민수기 30:5의 주석

ושמע אביה את נדרה..וקמו כל נדריה, and her father hears about her vow;….all her vows shall stand." We need to understand why the verse first speaks about "her vow" in the singular and then continues to speak about "her vows" in the plural. Besides, why did the Torah add the word: "all" both times. It would have sufficed to write: "her vows and oaths will stand," without adding the word "all" each time. Furthermore, why does the Torah use a different future tense when speaking about her vows, i.e. וקמו, whereas when speaking about an oath the woman uttered, it uses the word יקום to indicate that "it will stand?" The word יקום was altogether superfluous as the word וקמו which appeared earlier in the same verse would have referred to both vow and oath.

VV. 5 u. 6. ואם הניא וגו׳ ושמע וגו׳. An dem Tage, an welchem der Vater von der Gelobung einer seiner Obhut noch unterstehenden Tochter Kunde erhält, kann er durch Einsprache, הפרה, den Fortbestand des Gelübdes aufheben. Lässt er aber den Tag schweigend vorübergehen, so ist eine spätere Einsprache unwirksam, und zwar gilt hierfür nur die Dauer des natürlichen mit Sonnenuntergang zu Ende gehenden Tages (Nedarim 76b). — הניא von נוא der Wurzel von נא (siehe Schmot 12, 9), ist die spezifische Bezeichnung für הפרה, für die Wirkung der Einsprache des Vaters und des Mannes. Es ist dies הניא eine Unterbrechung, eine Hinderung des Fortbestandes — מיגז גיין — zum Unterschiede der התרה des חכם, welche den ganzen Bestand des Gelübdes von Anfang an aufhebt, עוקר נדר מעיקרו (Nasir 21b und 22a).

ושמע אביה, “and her father has heard about it (the vow).” The Torah speaks only about when the father has heard about his daughter’s vow from her directly. What is the legal status if he heard about her vow only from others? This is why the Torah continues that “all her vows remain in force.” Even if he heard about it only indirectly, he can use his authority to annul it within 24 hours.

We may be able to explain the wording the Torah used in our verse with the help of what we learned in Nedarim 87. The Mishnah says there: "If she said 'I swear that I will not eat either these figs or grapes,' and her husband confirms the part about her not eating figs, he has confirmed the entire vow. If the husband annulled the part of her vow concerning the figs, however she is still bound by the vow not to eat the grapes until her husband invalidates that part of her vow also. If she said: 'I swear not to eat these grapes, and I swear not to eat these figs,' she has made two separate vows.'" The Talmud explains that this Mishnah must be understood according to the view of Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the words אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו, "her husband may confirm it, or her husband may annul it," refer to the example cited in our Mishnah, that as long her husband has confirmed part of her vow he is considered as having confirmed the whole of it and his wife is bound to observe both parts of her vow. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, interprets the word יקימנו, to mean that the letters מנו in the word יקימנו (30,14) are to be understood as ממנו, "part of it.' He argues that just as her husband may confirm any part of her vow, so he may also annul any part of her vow so that partial confirmation equals total confirmation, so he only needs to annul part of her vow to invalidate all of it. Rabbi Yishmael counters that the Torah, after all, did not write ממנו, "a part of it?" Rabbi Akiva makes a conceptual comparison (מקיש) between invalidating a vow and confirming it. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees claiming that this is both Rabbi Yishmael's and Rabbi Akiva's approach, but that the other sages make the conceptual comparison between 1) confirming of a vow and 2) invalidating it. Just as in the case of invalidating a vow only the part of the vow which he has invalidated is affected, so when he has confirmed it only the part which he has actually confirmed is binding on his wife. The above is the version of our Talmud. Tossaphot, Ran and Nachmanides have a different version in which the conceptual comparison is reversed as follows: "Just as a partial annulment is not valid, so a partial confirmation is not valid (i.e. at all)." According to that version Rabbi Yishmael and the other sages share the same opinion. I believe that this is the correct version as is proved by the Tossephta.

כל נדריה וגו׳. Wie zu Verse 14 und 17 bemerkt, beschränkt sich das dem Ehemanne bei Gelobungen seiner Frau eingeräumte Veto auf נדרי עינוי נפש und דברים ל שבינו לבינה, auf körperliches Wohlbefinden gefährdende oder die gegenseitigen Beziehungen, des Gattenlebens schmälernde Gelobungen. Nach der durchaus allgemeinsten Auffassung ist auch das väterliche Veto auf dieselbe Weise beschränkt, wie dies auch im ספרי ausdrücklich gelehrt wird. Nur רמב׳׳ם 12,1 הל׳ נדרים)) erkennt dem Vater ein unbeschränktes Veto zu und hat bereits selbst in einem vom מגדל עוז (daselbst) mitgeteilten Schreiben an die חכמי לינל seine Auffassung gegen die insbesondere aus dem ספרי erhobenen Einwürfe zu verteidigen sich bemüht. Seine Verteidigungsgründe basieren außer dem unbeschränkten Wortlaute unseres Textes, vorzüglich darauf, dass die נדרי עינוי נפש, insbesondere aber die דברים שבינו לבינה, die doch bei dem Verhältnis einer Tochter zum Vater ganz andere als bei dem Verhältnis der Ehegattin zum Manne sein müssten, gar nicht hinsichtlich des Vaters im Talmud besonders behandelt werden. Dürften wir jedoch unsere zu V. 4 geäußerte Meinung für richtig anerkennen, dass selbst das dem Vater eingeräumte Veto nur aus Rücksicht auf die einstige Bestimmung der Tochter für ein Eheleben fließe, so könnten vielleicht damit diese gegen die allgemeine Auffassung geltend gemachten Schwierigkeiten von selbst sich lösen. Die דברים שבינו לבינה, gegen welche der Vater Einsprache tun kann, wären dann vielleicht in der Tat nur solche, die voraussichtlich ein friedliches und inniges Eheleben stören könnten, und die דברים שבינו לבינה für das Veto des Vaters wären in der Tat identisch mit denen des Mannes. Nicht ganz unerheblich dürfte auch dafür sprechen, dass bei dem rückblickenden Schlusssatze (V. 17) das בין איש לאשתו voransteht und sich ihm בין אב לבתו nur fast wie eine Konsequenz anschließt. Ist es doch auch schließlich dieser Satz אלה החקים וגו׳ בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו, auf welchem im ספרי die Gleichstellung des Gelobungsvetos des Vaters mit dem des Mannes basiert: מקיש את האב לבעל מה הבעל אינו מפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהם עינוי נפש אף האב אינו מפר אלא נדרים שבינו לבינה ונדרים שיש בהן עינוי נפש.

As a result of what we have heard so far, we are faced with three possible approaches to the problem. 1) The view of Rabbi Yishmael quoted by Rabbi Yehudah Hanassi when he edited the Mishnah, that as long as the husband confirmed part of his wife's vow he confirmed all of it, whereas if he annulled only part of it, the only part which is annulled is the part which he spelled out. 2) The approach of Rabbi Akiva that whenever the husband either confirmed or annulled part of his wife's vow, he has in effect confirmed or annulled all of it. 3) The approach of the sages that any partial approval or partial annulment is legally invalid. The wording of our verse can be explained satisfactorily according to the view of each one of these three approaches.

Rabbi Yishmael's view as expressed in the text of the Mishnah understands the verse as follows: "and her father (or husband) hears about her vow (singular) teaches that the verse speaks about a woman who made a single vow such as when she lumps together the figs and the grapes saying only once: "I vow not to eat, etc." This excludes a situation where she used the words "I vow not to eat" more than once in relation to two or more items she vows to abstain from.

When the Torah continues about her vows (plural) remaining in force if her husband remained silent when he heard the vow, the Torah refers to the kind of vow mentioned at the end of the Mishnah when she said: "I vow not to eat these figs, and I vow not to eat these grapes," and the husband remained silent only concerning part of her vows. Concerning such a situation, the Torah continues: "if her father heard about it and remained silent, then all her vows are in force." The reason the Torah writes "all" is to tell us that even if the husband remained silent concerning only a single part of her vow(s) i.e. he did not oppose the vow not to eat figs, all her vows remain valid. What Rabbi Yishmael meant to tell us was that the word והחריש, "he remained silent," does not mean he has to remain silent concerning the entire vow in order for it to remain valid. Had the meaning of the word והחריש been total silence by the husband or father, the Torah would not have needed to tell us that all her vows remain valid. Who would have imagined that such vows would not remain valid? The Torah therefore must have wanted us to appreciate that the words והחריש לה did not mean total silence but objection to only part of her vows.

When the Torah continues וכל אסר..יקום, "and any prohibition will remain if force," this means that when the words "all her vows (pl)" were used, the Torah did not refer to the kind of vows in which each part was introduced with the preface "I will not eat, etc.," but to vows in which a number of prohibitions were all lumped together under a single heading of: "I will not eat such an such, such and such, etc." The fact that the Torah uses the term אסר in connection with the rule יקום is no problem as the laws for vows or oaths are interchangeable as we know from verse 3 where the Torah speaks of "or."

The reason the Torah writes יקום instead of merely relying on the word וקמו which preceded it in the same verse, is that in that event the word וקמו would have had to apply also to the case in our Mishnah where by uttering a single vow (formula) the woman included several matters she undertook to abstain from. I would then have misunderstood the meaning of the words והחריש לה, that "her husband remained silent." The word יקום in the singular is needed then to teach that the husband has to express his consent by silence to every part of the vow in order for it to be valid.

When the Torah continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "but if her father disallow her," the words כל נדריה, "all her vows" mean that he has to disallow all parts of her vow or vows in order to make his objection legal. If he only expressed objection to his daughter's vow not to eat the figs under discussion, his objection remains meaningless until he also objects to her abstaining from the grapes she vowed not to eat at the same time. The word לא יקום recurs at the end of verse 6 in the singular again to alert us to the fact that the Torah speaks about a single vow (with more than one part) such as at the beginning of the Mishnah from Nedarim we have quoted.

According to the view of Rabbi Akiva that objection to part of her vow invalidates the whole vow and that consent to part of her vow means consent to her entire vow, our verses have to be understood in the following manner: ושמע אביה….. והחריש, "if her father remains silent when he hears about her vows, etc," the word ושמע refers to his having heard only part of her vow and his having remained silent to what he heard. In such an event the Torah legislates וקמו כל נדריה, "all her vows are valid," i.e. even the parts of her vow which her father has never heard about. The Torah then continues: ואם הניא אביה אותה, "if her father disallows her," meaning that even if he disallows only part of her vow, as long as he disallows part of her vow he has exercised his authority in this respect concerning her whole vow. This is why there is no need to follow this up with the words כל נדריה, "all her vows, or her entire vow, i.e. every part of it." If the meaning had been that the father had to disallow all her vows in order to be legally effective, what need was there for the Torah to add the word אותה? Seeing that the Torah saw fit to write the word אותה, it is clear that this word belongs to what follows, i.e. to the words לא יקום, it does not remain valid (singular), to inform us that the father succeeded in annulling even the part of the vow he had not specifically objected to.

Once we follow this approach the words: "and G'd will forgive her" at the end of our verse (6) make excellent sense. Supposing her father had only heard that she vowed to abstain from figs and did not even know about her also having vowed to abstain from grapes, and the woman, unaware of her father's ignorance, had nonetheless violated her vow by eating the grapes she had vowed not to eat, then G'd's forgiveness is needed because as far as she was concerned she had sinned. The news the Torah conveys with the words: "and G'd wil forgive her" is that even in such a case G'd forgives her trespass. This has to be spelled out so that we understand that the object of G'ds forgiveness is an absence of knowledge on the woman's part which was the cause of her inadvertently eating what her husband had not allowed her to eat.

Finally, according to the view of the sages that neither partial confirmation nor partial disallowance of the woman's vow is legally effective, the verse has to be understood as follows: The Torah phrased the words: "if her father hears of her vow" in the singular to alert you to the fact that the subject is a single vow, i.e. a single declaration "I will abstain from, etc.," as oppposed to a situation when the woman made two vows as I have already explained in connection with the view of Rabbi Yishmael. The Torah continues with "and her father remains silent…her entire vow (i.e. all parts of her vow) will stand." The words כל נדריה, "all her vows" refer both to what was written immediately before and prior to that. The meter of the verse then is: "if her father remains silent, i.e. under which circumstance is his silence effective to keep her vows valid? Answer: if his silence covered all parts of her vow; however, if it covered only part of her vow his silence is legally quite ineffectual."

The Torah then continues: "if her father disallows her…all her vows will not stand." The words "all her vows" now refer to what the Torah had already spoken of, i.e. if his disallowance covers all parts of previously mentioned vows, or all parts of her previously mentioned vow; then she does not even have to honour any part of her vow. The Torah reminded us by use of these words that in the event the father's disallowance had failed to cover even a single part of her vow, the words לא יקום do not apply. Although we have also said that the words כל נדריה may be applied to what follows instead of to what had been written before, the wording still makes sense as we then interpret the words לא יקום as applying, provided that all her vows are included in the disallowance; in other words the futility of cancelling part of the vow or vows would not then apply and all her vows are cancelled. All of the above applies only when she had made only a single vow though this vow included several parts as we deduced from the words: "and her father has heard her vow (singular). If, however, she had made separate vows i.e. prefacing each clause with the words: "I swear I will abstain, etc." then cancellation of one vow has nothing to do with cancellation or confirmation of the other vow.