출애굽기 22:31의 탈무드

¹⁰The text from here to Note 44 is also in Pesaḥim 2:1, fol. 28c; the parallel in the Babli is Pesaḥim 21b–23a. The discussion is about the prohibition of usufruct of ‘orlah fruits. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar¹¹In the Babli, R. Eleazar is not mentioned. [But the name appears in the Munich ms. of the Babli; added from Addenda and Corrigenda by Guggenheimer]: Everywhere it is written “do not eat, do not eat¹²Singular or plural., it shall not be eaten”, you understand a prohibition of usufruct included in the probition of eating unless the verse comes and explains to you as it did explain about limbs of a living animal and a carcass. What did it explain about limbs of a living animal? (Ex. 22:30) “Flesh torn in the field you shall not eat¹³The verse ends: You shall throw it to the dog. Why is it necessary to permit torn limbs as dog food? R. Eleazar argues that this shows that without such permission the limb would be forbidden for all usufruct..” And what did it explain about a carcass? (Deut. 14:21) “Do not eat any carcass; to the sojourner in your gates you shall give it and he may eat it.” Hizqiah stated a disagreement¹⁴In the Babli (Pesaḥim 21b), Ḥizqiah accepts the statement of R. Eleazar only for the passive formulation; later (Note 31) this is clarified to be the position of Ḥizqiah and R. Joḥanan in a second version. In this first version, Ḥizqiah must hold that an inference from a verse is only valid if there is no second verse leading to the same result. The theoretical basis is the recognition that the legal texts in the Torah are incomplete and sometimes contradictory as a system. In addition, it is held that words do not change their meaning in legal contexts. Therefore, a mechanism of translation of the Torah text into a coherent and reasonably complete system must exist. The rule appealed to by Ḥizqiah is one of the translation rules; cf. H. Guggenheimer, Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Ph. Longworth (ed.), Confrontations with Judaism (London 1966) pp. 171–196.
Since here the torn limb and the carcass both lead to the same argument, one of them would be superfluous and, therefore, both must be needed for other inferences. The argument of R. Eleazar is refuted.. What does one forbid to the dog?