Comentário sobre Números 30:3

נדר A VOW — This is when one says, Behold, I take upon myself an obligation which is as sacred to me as an offering, that I will not eat, or that I will not do such-and-such a thing. — One might think that if he swears that he will eat the flesh of an animal which has not been slaughtered properly according to the rite that I may apply to him the text, “He shall do according to all that goeth forth from his mouth”! It, however, says, “[If he takes an oath] to forbid something to himself”, i.e., to forbid for himself something which is permissible to him — and not to make permissible that which is forbidden to him (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4).

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre¹⁵Sifre, Matoth 153. is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond:¹⁰Verse 3. “I might think that even if ‘he swore’¹⁶The words “he swore” show clearly that the Sifre is speaking about an oath, while Rashi applied it to a vow. to eat n’veiloth and treifoth,¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows).¹⁷The language of the verse before us is as follows: If a man ‘voweth a vow’ unto the Eternal, or ‘sweareth an oath’ to bind his soul with a bond. Ramban’s intent is to point out that Rashi, who made his comment on the phrase if a man voweth a vow, and speaks of konam [a term used only in vows], is diverging from the Sifre who gives this explanation on the phrase or sweareth an oath. Since, as will be explained further on, there are important legal differences between vows and oaths, Rashi’s application of the Sifre to the case of a vow [instead of to an oath] is thus incorrect. And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this],¹⁸In my “Kuntros on Variant Readings in Rashi according to the first print, Reggio 1475,” p. 27 (printed in Berliner’s Rashi, Feldheim, Jerusalem, 5730) I have shown that on the basis of a minor emendation in the text of Rashi [as found in the Reggio edition], Ramban’s criticism of Rashi disappears. for the Rabbis have said¹⁹Nedarim 2b. that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters,²⁰Ibid., 13b. such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it.²¹In other words, there is no question as to when a person “vows” to eat n’veilah [which is forbidden] that it is invalid, but even if he “vowed” to eat a permissible thing it is also invalid, since we do not find anywhere in the Gemara vows about matters which require one “to get up and do,” but only matters which require one to abstain from certain things. On the other hand, in the case of an “oath,” as where one says “I swear to eat this loaf,” the oath would indeed be valid. Since Rashi applied it to “vows,” it is therefore incorrect, as explained above. — The reason for this distinction between oaths and vows is as follows: An oath takes effect upon the person himself. Hence if he says, “I swear to eat the loaf,” he is obliged to do so. But a vow takes effect upon the object. Hence if he says, “This bread is ‘konam’ to me,” it is a valid vow and he may not eat it. But if he were to say, “A vow be upon me that I shall eat this loaf,” it would be invalid, since it is a contradiction in terms [the statement begins with a reference to a vow, but concludes with — “I shall eat …” — which is appropriate only for an oath]. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,”²²Kinim 1:1. or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object which itself becomes forbidden], this [vow is valid] because [there is a general principle that] dedicating something [verbally] to the Sanctuary creates an obligation on one’s property exactly as if it had been handed over to an ordinary person.²³Therefore when he says, “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” it is as if he had actually separated a specific animal to be an offering. Thus his vow attaches to a definite object, and therefore it is valid. Or [it may be that] this is a stringency²⁴In other words, even if we are not to resort to the preceding explanation that a verbal promise to the Sanctuary is tantamount to actual delivery of the object, we may yet explain the reason why vows to the Sanctuary are valid, because of a stringency ordained by the Rabbis based on the fact that since ultimately he will set aside a specific animal for his offering, therefore the effect of the vow takes place immediately upon his utterance thereof, and all his property becomes mortgaged to the fulfillment of the vow. applicable [only] to vows to the Sanctuary, because they [such vows] involve an object which becomes forbidden to an ordinary person and invested [with sanctity] for the Sanctuary when [the object is actually] set aside [as an offering]; therefore right from the start [when he merely bound himself verbally to separate an animal as an offering at some future date], the obligation created by the vow takes effect upon his property. But the case of [ordinary] vows of utterance [about a secular matter] we have no such rule, because there is no [tangible] object existing at all, neither at the beginning [i.e., at the time of uttering the vow], nor at the end [i.e., at the time that the vow is to be fulfilled]. Similarly, [the expression of the Sifre mentioned by Rashi that] he can “forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but cannot allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah]” is a statement which is not correct to make in connection with vows [as Rashi did], because they do take effect on matters of [religious] commandments, just as they do on secular matters [i.e., on matters which do not come within the scope of the commandments]. Thus someone who says in the form of a vow “I will not make a Booth [for the Festival of Tabernacles]” or “I will not put on phylacteries” is indeed forbidden [to make the Booth, or to put on the phylacteries] although he thereby violates a positive commandment.²⁵The reason for this is that since a vow takes effect upon a particular object (see Note 21), he may forbid the use of the particular Booth or of the phylacteries in the fulfillment of the commandment. But he cannot prohibit their use by means of an oath, swearing not to use them, since the oath creates a prohibition on the person, and that is invalid for him to do, since “he has already sworn on Sinai” to fulfill the commandment, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath, as will be explained. Similarly a man who vowed not to have [sexual] intercourse with his wife is forbidden [to have such intercourse with her] although he thereby violates a negative commandment.²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. Similarly, vows take effect to oblige one to observe a negative commandment [although, of course, he already is bound not to transgress it], such as if he vowed not to eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. — [so that if he does it he violates two prohibitions: against eating n’veilah, and against breaking his vow, this principle being deduced] from the words of the Mishnah:²⁷Nedarim 17a. The Mishnah there establishes the distinction that a vow may take effect upon another vow, but one oath may not take effect upon another. From this Ramban deduces the teaching that if an object is prohibited to a person for some reason, such as n’veilah or treifah (see Note 14 above), or indeed any other prohibition, another vow — not to eat it — can still take effect upon that object doubly prohibiting the person from eating it, so that if he does eat it, he violates two prohibitions: one for having eaten n’veilah, and one for having violated his vow. “A vow may take effect upon a vow etc.”
Thus a vow takes effect to forbid [not only that which was previously permitted, but also to forbid] that which was [already] forbidden [such as when he vows not to eat n’veilah]¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96., and [a vow takes effect] not to do [something] which he is [commanded to do and] forbidden to transgress [such as the duty to have sexual intercourse with his wife,²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. as mentioned above], except that vows do not take effect to allow him to actively transgress a negative commandment.²⁸Thus if he vowed to eat the flesh of n’veilah which is prohibited by a negative commandment, the vow takes no effect whatever, so that if he does not eat it he is not punishable for having violated his word. But oaths are only able to render forbidden that which was [hitherto] permitted, and they do not apply at all to matters involving commandments, neither to transgress [the prohibition of] a negative commandment [even passively, such as by swearing not to have intercourse with his wife], nor to strengthen its observance [such as by swearing not to eat n’veilah],¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. nor to neglect [the performance of] a positive commandment, such as [by saying]: “I swear that I will not make a Booth,” or “[I swear] that I will not put on phylacteries.” Even to strengthen the performance of a positive commandment [an oath] cannot take effect, so that if a person swears to fulfill a commandment and does not fulfill it, he is not liable for [breaking his] oath either to [the punishment of] stripes [if he deliberately neglects it] or to [bring] an offering [if he neglects it accidentally].²⁹The punishment for breaking an oath in optional matters deliberately is the same as for transgressing any negative commandment; i.e., stripes (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), and for accidentally breaking it, there is a duty to bring an offering (Leviticus 5:4-13). But if one swears to fulfill a positive commandment [e.g. “I swear to wear phylacteries”] the oath is invalid, because “he has already sworn at Mount Sinai” [to perform all the commandments of the Torah], and an oath does not take effect upon another oath (see Note 27). Therefore if he does not fulfill the commandment, he is responsible for neglect of a positive commandment, but is not subject to stripes or an offering for failure of fulfilling the additional oath, since his oath never took effect. But it is permitted for a person to encourage himself [to fulfill a commandment by swearing to do so], for it is written, I have sworn, and have confirmed it, to observe Thy righteous ordinances.³⁰Psalms 119:106. See Nedarim 8a. Therefore it is only with reference to swearing [and not, as implied by Rashi, to vows] that one can interpret [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond¹⁰Verse 3. [as the Sifre does, that he may forbid upon himself that which was hitherto permitted to him, but may not allow himself to do that which is forbidden, by means of swearing to do it]. These are great [i.e., complex and important] laws, and the scholar will find them [explained in the Talmud] in their [proper] places.

איש כי ידור נדר, When a man vows a vow, etc. Why did the Torah repeat both the word נדר, vow, and the word שבעה, oath? Why could the Torah not simply have written איש כי ידור לה׳ או ישבע? Furthermore, why did the Torah phrase observance both in a positive and in a negative connotation, i.e. "he must not profane his word, as well as he must do in accordance with what came out of his mouth?" I believe we must look for the key to the way the Torah worded this legislation by remembering that there are two categories of vows and oaths. One category is related to a person's soul, i.e. he may undertake to study Torah, give a certain amount of charity, refrain from abominable practices, not to visit places predominantly visited by women, etc. The other category of vows and oaths pertains to the body and involves matters which are neither forbidden to us nor are we commanded to do them. Here too there are two divisions; one may vow to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or live in a certain house, etc. Or, one may undertake on oath not to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or wear certain clothes. G'd legislated here how a person should best conduct himself. The words כי ידור נדר, i.e. an ordinary vow involves an undertaking to go to a certain place or to perform a certain task. The addition of the word לה׳ means that different rules apply when the vow is not of a secular nature but relates to one's conduct vis-a-vis G'd. The addition of this word therefore means that the word נדר has not been repeated at all, but that once it applies to secular vows and once to religious vows.

(1) IMPOSING AN OBLIGATION ON HIMSELF ... HE SHALL NOT BREAK HIS PLEDGE. This refers to the votive offering. In other words, he must not delay his votive offering until after the festivals, as the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. For this is the explanation of "he shall not break [lo yahel]," as in (Jud. 3:25) "He waited [actually, "They waited"] a long time"; (Gen. 8:10) "He waited another seven days"; (Ps. 130:7) "O Israel, wait for the LORD" -- wait and anticipate Him. And one who explains [this] as an expression of desecration [hilul] according to the straightforward sense is in error.

איש כי ידור נדר לה', “If a man makes a vow to Hashem,” he vows to himself to honour Hashem. The reason we understand it in this fashion is that the Torah, otherwise, should have written בה'”, i.e. “in the name of Hashem,” or “invoking Hashem’s name.” Elsewhere, that is the prefix used in such cases as for instance in Genesis 21,23 השבעה לי באלוקים, “swear to me in the name of the Lord.”

A konam that I will not eat. Meaning that he says, “Let this article be like a konam to me, that I will not eat…” Though [a statement] prohibiting one from eating is applicable to a שבועה ["oath"] rather than a נדר ["vow"], as Ramban asks, this has already been answered by Re’m. See there.

V. 3. נדר .איש כי ידר נדר לד׳ וגו׳ (siehe Bereschit 28, 20). Wir kennen bis jetzt, außer dem besonderen Nasirgelübde, נדר nur als נדרי הקדש, als Weihung oder Gelobung eines Gegenstandes zum קדשי מזבח ,קרבן, oder zum Tempeleigentum, קדשי בדק הבית, sei es mit der Formel: נדבה ,הרי זו, oder: נדר ,הרי עלי (Wajikra 22, 21), und zwar wird in beiden Fällen, als נדבה sofort, als נדר im Momente der Erfüllung, der von der Gelobung betroffene Gegenstand allgemein zu jedem Profangebrauch oßur. Hier wird nun der Fall statuiert, dass jemand ידר נדר לד׳ לאסר אסר על נפשו, dass jemand eine Gelobung ausspricht, wodurch ein Gegenstand nicht allgemein, sondern על נפשו, ihm, dem Gelobenden so oßur werde, als ob er von einem allgemeinen נדר הקדש betroffen worden wäre; ein Gegenstand soll ihm so oßur sein, wie ein קרבן, wie der מזבח usw. Daher, wie wir glauben, der Satz (Nedarim 14 a): איש כי ידור נדר לד׳ עד שידור בדבר הנדור, es ist das hier besprochene Gelübde nur korrekt, wenn es den nach dem Gesetze einem durch Gelobung oßur werdenden Gegenstande — (z. B. קדשי מזבח oder קדשי בדק הבית) — innewohnenden Charakter einem anderen beliebigen Gegenstand zuspricht. Nicht aber בדבר האסור, wenn er z. B. gesagt hätte, es solle ihm oßur sein, wie דם, wie נבלה, da der Ißur דם und נבלה kein aus einer Gelobung hervorgegangener Ißur ist. Diese Fixierung eines Gegenstandes mit einem הקדש-artigen Charakter heißt: התפסה. Das eigentliche נדר ist daher nur ein sachliches Gelübde, indem es einem Gegenstande die Konsequenzen הקדש-Charakters zuspricht: eines או השבע שבועה — .אוסר חפצא על נפשיה, oder indem er die Gelobung als Eid ausspricht. Ein Gelobungseid ist immer persönlich, er bindet den Willen in Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand oder eine Tätigkeit. Wir haben somit hier zwei Kategorien: נדר לאסר אסר על נפש und שבועה לאסור אסור על נפשו. Sagt jemand, Wein solle ihm wie קרבן sein, so hat er sich durch נדר den Weingenuss untersagt. Sagt jemand, er schwöre, dass er keinen Wein trinken werde, so hat er sich durch שבועה den Weingenuss untersagt. Dieser begriffliche Unterschied zwischen נדר und שבועה hat einige wichtige Konsequenzen: נדר kann sich nur auf einen konkreten Gegenstand, דבר שיש בו ממש, beziehen, nicht aber auf ein Abstraktum, דבר שאין בו ממש, also nicht auf eine Tätigkeit, mag diese Tätigkeit als Substantiv oder Verbum ausgedrückt sein. Also nicht: Schlaf oder Schlafen, Gang oder Gehen, solle ihm קרבן sein. Dagegen kann man sich durch ein sachliches Gelübde indirekt die Erfüllung einer Mizwa unmöglich machen, z. B. die Sucka solle ihm קרבן sein. Denn die Pflicht ruht auf der Person und nicht auf der Sache. שבועה hingegen, wodurch zunächst die Persönlichkeit in ihrer Willensbestimmung getroffen wird, kann sich auch auf דבר שאין בו ממש beziehen, z. B. שבועה שלא יישן היום Allein eine שבועה zur Verletzung einer Pflicht, z. B. שלא ישב בסוכה ist nichtig, denn der Wille ist hinsichtlich der Pflicht bereits gebunden, in Beziehung auf eine Mizwa ist die Persönlichkeit nicht frei. Daher die Sätze: חומר בשבועות מבנדרים ובגדרים מבשבועות חומר בנדרים שהנדרים חלין על המצוה כברשות מה שאין כן בשבועות וחומר בשבועות שהשבועות חלות על דבר שיש בו ממש ושאין בו ממש מה שאין כן בנדרים (Nedarim 13 b). מדרבנן ist נדר auch תוספו׳) חל על דבר שאין בו ממש daselbst). Es haben sich ferner in der Volkssprache umlautende Ausdrücke, כנויים, für נדרים und שבועות gebildet, z. B. קונם für קרבן usw. die in ihren Folgen ganz die Kraft von נדרים und שבועות haben: כל כנויי נדרים כנדרים וכו׳, und ebenso braucht die Gelobungsformel nicht vollständig ausgesprochen zu sein, auch wenn sie nur dem Sinne nach angedeutet ist, יד, so dass das Aussprechen gleichsam eine Handhabe der Gelobung bildet, ist es ein bindendes Gelübde: ידות נדרים כנדרים (Nedarim 2 b). Ebenso ist überhaupt die Beifügung einer התפסה unwesentlich; דבר זה אסור עלי ist ein vollkommenes ר׳׳ן) נדר zu Nedarim 2 a). Endlich nur bei an sich gleichgültigen Dingen bedarf es des ausdrücklichen נדר- oder שבועה-Ausdrucks. Zu Mizwazwecken ist der einfache Vorsatzausspruch bindend (Nedarim 8a ר׳׳ן und ראש daselbst). Ist doch auch das älteste עשר אעשרנו לך ,נדר. (Bereschit 28, 20), nicht ein korrekter נדר-Ausdruck, sondern נדר בלשון שבועה (siehe auch י׳׳ד 206, 5). Ja, selbst wenn ein solcher Gelobungsvorsatz gar nicht in Worten ausgedrückt, sondern nur durch Übung betätigt worden, erhält er bindende Kraft (daselbst 214, 1).

או השבע שבועה לאסור איסר, “or swears an oath to declare something permitted to others as forbidden to himself;” what is the difference between making a “vow” and “swearing an oath,” seeing both place something out of bounds to the party making such a declaration?When making a vow the object of the vow is placed out of bounds to the party who makes such a vow, whereas when swearing an oath, the party swearing it places himself out of bounds to the object or people that are the subject of such an oath. Even though the Torah has not spelled this out specifically, we find hints that this is so in the wording used by the Torah to describe these two kinds of self imposed restrictions. (Compare Sifri) If someone says: “by the Life of Hashem and by your own life, I am not going to abandon you,” he is stating that Hashem is alive, and that the party to whom he makes such a statement is alive. Using the name of the Lord as relevant to one’s own standing, is something which makes it such a severe sin if it turns out that one does not honour such a vow or oath.

לא יחל דברו This is the same as לא יחלל דברו (the root of יחל being חלל): He shall not make his own word to bear a secular character (חולין) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4; see also Rashi on Leviticus 21:4).

YIDOR NEDER LA’SHEM (VOWETH A VOW ‘UNTO’ THE ETERNAL). The meaning of [the expression] ‘yidor neder la’shem’ is not like that of ‘asher nish ba la’shem (how he — David — swore ‘unto’ the Eternal),³¹Ibid., 132:2. for that [expression mentioned by David] is like ‘vayishava lo’ (and he swore ‘to him’)³²This is in reference either to Genesis 24:9, where Eliezer swore to Abraham to find a wife for Isaac from the country of his birthplace, or to Genesis 47:31, Joseph swearing to Jacob that he would bury him together with his fathers. In both cases the meaning of the prepositional lamed [‘lo’] is its literal meaning — “unto him,” and the intention is to say that the oath was “for his benefit.” Likewise the prepositional lamed [in the word la’shem] used by David has its literal meaning — “for ‘the benefit’ [so to say] and glory of G-d,” since the oath concerned his determination to build the House of G-d. which means that he swore to him for his [the recipient’s] benefit. But [the use of the prepositional lamed in the case of vows is equivalent to the use of the preposition beth (“by”)³³The gist of Ramban’s reasoning is as follows: The prepositional lamed in the case of oaths [in the examples cited above] has the meaning of “to” — to the benefit of the recipient, as is the case of Eliezer where the oath was for the benefit of Abraham. This principle, however, cannot be made to apply to vows, since in our verse it says if a man vows a vow ‘la’shem,’ and the verse is not speaking exclusively about vows to the benefit of the Sanctuary but refers to vows of all sorts, even of secular matters. Hence we must say that the prepositional lamed in vows has the same meaning as the beth [not the lamed] in oaths, which in both cases means “by” — by G-d. In other words, the prepositional lamed in vows and the beth in oaths are identical in meaning. Finally, Ramban will conclude that the Cabala does offer an explanation why a different preposition is used in each case. Thus it is shown that the mystic character of the Sacred Language is deeply embedded in the text of the Torah. in the case of oaths, for] in the case of oaths Scripture says: ‘u’vishmo’ (and ‘by’ His Name) shalt thou swear;³⁴Deuteronomy 6:13. v’ashbiacha ‘ba’shem’ (and I will make thee swear ‘by’ the Eternal);³⁵Genesis 24:3. as I swore ‘lecha’ (unto thee) ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ the Eternal), the G-d of Israel, saying: Assuredly Solomon thy son shall reign after me;³⁶I Kings 1:30. swear ‘li’ (unto me) here ‘bei’Elokim’ (‘by’ G-d).³⁷Genesis 21:23. But in the case of a vow Scripture does not say: “he vows ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ G-d)” but la’shem (‘to’ G-d). The Sages in the Sifre have already alluded to the reason for this matter [the different terminology], saying:³⁸Sifre, Matoth 153. See Vol. I, p. 66, where Ramban quotes this Sifre. “What is the difference between vows and oaths? Vows are like vowing³⁹This is the text in the Sifre and in Ramban here. In Genesis, however, Ramban has “swearing” (Vol. I, p. 66). The intent of the texts in both places is equivalent. ‘by the life of the King;’ oaths are like swearing ‘by the King Himself.’ Although there is no [clear] proof for this explanation [in Scripture], there is an allusion to it: By the living G-d, and by the life of your soul. I will not leave thee.”⁴⁰II Kings 4:30. See Vol. I, p. 66, Note 290 where this text is explained in detail. And the secret thereof is that the shevuah (oath) is derived from the word shivah [“seven” — alluding to the seven Emanations], for she [wisdom] hath builded her house, she hath hewn out her seven pillars,⁴¹Proverbs 9:1. whereas the vow is on [the level of] understanding, the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old.⁴²Ibid., 8:22. Thus you find that vows take precedence over the Torah, and therefore they apply to commandments just as to optional matters [as explained above]. Thus all vows are la’shem (“to” the Eternal), whereas all who swear [do so] “by” Him.

(2) HE MUST CARRY OUT ALL THAT HAS CROSSED HIS LIPS. This refers back to "taking an oath" (hishava sh'vu'ah) [i.e., not to "makes a vow" (yidor neder)] -- he must do according to what he specified in taking an oath, according to the time he specified, whether short or long. And a proof of the matter,of what these two things mean, is what Moshe said in Deuteronomy (23:22), "When you make a vow to the LORD your God, do not put off fulfilling it, ... You must fulfill what has crossed your lips and perform ...." Takes an oath, etc.

The Torah goes on או השבע שבעה, "or he swears an oath, etc." In the first instance the oath concerns something one undertakes not to do as stated here לאסור אסר על נפשו, "to deny himself something." Here too we have two categories of oaths. One may swear not to do something which is already forbidden, as Boaz did when he wanted to reinforce his resolution not to sin by swearing an oath.

אסר .לאסר אסר, sonst nur ein konkretes Binden und Fesseln, ist hier auf das Binden des Willens durch ein gelobendes oder schwörendes Wort übertragen. לא יחל יחל ,דברו Hifil von ”חלל“ wie ולא אחל את שם קדשי עוד (Ezech. 39, 7). Es dürfte zwischen Pi'el חַלֵל und Hifil הַחֵל ein Unterschied sein. חַלֵל hieße der Heiligkeit eines Gegenstandes zuwiderhandeln, der Gegenstand bleibt in seiner Heiligkeit, allein man behandelt ihn, als wäre er unheilig; so חלל ברית ,חלל את השם ,חלל שבת usw. החל , Hifil, heißt aber: etwas in dem חולין-Zustande lassen, es nicht zur Heiligkeit gelangen lassen. So ja das aus Ezechiel zitierte: ולא אחל את שם קדשי עוד. Es heißt dies ja nicht: ich will meinen heiligen Namen nicht mehr entweihen, sondern: ich will ihn ferner nicht in der Entweihung lassen, in welche er durch Israels Verirrung und sein verdientes Geschick geraten. לא יחלל דברו würde daher heißen: er soll sein Wort nicht brechen, der Heiligkeit seines Wortes nicht zuwider handeln. לא יחל דברו heißt aber: er soll sein Wort nicht folgelos, nicht חולין lassen. Es bindet ihn. Schon dieser Ausdruck deutet auf die Möglichkeit hin, dass das Wort, obgleich er es gesprochen, folgelos sein könne, und wenn nun die Halacha hinzutritt und den Pronominalbegriff betonen lehrt: הוא אינו מיחל אבל אחרים מחלין לו (so ist die Lesart Berachot 32a), er darf sein Wort nicht folgelos sein lassen, aber andere können ihm dessen Folgelosigkeit ermitteln, so ist in dem Ausdruck selbst der Begriff der hier von der Halacha gelehrten Korrektivtätigkeit des חכם in betreff der התרת נדרים präzisiert: חכם עוקר נדר מעיקרו. Es stellt die Untersuchung heraus, dass das gelobende Wort von vornherein folgelos gewesen. Das Ergebnis lässt das Wort in seiner חולין-Schwäche. So lange er aber sein gelobendes Wort einer solchen Untersuchung nicht unterworfen, oder diese nicht zu einem solchen Ergebnis geführt, לא יחל דברו, darf er sein Wort nicht חולין, nicht kraftlos lassen, vielmehr בכל היוצא מפיו יעשה.

לא יחל דברו, “he must not delay fulfillment of his words indefinitely.”Alternately, he must not profane his own solemn undertaking by not honouring it.” We find this expression used in this sense in Psalms 130,7: 'יחל ישראל אל ה, “keep faithfully waiting, o Israel for Hashem fulfilling His undertakings” where the Psalmist has G-d urging Israel to wait patiently for G-d to honour His vows. G-d can be depended on to fulfill His vows or oaths. The party failing to fulfill his vow must not profane himself by doing so. However, others, i.e. a legal court have the power to release him from the obligations he imposed himself at a time of personal stress, not realising all the implications of what he had said at that time. (Talmud tractate Chagigah, folio 10).

ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה. This refers to the words השבע שבועה, meaning that the party concerned must do as he has sworn to do and in accordance with the date he had specified whether in the immediate future or at a later date. Proof that this is the correct interpretation of our verse is what Moses himself said in Deut. 23,22 כי תדור נדר לה' לא תאחר לשלמו “when you make a vow to the Lord your G’d, do not be tardy in paying it;” this is followed immediately by מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית, “the utterance that emanates from your mouth you shall honour, and carry out the respective undertaking.”

Like לא יחלל. Thus, it is one of the doubled roots and had it not been a [a letter] ches, which does not take a dagesh [dot], it would have had a dagesh in order to complete the doubling. [Here the root is doubled, thus it should have been חלחל. However a dagesh in the ches would have substituted for the second letter ches]. [לא יחלל] means, “He should not belittle his words” as one belittles unsanctified property without concern of guarding it from impurity, as [one guards only] sanctified property from impurity.

The Torah was very astute in separating the word "vow" from the word "oath" by interposing the word "to G'd," to alert us to the fact that the reason both the word נדר and the word שבעה have been repeated is to allude to vows or oaths of a religious nature. Such religious vows or oaths are not subject to the same rules which govern vows or oaths of a secular nature. The words לא יחל דברו, "he must not profane his word," refer to vows and oaths which involve abstaining from something of a purely secular nature such as Boaz' oath; the rule which applies is: "he must not break his word; however, a collegium of judges has the power to annul the vow or oath in question (compare Nedarim 14). With respect to vows involving matters of religious significance, such as declaring something sacred for use only by the Temple treasury, etc., or oaths of a religious nature, the words which are applicable are: "everything which his mouth has uttered he shall do."

Dies Korrektiv der Gelobungen, auf welches bereits das ראשי המטות des V. 2, denen dessen Handhabung, wie bemerkt, überwiesen ist, hinblickt, ist im Texte nur durch eine leise Nuance angedeutet, um — wie רמב׳׳ן im Kommentar bemerkt, — nicht durch das jedermann zugängliche schriftliche Gesetzeswort einer missbräuchlichen Gleichgültigkeit gegen die Heiligkeit von Gelobungen Vorschub zu leisten. Es gehört zu den ganz oder doch fast ganz der Tradition vorbehaltenen Institutionen, die nach dem Ausdruck Chagiga 10a פורחין באויר ohne alle Stütze im Buchstaben der Schrift ausschließlich von mündlicher Überlieferung getragen sind, oder doch כהררים התלויים בשערה in Verhältnis zu ihrem Umfange und ihrer Bedeutung nur eine haarfeine Andeutung in der Schrift erhalten haben, שהן מקרא מועט והלכות מרובות, während anderen Gesetzinstitutionen eine ausführlichere Fixierung im schriftlichen Worte geworden ist, und gleichwohl הן הן גופי תורה, sind die einen wie die anderen gleich wesentliche Teile des Gesetzes. Das hier den ראשי המטות anvertraute Korrektiv der נדרים besteht darin, dass der Gelobende sein Gelübde in der Weise bereut, dass es ihm leid ist, überhaupt das Gelübde getan zu haben und bei richtiger Überlegung er es durchaus nicht getan hätte (חרטה מעיקרא), oder Umstände eingetreten, die unter gewöhnlichen Verhältnissen vorauszusehen waren und deren Voraussicht ihn vom Geloben zurückgehalten hätte (פתח, aber אין פותחין בנולד), dass er dann sein Gelübde einer Untersuchung Kompetenter unterwirft und sie um Entscheidung fragt (שאלה), und diese dann nach Befund die Auflösung des Gelübdes, als von vornherein aus Unbesonnenheit geschehen, aussprechen (מותר לך). Es unterliegt jedoch die Auflösbarkeit eines Gelübdes vielen gesetzlichen Bedingungen, die genau erwogen sein wollen, und ein durch Verschweigung eines wesentlichen Momentes ermittelter Lösungsausspruch wäre kraft- und folgelose Selbsttäuschung; denn nicht eine Macht zu binden und zu lösen ist in die Hand eines jüdischen חכם gelegt, sondern nur die Fähigkeit und die Pflicht untersuchender Erkenntnis.

The [letter,] yod is vocalized by a patach; and it does not state, "yechal," with a yod vocalized by a tsere, as in (Isaiah 48:11), "as how can it be desecrated (yechal)" - like many negative commandments that are stated in the passive form. For if so, its meaning would be that he could not find any way to desanctify his vow, even if it be done through annulment. Hence the verse states it in the active form, to teach that he - from himself - cannot annul it, but it is permitted that it be desanctified by others; and that is with the annulment of others. And this is [the meaning of] of what the Sages, may their memeory blessed, said  (Chagigah 10a), "He may not annul, but others can annul [it] for him."

Another reason why the Torah wrote the word לשם can be understood in light of Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim chapter 11. He writes that if a 12 year old boy has made a vow or sworn an oath, we examine him to find out if he is mature enough to have understood the significance of his undertaking, i.e. "to whom he made this undertaking." If so, he is held responsible just as an adult. The exegetical tool for this is the word איש before the legislation. The legislation applies to anyone who qualifies intellectually under the heading of איש, is mentally of age and realises his obligations vis-a vis G'd.

לא יחל דברו, “he must not desecrate his word.” The word is derived from חול, not to profane his word. Our sages explain this wording to mean that whereas the person who made the vow must not “profane,” it, others (three laymen or an expert) may do so (Chagigah 10). The annulment of a vow is possible if the person regrets what he vowed because he had not realised its full implications. He tells the court that had he known at the time he made the vow what he knows at that moment he would never have made the vow in the first place (compare Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,5). Having said this the lay judges or the expert will release him from his vow. The legal basis for this is that the vow is presumed to have been erroneous from the start and hence never valid.
A person is not permitted to cancel his own oath, his own vow, or even the vow of his wife on his own (without recourse to such a tribunal). The reason the husband cannot release his wife from her vows is that legally she is considered as part of him, i.e. אשתו כגופו. The inability of the husband to cancel his wife’s vow applies only when the husband was acting as the solitary expert. A husband is allowed to be part of a quorum of three people who listen to the wife state that had she known what her vow entailed she would never have made the vow in the first place. No one, even a “so-called” expert, may annul a vow single-handedly if there is a scholar of greater reputation available locally. Neither may a scholar take such a decision in the presence of his teacher (even if he has surpassed the teacher in knowledge), unless his teacher has specifically given him permission to do so (Maimondes Hilchot Shevuot 6,3).

That is that we were commanded to fulfill everything that we we take upon ourselves in speech, whether in an oath, a vow, charity, a sacrifice or anything else besides them. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "What issues from your lips shall you observe" (Deuteronomy 23:24). And even though they have already separated the words of this verse and arranged each word of it for various content, the intention that nevertheless comes out of all that [they] said to you is that it is a positive commandment for a person to fulfill everything that he accepts upon himself, whatever it may be. And one who violates it, [also] violates a negative commandment; and behold I will explain this in my mention of the negative commandments (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 157). And in the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 265:2): "'What issues from your lips' is a positive commandment." And you know that there is no content to the statement, "what issues," alone. However the intention is that which I mentioned to you - to understand the simple meaning of the verse, that He commanded to do what one puts out with his mouth. And behold that this commandment is repeated; and that is His saying, "according to all that issues from his mouth shall he do" (Numbers 30:3). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in many places - in Shevuot, in the end of Menachot and in Tractate Kinnim as well. That is to say that the specifics of concerning oneself to do the thing that one has obligated oneself; and how one exempts oneself when he has a doubt about what he said, is found there. (See Parashat Ki Tetzeh; Mishneh Torah, Sefer Haflaah.)

That is that He commanded us to administer the nullification of vows - meaning the precept that He instructed us about these laws. However the content is not that we are obligated to annul vows no matter what. And you should understand this issue itself from me - any time you hear me counting one of the laws [as a commandment], it [need] not be a command of a specific compulsory action. Rather it is a commandment by virtue of our being commanded to administer this law for this thing (when it arises). That the husband and the father can annul them is, behold, already explained in Scripture (Numbers 30). But the tradition comes [and informs us] that a sage can also annul a vow, as well as an oath. And the hint to this is in His saying, "he may not void his word" (Numbers 30:3) - he may not void his word, but others may void it for him. More generally, there is certainly no proof to this from Scripture; and they say (Chagigah 10a), "The annulment of vows floats in the air." So it does not have any [bona fide] support, but it is rather [known] from the true tradition. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Nedarim. (See Parashat Matot; Mishneh Torah, Vows 12.)