민수기 35:20의 미드라쉬

8) And whence is it derived that the claim in question is only a money claim? R. Eliezer said: "Ors are stated here ("or saw or knew") and "ors" are stated in respect to (denying) a pledge [pikadon] (Vayikra 5:21: "or (denying) a deposit or a theft"). Just as the "ors" stated in respect to a pledge involve only money claims, so the "ors" stated here (in respect to withholding testimony) involve only money claims. — This is refuted by the "ors" of a murderer (Bamidbar 35:20): "or if in hatred he thrust him or hurled at him in ambush"), which are "ors" but do not involve money claims. —

And whence is it derived that a disciple shall not speak for incrimination? From "He shall not be put to death by word of one witness" … And the sages say: Whence is it derived that a (single) witness is not to testify for exoneration? From (Bamidbar 35:20) "and a witness shall not testify in a soul." Whence is it derived that a disciple shall not speak for incrimination? From "one … shall not testify in a soul to kill him."

(Bamidbar 35:20) "And if in hatred he thrust him": What is the intent of this? From "And if with an iron implement," "And if with a hand-stone," "Or if with a wooden hand-implement," I might think that he is liable only if he killed him with these. Whence do I derive (the same for) other things? It follows by induction from all three, viz.: Stone is not like wood; wood is not like stone; and both are not like iron. And iron is not like both. What is common to all three is that they are potentially lethal, and if one killed (by them), it is a mitzvah for the avenger to kill him. This tells me only of his killing with these. Whence do I derive that he is likewise liable if he pushed him off the top of a roof and he fell and died? From "And if in hatred he thrust him" — in any event. — But perhaps even if he pushed him into water or fire or incited a dog or a snake against him? It follows (that this is not so) by induction from all three, viz.: Stone is not like wood and wood is not like stone and both are not like iron and iron is not like both. What is common to all three is that they are potentially lethal and he killed (by wielding them), in which instance he is liable — to exclude his thrusting him into fire or water or inciting a snare against him, in which instance his (the victim's) judgment is relegated to "Heaven." "or if he hurl aught at him in prey": (i.e.,) if he "hunted" him with intent to kill.