시편 124:9의 Responsa
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A, a nephew of Rabbi Kohen Zedek, asked the latter for advice regarding the planned betrothal of his daughter. A informed him that in his (A's) locality there were no qualified witnesses (unrelated to the bride) but that he intended to invite two strangers from another locality to act as witnesses to the betrothal. These two strangers, however, were brothers-in-law and one was the nephew of the other. Rabbi Kohen Zedek, then, told A that since these two were related to each other they were disqualified witnesses and consequently the betrothal would be void. A, however, answered that no great harm would be done even if the betrothal were void since the bridegroom would ultimately betroth the bride again, at the time of the marriage. A repeated this answer to the widowed sister of Rabbi Kohen Zedek who later witnessed the betrothal and protested that the witnesses were disqualified. Must A's daughter receive a divorce in order to free herself from the bridegroom?
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A, a nephew of Rabbi Kohen Zedek, asked the latter for advice regarding the planned betrothal of his daughter. A informed him that in his (A's) locality there were no qualified witnesses (unrelated to the bride) but that he intended to invite two strangers from another locality to act as witnesses to the betrothal. These two strangers, however, were brothers-in-law and one was the nephew of the other. Rabbi Kohen Zedek, then, told A that since these two were related to each other they were disqualified witnesses and consequently the betrothal would be void. A, however, answered that no great harm would be done even if the betrothal were void since the bridegroom would ultimately betroth the bride again, at the time of the marriage. A repeated this answer to the widowed sister of Rabbi Kohen Zedek who later witnessed the betrothal and protested that the witnesses were disqualified. Must A's daughter receive a divorce in order to free herself from the bridegroom?
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A, a nephew of Rabbi Kohen Zedek, asked the latter for advice regarding the planned betrothal of his daughter. A informed him that in his (A's) locality there were no qualified witnesses (unrelated to the bride) but that he intended to invite two strangers from another locality to act as witnesses to the betrothal. These two strangers, however, were brothers-in-law and one was the nephew of the other. Rabbi Kohen Zedek, then, told A that since these two were related to each other they were disqualified witnesses and consequently the betrothal would be void. A, however, answered that no great harm would be done even if the betrothal were void since the bridegroom would ultimately betroth the bride again, at the time of the marriage. A repeated this answer to the widowed sister of Rabbi Kohen Zedek who later witnessed the betrothal and protested that the witnesses were disqualified. Must A's daughter receive a divorce in order to free herself from the bridegroom?
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A, a nephew of Rabbi Kohen Zedek, asked the latter for advice regarding the planned betrothal of his daughter. A informed him that in his (A's) locality there were no qualified witnesses (unrelated to the bride) but that he intended to invite two strangers from another locality to act as witnesses to the betrothal. These two strangers, however, were brothers-in-law and one was the nephew of the other. Rabbi Kohen Zedek, then, told A that since these two were related to each other they were disqualified witnesses and consequently the betrothal would be void. A, however, answered that no great harm would be done even if the betrothal were void since the bridegroom would ultimately betroth the bride again, at the time of the marriage. A repeated this answer to the widowed sister of Rabbi Kohen Zedek who later witnessed the betrothal and protested that the witnesses were disqualified. Must A's daughter receive a divorce in order to free herself from the bridegroom?
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
A. Since the two witnesses were related to each other, they were disqualified and the betrothal was not binding. Therefore, A's daughter needs no divorce. As to the spreading rumor that a betrothal took place, the opinion of Rav is accepted that when the court discovers that a certain rumor [of betrothal] had no foundation in fact, the court silences such rumor. Moreover, a rumor is of no consequence unless the probability of its truthful origin has been upheld in court (cf. Git. 89a f.), while in our case the rumor is known to be baseless.
Rabbi Kohen Zedek wrote again to Rabbi Meir raising doubt as to the correctness of R. Meir's decision, and informing him that his (R. Meir's) teacher from Spiers at first agreed with this decision but later disagreed with it; and that meanwhile A's daughter became betrothed to another man.
Rabbi Meir answered that the first decision of his teacher was correct; that in the case of a woman who was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was later discovered to be related to the bridegroom, Rabbi Joel haLevi decided in a Responsum that the woman did not need a divorce, and permitted her to remarry; and that he enclosed a copy of Rabbi Joel's Responsum in order to prove that his own decision was based on a solid foundation. He added: A rumor is of no consequence unless it be current in the town where the alleged betrothal took place. In this case, however, A and his sons were the only Jewish residents of the settlement, and they were told beforehand that such a betrothal would be void. Moreover, even the authorities who hold that we cannot dispel a rumor, agree that when a rumor is self-contradictory, or the statements made therein are not untrue but harmless, such rumor is of no consequence. We are not at liberty to be overstringent in such cases and demand that a divorce be delivered in order to dispel any shadow of doubt as to the girl's freedom to remarry, since such a step would make her ineligible to marry a man of priestly lineage.
The leaders of the communities [Spiers, Worms, and Mayence] upon learning that R. Meir permitted A's daughter to become betrothed to another man without first receiving a divorce from her first bridegroom, became highly incensed and heaped abuse upon R. Meir for having permitted a married woman to remarry. Rabbi Mordecai [of Worms, cf. Mord. Ket. 290] and his associates wrote that Rabbi Hananel in his Sefer Hamikzoot, the author of Sekel Tob, Rabiah, and Rabbi Simha [of Spiers], all ruled that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of unqualified witnesses, must receive her divorce before she is permitted to remarry. They placed A and his daughter [but probably not R. Meir] under the ban in order to force A's daughter to receive a divorce from her second bridegroom.
R. Meir became highly indignant. He pointed out the clear distinction between witnesses who were rabbinically disqualified and those who were Biblically disqualified. He proved that the above-mentioned authorities as well as Alfasi, Rabbi Kalonymus, and the author of Ittur [Rabbi Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles] all agreed that a woman who was betrothed in the presence of Biblically disqualified witnesses required no divorce and was free to marry another. He showed that not a single authority contravened this view, and that the Rabbis of Spiers were misled in their haste and zeal by a faulty reading of the Sekel Tob.
R. Meir added: if the Rabbis of the communities subsequently discover an authority who ruled that such a woman must receive a divorce, they should realize that such a divorce was not required by Biblical law nor by rabbinic law, but that the authority of his own accord ruled that a divorce take place merely to dissipate evil gossip. Since the first betrothal of A's daughter took place in the presence of two witnesses who were beyond a doubt Biblically disqualified witnesses, as one of them was the nephew of the other, the betrothal was void; especially so since even at that time it was known to all bystanders that the betrothal possessed no validity whatsoever. Since she was subsequently betrothed to another, having first received permission from an authoritative court, no authority in the world would require that the Biblically valid second betrothal should be dissolved merely in order to dissipate unfounded doubts. Moreover, we are expressly enjoined by the Talmud from requiring that she receive a divorce from her second bridegroom, since such divorce would disqualify her from ever marrying her first bridegroom (Yeb. 11b). If the leaders of the communities are highly sensitive and are bent on dissipating any doubt in the matter, they should force the first bridegroom to grant a divorce to A's daughter and I, on my part, shall compel her to accept the divorce. Although such a divorce is unnecessary, and hence should not be granted, as it would bar the woman from ever marrying a man of priestly lineage, I should overlook this point in honor of the Rabbis of the communities. Accordingly A's daughter will wait for a divorce till the feast of Purim. If the communities will be unable to effect the divorce within that time, because of the stubbornness of the bridegroom and his refusal to comply with their request, we shall go against the wishes of the community leaders and allow A's daughter to marry her second bridegroom; as we shall not permit that she be put in a position where she can never remarry.
We have never seen revered teachers of old act in the manner of the above-mentioned community leaders. Differences of opinions have often arisen among the great authorities, some prohibiting what others permitted, but never did any one dare place under the ban those who acted contrary to his opinion. You, the aforementioned community leaders, probably delude yourselves with the idea that since your permission is required before a person may divorce his wife (see Finkelstein op. cit. p. 230), no scholar is permitted to render decisions in ritual law unless he receives your authorization. No, this is not true, for the Torah is free to anyone who is capable of arriving at a correct decision. You have gathered, and have associated with yourselves, men who do not understand the intricacies of the laws of marriage and divorce. I am not in a position to protest against my teacher of Spiers since I am his student [and owe him the respect and subservience of a student], but I protest against those who sought to ruin my reputation and honor. "Blessed be the Lord who hath not given us as a prey to their teeth". (Ps. 124, 6). "For they hid snares to take me". (Jer. 18,22). "The snare is broken and we are escaped". (Ps. 124, 7).
SOURCES: Am II, 41–2; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 212d f.; R. Judah Mintz, Responsa 11.
Ask RabbiBookmarkShareCopy