כל נדר וגו׳. Die Einsprachbefugnis des Mannes wird hier auf נדרי עינוי נפש, auf solche Gelübde beschränkt, die eine Vernachlässigung der Gesundheitspflege oder eine Gemüts- und Lebensgenussverkümmerung einschließen. Dazu kommen noch nach der an das בין איש לאשתו des V. 17 sich knüpfenden Halacha: דברים שבינו לבינה, Gelübde, die die Beziehungen der Gatten zu einander beeinträchtigen. Die ersteren sind mit der הפרה des Mannes für immer aufgehoben, die letzteren nur für die Ehe mit diesem Manne (Nedarim 79b).

מיום אל יום [BUT IF HER HUSBAND ALTOGETHER HOLD HIS PEACE AT HER] FROM DAY TO DAY — In order that you should not say that ביום שמעו in v. 13 means that the husband has the right of annulling from the time on the day when she made the vow to the same time on the next day (i.e., twenty-four hours), it accordingly states מיום אל יום, i.e., from the day when she makes the vow up to the next day, — to tell you that he may annul the vow only up to when it becomes dark, [for then another day begins] (cf. Nedarim 76b).

ואם החרש יחריש, when someone who has the authority to cancel a vow keeps silent when he hears it, it is as if he had given his consent by not voicing his objection.

So that you should not say [he may annul] for twenty-four hours. Rashi wishes to answer the question: Why is it necessary to write, “From one day to the next”? We cannot say it comes to teach that if he did not annul it on the day he heard, he can no longer annul it. For the Torah had already written (v. 8), “And her husband heard about them and remained silent on the day he heard, then [her vows] shall stand.” Rashi answers that if it had not written, “From one day to the next” one might have said that previously when it wrote, “On the day he heard” this was [measured] from "moment to moment," namely a twenty-four hour period.

V. 15. ואם החרש יחריש לה, selbst בשותק על מנת למיקט (Nedarim 79a). selbst wenn er nicht in der Absicht geschwiegen, das Gelübde aufrecht zu halten, sondern nur, um die Frau eine Zeit lang in der Schwebe zu lassen und dann Einsprache zu tun, ist mit Sonnenuntergang, und Ende des Tages, an welchem er von dem Gelübde gehört, die Einsprache nicht weiter möglich. Ein Schweigen in zustimmender Absicht gibt dem Gelübde sofort Bestand und kann selbst an demselben Tage keine Einsprache mehr geschehen קיים בלבו קיים (daselbst).

Until nightfall. Meaning that if he heard during the day, even if it was close to sunset, once he remained silent until nightfall he can no longer annul.

אחרי שמעו [BUT IF HE SHALL AT ALL ANNUL THEM] AFTER HE HATH HEARD THEM i.e., after he has heard and confirmed them — that he had said, “I am content with it”, then if he turns and annuls it even on the same day (Sifrei Bamidbar 156:2).

[BUT IF HE SHALL MAKE THEM NULL AFTER THAT HE HATH HEARD THEM], THEN HE SHALL BEAR HER INIQUITY — “he [the husband] takes her place.⁵⁵According to Rashi the verse speaks about a case where the husband confirmed his wife’s vow, and then on the same day annulled it, which he can no longer do. If she only heard about the annulment but not about the confirmation, and therefore unknowingly violated her oath — he bears her iniquity. Ramban presents another interpretation. Thus we learn that one who causes somebody else to commit an offense takes the place of that person with respect to all punishments [which that person would otherwise incur].” This is Rashi’s language, taken from the Sifre.⁵⁶Sifre, Matoth 156. It would appear that this woman [broke her vow] in error or was misled, for Scripture speaks [here] of a husband who heard [his wife’s vow and did not annul it on that day], and the wife does not know about this, and after some time he “annulled” [the vow, although he in fact no longer had the power to do so], and told her that [he annulled it] in the day he heard it.⁵⁷Above, Verse 15. Thus Scripture teaches us two things: that the husband bears her iniquity as if he had made a vow and profaned his word, and that she is totally free and not liable to any of the punishments [found elsewhere] for errors.⁵⁸See Ramban on Leviticus 1:4, (towards the end). But if the wife knows that he [her husband] did not annul it in the day he heard it,⁵⁷Above, Verse 15. and she is versed in this law [that he only has a right to annul her vows on the day that he hears it, and not later, and nonetheless she breaks her vow], then she is the guilty one, and [since] the husband did not cause the offense, therefore his punishment is [only] like that of someone who can protest [at another person committing a sin] and does not protest.
Now Scripture mentions this case with reference to a husband [misleading his wife to think that he annulled her vow in the day he heard it,⁵⁷Above, Verse 15. when in actual fact he “annulled” it only afterwards when he no longer had the right to], although the same law applies to a father [and his daughter’s vows], because Scripture speaks of normal circumstances, that a father usually guards himself against doing this because of his love for his daughter, whereas a husband might perhaps hate his wife and think that he will make her guilty [by misleading her to break her vow]. Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra wrote: “Then he shall bear her iniquity, because she is under his control.” If so, the verse is speaking of a case where he forces her to do that which she has bound herself⁴⁷Verse 9. [not to do, and it is then that he shall bear her iniquity]. But it is not correct [since the same laws obviously apply when he misleads her without actually forcing her].

ואם הפר יפר אותם אחרי שמעו, more than 24 hours after he had heard about it, i.e. when the period during which he could have cancelled it had expired, he can no longer change his mind;

ואם הפר יפר, "and if he surely decides to disallow, etc." This verse means that even when the vows he now decides to disallow are the type which he could have disallowed during the prescribed period, now that he has waited too long, he can no longer exercise his authority but must bear her guilt (if she violates her vow).

ואם הפר יפר אותם אחרי שמעו, and she does not even know that her husband had become aware of her vow, she must bear the burden of having violated her vow. Although, legally, her husband’s cancellation is effective, since she was not aware of this she had sinned unintentionally by violating her vow seeing she did not know that it was no longer valid.

ונשא את עונה, ”and he shall bear her iniquity.” If someone, -in this case the husband- causes someone else to commit a sin, the latter person is burdened with that guilt. In this instance, the husband, by rescinding his wife’s vow after the time limit for this privilege had expired, thereby deceived his wife into believing that her vow had been cancelled. If she then violates the terms of her vow, it is the husband who bears the iniquity.

Saying, “I approve.” Rashi wishes to answer the question: Why is it written, “If he annuls them after having heard them, he must bear her transgression” which implies that if he annuls them immediately after hearing, he will bear her transgression? But surely [in doing so] he has acted appropriately. We cannot explain that if he heard and endorsed, then later annulled on the same day, they would be annulled. For if so, why does the Torah say, “After having heard them” which implies that if he did not annul her vows immediately upon hearing them, he may not go back and annul them? Therefore, one must say that if he heard her vow and said, “I approve” that he can no longer annul it, even during the same day.

V. 16. ואם הפר, wenn er nach schweigender oder ausdrücklicher Zustimmung sie dennoch zum Brechen des Gelübdes bringt, trägt er ihre Schuld.

ונשא את עונה, “and he will bear the burden of her guilt.” She was as if having acted under compulsion, as she was under the impression that her husband was able to cancel her vow even after he had known about it for more than 24 hours.

ונשא את עונה HE SHALL BEAR HER INIQUITY — He takes her place. We learn from here that he who makes another take a false step takes his place in respect to all punishments which he would incur (Sifrei Bamidbar 156:2).

ונשא את עונה, the same guilt as that of a person who forces someone else to commit a violation of Torah law, or who teaches Torah other than according to the halachah, thereby misleading the student.

בין איש לאשתו, בין אב לבתו, “between man and his wife, between father and his daughter.” Our sages in Sifri Mattot 156 drew a comparison between husband and father. Just as the husband is only permitted to revoke those vows of his wife which either directly affect their marital relations or which represent an affliction upon his wife threatening to make her repulsive to her husband’s eyes, so the father also may only cancel vows of his daughter if they are either an affliction for his daughter undermining her health, or otherwise disturb the normal relationship between father and daughter. If, for instance, the daughter had vowed not to provide the services for her father which a daughter is expected to perform for him, the father is entitled to declare such a vow as null and void. This is also spelled out specifically in the Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11,1. Nachmanides, in his volume on the laws of vows, agrees with the Jerusalem Talmud.

בין איש לאשתו (siehe zu Verse 14 u. 6).,בנעריה בית אביה solange sie alsנערה dem Hause des Vaters angehört, also bis sie durchנשואין in das Haus des Mannes übergegangen.

Maimonides does not base his rulings on vows on the Jerusalem Talmud and rules that the father has an unrestricted right to cancel vows made by his daughter prior to her reaching the age of 12 and a half years. (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 12,1). He follows the plain text of the verse which does not speak of any restrictions. When the scholars from Luneil challenged Maimonides’ ruling pointing to the Sifri we quoted as their source, Maimonides told them that the author of the Sifri unless otherwise noted is Rabbi Shimon, and that we do not generally rule according to his opinion when it conflicts with the opinion of other scholars.
Concerning the subject of the efficiency and therefore desirability of making vows altogether, Maimonides writes in Hilchot Nedarim 5,23: “if someone engages in the practice of making vows to help him build his character, resist temptation, etc., then such a practice is praiseworthy. Example: if someone used to indulge in excessive consumption of wine and strong drink and he imposes upon himself a vow to abstain from drinking wine for an extended period in order to help him overcome his desire to imbibe this is a good idea. Similarly, if someone pursued illegal gains, i.e. payment for services not rendered, and the like, and he repents and wants to reinforce his resolution to desist from this in the future, he may make a vow not to accept gratuitous benefits from certain people, or even from all persons. There are other similar situations when the making of a vow is basically desirable. The principal criterion governing the desirability of a vow is if it helps the person making it to better serve his Creator.
Pursuing this line of thought, our sages in Avot 3,13 have said נדרים סיג לפרישות, “vows are a fence for abstinence.” Maimonides quotes several verses from the Bible in support of such an attitude, such as Psalms 119,106: “I have firmly sworn to keep Your just rules.” (Clearly, even David had to reinforce his resolutions with an oath). We know that Yaakov made a vow from Genesis 28,20. Our sages in Bereshit Rabbah 70,1 said that the reason that Yaakov added the word לאמור, “to say,” before spelling out the details of his vow was to tell his descendants that when they would find themselves in a situation similar to that of the patriarch Yaakov, they too should resort to making vows. In Numbers 21,2 we find that the Israelites accepted their patriarch Yaakov’s advice and vowed to destroy the Canaanites and their belongings if only the Lord would make them victorious over their attackers, the Canaanites.

Siehe ferner über נדרים zu Dewarim 23, 22 f.

Erwägen wir, dass dieser rückblickende Schlusssatz אלה החקים וגו׳ nur die in diesem Gesetzesabschnitt geregelten Beziehungen der Tochter und Frau zu Vater und Mann hervorhebt, das in V. 3 gegebene Gesetz über die Heiligkeit von Gelobungen überhaupt unerwähnt bleibt, so scheint in der Tat die Regelung dieser Beziehungen der Töchter und Frauen den eigentlichen Inhalt dieses Abschnittes zu bilden, welchem der allgemeine Ausspruch über die Verbindlichkeit der Gelübde nur einleitend, und zwar gegensätzlich, vorangeht: seine eigenen Gelübde kann ein Mann nicht lösen, für ihn liegt diese Befugnis in Händen seiner nationalen Genossen —; allein seiner Tochter und Frau gegenüber hat er eine beschränkte Befugnis der Einsprache. Aus diesem Gesichtspunkte dürfte sich denn dieses נדרים-Kapitel dem Kapitel 27 gegebenen Gesetze über das Erbrecht der Töchter, ergänzend und vielleicht motivierend, anschließen. Es ist die Bestimmung des Weibes, in das Haus eines Mannes als bedeutungsvoll integrierender Faktor aufzugehen, die ganze Erziehung im Vaterhause ist Vorbereitung dazu. Es ist aber nicht seine Bestimmung, selbständig ein Haus zu gründen. Daraus geht ebensowohl die Abhängigkeit ihrer עינוי נפש- und דברים שבינו לבינה-Gelübde von der Zustimmung des Mannes und Vaters hervor, wie wir dies zu Verse 4-6 angedeutet, als darin auch die Bestimmung ihr Motiv finden möchte, dass normal das Erbgut vom Vater nicht auf die Tochter übergeht.

That is that we were commanded to fulfill everything that we we take upon ourselves in speech, whether in an oath, a vow, charity, a sacrifice or anything else besides them. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "What issues from your lips shall you observe" (Deuteronomy 23:24). And even though they have already separated the words of this verse and arranged each word of it for various content, the intention that nevertheless comes out of all that [they] said to you is that it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill everything that he accepts upon himself, whatever it may be. And one who violates it, [also] violates a negative commandment; and behold I will explain this in my mention of the negative commandments (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 157). And in the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 265:2): "'What issues from your lips' is a positive commandment." And you know that there is no content to the statement, "what issues," alone. However the intention is that which I mentioned to you - to understand the simple meaning of the verse, that He commanded to do what one puts out with his mouth. And behold that this commandment is repeated; and that is His saying, "according to all that issues from his mouth shall he do" (Numbers 30:3). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in many places - in Shevuot, in the end of Menachot and in Tractate Kinnim as well. That is to say that the specifics of concerning oneself to do the thing that one has obligated oneself; and how one exempts oneself when he has a doubt about what he said, is found there. (See Parashat Ki Tetzeh; Mishneh Torah, Sefer Haflaah.)

That is that He commanded us to administer the nullification of vows - meaning the precept that He instructed us about these laws. However the content is not that we are obligated to annul vows no matter what. And you should understand this issue itself from me - any time you hear me counting one of the laws [as a commandment], it [need] not be a command of a specific compulsory action. Rather it is a commandment by virtue of our being commanded to administer this law for this thing (when it arises). That the husband and the father can annul them is, behold, already explained in Scripture (Numbers 30). But the tradition comes [and informs us] that a sage can also annul a vow, as well as an oath. And the hint to this is in His saying, "he may not void his word" (Numbers 30:3) - he may not void his word, but others may void it for him. More generally, there is certainly no proof to this from Scripture; and they say (Chagigah 10a), "The annulment of vows floats in the air." So it does not have any [bona fide] support, but it is rather [known] from the true tradition. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Nedarim. (See Parashat Matot; Mishneh Torah, Vows 12.)